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
Emergency Preparedness  
Canada

Protection civile  
Canada

PROTECTING CATEGORY II VITAL  
POINTS DURING TIME OF WAR OR  
SERIOUS CIVIL CRISIS

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA

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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA

DIRECTORATE OF  
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS COORDINATION

AND

THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON VITAL POINTS

CONTRACT STUDY REPORT

ON

PROTECTING CATEGORY II VITAL POINTS  
DURING TIME OF WAR OR SERIOUS CIVIL CRISIS

BY  
R.R. Geddes

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Ottawa, Canada

28 March 1988

## SUMMARY

The Canadian Vital Points Program has enjoyed an enviable record since 1914. The allies have been able neither to match the Canadian civil program nor to sustain their military equivalents. Although an off-and-on interest, the Canadian civil program has evolved and been refined since its 1914 origins.

The main limitation in the Canadian Vital Points Program is the practice of self-help, amateur security intelligence estimates. It provides a dangerous base for the contingency planning of the protection of the nation's vital points, and must be replaced by the professional security intelligence processes.

The threat to civil vital points is assessed as being small cell and individual acts of sabotage across the complete spectrum of violence and destructive power. The fence, padlock and security guard will no longer provide adequate protection during times of war and serious civil crisis. Consequently, a shift is required in thought processes from World War II era protection to protection from sabotage in a high-tech era characterized by computer crime, mass destruction terror and mind manipulating communications.

The role of the Canadian Forces is to defend Canada from external military aggression. The normal, first line protection of property against criminal acts is an owner's responsibility. Sabotage is an offence under the Criminal Code of Canada. Therefore, the protection of civil vital points' property against acts of sabotage is considered to be a civil law and order function in which the owners or occupants are responsible for providing the normal, first line protection. The various levels of government having jurisdiction are responsible for the provision of appropriate emergency response, backup protective services. That concept is current policy for the Vital Points Program. Because it appears to be the only practicable approach, that policy for the protection of Category II Vital Points should be confirmed and reinforced.

Chapter 7 summarizes the main recommendations. The general thrust is to shift the emphasis from the emergency protection of vital points to a prevention directed, ongoing state of good security based on an integrated system of education and informed employee/occupants' best self-interests in combination with modern, passive and active protection measures. Under that concept, the crisis task would be the limited augmentation of guards within an already effective protective system.

1800-1 (EPC)

January 5, 1987

THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON VITAL POINTS

SUB-COMMITTEE STUDY

ON THE GUARDING OF CIVIL VITAL POINTS

GUIDELINES

(FOURTH DRAFT)

**Purpose:**

The purpose of the study is to develop an outline plan or plans for protecting Category II vital points (VPs) during time of war or serious civil crisis which, under the worst scenario, would include the requirement to make special arrangements to protect all Category II VPs concurrently for a period of up to six months.

**Study Specifications**

The study group will consider such matters as the threat, manning, training, equipping, estimated costs, financial and other resource sharing, draft orders and regulations as well as any emergency measures which may need to be added to the Government Emergency Book.

**Reports**

The Chairman of the study group will make progress reports at the ACVP meetings. A final report is to be presented to the ACVP by April 1, 1988.

**Membership**

Chairman  
DND  
RCMP

The sub-committee may call upon the expertise of members of the ACVP, government departments or any other advisor who may contribute to the study.

## Guidelines (cont'd)

### Other Considerations

The Solicitor General of Canada is responsible for the security of Category I VPs. However after the first three months of a crisis, assistance could be required from other sources.

It is assumed that a 30-day notice could be expected at the end of which all Category II VPs would be provided with the necessary protection.

Security guards for federal VPs could be under control of a federal authority while guards for provincial/territorial VPs might be under control of provincial authorities. The requirement for a security coordinating group should be considered by the study group.

The approximate number of security guards required for VPs will be provided by the RCMP.

The degree of protection for each VP will vary with the importance of the VP, the nature of the threat, and whether the country is at war or peace.

### ADDENDUM

During a 10 September, 1987 meeting of the Emergency Preparedness Canada Director of Emergency Operations Coordination, his Study Project Officer and the study consultant, it was agreed that:

1. the study is to be general in nature and not specific to individual vital points;
2. the study report will contain a glossary of terms related to the threat to and protection of vital points for the purposes of avoiding contextual misunderstandings;
3. the reports recommendations for the protection of Category II Vital Points shall be directly related to the analysis of the threat to vital points, which the study consultant is to develop; and
4. air attack by bombers, missiles and nuclear weapons is beyond the scope of the study.

The contract was given to the consultant on 18 June, 1987 as EPC contract #7A-170, certified under Section 25 of the FAA on 25 May, 1987.

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## LIST OF REFERENCES

- Annex A - Copy of 8 October 1941 Draft Form Letter on Responsibility for Guarding Vulnerable Points.
- Annex B - Copy of Minutes of a Meeting on 3 November, 1941 of the Committee on Vulnerable Points.
- Annex C - Extracts, Proceedings Spring 1987, The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

## GLOSSARY

Definitions below are provided at the request of the Advisory Committee on Vital Points. Except where otherwise noted, they are from the Canadian Forces, army glossary, May 1984.

- attack** - an offensive operation designed to destroy enemy forces by fire and movement.
- assault** - the climax of an attack.
- defence** - operations undertaken to prevent the enemy from seizing terrain or breaking through into a defended area.
- defended area** - an area of operational responsibility containing a group of defended localities organized in depth, each of which in turn are organized for all round defence.
- defended post** - position held by small sub-unit. Defended posts are grouped in mutual support to form defended localities.
- guard** - a security element who's primary task is to protect the main force by fighting to gain time, while also observing and reporting.
- (dictionary - watch, vigilante state; protector, defender, sentry; body of soldiers, etc. serving as protectors of place or person...)
- protect** - (dictionary - keepsafe, defend, guard)
- sabotage** - (Criminal Code, section 52 - Acts prejudicial to the safety, security, or defence of Canada, or...)
- Act of commission or omission, short of an overt act of war, which is undertaken with intent to destroy, damage, interfere with or obstruct installations, material or information in the interests of a foreign power or of a subversive political organization.

serious (in the context of protecting vital points)  
civil crisis

- (usage in this study report - acts of violence, over a period of time, for the purposes of confronting and discrediting the established system or authority.)

trip wire (in the context of protecting vital points)  
protection

- (usage in this study report - a physical security system designed to detect an unknown or undesirable incident, circumstance, or condition and to cause an automatic, emergency response which is appropriate for the situation.)

## CHAPTER 1

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

#### Purpose

101. Canada has had on-and-off vital point protection plans since its earliest days. Because of the considerable misunderstanding and misrepresentation encountered during the course of this study on how Canada and its allies protected vital points in the past, an historical review became an essential part of the study.

#### First World War

102. The two pertinent, notable events of the First World War protection plans were the passing of the War Measures Act and that the mobilization plans were ignored. As a result there was much flag waving, mob demonstrations demanding war, hysterics and unreasoning emotion, and confusion and pointless indiscriminant actions during national mobiization.<sup>1</sup>

103. During the First World War, the Militia was called out very early to protect vital points. Shortly thereafter, it was decided that 50,000 soldiers should remain in Canada to guard against possible hostile action by the large number of Germans and Austrians living in the United States. Neither the manpower crisis in the field army overseas in 1917 nor the entry into the war of the United States in April 1917 persuaded the government to change those commitments. When an attempt to resort to volunteers for home defence failed, the government introduced the military service act (conscriptioin). Of the 120,000 conscripted, only 24,000 were taken on strength of expeditionary forces overseas. All those decisions were political and were contrary to the advice of the military, which insisted all along that there was no threat of any kind within Canada.<sup>2</sup> The result was in excess of 100,000 soldiers in Canada doing nothing when the army in Europe was greatly under strength. Those political decisions had little to do with vital points and it is false to say the soldiers were for their protection.

#### Between the Wars

104. After the 1918 armistice to end all wars, defence and national security disappeared as issues. However,

events proved that a great deal of effective contingency planning took place behind the scenes. From 1927 to 1936, the Joint Staff Committee, a sub-committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee averaged one meeting per year. From 1936 on, they met six or more times per year. Four options were developed as contingency plans for mobilization - two options for purely home defence and two for an overseas war. On 27 June, 1938, an outline plan for the protection of Canada was submitted to the Minister of National Defence. With his approval and authority, the plan was distributed for guidance and action.<sup>3</sup>

105. It is obvious that far greater expenditures and more time would have helped the preparations for national mobilization in 1939. However: "The country may not have been prepared psychologically for war in September 1939; it was not, however, wholly unprepared materially".<sup>1</sup>

## World War II

106. An inter-departmental Vulnerable Points Committee was constituted in 1938 (PC 531 of 1938) as one of the sub-committees of the interdepartmental Defence Coordination Committee. The Vulnerable Points Committee was administered by the Deputy Minister of Justice (the department responsible for the RCMP at that time) and was chaired by the Minister for National Defence for Naval Services. Upon dissolution of the Defence Coordination Committee in 1941, the Vulnerable Points Committee was re-designated as a separate committee (PC 51 of 1941). The main function was to review and to make recommendations on the various proposals for the protection of civil sites in Canada.<sup>4</sup>

107. In contrast with 1914, "the mobilization in 1939 followed closely the plan as laid down before the outbreak of war". A state of emergency under the 1914 War Measures Act was declared as of 25 August 1939. On 26 August, an order-in-council called-out the designated troops for the coastal defences and protection of vulnerable points.<sup>3,5</sup> The response was voluntary and good. Within a day, the vulnerable points were guarded and the coastal defences manned. On 9 September parliament approved a motion in favour of war and on 10 September 1939, the proclamation of war was issued. By 30 September 1939, twenty days after Canada's declaration of war, the planned 5,646 soldiers were employed and remained as vulnerable point guards for approximately two months. It is important to note that the protection of vulnerable points, although a part of the mobilization plan, was separate from the Defence of Canada (coastal defence) plan.

108. The mobilization plans for the protection of vulnerable points were contained in the option, for a long war overseas, known as "Defence Scheme Number 3 (1938)".<sup>7</sup> Each District Officer Commanding sent in a list of vulnerable points which he proposed to protect from the beginning of the "precautionary stage" prior to war being declared. The total list was staggering and inconsistent. As a result, federal vulnerable points were defined and the lists refined as "essential to the national welfare, or to the effective prosecution of the war and which, at the same time are of such a nature that military guards can in fact render effective protection... defined as follows":

- a. important canals comprising the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence systems;
- b. railways at those few points where destruction or damage would seriously impede trans-Canada communication;
- c. defence arsenals, magazines, ordinance stores, aerodromes and important armouries; and
- d. other sites including important cable landing places, grain elevators at Fort William and Port Arthur, selected drydocks, selected hydro electric generating stations, and selected wireless telegraphy stations.

109. Protection for "all industrial plants, municipal water works and other points of a like nature, as well as power plants, drydocks, elevators, and wireless stations other than those specially selected" was to be provided by "the civil or private authorities who are normally responsible in time of peace".<sup>7</sup>

110. A revised list was promulgated 18 March, 1939, which required a total of 5,646 personnel for vulnerable point protection.<sup>8</sup> Although the RCMP inspected all civil vulnerable points in June 1939, and a report dated 6 July, 1939, from a sub-committee of the Interdepartmental Committee on Defence Coordination confirmed and re-stated the above protective responsibilities, a decision could not be reached for the division of federal responsibility between the RCMP and the military.<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, the Militia initially protected all vulnerable points which were the responsibility of the federal government. However, the RCMP gradually assumed

the responsibility during November.<sup>10</sup> After 1 December, 1939, at least officially the military were guarding only purely military vulnerable points and activities within Canada, including coastal sites and oil storage depots which were considered potential targets for enemy coastal raiding parties. In addition, the military was tasked with providing a back-up to local guards at:<sup>11</sup>

- a. The Arvida plant of the Aluminum Company of Canada;
- b. the hydro electrical generating systems at Niagara; and
- c. The Trail, British Columbia plant of the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company.

111. There was then the peculiar situation that a little more than a month after Canada's declaration of war, and when the RCMP was desparately searching for special constables, the army was releasing soldiers who were then faced with the problems of re-establishing themselves as civilians in an increasingly closed society. Many were judged to be too old or medically unfit (needed glasses or dental work or had flat feet) for field (operational or logistical) military duties and, the RCMP would neither accept those qualified as military leaders nor match the relatively low pay and allowance rates of the army.

112. The RCMP and military mindsets aside, and no longer able to withstand the pressure of public opinion and special interest lobby groups, on 23 May, 1940, the government announced the creation of a Corps of twelve companies, each of 250 First War veterans. The Corps was initially called the "Veterans Home Guard".<sup>12</sup> They were to be used to relieve other Active Service Units in the protection of military property, but "not in guarding vulnerable points".<sup>13</sup> The reason given was a strange limitation by the regular military that "they should not be in a position to come into direct contact with the enemy", and wisely was not passed onto the veterans who volunteered for and were sworn to active service in or out of Canada. Like all other military who volunteered without limitation, they proudly wore the "GS" badge for general service on their uniform sleeve. Eventually their name was changed to "Veterans Guard of Canada". They had training and administrative roles, took over internment camps from the Provost Corps, were stationed at some vulnerable points, and some companies served abroad. The Corps reached a strength of over 10,000 in 1943, but was apparently never officially authorized to protect

vulnerable points - although, at least within the military vulnerable points, they did in significant numbers.<sup>14</sup>

113. The RCMP had 1,429 Special Constables and an undefined number of regular members employed on vulnerable point related duties at the end of October 1941. At that point in time, they were attempting to find another thirty Special Constables.<sup>15</sup> By 20 June, 1941, the total military strength on vulnerable point duties was down to 145 because of the police and private security guards taking over the duties.<sup>16</sup>

114. Although the government worried about, and frequently caused the Deputy Minister of Justice to review the policy for the responsibility for vulnerable point protection, it can be seen from the form letter attached as Annex A (at the back of this report) that the government at least professed that the protection was a civil law and order function. The form letter was drafted by the Deputy Minister of Justice and approved by both the Ministers of Justice and National Defence.<sup>17</sup> However, the historians are not so kind. Although the military and the RCMP insisted that there was no threat to Canadian territory, political pressure forced the army to retain in excess of 62,000 soldiers in Canada and the air force to plan a forty-nine squadron establishment in Canada.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, it was impossible for the politicians to resist the lobbies for the local protection/prestige/economic benefits of military deployments. The minutes of the 3 November, 1941, meeting of the interdepartmental Committee on Vulnerable Points are enlightening (copy attached as Annex B at the back of this study report) only from the policy and recommendation points of view. The reality of the politics was that by late 1943, when the tides of war were clearly in our favour, the army had deployed two battalions, two independent infantry companies, three independent infantry platoons, and twenty-six platoons (approximately 1000 men) of the Veterans Guard of Canada at vulnerable point sites.<sup>18</sup> Those deployments were in addition to the vulnerable point guards, contrary to professed policy, contrary to RCMP and military advice, and not justified by the generally accepted analysis of the threat at the time.

#### Protected areas

115. The historical files contain frequent reference to fortress like "protected areas". No record was found of any actually having been declared. The most interesting case was the Port of Halifax. For some unexplained

reason, a British Brigadier Craig prepared a report stating Canada required an efficient security system and a good system of "protected areas", including Halifax. The RCMP was tasked (PC 6441 of 1941) with investigating the recommendation for Halifax, apparently as a result of a letter signed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The RCMP report<sup>19</sup> prepared by a Superintendent A.N. Eames is instructive for four reasons:

- a. Eames was "Security Control Officer, Port of Halifax";
- b. he found nothing that would convince (him) of the advisability of creating a "protected area" in spite of the high visibility the idea had received;
- c. he gave a detailed description of the protective-security measures in the Halifax region; and
- d. he implied either tasking and coordination confusion or local initiative when he stated it is assumed the army was guarding the Imperial Oil Refinery only because it was on a list prepared in 1938 (over three years earlier).

#### United States - World War II

116. The United States, World War II policy and practice for the guarding of vulnerable points were frequently misrepresented during discussions for this study. The reports of both the Canadian Military Attaché and the RCMP Liaison Officer with the CIA were specific that, except for essential jurisdictional and organizational differences, the United States and Canada had the same basic policy. With few exceptions, "the owner or agency operating or controlling the facility (was) responsible for the provision of adequate safeguards against sabotage".<sup>20</sup>

117. The responsibility for vulnerable point surveys was initially given to the CIA, and then was transferred early 1942 to the army, navy, Federal Power Commission, and the Office of Civil Defence for their respective jurisdictions. State National Guard units were assigned to guard duties immediately following the 7 December, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, but were withdrawn in early 1942.

118. The fifty-five battalions of military police frequently mentioned as having been created to protect vulnerable points were in fact organized and deployed in

Corps areas as strategic reserve counter-strike forces. They were not predestined for duties as guards at vulnerable points.

119. The War Department did not provide guards at vital contractor or war material plants. A mid-1942 War Department order made the civilian guards at more than 11,000 industrial plants auxiliaries of the Army Corps of Military Police. They were still hired, fired and paid by the plant operator. Their distinctive dress was a brassard provided by the army for identification purposes. The purpose of the system was:

- a. where the quantity of guards was of sufficient size, give the Department of Defence some standards control through the provision of a leader for supervision and training; and
- b. to give the guards the protection (from civil criminal justice) of military arrest and trial in the event a guard injured someone while on duty.

#### United Kingdom - World War II

120. In 1938 a Key Points Intelligence Branch was formed in the Air Ministry and charged with the collation of information concerning factories vital to the war effort. At the outbreak of war, the organization was transferred to the Ministry of Home Security and redesignated the Key Points Intelligence Directorate. It was responsible for recording, grading and coordinating activity concerning all vital points. Within the War Office, there was a Vulnerable Points Adviser (major-general), who was responsible for surveying and recommending the protective measures for all vulnerable points. The military, using Local Defence or Home Guard troops was responsible for few civil vulnerable points. The reports are specific that the United Kingdom's policy and practice were similar to Canada's policy.<sup>4</sup>

#### Post 1945

121. Victory in 1945 meant the demise of the programs in the United States and Canada and, except for the recording directorate in the Ministry of Home Security, in the United Kingdom. It was back to the on-and-off status. Not surprisingly, the military programs in Canada had greater success because protective-security is part of military doctrine and that doctrine never entirely gets lost during periods of restraint, changing priorities and restructuring.

122. The federal Cabinet Defence Committee established an Interdepartmental Committee on Vital Points in October 1948. The terms of reference included: maintaining an up-to-date list of vital points; assessment by the armed forces and the RCMP of the vulnerability from attack and sabotage respectively; and recommendations to be made for protective measures.

123. Clearly the orientation was war, and the committee quickly relearned that enemy attacks are the responsibility of the military. Consequently, the committee concerned itself with vital civil installations and sabotage during wartime. There were now two lists for wartime - civil under the Interdepartmental Committee on Vital Points and military under the Department of National Defence.

124. In April 1960, the Cabinet Defence Committee dissolved the Interdepartmental Committee on Vital Points, and transferred the civil program to the Canada Emergency Measures Organization. Progress continued to be made, primarily on a staff officer basis. An interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Emergency Plans replaced the Cabinet Defence Committee.

125. The October 1970 Crisis gave new meaning to the term civil crisis. On 21 December 1970, the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence directed that:

- a. the Emergency Measures Organization coordinate and maintain a national list of peacetime vital points;
- b. an Interdepartmental Committee on Emergency Planning (ICEP) be formed to provide advice, assistance and policy guidance;
- c. vital points be classified into a system of categories for their importance and further sub-divisions to reflect the effects caused by denial or destruction; and
- d. the RCMP be responsible for the coordination of security surveys.

126. Government priorities shifted from civil defence back to conventional defence and security. The Canada Emergency Measures Organization was reduced to what is now Emergency Preparedness Canada. The issue of the Emergency Planning Order 1981 (PC 1981-1305 of 21 May, 1981) meant the survival of the Vital Points Program.

## Conclusion

127. Canada's Vital Points Program has a better and more consistent record than equivalent allied programs. Much that is attributed as advantages of the allies' programs is little more than distortion and misrepresentation.

128. The concepts of regional Security Control Officers (paragraph 115) and the classification of vital points to clearly reflect effects caused by denial or destruction (paragraph 125) seem to have had promise and to have been lost over time. Both concepts should be reviewed for potential re-introduction.



## CHAPTER 2

### TODAY'S VITAL POINTS PROGRAM (December 1987)

#### Object

201. The object of the Vital Points' Program is to ensure that, in the event of war or peacetime serious civil crisis, facilities and services vital to the nation, province, territory or municipality have been identified and their security arrangements have been determined.

#### Vital Points Manual

202. Emergency Preparedness Canada maintains a Vital Points Manual which is both a policy and procedures document, and a general guide to the national Vital Points Program. The principles are equally applicable at the federal, provincial and municipal levels.

203. In the opinion of the writer, some minor reorganization of the Vital Points Manual would be beneficial. For example, the policy and responsibility for security inspections and for protecting vital Points could be clarified by being consolidated and removing ambiguities.

#### General

204. In 1978, the Interdepartmental Committee on Emergency Planning (ICEP) approved a paper titled "The Canadian Government Program for the Protection of Vital Points". Primarily as a result of decisions made at that time, the program is dynamic, current, active and apparently sustainable:

- a. Emergency Preparedness Canada is responsible to the Interdepartmental Committee on Emergency Planning for the maintenance of the Vital Points Program;
- b. an interdepartmental working group, the Advisory Committee on Vital Points (ACVP) meets most months under the chairmanship of Emergency Preparedness Canada for the purposes of providing advice and recommendations, administering the federal list of Vital Points, and the detailed monitoring of the national Vital Points Program; and

- c. the RCMP is responsible for the security inspections, except for provincial lists in Québec and Ontario where the provincial police are responsible for the security inspections.

205. Subsequently, the concept of separate wartime and peacetime and lists was discarded on recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Vital Points.

#### **Separate Military Programs**

206. For reasons, which have been validated by the Canadian experience with vital points since 1914, the Department of National Defence maintains a totally separate program for military vital points. Military vital points are on property under the jurisdiction and protection of the Department of National Defence. Although the military program is separate, a military officer is an active member to the interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Vital Points.

207. By agreement between Emergency Preparedness Canada and the Department of National Defence, the military is responsible for the protection of federal, civil vital points located on Department of National Defence property.

208. For less clear reasons, the defence Vital Materials Contractors List is also outside the national, civil Vital Points Program. However, some contractors may be both in the civil national Vital Points Ledger and on the National Defence Vital Materials Contractors List. All the known reasons for the separation seem to have been overtaking by events. There now is a healthy and viable civil program. Defence Production has disappeared as a separate federal department. Defence contracts are now administered by the Department of Supply and Services. According to the Vital Points Manual, defence vital contractors are fully responsible for providing their own protective security. The civil Vital Points Ledger is now automated with the capability of time expiry dates. Therefore, it perhaps is time to review the practice of a separate Vital Materials Contractors' List outside the national civil Vital Points Program.

#### **Vital Points Committees**

209. The federal interdepartmental working group known as the Advisory Committee on Vital Points (ACVP) oversees the national Vital Points Program. In

addition, the committee members sponsor and the committee approves vital points on the federal civil vital points list.

210. Emergency Preparedness Canada arranges for the cooperation of provincial authorities and encourages provinces to establish provincial vital points' committees and lists. As of December 1987, not every province had joined the Vital Points Program. Municipalities are also encouraged to have their own program, working through their provincial committee. The coordination of lists and the maintenance of the national Vital Points Ledger, through the federal Advisory Committee on Vital Points is advocated.

#### **Industrial Advisory Bodies**

211. Some industries, such as electrical, communications, transportation and pipelines have advisory bodies, which among other activities may act as vital points committees. They have a critical interest in the continuing functioning of their industry. Such industrial, service and governmental organizations can speak for a significant portion of their group and do set standards which are specific to their field.

#### **Vital Points Ledger and Lists**

212. The RCMP maintains the national, civil Vital Points Ledger as a computer program. In reality, the ledger comprises thirteen lists - a list of federally sponsored civil vital points, a list for each of the ten provinces, and a list for each of the two territories. In addition the Department of National Defence has two lists outside the Ledger.

