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
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A BRIEFING
ON
PREVENTIVE SECURITY
FOR
THE SECOND ANNUAL
CANADIAN PENITENTIARY SERVICE
SECURITY CONFERENCE
HELD AT
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE CENTRE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
6 THROUGH 10 JANUARY 1975.

PREPARED BY:

D. Dawe,
Director,
Preventive Security Division.

OTTAWA, Ontario
January 9, 1975.



SECURITY

"Quiétude generated by the dynamic organization of systems against threats to resources, assets or interests".

Robert Diguier.

PREVENTIVE SECURITY

OTTAWA, Ontario
January 9th, 1975.

PART ONE - INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Preventive Security is not totally new but rather the formalization of activities which good and better correctional staff and directors have been practising for years as they kept their fingers on the pulse of institutional activities. The *Preventive Security Division* is relatively new to the service. Mr. Paul Faguy, our former Commissioner, himself drafted the expanded Canadian Penitentiary Service Security Branch organization chart which provided custody and control, or in a word - security - equal status with programs, organization, administration and services. A Branch headed by a Deputy Commissioner and consisting of two separate and equal yet complimentary Divisions was created and staffed.

Originally the *Preventive Security Division* was to have been called the Intelligence Division but the real role is more than that and in any case *Preventive Security* sounds better than Intelligence in this modern libertarian society.

ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The role and responsibilities of *Preventive Security* are outlined primarily in Commissioner's Directive 170 issued on June 26th 1974 and in Commissioner's Directive 171 and 212 issued on December 20th and 23rd 1974 respectively.

Specifically *Preventive Security* is responsible for:

- a. Policies, programs and procedures for the prior detection and prevention of disturbances, escapes, and other security hazards through the collection, collation, analysis and timely dissemination of event and incident indicator information and data;
- b. In conjunction with the Operational Security Division, the continuing evaluation and testing of the effectiveness of security policies, programs and procedures;
- c. Policies, programs, and procedures for the security of personnel within CPS, and visitors to CPS, in accordance with government requirements, policies and standards;
- d. Policies, programs, and procedures for the security of information and correspondence within the CPS in accordance with government requirements, policies and standards; and
- e. Policies, programs, and procedures for liaison with police, law enforcement and security agencies, the National Parole Service (and Board) especially in respect of information exchange.

PURPOSE OF THIS BRIEFING

The Regional Deputy Director Security and the Institutional Assistant Director Security is, in respect of his jurisdictional area, the focal point of security activity. His total involvement and personal support is essential to security success. To perform effectively, he must know what the total requirement is and what is expected of him. Accordingly, the

purpose of this briefing is to outline *Preventive Security* to CPS security personnel and to solicit their support.

PART TWO - DISCUSSION

MAJOR ROLE

Just as the primary role of CPS is the protection of society and the key to achievement of that primary role is security: the primary role of the *Preventive Security Division* is contributory to the same objective through the prior detection and prevention activity. This is Prevention through Intelligence. To effectively meet the requirements of collection, collation, analysis, dissemination and reaction is dependant upon the development of sources of information, the collection, prompt reporting of such information, effective analysis and timely dissemination of information to ensure reaction, your involvement is essential. The program will be only as effective as the sources of information.

Each of you has far more experience in CPS than anyone in the *Preventive Security Division*: but, *Preventive Security* is not without experience - our combined experience presently totals one hundred and twelve years or an average of 22.4 years of total spectrum security training and experience. Our staff is inflexible in only two areas:

- a. Co-operation is a two-way street; and
- b. Sources of information must be protected.

Each of you has experienced the grapevine in action. Prison grapevines are the fastest communication system known to man defying most hazards and equalled perhaps only by the computer in speed.

Each of you has observed patterns of activity. You already recognize that if a certain incident or event occurs, it may usually lead to a certain other incident or event. Analysis of every disorder and multiple escape which has taken place in or from Canadian Penitentiary Service institutions over the last ten years is in progress. It is already evident that there were, in every case, certain pre-incident indicators which if they had been recognized, reported and analysed could have resulted in a reaction which MIGHT have prevented or at least minimized the incident.

Let's look at one incident which was prevented. The incident is true. If preventive action had NOT been taken a veritable disaster would have occurred.

- a. In July 1973, documents were found by a police department outlining a plan for a mass escape from a CPS institution. The plan involved several institutions. The plan called for the introduction of weapons and explosives; for a disturbance to start in one institution and to spread to others. The operation was to be spectacular.
- b. In December 1973, another separate police agency received information that a mass escape was planned which involved the introduction of explosives into institution "A" and information that the plan involved the taking of hostages;
- c. In June 1974 further similar information was received again mentioning institution "A" but adding five others (B, C, D, E and F) but adding that the disturbances would commence in the kitchen of an institution;

- d. On June 22 and 23, 1974, a search of the yard at institution "B" revealed fifty-four knives buried, in bunches;
- e. On July 10th, 1974, a totally separate source repeated the information almost verbatim. Inquiry revealed that there was no way that this latest source could have had contact with any of the previous sources;
- f. On July 16th, 1974, at institutions "C" and "D" an inmate and an officer respectively reported the same information;
- g. On July 20th, 1974, a street source reported that institution "E" was to be the focal point;
- h. On July 30th, 1974 a further search of the yard at institution "B" resulted in the discovery of thirteen more buried knives;
- i. On August 7th, 1974, a search at institution "B" resulted in the discovery of six rounds of .22 cal. ammunition;
- j. On August 7th, 1974 a source revealed a method of weapons entry and the next day a weapon was intercepted on its way to the inmates of institution "B";
- k. On August 13th, and 17th at institutions "E" and "F" weapons were intercepted;
- l. On August 18th, 1974, a police source reported that eleven sticks of dynamite had been smuggled into institution "E" on July 15th, 1974;

- m. On August 29th, R.C.M.P. search dog found an empty box in the exercise yard (ball diamond) of institution "E". The search dog was specially trained to sniff explosives;
- n. On the same day two other sources reported that eight sticks of dynamite, detonators, fuse and guns had been smuggled into institution "E";
- o. On September 8th, 1974, continuing searches of institution "C" revealed the items shown on the photograph attached.


What do you think might have happened had this cache NOT been found?

This is but one example of effective pre-incident detection; collection, collation, analysis of information; dissemination and effective response.

POLICE LIAISON

The example quoted previously involved liaison with the police. *Preventive Security* has been tasked, on a national level, with responsibility for police liaison.

Preventive Security is the focal point of liaison between the law enforcement to court to return to society aspects of the Criminal Justice system and we are under no illusions as to police interest even while these people are supposed to be "off the street" or "out of circulation" as the result of investigation, apprehension, conviction, and sentence. We know that they continue associations, advance their criminal connections and abilities, in some cases continue their manipulations and often get back to the street sooner than the law enforcement/criminal intelligence fields would like to see.





The views, requirements and recommendations of police, penitentiary services and parole board are not divergent. The emphasis may shift, but, in all cases the primary responsibility is constant - the protection of society, and of the individuals who make up our society. Our various services have a part to play in this protection: we all deal with people, with individuals, with information concerning individuals with the might of the law, and each of us is required to make judgement decisions which affect certainly the individual, but in some cases perhaps society as a whole. Only by working together, communicating, exchanging information in a timely, frank, and reciprocal manner acceptable to all, can we achieve our objectives. The process will require additional efforts, it will not change overnight: but, it will work.

The CPS skirts are not entirely clean. In one, often quoted case, very sensitive information on organized crime was provided by police; the case was discussed at a staff meeting, the file was left in the conference room, an inmate came in to clean up and the grapevine had the whole case across the country via moccasin telegraph faster than Alexander Graham Bell. The police learned the details of the incident and threatened to cut off all information unless action were taken to initiate an improved security of information program. The program outlined in DI 750 is the result. While it may appear to some that the program appears similar to that of the military or external affairs program, please note that it has been modified considerably and is neither excessive to our actual across the board requirements or is it as cumbersome as it might initially appear. -

The CPS is the bridge between conviction and return of an offender to society. CPS receives the product of the law enforcement investigation and processes that raw materiel - with available background information - to the point where it is refined and prepared for finishing by the National Parole Board for a return to society. Both services are dependant upon information provided by the community, the police and the courts,

for guidance in the required processing and each has an obligation to the other and to the police not only for the continuity of possession, and all that entails, but more importantly for the collection, collation, and dissemination of information of necessary information relative thereto.

There is absolutely no conflict of interest. The aims of the correctional services are the protection of society through the reformation and re-education of the inmate referred to us by the courts. We depend on the police and the courts to provide the detailed data on the circumstances which placed the offender before the court and we must have particulars respecting the offender. His/her attitude and displayed characteristics are essential assessment factors and as much data as possible must be collected. The police and the National Parole Board are obviously dependant upon us for information on his whereabouts and his reaction to the reformation process. The exchange of information cannot be a one-way street nor can the information exchange be delayed. The need to know principle of information security must be observed; confidentiality must be inviolate; and timeliness is of the essence. These principles are recognized as essential; now is the time for implementation. First we must establish liaison, rapport and mutual trust to make effective communication and consultation work.

The process involves you too. In January 1972, the Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, responsible for studying the parole system in Canada, invited all individuals or groups interested in the question of parole to submit written reports and for certain agencies to appear at public hearings.

The RCM Police, the Association of Chiefs of Police of Ontario, the Montreal Urban Community Police Service, the Association of Chiefs of Police for the Province of Quebec, the Montreal Policemen's Brotherhood and the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police presented their views. In 1973, at their National Convention in Charlottetown, the Canadian Association

of Chiefs of Police formed a joint committee, expanded at the Winnipeg Convention in 1974 to include the Canadian Penitentiary Service as well as police and the National Parole Board which is tasked "*to develop and maintain a more effective mechanism of communication and consultation between the Police, National Parole Board and the Canadian Penitentiary Service.*"

Study sessions and workshops have now been held in Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, Edmonton and Vancouver.

