Foreign Interference

Date: April 29, 2021

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Fully releasable (ATIP)? Yes

Branch/Agency: NSCB/PS

Issue:

Global News: “Russia, China campaigns seek to sow mistrust in Western COVID-19 vaccines: EU report”.

Proposed Response:

Background

On April 28, 2021, a Global News article citing a recent European Union (EU) report on disinformation, notes that Russian and Chinese media are systematically seeking to raise fears in Western COVID-19 vaccines, and sow distrust and divisions in the West. According to the article, in late 2020 and early 2021, the two countries’ state media outlets amplified fake news online in multiple languages, highlighting safety concerns, unfounded links to deaths and promoted Russian and Chinese vaccines as safer and superior options. “Both Chinese official channels and pro-Kremlin media have amplified content on alleged side-effects of the Western vaccines, misrepresenting and sensationalizing international media reports and associating deaths to the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine in Norway, Spain and elsewhere,” the EU report said.

Foreign interference is understood as hostile activity undertaken by foreign states that is purposely covert, malign, clandestine and deceptive. It can include threats, harassment and intimidation. These activities can be directed at Canadians, or residents of Canada, or against Canadian institutions to advance their strategic interests at the expense of our national interest and values.

Through its mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, [Redacted]

Several reports have highlighted the threat of foreign interference in Canada. For example, the 2020 CSIS Public Report, released on April 12, 2021, states that In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, espionage and foreign interference threats continue to persist and, in some areas, are increasing. Canada’s advanced and competitive economy, and its close economic and strategic partnership with the United States, makes it an ongoing target of hostile foreign state activities. Foreign governments also continue to use their state resources and their relationships with private entities to conduct clandestine, deceptive, or threatening foreign interference activities in Canada. In many cases, these clandestine influence operations are meant to support foreign political agendas or to deceptively influence Government of Canada policies, officials, or democratic processes.

Further, the 2019 Annual Report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) outlined foreign interference activities, including the targeting of Canadian institutions by threat actors. The NSICOP (2019) report pointed to China and Russia as being particularly active in Canada and made a number of recommendations for Canada to bolster its response to the threat of foreign interference.

Your open letter to all Members of Parliament, outlining the threat of foreign interference, and what the Government is doing to address it, was sent on December 18, 2020 in response to the motion introduced in the House of Commons by Mr. Michael Chong (Wellington—Halton Hills) that was passed on November 18, 2020. The motion reads: That, given that (i) the People’s Republic of China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, is threatening Canada’s national interest and our values, including Canadians of Chinese origin within Canada’s borders, (ii) it is essential that Canada have a strong and principled foreign policy backed by action in concert with its allies, the House call upon the government to: (a) make a decision on Huawei’s involvement in Canada’s 5G network within 30 days of the adoption of this motion; and (b) develop a robust plan, as Australia has done, to combat China’s growing foreign operations here in Canada and its increasing intimidation of Canadians living in Canada, and table it within 30 days of the adoption of this motion.

Threats to Democracy

[Redacted]

It is important to note that disinformation, originating from anywhere in the world, can have serious consequences including threats to the safety and security of Canadians, erosion of trust in our democratic institutions, and confusion about government policies and notices including information on the COVID-19 pandemic. State-sponsored disinformation campaigns are an example of foreign interference.

In an effort to counter foreign interference against the 2019 Federal Election, the Government created the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force, composed of officials from CSE, CSIS, RCMP and GAC. As members of the SITE Task Force, CSIS was involved in efforts to raise awareness and assess foreign interference threats against the 2019 federal elections, and the RCMP provided law enforcement expertise. The SITE Task Force remains after the 2019 Federal Election, as threats to democratic institutions, such as foreign interference and disinformation, have not abated.