213. The lists are classified and on a loosely controlled distribution system. In theory, only the RCMP, Emergency Preparedness Canada and the Department of National Defence points-of-contact have access to all lists. Based on several months observation, the writer's opinion is that anyone with access to Advisory Committee on Vital Points documentation over an extended period of time, could produce and maintain a fair representation of the lists.


214. In addition to the Vital Points' Lists by sponsor, category and identifying serial number, the Vital Points' Ledger contains extensive information about each Category I and IIA vital point based on the protective-security inspection. Category IIB points receive only a partial inspection and Category IIC points are not inspected.

## Categories and Classifications

215. The significance of a vital point is determined by applying the following factors:

- a. importance of the product or service;
- b. dependence of the population on the product or service;
- c. cost of replacement;
- d. replacement time; and
- e. availability of substitutes or alternates.

216. Vital points are assigned categories and classifications, the relationships of which are depicted here:



\* The Vital Points Ledger does not contain the military list and most of the defence Vital Materials Contractors.

217. A Category I vital point is a resource or facility, whose disruption would have a disastrous effect upon the security and the continued efficient functioning of the nation. They appear on the federal list only and, because they are "very limited in number" and "are unique", they are not assigned a point score.

218. Category II vital points can be either provincial or federal. They are a resource or facility whose disruption would adversely effect the security and the efficient functioning of the nation and/or province (or municipality) to the extent that "government(s) should advise and encourage the provision of adequate protective security". Within the Category II, there are three sub-classifications based on the rating score converted to a percentage. Category II A vital points receive a complete security inspection. Category II B vital points receive only the physical-security portion of the inspection. Category II C vital points are not inspected.

#### Responsibility for Protection

219. Allowing for exceptions such as the military protecting federal civil vital points located on military property, in accordance with the Vital Points Manual the policy on vital points protection responsibilities is:

- a. "the RCMP... is responsible for the protection of Category I vital points during a crisis";
- b. "the proprietor or manager of a Category II (vital point) facility is responsible for its security at all times";
- c. "the security of Military Vital Points is the responsibility of the Canadian Forces"; and
- d. for the Department of National Defence's Vital Materiels Contractors List, "these contractors are responsible for the security of their own facilities".

## Total Vital Points by Region and Sponsor

220. As of 29 September, 1987, the Vital Points Ledger listed the following vital points:

Region	Federal List	Provincial List	Totals
British Columbia	98		98
Alberta	84		84
Saskatchewan	37	78	115
Manitoba	48 (c)		48
National Capital Region (a) and Eastern Ontario (b)	127		127
Ontario less (a) and (b)	244 (c)		244
Québec less (a)	194		194
New Brunswick	25	128	153
Nova Scotia	43	61	104
Prince Edward Island	4	8	12
Newfoundland	19	(d)	19
Yukon Territory	11	14	25
North West Territories	9	33	42
TOTALS (e)	938	322	1260

### Notes:

- a) The National Capital Region is astride the Ontario/Québec border
- b) The RCMP divisional structure
- c) The Vital Points Ledger reflects the former RCMP Divisional structure where the Ontario Lakehead District came under the Winnipeg based D Division Headquarters
- d) Provincial Vital Points (3 or 4) had not been processed and entered into the Ledger.
- e) Does not include the military and Vital Material Contractors lists

### Allies do not Have Solutions

221. Almost as though grasping at straws, there is a broadly based desire to copy perceived solutions to the vital points protection problem from the United States and the United Kingdom. Neither country has a civil vital points program equivalent and, neither country claims to have a viable solution to the protection problem. Except for their access to the intelligence process, without any doubt, Canada has the more advanced and active civil program.

## United States Today

222. The United States' equivalent, the Key Assets Protection Program can best be described as in the process of being restructured. FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) does not legally exist and does not have the comparable vital point responsibilities of Emergency Preparedness Canada. Based on a review of files up to 2 April, 1987 and presentations during the 1987 Conference of the State Defense Force Association of California, in the United States:

- a. the Key Assets Protection Program (KAPP), which is a Department of Defense program for critical defence assets, and the Joint Key Assets Protection (JKAP), which is a Department of Defense program "to assist civil authorities in the land defence of designated assets" follow processes similar to the Canadian Vital Points Program;
- b. the processes including policy, sponsoring and security inspections are functions of the Department of Defense;
- c. the first Key Assets List (KAL) of approximately 200 key assets was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 24 October 1985 (same estimate was provided 1 November, 1987) for distribution in separate federal and state volumes;
- d. the 1986-87 re-organization of the continental United States' military command and control structures disrupted staff lines and implementation progress - but the two programs remain in effect;
- e. doctrine and policy "emphasize that the responsibility for the protection of Key Assets rests primarily with the civil sector including management, local, state and federal law enforcement authorities";
- f. because "federal forces are prohibited from being used to enforce civil law", the State Area Command (STARAC) commanders are responsible for the programs crisis plans;

- g. illustrations and background paper/briefings refer to the local plant guards made auxiliary military police and given brassards for identification during World War II (reference paragraph 119) as "300,000 troops for the same purpose" (which is inconsistent with sub-paragraph f, above and with the facts); and
- h. (1 November, 1987) officials assume that the necessary legislation (Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Federal Emergency Plan D March 1970) eventually will be enacted to provide the required legal authorities.

### United Kingdom Today

223. The United Kingdom's approach to their "Key Points" is less than clear to the writer. It almost seems as though the September, 1985 "Brave Defender" military exercise was an end in itself. Both the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence have a role. If there is co-ordination, it receives little emphasis. As only the British can do, they practice the protection of civil Key Points in a military context using a "new concept for Military Home Defence" which emphasized the "Vital principle of police primacy - in which the military act in support (of) and at the request of the police". Quite simply, whatever all that means, it will probably work because of the British ongoing experience with security force operations in Northern Ireland, their threat is more relevant due to the United Kingdom being part of NATO Europe, and traditional British pragmatism provides a degree of bureaucratic flexibility enjoyed nowhere else in the world.

224. "Key Point nominations originate at a high level and are sent via proforma to the Key Point Sub Committee". The reasoning is reviewed and if the Sub Committee agrees, it sends out the travelling (military) Threat Assessment Team. That team first works out how the Key Point could be attacked and then develops a plan for passive and active defensive measures. The Threat Assessment Team sends a report to the Ministry of Defence Standing Committee, which makes the final decision and maintains the Key Point List.

225. Under the Military Home Defence concept: key points are assigned a priority for their guarding/protection; an area "out to 2000 metres out" surrounding the key point is called the Ground Defence Area (GDA) and is the focus of activity ("patrolling and

dominating" and "few guards will be wholly static"); Mobile Reaction Forces (MRFs) or force reserves back-up key point guards at successive levels of command; and under the principle of civil police primacy, the military assist rather than replace civil authorities. It all seems to be an update of the late 1940s-1960s internal security (IS) doctrine and operations used in Malaya, Cyprus, Borneo, Aden, the South Arabian Federation and today, in Northern Ireland.

#### Federal Republic of (West) Germany

226. West German federal government regulations exist for the identification, evaluation and classification of "sensitive civil objects". A draft of federal regulations for the protection of sensitive civil objects and draft directives for planning co-operative military-civil protection were pending co-ordination with the provinces as of late 1984. The Ministry of the Interior seems to be fully responsible for the program.

## CHAPTER 3

### INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ESSENTIAL

#### No Official Intelligence Estimate

301. During the Second World War, the vulnerable points program suffered through a government high-level swamp of indecision, which resulted from either an ignorance of or unwillingness to accept the best available intelligence estimate of the threat within Canadian territory. Consequently, the program was excessively costly in resources and, the interdepartmental Vulnerable Points Committee was forced to frequently review and to re-justify fundamental policy on the responsibility for the protection of vulnerable points because the policy was an impediment to political expedience in the form of agreeing to the wishes of local authorities who felt they also should enjoy the benefits (economic, prestige, improved emergency services at no cost) of the federal program.

302. Circumstances have not changed in terms of net effect. The two frustrations during the conduct of this study were the unavailability of an official Government of Canada intelligence estimate of the threat to the civil sector within Canada during time of war or serious civil crisis, and the resulting divergent views on vital points' protection requirements. If the definition of vital point is valid, then, in the interests of national security, the protective arrangements must be based on the best possible, current intelligence. That state requires that the Vital Points Program be given the product of logical analysis resulting from the intelligence process rather than receiving either raw information or, the current state, silence.

#### Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)

303. CSIS is clearly responsible by law for national security intelligence services. CSIS is still in the developmental stages and productivity consequently needs to mature. The legacy of the past, at least three intelligence disasters in one year (Turkish Embassy, Air India disaster, and the attempted assassination of an Indian cabinet minister visiting in British Columbia), and a series of procedural problems in 1986 and 1987 have not helped. The resulting ongoing media and political pressures to limit the (counter-espionage) security intelligence functions, and the political sensitivity of

security intelligence in general impose constraints which could prove counter productive for the effective planning of vital point protection.

### Intelligence Mindset

304. It would seem that the first skills an intelligence officer learns are the grim, tight lipped responses of "can't comment" and "no information". It is neither CSIS in isolation nor a matter of life and death information. A request to a former Department of National Defence representative on the Advisory Committee on Vital Points for information on the Soviet Spetsnaz eventually resulted in the verbal reply that there was no information available. That relayed reply is simply unacceptable on the basis that Spetsnaz troops are in the Soviet order of battle and the information is reported in various unclassified journals and books. That mindset gives the impression that the system as a whole is not only immature, but also needs to prove its integrity.

305. What is the "system as a whole"? National Defence, External Affairs, Customs, Immigration, Transport, etc., etc. have intelligence and/or security organizations. Are they separate jurisdictions or is there a functioning central collation and synthesis agency with clear responsibility for the timely and appropriate dissemination of any threat to either national security or law and order? Doesn't that include the provision of the threat estimate as a basis for governmental contingency planning? It does in the United States and the United Kingdom.

306. The Senate Special Committee on Terrorism was impressed by the individual departmental and agency "bricks" in the government's counter/anti-terrorism structure and said: "When taken as a whole, however, the Committee is not convinced that the structure can operate effectively and efficiently, particularly in response to crisis. There appears to be considerable potential for counter-productive and inefficient effort, duplications, overlaps, inconsistencies and "turf battles"... in two recent terrorist incidents (the Air India crash and the Turkish Embassy incident), the structure and process set out on paper was largely ignored or short-circuited".<sup>21</sup>

### A Canadian Responsibility

307. Yoram Hamizrachi, a former Colonel in the Israeli Defence Forces, a University of Manitoba lecturer, co-director of the Counter-Terror Study Centre, and a

researcher with Strategic Planning Associates advised that we can't count on intelligence sources outside Canada. Canadian intelligence gathering depends heavily on the cooperation of friendly foreign services, but he points out they are not always eager or able to share. He also says the layman thinking of Interpol in terms of Hercules Poirot may be impressed, but not the professional analyst. Because Interpol is basically an anti-crime organization and includes Cuba, Libya, Iran, etc. in its membership, Interpol is not capable of providing important and reliable information on national security matters.<sup>22</sup> The Vital Points Program must receive and use the product of the Canadian security intelligence professionals.

### Intelligence Requirement

308. The writer was not so naive as to assume that access would be given to the top secrets of the Canadian and NATO intelligence gathering and counter-espionage systems. However, it was assumed that a general statement of the threat to the civil sector would indirectly be made available as a basis for the study. Surely the Western systems are as effective and as thorough as the Warsaw Pact systems. Surely Western analysts have examined the Canadian sector from a Soviet intelligence perspective of civil targets for sabotage, which are critical to Canada's participation in NATO's defence of Western Europe.

309. The requirement is not for names, sources, etc. The requirement is for an estimate of the potential threat to the civil sector within Canada in time of war and during serious civil crisis in terms of potential targets, capabilities (both the methods of attack and the probable effectiveness of saboteurs), scope of sabotage activities, size of sabotage teams, and their equipment and training. The requirement is for general information which is specific enough to permit the development of an effective contingency plan to protect civil vital points in the worst case scenario. In time, the estimate should deal with specific targets such as pipelines, air transportation systems, computer systems, telecommunications systems, etc. so that their vulnerability can be assessed in relation to the threat as a basis for updating the contingency protection plans.

### Conclusion

310. Viable, effective and efficient contingency plans for the protection of civil vital points during time of war and during serious civil crisis cannot be developed and updated without the logic of an analysis of the threat prepared by the professionals. Clearly CSIS is the responsible agency for that analysis. Therefore, it is recommended that Emergency Preparedness Canada:

- a. develop a threat analysis statement of requirements specific to the civil Vital Points Program;
- b. establish a high-level interdepartmental procedure for the purposes of ensuring that an official Government of Canada annual update of the threat analysis is automatically provided in terms which permit a realistic evaluation and updating of contingency plans for the protection of civil vital points by region and/or type of vital point including systems; and
- c. in the interim, submit the notes on the threat contained in this study report to CSIS for constructive evaluation.

## CHAPTER 4

### NOTES ON THE THREAT

#### Purpose

401. The purpose of these notes on the threat to Canadian civil vital points security is to precis and to illustrate the potential threat capabilities and methods of sabotage which should be considered when developing the vital points emergency protection plan.

#### Excluded From this Study

402. Neither the requirement for an emergency protection plan nor the specific vital points are a part of this study. The 26 June, 1987, statements of the Minister Responsible for Emergency Preparedness during introduction of the draft Emergencies Act and the Emergency Preparedness Act re-affirmed the Government of Canada's civil preparedness policy. The nomination and designation of specific vital points is a function of the interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Vital Points, which is coordinated by Emergency Preparedness Canada. Therefore, both the requirement for an emergency protection plan and the vital points list are prescribed for the purposes of this study.

403. During a 10 September, 1987, meeting with Emergency Preparedness Canada staff, it was agreed that foreign air attack by bombers, missiles and nuclear weapons is beyond the scope of this study. That threat to Canada has been dealt with in great detail since the late 1940s.

#### Official Intelligence Estimate Not Available

404. Because an official Government of Canada intelligence estimate could not be obtained, it was decided during the 10 September, 1987 meeting that the study consultant should develop his own assessment of the potential threat to civil vital points during time of war and during serious civil crisis.

#### By an Amateur for Amateurs

405. These notes are based on unclassified information obtained from the media, public libraries, archives, films and unclassified briefings during the 1987, convention of the State Defence Forces Association of California. The examples of actual incidents are included at the 8 September, 1987, request of members of the interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Vital Points.

Because these notes have been prepared by an amateur for amateurs, include examples of incidents, and are based upon second-hand, unclassified information, they are necessarily verbose.

### World War III (Warsaw Pact vs NATO)

406. The NATO, United States and Canadian defence posture against the threat of general war with the Warsaw Pact clearly is based on the assumption that any land battle would take place in Europe. Presumably, the reasoning is along the lines of:

- a. the massive logistical preparations essential for a Soviet assault on North America could not be concealed and would result in pre-emptive strikes by NATO; and
- b. before the Soviets could develop a capability for sustained land operations in North America, they must first ensure both the control of the Eastern European countries and the defeat of the considerable NATO forces deployed in Western Europe.

407. The 28-29 September, 1987 CANUS Landop Annual Review contained the opinion that it is not considered that the military threat to Canadian territory over the next ten years will exceed commando-type raids launched from submarines or surface vessels, or airborne operations carried out by Spetsnaz. As can be seen from paragraphs 424-427, the conduct of airborne mounted land operations is less than an ideal role for Spetsnaz.

408. Beyond the above opinion, the writer could not find a shred of evidence that serious, informed opinion exists which supports the view that Soviet or Warsaw Pact military land forces, beyond the small cell or individual levels, would be deployed in North America either in preparation for or in the event of war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In fact, during the 1987, convention of the State Defence Forces' Association of California, a speaker from the Castle detachment of the United States Air Force Intelligence Service totally discounted the idea of foreign military other than spies, saboteurs and assassins being deployed in North America. To extrapolate further at this time would be pure speculation, not intelligence, and would provide a dangerous base from which to plan the protection of vital points.

## Military Doctrine of Operations in Depth

409. Modern military doctrine includes the concept of special forces operating in depth behind the opposing forces front lines for the purposes of disrupting the highly vulnerable military and civil rear areas, dispersion of the opposing forces, seizing specific targets (bridges, airfields, logistical systems) for their own future use, and interdicting reserves and follow-on forces. Extracts from the Spring 1987 Proceedings of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, attached as Annex C at the back of this report, contain Charles J. Dick's description of the Soviet philosophy, including the employment of special purpose forces. That is theatre tactical doctrine. Under the World War III scenario described earlier, it would be a far-fetched-flight-of-imagination to consider Canada a rear area for a land battle in Europe or within the boundaries of a Soviet Front assaulting NATO in Europe.

## Transporting the Threat

410. There seems to be a tendency in military journal articles to apply NATO European territorial vulnerabilities to North American territory. Another ploy is to itemize types of Soviet Forces with special training without regard for their place in the Soviet order of battle, e.g.: Brigada Osobova Haznacheniya (BON), the rough equivalent of the United States Rangers; or the Soviet Naval Infantry, the rough equivalent of the British Royal Marines. Many of us are not competent to deal with the question of the credibility of journal articles from the perspectives of second-hand translations from a strange language as used in a secretive culture and how up-to-date the material is. Annex C at the back of this report contains an extract from a paper by George Kamoff-Nikolsky, a Canadian analyst of Soviet Affairs, to illustrate the terminology and timeframe limitations in our conclusions about Soviet military doctrine (dogma) on the basis of much of the material in our libraries. If those journal writers have their facts straight, then the Canadian, United States and NATO political and military leaders are dead wrong in their choice of strategy. The question never answered in the journals is what the Soviets would gain from such an employment of scarce, expensive and probably elite military forces in North American that could not be achieved by more economical means.

## Soviet KGB Operates in Canada

411. Mr. Reid Morden, the new head of the counter-espionage Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) stated: "One of the most interesting things found was the extent of hostile intelligence activity and intelligence gathering that is going on here".<sup>24</sup>

412. A CBC documentary film (The KGB Connections - An Investigation into Soviet Operations in North America<sup>25</sup>) highlights the vulnerability of Canada to subversion and sabotage, and illustrates the degree to which agents of the potential enemy have infiltrated and now permeate North American diplomatic, political, military, economic, academic, cultural, industrial, scientific, etc. organizations. There is a vast reservoir of diverse talent pre-positioned and, if and when needed, ready and capable of responding to the commands of a foreign power. Thus both the capabilities and vulnerabilities now exist, which if exploited in a crisis could test the vital fabric of Canada.

### Legal Agents

413. Legal agents are foreign agents legally in Canada: diplomatic and trade officials; press attachés; cultural and scientific exchanges; students and academic exchanges; business agents such as tractor and automobile distributors; scientific, cultural and sporting visitors; members of international agency staffs such as CAO (Civil Aeronautics Organization); and the legal agents of Soviet agent states such as Cuba, Poland and East Germany. Refugees and immigrants must be added to the list as a potential source of foreign agents. The Canadian public has been aware from media reports since the 1945 Igor Gouzenko affair that many foreign legal agents in Canada operate as spies, intelligence officers, and KGB operators. Because they are known, it must be assumed that most legal agents could be neutralized after a war or crisis broke out.

### "Illegals"

414. "Illegals" are agents of foreign powers who have illegally entered or remained in Canada. They falsely live the lives of ordinary citizens under assumed identities and covers. According to the CBC documentary most are so well character-trained that they are not recognizable as outsiders or anything but normal, law-abiding members of the community. Their role is to

conduct espionage operations on orders from KGB headquarters, or Soviet agent states' equivalents, in time of war or international crisis such as a break in diplomatic relations. Perhaps the most famous "illegal" was Rudolph Abel who was captured in New York in the 1950s. The CBC employed KGB Colonel Rudolph Herman, an "illegal", as a cameraman. A defected "illegal", who is a pipeline systems expert lived in Edmonton, which is the western terminal of Canada's pipelines.

### Moles in High Places

415. "Moles" are trusted insiders who are secretly working as agents of a foreign power. As the frequent and regular exposés throughout the western free world have shown, moles can work their way to the top and are often given highly critical and sensitive national security positions within NATO countries. Papers stolen by Igor Gouzenko when he defected in Ottawa in 1945, lead to the 1950 arrest of mole Klaus Fuchs, the German born physicist who held key, top positions in both British and United States nuclear research from 1941 to 1950. In addition to the obvious role of espionage on behalf of a foreign power, they act as "agents of influence". Agents of influence may be either direct by being already planted within the decision-making apparatus or, indirect by attempting to manipulate public opinion over heads of government.

416. The better known and probably the greatest espionage caper was achieved by the moles Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, who were executed in 1953 for relaying atomic bomb secrets to the Soviets. A United Kingdom saga is perhaps more instructive in illustrating the extent and effectiveness of the mole system of foreign agents. Kim Philby was a friend of Donald McLean and Guy Burgess. All three defected to the Soviet Union eventually. Guy Burgess recruited Sir Anthony Blunt in 1930. Philby was a senior British intelligence officer responsible for CIA liaison and was head of the department dealing with Soviet espionage in Britain.<sup>26</sup> Both McLean and Burgess were high level Foreign Office officials with access to the highest classified Allied documents. McLean is supposed to have done the greatest damage to western security by simply photocopying documents under his control and passing them directly to the Soviets. Blunt, who was exposed by the British Prime Minister in November 1987, was a trusted adviser to Queen Elizabeth II. The conclusion of moles infesting high places and being a potential threat to vital points is difficult to avoid.

417. Not in Canada, you say! Our political, military and industrial roles in NATO, NORAD and the Commonwealth make Canada an attractive espionage target. Our national character and public lack of concern for security make Canada a relatively easy and safe espionage target. John Watkins, the mid 1950s Canadian Ambassador to Moscow is reported to have been a KGB mole. He returned to Canada to head up the organization responsible at that time for the coordination of all Canadian intelligence activities. Also in Canada, a Pisces submersible, purported to be the most advanced in the world, was shipped piece-by-piece from the British Columbia factory via Switzerland to Italy, where it was assembled and transferred in the water to the Soviets. Were there acts of commission and omission by Canadian officials in that Soviet technological end-run?

418. Canada is vulnerable to moles in high places. The CBC documentary quotes a long term and very successful recruiter of agents as saying that it is very easy to recruit ideological supporters at the top of the western bloc hierarchies. Many of the better known exposed to date were recruited during their university days. Their rise to the top is not surprising because most have been uniquely gifted in their field of expertise. What is surprising and a warning of the systems' limitations, is that most presumably were subjected to the highest tests of security and reliability screening.

#### **Fellow Travellers**

419. Fellow travellers are Canadians ranging from top officials to lower level workers who are or may be useful to the Soviet espionage network. Some are being blackmailed and others cooperate for money or opportunity. They are neither necessarily ideological supporters nor necessarily aware of the impact of their activities. Many will never have any connection with acts of sabotage. Alger Hiss and Noel Field at the top of the United States' State Department in the late 1940s are perhaps the better known examples. A Canadian example would be Professor Hugh Hamblton who blew his cover with a trip to the Soviet Union in 1975. He was arrested during a visit to Britain in 1982 and convicted as a Soviet spy. He was a long term intelligence officer for Canada and for NATO.

#### **Disinformation**

420. One Soviet defector in the CBC documentary states that "the highest form of warfare is to subvert the enemy's society - it is also the simplest and most

efficient". The Soviets and their agent nations run an effective disinformation program in Canada for the purposes of subversion. It is more dangerous than propaganda. Disinformation is the subtle management of information to lead public opinion to form the wrong conclusions. To be effective, disinformation must be in a credible format and medium. Advertisers often practice a mild and hopefully harmless form of disinformation to get buyers to select their products. Two brazen events reported in the CBC documentary are worth noting.

421. A Soviet agent states' copy of the KGB published a red covered paperback titled "Who is Who in the CIA", which could be found in reference libraries and was often used in writers' footnotes. The problem was that there was a generous sprinkling of false information about Western officials in various capacities around the world. The purpose was to discredit Western agencies in third world countries by making employees appear to be CIA agents.

422. The second event was the publication and distribution of an authentic looking issue of a Winnipeg ethnic newspaper on a day that the publishers earlier had decided they would not go to press. Some articles inflamed ethnic opinions to the extent that retractions and explanations could not contain the spread of damaging opinion.