A list of the membership of the National Joint Committee is attached.

At the June meeting of the National Joint Committee it was agreed that Regional Committees would be formed and that each group - i.e., police, parole and penitentiaries - would be represented. As if the DRD security doesn't have enough to do, he is the CPS regional representative, and will shortly be contacted by the police representative.

That isn't all though. The Commissioner on December 20th, 1974, signed C.D. 171 - Inmate Movements, Special Cases - which is directly related to the liaison responsibility and involves every one of us here. C.P.S., and in particular, *Preventive Security*, is entering the age of computerization: because we must be able to handle greater quantities of information faster, more accurately than ever before and we must guarantee the speed, completeness and security of our information, the computer is the only way to go. While your involvement will be increased we hope to reduce your workload.

Our plan is to collect and collate information in respect of those inmates involved in Organized Crime (see chart attached) and to make this information plus intelligence available via the computer. Initially, it is planned to have a computer at National

Headquarters, compatible with the CPIC network, and connected to terminals in each of the Regional Headquarters. Ultimately it is planned to expand the network to each institution.

You will appreciate that the intelligence information is extremely sensitive and must be protected. Thus Divisional Instruction 750 - Security of Information - has been prepared and Mr. T.B. Kelly (Chief of Internal Security) will be speaking to you on that specific subject later.

Additionally, part of the security of information requires assurance of the security of personnel. This too is now an ongoing program outlined in Divisional Instruction 751 - Security of Personnel - and Mr. F. H. White (Personnel Security Officer) will cover the background, requirements, procedures and problems later.

Another area of major *Preventive Security* concern is the collection and collation of information. Commissioner's Directive 212 is one step toward implementation of our program in this respect and Divisional Instruction 753 is now in DRAFT form to "make it happen".

A big problem is of course resources and you will, I hope, be as delighted as I am to learn that on December 10, 1974, the Commissioner approved the establishment and staffing of five man years combining the *Preventive Security* and Investigator positions proposed earlier. Initially these positions are being utilized as follows:

- a. National Headquarters - two;
- b. Quebec Region - one;
- c. Ontario Region - one;
- d. Pacific Region - one;

The positions have been classified at the AS-4 level and staffing action is in progress. Ultimately, it is hoped to have one full time investigator in each Region and major institution. This will take time.

It will also contribute to CX career development. Initially considerable proven specialized expertise which is not readily available within the service in sufficient quantity to meet the immediate requirement, is being brought in as a nucleus around which promising resources now within the system can be nurtured and developed. Specialized training will be provided but we will require positive evidence of interest and determination as well as ability on the part of potential investigators as we strive to ensure that *Preventive Security* joins Operational Security in providing a service as an integral part of the Security Branch.

Your questions, comments and support are, and will continue to be, invited and sincerely welcomed.

ATTACHMENTS

1. C.D. 170 - CPS Security Program
2. Organization Chart
3. Preventive Security Division Nominal Roll
4. C.D. 171 - Inmate Movement - Special Cases
5. C.D. 212 - Preventive Security - V. & C.
6. D.I. 750 - Security of Information
7. D.I. 751 - Security of Personnel
8. DRAFT D.I. 753 - Collection, Collation of Information
9. Computerization Proposal.
10. Organized Crime
11. National Joint Committee - Police, Parole, C.P.S.
12. Questions ???

CANADIAN PENITENTIARY SERVICE
SERVICE CANADIEN DES PÉNITENCIERS

June 26, 1974

le 26 juin 1974

COMMISSIONER'S DIRECTIVE
No. 170

DIRECTIVE DU COMMISSAIRE
N° 170

Canadian Penitentiary Service
Security Program

Programme de sécurité au sein
du Service Canadien des
Pénitenciers

1. AUTHORITY

This directive is issued pursuant to subsection 29(3) of the Penitentiary Act.

2. PURPOSE

This directive sets forth the responsibility for and establishment of the Security and Preventive Services Program of the Canadian Penitentiary Service.

3. DIRECTIVE

- a. The Deputy Commissioner, Security, shall be responsible for the management of security within the Canadian Penitentiary Service to protect society and to contribute to the rehabilitation of offenders through operational and preventive security programs.
- b. The Director of Operational Security (DOS) and the Director of Preventive Security (DPS) shall be responsible for the preparation and promulgation of appropriate divisional instructions.
- c. Administration of the program shall be in accordance with Commissioner's Directive No. 106.

1. AUTORITÉ

Cette directive est émise en conformité du sous paragraphe 29(3) de la Loi sur les pénitenciers.

2. OBJECTIF

Cette directive établit les programmes de sécurité opérationnelle et préventive au sein du Service canadien des pénitenciers et en spécifie la responsabilité.

3. DIRECTIVE

- a. Le commissaire adjoint (sécurité), sera responsable pour la gestion de la sécurité au sein du Service canadien des pénitenciers dans le but de protéger la société et de contribuer à la réhabilitation des délinquants par l'entremise de programmes opérationnels et préventifs en matière de sécurité.
- b. Le directeur de la sécurité opérationnelle (DSO) et le directeur de la sécurité préventive (DSP) seront responsables pour la préparation et la promulgation d'instructions divisionnaires.
- c. L'administration du programme sera en conformité de la directive du Commissaire n° 106.

d. The program shall include:

- (1) policies, programs, and procedures for the security of inmates;
- (2) policies, programs, and procedures for the security of information and correspondence within the Penitentiary Service in accordance with government requirements, policies and standards;
- (3) policies, programs, and procedures for the security of personnel within the Penitentiary Service and visitors in accordance with government requirements, policies and standards;
- (4) policies, programs and procedures for the prior detection and prevention of disturbances, escapes and other security hazards through the collection and analysis of event and indicator information and data; and
- (5) the continuing evaluation and testing of the effectiveness of the policies, programs, procedures.

e. All personnel of the Penitentiary Service shall acquaint themselves with the policies, programs, and procedures and,

d. Le programme de sécurité comprendra:

- (1) les politiques, les programmes et les procédures pour la sécurité des détenus;
- (2) les politiques, les programmes et les procédures pour la sécurité des renseignements et de la correspondance au sein du Service des pénitenciers, selon les besoins, les politiques et les standards gouvernementaux;
- (3) les politiques, les programmes et les procédures pour la sécurité du personnel et des visiteurs au sein du Service des pénitenciers selon les besoins, les politiques et les standards gouvernementaux;
- (4) les politiques, les programmes et les procédures pour la détection antérieure et la prévention de troubles, évènements et autres menaces à la sécurité, à l'aide de la collection et d'analyse d'événements et aussi de statistiques sur de l'information indicatrice; et
- (5) l'évaluation et la vérification continue des politiques, des programmes et des procédures afin d'en déterminer l'efficacité.

e. Tout le personnel au sein du Service canadien des pénitenciers doit se familiariser avec les politiques, les

although the Operational and Preventive Security Divisions will be primarily responsible for:

- (1) determination of Service operational security and preventive security objectives;
- (2) planning and definition of security policies;
- (3) determination of security activities and the establishment of security guidelines for the implementation of security policy;
- (4) determination of security standards to be achieved and the evaluation of results obtained; and
- (5) criteria evaluation of security resources utilization;

security, in the final analysis, is an individual requirement and responsibility shared by all staff, whose support and adherence is essential.


ORGANIZATION

The Security organization chart is attached as Annex "A" to this directive.

DIVISIONAL INSTRUCTIONS

Divisional Instructions amplifying this Commissioner's Directive are contained in the 700 series.

Commissioner,



D. A. Faquy.

programmes et les procédures et, quoique les Divisions de Sécurité opérationnelle et préventive seront essentiellement responsables pour:

- (1) la détermination des objectifs du Service de sécurité opérationnelle et préventive;
- (2) la planification et la définition des politiques en matière de sécurité;
- (3) la détermination des activités et aussi l'établissement de lignes de conduite en matière de sécurité, servant à la mise en oeuvre de la politique sécuritaire;
- (4) la détermination des standards sécuritaires à atteindre et l'évaluation des résultats obtenus; et
- (5) l'évaluation et l'utilisation des ressources sécuritaires;

la sécurité, en dernier lieu, est une obligation individuelle et une responsabilité partagée par tout le personnel dont le support et l'adhérence sont essentiels.

4. ORGANISATION

L'organigramme sécuritaire est inclus à l'Annexe "A" de cette directive.

5. INSTRUCTIONS DIVISIONNAIRES


Les instructions divisionnaires amplifiant cette directive du Commissaire sont contenues dans la série 700.

