Foreign Interference – China’s Use of the United Front Work Department

Date: June 9, 2020

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Branch/Agency: NSCB/PS

Issue:

On June 9, 2020, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) published an analysis of the CCP's use of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) as a primary foreign interference tool. The Toronto Star also published an article which outlines related issues for Canada.

Proposed Response:

Background:

On June 9, 2020, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) published an analysis of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) use of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) as a primary foreign interference tool. The Toronto Star also published an article outlining related issues for Canada.

The ASPI report states that China is making fresh efforts to influence Chinese communities around the world to advance Beijing’s interests, requiring heightened vigilance from democratic countries. Beijing uses the UFWD to stifle criticism, infiltrate foreign political parties, diaspora communities, universities and multinational corporations. The UFWD’s importance to the Chinese Communist Party has grown in recent years under President Xi, as 40,000 new staff have been added.

The report does not specifically cite Canada's experience, however, the author Alex Joske told The Star that Canadian attendees are numerous at UWFD conferences and events. By using techniques such as political donations, offering paid trips to China, using flattery, and co-opting international politicians. In the Toronto Star article, the report's author recommended that Canada carry out detailed studies of UFWD work across the country as well as in specific sectors, and communicate findings to the public to promote general understanding.

Other reports have highlighted the threat of foreign interference in Canada. For example, the 2019 CSIS Public Report, released on May 20, 2020, states that espionage and foreign-influenced activities are almost always conducted to further the interests of a foreign state, using both state and non-state entities. Espionage and foreign-influenced activities are directed at Canadian entities both inside and outside of Canada, and directly threaten Canada’s national security and strategic interests. Democratic institutions and processes around the world—including elections—are vulnerable and have become targets for international actors. Foreign threat actors—most notably

hostile states and state-sponsored actors—are targeting Canada’s democratic institutions and processes. Further, the Annual Report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) outlined foreign interference activities, including the targeting of Canadian institutions by threat actors. The NSICOP report pointed to China and Russia as being particularly active in Canada and made a number of recommendations for Canada to bolster its response to the threat of foreign interference.

Over the years, CSIS has seen multiple instances of foreign states targeting specific Canadian institutions. The scope of potential foreign interference activities can be broad, encompassing a range of techniques that are familiar to intelligence agencies. These include: human intelligence operations, the use of state-sponsored or foreign influenced media, and the use of sophisticated cyber tools.

The Government of Canada’s security and intelligence community is combatting these threats within their respective mandates. For example, CSIS has longstanding investigations into foreign interference threat activities targeting democratic processes and institutions across Canada. The provision of CSIS intelligence and assessments to senior levels of government allows for informed decision making when responding to and developing policies to address these threats. Likewise, the RCMP has a broad, multi-faceted mandate that allows it to investigate, and prevent foreign interference drawing upon various legislative authorities.

Contacts:

Prepared by: NSOD

Approved by: Dominic Rochon, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, 613-990-4976 (pending)

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