423. In terms of perceived Soviet espionage goals, those two disinformation programs were probably more productive than bullets or bombs would have been. Some Canadian public and corporate institutions and services, including some vital points, are perhaps more potentially vulnerable to disinformation programs than to bullets and bombs.

#### **Spetsnaz (troops of special designation)**

424. Remember that Canada is neither Czechoslovakia nor the United Kingdom and that their threat scenarios and vulnerabilities cannot automatically be transported to Canada. However, Warsaw Pact special designation troops (Spetsnaz) are a potential threat to Canadian vital points. GRU (Red Army Intelligence) troops, both in uniform and in disguise, seized Prague airport in 1968 so that Soviet army units could fly in unhindered. In a study compiled for the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, Colonel Micheal Hickey, a former general staff officer in the United Kindom Ministry of Defence stated that Britain would be more vulnerable than any other NATO nation to espionage, subversion and general havoc at the hands of Spetsnaz.<sup>27</sup>

425. Spetsnaz - Spetsialnoye Nasnachenie - "Troops of Special Designation"<sup>28,29</sup> are among the elite of Soviet youth, including conscripts and have the highest level of national priority. Units have either a marine or army designation. They are recruited or selected and trained by the Soviet army and navy. They are organized into sub-unit teams of ten persons - a leader and nine assorted specialists (demolition, weapon, medical, electronic, etc.). Their training is long and includes languages, foreign culture, foreign weapons and foreign military customs. Although some are parachutist, that individual skill does not necessarily indicate an airborne land operations role. Teams are not always identical in the skill mix, and some teams are known to specialize in the destruction of nuclear facilities. The United States has received at least one uniformed defector from Spetsnaz.

426. Spetsnaz role is sabotage and subversion. The aim is diversionary operations (to divide, disrupt, disperse, sow confusion), disruption or destruction of services and facilities, and assassination. During peacetime Spetsnaz are controlled by the KGB, and during military operations by the GRU at the highest level of operational command. If employed in Canada during a crisis or general war, Spetsnaz would probably be tasked as individuals working within the framework of a coordinated team plan. Bearing in mind that the Canadians being portrayed as the hypothetical victims of assassination and sabotage are based in West Germany and that the included follow-on record of discussion contains significant clarifications, a paper containing related comment on "troops of special designation" by prominent private-sector international affairs analysts, who are associated with the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies is included in Annex C at the back of this report. The paragraph 410 detail is relevant.

427. Spetsnaz enter the target areas or countries as both "legal agents" and "illegals". They are sent in under the guise of crew members on fishing and merchant vessels, sporting and cultural visits, academic and scientific exchanges, crew on passenger aircraft, as tourists, truck drivers in Europe, trade and commercial officials, agriculturalists, students, etc., etc. to reconnoitre potential targets, to establish hidden supply dumps, and to act as long term "sneakers" or "laybacks". It must be assumed that North America has received some Spetsnaz attention.

## Serious Civil Crisis Definition

428. A definition of "serious civil crisis", within the context of this study on protecting civil vital points, could not be found. For the purposes of this study, the writer developed the following definition: "Acts of violence, over a period of time, for the purposes of confronting and discrediting the established system or authority". Such a state at the national level seems improbable in peacetime Canada. The October 1970 Crisis is considered to have been a provincial civil crisis in which federal assistance was provided. The cause was politically based. It is probable that a future peacetime, serious civil crisis would be limited to a specific sector of Canada if politically based, or to a specific industry, service or community, if the base cause was labour relations, environmental, peace activists, civil rights, ethnic origins, etc. Whatever the base cause and geographic area concerned, the potential threat to vital points would still be sabotage and, because the expertise and materials exist in abundance, the sabotage methods and protection requirements for any vital point would be the same as during war. The extent of the civil crisis, under most circumstances, probably would be geographically constrained.

## The Computer Age

429. Crime, and presumably sabotage, has changed from the gun and mask era of the Second War. According to Professor Fred Cohen, a University of Cincinnati researcher on computer crime, the possibility of computer systems becoming a primary medium for subversion and software (sabotage) depicted in some classic science-fiction thrillers "has become much more real". According to Donald Latham, executive vice-president of Computer Sciences Corporation and a former United States Assistant Secretary of Defence: "The dangers of viruses and some other (forms of) computer attacks are just unbelievable... the threat is more serious than most people think..." The hazards are magnified because network trespassers who are skilled in electronic manipulation are difficult to detect or capture. Matters are made more difficult by the fact that the culprits are often trusted insiders. Managers, who are proud of their security systems should not be complacent because even the giants in high technology are unwitting victims.<sup>23</sup>

430. In December 1987, an unknown prankster inserted a Christmas message into the private electronic mail system run by IBM. "The programmer designed the greeting to copy itself from one electronic mailbox to another - an instruction that tied up vast amounts of computer memory. As a result, IBM's worldwide electronic mail network was snarled for 72 hours."

431. In an affidavit filed in United States District Court in Chicago, the Secret Service alleges that a 17-year-old using the code name "Shadow Hawk" gained access to AT&T computer systems of NATO and the United States Air Force. Secret agents raided his home on 4 September, 1987, seizing stolen software worth \$1 Million and three computers.<sup>39</sup>

432. In the early fall of 1987, computer hobbyists of the Hamburg, West Germany Chaos Computer Club penetrated the secrets of the United States based NASA computers. "Virtually the whole system was open".<sup>23</sup>

433. Bell Canada has increased security on all its major switching centres after it found an employee had been sabotaging the federal government's ultra modern Enhanced Exchange Wide Dialling Telephone system since installation in 1985. The culprit was discovered and fired in March 1987. Sources were quoted as saying that he used his wedding ring to throw switches out of whack, and his motivation was the overtime he was paid as one of the trouble shooting technicians when the system failed. Bell has installed 1,200 similar systems and now has a computer restore service in batches within four to five minutes of failure.<sup>40</sup>

434. Electronic crime has become so widespread and markedly more destructive than the teenage hackers of the early 1980s that the methods have earned their own colourful names. Trojan horse programs are software instructions that purportedly perform a useful task. But hidden inside them is a second, hostile program that will destroy or alter electronic files. Particularly destructive sets of program instructions are referred to as logic viruses because of their electronic ability to replicate and infect targeted programs or files. The electronic chain letter that snarled IBM's worldwide network for 72 hours was "a comparatively mild" form of such a virus. Virus technology has reached the stage where the effects can be hidden until a programmed date, which may be months or years in the future. Not only is electronic crime more widespread and more destructive,

"the police are trailing" according to the coordinator of the computer crime investigation course at the Canadian Police College. Government business, military, industrial, telecommunications, broadcast, educational, transportation, medical, financial and security systems all rely heavily on electronic sub-systems and are vulnerable to computer age sabotage. Because of all the opportunities for computer misadventure and potential damage, the concept of the "disaster recovery plan" has gained new meaning and urgency. It is now an essential element of any security system.

### Terrorists and Terrorism

435. Aside from the "serious civil crisis" scenario, terrorists and terrorism are a consideration in any vital point protection plan for four reasons:

- a. destructive power (fire, explosion, projectile, electronic, disinformation) is not moderated by the semantics of the title (saboteur, terrorist, criminal, 'kook') assigned to the perpetrator;
- b. although the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety did not feel state-sponsored terrorism to be of concern to Canada,<sup>30</sup> evidence continues to grow that there is a worldwide terror loose federation or network aimed at the destabilization of Western democratic society - the evidence includes the 1987 United States governments open charge that the Soviet Union is fostering international (surrogate) terrorism;<sup>31</sup>
- c. the use by terrorists of high technology and/or mass destruction weapons has been a capability and a concern for well over a decade;<sup>32</sup> and
- d. most terrorists in Western democracies seem to be motivated by psychopathological-criminal personalities rather than the political-legitimate causes of the popular guerrilla movements<sup>33</sup> and hence, are in search of a cause.

436. The United States inner-city riots of 1969-70 were genuine citizens' protests over inner-city conditions. They illustrate the potential threat terrorism poses to Canadian security. The flames of violence during the protests were fuelled and ignited by outsiders - the Weatherman terrorists. A basic tenet of the world revolution is the frequent, violent confrontation of established authority. The cause piggy-backed onto, the ideology of those used to do the confronting, and the lack of success in any incident are all irrelevant to the cause of discrediting the established system. The inner-city circumstances presented the Weatherman terrorists with an opportunity for a massive reign of terror. The terrorists were trained and equipped in Cuba by the Soviet commanded Cuban intelligence agency, as a by-product of the sugar cutting brigades' excursions. The Weatherman sent representatives to Canada with a too late offer to participate in the October 1970 Crisis.<sup>25</sup>

#### Terrorism Reference Studies

437. The writing on terrorism is extensive. ORAE, the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment of the Department of National Defence published two overview reports from a Canadian perspective in 1981.<sup>32,33</sup> Both reports contain extensive references and bibliographies.

438. The June 1987 Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety states: (page 1) "It would be regrettable were Canadians to be sanguine about terrorism. As has been demonstrated in other countries, one terrorist incident or a series of related terrorist incidents can preoccupy or paralyze a government and deflect it from its course." (page 9) "Domestic terrorism has taken a significant toll in Canada..." "The current threat originates from (a small, radical fringe of) three ethnic groups in Canada, each reacting to a past, current or evolving situation in the country of their origin". "... presents a major challenge to Canada, to Canadian policy, to intelligence and law enforcement, currently and for the foreseeable future".

#### Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical

439. A nuclear (explosive devices), radiological, biological (disease and toxic effects), and chemical (physiological effects) threat to Canadian vital points cannot be dismissed. The official Canadian involvement in those fields is primarily industrial, medical and agricultural related, and at Suffield, Alberta, research on protective measures against their use as weapons by an enemy.

440. A book, "Technological Terrorism" by Dr. Richard Charles Clark points to "the relative ease with which mass destruction weapons can be acquired, or fabricated, (transported), and utilized, and to what he feels has been an almost blanket lack of response" by governments and the public.<sup>32</sup> In September 1974, the hands of the Doomsday Clock were moved three minutes closer to midnight by the editors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists because of society's increasing vulnerability to "the disruptive acts of desperate individuals or organizations". "However, the use of fissionable material as a radioactive poison... (and) the sabotage of a nuclear facility are more tangible concerns".

441. The threat of the non-military use of biological and chemical agents as weapons has received less public attention, but may in fact be more realizable than nuclear terrorism. A 1976 CIA study warned: "In contrast to nuclear devices, many of these (chemical, radiological and biological agents) are at present relatively easy to acquire. Hence the danger that they could turn up in the hands of the sort of ultra-radical or psychopathic fringe group that would have the fewest compunctions about using them is very real."

442. Almost without exception, writers argue that the importance of populist and environmental issues to, and the rationality of terrorist groups protects society against their use of mass destruction weapons. Such logic should be rejected by those responsible for the protection of vital points for two reasons. First, those who engage in sabotage do not have the limited objective, moral, material, or psychological constraints of small, isolated terrorist groups such as the Canadian Squamish Five. Second, events in the United States and Western Europe prove that fringe groups have both the capability and willingness to make a quantum jump in their methods of terrorism.<sup>35</sup>

#### High Tech Era Terrorism Incidents

443. By agreement, this report is to include examples of incidents as an illustration of potential sabotage methods. Most of the incidents listed in this section concern threats of mass destruction methods and, except where otherwise noted, are taken from the Anthony Kellett ORAE report<sup>32</sup> for ease of future reference.

444. Internationally during the 1970s, there were more than a dozen attacks against nuclear facilities. An August 1976 newspaper article quoting a United States House of Representatives Sub-Committee noted that "the government is unable to find at least 6,000 pounds of (nuclear) material of weapons grade". In 1974, a lone terrorist protesting prison conditions in Austria sprinkled radioactive materials in two trains. An October 1978, article in the "New Scientist" reported that Arab terrorists had stolen nerve gas. In April 1975, fifty-three litre bottles of mustard gas were stolen from the West German Army. In 1976, a factory producing nerve gas for criminals was discovered in Vienna. In 1970, the Baden-Meinhof group threatened to spread anthrax through the mail. Again in 1970, members of the Weather Underground planned to steal germs from the bacteriological warfare centre at Fort Detrick, Maryland to contaminate a city water supply. In 1972, members of a neo-Nazi group, the Order of the Rising Sun were apprehended in Chicago with some eighty pounds of typhoid bacillus, which they reportedly intended to introduce into mid-Western city water systems. In 1971, a fourteen year old subjected Orlando, Florida to nuclear blackmail. In 1977, a hijacker threatened to crash an airliner into the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee.

445. The new-era incidents do not happen only outside Canada and the methods are not restricted to the chemical, nuclear and bacteriological fields. On 25 November, 1987, two hundred and fifty Alberta police officers were searching for five hand held rockets capable of penetrating 27 centimetres of steel or 76 centimetres of concrete at a range of several hundred metres. The rockets were sold by an Edmonton arms dealer.<sup>36</sup> In 1970, Italian police seized Soviet manufactured SAM7 Strela missiles during the arrest of leftists. In June 1976, at the Vancouver United Nations Habitant Conference, the Greenpeace Foundation declined stolen plutonium, which reportedly was offered to help make a statement. On 29 September, 1987, Police seized 913 illegal machine guns, including some anti-aircraft weapons after they arrived in Calgary by rail seven weeks earlier and were held by Customs Canada. The Customs superintendent for interdiction and intelligence said the weapons were for persons in Alberta. A RCMP superintendent said we know where they originated and who they were intended for.<sup>37</sup> In August 1980, a bomb killed eighty-four people in a Bologna, Italy railway station. In 1978, the arson of an Iranian theatre killed more than four hundred.

446. The above listing of examples of new-era incidents is in addition to the computer-age incidents referred to in paragraphs 429 - 434. They are all cited to illustrate that the threat goes beyond the break-and-enter, explosive device, and bullet sabotage methods of the Second War. The new-era methods simply expand the spectrum because the older, less sophisticated methods are also still in use.

447. James Henry Wise was charged with mischief on 13 November, 1987, as a result of the toppling of a \$4 million, one hundred metre high Bell Canada microwave tower near Williamsburg, Ontario at about 2300 hours on 15 August, 1987. Five of the thirty-two steel cables supporting the tower were cut by a torch. The destruction of the tower, which was part of a nation wide communications system, disrupted CBC radio transmissions and long distance telephone networks in Eastern Ontario and Western Québec, including some Montréal and Maritime circuits until two temporary towers could be erected two days later. Bell Canada posted security guards at its Eastern Ontario towers as a result of the incident.<sup>38</sup>

#### Canada's Own Squamish Five

448. At 0105 hours on 31 May, 1982, a series of explosions destroyed the B.C. Hydro Dunsmuir substation on Vancouver Island causing \$5-6 million damage. The sub-station is part of the \$1 billion Cheekye-Dunsmuir transmission line. There were no injuries at the unguarded site.<sup>41</sup>

449. On 14 October, 1982 at approximately 2318 hours, an explosion rocked the Litton Industries plant in Etobicoke, Ontario just thirteen minutes after a telephone bomb threat had been recorded by Litton's security personnel. The car bomb (a stolen 1980 GMC van with approximately 500 pounds or ten cases of dynamite) injured seven people and caused \$5 million in structural damage.<sup>42</sup>

450. Both incidents are of special note because they happened in Canada, were investigated and were reported in detail. Convictions resulted from both investigations. The Squamish Five, who eventually pleaded guilty, were charged 21 January, 1983 with the B.C. Hydro bombing, with plotting to blow up the ice breaker Terry Fox, and with sabotage at Canadian Forces Base Comox. Police also seized about a ton of explosives and a large number of weapons in the B.C. Hydro incident. Charges for the Litton incident were separate.<sup>43</sup> Both incidents provide lessons to be learned by those responsible for protecting vital points.

## Timing of Acts of Sabotage

451. Isolated acts of sabotage are relatively common in peacetime Canada. The expertise and material resources exist in abundance. Acts of sabotage must be anticipated on an apparently indiscriminate basis during any local, regional, provincial, or national serious civil crisis. The assumption is that the goal would be to violently confront and discredit established authority rather than to impair or destroy critical facilities.

452. It is possible, but highly unlikely, that a potential enemy would signal their intentions with either planned or spontaneous, pre-attack acts of sabotage in Canada. Neither enemy agents in Canada nor domestic subversives are likely to be informed about the timing of pending hostilities because of the potential loss of surprise and resulting pre-emptive NATO actions.

453. Because they are known, enemy legal agents in Canada and many domestic, potential saboteurs would be neutralized by the counter-espionage systems. However, it would be foolish to assume that all potential saboteurs are known by the counter-espionage systems.

454. It is probable that "illegals" in Canada, including foreign intelligence officers and Spetsnaz team members, would direct and personally coordinate or carry out pre-planned sabotage operations on their superiors' command after the outbreak of hostilities. In addition, it is probable that individual Canadians, who are either opposed to our system or feel they could advance their particular cause, would conduct uncoordinated, spontaneous acts of sabotage after an attack. The probability and frequency of these acts of sabotage would depend on many factors, including:

- a. the degree of support the adversary enjoys in Canada;
- b. the extent of post-attack devastation and the willingness of the adversaries to continue operations;
- c. the degree of counter-espionage operations success and the resulting ability of saboteurs personally to survive and function; and
- d. the state and effectiveness of emergency planning and measures, including vital points protection.

## Probable Period of Warning

455. What is meant by the phrase period of warning? Do we mean from the initial indicators which historians will claim in their post event analysis that the intelligence experts should have, but failed to recognize, or do we mean from the time the official warning order is passed down the executive net? Within the bureaucracy, it is surely the executive order that will be meaningful to the implementation of emergency plans. Significant time will be consumed by the intelligence and executive processes prior to the release of the warning order. What impact does or should that definition of the period of warning have on emergency contingency planning? The guidelines for this study state: "It is assumed that a 30 day notice could be expected at the end of which all Category II VPs (vital points) would be provided with the necessary protection." That is an assumption, not a policy statement. What if the actual warning is much shorter? How valid is the assumption for contingency planning? The answer depends on factors such as:

- a. how much warning Canada actually gets for future war or serious civil crisis;
- b. the state of contingency plans at the critical point in time;
- c. both the ability and will to respond of the responsible authorities (not necessarily political) at the critical time;
- d. the allocation of priorities and resources, and the procedures for disseminating policy and decisions; and
- e. the readiness state of the applicable emergency system(s) at the time the warning is received and decisions are made.

456. How much warning did federal authorities have for the October 1970 Crisis? What if that crisis had had populist support rather than being the uncoordinated acts of a couple of small terrorists cells? What if there had been a multiple crisis situation?

457. United States national mobilization preparedness planning is based on the assumption that it will be come-as-you-are or what-you-have-is-what-you-get for the

first 180 days. The reasoning is that the military rapid reinforcement plans, the industrial surge, and the civil protection organizations will immediately exhaust the supply of trained personnel, equipment and other resources.<sup>44</sup> The message is that more and better contingency planning is essential for the worst case scenario. In the worst case scenario, if it is not pre-planned, it is a lost cause.

458. One article addresses the problem of how much notice based "on the worst case scenario - (which is) a short notice, all-out Soviet conventional attack on NATO" in Western Europe. Using that scenario and the NATO defence limitations, the author argues that only eight to fourteen days notice can be expected of a Soviet attack with only partial mobilization because of Soviet conventional superiority and doubts about NATO's ability to make good on its threat of "first use" of tactical nuclear weapons. The article also states that there are informed NATO officials who believe that the Soviet Union now has the capability "to initiate operations from a standing start".<sup>45</sup>

459. Assuming the above to be valid, the significantly decreased warning time has far reaching consequences. First, it greatly compresses the timeframe for political leaders to make crucial decisions. Second, it allows virtually no time for public consensus to form, which is vital for effective mobilization in an open society. Third, it places a tremendous premium on speed, which includes getting it right the first time. Again, the message is a clear call for more and better contingency planning.

460. What period of warning can be expected for Canada? During a 1983 Symposium on "Civil Mobilization Planning", the Department of National Defence's Director of Mobilization Planning stated: "DND is planning on a maximum warning of thirty days and a minimum of two days".<sup>46</sup> During the same symposium:

- a. a presentation on threats and mobilization capabilities included - "the first characteristic that must be addressed is the likelihood of a short warning...examples...only a few days warning, if that, of the Argentine invasion of the Falklands... Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afganistan were effectively camouflaged until the last minute... 1973 war in the Middle East caught Israel almost completely by surprise";<sup>47</sup> and

- b. the startling observation by the then Emergency Planning Canada, Planning Coordinator Civil Mobilization that - "to plan for a short warning period is impractical in a democracy".<sup>48</sup>

461. Clearly, logic does not side with those who argue Canada should expect an extended period (thirty days) warning of war or serious civil crisis. There almost seems to be confusion on the separation of the political decision making process and requirements for the maintenance of prudent, contingency plans by departmental staffs which will enable the political leaders to act if and when the circumstances dictate action. The Vital Points Program's emergency protection plans should be based on the likelihood of a short (two or more days) warning period, at the end of which all vital points would be provided with the necessary protection. Any greater period of actual warning would be a bonus factor rather than the potential disaster of erring on the optimistic side with an assumption of an extended period of warning.

#### Soviet Selection of Targets for Sabotage

462. The identification of vital points is not a part of this study. However, a question to which no answer has been found is how is the Soviet perspective applied and by whom. Canada's experience with subversion to date clearly suggests that the KGB is neither aimless, nor unprepared, nor leaves events to chance. For example, why would the KGB have at least one pipeline expert in Edmonton as an "illegal". The argument is not that the current federal and provincial vital points do not meet the selection criteria. The concern is that at least some targets most likely to be selected by the Soviets, and which also meet the vital point criteria, may not be included in the lists. Those targets are initially likely to be the critical elements of civil systems essential for Canada's early support to NATO in a European war, and then the critical elements of systems essential to sustain that support until the war is ended.

463. It may be difficult to identify "the critical elements of systems essential", especially under the Vital Points Program's process of departmental sponsors and the focus on "points". Examples of critical element target selection would be the Allied selection of ball-bearing factories and Balkan petroleum facilities as strategic bombing targets during the Second War. A more current example related to the application of the Soviet

perspective when selecting potential sabotage targets in North America would be the transformers in the Silicon Valley's electrical power distribution system, which if destroyed would close down the entire Silicon Valley for two to three years<sup>49</sup> in today's circumstances of restricted transformer production capacity.

464. It was a surprise to find that some claim that there are no probable sabotage targets in Canada. That opinion evades the issue of national security protection, and presumably has some correlation with assumptions about primary nuclear targets within Canada. One must go back to the question: Why would the KGB have at least one pipeline expert in Edmonton as an "illegal"? The Soviet perspective in a strategic overview sense must be considered in addition to the current departmental processes for identifying vital points. Because of the intelligence mind-set in Canada (reference chapter 3), perhaps the better starting point would be through Emergency Preparedness Canada's representative in NATO Headquarters and within the context of the defence of NATO Europe.

### Conclusion

465. There remains a probability that, at some time in the future, Canada will again experience local, regional, provincial or national serious civil crisis, such as the October 1970 Crisis. The expertise and material resources exist in abundance for acts of sabotage of vital points in such a crisis. The goal in that scenario would be to violently confront and discredit established authority rather than to impair or destroy services and sites. (reference paragraph 428).