Le Commissaire,

June 26, 1974

le 26 juin 1974


NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS SECURITY BRANCH ORGANIZATION CHART
ORGANIGRAMME DE LA DIRECTION DE LA SÉCURITÉ, ADMINISTRATION CENTRALE



1974

le 26 juin 1974

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS SECURITY BRANCH ORGANIZATION CHART
ORGANIGRAMME DE LA DIRECTION DE LA SÉCURITÉ, ADMINISTRATION CENTRALE



PREVENTIVE SECURITY DIVISION

NOMINAL ROLL

Director	<u>D. Dawe</u>	2009A St. Laurent Blvd., OTTAWA, Ontario K1G 1A3.	(613)737-4 Rm533B 5-0
	<u>Pagette</u>		(613)237-40 Unit 411
Chief Security Analyst	<u>H. Neufeld</u>	96 Canter Blvd., OTTAWA, Ontario K2G 2M7	(613)224-53 Rm533C 5-08
Chief Internal	<u>T.B. Kelly</u>	2166 Loyola Court, Suite 115, Ottawa, Ont.	(613)745-560 Off. 2-2724
Chief Security Personnel	<u>F.H. White</u>	1095 Cline Crescent, OTTAWA, Ontario	(613)225-690 Rm 531A 2-27
Security Officer	<u>J.L. Marleau</u>	18 - 2nd Avenue, POINTE-GATINEAU, PQ.	(819)777-542 Rm531B 5-084
Secretary	<u>G. Brunet (Mrs.)</u>	123 Granville St., VANIER, Ontario K1L 6Y3.	(613)746-369 Rm533A 5-093
Security Analysis Clerk	<u>G. Doucet (Mrs.)</u>	334 Riel Blvd., HULL, P.Q.	(819)771-524 Rm531 2-2724

CANADIAN PENITENTIARY SERVICE
SERVICE CANADIEN DES PÉNITENCIERS

December 20, 1974

le 20 décembre 1974

COMMISSIONER'S DIRECTIVE
No. 171

DIRECTIVE DU COMMISSAIRE
N° 171

Inmate Movements -
Special Cases

Déplacement des détenus -
Cas spéciaux

1. AUTHORITY

This directive is issued pursuant to subsection 29 (3) of the Penitentiary Act.

1. AUTORITÉ

Cette directive est émise en conformité du paragraphe 29 (3) de la Loi sur les pénitenciers.

2. PURPOSE

This directive sets forth the responsibility of the Security Branch in respect of transfers and temporary absences in respect of all inmates of Canadian Penitentiary Service institutions who are subject to special supervisory requirements because of:

2. OBJET

Cette directive établit la responsabilité de la Direction de la sécurité en ce qui concerne les transferts et les absences temporaires pour les détenus des institutions du Service canadien des pénitenciers qui sont sujets à une surveillance spéciale pour les raisons suivantes:

a. Conviction for Criminal Code offences contrary to sections:

a. Conviction pour infractions au Code criminel du Canada, contrairement aux sections:

(1) 46 - Treason and other offences against the Queen's Authority and Person.

(1) 46 - Trahison et autres infractions contre l'autorité et la personne de la Reine.

(2) 51 - Intimidating Parliament.

(2) 51 - Intimider le Parlement.

(3) 52 - Sabotage.

(3) 52 - Sabotage.

(4) 62 - Sedition.

(4) 62 - Sédition.

(5) 75 - Piracy.

(5) 75 - Piraterie.

(6) 76 - Hijacking.

(6) 76 - Détournement.

- | | |
|--|--|
| (7) 132 - Prison Breach. | (7) 132 - Bris de prison. |
| (8) 214(2) - Murder punishable by death. | (8) 214(2) - Meurtre punissable de mort. |
| (9) 247, 248, 249 - Kidnapping. | (9) 247, 248, 249 - Enlèvement. |
| (10) 687 - Dangerous Sexual Offender. | (10) 687 - Criminel sexuel dangereux. |
| (11) 688 - Habitual criminal. | (11) 688 - Repris de justice. |

- | | |
|--|--|
| b. Involvement in organized crime. | b. Implication dans le crime organisé. |
| c. Deportation upon expiration of sentence. | c. Déportation à l'expiration de sa sentence. |
| d. Having testified as a Crown witness as the result of an institution related offence. | d. Ayant attesté comme témoin de la Couronne à la suite d'une infraction par rapport à une institution. |
| e. Other documented cases of special continuing interest of a preventive security nature, (i.e., inmates who have demonstrated a violent character whilst in custody). | e. Autres cas documentés spéciaux d'un intérêt particulier à la Direction de la sécurité préventive, (i.e., détenus ayant démontré un caractère violent en détention). |

3. RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER DIRECTIVES

This directive shall be read in conjunction with Commissioner's Directives Nos. 110, 133, 135, 170, 228, 813 and 814.

4. PROCEDURE

- a. At institutional level, files of inmates described in paragraph 2 above shall be annotated on the left file

3. RAPPORT AVEC LES AUTRES DIRECTIVES

Cette directive doit être lue et appliquée concurremment avec les directives du Commissaire nos 110, 133, 135, 170, 228, 813 et 814.

4. PROCÉDURE

- a. Au niveau des institutions, les dossiers des détenus décrits dans le paragraphe 2 ci-haut mentionné, devraient être annotés à l'intérieur de la couverture

cover flyleaf as follows:

gauche, comme suit:

SECURITY NOTICE

AVIS DE SÉCURITÉ

Additional data on this subject is held on classified security files, including but not limited to temporary absences or transfers. Access is limited on a "need to know" basis. No action relative to the subject IS to be taken without prior consultation with the Deputy Regional Director Security.

Les données additionnelles concernant ce sujet sont contenues dans des dossiers qui portent une cote de sécurité, n'étant pas limitées mais incluant les absences temporaires et les transferts. Ces dossiers ne peuvent être consultés qu'en cas de nécessité. Aucune décision ne DOIT être prise à ce sujet sans avoir consulté au préalable le directeur régional adjoint de la sécurité.

- b. Deputy Regional Directors Security will receive and hold synopsis of the information held by the Director Preventive Security.
- c. Institutional staff, before initiating transfer or temporary absence action in respect of such inmates, will refer each case through the Deputy Regional Director Security to the Director of Preventive Security for a recommendation.
- d. Inmate programs staff will be briefed by the Deputy Regional Director Security and will give support to such recommendations as may be provided.


- b. Les directeurs régionaux adjoints recevront et devront garder un résumé de l'information gardée par le directeur de la sécurité préventive.
- c. Le personnel des institutions, avant d'accorder un transfert ou une absence temporaire dans le cas de ces détenus, référera chaque cas par l'intermédiaire du directeur régional adjoint de la sécurité au directeur de la sécurité préventive pour sa recommandation.
- d. Le personnel des programmes pour les détenus sera instruit par le directeur régional adjoint de la sécurité et donnera appui à ces recommandations.

e. Security recommendations will be held on security files only.

Commissioner,

e. Les recommandations sécuritaires seront gardées sur les dossiers de la sécurité seulement.

le Commissaire,



P. A. Faguy.

SERVICE CANADIEN DES PENITENCIERS

December 23, 1974

le 23 décembre 1974

COMMISSIONER'S DIRECTIVE
No. 212

DIRECTIVE DU COMMISSAIRE
N^o. 212

Preventive Security -
Visits and Correspondence

Sécurité préventive -
Visites et correspondance

1. AUTHORITY

This directive is issued pursuant to section 29(3) of the Penitentiary Act.

1. AUTORISATION

Cette directive est émise conformément au sous paragraphe 29(3) de la Loi sur les Pénitenciers.

2. PURPOSE

This directive sets forth the policy of the Service respecting the Preventive Security controls to be applied to visits and correspondence and should be read in conjunction with other V & C Directives.

2. BUT

La présente directive établit la politique du Service en ce qui concerne les contrôles de la sécurité préventive qui doivent s'appliquer aux visites et correspondance, et doivent ce lire en conjonction avec d'autres directives de visites et correspondance.

3. DIRECTIVE

Section 2.18 of the Penitentiary Service Regulations provides:

"In so far as practicable the censorship of correspondence shall be avoided and the privacy of visits shall be maintained but nothing herein shall be deemed to limit the authority of the Commissioner to direct or the institutional head to order censorship of correspondence or supervision of visiting to the extent considered necessary or desirable for the reformation and rehabilitation of inmates or the security of the institution". Accordingly, while censorship of correspondence will not normally be performed, all incoming and outgoing correspondence, except privileged correspondence as defined by

3. DIRECTIVE

Section 2.18 de la Loi sur les pénitenciers dit que:


"Dans la mesure où cela est pratique la censure de la correspondance doit être évitée et l'intimité des visites doit être respectée, mais rien aux présentes ne doit être considéré comme limitant l'autorité du Commissaire de réglementer, ou du Chef d'une institution d'ordonner la censure de la correspondance ou la surveillance des visites selon les modalités tenues pour nécessaires ou utiles à la rééducation et, à la réadaptation des détenus ou à la sécurité de l'institution". Suivant que la censure de la correspondance ne sera pas exécuter, toute correspondance, à l'exception de la correspondance privilégiée comme défini dans la Directive du Commissaire 219, paragraphe 7,

C.D. 219, paragraph seven, shall be inspected to prevent transmission of contraband. All visits in maximum and medium security institutions shall be closely supervised and may, when in the opinion of the Director, Preventive Security or the institutional Director, if security so requires, be monitored and/or recorded. Whenever such action is taken a report shall be forwarded to the Commissioner, Attention Director, Preventive Security, within 48 hours of the occurrence. Warning notices to this effect shall be displayed in all visiting areas.

sera inspecter pour empêcher la transmission de la contrebande. Toutes visites dans les institutions à sécurité maximale et minimum devraient être surveillées et pourraient, au jugement du Directeur de la sécurité préventive et du Directeur institutionnel de la sécurité, si la sécurité l'exige, être écouté et/ou enregistré. Toutes fois que ces mesures seront prises, un rapport devra être soumis au Commissaire, à l'attention du Directeur de la sécurité préventive, suivant les 48 heures de l'évènement. Des avertissements à cet effet seront afficher dans toutes les salles de visites.

The Commissioner

Le Commissaire



P.A. Laguy

PROPOSED QUESTIONS
FOR
PARTICIPANT DISCUSSION
RE
PREVENTIVE SECURITY

1. Does the materiel presented provide you with a better understanding of the role, responsibilities and organization of *Preventive Security*?