[Redacted]

Information manipulation, in particular disinformation, has been a subject of international collaboration in the context of COVID-19. Canada has discussed the threat and possible responses across a variety of bilateral and multilateral engagements and fora. [Redacted]. You represent Canada at the Five-Country Ministerial, an annual forum where Five Eyes security ministers meet to discuss opportunities for collaboration and information sharing on various national security issues, including foreign interference. These discussions often include the sharing of respective approaches to shared issues, and the coordination of a cohesive Five Eyes responses.

Threats to Communities

[Redacted]

These activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians. When CSIS is informed of allegations of foreign interference, it uses the full mandate of the CSIS Act to investigate, advise and respond to the threat, alongside law enforcement, to keep Canadians safe from harm and intimidation. Furthermore, criminal activity that is reported to law enforcement and that involves a national security nexus is investigated by the RCMP.

Threats to the Economy and Research Sector

[Redacted]

Direct engagement between Canadian universities, federal laboratories and security institutions on the risks posed by foreign interference has been ongoing since 2016 through the Safeguarding Science initiative led by Public Safety Canada, in partnership with 10 other federal departments. This initiative aims to raise awareness within Canada’s research communities of the risks of proliferation; dual-use technology; research security; and cybersecurity. The initiative informs participants about tools to help recognize and mitigate the risks Canadian institutions are facing, including those posed to their research and development. Thus far, Safeguarding Science presentations have been delivered to 34 institutions and 16 federal labs across the country. Expansion efforts are also underway to deliver additional tools and guidance to the research community, along with more workshops from coast-to-coast and within the private sector and with Provincial/Territorial partners.

In addition, Public Safety Canada has established a Federal, Provincial and Territorial Community of Practice on Economic-based Threats to National Security to bring together key officials at the working level from across these jurisdictions to discuss national security threats that arise through economic activities. This includes, for example, threats arising from foreign direct investment, trade and exports, and the transfer or acquisition of Canadian intellectual property, knowledge, rights and licenses.

The COVID-19 pandemic has provided foreign threat actors with unique opportunities to advance their objectives, to the detriment of Canada’s national interest. The impacts of economic-based national security threats including the theft of intellectual property, and threats to Canada's supply chain are ongoing national security concerns. [Redacted].  

On September 14, 2020 the Ministers of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Public Safety, and Health released a statement encouraging all members of the research community to take extra precautions to protect the security of COVID-19-related research, intellectual property and knowledge development. The statement reinforces that it is critical that research undertaken in Canada, by Canadians, with Canadian funding is safeguarded to protect both the integrity of our research ecosystem and long-term economic competitiveness and prosperity. It also notes that the Government has instructed federal research funding agencies to review their security policies and processes and to promote awareness of best practices and tools. The government also launched the Safeguarding Your Research portal on the same date to support Canada’s research community. The portal provides information, best practices and tools to help researchers identify and mitigate potential security risks to their work.

Finally, in the current economic environment shaped by COVID-19, the Government of Canada is applying increased scrutiny to all foreign direct investments, controlling or non-controlling, into Canadian businesses that are vital to public health and the security of supply of critical goods and services to Canadians or to the Government of Canada. Further, at this time the Government of Canada will also subject all foreign investments by state owned enterprises, or private investors assessed as being closely tied to or subject to direction from foreign governments, to enhanced scrutiny under the national security provisions of the Investment Canada Act (ICA). CSIS is a prescribed investigative body under the national security provisions of the ICA and conducts investigative efforts related to national security concerns arising from foreign investment. CSIS works with partners to provide advice in support of this process. The RCMP also participates in the national security review of foreign investment process under the ICA, to offer a law enforcement perspective, and to assess if there are potential criminal linkages to certain foreign investment proposals. The process may result in a Governor in Council divesture order or impose mitigation conditions on investments that would be injurious to Canada’s national security. As reported in the 2018-19 ICA Annual Report, for the four fiscal years 2015-16 to 2018-19 the Governor in Council issued eight 25.4 final orders: six blocking or ordering the foreign investor to divest of its investment and two imposing conditions that protect national security while allowing those investments to proceed.

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