466. Foreign military land operations in Canada beyond the level of small party commando-type raids are improbable. Even then, the commando threat is not universally accepted. However, the Soviet Union and any other potential enemy that has maintained a diplomatic, or other legal or illegal presence in Canada has had ample opportunity to obtain legally and illegally sufficient information on vital points and other government, industrial and service sites and systems to design effective, low-risk sabotage. There is considerable evidence that the Soviets and Soviet agent states now have an extensive network of spies, saboteurs and assassins deployed within North America. Those agents in Canada are both foreigners and Canadian nationals. (reference paragraphs 406-427)

467. As crime has changed, so probably has sabotage changed from the bomb, gun and mask of the Second War era. Potential methods of sabotaging vital points cover the complete spectrum of violence and destructive power: hoaxes; vandalism; intimidation; disinformation; assault; robbery; extortion; computer-age misadventure; hostage taking; crippling mutilation; arson; assassination; bombing including mail, parcel, vehicle, projectile, rocket, mine, and trojan-horse means of delivery; and the now very feasible, ultimate mass destruction weapons in the nuclear/radiological, biological and chemical fields. (reference paragraphs 429-434 and 439-450)

468. Isolated acts of sabotage are relatively common in modern, peacetime Canada. Therefore, apparently indiscriminate, spontaneous acts of sabotage will probably continue to occur. In the event of war, pre-attack acts of sabotage are unlikely in Canada. Pre-planned and coordinated acts of sabotage are highly probable after the outbreak of war. In the event of a crisis or war, known potential saboteurs including legal agents of the enemy could be neutralized by the counter-espionage systems. However, it would be foolish to assume that all potential saboteurs, including the "illegals", will be known. (reference paragraphs 450-453)

469. Emergency Preparedness Canada should consider three procedural changes in the Vital Points Program to better ensure that the emergency protection plans are responsive to the potential threat:

- a. for contingency planning purposes, adopt the assumption of a short period of two or more days warning, at the end of which all vital points would be provided with the necessary protection (reference paragraphs 455-461);
- b. in addition to the process of federal departments and provinces sponsoring vital points within their respective spheres, establish a procedure to ensure the periodic application of the Soviet strategic perspective on the selection of sabotage targets as a means of ensuring that "critical elements of systems essential", which are not within the sphere of any specific province or federal department are not missing from the Vital Points Ledger (reference paragraphs 462-464); and

- c. in the due course of time, establish a process within the Vital Points Ledger system to sort by geographic area (other than RCMP divisions), and/or type of industry and service because a "serious civil crisis" is likely to be limited to either a particular region of Canada or to a specific industry or service (reference paragraphs 428, 435-438, 451, 462, and 468).

## CHAPTER 5

### PROTECTING CANADA'S VITAL POINTS

#### Purpose

501. The purpose of these notes on protection is to précis the general factors which should be considered when developing the outline, contingency plan for protecting vital points.

#### Study Task

502. "The purpose of the study is to develop an outline plan or plans for protecting Category II vital points (VPs) during time of war or serious civil crisis, which under the worst scenario, would include the requirement to make special arrangements to protect all Category II VPs concurrently for a period of up to six months".

503. Essentially, the task is to develop a contingency plan with options which identify the five little friends of Kipling fame (who, what, where, when and why) for protecting Category II vital points during a crisis. At the appropriate time, consideration of those five elements within the context of the crisis situation should logically lead to the "how" - an operational plan to be implemented.

#### Vital Point Categories, Classifications and Policy

504. Chapter 2 contains a summary description of today's Vital Points Program. Paragraphs 215-218 describe and illustrate the categories, classifications and relationships. Most importantly, paragraph 219 summarizes the policy for vital point protection.

#### Protecting Category I Vital Points

505. The Emergency Preparedness Canada Vital Points Manual states (EPC 26/85, page 11, last sentence): "The RCMP, through the Solicitor General of Canada, is responsible for the protection of Category I vital points during a crisis".

506. As should be expected, the RCMP plan is essentially a law and order, policing plan. For those sites now in existence the plan is based on on-site, special constable, static guards in combination with an electronically monitored system of passive detectors. The static guards in the RCMP uniform, are readily recognizable as peace officers, have personal weapons and modern two-way

communications. Some have protective shelters. That fixed, on-site system is backed up by mobile patrols, mobile response teams and, if required, the protective and emergency services of the community. The basic, fixed on-site system is frequently referred to as "trip wire protection" because an incident automatically triggers an emergency response. Presumably, during a crisis, most Category I vital points would in fact have a lower level of protection because of limitations imposed by preparation time available. This level of protection surely has a bearing on protection levels for Category II vital points.

507. Two cautions are crucial. First, it is a coincidence that some Category I vital points are now protected by the RCMP. Second, the RCMP does not have the personnel and material resources to protect Category I vital points today. The major limitation of the policy and the plan is that during the surge of police duties which will always exist at the critical time during a national or civil crisis, federal priorities and resource allocations may, of necessity, weaken the protection of vital points. For example, the RCMP had difficulty getting personnel to protect vital points in late 1941 because of government resource policies, military recruiting practices, and a RCMP mental-block on who was acceptable as special constables and how much they should be paid.

#### Category II Vital Point Guard Requirement

508. The responsibility for the protection of vital points is policy and is summarized in paragraph 219. In accordance with that policy, and to the extent permitted by the information in the Vital Points Ledger as at 29 September 1987, the table below tabulates the approximate number of personnel required as Category II civil vital point static guards for "trip wire protection" on a 24 hour day, seven days per week basis during a crisis. The following notes are important:

- a. military and most Vital Materials Contractor vital points are not a part of the civil Vital Points Ledger;
- b. because protection responsibility is not an item in the data, the responsibility often was not clear and a guess was made;
- c. identifiable crown corporations were classed as "others";

- d. because the Ledger is compiled on an as data, time and resources become available basis, and because the data submitted is often incomplete, a large number of vital points do not have their crisis static guard requirement number recorded - they are listed on separate lines with a "no record";
- e. the vital point status of international bridges is not clear and they are not included in the table;
- f. some provinces had not submitted a provincial list as at 29 September 1987; and
- g. at the time the information was extracted, the ledger was organized on the former RCMP divisional boundaries, and some manual changes to match provincial boundaries were made for the purposes of the following table.

PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO PROTECT

CATEGORY II VITAL POINTS

("trip-wire" level)

Region	Protection Responsibility	Vital Point Quantity	Personnel Quantity
British Columbia	Federal	12	457
		7	no record
	Province	0	-
	Others	18	311
		52	no record
Alberta	Federal	2	no record
	Province	1	15
		1	no record
	Others	19	302
		52	no record
Saskatchewan	Federal	1	9
	Province	7	80
		13	no record
	Others	52	573
		34	no record
Manitoba	Federal	3	23
		1	no record
	Province	0	-
	Others	35	474
		3	no record
Ontario	Federal	29	531
		5	no record
	Province	0	-
	Others	236	5,146
		65	no record

Region	Protection Responsibility	Vital Point Quantity	Personnel Quantity
Quebec	Federal	5	64
		1	no record
	Province	0	-
	Others	76	1,405
		101	no record
New Brunswick	Federal	0	-
	Province	0	-
	Others	149	1,424
		3	no record
Nova Scotia	Federal	2	20
	Province	1	no record
	Others	80	1,332
		17	no record
Prince Edward Island	Federal	1	no record
	Province	0	-
	Others	10	no record
Newfoundland	Federal	3	no record
	Province	0	-
	Others	4	83
		11	no record
Yukon Territory	Federal	9	130
	Territory	2	no record
	Others	2	15
		12	no record

Region	Protection Responsibility	Vital Point Quantity	Personnel Quantity
Northwest Territories	Federal	0	-
	Territories	1	10
		5	no record
	Others	22	170
		14	no record
	<hr/>		
SUB-TOTALS	Federal	61	1,234
		20	no record
	Province/ Territories	9	105
		22	no record
Others	693	11,235	
	374	no record	
<hr/>			
GRAND-TOTALS Category II	national	763	12,574
		416	no record
		<u>1,179</u>	

(The notes in paragraph 508 are an important part of the above information, which in general is NOT reliable)

509. If the information in the above table was reliable and if extrapolation was a valid procedure, the grand total of 1,179 Category II vital points would require 19,430 personnel as static guards to provide "trip wire protection" on a 24 hour day, seven days per week basis during a crisis.

510. The state of the Vital Points Ledger should be reviewed from the point of view of contingency planning. It was a surprise that the precise responsibility for protecting each vital point is not part of the data and a sorting capability. That specific (name and address) authority, the assigned category and the precise description and location of the vital element within the site would seem to be the key data for both contingency planning and possible plan implementation. The requirement for the estimated total number of personnel to be employed at each site as crisis, static guards is less clear. An augmentation requirement number would seem to be more functional.

511. The obligation to protect specific sites under international accords should be reviewed. International bridges, for example, were a problem during both the First and Second Wars (reference Annex B). Apparently the bridge problem remains unresolved today. Are there other types of sites with international obligations?

#### Worst Case Scenario

512. The worst case scenario, in terms of the problem of protecting vital points in Canada, is clearly a short (two or more days) notice, all-out Soviet conventional attack on NATO Europe. It must be assumed that NATO defences would not collapse and, consequently, a protracted war in Europe could follow. That scenario, in terms of contingency planning for the protection of vital points:

- a. would require a "jump-start" implementation capability;
- b. would compress the time available for the political decision process and the forming of public consensus; and
- c. could mean a long term task.

513. A contingency plan which will work in the above scenario, could readily be adapted for any lower order of crisis. See paragraphs 428 and 455-461.

*Outlets  
PIPELINES  
ELEC. TRANSMISSION  
LINES*

### Sabotage is a Criminal Offence

514. Regardless of the definition being used, the act of sabotage includes the impairment, damage or destruction of property. No matter what the circumstances are, such acts are against the law in Canada. Section 52 of the Criminal Code of Canada covers such acts which are "...prejudicial to (a) the safety, security or defence of Canada, or..."

515. The National Defence Act, the old War Measures Act and Defence of Canada Regulations, the new Emergencies Act, the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, the status of foreign agents, etc. all have nothing to do with the fundamental law. Presumably, whatever plan is adopted for the protection of Category II vital points:

- a. the operational methods essentially will be the enforcement of law and order; and
- b. either the process of declaring a site a vital point or the definition of a vital point will legally satisfy the criterion for a conviction under Section 52 of the Criminal Code of Canada.

### Can't Transport Allied Solutions

516. Canada's major allies do not have solutions to the civil vital points protection problems. In fact, as of late 1987, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of (West) Germany did not have civil programs in operation. See paragraphs 221-226 for a description of their current programs.

517. More importantly, Canadian law, conventions, organizational structures, resources, geography, demographics and threat scenario are all different from those of our allies. Although allied solutions for vital point protection cannot be transport, the Canadian Vital Points Program can, and does benefit from Emergency Preparedness Canada's very active program of the exchange of information and ideas with our allies.

### Attitudes are a Prime Limitation

518. In an open democratic society, public opinion can be neither commanded nor ignored. Time must be allowed for consensus to form and public support to be nourished for programs effecting social conventions and the

taxpayer's purse. The Vital Points Program is such a national security program.

519. An article by Douglas Fisher in the November 1987 Legion Magazine contained an appraisal of a brief on Canadian "public information on defence and security issues" by a panel for the North Atlantic Assembly, an offshoot of NATO. According to Mr. Fisher: "The brief winds up with a thorough canvas on whether we have a specific national outlook... The short answer is no, partly because our public information networks do not convey and sustain immediacy and intensity in international matters... the brief drew remarkably little coverage or editorial reaction, perhaps because it offered our TV news no opportunity for visuals".

520. Seminars and color-matched brochures and news releases are great; however, they are passive and reach only the converted. The aim should be to reach those who can help the program and have not been converted. Paragraph 211 lists some broadly based associations. Why not a booth or presentation at their conferences, the Conference of Defence Associations, the Canadian Association of Police Chiefs, The Industrial Preparedness Association, the Defence Industries ARMEX, etc., etc.

521. Politicians respond to public opinion. As for Douglas Fisher and the media, they respond to program initiatives of public interest while generally ignoring the mountains of news releases.

#### Expertise is not a Problem

522. Protective security has become a big business with a broad range of skills and modern technology readily available. It is difficult to imagine an organization or site which does not have formal and informal protective systems. Today, even private homes and churches have "black box" systems to back up their members, locks, fences, dogs, etc. Those systems are backed up by the municipal, emergency protection services (police, fire, telephone, ambulance, etc).

523. The larger police forces have kept pace with developments in the technological, scientific, social, industrial, academic, business and criminal fields. Industries, utilities, municipalities, emergency services, etc., etc. have created advisory bodies and educational systems to enhance their survival and corporate good health. It would be impossible for the Vital Points

Program to match those collective skill and knowledge levels. Instead, every effort should be made to become associated with those bodies and systems, and to become a part of their programs in terms which they perceive to be beneficial. Providing it is pro-active and a constructive relationship, it is difficult to imagine a more beneficial activity for the Vital Points Program than gaining access to that knowledge and skills, and, more importantly, earning their active support and participation. Because the policy (paragraph 219) is that they are responsible for their own protection; because they build, occupy, manage and now protect their sites; and because they operate from the bottom-line and have corporate good health as their primary objective - they are in the best position to define the critical elements, the unique hazards, the optimum protection, and the viable alternates. Surely that is what the Vital Points Program is about. The expertise is readily available.

#### Resources are not an Obstacle

524. During the course of this study, the availability of resources was frequently mentioned as being a limitation on the scope of the Vital Points Program or as an obstacle to developing protection plans. In both cases, the wrong factors and conclusions are being drawn from the fact that, in general, no resources are dedicated now for the specific task of protecting vital points.

525. In terms of magnitude, for the Category II vital point protection task, the "trip wire protection" level requires personnel roughly equal to the standing, regular army's field force. The material requirements will also be large. An undefined crisis, which will threaten vital points, may occur within the next one, two or three decades. It would be wasteful to attempt to have the trained personnel and material resources ready and waiting for such an unforecastable event. Most of the resources, including trained personnel, would time-expire before being used.

526. Any government, which decides to protect vital points will dedicate the reasonably required resources. Experience ranging from the October 1970 Crisis to the 31 July 1987 Edmonton storm disaster proves Canada's willingness and capability to respond effectively in a crisis. It is the role of the staff contingency planners to develop companion personnel and logistical outline plans, which, when applied to existing emergency

capabilities, will make the vital point contingency, emergency protection plans practicable. The availability of resources is not an obstacle to planning the crisis protection of vital points.

#### Politicians are not the Problem

527. Repeated reference to the lack of political will and leadership was noted during the research and background discussions for this study. That must be a distortion of reality for the purposes of advancing various causes. It certainly ignores the processes of governing in an open parliamentary democracy.

528. Under our system, the political will and leadership is displayed through the enacting and application of laws, through the budgetary processes, and a system of ministerial accountability. In terms of protecting Canada's security, the National Defence Act, the War Measures Act, the Criminal Code, the RCMP Act, the Security Intelligence Service Act, and the 1981 Emergency Planning Order are in effect. Legislation was introduced 26 June 1987 repealing the War Measures Act, amending the National Defence Act, withdrawing the 1981 Emergency Planning Order, and introducing the new Emergencies Act and the Emergency Preparedness Act. Beyond that legislative process, no politician in Canada wishing to be re-elected is going to approve or advocate increased national security measures before there is a need. It is a management principle that senior executives do not make decisions which either are not their's to make, or do not have to be made now. We should not expect the politician to be different.

529. Presumably the criticism is that of accountability and represents an opinion that ministers are not ensuring that departmental staffs maintain effective programs. There are two aspects of the departmental programs concerned here. First, there is the maintenance of contingency plans including the consequences pro and con, and the drafting of companion regulations, orders and enabling legislation which will allow the politicians to make decisions at the critical time. Second, via the annual estimates, provision must be made for the critical resources which will make the contingency plans viable. Ministers may be briefed and consulted; however, they should not be expected to make implementation decisions before the crisis develops.

#### Role of Canadian Forces

530. The primary role of the Canadian Forces is to defend Canada against foreign aggression. The act of

sabotage is criminal and is not foreign aggression. All, who are reasonably current in national affairs, know the Canadian Forces are over-tasked and resource starved. Under the worst case scenario of a short notice, conventional war in Europe, the regular forces and primary reserves are fully committed to the rapid reinforcement of NATO. Therefore, any plan to protect vital points, which is based primarily on those two components is doomed to failure in the worst case scenario.

531. However, all military options for the protection of vital points cannot be dismissed. There are lower orders of crisis. The use of the Canadian Forces in the roles of Aid of the Civil Power and assistance to other departments and the provinces is both quite common and well practiced. In addition, the Canadian Forces control perhaps the most extensive real-estate, training, logistical, and (C<sup>3</sup>I) command, control, communications and intelligence networks in Canada. That total, integrated system is characterized by three qualities which make it attractive to the Vital Points Program's contingency planning: a well established procedure for providing emergency assistance; a rapid, flexible response capability; and a capacity for quick, variant expansions. A memorandum of understanding should be developed as an adjunct to the vital points contingency, emergency protection plans for the purposes of clarifying responsibilities, procedures and expectations. The actual amount of assistance the Canadian Forces could provide and the duration of any such assistance would be determined by the crisis situation.

#### Aid of the Civil Power

532. There is a great deal of confusion about the meaning of the curious expression "aid of the civil power". Perhaps the easiest explanation is to simply state that this military role does not apply, for contingency planning purposes to the Vital Points Program. It may have limited application within the larger context of serious civil crisis.

533. Section 232 of the National Defence Act states that any element of the Canadian Forces is "liable to be called out for service in aid of the civil power in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace... that is beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent, or deal with". By law, the circumstances are very restricted. Because criminal law enforcement is a provincial jurisdiction, the provincial attorneys general are the sole requisitioning authorities. The response is

mandatory and immediate, and is not subject to a federal government decision. The Chief of the Defence Staff determines the type and size of military aid, and may withdraw elements for higher priority tasks. An accompanying magistrate and the reading of the so called "Riot Act" (section 68 of the Criminal Code) are not requirements as is generally believed. However, the attorney general must designate a "representative of the civil power" (selected police officer) to accompany the military at the scene. Titles and some minor conditions vary from province to province.

### Passive Protective Measures

534. Any considered list of well protected sites would probably include the United States Gold Depository at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Surprisingly, the protection of "Fort Knox" includes few personnel as active guards. Most of the justifiable reputation comes from passive measures, including: old fashioned construction methods, doors, fences, locks, military type obstacles as barriers and to channelize traffic, and modern electro-mechanical systems to detect, measure and monitor almost everything. No doubt there are finely tuned security routines for employees and traffic. That impenetrable mass is backed-up by a United States Army emergency response system.

535. Paragraph 522 makes the point that security has become a big business making a broad range of protective security skills and modern technology readily available to anyone. A modern, two storey, four bedroom home with a ground floor family room, attached garage and finished basement can be electronically protected for between \$1,400 and \$1,800 installation charges and a \$20 monthly fee for electronic monitoring at eight second intervals. That basic system includes: door and window intrusion systems; two panic buttons; an option of a personal panic button; eight temperature, smoke, motion etc. detectors; a central control panel; and an exterior bell or horn. You can add detectors for just about anything imaginable from gas to flooding and a whole range of audio, video and paper recorders or monitors. The sales pitch points out that all those black box devices have none of the human limitations (hunger, sleep, confusion, limited attention, time-off, illness, dishonesty, poor hearing or vision, etc.).

536. The point is that there is a vast range of options today. Perhaps the emphasis within the Vital Points Program should shift from emergency guard personnel to an integrated approach. Many of the options are more cost

effective and, in terms of communicating an emergency state which requires a rapid response, are far more efficient than a security guard who may or may not detect the emergency, may or may not respond correctly, and may or may not be rendered ineffective by panic, injury or capture. Presumably the real objective is to ensure the continued or future availability of the service or product. The optimum protection, bearing in mind the variety of threat risks and related responses, is perhaps an integrated passive and manned system, with emergency response back-up available on a lapsed time basis, and the maintenance of an updated and tested/rehearsed "disaster recovery plan".

### Defence of Canada or Civil Vital Point

537. The 1938 Defence Scheme Number 3 made provision for both the defence of Canada and protection of civil vital points within the context of Canada's participation in an extended war outside Canadian territory. Naturally, not being privy to state secrets, the writer is not aware of any such cross-reference process in place today. There should at least be such a process as a means of defining responsibility.

538. In particular, anything directly related to NATO rapid reinforcement plans and the functioning of the Canadian Forces during wartime should be reviewed as potential defence of Canada tasks for the military. For example, it is understood that the Minister of National Defence and the Solicitor General have signed a 1987 Memorandum of Understanding on the protection of shoreline harbour facilities. If true, those facilities should not be both vital points and defence of Canada tasks. Is there even a procedure for comparing the civil, military and vital materials' contractors lists as a means of defining responsibilities? What about the protection of naval shipping shore and navigation systems? Is the military dependent on the air traffic control centres for Canada and the North Atlantic? There must be a coordinating, cross-referral and precedence setting system. Otherwise, the interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Vital Points will become bogged down in a swamp of confusion and indecision at the critical time.

### How Much Force?

539. The amount of force which is legal and appropriate for use in protecting vital points in various types of crisis needs to be defined. The post October 1970 Crisis debate illustrates the potential hazards of not having

clear guidelines. The 16 October 1970 proclamation of the War Measures Act earned international praise and the support of most Canadians, including 51 percent of Francophones (Toronto Star, 19 October 1970), and all but sixteen members of parliament in the House of Commons vote. However, more recent debate has been less kind and makes the need for a definition more important.

540. Conflict Study 194, December 1986 published in the United Kingdom by the Centre of Security and Conflict Studies, a division of the Institute for the Study of Conflict provides a balanced assessment of the fine calculation in determining the degree of force required to counter the threat, protect the security personnel at the scene and, avoid unacceptable casualties among bystanders. The author examines recent, worldwide incidents and the options for use of force available, and concludes: "For police and security forces the essential organizational goal should be to avoid "reactive control" and strive for "preventive control", emphasizing intelligence gathering and sensitivity to social tensions, plus the availability of adequate "preventive" but minimum force". The issue must not be dismissed lightly because the central issue causing this study is the organizational goal for protecting vital points. How much force is legal and appropriate? The determination of the answer is not an administrative or operational staff function.

#### Powers of Arrest

541. It would seem reasonable that the protection of civil vital points during a crisis should include unquestioned, legal authority to arrest suspects without a warrant. Broadly speaking, under section 449 of the Criminal Code, any citizen may arrest without warrant a person whom he believes to have committed a criminal offence and to be escaping from, or freshly pursued by, persons who have the necessary authority.

542. An act of sabotage is a criminal offence, in which case the ordinary citizen's powers are limited to assisting "persons who have the necessary authority". On the other hand, a "peace officer", as defined by section 2 of the Criminal Code, may under section 450 of the Criminal Code arrest without warrant a person who has committed an indictable offence, or whom he believes has committed or is about to commit an indictable offence, or whom he believes has committed a criminal offence. There is cause for concern as to the appropriateness of vital point guards holding the status and powers of "peace

officer". Indeed, in Alberta and Ontario some options for vital point guards, such as private and contract security guards, may not be permitted to hold "peace officer" status under provincial legislation except within the limits of by-law enforcement.

543. Constables, special constables and auxiliary constables are appointed under the RCMP Act, the various provincial police acts, and a variety of other statutes at the provincial level ranging from public works in Ontario to provincial parks in Newfoundland. They all seem to be "peace officers" as defined in either the Criminal Code or the specific statute.

544. "Peace officers" are being appointed under both federal and provincial statutes, which raises the complication of the "legal status". A Law Reform Commission of Canada report<sup>50</sup>, suggests that having the powers of "peace officer" does not necessarily mean the powers are for all sections of the Criminal Code and that the extent of the powers will depend on the purposes for which the appointment was made and the extent of the responsibilities. Presumably that is the reasoning behind section 239 of the National Defence Act which states: "...when called out for service in aid of the civil power shall, without further authority or appointment and without taking oath of office, be held to have and may exercise... all the powers and duties of constables, so long as they remain so called out, but they shall act only as a military body..." The last phrase, according to Article 23.11 of Queens Regulations and Orders, means that they "may exercise all the powers and duties of constables but are not to be considered constables" (peace officers). Perhaps that extract provides an example of the requirement for vital point guards powers. Although less appealing to the writer, section 401 of the Federal Railway Act and section 5 of the Federal National Harbours Board Act provide other examples of special powers. In any event, the matter should be resolved on the basis of expert opinion, such as the Law Reform Commission of Canada which has the broadly based experience and knowledge of the various provincial and federal statutes. In due course, the appropriate enabling legislation and a vital point guards' operating instruction should be drafted.

#### Powers of Search and Seizure

545. Although their experience should tell them otherwise, many think of a warrant being required for a

legal search. Most searches are conducted without warrants and are legal: searches incidental to lawful arrest; searches pursuant to specific statutes such as the highway vehicle safety check; searches related to the exercise of property rights; and searches when consent is given. Vital point guarding cannot be effective without the powers of search and seizure without warrant.