2. Are the Directives and Divisional Instructions clear, concise, and practicable to you? If not, suggest amendments?

3. Are you aware of the Commissioner's letter of August 21st, 1974, directing that all C.P.S. staff be advised, officially and in writing that security is everybody's concern; that the senior correctional officer on duty is the focal point for all security activity and information and that information is to be channelled expeditiously to H.Q. through Regional H.Q.?

4. Are you "making it happen" in your Region or institution?

5. What do you do with "kites" in your institution?

6. Is every piece of information collected, recorded, collated, passed on, acted upon? If not, are you ready now to "make it happen"?

7. Have you effected local police and parole liaison?
8. Do you know which of your inmates are "organized crime" involved?
9. Are your staff being developed to become security conscious?
10. What can *Preventive Security* do to help you and your institution?

CANADIAN PENITENTIARY SERVICE

June 24th, 1974

DIVISIONAL INSTRUCTION No. 750

SECURITY OF INFORMATION

1. Authority

This instruction, applicable to all elements and activities of the Canadian Penitentiary Service, is issued in accordance with Commissioner's Directive Number 170 dated June 26, 1974 and Canadian government security of information policies.

2. Purpose

The purpose of the instruction is to outline to all Penitentiary Service staff personnel the regulations and standards required to protect official information.

3. Definitions

In this instruction:

- a. "authorized person" means a person who, in the performance of his or her duties as an employee of the Service, having been security cleared to the appropriate level, and having an established official "need to know", may be granted access to information of, or entrusted to, the Canadian Penitentiary Service.
- b. "classified information" means information of a written, oral aural, or visual nature, to which a security classification has been assigned and to which access must be limited to authorized persons.

- c. "document" means any form of recorded information or any part thereof and includes, but is not limited to; records, correspondence, and all other forms of written, typewritten, shorthand, duplicated, stencilled, printed, photocopied, information, drawing, photographs, graphs, maps, etc.
- d. "downgrading" means the lower re-assignment of classification, including reclassification, authorized in accordance with this instruction.
- e. "guarded area" means an area occupied or protected by authorized personnel.
- f. "need to know" means that the necessity, for the purposes of official duties and responsibilities of an individual, to have access to information.
- g. "restricted area" means an area within the Canadian Penitentiary Service facilities - HQ, Region or institution - in which classified information is kept, classified work is performed, classified material is stored, etc., and which must, at all times be protected from access by other than authorized persons.
- h. "registered document" means any document, classified or not, bearing a title and copy number, which must be accounted for periodically.
- j. "security clearance" means the official acknowledgement, based upon official inquiry, that an individual is worthy to be entrusted, on a need-to-know basis, with access to and knowledge of classified information.

- k. "security of information" means the protection of classified information to ensure that it does not pass to unauthorized persons visually, orally, or physically.

4. Security Classifications

The four Canadian security classifications are as follows:

a. Top Secret:

Documents, information and material, the security aspect of which is paramount, and whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the Nation.

b. Secret:

Documents, information or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which would endanger national security, cause serious injury to the interests or prestige of the nation, or any government activity thereof, or would be of great advantage to a foreign nation.

c. Confidential:

Documents, information or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which, while not endangering the national security, would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the Nation, any government activity, or individual, or would cause administrative embarrassment, or difficulty, or be of advantage to a foreign nation.

d. Restricted:

Documents, information or material (other than Top Secret, Secret or Confidential) which should not be published or communicated to anyone except for official purposes.

Within the Canadian Penitentiary Service it is extremely unlikely that the classification of Top Secret would ever be used and very few documents would be secret. However, the great bulk of information held by the Service is of a personnel nature and would normally fall into the broad classifications of Confidential or Restricted. Caveats have been developed and applied to further divide the controls implied by the assignment of security classification: these include; Confidential - Personnel Management, and Confidential - Medical Records, etc.

5. Knowledge of Classified Documents

Classification of documents in any of the security categories does not imply an automatic distribution. Knowledge of all classified documents, information and material must be confined to those whose duties make such knowledge essential. No person is entitled solely by virtue of his rank or position to have knowledge or possession of classified matter.

6. Origination

The originator of a document is responsible for the initial assignment of security classification. To assist originators, a "Guide to Security Classification in the Penitentiary Service" is appended to this instruction as Annex A.

7. Marking

All classified documents must be clearly stamped or marked with the security classification to which they are assigned, in the top right-hand corner above the file number. In the case of folded maps or other large documents, the Security classification must be visible in the top right-hand corner when open or folded. The Security classification must also appear at the beginning of the text of any message assigned to that classification.

8. Classified documents comprised of several pages are to be

marked on each page, unless enclosed in a permanent or secure binding, in which case the marking need be only on the front cover, title page, page one, all appendices, and any full page or inserted map or illustration. File jackets and loose leaf binders are not permanent bindings; stapling is not a secure binding. The first page or cover of any document in several pages, other than a printed document, is to be stamped (not typed) with the security classification subsequent pages may bear a typed marking.

9. Handling

Classified documents may be handled only by persons entitled to knowledge of their contents and to the extent their duties require, by persons employed on copying, typing, and clerical duties.

10. Notebooks

Notebooks which contain top secret, secret, or confidential matter are regarded as official and not as private property. In general they are treated in accordance with the regulations governing the category of the material contained therein. Normally, such books may not be removed from the facility in which they are compiled. Such notebooks must not be removed to private premises.

11. Transmission

Secret matter being transmitted from one point to another in Canada is to be by courier or registered mail. Transmission from one building to a nearby one or within a building is by hand of an officer or by authorized messenger.

12. Secret documents are to be enclosed in two covers or envelopes except when transmission is by hand or an officer from one office to another within the same building or immediately adjacent buildings.

13. The outer cover or envelope is to be addressed to the faculty for which it is intended and is not to indicate the security category of the contents.

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12. Secret documents are to be enclosed in two covers or envelopes except when transmission is by hand or an officer from one office to another within the same building or immediately adjacent buildings.

13. The outer cover or envelope is to be addressed to the Unit for which it is intended and is not to indicate the security category of the contents.

14. When a secret document is transmitted by hand of an officer or authorized messenger between distant buildings it is to be enclosed in two envelopes or covers. The inner envelope is to be gum-sealed, receipt form enclosed and addressed to the individual or appointment for whom it is intended and is to bear the classification "Secret".

15. When transmitted by hand of an officer or authorized messenger within the same building or immediately adjacent buildings, secret documents may be carried in one envelope. This envelope or cover is to be gum-sealed.

16. A receipt on delivery may be obtained for all secret documents if the sender so desires.

17. Transmission of Confidential Matter

Confidential matter is transmitted from one point to another in Canada by ordinary mail, from one building to a nearby one or within a building transmission is by hand of an officer or by authorized messenger.

18. Confidential documents (except when taken by hand of an officer or authorized messenger) are to be sent in two envelopes or covers.

19. The inner envelope or cover is to be gum-sealed; addressed in the normal manner marked "Confidential"; the outer envelope is to be addressed to the address for which it is intended and is not to indicate in any way the security category of the contents.

20. When transmitted by hand of an officer or authorized messenger within the same building, or immediately adjacent buildings confidential documents may be carried in one envelope. This envelope or cover is to be gum-sealed.

21. A receipt on delivery may be obtained for confidential documents if the sender so desires.

22. Transmission of Restricted Matter

Restricted matter is to be transmitted by ordinary post office channels, but when the documents have any special value in themselves, restricted mail is to be used.

23. Restricted documents are passed in one envelope only, which is to be inscribed with the name and address of the unit. No other marking is to be made on the envelope.

24. Storage of Classified Matter

Classified matter must be protected from unauthorized access during periods of storage. Criteria for security storage facilities have been developed over a period of many years and are common to all government departments and agencies. Classified matter and valuables - money, negotiables, weapons, etc., - shall NOT be stored in the same container. Minimum security storage requirements are dependant upon the security classification of the material to be protected and secondly the physical characteristics of the storage area. Current criteria, which shall be observed throughout the Service are as follows:

a. TOP SECRET

- (i) Must be stored only in a guarded area.
- (ii) Must be stored in a vault or dial lock safe approved by the RCM Police Security Equipment Section for the storage of Top Secret material.

b. SECRET

- (i) When stored in a guarded area shall be contained in;
 - (a) a vault or dial lock safe approved for that purpose; or
 - (b) a steel cabinet with removable T bar, which has top and bottom hasps welded to the cabinet, securely locked in place across all drawers with an

approved manipulation proof three wheel combination dial lock; or

- (c) a steel cabinet approved by the RCM Police Security Equipment Section for that purpose, and equipped with an approved manipulation proof three wheel combination lock.

(ii) When stored in an open or unguarded area secret material shall be stored in an approved vault or dial lock safe.

c. CONFIDENTIAL

Shall be contained in:

- (a) a vault or dial lock safe approved for that purpose; or
- (b) a steel cabinet with removable T bar, which has top and bottom hasps welded to the cabinet, securely locked in place across all drawers with an approved manipulation proof three wheel combination dial lock; or
- (c) a steel cabinet approved by the RCM Police Security Equipment Section for that purpose, and equipped with an approved manipulation proof three wheel combination lock.

d. RESTRICTED

Restricted material in a guarded area may be stored in a locked room or office. In open or unguarded areas restricted material shall be stored in cabinets and such cabinets shall be located in locked offices.

25. Safeguards During Use

The authorized person to whom classified documents have been issued shall, at all times, be responsible for their safekeeping, whether or not being used in a restricted area. As soon as practicable after having served their purpose, they shall be returned to the person from whom they were obtained, or placed in the appropriate filing container. Under no circumstances are classified documents to be left exposed in unattended offices or left out of their regular container over night.

