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C, B, R, or N : the influence of related industry on terrorists’ choice in unconventional weapons / Nicole Tishler.

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Location

Kanishka Research Project

Resource

e-Books

Alternate Title

Influence of related industry on terrorists’ choice in unconventional weapons

Authors

Publishers

  • [Vancouver, B.C.] : TSAS, 2013.

Bibliography

Includes bibliographical references (p. 24-26).

Description

1 online resource (29 pages) : charts

Note

Author affiliated with: Carleton University, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs.
"TSAS is supported as a national strategic initiative funded by SSHRC and Public Safety Canada, along with the following departments of the federal government: Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC),Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)".

Summary

"This study explores which factors, given that a terrorist has crossed the threshold over conventional weapons and into using unconventional ones such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN), will determine the likelihood that he/she chooses to use C, B, R, or N weapons. Relying primarily on data from the incident-based Monterey WMD Database, it employs multinomial logit regression with C, B, R, or N as a categorical dependent variable: a first within the relevant econometric literature. Fundamentally, the study tests the widely-held—although empirically unsubstantiated—technological deterministic assumption that the more readily CBRN technology, materials, and knowledge are accessible to terrorists, the more likely terrorists will be to use unconventional weapons of the corresponding kind: a relationship hypothesized to be stronger for serious attack perpetrators than for hoaxers. Next, the study tests the notion of a continuum of proliferation potential, hypothesizing that as states’ regulatory capacity increases, biological terrorism will be most likely and nuclear terrorism will be least likely. Finally, the study assesses variables that have previously been proven as significant determinants of CBRN over conventional terrorism, to provide the groundwork for future evaluation of the extent to which terrorists may be induced to pursue C, B, R, or N over conventional weapons."--Author's abstract.

Subject

Online Access

Contents

Introduction -- Literature review -- Conceptual framework -- Weapon type and related industry: the technological determinist argument, regulatory capacity, and proliferation potential -- The data -- The sample and the dependent variable: weapon type used in attack -- Results and analysis -- Findings across differing arrangements of the dependent variable -- Conclusions -- References -- Appendix -- Table A1. Summary statistics for measures of CBRN-related industry -- Table A2. Summary statistics for measures of states’ regulatory capacity -- Table A3. Summary statistics for previously identified controls -- Table A4. Summary of control variables collected based on previous studies -- Table A5. Results for logit regression on hoaxes and pranks and multinomial regression on serious incidents.

Series

Working paper series (TSAS) ; no. 13-01 (Oct. 2013)

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