546. Two important distinctions must be covered by the delegated powers. First, the distinction between personal searches and property (places and things) searches is essential because of the human rights aspects. Second a distinction between the searches conducted by persons and by those conducted by animals, mechanical and technological aids and devices such as metal detectors must be covered by the delegated powers.

547. It seems reasonably clear that the common law powers of "peace officers" includes searching the persons whom they arrest. It is less than clear what powers of search and seizure occur to citizens other than peace officers. A wide variety of provisions in both federal and provincial statutes, including sections 89, 100, 101(2), 181(2) and 299(3) of the Criminal Code, confer special powers of search without warrant on various persons for specific reasons. Section 93 of Ontario's Liquor Control Act provides an example of specific powers of search and seizure without a warrant which could provide a model for vital point emergency protection, guards' powers.

548. One military officer suggested that emergency powers already exist in accordance with sections 34 and 38 to 42 of the Criminal Code and as amplified by section 25. First, those sections of the Code relate to self-defence and property rights. Second, a Law Reform Commission of Canada report, in discussing the topic notes: "...most searches made pursuant to the exercise of property rights can be made only with the consent of the person being searched, or whose property is being searched". That opinion seems to apply to current aircraft/airport security, where signs clearly warn passengers that they must voluntarily agree to being searched or else they will not be permitted to board an aircraft. That does not seem to be a reasonable procedure in the case of the emergency protection of vital points during a war or serious civil crisis.

549. As in the case of powers of arrest, the powers of search and seizure should be resolved on the basis of

expert opinion, not departmental legal advisers. Again, in due course, the appropriate enabling legislation and a vital point guards operating instruction should be drafted.

### Weapons and Lethal Force

550. It is inconceivable, in the context of protecting Canada's vital points from sabotage during a war or serious civil crisis, that the protective guards would not be armed with weapons and possess specific orders for the use of the weapons. However, the role is one of protecting civil property, and the existing legal opinion and judicial practice seem to be clearly that the protection of property does not justify the use of lethal force.<sup>52, 53</sup>

551. There seems to be little point in providing emergency, protective guards with weapons and ammunition if, within limited circumstances, the weapons cannot be used to protect vital point property, fixed or otherwise, from both the threat of and an act of sabotage. The authorizing circumstances must be related to the protection of the vital point property, and not only to the protection of life. It is understood that the military believe that their doctrine on the use of lethal force to protect property has been preserved by the rewording of a departmental publication and operational plan. Surely, they jest! Courts are not known to give primacy to bureaucrats' directives over well established judicial precedents. Equally, the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence special "Rule 7" seems both too complex and in conflict with Canadian law.

552. Again, the matter must be resolved on the basis of competent opinion, and the appropriate enabling legislation and operating instruction drafted.

### Immunities and Protections for Guards

553. There is no intention of suggesting that society can in anyway provide adequate recompense for police, firemen, military, etc. injured or killed during the performance of their public duties. Equally, there is little chance of legislation or regulations absolving their individual responsibility for any acts of omission or commission during the performance of their public duties which the courts may judge to be offences under civil or criminal law. However, in both cases, the Canadian sense of fairness and compassion requires greater efforts on the part of both legislators and regulating authorities to achieve the ideals.

554. The emergency protection of vital points falls within the context of the above. Under the Canadian system of volunteers, it will be increasingly difficult to find personnel to protect vital points if the reasonable immunities and protections are not in place prior to wartime or a serious civil crisis. There are two elements - financial benefits' and protections to accompany the special powers. Regulations must ensure the protection of income, pension, insurance, medical, death, etc. benefits without the individual or survivors having to resort to costly litigation or lengthy hearings. Many insurance policies contain exception clauses such as war, riots, military aircraft, etc. Procedures must be developed which result in an automatic administrative process, such as a board of inquiry to determine that the injury or death was not self-inflicted and that the individual was on duty in the broader sense. The Canadian Corps of Commissionaires provides portal to portal insurance. The Canadian Forces has an emergency status known as "active duty". The RCMP and other protective service organizations can provide other examples of modern compensation entitlements. Certainly, it would be undesirable to return to the World War II situation of personnel giving up entitlements when they "volunteered" to serve.

555. In theory, under a variety of statutes, "peace officers" are accorded special privileges, immunities and protections during the duty exercise of their powers which do not apply to ordinary citizens. Although most would agree that is correct, there are growing concerns that the system is inadequate in both directions. First, one must read some of the laws to see why our criminal justice system is having difficulties, and to see the urgent need for more plain language in our laws, regulations and orders. The protections accorded are at best tenuous when worded: "if he acts on reasonable and probable grounds"; "on good faith and on reasonable and probable grounds believes"; "no more force than is necessary"; "the courts would likely"; and "there is no immediate apparent reason to believe the courts would reverse" (a decision based on the War Measures Act). As implied in paragraph 551, the military regulations on the use of lethal force to protect property are in conflict with Canadian law. The Office of the Judge Advocate General has issued the opinion that regulations and orders stating "that as much force as is necessary, including the use of lethal weapons, may be used to protect vital points... is not supported in law".<sup>52</sup> The enabling legislation, regulations and operating instructions

drafted for the emergency protection of vital points must be in plain language. The second concern is that the training of "peace officers" on the special status accorded often seems as weak as the language. The training of vital point guards must include exercises on the use of their special status powers.

### Paying the Piper

556. Although there was no attempt to compare the various lists or to determine consistency within the whole, unanswered questions surfaced in the process of counting the quantities of vital points and emergency guards required. Why are broadcast facilities, or court houses, electrical distribution system sites, or hospitals, etc. listed in one or two regions and not in other regions? Suggested reasons were generally tentative. The logic seems to be that fifteen authorities have fifteen lists, each compiled on the basis of the particular authority's perspective. Within that context, the protective responsibilities summarized in paragraph 219 make even greater sense. Following that logic to its conclusion, the authority controlling each of the fifteen lists should be responsible for organizing the provision of and paying for any additional, emergency protection provided in a crisis. That responsibility could be satisfied either by direct action or by coordination to ensure someone else takes the action.

### Unacceptably Naive

557. Public literature on protection and various instructions on emergencies make the point that the best protection against fires, bombs, threats, intruders, etc. is the maintenance of a good, ongoing state of physical security in which the employee/occupants of the site are informed, alert, responsible and capable of the correct reaction to emergency situations. One publication advises: that such a state is in the employee/occupants' best interest of protecting their safety and jobs; that the containment of damage through the prompt and correct reaction to an emergency is critical to continued operations; and that outside security personnel cannot provide the same levels of protection. Current high technology articles stress that a "disaster recovery plan" is as essential as buying insurance if continued operation is the goal.

558. Unfortunately for protective security, Canada's experience generally has not lead owners, security

officers and employees to be concerned about a potential threat of sabotage and the required protective measures. Most of us think of protective security in terms of doors, locks and fences. We forget that such security only deters the honest. Ask most Canadians to draw a picture of a bomb and you would get a television/movie style aircraft bomb - not a vehicle, attache case, office machine, parcel, etc. representation. Most of us are at the cartoon caricature level in our thoughts on sabotage and protection.

559. Would it be unreasonable, without in anyway advertising vital point status, to make the maintenance of a protective-security program a requirement of being listed in the Vital Points Ledger? The Nova Corporation has been convinced that good security is in the Corporation's best interests. Certainly, Litton Industries (paragraphs 449 and 450) could have reduced personal injuries and perhaps property damage in October 1982 with such a program. The requirement would not be unreasonable if a package (bulletins, video cassettes, posters) was available free of charge like fire prevention program materials. Such a program could also include an annual or semi-annual bulletin, based on case studies and what is new, and be directed at those responsible for the ongoing security of each vital point. Safety, security and various protective services' journals, in addition to such sources as police, fire and bomb data centre bulletins<sup>42</sup> could be sources of material. The objective would be to create and maintain an ongoing state of physical protection, awareness and expertise in lieu of the current naivety. It is an interesting limitation of private insurance policies that the failure to follow basic security practices may invalidate the coverage. Why not extend that concept of responsibility to the protection of vital points.

#### Define Parameters

560. When it was discovered that protecting Category II civil vital points at the "trip wire level" would require a protective force of personnel equal in number to the regular force standing field army, the reaction was to look for specifications or parameters within the Vital Points Program which would provide guidelines as a means of containing the emergency protection task, and at the same time ensure the lists contain all the critical points. There are none. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, in addition to the vital point definitions, the Vital Points Program should include a definition of parameters on what the program includes and excludes.

## Reduce the Task

561. Sponsors sometimes do remove vital points from the various lists. However, there is little evidence of a positive, active program of task reduction. Such a process should pay significant dividends in both the resources required and the program confidence factor. The lists and related resource requirements should be maintained at absolute minimums.

562. Some of the more obvious suggestions for inclusion in such a task reduction program are: a short, paper process of boarding nominations for vital point status to ensure expert consultation and that criteria application are valid; precise definition of the critical element within the vital point address; confirmation that the owner/occupant has implemented reasonable protection, including plans for various emergencies; a critical examination of both existing alternatives and alternatives that could be created; an impact of loss analysis in various threat scenarios as a means of determining a risk precedence rating as a basis for establishing priorities for protection; and a partial or total disaster recovery factor.

563. An unanswerable concern is whether or not there is a measure of the acceptable trade-off between protection and risk of loss. Risk is an element of life and society. Is loss from fire, storm, vandalism, etc., acceptable today, but not in a crisis? Why? Why is it acceptable for a vital point to cease operations for economic reasons today, but not by sabotage during crisis? Litton and B.C. Hydro gambled in 1982. Bell Canada gambled in 1987. They continue to gamble that the risk does not justify increased protection. Why is a crisis, without an identified direct threat against a specific site any different? That informed gamble or risk is the basis of our civil emergency protection (police, fire, medical, ambulance, etc.) systems and many corporate protection systems.

564. Another unanswerable concern is how the periodic review of individual vital points works. How effective is the process? Paragraph 510 proposes a review of the state of the Vital Points Ledger. Does the Ledger record the requirement for and prompt a periodic review? What tests or criteria are applied to ensure that once on a list, a vital point does not get an automatic renewal blessing. It is interesting that the United States' federal General Accounting Office, the United States Department of Energy

and industry spokesmen all thought that their emergency preparedness system's plan for protecting pipelines had got it wrong and "is incoherent".<sup>54</sup> Allowing for differing perspectives and opinions, the fundamental indictment was that the key asset criterion for pipeline systems was based on outdated systems, which since had been upgraded to correct many vulnerabilities. Is the Canadian Vital Points Program's periodic, updating system any more automatic, effective and dynamic? It should be as a means of the pro-active reduction of the emergency protection task. A long term review and audit process spread over five years of new nominations and due periodic reviews would eliminate any limitations now in the Vital Points Ledger without a significantly increased workload for any part of the Vital Points Program.

#### Organization for Emergency Protection

565. Normal site protective security plus the protective services in most urban centres provides a large measure of continuous protection capable of dealing with almost any threat or disaster. Guarding is only one aspect of protective security. Emergency response, containment and recovery operations may be the more important elements of protection when future operations are essential at the site or an alternate location. In theory, if the protective guard force at a vital point was not capable of dealing with all potential sabotage methods, the provision of an emergency protective guard force could lower the degree of protection to below the accepted urban norms. As stated in paragraph 467, the potential sabotage methods cover the complete spectrum of violence and destructive power. The capability of dealing with such a broad range of situations could be achieved by either of two organizations.

566. The first organization, and the one frequently offered as a suggestion during the conduct of the study, would be a military style structure with considerable personnel and material resources to provide the flexibility, depth, expertise and rapid response (within a few minutes) capability. The C<sup>3</sup>I (command, control, communications and intelligence) elements would take a long time to develop. Such an organization would be extremely costly and, on the basis of the threat described in chapter 4, wasteful. Such an organization for the protection of vital points generally, is improbable. However, in rare cases, the government may direct that specific vital points be afforded such massive protection on a temporary basis during the initial phase of crisis management. If so, only the military could provide such a

force on short notice. Even then, beyond guarding, the capabilities would be limited.

567. The second organization, which was suggested only once by a member of the RCMP, in general terms and outline is the one proposed for the protection of Category I vital points, and which is roughly described in paragraph 506. That organization relies on a back-up system from civil protective services and, if required, the resources of the larger urban community to provide the depth, expertise and flexible response required to deal with any given emergency situation. This second organization, structured on the principles of economy of effort and concentration of force, is largely in being.

568. The arguments for the military style organization were primarily that such a force would initially be able to deploy the resources required to fully protect a vital point against all methods of attack, and not the "trip wire level". Some even advocated a third-world style para-military national police force. With over thirty-six years service in the combat arms including training and employment as an operational staff officer, the writer is not convinced the arguments are valid. First everyone in the military wears many hats, and most special capabilities are extremely limited and are controlled at the highest levels. Second, every organization from food services to armour provides its own protection. Third, commanders determined force deployment on the basis of their threat assessment. Even in the aid of civil power role, the Chief of the Defence Staff determines what forces are deployed and for how long, and he has the authority to withdraw deployed forces for higher priority tasks. In fact, the literature consistently makes the point that the military organization is not suited to the civil protection role. In reality, given the resources at great cost and the support of the larger urban community, the military style organization would probable only match the "trip wire protection" level planned for Category I vital points. Did the military do more in the October 1970 Crisis' protection tasks? Of course not.

569. Canada, being a federal type democracy, is a hot-house for jurisdictional disputes. Federal, provincial, municipal, corporate, labour and a host of pressure groups function primarily in an open, confrontational environment. Each party is vying for either a point won or a larger slice at a lower cost. The Vital Points Program involves all levels of government, almost every provincial and federal department and agency,

the protective services, the unions, the private sector, and on the basis of contentions issues (national security, weapons, extended powers, public restrictions, etc.), many lobby groups. All can be expected to enter the fray if and when vital point protection plans are implemented and stray outside the norms of the law, conventions, jurisdictions, expectations and established procedures. The plan breaking the most new ground is likely to generate the most opposition and to be the least expeditious. The most expeditious plan will be the one that falls within existing norms.

570. Although the federal government is responsible for national security and legislates criminal law, the provinces are responsible for law enforcement and civil protection. Almost always, the private sector will demand the benefits of those jurisdictions protecting their infrastructure and, at the same time, object to any infringement on their management rights. Therefore, ideally the vital point emergency protection organization will mesh with the public and private structural organizations of Canada. Attempting to do otherwise outside of a disastrous, nation consuming crisis would be attempting the impossible.

571. During the study, repeated attempts were made to find a criterion for a vital point emergency protection force structural organization. Each attempt resulted in a list of unanswerable questions about the nature, extent and duration of the crisis. The worst case scenario, as described in paragraphs 512 and 513, and the chapter 4 notes on the threat impose limitations, but do not suggest a structural organization. After reviewing the problem, a systems' analyst gave the opinion that the requirement was for a flexible system of capabilities, and not an organizational structure. His opinion, based on reading the first draft of this report, was that any emergency protection provided for vital points during a crisis will be augmentation of existing site protection within the framework of emergency/crisis management. In addition, he personally could not see static guards providing any protection against many of the sabotage methods.

572. The systems' analyst used three hypothetical incidents contained in this report to illustrate what he meant by protection through "a flexible system of capabilities". First, doctors discover several employees in a factory are suffering from radiological poisoning. Second, snipers destroy key electrical transformers in a grid providing electricity to a large city's industrial

core. Third, a bomb threat has been received in a downtown, major communications centre. Each incident is possible, and each requires a vastly different response in terms of expertise and material resources. The security guards in each incident are almost irrelevant.

573. Based on the above line of reasoning, the outline plan for protecting Category II Vital Points during time of war and serious civil crisis, from an organizational point of view, must:

- a. be flexible to respond to the particular circumstances of a variety of developing crises and sabotage methods;
- b. ensure a framework for emergency/crisis management which has the capability of timely response to any single or multiple sabotage incidents within the broad spectrum of violence and destructive power; and
- c. provide the capability for the timely augmentation of on-site active and passive protection.

#### Doctrine and Training

574. The more one thinks about the specifications for a vital point protection system, the more obvious it becomes that the fundamental doctrine and training already exists in Canada. Public and technical libraries now contain large amounts of information on emergencies and disasters of almost every imaginable kind. Police, military, fire, medical, academic, industrial, utility, governmental, etc. services devote considerable time and resources to operational research, training and personnel development for dealing with emergencies in their fields of expertise.

575. What is less clear is our frontline emergency systems' competence to recognize, classify and quickly respond to the broad spectrum of unusual, potential crisis incidents. Are there directories at the national, provincial and local levels to aid those responsible for emergency/crisis management? Certainly Canada has had broadly based experiences in disasters and crisis which could be used as case studies to develop criteria, specifications and checklists for the audit of doctrine and training requirements. It would then be a matter of cataloguing what now exists and developing what is missing.

576. From the civil vital points site guarding point of view, including C<sup>3</sup>I (command, control, communications and intelligence), the police system has most of the answers on tasks, organization, procedures, resources required and training. However, they do not have the resources now to deal with the worst case scenario. The National Capital Region provides a living-example of civil emergency protection requirements. There are governmental, civil vital point and diplomatic requirements. The region is a maze of jurisdictions and the focal point for lobbyists and activists of all stripes. The RCMP National Capital Region Division and the protective operations directorate provide a dynamic model as a basis for active and passive protection doctrine, operations and organization for emergency/crisis management. The RCMP Headquarters Training and Development Branch has completed a Protective Services Study and maintains a draft, Course Training Standard for a ten day, regionally conducted course to train special constables for "a primary operational function of providing perimeter security, access security and physical security at designated vital points across Canada...(tasks) will include seaports, airports, pipelines and other industries essential..."

577. Rather than re-inventing the wheel, that considerable effort and progress should be adopted and adapted by Emergency Preparedness Canada for the national Vital Points Program. The remaining requirement would be to indoctrinate those responsible for protecting specific vital points, and coaching and assisting those responsible for emergency/crisis management at the provincial and local levels. It is recommended that Emergency Preparedness Canada develop an outline reference system which will cover or cross reference the doctrine, organizational concepts, crises management directories and operational procedures required for the national protection of vital points.

## CHAPTER 6

### OPTIONS FOR GUARDING

#### Requirement

601. The object of the Vital Points Program is to ensure that, in the event of war or peacetime serious civil crisis, facilities and services vital to the nation, province, territory or municipality have been identified and their security arrangements have been determined.

602. "The purpose of this study is develop an outline plan or plans for protecting Category II vital points...under the worst scenario..."

603. Paragraphs 508 and 509 suggest, as a rough and perhaps unreliable estimate, that 19,430 personnel would be required for static guard duties to provide "trip wire protection" for all Category II vital points, as at 29 September 1987, on a 24 hour day, seven days per week basis during a crisis. That estimate includes at least some of the security staff now employed at the vital points. The numbers of current security staff was not extracted from the Vital Points Ledger because the information frequently was not listed and there was no method of correlating current duties with crisis protection tasks. As suggested in Paragraph 510, the requirement or utility of these estimates for contingency planning purposes is not clear. They must be treated as being tentative at best.

#### General Approach

604. Although it is a questionable process to list options not considered practicable or viable, it is being done here because those options were frequently mentioned as solutions to the problem of the emergency protection of Category II civil vital points.

#### Assumptions

605. The options listed should be considered within the context of the following assumptions:

- a. the policy on the responsibilities for the protection of vital points will not change (paragraphs 219 and 556);
- b. emergency protection operational methods essentially will be the enforcement of law and order (paragraphs 514, 515 and 539-555);

- c. for contingency planning purposes, a short (two or more days) warning period is possible (paragraphs 455-461 and 512);
- d. with few exceptions, the level of emergency protection will be augmentation required to achieve the state of "trip wire protection" (paragraphs 506, 508, 536, and 565-573);
- e. actions will be taken to define the parameters for emergency protection, to contain the magnitude of the task, and to shift the protection emphasis from emergency guards to an ongoing state of good protective security based on an integrated system (paragraphs 557-564, 534-538, and 573); and
- f. the worst case scenario of a short-notice, extended duration, conventional war in NATO Europe is the primary criterion (paragraphs 455-461, 512 and 513).

#### **Option 1 - Create a Special Para-Military Force**

606. It has been suggested that Canada should have a special para-military force for internal or national security. Third world military police type organizations and the United States' system of State Defense Forces or State Militia were mentioned most often as examples.

607. Neither organizational example has any advantage or real role within the Canadian context. The State Defense Forces or Militia do not have universal acceptance, are voluntary, unpaid associations at the State level, and are in search of a role. They range from an embarrassing Kentucky Colonel style private army unit in Texas to a useful auxiliary of the State controlled California National Guard. Both the para-military force and the State Defense Force organization would divert resources, and would create constitutional and jurisdictional problems in Canada. An ongoing peacetime organization would be costly and wasteful, and is improbable. In both cases, it is doubtful that a force could be created in time and with the capacity to respond adequately in a worst case scenario. The task would be similar to trying to create a second field army or second national police force. The legislative powers and paper alone would be crippling burdens during the initial stages of an emergency.

608. The significant argument in this option is that both organizations are foreign solutions to foreign structural and political problems. Canada has the capacity to achieve the same capabilities with fewer limitations. For example Canadian equivalents of most members of the State Defense Forces are or could be in the Canadian Forces primary or supplementary reserves. In Canada, the constitution does not prohibit the use of federal forces for law and order enforcement duties. In fact, the opposite is the norm.

#### **Option 2 - Create a Military Home Guard**

609. The United Kingdom Military Home Guard involves the same type of person that joins the State Defense Forces in the United States and the Canadian Forces supplementary reserves. In the United Kingdom, they are formed as a part of the Territorial Army and have a visible role. In Canada, they are a list of names.

610. During the Second War, Canada created the Veterans Guard of Canada (paragraph 112) and gainfully employed them on Defence of Canada tasks and the guarding of prisoners of war. Although many military officers consider the supplementary reserves to be over-the-hill, many are in fact fully capable of and well qualified to replace regular force personnel employed on non-operational and static duties.

611. The main limitations of creating a military home guard for the protection of civil vital points are that: because Canada does not have an internal-security (IS) problem, the use of military for civil policing roles has generally been seen to be undesirable; and most of the personnel who would be suitable for such a home defence role are, or should be earmarked for Canadian Forces duties in the worst case scenario. The personnel concerned are in limited supply and are not the solution to all contingency planning personnel problems. Canada is relatively unique in not having had any form of recent compulsory military service to ensure a large pool of suitable civilians with prior military service. The Military Home Guard is a popular concept within the Canadian Forces. Someone should do a head-count to determine the extent of the capability.

#### **Option 3 - Use of Civil Police Auxiliaries**

612. The RCMP Security Systems Branch completed an extensive study of auxiliary police programs in November 1979. The study traces the main development of the

program from its inception in 1962 as a civil defence capability of augmenting police in the event of widespread disaster caused by a nuclear attack. Gradually, the focus shifted from emergency support to augmenting detachment or local law enforcement tasks.

613. Any police force may have auxiliary constables. They are under provincial jurisdiction. Within the RCMP, they are restricted to "contract provinces having legislation that provides for their appointment". In general, auxiliary constables wear the uniform of the force they augment, receive limited on-job training, are not paid and are generally without career benefits or privileges. Although their employment is very limited, most auxiliary constable positions seem to have taken on the status of being essential to the local force or detachment. At one time, their employment created a labour relations problem in the Ontario Provincial Police.

614. Because they are now an established part of the police at the detachment or local level, auxiliary police must be considered to be an integral part of the detachment or local force capability. As presently constituted, auxiliary police are not a viable option for guarding vital points on a national basis.

#### **Option 4 - Task the Canadian Forces**

615. The Canadian Forces option for guarding civil vital points is the option most frequently and emotionally advocated. This option has been discussed in considerable detail at paragraphs 530-533, 537-538, and 565-568. The popularity of the idea is presumably related to Canadian Forces participation in many disaster operations, Search and Rescue, the October 1970 Crisis, etc. Perhaps there is also a widespread belief that the Canadian Forces are unlikely to be engaged in a war.

616. The primary argument against this option is that the regular force and primary reserves are fully committed to NATO rapid re-inforcement plans in the worst case scenario (paragraphs 512, 530 and 605.f.). Therefore, by definition, the Canadian Forces cannot be considered the contingency planning option for guarding Category II civil vital points.