When an unauthorized person is present, classified documents shall be covered, turned face down, or placed in a container out of sight.

26. Reproduction of Classified Documents

All reproductions of classified documents shall be marked in the appropriate manner with the same security classification as the original or copy at the time of reproduction.

Unless reproduction is specifically prohibited in the document, classified information may be reproduced on the authority of an officer who shall certify that such reproduction is necessary. A record shall be kept of all reproductions.

27. Protection of Keys and Combinations

Keys and lock combinations must be given the same degree of protection as that afforded to the material which is being protected. For example, a combination to a container containing confidential material must be safeguarded as Confidential matter.

In selecting combination settings, numbers should be chosen at random. Multiples, simple ascending or descending number series, or numbers associated with the office or office occupants such as birth dates or telephone number should be avoided.

Combinations and keys should be accessible only to those persons requiring access to them on a "need to know" basis.

Combination lock settings and padlocks securing classified matter should be changed at least every six months and at the earliest practicable time following:

- a. The loss or possible compromise of the combination or key.
- b. The termination of duty, or reassignment of any person having knowledge of the combination, or access to keys.

In addition to key and combination padlocks being susceptible to picking and manipulation, there is the danger of an identical lock with a known key or combination being surreptitiously substituted for a lock in use. Further, an unprotected padlock could be temporarily removed and its locking mechanism compromised without the user of the lock being aware of its compromise. For these reasons, the padlock itself should always be protected when not in use, along with the keys and padlock combinations.

28. Destruction of Classified Information

Classified waste in ANYTHING which is classified or contains classified information and which is ready for disposal.

This includes stenographers' notebooks, carbon paper, work sheets, etc. It also includes material which bears a security classification, even though the material may have since been declassified.

Destruction shall be by burning or shredding.

29. Loss or Compromise

Classified information is compromised when it has been made available to people who either are not in possession of adequate security clearance or have no "need-to-know".

When it has been established that compromise has occurred, it is a breach of security; when compromise is unlikely, it is a security infraction.

Once a breach of security has been established:

- a. C.P.S. H.Q. shall be advised.
- b. The next action is to ensure that the originator of the classified information is informed of the compromise as early as possible; the second to ensure that the case is handled by an investigator who has adequate time to work uninterrupted.
- c. The investigation into a security infraction and the full investigation of a breach of security should establish "when", "where", "how", "who", and results of the security violation.
- d. Conscientiously kept records of infractions and breaches will reflect any pattern of careless security habits which may develop and subsequent corrective action can be taken. Also, such a system recording date, time, place and type of infraction with respect to a section or group will eventually assist in determining the responsible person.

CANADIAN PENITENTIARY SERVICE

Guide to Security Classification

1. The following examples of information requiring the assignment of security classification and protection in accordance with standards established for that level of classification are provided for general guidance.

a. The following are examples of data which should be classified TOP SECRET.

- (i) Operational security and intelligence plans prepared to meet contingencies which might involve delicate political negotiations or which could result in serious international repercussions, or
- (ii) Information about the methods used or success obtained by intelligence or counter-intelligence services, and any such information which could imperil sources of intelligence.

b. The following are examples of data which should be classified SECRET:

- (i) Details of security and preventive security operational plans which do not require TOP SECRET protection.
- (ii) Details concerning the security vulnerability of vital installations.
- (iii) Detailed contingency plans for emergency response in the event of disorders during any period of staff deficiency or labour strife.

- (iv) Details of preventive security sources of information;
 - (v) Details of security alarm and communication facility plans.
- c. The following are examples of information and data which should be classified CONFIDENTIAL:
- (i) Routine security reports
 - (ii) Medical Records
 - (iii) All police reports.
 - (iv) Staff personnel files.
 - (v) Inmate personnel files and records containing assessments.
 - (vi) Documents containing complete or comprehensive details of the Penitentiary Service or institutional security structure, including command, control and facilities, and
- d. For all other cases where information is for official use only and not for public dissemination, the classification of RESTRICTED should be applied.

CANADIAN PENITENTIARY SERVICE

4 October 1974

DIVISIONAL INSTRUCTION NO. 751

SECURITY OF PERSONNEL

1. Authority

This instruction is issued in accordance with Commissioner's Directive Number 170 and Government of Canada Security of Personnel policy.

2. REVOCATION

Divisional Instruction 317 dated January 31, 1964 is hereby revoked.

3. PURPOSE

The purpose of this instruction is to outline to all Penitentiary Service staff personnel the regulations and standards required to meet security of personnel standards.

4. DEFINITIONS

In this instruction:

- a. "authorized person" means a person who, in the performance of his or her duties as an employee of the Service, having been security cleared to the appropriate level, and having an established official "need to know", may be granted access to information of, or entrusted to, the Canadian Penitentiary Service.
- b. "classified information" means information of a written, oral, aural, or visual nature, to which a security classification has been assigned and to which access must be limited to authorized persons.

- c. "document" means any form of recorded information or any part thereof and includes, but is not limited to; records, correspondence, and all other forms of written, typewritten, shorthand, duplicated, stencilled, printed, photocopied, information, drawing, photographs, graphs, maps, etc.

- d. "facility" means any establishment, building, office, equipment, or other material object under the care and control or from time to time in use by the Canadian Penitentiary Service.

- e. "Need to know" means that the necessity, for the purposes of official duty and responsibilities of an individual, to have access to information.

- f. "restricted area" means an area within the Canadian Penitentiary Service facilities - H.Q., Region or institution - in which classified information is kept, classified work is performed, classified material is stored, etc., and which must, at all times be protected from access by other than authorized persons.

- g. "security clearance" means the official acknowledgement, based upon official inquiry, that an individual is worthy to be entrusted, on a need-to-know basis, with access to and knowledge of classified information.

- c. "document" means any form of recorded information or any part thereof and includes, but is not limited to; records, correspondence, and all other forms of written, typewritten, shorthand, duplicated, stencilled, printed, photocopied, information, drawing, photographs, graphs, maps, etc.

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- g. "security clearance" means the official acknowledgement, based upon official inquiry, that an individual is worthy to be entrusted, on a need-to-know basis, with access to and knowledge of classified information.

- h. "security of information" means the protection of classified information to ensure that it does not pass to unauthorized persons visually, orally, or physically.

5. GOVERNMENT POLICY

It has long been established (by Cabinet Directive) government policy that before any person is permitted access to government information, the government must be assured of the worthiness of the individual to receive such trust. The acknowledgement is called security clearance.

The object of a security clearance is to verify to supervisory staffs that the person concerned is regarded as being sufficiently reliable to be entrusted with information classified up to and including the same level as that indicated on the security clearance certificates. This verification of reliability is determined by conducting an investigation into the background of this person for a sufficient period of time and in sufficient detail to provide assurance as to his loyalty, his personal integrity, and his general suitability to be entrusted with the nature of information. While a security clearance cannot positively guarantee the loyalty and reliability of a person, it ensures that, insofar as our resources will permit, an approved and uniform system of inquiry has been followed and that, in the absence of any personal adverse knowledge, supervisory staffs may permit access without undue concern.

6. RESPONSIBILITY FOR OBTAINING SECURITY CLEARANCES

-Security is everybody's personal responsibility. This being so, it is then the responsibility of every person who fills a supervisory role to ensure that all persons who are subordinate to them are security cleared to the proper level.

7. STAFFING RESPONSIBILITY

It is the responsibility of staffing officers to ensure that particulars of all Candidates for positions which have a security clearance requirement are referred to the Preventive Security Division for a clearance before an offer of appointment is made.

8. GRANTING OF SECURITY CLEARANCES

To ensure uniformity of procedures in the processing of requests for security clearances, criteria have been established by the government . These criteria reflect the minimum standards which must be met before a security clearance may be granted and the same criteria apply to all.

When a person has been investigated with favourable results, his security reliability is officially acknowledged by the granting of a security clearance.

9. DENIAL OF SECURITY CLEARANCES

There is a widespread belief that disloyalty to Canada is the only bar to a security clearance and that subversive persons are the only ones that we must be careful about. That is not true.

In fact, the majority of people found to be security risks are perfectly loyal Canadian citizens. Unfortunately, due to a defect or weakness in the ir personal characters, they should not be trusted with classified matter.

Personal weaknesses may take the form of dishonesty, intemperance, susceptibility to blackmail, boastfulness, or just carelessness. If, after careful examination of a case, a person's loyalty or reliability still remains in doubt, that doubt must be resolved in favour of Canada.

10. RIGHTS

A great deal is said today about individual rights. An employer has rights too. The employer has not only a right but an obligation to protect himself and to do this must establish policies and conditions. Security clearance therefore is a condition access and thus a condition of employment.

Nobody has a "right" of access to classified matter and no man's freedoms are infringed when access is denied.

To deny a security clearance to a person is not tantamount to accusing him of a crime. The sole point at issue is whether or not he can or should be trusted with classified matter.

Although no person has a "right" to have a security clearance, he does have a basic right to earn a living, and if at all possible, he should not be denied the opportunity to earn a living. Care must be taken to ensure that this principle is maintained. In the light of this it may be necessary to reassign a person who is not clearable, or even cause his removal from the public service. Such action is the responsibility of the Security Clearance Review Board which assures the greatest public protection and the minimum harm to the person.

11. CLEARANCE PROCEDURES

Certain positions automatically require TOP SECRET or SECRET clearance because the incumbents are required to attend Cabinet Committee meetings, meetings on Treasury Board estimates, sensitive issue of government policy, etc. The following positions shall be security cleared as noted below:

a) TOP SECRET

Commissioner

Deputy Commissioner

Divisional Directors

Regional Directors

Deputy Regional Director (Security)

Chief, Secretariat

Chief, Office Services

Chiefs in Security Divisions

Secretaries to the above

Security staff personnel according to position and a "need to know" basis.

b) SECRET

- All other Deputy Regional Directors
- Directors of Institutions
- AD's Security
- Secretaries to the above.

