Transition Binder: National Security

The national security threat landscape is increasingly complex and diverse, and presents significant challenges to Canada's security, economic prosperity, and social cohesion. In this evolving landscape, provinces and territories, private sector entities, academia, non-governmental organizations, and individuals, are all important stakeholders. Outreach and engagement are key in building resilience to modern threats in the physical and digital world. Transparency and accountability mechanisms are also key to maintaining public trust. The preservation of national security is a multi-faceted endeavor that requires cooperation across a diverse range of policy development, initiatives and programs. Public Safety Canada (PS) functions as a centralized hub for spearheading work in counter-foreign interference, counter-terrorism and violent extremism, critical infrastructure protection, cyber security and transportation security. Advancing work in this area requires strong partnerships with a number of federal departments, including Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), Transport Canada (TC), Canadian Heritage (CH), Finance Canada, and our portfolio agencies.

Relevant Mandate Letter Commitments

Further Information

Foreign Interference

Foreign interference (FI) refers to harmful activities undertaken by foreign states, or their proxies, that are clandestine, deceptive, or involve a threat to any person to the detriment of Canada's national interests. FI poses one of the greatest strategic threats to Canada's national security and threatens to undermine the integrity of our political system, democratic institutions, long-term economic prosperity, social cohesion and the safety of Canadian communities. PS is advancing efforts to counter FI along a number of fronts.

The Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA), part IV of Bill C-70, received Royal Assent on June 20, 2024. Bill C-70 modernized legislation relating to countering foreign interference in Canada, including the Criminal Code, the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. FITAA also calls for the establishment of a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry to be administered by a Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner - work is underway at PS to operationalize the Act. PS is also leading efforts to improve coordination of a whole-of-government effort to respond to transnational repression (TNR) by overseeing implementation of a TNR Action Plan. Additionally, PS is working to implement a strategic communications and engagement plan to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), which includes sensitizing social media influencers and content consumers to the risks that are posed by state-sponsored mis- and disinformation.

The Office of the National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator (ONCFIC), housed in the National and Cyber Security Branch, was established in 2023 to coordinate whole-of-government response to FI and conduct public outreach and engagement. ONCFIC is leading efforts to raise public awareness of the threats posed by TNR, including coordinating cross-Canada engagements planned to begin in early 2025 with communities vulnerable to TNR. The ONCFIC supports the PS Deputy Minister's role as a member of the "Panel of 5" in the Critical Elections Incident Public Protocol.

In 2025, Canada assumes the Presidency of the G7, where countering FI and TNR are proposed to be included as Signature Leader's Initiatives. The department is currently waiting on a return from the Prime Minister regarding these additions. PS and Global Affairs Canada (GAC) would co-chair the FI/TNR policy table which will be tasked with developing initiatives to meet the G7 mandate to respond to FI and TNR. Together, PS and GAC are coordinating the development of a G7 Foreign Interference Response Protocol, and a joint G7 toolkit to counter TNR as part of the G7 Leader's Compact to Counter Foreign Interference. In parallel, we are collaborating with GAC to develop a Track 1.5 Dialogue event bringing together government and civil society to bolster protection against states attempting to carry out TNR and FI.

Investigative Authorities in a Digital Era

Canadian law enforcement and national security agencies operate in an increasingly complex digital cyber environment. With an ever-growing number of investigations now having an online or cyber dimension, timely access to digital communications, including electronic information and data in the possession and control of communications service providers, is vital to advancing investigations into national security threats and serious crimes. Ensuring data access—with appropriate oversight and subject to a clear set of rules and safeguards—requires PS to continually evaluate Canada's lawful access legislative framework, identify gaps and propose solutions. Given the cross border dimension of electronic information or data, which may be stored abroad, international cooperation is vital to Canadian investigative agencies' ability to obtain such information and data in the course of their investigations. On this front, Canada and the US are negotiating a bilateral data access agreement in relation to the US Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act), enacted in 2018. Data access agreements in relation to the CLOUD Act would permit trusted partners of the US to gain more direct access to the electronic information held by US communication service providers, as part of lawful investigations, subject to a range of safeguards.