617. However, as outlined in paragraph 531, the Canadian Forces have many qualities and capabilities which should be taken into consideration in the planning for any crisis operation and, which would not disrupt their primary role.

For example: the Canadian Forces now maintains emergency, mobile reaction forces on standby; the total integrated defence system within Canada will always have the capacity to provide selected assistance to other departments and the provinces; and war will enhance (public opinion, funding, emergency powers) the unique capability for rapid, variant expansions. During the First and Second Wars, the military assisted the civil authorities in providing the initial jump start, emergency protection (paragraphs 512, 573, 103, 107). In both wars military personnel were quickly replaced by civil authorities in tasks not defined as Defence of Canada operations.

#### **Option 5 - Task the Civil Police**

618. During the course of the study, no one suggested tasking the civil police systems to provide emergency augmentation guards for Category II civil vital points. That somehow seems strange in view of the facts that it is a civil law and order task and the maintenance of law and order is one of the primary, traditional roles of civil police. Perhaps, the message that police resources are very limited and not designed to cope with extended duration crises is getting through.

619. There is a danger of gross over-simplification; however, the police law and order primary operational method is to respond to emergency incidents and threats. Preventative policing, in the form of guarding or patrolling, has significantly declined as a proportion of the total police effort. Without intending to be controversial, it must be stated that the extended employment of regular, highly trained police as static, protective guards is wasteful. However, as with the military, there are lower orders of tasking and variant capabilities within the civil police systems.

620. During the Second War, the RCMP recruited and trained special constables for emergency, static guard duties (paragraphs 110-111). The current RCMP plan is for the emergency guarding of Category I civil vital points in a crisis by special constables (paragraphs 505-507). RCMP Headquarters maintains a draft Course Training Standard for a 10 day, regionally conducted course to training special constables for emergency, static guard duties (paragraph 576). Almost any civil police force can, and many do, have auxiliary constables, special constables, by-law enforcement constables/officers, and any other variant acceptable to the provincial attorney general and the law.

621. The RCMP, at least in the National Capital Region, maintain plans for the initial, rapid implementation of their emergency guard tasks. As stated above, they also maintain a contingency plan for sustaining those tasks in a worst case scenario. Two concerns are unanswered. First, has the RCMP initial, rapid implementation plan been subjected to operational research techniques for a multi-crisis situation (e.g. guarding plus mass evacuation due to nuclear fallout plus special operations to detain a mass of dissidents - all in addition to the routine policing tasks and implementing the emergency plans)? Second, do the provinces and key municipalities maintain similar contingency plans?

622. Contingency planners must not lose sight of the first principle - the responsibility for protecting vital points rests with the owner/occupant (paragraphs 219 and 556). That responsibility must include the provision of emergency, augmentation guards. Federal, provincial and municipal police should be tasked only to be responsible for their governments' vital points, excluding crown corporations and agencies. Therefore, the tasking of civil police cannot be considered the contingency planning option for guarding Category II civil vital points in the worst case scenario.

#### **Option 6 - Private Security Guards**

623. Private security guards are those which are an integral part of the organization. The employer hires, trains, directs and fires or retires them like any other employee. They are a fact of life in many industrial, commercial, educational, utility and institutional organizations. Their powers, under the law, come from statutes relating to the exercise of property rights and being agents of the owner. Those powers include arrest, and search and seizure.

624. In some ways, private security guards enjoy greater freedom and real power than do civil police. By virtue of being insiders and an extension of management, they have access to areas and information often legally denied the police. They can indirectly control employment, administrative sanctions and entry. Being an extension of management, private security guards can initiate protective security measures and programs which would be considered unacceptable actions by the police.

625. Unfortunately, the source of their main advantages is also their primary limitation. Private security guards often spend most of their effort on management related administrative functions such as information, traffic

control, parking, employee time keeping, theft prevention, safety, etc. One library reference suggests that limitation frequently results in ineffective protective security because of bottom line cost considerations and administrative priorities.

626. Because private security guards are found almost exclusively in the corporate sector and are a management decision and resource, they cannot be considered the contingency planning option for the emergency, augmentation guarding of Category II civil vital points unless some method of payment and operational control can be developed. Both conditions are doubtful, although the United States did achieve some control of industrial security guards during World War II (paragraph 119). Therefore, private security guards should be viewed as an option only for the private sector's exercise of its protective responsibilities. That aspect should be pursued as part of the task reduction sub-program.

#### **Option 7 - Contract Security Guards**

627. One Law Reform Commission of Canada study<sup>50</sup> suggests that the growth of contract security guards has been so phenomenal in Canada in recent years that they now exceed the numbers of civil police. Although they are regulated by both provincial and federal statutes, the consensus seems to be that they are generally within provincial jurisdiction.

628. The public sees only the tip of this so called rent-a-cop industry, and is generally not too impressed. They seem to be available for almost everything legal. One sales representative of an international agency explained that clients get what they pay for and often do establish high quality specifications in their contracts. Some contract security guards get only a uniform and an address to report to for watchman type duties. Others undergo extensive pre-employment and on-job training. One recent newspaper ad for 100 full time contract security guards contained an offer of 40 hours pre-employment training and \$7 per hour pay.

629. The private sector and government, including the RCMP employ contract security guards. The main advantages for the employer are highly flexible employee levels and limited, financial commitment. In return, the employer risks a low standard of performance and effectiveness. One person with considerable experience with contract security guards stated that although they are the least preferred option, they use them because they are the

cheapest option, are sort of security checked by the supplying company, and can both be put in place or withdrawn easily and quickly. He advised that, in their experience, the main limitations are: little or no training; almost never any experience; very high turn-over of personnel resulting in a lack of continuity; limited familiarity with the site and task; inconsistent methods; significant command and control problems because of limited motivation and self-discipline; they often report for duty very tired because it is a second job or they are a full-time student; and because of their public image, contract security guards are a weak deterrent.

630. It is a sad realization, that there is unlikely to be any option but to include the contract security guard system as an option in the contingency planning for the emergency augmentation of guards at Category II civil vital points. The key is to be aware that you get what you pay for, and to develop appropriate training and performance standards, which may be used as specifications at the time a contract is awarded. Clearly, from a national security point of view, contract security guards should be an option of last resort.

#### Recommended Option

#### Option 8 - A Combination of Options 4, 5, 6 and 7

631. There is no single, viable source of emergency, augmentation guards for the protection of Category II civil vital points in the worst case scenario. In that scenario, there is the possibility for a "jump start" requirement and an extended duration task. A combination of the realities of the national organizational structure and jurisdictions, the policy on the responsibility for protecting vital points, the fifteen separate vital point lists, and the public and private sector makeup of each of those lists almost guarantees no single authority will control the implementation of the emergency augmentation of vital point guards at the start of a war or serious civil crisis. That reasoning is recommended as the background for the contingency planning of the emergency augmentation of guards protecting vital points.

632. Although trite, it must be stated that the emergency plans must not only achieve the goal: the emergency, contingency plans must be practicable, viable and flexible. For the guarding element of the protection plans, three stages are recommended:

- a. preparatory stage - actions to make the implementation and sustainment stages feasible, which includes definition of guard emergency augmentation requirements and responsibilities, understandings or agreements on capabilities and procedures, specification of training and performance standards, confirmation of powers and status, confirmation of operating procedures, development of procedures and responsibilities for communicating warning and implementation orders, a process for reviewing and updating the plans, and finally the period of warning;
- b. implementation stage - augmentation of vital point guards with civil police, private security guards and contract security guards, and depending on the crisis circumstances, with limited assistance from the Canadian Forces;
- c. sustainment stage - adjustments to the guarding of individual vital points, including the replacement of regular police and Canadian Forces assistance, until the emergency status becomes the routine.

633. By definition, "trip wire protection" requires an automatic, immediate, back-up response to an incident. It is assumed that automatic, immediate response should first investigate and second, either rapidly reinforce the vital point guard from a ready reserve or call for another appropriate response. Depending on the local organizational structure, the automatic, immediate response to investigate the situation would come from either the local civil police or the guarding organization's supervisors. In most cases, the rapid reinforcement team would be provided by the civil police or a regional military organization tasked to assist the police. Rarely would private or contract security guards have either the capability or the legal power to deploy rapid reinforcement (SWAT) type teams.

#### **Flexible Response Capability Essential**

634. Neither governments nor private sector organizations are likely to spend money on protective security measures until they can be convinced that there is a real requirement. Therefore, the actions in the preparatory stage are a crucial factor in determining whether or not the contingency plan will be feasible. The intelligence process is likely to provide few hints on the

timing, type or scope of a crisis. Therefore, the contingency plan preparations must be generally applicable to and adaptable to any crisis scenario. For example, understandings and agreements should cover principles, expectations, capabilities, procedures and limitations, rather than precise arrangements for a specific crisis situation.

## CHAPTER 7

### RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Study Purpose

701. The purpose of the study is to develop an outline plan for protecting Category II vital points during time of war or serious civil crisis.

#### Protecting

702. The meaning of the word "protecting" unexpectedly generated considerable debate and indirect controversy about what was expected from this study. Protect means keep safe, defend or guard. During the course of the study, defend was dropped as a pertinent meaning because of the military, field operational mission or task association.

#### Recommendations' Status

703. All recommendations originate from the study and do not necessarily represent the views or reflect the policies of Emergency Preparedness Canada. All recommendations are directed to Emergency Preparedness Canada for evaluation and decisions.

#### First Principle - Policy

704. Canada and most major allies have consistently maintained the same policy on the responsibility for the protection of vital points since early in the First World War. In spite of that, many directly involved in the Vital Points Program seem to believe that the federal government should provide the protection during a war or serious civil crisis. Their position seems to reflect their frustration at the general apathy on security issues, rather than any convention related to property protection. It is recommended that the existing policy on protecting vital points be confirmed as the first principle, reinforced and broadly advertised within the Vital Points Program (paragraphs 219, and 556-559).

#### Ongoing Protection State

705. The emphasis of the Vital Points Program is on emergency protection during a crisis. As with fire, crime prevention and safety programs, the larger benefits and economies accrue from the maintenance of an ongoing preventative state and attitude. The emergency incident

is generally too little too late, and represents a costly defeat. It is recommended that the Vital Points Program shift the emphasis from emergency protection to the maintenance of a good ongoing state of protective security based on an integrated system of education, informed employees/occupants' best self-interest, and passive and active protection measures, including the maintenance of disaster recovery plans. (paragraphs 218, 534-536, and 557-559)

#### **Task Reduction Sub-Program**

706. Ignoring funding and material resources, it is estimated that the emergency guarding of Category II civil vital points will require personnel roughly equal in number to the standing field army. There is a suspicion that the tasking level both may contain inconsistencies and overstatements of requirements, and may not include some vital assets. An example of an overstated requirement is the protection of a site such as a factory rather than the vital asset within the factory. An example of possible missing vital assets is civil systems or facilities critical to the rapid reinforcement of NATO Europe. A major part of the protection plan problem is the magnitude of the task. The resolution of task anomalies should pay significant dividends in the form of both resource requirement reductions and program confidence. It is recommended that a sub-program of parameter definition and task reduction be established for implementation over the long term (more than five years). (paragraphs 124, 208, 211, 212, 215, 218, 510, 511, 520, 523, 537, 538, 556, 560-564, 707, and 705)

#### **Public Opinion**

707. Earlier, mention was made of the general apathy on security issues, and of the potential benefits of prevention directed protection programs. Both aspects are tied to public opinion and consensus. In the larger scale of the life of the nation, the problems of protecting vital points are insignificant, and that is probably correct for the general public. However it is an inappropriate state for those officials, executives and systems responsible for the critical decisions and actions required for program implementation. It is recommended that a subdued information program be initiated to inform and cultivate the support of individuals in positions and organizations important to sustaining the program and implementing protective measures. (paragraphs 211, 520, and 523).

## Intelligence Process

708. Unlike the United Kingdom and United States, the product of the intelligence process is not readily available to contingency planners in Canada. It is not a case of access to state secrets, sources or names. It is not even a life and death matter. It is simply a matter of planning on the basis of the best available and most reliable information. The self-help intelligence process is a dangerous base from which to develop national emergency plans for the protection of vital points. It is recommended that a high level, interdepartmental procedure be established to ensure that an official, annual update of the threat analysis is automatically provided as a basis for evaluating and updating the vital points emergency protection plans. (Chapter 3)

## Threat to Civil Vital Points

709. Chapter 4 discusses and illustrates the potential threat to vital points in great detail. The threat is sabotage covering the complete spectrum of violence and destructive power (paragraph 467), by small cells or individuals (paragraphs 465 and 466). Sabotage, like crime, has changed from the break and enter, gun and bomb methods of the Second War era, and requires an equally radical change in thinking and protective measures. There is little evidence of such change permeating the Vital Points Program. There is little evidence of the application of the potential enemies' perspective on what is vital within Canada. The assumptions about the enemies' operational capabilities and, hence the anticipated period of warning are a concern. Therefore, it is recommended that:

- a. for contingency planning purposes, the assumption of a short (two or more days) warning period be adopted (paragraphs 455-461);
- b. a procedure be established to ensure the periodic application of the potential enemies' perceptions of vital points within Canada (paragraphs 462-464);
- c. because there is a broad scale of threat and serious civil crisis scenarios, a flexible sorting capability be added to the Vital Points Ledger in the due course of time (paragraphs 428, 435-438, 451, 462, and 468); and

- d. an information sub-program be initiated within the Vital Points Program to elevate perceptions of crime and sabotage from the Second War era methods to the era of high technology crime, mass destruction weapons, terrorism, and mind manipulating communications. (paragraph 467 and Chapter 4 generally)

### The Law and Protective Security

710. Daily media reports and parliamentary debates illustrate the legal implications and problems of emergency measures and national security issues. The human rights legislation and evolving judicial powers are jolting public perceptions and many accepted law and order practices. How will an emergency organization perform when the professionals are unsure and having problems working within the law? It is recommended that experts, who have broadly based knowledge and experience in those specific aspects of federal and provincial law, determine and define the legal implications and criteria of protecting civil vital points property during war and during serious civil crises. The investigation should include the use of persons who are not "peace officers" as well as the police. If there is a requirement for enabling legislation or emergency regulations and orders, they should be drafted as an adjunct of that review process. Quite simply the process must go beyond the legal discussions and conflicting opinions now on departmental files, and must be specific to vital points in various emergency scenarios. Among other issues, the review must include:

- a. criteria for an offence of sabotage under Section 52 of the Criminal Code and the relationship to any legal requirements on the designation of vital points (paragraph 515);
- b. use of appropriate and legal force in terms and for conditions which are understandable to vital point owners and emergency guards (paragraphs 539-540);
- c. power of arrest for vital point guards (paragraphs 541-544);
- d. powers of search and seizure, without warrant, for vital point guards (paragraphs 545-549);

- c. the possession of weapons and the use of lethal force by vital points guards, including for the protection of vital points' fixed and movable property (paragraphs 550-552); and
- f. immunities and protections to be afforded vital point guards by their source of origin (police, persons other than "peace officers", military, private security guards and contract security guards) while performing their duties during a crisis incident (paragraphs 553-555).

### **Doctrine and Operating Procedures**

711. The time of deployment of a diverse protective force is not the optimum time for developing operational procedures, tactics and other fundamental doctrine. Now is the time to start and to plan to produce a manual in due course. To be meaningful, it must be based on a protective force general outline organizational structure which can be adapted to any region and scenario, and must deal precisely with the paragraph 710 issues. It is recommended that, in due course, doctrine for protecting vital points be developed and promulgated in a manual under Emergency Preparedness Canada's control (paragraph 710 including secondary references and paragraphs 570-577).

712. Much has been already accomplished in the field of developing provincial and local or municipal emergency crisis management capabilities. It is recommended that those capabilities be reviewed: first, to ensure that all vital points fall within the boundaries of such a system; and, second, that sabotage incidents are included as a potential crisis (paragraphs 573, 575 and 577).

### **Regional Protective Security Coordination**

713. Human nature explains many phenomena. However, it does not explain why some of us, without rational justification, demand that we also be declared a nuclear target zone, protected area, vital point, etc. Neither does it explain why some feel that they personally need to develop defence, and law and order plans and forces. Those phenomena are normal in some circles and in emergencies, and are often afflictions suffered by responsible officials. The consequences can be wasted time, governmental indecision and deflected resources. A perusal of historical examples will re-inforce the recommendations concerning the intelligence process made

in paragraph 708. It is recommended that a system of regional protective-security coordinators be established to evaluate and objectively recommend the appropriate reaction to such requests and proposals made within the Vital Points Program, and to provide a local source of expertise and advice (paragraph 115 and Annex B).

### **Guarding Category II Civil Vital Points**

714. The purpose of this study and much of the initial focus during the study was a search for the holy grail. The reality is that there is no single, practicable solution to the problem of protecting Category II vital points during a war or serious civil crisis. Paragraphs 704, 705, 706, 711 and 712 propose essential elements for their protection. It is recommended that the emergency guarding element be based on a three stage contingency plan for the augmentation of vital point integrated protective systems: a preparatory stage extending from the present to the end of the period of warning; an implementation stage; and a sustainment stage. Depending on the period of warning, the implementation stage may be a distinct, limited duration containment operation, or may blend with sustainment. It is recommended that for the worst case scenario, the contingency plan be based on the need for a limited duration containment operation using civil police, private security guards, contract security guards, and any Canadian Forces assistance permitted by the crisis situation. Canadian Forces personnel and regular police would be quickly replaced by other resources and adjustments made during the sustainment stage. (paragraphs 605 and 631-634)

### **Training**

715. Every day, television news projects into our homes the hazards and horrors of emergency measures for maintaining law and order in Poland, South Korea, South Africa, labour unrest incidents, etc. Even the use of only regular civil police does not prevent excesses. Command, control, communications, and intelligence (information) (C3I) are always difficult. The emergency protection of civil vital points could create similar isolated scenarios without the provision of adequate training and structural discipline. The RCMP, the Canadian Forces, and presumably most police forces have training systems. However, provision must be made for training all others guarding vital points in a crisis, and for teaching and practising everyone in the unique elements of guarding civil vital points. As stated in paragraph 576, the RCMP maintains a Course Training

Standard and concept for training their own vital point guards. Military recruit training, local training and the Base Defence Force Leaders course provide a measure of relevant skills and knowledge within the Canadian Forces. It is recommended that with assistance from both the RCMP and the Canadian Forces, Emergency Preparedness Canada draft and maintain a course training package for vital point guarding. The package would have to be flexible enough for adaptation and adoption by police, military variants and private industry. The flexibility would have to include provisions for a concentrated course, on-job training modules, regional courses, on-site courses, etc. Provision would also have to be made for weapon training and firing.

716. When the policy, doctrine and training for vital point protective operations is known, the information must be disseminated. It is recommended that the outline information be inserted in the Vital Points Manual, applicable courses at the Canadian Emergency Preparedness College and the Canadian Police College, and the agenda of suitable seminars, symposiums and conferences.

#### **Miscellaneous Recommendations**

717. The study contains a large number of ideas and suggestions for refinements not directly related to protecting vital points. Those topics are not listed in this Chapter.

718. In addition, some recommendations are contained in the report, which have a bearing on protection, but do not warrant discussion here. It is recommended that:

- a. consideration be given to merging the Vital Materiels Contractor List into the federal, civil vital points list (paragraph 208);
- b. a process be developed for referral and cross checking between defence of Canada tasks, the military vital points and the civil vital points (paragraphs 212 and 537-538);
- c. the active program of exchange of information with allied programs continue (paragraph 517);
- d. efforts continue to find a system for making Vital Point Lists more secure (paragraph 213);

- e. the Vital Points Ledger be reviewed to ensure it can provide the data essential for effective contingency planning (paragraphs 510 and 556);
- f. a process for recording existing memorandums of understanding and other agreements related to vital point type tasks be established, and that it be confirmed they contain the optimum arrangements; and
- g. if the above agreements do not include conceptual arrangements for Canadian Forces assistance in the emergency guarding of civil vital points, such an arrangement be completed (paragraphs 531 and 634).

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OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

Memorandum

TO:

C.G.S.

October 8, 1941.

Re: Allotment of Responsibility for Guarding  
Vulnerable Points

With reference to my memorandum of 16th August and yours of 23rd August on the above matter:

I have gone over the draft form letter again and have made some further corrections.

I have had it discussed with Mr. MacNeill of the Department of Justice. He thinks that from the civilian point of view it covers the situation.

If you concur from the Service point of view, will you please have this form passed on for use in appropriate cases.

(sgd) J.L.R.

DRAFT OF FORM LETTER

Re: Allotment of Responsibility for  
Guarding Vulnerable Points

1. Introduction appropriate to specific letter to which acknowledgment is to be made.
2. The question of the protection of vulnerable points in Canada in time of war was carefully examined and reported on by a special inter-departmental committee during the Spring and early Summer of 1939. The Committee's report was duly approved by the Government as were its later recommendations under the same head subsequent to the outbreak of the war, that is to say, in the late Autumn of 1939. Although during the past two years this question has been under constant review, no good reason has appeared to indicate the desirability of changing this policy.
3. Incidentally, the Government's policy in respect of the guarding of vulnerable points is precisely the same as that adopted in the United Kingdom. Briefly stated, it is based on the principle that the maintenance of law and order and the protection of life and property is the responsibility, not of the Military, but of the Civil authority, and that in time of war this responsibility continues to devolve on the same authority on which it rests in time of peace.
4. The foregoing, of course, refers only to the protection of persons and property from the actions of evilly disposed persons and is not to be confused with the Dominion Government's responsibility to defend the national territory and all it contains from attack by the organized military forces of an enemy. This duty, of course, devolves upon the Fighting Forces.
5. In implementing this policy, a few exceptions have been made, notable in respect of the guarding of the Ontario Hydro Electric plants in the Niagara area and also at one or two isolated points, where, because of their geographical location and vital importance, military protection has been afforded. Again the Dominion Government, on the civilian side has assumed a measure of responsibility for the guarding of other facilities vital to its war effort, namely, the protection of important

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vulnerable points on the two trans-Canada railways, dry-docks, canals and so on. Responsibility for guard duties at these points has been assumed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The general rule is, however, that responsibility for provincial, municipal and private works and establishments devolves upon the proprietor and the local police.

6. From the foregoing it will be seen that there is a clear division of responsibility in the matter of defence against the armed forces of the enemy (which is the business of the Fighting Forces) and the protection of life and property against the actions of evilly disposed persons (which is the business of the Police) and that in these circumstances it is in the national interest that the Army ought to confine its activities within its own sphere.

7. In these circumstances, etc., it is regretted that .....(a conclusion appropriate to the letter under reply).

.....

(Copied from Directorate of History  
reference file 112.1(39))

Meeting of  
Committee on Vulnerable Points  
November 3rd, 1941.

Mr. Chairman - Honourable Mr. Angus L. Macdonald  
(Minister of National Defence for  
the Naval Services)

Present: J.F. MacNeill, Department of Justice  
M.A. Pope, Brig., V.C.G.S.  
R.B. Gibson, Col., Oprs.  
R.G. Johnson, Dept of Munitions and Supply  
J.M. Somerville, Dept. of Public Works  
M.T. Sheard, Air Services.  
R.L. Cadiz, Deputy Commr., R.C.M.P.  
Inspector Fraser, R.C.M.P.

Chairman: I have before me, gentlemen, several letters  
having to do with vulnerable points.

MOHAWK BITUMINOUS MINES, LIMITED

Letter referring to what the company considers  
a vulnerable point at each of its coal mines  
and makes certain suggestions with regard to  
protection which should be given such points.

INTERPROVINCIAL BRIDGE AT HAWKESBURY AND  
CARTRIDGE FACTORY AT BROWNSBURG.

Letter suggesting gun protection against  
air-craft, as both would be in line with any  
possible enemy air attack on either Montreal or  
Ottawa.

PORT OF COUNTRY HARBOUR, NOVA SCOTIA

Letter advising that this Port is well known to  
many enemy master mariners, they having sailed  
in and out during peace time with cargoes and  
the fact that it is an isolated, sheltered and  
unfortified spot, makes it ideal for a  
submarine hideout as it is nearly 5 miles  
from the nearest house, with the very best of  
deep water entirely hidden from open sea.