The Commissioner has determined that all employees of the Penitentiary Service shall be security cleared to a minimum of Confidential. Employees, who may have access to information classified "Confidential Personnel Management, shall be cleared to the normal "Confidential" level and their positions should be so identified.

In order to determine which positions require a security clearance above confidential level, it is necessary to know whether the incumbent may need access to information classified Secret or Top Secret in order to perform the duties of the position. Supervisors at all levels are responsible for determining the security clearance requirements of positions under their control. Effective 1 November 1974, and semi-annually thereafter, each position shall be reviewed and categorized in a security clearance requirements register - copies of which shall be prepared in triplicate and distributed as follows: original to AD Security or where there is no AD Security to the Director; duplicate to the DRD Security and triplicate to HQ CPS, ATTENTION: Preventive Security Division. The register shall show for each establishment:

- a. position number;
- b. position title;

- c. incumbent;
- d. Classification of the most-highly classified information to which access is required - to be known as "access requirement";
- e. Security clearance status of the incumbent:
 - (i) level of clearance granted; and
 - (ii) date of clearance; or
 - (iii) date taken on strength; and
 - (iv) date clearance requested.

12. INITIATION OF CLEARANCE PROCEDURES

Most CPS staff have already completed Personal History Forms (Annex A) and Fingerprint Forms. In some cases updating is required. In all cases updating is required every five years. Where an individual has not completed the necessary forms within the past five years, when forms are specifically requested by HQ CPS, or when new employees are being processed for engagement the following action will be taken:

- a. Security Clearance Request and Authorization in the form shown at Annex C to this instruction will be completed and forwarded to HQ CPS (Preventive Security) through Regional H.Q.
- b. Personal History Form (Annex A) will be completed by the individual concerned, in accordance with the instructions shown at Annex B;
- c. Fingerprints will be provided on RCMP Form C216C.

- d. Forms will be vetted for completeness by security staff;
- e. Applicants will be given a security briefing in the form shown at Annex "D" and will sign the security briefing certificate in duplicate. The duplicate copy is to be placed in subject's personal file. This form will be reproduced locally.
- f. Personal History Forms, fingerprints, and original copies of briefing certificates will be forwarded to CPS HQ through DRD (Security).
- g. When clearance action is completed HQ CPS will forward the clearance certificate through DRD (Security).
- h. Clearance Certificates will be recorded in the Security Clearance Requirements Register and passed to the appropriate Personnel Officer.
- j. Personnel Officers receiving Security Clearance Certificates will ensure that they are affixed to the inside left cover of the appropriate individual's personnel file.
- k. A Security declaration to be signed in duplicate by the applicant will be included with the clearance certificate. The original copy is to be forwarded to DPS when completed. The duplicate copy is to be retained in subject's personal file until used for debriefing subject upon his release from the service.

TO
AFROM
DEChief Internal Security
Canadian Penitentiary Service.SUBJECT
OBJETSecurity

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION -- DE SECURITE
OUR FILE -- N/REFERENCE
YOUR FILE -- V/REFERENCE
DATE

This document may be taken as confirmation that you have been security cleared to the level of To complete our files, I would request that you sign the attached declaration.

The declaration refers to the Official Secrets Act and, in particular, section 4. You have been given a copy of this.

You are also reminded of the Oath or Affirmation of Office and Secrecy to which you have already subscribed. The oath reads "I solemnly and sincerely swear that I will faithfully and honestly fulfill the duties that devolve upon me by reason of my employment in the Public Service and that I will not, without due authority in that behalf, disclose or make known any matter that comes to my knowledge by reason of such employment. So help me God".

There are a number of aspects of security concerning which one should always be mindful. Basic to the security system is the principle that no one should be given classified information unless he has a need to know this information in order to perform his duties. (This includes information about your own security clearance). This means that no one should accept classified information, even if he is security cleared, unless he needs to know it. It also means that anyone who is considering imparting classified information to another person should satisfy himself of two things:

1. That the other person needs to know the information in order to carry out his duties, and
2. That the other person is cleared to the level of security required for that particular document. (If necessary this can be confirmed by your Supervisor.

One of the greatest dangers to the security system is carelessness. Consequently, members of the staff who are security cleared are asked to make a special effort to be careful in the handling of classified documents. When these documents are not in use they should be kept in a locked cabinet or safe which has been approved for the purpose. Classified documents should be passed from person to person either by hand or in properly sealed envelopes. Your Director's office has a copy of a set of guidelines concerning the method of handling classified documents and if you have doubt about procedures, you should consult these.

Should you marry or remarry at any time during your employment with the Canadian Penitentiary Service, you are asked to submit a new personal history form in relation to your new spouse. Failure to do this would cause your security clearance to become null and void. If you are transferred to another position, your security clearance status will be reviewed in relation to your new work.

If at any time you have doubts concerning a matter of security, I would urge you to raise it with your Director without delay. Also, of course, you should feel free to consult with Security personnel.

4.(1) Every person is guilty of an offence under this Act who, Having in his possession or control any secret official code word, or pass word, or any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information that relates to or is used in a prohibited place or anything in such a place, or that has been made or obtained in contravention of this Act, or that has been entrusted in confidence to him by any person holding office under Her Majesty, or that he has obtained or to which he has had access while subject to the Code of Service Discipline within the meaning of the National Defence Act or owing to his position as a person who holds or has held office under Her Majesty, or as a person who holds or has held a contract made on behalf of Her Majesty, or a contract the performance of which in whole or in part is carried out in a prohibited place, or as a person who holds or has held such an office or contract,

(a) communicates the code word, pass word, sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information to any person, other than a person to whom he is authorized to communicate with, or a person to whom it is in the interest of the State his duty to communicate it;

(b) uses the information in his possession for the benefit of any foreign power or in any other manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State;

(c) retains the sketch, plan, model, article, note, or document in his possession or control when he has no right to retain it or fails to comply with all directions issued by lawful authority with regard to the return or disposal thereof; or

4.(1) Est coupable d'infraction à la présente loi quiconque, ayant en sa possession ou contrôle un chiffre officiel ou mot de passe, ou un croquis, plan, modèle, article, note, document ou renseignement se rapportant à un endroit prohibé ou à quelque chose en cet endroit ou qui y est utilisé, ou qui a été fabriqué ou obtenu contrairement à la présente loi, ou qui lui a été confié par une personne détenant une fonction relevant de Sa Majesté, ou qu'il a obtenu ou auquel il a eu accès, alors qu'il était assujetti au Code de discipline militaire au sens de la Loi sur la défense nationale, ou à titre de personne détenant ou ayant détenu une fonction relevant de Sa Majesté ou à titre de personne qui est ou a été l'adjudicataire d'un contrat passé pour le compte de Sa Majesté, ou d'un contrat qui est exécuté en totalité ou en partie dans un endroit prohibé, ou à titre de personne qui est ou a été à l'emploi de quelqu'un qui détient ou a détenu cette fonction, ou est ou a été l'adjudicataire du contrat,

a) communique le chiffre, mot de passe, croquis, plan, modèle, article, note, document ou renseignement à toute personne autre que celle avec laquelle il est autorisé à communiquer ou à qui il est tenu de le communiquer dans l'intérêt de l'État;

b) utilise les renseignements qu'il a en sa possession au profit d'une puissance étrangère ou de toute autre manière nuisible à la sécurité ou aux intérêts de l'État;

c) retient le croquis, le plan, le modèle, l'article, la note ou le document qu'il a en sa possession ou contrôle quand il n'a pas le droit de le retenir, ou lorsqu'il est contraire à son devoir de le retenir, ou qu'il ne se conforme pas aux instructions données par l'autorité compétente relativement à sa mise ou à la façon d'en disposer; ou

(d) fails to take reasonable care of, or so conducts himself as to endanger the safety of the sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, secret official code word or pass word or information.

(2) Every person is guilty of an offence under this Act who, having in his possession or control any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information that relates to munitions of war, communicates it directly or indirectly to any foreign power, or in any other manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State.

(3) Every person who receives any secret official code word, or pass word, or sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information, knowing, or having reasonable ground to believe, at the time when he receives it, that the code word, pass word, sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information is communicated to him in contravention of this Act, is guilty of an offence under this Act, unless he proves that the communication to him of the code word, pass word, sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information was contrary to his desire.

(4) Every person is guilty of an offence under this Act who

(a) retains for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State any official document, whether or not completed or issued for use, when he has no right to retain it, or when it is contrary to his duty to retain

d) ne prend pas les précautions raisonnables en vue de la conservation du croquis, du plan, du modèle, de l'article, de la note, du document, du chiffre officiel ou mot de passe ou du renseignement, ou se conduit de manière à en compromettre la sécurité.

(2) Est coupable d'infraction à la présente loi quiconque, ayant en sa possession ou contrôle un croquis, plan, modèle, article, note, document ou renseignement se rapportant à des munitions de guerre, en donne communication directement ou indirectement à une puissance étrangère, ou de toute autre manière nuisible à la sécurité ou aux intérêts de l'État.

(3) Si une personne reçoit un chiffre officiel ou mot de passe, ou un croquis, plan, modèle, article, note, document ou renseignement, sachant ou ayant raisonnablement lieu de croire, au moment où elle le reçoit, que le chiffre, le mot de passe, le croquis, le plan, le modèle, l'article, la note, le document ou le renseignement lui est communiqué contrairement à la présente loi, cette personne est coupable d'infraction à la présente loi, à moins qu'elle ne prouve que la communication à elle faite du chiffre, mot de passe, croquis, plan, modèle, article, note, document ou renseignement était contraire à son désir.

