Summary
Two events, the September 11, 2001 attack and the false assessment of Saddam Hussein's weapons arsenal failures convinced the American public that their intelligence system was broken and prompted a radical reorganization of agencies and personnel. However, this book argues that both critics and politicians severely underestimated the obstacles to true reform. Reform requires both strengthening its strategic assessment capabilities and looking within to the organizational and political dynamics of collecting information and determining its implications for policy. Some of the topics discussed include: how fixing one malfunction can create another; how expertise can be both a vital tool and a source of error and misjudgement; the pitfalls of always striving for accuracy in intelligence, which in some cases can render it worthless; the danger of "politicizing" intelligence; and the issue of secrecy; and when it is excessive, when it is insufficient, and how limiting privacy can in fact protect civil liberties. The author argues that when it comes to intelligence, citizens and politicians should focus less on consistent solutions and more on achieving a delicate balance between conflicting requirements.
Contents
1. Twenty-first-century intelligence: new enemies and old. -- 2. Permanent enemies: why intelligence failures are inevitable. -- 3. Theory traps: expertise as an enemy. -- 4. Incorruptibility or influence? Costs and benefits of politicization. -- 5. Two faces of failure: September 11 and Iraq's WMD. -- 6. An intelligence reformation? Two faces of reorganization. -- 7. Whose knowledge of whom? The conflict of secrets. -- 8. Enemies at bay: successful intelligence.