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WHIRLPOOL RAPIDS BRIDGE Letter advising that the following resolution had been adopted by Directors of their Company. "That the civil guards appointed two years ago for the protection of the Whirlpool Rapids Bridge from sabotage, etc., be notified their services are dispensed with October 15th, 1941, and that a copy of resolution be passed to Hon. J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence." Letter states work done by civil guards and denotes urgency and necessity of bridge being placed under military control.

CITIES OF WINDSOR, BRANTFORD AND SARNIA

Letter objecting to the decision of the Federal Government that the Cities of Ottawa, Toronto and Hamilton are alone vulnerable areas, asking that action be reconsidered by the Federal Government with a view to providing adequate protection and equipment for other vital areas in the Dominion.

CITY OF ST. CATHARINES

Letter requesting Federal Government to officially recognize Niagara Peninsula as a vulnerable area.

WELLAND CANAL

Letter from R.E. Barry, New London, Conn., a former American Naval Officer, advising that the defence of the locks of the Welland Canals is as important as that of the Panama Canal, mentioning the possibility of German Dive Bombers routed north of the great circle attacking same.

LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
DOMINION AFFAIRS

Letter from Mr. Churchill to Prime Minister, urging that the report of Brig. Craig be studied carefully and everything be done to make good what Craig recommended. They have found that you require an efficient security service and good system of protected areas.

.../3

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- Chairman: Is there any feeling that we should change our policy with regard to the foregoing? I got the idea at one time that I should get out of this and that I should get some military man to take over the chairmanship. I am a little disturbed about this accumulation of stuff which will keep growing. A man should be appointed to look after these things. Is there any feeling that we should alter our policy in any regard?
- Mr. Cadiz: Under present circumstances, we are unable to get men for such responsible duties. We increased our staff by 30 men, and I think that the reports have been very satisfactory. My ideas are unchanged.
- Chairman: Do you feel that you can carry on with your present work?
- Mr. Cadiz: Yes, provided we get assistance from the Army. Necessary personnel needed. Men are better paid by factories, therefore, our men are leaving. We have 1429 Special Constables.
- Chairman: Do you think that it may be necessary to take men from the Army and detail them for this work?
- Mr. Cadiz: All we have are War Veterans. We must get men from Montreal to go to the Welland Canal. Request Veterans of Canada be released to us.
- Brig. Pope: The proposal was, Sir, that men who were eligible for discharge might be useful. Draftees might be moved around.
- CONCLUSION: "Men of low category in the Army might be seconded to R.C.M.P. for constabulary duties."
- Chairman: Are we to continue to say to all these people that they must guard their own plants?
- Brig. Pope: I should think so, Sir.
- Mr. MacNeill: The matter was considered on three occasions. There have been no enemy attacks whatsoever. There is no reason to change our policy. Responsibility falls on General Managers and Directors for looking after their establishments.

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- Chairman: With regard to Whirlpool Rapids Bridge - guards to be withdrawn - freight increased to 900 cars per day - protection given by civil guards not at all satisfactory - should be placed under military control. Suppose they have withdrawn guards: what are we to do?
- Brig. Pope: That is but a threat, Sir. They should be advised by a form letter.
- Chairman: With regard to coal mines, it is pointed out: "The vulnerable point of each coal mine is its tipple, and if this were destroyed, either by fire or by explosion, operations could not be resumed, normally, in less than six months." That is true, what can we do?
- Brig. Pope: Every industry has its own troubles. R.C.M.P. had similar troubles in 1932, and they got around it. That is the same principle as in peacetime.
- Mr. MacNeill: That is the policy in the United States.
- Chairman: Mr. Hoover, F.B.I. man, in the United States, has written an article which appeared in a current magazine, urging pretty much our policy that they get skilled men, like R.C.M.P., to tell them what to do and that they should go ahead and do it, i.e., what doors to be protected, etc., etc.
- Brig. Pope: Yes, Hoover approved of our general plan. Same principle involved in States. Everyone looks after their own plant. A plant manager can do it for at least one-quarter of the cost of the Army. Army more expensive and not so good. It is an expensive item and the Army is not geared for this purpose.
- Chairman: We had better tell them all then to go ahead and do their own? One man raises this point: "He could insure against these bridges". Surely, they must exaggerate the accuracy of these bombers, as the place seems well protected.
- Brig. Pope: As we cannot protect Halifax or Sydney as yet, we had better forget our mines for the present. Plan too far fetched. R.C.M.P. should be held responsible.

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Chairman: Is there any feeling that we should change?  
Or, should we hang on to our policy?

All agreed - No change.

Chairman: What about Halifax?

Report to be made at the end of the month. We increased the guards at Halifax and it is now satisfactory.

Chairman: There used to be complaints that some roads were guarded and others weren't. Surely someone should look after that.

It is impossible to get through guards in Halifax, as I have been down recently. Of course, one never knows when one may slip through. However, we hope to get special constables.

NOTE: Superintendent Ames of the R.C.M.P., who is in charge of security work at Halifax, will report at the end of this month.

Chairman: Have you any point that you wish to raise?

The only thing is that "Trail" situation. Saboteurs organized in the United States could shape up an invasion.

F.B.I. assure us that situation in Washington is very closely watched.

Chairman: How quickly could they get up from Seattle, supposing they left at sundown?

There are two points that are not guarded. I might suggest that the solution of this might be if an extra immigration officer be placed there. We haven't accommodation there at all. In winter months we have but one man there.

We should put it up to immigration officials to do their work by night as well as by day.

Chairman: How many men have you at Trail?

- 6 -

Col Gibson: We have four platoons, 140 men, of Veterans' Guard, who are stationed strategically. These fellows are in uniform. Trail is a little different from most other plans. It is but a "Show Force". They are just there as a Reserve in the event of the Company calling them. (Guard) Company changes every month. It is the training and rest station of the Veterans' Guard.

Chairman: Wouldn't they have an outpost down the road somewhere. How far is junction from Smelters?

Approximately three miles. It might be alright to put an outpost at the junction. Bridges and railways are to be protected.

Chairman: How big a place is Trail?

Quite large, although town is consolidated in a small area.

Chairman: The only thing I would suggest is the possibility of a small outpost down the road.

Brig Pope: Commissioner Wood has stated that there is no need for anything at Trail.

It is purely a question of communications at Trail.

Chairman: What does Alexander think of it?

He points out that its conceivable in spite of R.C.M.P. advice to the contrary.

If there is reporting by day, there should also be reporting by night.

NOTE: Immigration cannot supply extra men.

Chairman: Decision is that we let Trail stand as it is?

All agreed.

NOTE: Immigration should be asked. Possibly they might do it some other way.

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"Patson" - two men, stationary.  
"Waneta" - summer only.  
"Nelway" - summer only.

(All points on road.)

Radio communication is asked for. Alexander requested same.

NOTE: There are coastal defences at Rupert. Shipyards and docks are of vital importance.  
Military guard dry docks only.  
Grenadier Guards from Montreal are in Saint John.

Chairman: Has anyone any point to raise?

Meeting adjourned.



PROCEEDINGS, SPRING 1987

ANNEX C

# THE SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE

EDITED BY BRIAN MACDONALD

Extracts reproduced by permission:

- pages 17 to 21, George Kamoff-Nikolsky on the evolution of Soviet doctrine;
- pages 90 to 95, Charles J. Dick on Soviet military operations in depth; and
- pages 123 to 135, Maurice Tugwell on Soviet unconventional operations.

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**The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies**

**1 St. Clair Avenue West, Suite 1202**

**Toronto, Ontario, M4V 1K6**

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# 1 The Soviet View of the Nuclear Option

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GEORGE KAMOFF-NICOLSKY

## THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

Brian MacDonald

Colonel Sosnkowski, a member of the executive committee of the Institute and a former Director of Artillery and military attaché in Bonn, will chair the first panel of the morning.

Colonel Sosnkowski

The first speaker, George Kamoff-Nicolosky, retired in 1983 from the position of Director of Strategic Analysis, but is still working as a consultant for studies of Soviet military doctrine and strategy in the nuclear era.

George Kamoff-Nicolosky was educated at the University of British Columbia, London University, and Carleton University in Ottawa, where he was a senior visiting research fellow of the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs. He is also a graduate of the National Defence College of Canada.

George was commissioned in 1938, was mobilized in 1939, and served throughout the war in regimental, staff and intelligence appointments. After the war he remained in Germany on the intelligence staff reporting to the British Foreign Office, and later served in similar British and Canadian appointments at several European posts, until he returned to Canada in 1955.

18 GEORGE KAMOFF-NICOLSKY

George Kamoff-Nicolosky's very distinguished career has always called on in-depth research and analysis. At the moment he is writing a book on Soviet foreign policy in the Third World; sections of this have already been published.

**George Kamoff-Nicolosky**

The last comprehensive and authoritative Soviet review of its military strategy (available in the West) is the Third Edition of *Voyennaya Strategiya*. Published in Moscow by the official Military Press House, Voenizdat, it was originally released in 1962, amended in 1963 and updated in 1968.

Edited by the late Marshal of the Soviet Union and long-time member of the Central Committee, V.D. Sokolovskiy, *Strategiya* provided details of Soviet considerations, plans and strategy for war in the nuclear age. The consolidation of contributions from seventeen noted academics and military personnel established clearly that all strategic considerations were within the parameters of the military 'doktrina' determined by the Politburo and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. That linkage is vital. Change in 'doktrina' means modifications of strategy.

Those charged with drawing up Soviet military strategy are faced with the requirement to safeguard the Soviet Union and its socialist allies from both conventional and nuclear attack and to gain full military victory through the total destruction of any and all aggressors.

Sokolovskiy emphasized the relationship between doctrine and strategy at the outset of *Strategiya*, examining strategy in relation to political, economic, moral, ideological and other germane factors including the basic differences between 'bourgeois' and 'Soviet' military thought.

The nature of 'imperialist' military strategy was assessed with great care, as were United States and NATO military capabilities and both military and economic preparations for war. Against this background of threat and enemy capabilities, Sokolovskiy reviewed Soviet military strategy from 1917. The historical account provides the basic rationale for change.

The nature of 'modern war' was examined. The impact of nuclear weapons dominates all considerations, leading to the conclusion that a future world war would be a 'nuclear rocket war.' Detailed reference was also made to rapid technological and scientific break-throughs which would necessitate future change in doctrine and strategy. Lenin's views, which are so firmly incorporated into the official 'doktrina,' were confirmed as totally applicable as of 1968.

Three major points emerge from *Strategiya*. First, all significant technological

and scientific changes would require modifications in doctrine and strategy. Second, any conflict involving both the United States and the Soviet Union would rapidly escalate to total nuclear war. And third, Lenin's dictum that war is a continuation of politics and another way to achieve national objectives was still valid in 1968.

There have been numerous indications that an updated version of *Strategiya* has been produced in Moscow. It records the doctrinal and strategic changes stemming from the significantly altered conditions in the eighties and predicted for the nineties. The release of the new study has been delayed. Major leadership changes in the Soviet Union have contributed to the requirement to reassess past decisions.

Gorbachev is obviously aware of the proposals for change to Soviet military doctrine and strategy. Significant indicators of change are reflected in statements and works of very senior Soviet civilian and military officials. But without an 'official' update to Sokolovskiy's work, many vital questions remain an enigma to the West. For example, is it still valid (from a Soviet perspective) that the Kremlin reaction to any SACEUR use of a tactical nuclear weapon would be a 'total' Soviet nuclear retaliatory attack?

Various Western agencies and academics have attempted to provide the required answers. Concern that 'intent' is related to 'capability' is one of the driving forces to a Western resolution of actual changes in Soviet military doctrine and strategy. However, the credibility of some of the efforts to provide answers is questionable since Western resources, rather than Soviet, are being used by some researchers. Mirror-image techniques are being applied in assessing 'likely' Soviet decisions. Far too many analysts are dependent on translations of Soviet texts.

*Voyennaya Strategiya* is one of the most important Soviet military documents to reach the West. It is also an outstanding example of how translations can distort.

The latest English language version, translated and edited by Harriet Fast Scott and published by Crane, Russak and Company in New York in 1975, is excellent. Mrs Scott reviewed all three Soviet versions and commented on all modifications in content. Moreover, she corrected the totally unacceptable errors and misinterpretations of earlier translations. But for some twelve years (1963-1975), those in the West who could not, or did not want to, read the original Russian text depended on available translations. In consequence, they had a distorted view of what had actually been written in Russian.

Many, who had read the original translations, used the text in footnote

references. Others used such references without reading the actual translated text. Many have not 'bothered' to read the Scott version. As a direct result, the original errors in interpretation are still being perpetuated.

The requirement to understand the Soviet military doctrine and strategy has never been more evident. The 1968 version of *Strategiya* is outdated. An updated Soviet collated script is not available. This assessment of the evolution of Soviet nuclear doctrine is based on research which is still continuing within the broader context of an OPAEBND commissioned study, *Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy in the Nuclear Era*. It deals with nuclear doctrine in two steps: as it developed to 1968; and then the changes to the present day.

### Soviet Terminology

Translation without factual interpretation assures erroneous conclusions regarding Soviet statements and writings. Moreover, even knowledge of the Russian language without full understanding of usage and of specific context contributes to the continuing failure to comprehend that the Soviet military thought process, perception and use of language differs drastically from Western concepts and practices.

Russians are explicit in the choice of words. There should be no excuse for failure to understand the exact meaning. The Soviets use *sderzhivaniye* or 'restraint' when addressing their capability to deter United States nuclear attack. They mean simply that the Soviet capability to launch a devastating second strike is what deters an American nuclear attack. In referring to the American capability 'to deter' Soviet action, they use the Russian word *ustrasheniye* — 'to terrorize.' Moscow equated the pre-PD 59\* United States policy of targetting Soviet cities as an effort to 'deter' through applying 'terror tactics' against the Soviet population. Yet when Soviet-United States discussions were translated into English, the one word, 'deterrent,' was used in the Western text. The Russian texts, however, were explicit as to different meaning and context: two words were used, with totally different meanings.

To understand the complexity of research into Soviet military 'doctrine' and 'strategy,' it is a prerequisite to comprehend fully the Russian meaning of the terminology related to the subject. That understanding cannot just be dictionary translations. The application of the words themselves must be appreciated. The following are crucial to the topic at hand:

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\*Presidential Directive

*Voyennaya Doktrina (Military Doctrine)*

Military doctrine (as it is understood by the Soviets) equates to dogma. It is decided at the top level, and cannot be debated; as in other religions, total acceptance is demanded. It is a national, objective, and unanimous series of doctrinal rulings determined by the Politburo and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in relation to specific principles of war and peace. The doctrine outlines the essence and character of all possible wars and the official and correct means to deal with the preparation for such wars. This includes the preparation of the armed forces and of the nation as a whole for the struggle against any aggressor.

The fundamental tenets of military doctrine are formulated and changed on the basis of national policy, the social system, the level of economic and military development, new scientific achievements and the nature of expected war.

Modification in doctrine stems, therefore, from changes in political, technological, scientific and related assessments. The American introduction of nuclear weapons into the military equation in 1945 laid the foundation for major changes in Soviet military doctrine. The changes, at each stage of United States development, were directly linked to the Soviet state of the art and Soviet capabilities to take degrees of effective action against a nuclear armed potential aggressor.

Military doctrine is based on unanimous Party decisions. Military science is developed through subjective and often contradictory views. Yet the two are inter-related. Doctrine incorporates those aspects of military science which the Politburo unanimously accepts.

*Voyennaya Nauka (Military Science)*

Military science, based on Marxist-Leninist teachings, investigates the objective laws which govern armed conflict. It is guided by materialistic developments and history and considers the achievements of related science which promote continual development and progress in the military sphere.

Military science also provides knowledge concerning the nature, essence and content of armed conflict. It deals with all pertinent subjects such as manpower, facilities, and the methods of conducting military operations.

*Printsipy Voyennogo Iskusstva (Principles of Military Art)*

Military art is the basic component of science. The fundamental propositions drawn from the objective laws of war determine the trends in the preparation for and conduct of war. The principles permit military commanders to assess

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 CHARLES J. DICK

## OPERATIONS IN THE ENEMY'S DEPTH

### Colonel Michael Stevenson

Our next speaker is Charles Dick, T.D., B.A. Originally a history teacher, Charles Dick developed a deep and abiding interest in the Soviet military as a result of his work in the Parachute Regiment and the Intelligence Corps. He has published numerous articles in the *International Defence Review* and other defence-related journals, and has contributed chapters to various books and reports. During 1983 to 1984, he was employed by the Ministry of Defence as a special consultant to write the Army's *Threat Manual*. Thereafter, he attended the Russian interpreter course at the Royal Army Education Centre in Beaconsfield, before joining the Soviet Studies Research Centre in 1986. His subject is the Operations Manoeuvre Group. Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome Charles Dick.

### Mr Dick

#### The Strategic Context

Marxism-Leninism teaches that, in war, the superior economy will win. This is a discouraging thought for the Soviet Union as NATO is stronger than the Warsaw Pact in every area of importance — population, resources, industrial muscle, technological sophistication. Nor is the option open to the Soviets to adjust the balance in their favour through the use of nuclear weapons. Retaliation would be inevitable, and it would destroy the thing most dear to the Politburo — its position as the ruling body in the Soviet Union. As N.S. Khrushchev put it, 'the

nuclear weapon does not obey the laws of the class struggle.' If used, it will destroy not only capitalism but also communism, and any other 'ism' as well. The conclusion the Soviets draw from these premises is that war with NATO would be a highly risky and therefore undesirable undertaking (at least as long as the Alliance maintains its cohesion and determination). If, however, for some reason war is seen to be inevitable, then it must be won very quickly indeed, before NATO can either mobilize its superior potential for warlike purposes, or even reach and implement the decision to use nuclear weapons to halt the Warsaw Pact offensive, or worse by far, to strike the Soviet Union itself.

This dictates the requirement that the war be won in its 'initial period,' defined as 'the period of time which elapses between the start of hostilities and the completion of mobilization, concentration and deployment.' In other words, the Soviets wish to have brought the war to a successful conclusion before NATO is even ready to begin to fight it. (It must be noted, in this context, that the concept of the initial period will only really affect the victim, as the aggressor, carefully concealing his intentions, if not his capabilities, will already have his preparations in hand while the other side is still labouring under the delusion that it is merely facing another crisis and has not divined that this time the enemy actually intends to attack.)

The Warsaw Pact cannot, of course, get at the lynch pin of the Western Alliance, the United States, without the use of nuclear weapons. The next most important area, however, the Low Countries and the Federal German Republic, the economic and (in the latter case) political and military heart of Europe, is vulnerable because it is so small. It can be swallowed in one bite, in the course of a single strategic offensive operation.

To achieve victory in such an operation, the Soviets recognize that they must be able to guarantee certain prerequisites. These are:

- A substantial measure of strategic and personal surprise.
- A sufficiently heavy weight of initial blow to retain the initiative conferred by surprise and carry the offensive to at least the nearest strategic objectives without having to wait on further mobilization or pausing to regroup.
- A high-speed advance to retain the initiative, keep the enemy off balance, preclude his nuclear option and induce military and political paralysis and loss of will.
- A substantial degree of air superiority to prevent NATO's airpower from helping to stem the offensive or prevent the timely deployment and commitment of second tactical, operational and strategic echelons and to ensure

the projection of Warsaw Pact firepower and forces deep into the enemy rear to hamper his mobilization and deployment and the establishment of a stable and coherent defence.

- A simultaneous attack on the enemy throughout his operational depth. The implementation of this principle by the Ground Forces will be the subject of this paper.

### Philosophy of Deep Operations

The Soviets realize that the mobility, range and power, and armoured protection enjoyed by contemporary weapons systems, coupled with the efficiency of rapidly laid minefields and the flexibility of air power make it possible for NATO formations quickly to create a strong, stable defence. Once it is established, the Soviets have very considerable doubts about their ability to overwhelm such a defence within the time scale that they require. Of course, surprise will be expected to confer a substantial initial advantage, but it is inevitably a wasting asset; given time, the defender will recover, identify the main threats and take steps to counter them — a task made all the easier in many parts of the Central Region by the limitations which ground places on offensive action; the ground favours the defence. For a strategic offensive operation to be successful, it is thus essential that the effects of surprise be prolonged, and indeed exacerbated. The enemy must be prevented from recovering his cohesion and balance. This cannot be accomplished solely by engaging his main groupings in head-on assaults. Such attacks will indeed be necessary to pin the enemy, but a speedy decision can only be reached through bold, rapid and deep manoeuvre into the enemy rear. The enemy must be destroyed simultaneously in the rear and at the front, not in sequential phases. The Soviets perceive NATO to be particularly vulnerable to deep operations for a variety of reasons, the most important of which is its lack of a unified doctrine and concept of operations.

In other words, action in the enemy rear is not merely a useful addition to the Soviet offensive effort. It is seen as a decisive element in any offensive operation. The morale, cohesion and physical strength of the defence is to be eroded from within more than it is battered down from in front. Deep operations are intended to accomplish the following:

- The most important mission is the negation of NATO's nuclear capability by destroying some delivery means and their logistic support and communications and by keeping others on the move. Moreover, the most

dangerous spearheads of the Soviet advance will be poor nuclear targets. They will be so fast moving and so intermingled with the defence that they will be difficult to target.

- Action in the enemy's depth will prolong the destabilizing effects of surprise. It will force enemy groupings to fight a running battle in which they will reap no advantage from prepared defences, or alternatively to face attacks from the flanks and rear if they stay in place. It will also hamper, disorganize and delay enemy efforts to complete the mobilization, concentration and deployment which surprise prevented him from concluding before the outbreak of hostilities.
- Deep attacks by Ground Forces elements and special forces against NATO's air defences and air bases and their associated command, control and logistic support is seen as an essential element in the counter-air battle to ensure Soviet air superiority. Air superiority is, in turn, an essential for the deep operation.
- To maintain the momentum and win the crucial battle for time, speed is a guarantor of victory. It is necessary through deep operations to capture ground vital to the enemy, for example, water obstacle crossings and defiles, road crossings before they can be occupied and prepared for defence.
- The easiest and quickest way to defeat the enemy is seen by the Soviets to be the destruction, or at least the disruption, of the defender's command and control and logistic system. Powerful combat groupings and nuclear weapons depend on these for their effectiveness, and they are easier to knock out than combat elements.
- Operations in the enemy's rear are calculated to undermine the enemy morale and spread panic. Not the least important target group is the political leadership and the civil population. Refugees will significantly hamper defensive manoeuvre and logistic support and it is probably easier to destroy many governments' will to continue the struggle than it is to destroy their armed forces. Historical precedent has probably convinced the Soviets that the smaller NATO states may well be driven out of a war by deep and rapid thrusts. In the last war, Denmark lasted one day, Belgium about five.

Not surprisingly, given the crucial importance the Soviets attach to the battle in the enemy's depth, substantial forces are dedicated to the task. The resources available to commanders are operational-tactical missiles and long range artillery, especially important if weapons of mass destruction come to be employed; air-power, amphibious forces; special purpose forces (SPF); airborne units; air-borne units and formations; and separate detachments of the ground forces

pushed ahead of the main body at all levels of command from unit level upwards. The battle in the enemy's depth is, in other words, a combined arms effort. It is not a question of our air against their air, and our tanks against their tanks. They look for the synergistic effect of various different arms and services collaborating together.

### Special Purpose Forces

Special Purpose Forces (SPF) are the subject of great and growing emphasis by the Soviets. It is believed that, especially if the enemy is unprepared, the effects of their activities will be out of all proportion to their numbers. The Soviet experience of partisan activity during the Great Patriotic War tends to bear out this belief.

The whole area of SPF is one where little hard information is available. It would appear, however, that each army deploys a company of 110 to 120, each front a brigade of 1000 to 1300 men (and each fleet a somewhat smaller brigade). There may also be strategic SPF units deployed against TVO level targets. Each non-Soviet Warsaw Pact country also fields SPF. Finally, the Soviets make as great a use as they can of espionage and subversion at all levels, and they will undoubtedly try to exploit fifth columnists, whether wittingly or unwittingly working for the Soviet Union.