(4) Est coupable d'infraction à la présente loi, quiconque

a) retient, dans un dessein nuisible à la sécurité ou aux intérêts de l'État, un document officiel, qu'il soit ou non complété ou émis pour usage, lorsqu'il n'a pas le droit de le retenir ou lorsqu'il est contraire à son devoir de le retenir,

or fails to comply with any directions issued by any Government department or any person authorized by such department with regard to the return or disposal thereof; or

(b) allows any other person to have possession of any official document issued for his use alone, or communicates any secret official code word or pass word so issued, or, without lawful authority or excuse, has in his possession any official document or secret official code word or pass word issued for the use of some person other than himself, or on obtaining possession of any official document by finding or otherwise neglects or fails to restore it to the person or authority by whom or for whose use it was issued, or to a police constable, R.S., c. 198, s.4.

5. (1) Every person is guilty of an offence under this Act who, for the purpose of gaining admission, or of assisting any other person to gain admission, to a prohibited place, or for any other purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State,

(a) uses or wears, without lawful authority, any military, police or other official uniform so nearly resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive, or falsely represents himself to be a person who is or has been entitled to use or wear any such uniform;

(b) orally, or in writing in any declaration or application, or in any document signed by him or on his behalf, knowingly makes or connives at the making of any false statement or any omission;

ou ne se conforme pas aux instructions données par un département du gouvernement ou par toute personne autorisée par ce département concernant la remise dudit document officiel ou la façon d'en disposer; ou

b) permet qu'un document officiel émis pour son propre usage entre en la possession d'une autre personne, ou communique un chiffre officiel ou mot de passe ainsi émis, ou, sans autorité ni excuse légitime, a en sa possession un document officiel ou un chiffre officiel ou mot de passe émis pour l'usage d'une personne autre que lui-même, ou, en obtenant possession d'un document officiel par découverte ou autrement, néglige ou omet de le remettre à la personne ou à l'autorité par qui ou pour l'usage de laquelle il a été émis, ou à un agent de police. S.R., c.198. art. 4.

5. (1) Est coupable d'infraction à la présente loi, quiconque, dans le dessein d'avoir accès ou d'aider une autre personne à avoir accès à un endroit prohibé, ou pour toute autre fin nuisible à la sécurité ou aux intérêts de l'État,

a) endosse ou porte, sans autorité légitime, un uniforme militaire ou de la police, ou autre uniforme officiel, ou tout uniforme qui y ressemble au point d'être susceptible d'induire en erreur, ou se représente faussement comme étant une personne qui est ou a été autorisée à endosser ou porter un tel uniforme;

b) verbalement, ou par écrit dans une déclaration ou demande, ou dans un document signé par lui ou en son nom, sciemment fait une fausse déclaration ou une omission, ou la tolère;

(c) forges, alters, or tampers with any passport or any military, police or official pass, permit, certificate, licence or other document of a similar character, (hereinafter in this section referred to as an official document), or uses or has in his possession any such forged, altered, or irregular official document;

(d) personates, or falsely represents himself to be a person holding, or in the employment of a person holding, office under Her Majesty, or to be or not to be a person to whom an official document or secret official code word or pass word has been duly issued or communicated, or with intent to obtain an official document, secret official code word or pass word, whether for himself or any other person, knowingly makes any false statement; or

(e) uses, or has in his possession or under his control, without the authority of the Government department or the authority concerned, any die, seal, or stamp of or belonging to, or used, made, or provided by any Government department, or by any diplomatic or military authority appointed by or acting under the authority of Her Majesty, or any die, seal or stamp, so nearly resembling any such die, seal or stamp as to be calculated to deceive, or counterfeits any such die, seal or stamp, or uses, or has in his possession, or under his control, any such counterfeited die, seal or stamp.

c) forge, altère ou falsifie tout passeport, ou une passe, un permis, un certificat ou une autorisation officielle ou émise par l'autorité militaire ou la police, ou tout autre document d'une nature semblable (ci-après désigné "document officiel" au présent article), ou qui utilise ou a en sa possession un tel document officiel forgé, altéré ou irrégulier;

d) se fait passer pour une personne ou se représente faussement comme une personne détenant, ou à l'emploi d'une personne détenant, une fonction relevant de Sa Majesté, ou comme étant ou n'étant pas une personne à qui un document officiel ou un chiffre officiel ou mot de passe a été dûment émis ou communiqué ou, dans l'intention d'obtenir un document officiel, un chiffre officiel ou mot de passe, pour lui-même ou pour une autre personne, fait sciemment une fausse déclaration ou

e) utilise ou a en sa possession ou sous son contrôle, sans l'autorisation du département du gouvernement ou de l'autorité en cause, une matrice, un sceau ou un timbre d'un département du gouvernement ou appartenant à ce dernier ou utilisé, fabriqué ou fourni par un semblable département ou une autorité diplomatique ou militaire nommée par Sa Majesté ou agissant sous son autorité, ou une matrice, un sceau ou un timbre qui y ressemble au point d'être susceptible d'induire en erreur, ou contrefait cette matrice, ce sceau ou ce timbre, ou utilise ou a en sa possession ou sous son contrôle une telle matrice, un tel timbre contrefait.

14. (1) Where no specific penalty is provided in this Act, any person who is guilty of an offence under this Act shall be deemed to be guilty of an indictable offence and is, on conviction, punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years; but such person may, at the election of the Attorney General, be prosecuted summarily in the manner provided by the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to summary convictions, and, if so prosecuted, is punishable by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding twelve months, or by both.

(2) Any person charged with or convicted of an offence under this Act shall, for the purposes of the Identification of Criminals Act, be deemed to be charged with or convicted of an indictable offence notwithstanding that such person is prosecuted summarily in the manner provided by the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to summary convictions. R.S., c. 198, s. 15.

15. (1) Lorsque nulle peine spécifique n'est prévue dans la présente loi, toute personne coupable d'une infraction y visée est réputée coupable d'un acte criminel et est punissable, sur déclaration de culpabilité, de l'emprisonnement pour une période n'excédant pas quatorze ans; mais cette personne peut, au choix du procureur général, faire l'objet de poursuites sommaires de la manière que prévoient les dispositions du Code criminel relatives aux déclarations sommaires de culpabilité, et, dans le cas de telles poursuites, elle est punissable d'une amende d'au plus cinq cents dollars ou d'un emprisonnement d'au plus douze mois, ou à la fois de l'amende et de l'emprisonnement.

(2) Toute personne accusée, ou déclarée coupable, d'une infraction à la présente loi est, pour l'application de la Loi sur l'identification des criminels, réputée accusée, ou déclarée coupable, d'un acte criminel, même si cette personne fait l'objet de procédures sommaires de la manière que prévoient les dispositions du Code criminel relatives aux déclarations sommaires de culpabilité. S.R., c. 198, art. 15.

CANADIAN PENITENTIARY SERVICE

SECURITY DECLARATION

In the matter of consideration to my being granted access to
classified information

I _____

of _____

in the County of _____

Do declare that:

My attention has been drawn to the provisions of the Official
Secrets Act and I am fully aware of the serious consequences
which may follow any breach of these provisions.

I undertake not to make any disclosure, either orally or in
writing, of classified information, gained by me as a result
of my employment, to any person not authorized to receive it,
without the previous sanction of my superior officer in the
Service.

I understand also that these provisions apply not only during
the period of my employment but also after employment with the
Service ceased.

I appreciate that all the classified information which I may
acquire or to which I may have access either during or
subsequent to my employment is information that is covered by
section 4 of the Official Secrets Act and that it would be a
contravention of this Act for me after I have left the
Canadian government service--

- (a) to publish without lawful authority in writing any such
information in any form, whether orally or in any
document, article, book, play, film or otherwise, or
- (b) to communicate without lawful authority in writing any
such information to any other person whether or not
such person is or has been employed in the service of
the government.

I further undertake, on leaving the Service, to surrender any
identification card, pass, sketch, plan, model, article, note
or document made or acquired by me in the course of my official
duties, save such as I have been duly authorized in writing to
retain by my superior officer in the Service.

I am also aware that improper disclosure of classified
information resulting from lack of reasonable care or
negligence is also an offence under the Official Secrets Act.

I have been given a copy of Section 4 of the Official Secrets Act.

Signed _____

Witness _____

Date _____

SERVICE CANADIEN DES PENITENTIERES

DECLARATION SECURITAIRE

En ce qui concerne la question de me voir accorder l'accès
à des renseignements réservés

Je soussigné _____

de _____

comté de _____

déclare solennellement

que les dispositions de la Loi sur les secrets officiels ont
été portées à ma connaissance et que je connais clairement
toutes les conséquences sérieuses pouvant résulter d'une
violation de ces dispositions.

Je m'engage à ne jamais divulguer, ni oralement ni par écrit,
les renseignements réservés obtenus par moi par suite de mon
emploi, à une personne qui n'est pas autorisée à les recevoir
sans l'autorisation préalable de mon supérieur dans le Service.

Je comprends également que ces dispositions s'appliquent non
seulement pendant la période de mon emploi mais aussi après
la cessation de mon emploi au sein du Service.