Economic-Based Threats to National Security

An interconnected global economy and rapid technological innovation has increased the number of vectors through which serious economic-based threats to national security can manifest. These national security risks can arise in a number of ways, including the transfer of sensitive technologies to hostile actors, dangerous supply chain dependencies, and foreign ownership of Canadian critical infrastructure. Hostile actors may pursue these outcomes through foreign investment, research partnerships, or other economic activities.
In partnership with other government departments, PS has policy tools to respond to economic-based threats to national security. These include, but are not limited to:

The GoC has received Parliamentary approval of legislative amendments to the Investment Canada Act (Royal Assent received March 2024) that are intended to better protect the Canadian economy from hostile state actors. Public Safety will have an important role in supporting ISED on the regulatory process to follow, in addition to remaining actively engaged on a range of economic security related issues that touch on various other government department mandates, such as critical minerals, supply chains and connected vehicles.

Research Security

Canada's national security community continues to grapple with the threat posed by espionage and theft of cutting-edge research, trade secrets, and intellectual property that has national security and economic significance. Since 2016, PS has been involved in a number of initiatives to strengthen the security posture of Canada's research institutions, particularly through its Safeguarding Science initiative. However, to strengthen and expand on those efforts, PS was allocated funding through Budget 2022 for the creation of a Research Security Centre (RSC). The RSC is mandated to support the academic community to protect their research by continuing to raising awareness of research security threats through its Safeguarding Science initiative, providing direct support to universities and research community on matters relating to research security and by implementing research security policy and guidance. The RSC is now fully operational and has developed a network of academic stakeholders across the country through its six regional advisors located across Canada. The RSC also maintains a team at headquarters in Ottawa which is responsible for operationalizing and implementing the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships as well as the Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern; including updates to the Named Research Organization List.
The National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships (NSGRP) were introduced in 2021 and aims to bring security considerations into funding decisions for grant applications involving a private partner. In this regard, the applications are referred by the granting councils to the Research Security Centre for national security review. The Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern (STRAC) was announced in May 2024 and came into force on May 1, 2024. The STRAC policy prohibits collaboration in a defined sensitive technology research area (STRA) with listed organizations that pose a risk to Canada's national security – known as Named Research Organizations (NROs).

Critical Infrastructure

Vital services such as transportation and shipping networks, telecommunications, power grids, and emergency networks are increasingly vulnerable to interference from hostile states seeking to advance their own geopolitical interests, or from non-state actors seeking financial gain. The fact that much of this critical infrastructure (CI) is privately-owned or under the authority of other orders of government (provincial/territorial/municipal) complicates the challenge of protecting these vital assets and systems. Threats to CI are compounded by risks including rapid technological advancements, increased digital connectivity, increasing extreme weather events due to climate change, and the evolving supply chain dynamics. CI assets and systems are highly interconnected and interdependent across sectors and regions, and disruptions in one area can have cascading impacts across the country and the economy. Public Safety continues work to strengthen the security and resilience of CI, including engaging stakeholders (e.g., lead federal departments responsible for CI sectors; other orders of government; owners and operators of CI), as well as allied partners, recognizing that other countries have been shifting their own approaches to CI in response to the evolving threat landscape.

Terrorism and Violent Extremism

The terrorism and violent extremism (T/VE) threat landscape has evolved significantly, and has become more crowded and complex than ever before. By and large, T/VE threat actors have evolved from the post-9/11 space, where they were often religiously-motivated, hierarchically structured, and based abroad. Today, religiously-motivated T/VE threat actors are far more decentralized and seek to encourage and inspire individuals to conduct attacks domestically. Over the last ten years, other T/VE threat actors have emerged and are on the rise in Canada, with white nationalism and accelerationism, involuntary celibacy, and anti-authority ideologies now making up the bulk of active T/VE criminal and intelligence investigations. The threat landscape has progressed beyond comprehensive large-scale plotting by global actors and increasingly towards lone-wolf type threats, challenging investigations and possible countermeasures. Further complicating the T/VE threat landscape is that individuals who have radicalized to violence are increasingly driven by a range of influences, often combined with personal grievances, rather than a singular belief system. The result is a personalized worldview that often centres on the willingness to incite, enable or mobilize to attack. These individuals are: highly tech savvy, active online, connected transnationally with other violent extremists, and leverage private chat forums, social media and other networks to create and spread T/VE propaganda, mis and disinformation, and hate speech. In addition to increased risk of T/VE attacks that threaten the physical and psychological safety of Canadians, including racialized, religious, and the 2SLGBTQI+ communities, there is also a more general fracturing of social cohesion, incitement of criminal activity, and an undermining of trust in public institutions and government. T/VE threat actors have also adapted to circumvent traditional systems and tools to support their means of survival (e.g., through the use of crypto or virtual currencies, and encrypted messaging apps) to further their objectives in ways that directly or indirectly undermine Canada's economic, institutional, and national security.