The main task of SPF is believed to be reconnaissance and target acquisition for air, missile or heliborne/airborne attacks. However, they will also carry out sabotage attacks. Their main impact may well be expected in the initial period of the war, when NATO is attempting to mobilize and deploy to meet a surprise attack. In conjunction with air and missile attacks, some of which they will direct, for example, with laser designators, their sabotage will be expected to hamper and delay NATO reactions and spread confusion, far and distant. They will thus help to win the crucial battle for time.

SPF targets (including both those for sabotage and for target acquisition) will include:

- Nuclear weapons and associated command, control and logistics.
- Airfields, including aircraft and infrastructure.
- Headquarters and communications centres.
- Air defence radars, weapons and control facilities and EW equipments.
- Choke points, such as bridges, ports, mountain passes, rail junctions, to hamper mobilization, deployment, manoeuvre and logistic support.

- Assassination of key military and political personnel to disrupt command and control.
- Economic targets, such as power stations, pipelines, oil and gas storage facilities, electricity transmission lines, to attack both the enemy's capacity and will to wage war.
- Capture of prisoners for interrogation.
- Beach and oz reconnaissance and marking for amphibious and airborne assaults.
- Reconnaissance of enemy general purpose forces.

The Soviets doubtless believe that the effectiveness of their SPF will be all the greater because other deep operations will help to ensure that the resources available to be deployed against them will be inadequate.

### Heliborne Assaults

Given the payload and range restrictions and the heliborne assault...

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 MAURICE TUGWELL

## SOVIET UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

### General George Bell

Maurice Tugwell had a distinguished career in the British army, ending his service with the rank of Brigadier. In his studies, he has specialized in low-intensity warfare, particularly the psychological element of that subject. He has a doctorate in war studies from King's College in London, and from 1980 to 1986 he was the director of the Centre of Conflict Studies at the University of New Brunswick. He is now the director of the Mackenzie Institute for the Study of Terrorism, Revolution and Propaganda, which is an independent institute and information centre here in Toronto.

### Maurice Tugwell

It is 1990. Six weeks ago the Soviet Union demanded that the West German government eject all United States troops and weapons from its soil. Moscow's propaganda depicted the Americans as an army of occupation and a threat to East European security. Western peace movements and communist parties immediately orchestrated a massive 'hands off the Federal Republic' campaign. Rallies and marches have taken place throughout the NATO countries. In West Germany, these turned violent as the local communists joined forces with the Red Army terrorists to raise a 'people's resistance army' to engage the police in street fighting.

Yesterday, TASS announced full Warsaw Pact mobilization as a 'defensive' precaution. Intelligence confirmed forward deployment.

In response, NATO went through the first three stages of alert measures within 24 hours. At Canadian Forces Base Lahr, advance parties left for forward deployment areas and the main body of the mechanized brigade was brought to two hours readiness. Then, last evening, things began to go to pieces.

At the Baden Sollingen airforce base, between eight and nine p.m., 27 married quarters occupied by Canadian pilots were visited by men or women supposedly selling works of art. In every case where the pilot himself responded to the enquiry he was shot dead. Four wives were killed for good measure. In the Lahr complex, anti-tank rockets were fired into windows of servicemen's apartments and a heavy machine gun set up on a nearby hilltop raked the town and base.

At about one a.m. this morning first reports arrived of Warsaw Pact attacks across the entire central front. Helicopter troops were landing well in advance of the main body, occupying key features in the NATO defensive deployment area. Airfields, supply depots, pipelines and headquarters were also under attack.

By listening to ordinary public radio broadcasts from various NATO sources, the brigade intelligence staff pieced together some very disturbing accounts. During the previous day and evening, assassination teams had attacked every head of state, chief minister, cabinet minister, chief of staff, senior civil servant and diplomat in every NATO capital city. The success rate had been high. In Washington, D.C., the White House was by no means the only famous building that lay in ruins. Broadcasts from the Hague, Bonn and Antwerp ceased early this morning. These cities were in the control of Soviet airborne divisions.

The Canadian brigade's deployment was severely delayed by the attacks at the base and, naturally, soldiers were reluctant to abandon their families. The commander decided he must leave one third of his force behind as base protection. Luckily, the brigade had already loaded its gas, ammunition and supplies; because the depots had been damaged by precision missile attacks.

It was broad daylight when the reduced force moved out. It was ambushed after ten km, and came under air attack soon after. Everywhere, the story seemed to be the same: NATO's mobilization and deployment plan had been severely disrupted, leaving the Warsaw Pact forces with a clear run. If there was scarcely any centralized control to make order out of growing chaos, this would be due to attacks on headquarters. During the previous evening, assassins attempted to kill commanders and staff at divisional level and above, with some success. At precisely one a.m., salvos of short-range ballistic and cruise missiles hit every NATO headquarters. Pin-point accuracy was achieved by homing beacons placed by agents. It was as Marshal Ogarkov had predicted, back in 1983: the new, precision, conventional, 'operational-tactical and *strategic means*' would

predetermine the operations of the war's initial period which, as the experience of local wars shows, could be of 'decisive importance.'<sup>1</sup>

How realistic is such a scenario? Is this danger of the Soviet Union's unconventional warfare capability as severe as I have painted it?

The Soviets use the word *spetsnaz*, meaning 'special designation,' for unconventional methods and means of warfare. Our sources of information on the subject, at least in the open literature, are thin. Easily the best analyst that I know of is Dr John Dziak of the Pentagon's Defence Intelligence Agency. He draws on historical studies, defector debriefs, Soviet official material, and other scholars' work.<sup>2</sup> Another source, more exotic but less easily classified, is the defector who writes under the name Victor Suvorov.<sup>3</sup>

We know beyond any shadow of doubt that the Soviets have used special designation troops, internally and externally, in every military intervention or crisis. We also know for certain that such troops exist in considerable strength and are being used, or trained, in Afghanistan today. What is much more difficult to assess is their likely roles in the sort of situation I outlined, their capacity to reach their objectives and their capability once they get there. In the type of Europe that Gorbachev seems to be creating, one where NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons is undermined and where public opinion no longer takes the Soviet military threat all that seriously, the unconventional threat, as the sharp end of the diplomatic-political-ideological-subversive-military sword, becomes particularly important.

Lenin militarized politics, denying any hard and fast distinctions between the roles of party activist, diplomat, assassin, soldier or policeman. All fight for the party's cause, using what Lenin called 'all the methods of struggle.'<sup>4</sup> In this sense, *all* Soviet operations have an unconventional element in them — the pervasive and complete domination by the party of every organization, unit and plan. This is something we cannot easily imagine. It is quite different from our Western concept of the subordination of the military to government control, in which the subordinate armed forces conduct their affairs free of day-to-day political interference. Leninist politics is all about power, and therefore the organs of power are organically integrated into the party.

The concept of *spetsnaz*, therefore, is essentially political, although using military means. It ensures that really important operations are in really reliable hands — reliability being measured as much by political as by military or technical standards.

In 1921, the young Soviet state was in danger of falling apart. In Petergrad, naval mutineers held the fortress of Kronstadt. General Tukhachevskiy directed

the attack to quell the mutiny with communist military cadets out in front, followed by picked Red Army troops, behind whom Cheka (secret police) machine-gunners prevented any desertions.<sup>5</sup> The *spetsnaz* pattern was being established, albeit pragmatically.

Here, in outline, is the subsequent historical record:

### 1 The 'internal' use of *spetsnaz*<sup>6</sup>

Special units of Cheka enforced the 1930s 'collectivization' and 'industrialization,' assisted by Frontier troops, Internal troops, and such specialized formations as the OGPU's Dzerzhinskiy Division.

When the Moslem *Basmachi* rebellion in Soviet Central Asia got beyond the control of regular troops, a special force, the Khorezm Group, was created out of OGPU and Dzerzhinskiy units. This set the pattern of superimposing party *spetsnaz* over and above military command whenever party control was in jeopardy.

Because the Red Army began to fall apart under the Nazi onslaught of 1941-42, the armed forces Counterintelligence Directorate, SMERSH, was expanded to hundreds of thousands to ensure loyalty, and to act as shock troops.

As the Red Army occupied East European countries, SMERSH turned its attention to imposing communism on the newly captive nations. The 300 000 strong KGB border guards have enforced population moves in occupied countries, taken part in counterintelligence operations, and fought the Chinese army along the frontier. Today these guards are trying to stop Afghan hit teams from raiding Soviet targets north of the Afghan border. KGB troops are the equivalent of the Waffen SS, being organized as divisions with all modern equipment.

After World War II, special detachments of high political reliability were used against Ukrainian and other uprisings. In Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968, *spetsnaz* operations crushed the revolts. The Prague operations involved an airborne division working under KGB guidance landing by deception, and a combined operation to pre-empt resistance that involved military, KGB and Czech traitors who had all along been working for Moscow.

Today, inside the Soviet Union, the KGB's Third Directorate has taken the old SMERSH role of overseeing the armed forces. Additionally, the Ninth Guards Directorate provides élite division and regimental size units for internal security. All this in addition to the border guards.

Mainly, however, internal security is in the hands of the MVD — the Ministry

of Internal Affairs. This ministry has 260 000 internal security troops of its own, including motor rifle divisions — a party praetorian guard. The MVD fought in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. In fact their first deputy chairman, Viktor Paputin, was killed in December 1979, in a first and unsuccessful attempt to kill Amin. The MVD also controls the Militia, which has nothing in common with Canada's volunteers, but is the police force.

## 2 The 'external' use of *spetsnaz*

In the 1930s, under Marshal Tukhachevskiy's direction, the Soviets formed airborne divisions. Tukhachevskiy saw these being used ahead of the main force in what is now the established manner, but he also incorporated Special Purpose battalions. These were trained to link up with traitors in the target country for 'direct action' against leaders and key points.

During the Spanish Civil War, Stalin despatched the head of military intelligence, Berzin, to assist the Republicans but also to select a group of Soviet officers and men, directly under his command, to seize control of Madrid should the Republicans emerge as victors. Their mission was to ensure that Spain became communist. Berzin also trained the Spanish to fight as partisans behind Nationalist lines. Working parallel with Berzin was Aleksandr Orlov, heading the enormous НКВД or secret service presence in Spain. One of his agents controlled the political activities of Norman Bethune, persuading him to act as roving propagandist on a prolonged North American tour. Orlov also spirited Spain's gold reserves to Russia, and liquidated Trotskyites and other left-wing 'enemies.'

In 1940, the Soviets — still allied as non-belligerents with Nazi Germany — were well placed to observe and analyze General Kurt Student's operations in Norway in April, and Holland in May, in which airborne and air-landed troops linked up with local traitors in attempts to destroy resistance by decapitating the government apparatus.<sup>7</sup> They must also have admired the 'Brandenburger' detachments who operated in plain clothes in Poland, Holland and France.

When in 1941 the war came to the USSR, Tukhachevskiy had already been murdered, along with most of the Soviet Union's officer corps, by Stalin. Moreover his parachute divisions had to be used as infantry and could not operate offensively as he had planned. Nevertheless, special operations were conducted behind enemy lines by creating a huge partisan army in Nazi-occupied territory. Forces were drawn from НКВД, СМЕРШ and similar 'reliable' sources and the commander reported directly to Stalin. The partisan experience has greatly influenced Soviet military doctrine.

Operations in areas such as Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Afghanistan have relied heavily on 'unconventional' means. In Central America, Cuba acts as proxy for the Soviet Union, providing in Nicaragua a general to command the revolution and the political-military advice and hardware necessary to hold it in place. The chief role of advisor staffs in countries like Mozambique is to see that the army remains loyal to the party and, therefore, that the communist party stays in power, come what may.

The Christmas 1979 coup in Kabul was a *spetsnaz* affair involving airborne troops and ГРУ (Soviet military intelligence) units, all led by a КГБ officer. Amin was killed this time, and so was Colonel Bayerenov, who, according to one source, had been in command of the КГБ terrorist training school.<sup>8</sup>

Currently the 'external' *spetsnaz* agencies are mainly to be found in the КГБ and the armed forces. The КГБ's First Chief Directorate is tasked for high level or strategic operations outside the bloc. In this respect it works virtually under command of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which controls Soviet foreign policy, overseas communist parties, the elaborate front organizations, and of course the 'peace' and deception networks. The First Directorate is responsible for assassinations, kidnappings, the return of defectors, international terrorism support, and all forms of 'active measures.'

Because of the political and sensitive nature of special operations, the armed forces' *spetsnaz* are also controlled at the highest level. They consist of the airborne divisions, which are not normally referred to as *spetsnaz*, but are essentially in this category, the ГРУ's *spetsnaz* brigades, and naval *spetsnaz*. The airborne, seven or eight divisions, are directly controlled by the Supreme High Command. Their tasks could vary from tactical to strategic, but the latter are more likely in any major operation. КГБ oversight or control would be probable.

Naval *spetsnaz*, one unit to each of the Soviet Union's four fleets, are available for commando or special swimming missions and for midget submarine reconnaissance such as experienced by Sweden and Norway. In several Swedish intrusions, *spetsnaz* naval infantry have been spotted ashore.

Command of the army's *spetsnaz* is through what is in effect a parallel chain of command owned by the ГРУ, the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff. So they, too, are tightly controlled from the the top, although geographically dispersed throughout the military districts, or fronts, after mobilization. Suvorov says there is one *spetsnaz* brigade for each district, which could work out at 24 brigades — an uncertain figure. Given between 900 and 1200 men per brigade, the worst case total is some 22 to 29 000 individuals, plus reserves, plus Warsaw Pact equivalents.

The majority of these troops are conscripts specially trained. However, of each brigade's four or five sub-units, one — called the 'headquarters company' — is composed of professionals and maintained at constant readiness. The title is disarming for military men in the West, where an 'HQ company' consists of the lame and lazy who administer the outfit. The Soviet title refers to the *enemy's* headquarters — the objective of these killer companies. This company's sole task, Suvorov tells us, is to seek out and kill the enemy's political and military leaders.

The final element of 'external' *spetsnaz* consists of the GRU agents in place in NATO and other countries whose role is either to remain as 'sleepers' until activated just prior to hostilities, or to gather and pass back intelligence on target areas. The sleepers have no espionage duties that might compromise their cover. Once activated, they destroy key points and assist the incoming *spetsnaz*.

One final point of detail provided by Suvorov tells us that some professional athletes in the Soviet Union, such as the ZSKA sports club, are in fact *spetsnaz*. The arrangement builds fitness and esprit de corps in the unit, improves the Soviet Union's Olympic performance, and provides cover for on-the-spot reconnaissance of possible objectives. The KGB, apparently, uses the Moscow Dynamo sports club for similar purposes.

### Conclusion

Considering what the Germans achieved with such slim resources in 1940, I do not recommend that NATO take a relaxed view of the Soviet *spetsnaz* threat today. The British major exercise 'Brave Defender' suggested that the problem is being addressed in that country, which has to bring its 1st Corps up-to-strength from the territorial reserves in time of tension. My opening scenario dealt with Canadian forces in Germany. I could also provide a warning about Halifax and Ottawa. After all, we invited the Red Army Choir for a reconnaissance recently, and if that outfit is not controlled by the GRU, my name is Viktor Suvorov.

### Notes

1 Quoted in Mary C. FitzGerald, 'Marshal Ogarkov on the Modern Theatre Operation,' *Conflict Quarterly*, Summer 1986, 48. Ogarkov was quoted from 'The Victory and the Present,' *Izvestiya*, May 9, 1983.

2 See John J. Dziak in 'The Soviet Approach to Special Operations,' Barnett, Tovar, Shultz, eds., *Special Operations in US Strategy* (Washington: National Defence University Press, 1984), 95-120.

- 3 Viktor Suvorov, 'Spetsnaz, the Soviet Union's Special Forces,' *International Defence Review*, September 1983, 1209-1216; see also Michael Hickey, 'The Spetsnaz Threat: Can Britain be Defended?,' Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, *Occasional Paper no. 23* (London: Alliance Publishers, 1986).
- 4 V I Lenin, 'Left Wing Communism — An Infantile Disorder,' 1920, *Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress, 1966), vol. 31, 96.

- 5 David Shub, *Lenin: A Biography* (1948), (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977 edition), 409.
- 6 The sources quoted in notes 2 and 3 have supplied most of the detail for this summary.
- 7 See Maurice Tugwell, 'Day of the Paratroopers,' *Military Review*, March 1977, 40-53.
- 8 Dziak quotes *Time* magazine, November 22, 1982. (An analyst with access to classified information is only likely to quote a journalistic source if the information is also available to him from a reliable covert source.)

### Question (unidentified)

We know that American and British special forces are the object of some envy. Are *spetsnaz* units the object of envy there as well?

### Tugwell

They might be. There is a very strong resistance in the Soviet armed forces to élite troops because there is only one loyalty, and that is to the party, and therefore they would not want any unit to feel that it was much different. Probably a good many staff and command people complain that too much talent is being taken out of their infantry divisions because of their recruitment. That is a strong argument, which every armed force in the world raises against too much draining of talent.

### Charles Dick

I don't get the impression that the investment in special forces is considered at all counter-productive. We see the most important role of the line *spetsnaz* as being reconnaissance, target acquisition, and target destination, rather than the more spectacular things that you have outlined.

### Cynthia Cannizzo

In the spy novels and popular mythology, the GRU is always painted as the poor step-sister of the KGB. Could you comment on the relationship between the GRU

and the КГВ, and the inter-service rivalry between them.

#### Tugwell

I think there is probably healthy rivalry. We'd like to think of it being cut-throat and unhealthy because that makes us feel better. ГРУ is huge: it is a massive armed force, plus a massive intelligence branch, plus special troops. In peacetime, almost all external operations are going to be КГВ except for the ГРУ members of the embassies who are selecting and recruiting sleepers. Espionage could be mixed, because the ГРУ are targetting all the military industries. But given war, the ГРУ would outnumber the КГВ by multiples of dozens. So suddenly in war, the military intelligence really comes into its own.

#### John Thompson

What is your assessment of the credibility of Viktor Suvarov?

#### Dick

I met Viktor Suvarov once, and talked to him for some time. I also knew one of his debriefers. He was a staff captain when he defected. A staff captain in the British army knows very little. In an organization which is infinitely larger than the British army and infinitely more secretive, he would know the square root of sod-all. He was allowed, quite wrongly I think, by his debriefers, to think that he knew a great deal. They used him as a sort of propaganda vehicle, and he has become a sort of Frankenstein monster who has come away thinking that he knows the inner workings of the Soviet General Staff. When you read what he said, or talk to him, it is plain that this is simply nonsense. If you think of him as a novelist along John de Carré lines but with rather less credibility, I think you have a fair handle on Viktor Suvarov. Don't take him too seriously.

#### George Kamoff-Nicolosky

I agree. I think the gentleman you have just been talking about had a very important father, and I think he learned a lot from him. Without identifying him specifically, I would certainly not quote him as a source of authentic information.

You didn't mention a number of ГРУ people who have 'successfully' defected to the West. We seem to have two in Washington, one in Ottawa,

one in Paris and two in London, all of them officers of the ГРУ who managed somehow to leave their country rather well equipped with lots of books and photographs. I thought that you might like to suggest that they were influencing the minds of people by being quoted as experts and advising congressional committees in Washington as to what the Soviets want to do.

#### Tugwell

Are you suggesting, George, that some of them are plants?

#### Kamoff-Nicolosky

I think it rather strange that within a period of one year five relatively senior members of the ГРУ should find it possible to escape and establish their positions in such areas as Washington, London, Paris, Ottawa, and because of the lack of knowledge we have in the West on the ways of the Soviet Union, they have become experts. This is more of a danger than some of the things you quoted in your scenario. Experts who come as 'defectors' are accepted as defectors, are accepted as being 'enemies of the Soviet state,' and gain phenomenal access to decision-making personalities.

#### Question (unidentified)

Is there a spetsnaz threat to northern Canada? If not, why not? If so, what are their objectives?

#### Tugwell

I don't really know. Canada, along with every other NATO country, is the subject of reconnaissance, both by agents in place and by units that carry out reconnaissance by whatever means — which could include submarines. I don't think it would be a very high priority.

The whole objective of the war in Europe would be to win in Europe quickly; therefore, any spetsnaz operation aimed at Canada or the United States would be largely designed to prevent the reinforcement of the European forces. Spetsnaz operations would be efforts to close air fields, close ports, and generally disrupt. If, when you want to concentrate on getting forces in Germany reinforced and the country mobilized on a war footing, you have to look inwards, it is just like

terrorism in peacetime. It takes your mind off the broader picture. A few incidents in Ottawa and places like that would put the whole country in a state of semi-siege. But Canada would have a very low priority compared to Western Europe.

#### Question (unidentified)

What do we know about parallel *spetsnaz* in eastern European countries subordinate to the Soviets in time of war? We know that a lot of the visiting picture sellers in Sweden and truck drivers near military installations are Polish.

#### Tugwell

There is parallel *spetsnaz* in every Warsaw Pact army. East Europeans make very good agents because they are not so suspect and, especially East Germans in West Germany, are very useful. Many *spetsnaz*, according to Suvorov *again* — whom we may not trust, but is nevertheless an interesting source — operate in enemy uniform, that is NATO uniform or plainclothes. Germans in particular can get away with that, and be rather dangerous.

#### General George Ball

Who are we calling *spetsnaz*? Obviously, the Soviets have special service troops, but it seems to me that thanks to Suvorov what we have done is put all these people in together and created a marvellous image which is everybody from a KGB assassin to a tank driver, pulled together by some sort of wonderfully centralized KGB plot, which makes the whole idea of *spetsnaz* irrelevant. It is impossible to deal with it analytically.

#### Tugwell

I took the term 'special designation,' which is very vague. It is rather like 'unconventional operations' or 'special operations,' which are very vague terms in our armed forces. What is a 'special operation'? A B-52 sent to pick up somebody out of the sea who has crashed is a special operation for that crew. I did deliberately use it in that broad sense, because I wanted to look at the whole spectrum. If you look at it in the sense of SAs or special forces, then you have GRU brigades, *spetsnaz* brigades, and that's about all. They are military, and they are doing a specific job.

But even they don't wear a special badge that says *spetsnaz*. I don't think they organize their forces in quite the same Rambo way that we do; when we form a special unit, in order to make the chaps feel good, we put something special on their arm with a picture for those who can't read.

#### John Hines

They say 'troops of special designation' as distinct from the run of the mill soldier. Chemical and nuclear weapons, for example, are classified for special treatment and special control. There are perhaps a thousand soldiers or more in each front with that designation. Their missions are of the highest priority. The KGB also has troops with those designations, and they are probably more likely to be in place than the GRU.

I feel compelled to comment on the question of planted GRU. I think most of the defectors in the last 18 months, have tended to be KGB, and some GRU. The Western system, U.K./U.S. at least, is extremely self-conscious and introspective, almost to a fault, in trying to determine whether or not these people are genuine. It is a threat to which we are most vulnerable.

Even if there are only 20 teams, if you assign priorities based on the most important targets, the effect they can have can be absolutely phenomenal. The Kabul incidents and the Prague example are absolutely legitimate and profoundly disturbing.

Questioning the credibility of Suvorov tends to undermine the credibility of the whole idea of *spetsnaz*. There is a legitimate problem in terms of the use of *spetsnaz* and the fact that Suvorov is not a credible source does not mean that the problem is not real.

#### Tugwell

About two years ago, I talked to the Institute on insurgency and counter-insurgency in the Central American area, and I put my theory that whilst it is true that the objective conditions for revolution must exist before a successful revolution can be launched, what the Soviets have become quite good at is creating the objective conditions, thus generating the thing faster than ordinary circumstances might, or might not, do. I don't think we should ever forget that the Soviets are a revolutionary people; this is a revolutionary doctrine. We tend to think in terms of inter-state war; that could be misleading if we don't remember that they are interested in revolutionary war. I don't think they will cross that

border, and come across the Weser and the Elbe unless there is a quasi-revolutionary situation brewing in west Europe. This is my area of concern. There is a gap between ordinary politics and diplomacy, which we understand, and the ordinary military part, which we understand. But there is a huge gap in between which Leninists understand and most of us don't. You have to start thinking as a Leninist in order to be able to fill that gap. In that area is the real threat to the West — if we should start fighting among ourselves, and get a sort of semi-revolutionary situation breaking out in West Germany or Britain, or anywhere else. This is the part of the defence spectrum which links up *spetsnaz* with the rest of the military continuum, because the Soviets don't draw any lines along the way.