Terrorist Listings

An important tool used to combat the threat of terrorism is the Criminal Code list of terrorist entities. Listing terrorist entities, be it groups or individuals, helps to ensure that Canada's financial system cannot be used to facilitate terrorist activities by freezing an entity's property. Being listed establishes an entity as a "terrorist group" as defined under the Criminal Code. Certain offences related to terrorist financing, terrorist-related travel and terrorist recruitment may apply. This strengthens law enforcement's ability to take action against domestic members and supporters of terrorist entities. A listing can further support the removal of the entity's presence on social media and online platforms, and can support the decision to render an entity's members inadmissible to Canada. There are currently 75 groups and 2 individuals on the Criminal Code list.

Samidoun (October 2024) and Ansarallah (Also referred to as the Houthis, December 2024) were recently added to the list of terrorist entities.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has been a listed terrorist entity since November 2013. HTS is now widely viewed as the de facto government in Syria with potentially the support of various Salafi-jihadist extremist groups. HTS is trying to convince Western countries to remove them from the list of terrorist organizations. Entities on the list undergo a statutory review every five years. HTS is in the process of this statutory review.

Terrorist Financing – The Authorization Regime

The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 highlighted the complexities of carrying out international aid activities in regions controlled by a terrorist group and, in particular, the limitations that Canada's terrorist financing provisions in the Criminal Code posed on the delivery of such assistance activities. As such, in June 2023, the Government of Canda passed legislation (Bill C-41) which amended the terrorist financing provisions to include both an exception for humanitarian assistance activities and an Authorization Regime to facilitate the delivery of other needed activities in regions controlled by a terrorist group, where this would incur an incidental but unavoidable benefit to a terrorist group.

The Authorization Regime publicly launched in June 2024. Under this new Regime, the Minister of PS may grant an authorization to eligible persons to conduct, in a geographic area that is controlled by a terrorist group, activities that would otherwise be prohibited under the Criminal Code. As lead department for the Regime, PS is ultimately responsible for the administration of the program. This role includes leading the administrative functions, managing the application assessment process and the mandatory security reviews, providing recommendations to the Minister of PS on the decision to grant or refuse an authorization, and conducting the enforcement and compliance monitoring activities. Although the scenario in Afghanistan prompted the legislative change, the Authorization Regime is not restricted to this country and can apply to other regions controlled by a terrorist group. In light of current global events, as well as the expansion of volatility around the world over the rise of terrorism, the Authorization Regime is expected to have increased applicability into the future.

Canadian Extremist Travellers

Canadian Extremist Travellers (CETs) are individuals who are suspected of travelling abroad to engage in T/VE activity. This includes, but is not limited to the participation in armed combat, financing, radicalizing, recruiting and media production. Offences specifically related to leaving or attempting to leave Canada for the purpose of committing certain terrorism offences are contained in the Criminal Code. PS continues to work with the security and intelligence community to ensure that the GoC can respond to the T/VE threat relating to CETs. Responding to the threat posed by CETs engages the mandates of multiple departments and agencies, including PS, Global Affairs Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS).

In the event of a return of a CET, the first objective is arrest and prosecution, should there be sufficient evidence. If there is insufficient evidence for a charge, the RCMP and its law enforcement and security and intelligence partners will continue their investigations, while other tools may be leveraged to manage and mitigate the threat. These tools include the use of terrorism peace bonds, using the Secure Air Travel Act (SATA) or the national security provisions of the Canadian Passport Order (CPO) to prevent travel and, in certain circumstances, the use of CSIS threat reduction measures to manage and mitigate any potential threats.

In 2021, the Government of Canada (GoC) adopted the Policy Framework for considering the provision of extraordinary assistance to Canadians or presumed Canadians detained in north-east Syria (NES). The Framework can be triggered for unaccompanied children, and for individuals whose situation has changed significantly since the Framework's adoption. Since 2021, the GoC has conducted [REDACTED] missions to repatriate Canadian women and children from NES. The repatriation of the remaining CETs in the region requires approval by the Minister of Public Safety and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and will be based on numerous considerations, including the national security risks that these individuals may pose upon return to Canada, for which PS and its Portfolio partners are responsible for producing.

Canadian Security and Law enforcement agencies can leverage a number of tools to manage and mitigate the threat posed by returning CETs. These tools include the use of terrorism peace bonds, using the Secure Air Travel Act (SATA) to prevent travel and, in certain circumstances, the use of CSIS threat reduction measures.

PS is responsible for a number of statutory obligations under the SATA, CPO, and the Prevention of Terrorist Travel Act (PTTA). SATA provides the legislative framework for the Passenger Protect Program (PPP) which aims to enhance transportation security by preventing individuals who may pose a threat to the airplane or who may travel by air to commit a terrorist act from boarding the plane or go through additional security screening. Pursuant to the CPO, the Minister of Public Safety may refuse, revoke or cancel a Canadian citizen's passport if the decision is necessary to prevent the commission of a terrorism offence or for the national security of Canada or a foreign country or state.

National Security Reviews

The enactment of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security Act, 2017 marked the launch of a new national security review framework. The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), and Intelligence Commissioner provide independent, fact-based, external review and oversight of Canada's security and intelligence activities. PS' role in supporting review is twofold: it coordinates work with the review bodies for any issues in which PS is under review, as well as advising the Minister on decisions and interactions with review bodies regarding portfolio agencies. PS is also ultimately responsible for national security review policy with consideration for any future legislative changes. PS' role is complementary to the Privy Council Office, which is responsible for ensuring central coordination of the security and intelligence community's support to review.

National Security Act, 2017 (Bill C-59) Review

The National Security Act, 2017 enhanced Canada's national security framework by modernizing various laws and equipping its national security agencies with the tools they need to address new and emerging threats. The Act mandates that Parliament conduct a comprehensive review of the legislation in the fourth year after the Bill's coming into force. A parliamentary review would likely include an assessment of how legislation has affected the operations of CSIS, the RCMP and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) that relate to national security, information sharing, and the interaction of those organizations with NSIRA, the Intelligence Commissioner and NSICOP. Relatedly, the NSICOP Act includes a similar requirement for parliamentary review which could commence any time.

Intelligence and Evidence

Intelligence and evidence (I&E) refers to the operational and legal challenges encountered when sensitive information is used to inform criminal investigations and legal proceedings, or other government action to address national security threats (including threat disruption/mitigation). A dilemma arises from the need to protect how information is obtained, assessed, and shared for national security purposes, and the legal obligation to disclose relevant evidence to a person accused of a crime or otherwise subject to legal proceedings. The Countering Foreign Interference Act, enacted major reforms for administrative law by introducing a fit-for-purpose secure proceedings process for reviews and appeals arising from federal administrative decision making. The bill also made targeted improvements for criminal proceedings. PS, in cooperation with Justice Canada, continues to engage internal stakeholders to examine other I&E issues in the criminal and civil contexts and assess potential options to address them.

Stakeholder Perspectives

In today's threat environment, stakeholders are strong partners with the federal government and play a key role in supporting Canada's national security interests. Examples include: companies from small start-ups working on innovative new technologies and large corporations that own and operate nation-wide networks of critical infrastructure; universities that house cutting-edge research and data; financial institutions that freeze the assets of organizations and individuals on Canada's terrorist entities list; and, air carriers that work with the GoC to prevent individuals deemed a threat to air travel from boarding a plane. Provinces and territories are also important partners with respect to information sharing, and also own, operate and oversee the regulation of a significant share of Canada's critical infrastructure. Furthermore, PS regularly cooperates and shares information with international partners, and particularly Five Eyes allies, on a number of national security files, including hostile activities by state actors, terrorist listings, and economic-based threats to national security. Canada's upcoming G7 presidency priorities will likely feature several national security related elements. Overall, PS continues to work closely with stakeholders, both inside and outside the security and intelligence community, to look for new and innovative ways to enhance the measures in place to address the range of today's threats.

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