Je reconnais que tous les renseignements réservés que je peux
obtenir ou auxquels je peux avoir accès soit pendant soit après
ma période d'emploi sont des renseignements visés par l'article 4
de la Loi sur les secrets officiels et que je contreviendrais
à cette Loi si, après avoir quitté le service du gouvernement
canadien--

- (a) je publiais sans autorisation légitime par écrit, l'un
quelconque de ces renseignements sous quelque forme que
ce soit, oralement ou dans quelque document que ce soit,
article, livre, ouvrage dramatique, film ou autrement, ou si
- (b) je communiquais sans autorisation légitime par écrit, l'un
quelconque de ces renseignements à une autre personne, que
celle-ci soit ou ait été au service du gouvernement, ou non.

Je m'engage en outre à rendre au moment de mon départ du Service
tout laissez-passer, carte d'identité, croquis, plan, modèle,
article, note ou document fait ou obtenu par moi dans l'exercice
de mes fonctions officielles, sauf celles que j'ai été dûment
autorisé par écrit à conserver par mon supérieur dans le Service.

Je reconnais également que toute divulgation indûe de renseignements
réservés, résultant d'un manque de précautions raisonnables ou de
négligence, constitue aussi une infraction en vertu de la Loi sur
les secrets officiels.

Je déclare avoir reçu un exemplaire du texte de l'article 4 de la
Loi sur les secrets officiels.

Signature _____

Témoin _____

Date _____

CANADIAN PENITENTIARY SERVICE
DIVISIONAL INSTRUCTION 753
PREVENTIVE SECURITY
COLLECTION, COLLATION & DISSEMINATION OF
SECURITY INFORMATION

AUTHORITY

1. This instruction is issued pursuant to Penitentiary Service Regulation 1.14.

PURPOSE

2. This instruction outlines procedures for the collection, collation, reporting, analysis and dissemination of security information to alert directors and staff when indications show that something unusual is about to, or might, happen.

RESPONSIBILITIES

3.
 - a. Preventive security is dependant upon the timely collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination of information or indications which show that something unusual is about to, or might, happen. Every possible source of information must be utilized to collect the information and to ensure its prompt transmission to preventive security authorities and to permit the timely alert notification of institutional directors and appropriate staff. Responsibility for the collection and reporting of information is shared by every member of the service, however, specialized expertise is required in some cases and specific requirements and therefore such specialized activity will be provided by specially trained security personnel.
 - b. Institutions.
The Assistant Director Security is the focal point for security at the institutional level. All security information must be promptly reported to him, or in his absence to the senior correctional officer present. Where such information indicates the potential of an immediate threat to institutional security he shall ensure that all posts are advised immediately and shall take action to counteract the threat. A report of such information shall be prepared. Where information is received of a non-immediate nature a full report shall be prepared and passed through preventive security channels for analysis and further dissemination.

- c. At the Regional Headquarters the office of primary interest is that of the DRD Security who must be continuously aware of the security state of all the institutions with his region.
- d. Regional Headquarters is responsible for ensuring that CPS Headquarters Preventive Security Division is immediately informed of all security threats and hazards.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

4. Information of a preventive security nature may be obtained from any or all of the following sources:

a. Human Sources

- (i) Open or overt sources such as staff, including observed activities, overheard inmate conversations etc; or
- (ii) Confidential or covert sources including staff and inmates. The obvious requirement to protect confidential sources of information cannot be over-stressed.

b. Technical Sources

- (i) Electronic sources may include closed circuit television, electronic alarm systems and/or special monitoring systems;
- (ii) Photographic sources may include closed circuit television, and/or special photography; and
- (iii) Censorship may be applied in special cases and may reveal preventive security information. In this regard it should be noted that all visiting areas in maximum security institutions will be capable of being monitored. Classified guidelines will be issued separately to identify the policy for monitoring activities but, whenever, in the opinion of the institutional director, it appears that a threat to the security of his institution may be reduced by the selective monitoring of visits, or on direction of CPS Headquarters, such visits will be monitored. The raw material from such monitoring will be examined by designated officers on a daily basis and information of value will be reported for further analysis. Whenever mail censorship is applied the censoring officer will provide a copy of the correspondence, for analysis to CPS Headquarters, attention Preventive Security Division.

D. Dawe
Director, Preventive Security.



TO
A

CHIEF OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS IMPROVEMENT

FROM
DE

DIRECTOR,
PREVENTIVE SECURITY DIVISION.

SUBJECT
OBJET

PREVENTIVE SECURITY DATA REQUIREMENTS

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE December 16, 1974

1. DPS has an urgent and continuing requirement for data respecting inmates as follows:

- a. INDICES: three separate inmate indices
 - nominal alphabetical
 - FPS numerical in sequence
 - CPS inmate number in sequence

to facilitate identification and cross reference to partial information from various sources and showing fields 1, 4, 15, 16, 17, 18, 80, 84, 114, 115, 117, 171, 173.

b. Listing of Dangerous Sexual Offenders by region and institution cross referring to section 689 of the Criminal Code 1970 or to section 661 of previous editions and showing date of last admission to a penitentiary and field as above;

c. Listing of Habitual Criminals by region and institution cross referring to section 688 of the 1970 Criminal Code or to Section 660 of the 1970 Criminal Code or to section 660 of previous editions and fields as above;

d. Listing of inmates convicted of:
-- capital murder contrary to section 218 of the Criminal Code 1970 or section 206 of previous editions; and

e. Listing of escapees - field 80 cross referring to field 5 and 4.

2. Your assistance in this matter will be appreciated. In passing I mentioned, during a recent meeting with Mr. R. McKay, that I would be requesting this information.

D. Dawe.
D. Dawe.



Deputy Commissioner Security

FROM / DE: Director, Preventive Security

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION / DE SÉCURITÉ
OUR FILE / N° RÉFÉRENCE HQ 601/74 (DPS)
YOUR FILE / V° RÉFÉRENCE
DATE July 2, 1974

SUBJECT / OBJET: PREVENTIVE SECURITY RECORDS & DATA PROPOSAL TO COMPUTERIZE

1. The Preventive Security Division, which has recently been formed will require extensive records including:
 - a. Staff Personnel Security Clearances; (9-11,000 records)
 - b. Staff Personnel Identification Cards; (9-11,000 records)
 - c. Inmate Protective Cases; (3-600 records)
 - d. Inmate Escape-prone Cases (approx 900 records)
 - e. (Contraband records (4700 records)
 - f. Intelligence Source Records
 - g. Security of Information Records;
 - h. Incident records; and
 - j. Incident indicator records..

q It is apparently ultimately intended to computerize these records. The computerization will require, in the case of the Preventive Security Division's records, security - access control limited on a "need to know basis"; speed-file search and read-out never to exceed 15 minutes; audit trail; input, output, read only, read-write, write only capability; and ability to compute indicators against known data very quickly. It would be advantageous to have the capability to communicate with other facilities - eg. regions, and CPIC. The cost of establishing manual files and later converting to computerized files plus the personnel savings to be effected by computerizing indicate that cost-effectiveness would result from immediate computerization. It is proposed therefore that computerization of Preventive Security records take place now utilizing of dedicated, in-house, mini-computer.

2. Currently available equipment and facilities have been studied as shown in the attached Annexes and it has been established that immediate and foreseeable needs could be met for an expenditure of \$0,500.00 initially and less than \$2,200 monthly which would include system design, equipment installation, maintenance, communications capability to each region, secure storage, programs, and staff training.

3. Equipment availability is normally 6-10 weeks although it has been established that the recommended system could be installed and operating within 30 days.

4. Accordingly it is recommended that approval be sought for the provision and operation of computerized Security Branch records through a Datapoint 2200 Computer System complete with the following equipment available from TRW Systems Canada Limited, Ottawa:

- a. Datapoint 2200 - 122 Version II 12K Computer
Cost: \$350.00 per month plus \$49.00 per month maintenance.
- b. Centronics 2200-244 Printer - 165 cps; 60-200 LPM;
Cost \$170.00 per month plus \$55.00 per month maintenance.
- c. Datapoint 2200-350 Disk Drive with controllers - 2.5 meg bytes
Cost \$395.00 per month plus \$38.00 per month maintenance.

Total monthly charge for these items \$1057.00

Installation and ancillary charges are as follows:

i.	Installation - one time charge	\$350.00
ii.	Disk Paks - five required	550.00
iii.	Printer Paper \$20.00 per box (suggest initial order five boxes)	100.00
iv.	Pre-prepared programs as shown at Annex A	250.00
v.	CPS special programs	2,000.00
	Total one time cost	\$3,250.00

If it were decided to expand the system to provide a communications capability (transmit and receive, video and print at CPS HQ, video only at Regional HQ) the following additional equipment and costs would be incurred:

- (i) Communications modem (provides dial up capability \$75.00 installation fee \$66.00 per month rental thus for CPS HQ and each of five Regional HQ cost would be \$450.00 installation and \$396.00 monthly rental; plus
- (ii) Terminals - five at \$132.00 per month or \$660.00 per month.

Such a system would permit cost-effective data entry, retrieval, processing and communications at a saving of at least one man year, and would cost the Service:

- (a) An initial expenditure of approximately \$4500.00 plus
- (b) A monthly expenditure of less than \$2200.00.



D. Dave,
Director,
Preventive Security.

Annexes

- A - CPS Preventive Security Information System Requirements.
- B - CPS Preventive Security Information Flow Chart.
- C- Summary of Equipment Availability
- D - Program Requirements.
- E - Computer Characteristics.
- F - Printer Characteristics.
- G - Disk System Characteristics.
- H - Communications Characteristics.
- J - Proposed System Configuration.

CPS Preventive Security Information System Requirements

Information requirements of the Preventive Security Division
include:

a. Personnel Security

- i. CPS Position Numbers
- ii. CPS Position Location
- iii. CPS Position Name & Brief Description
- iv. CPS Position security clearance requirements
- v. CPS position incumbent
 - (1) Social Insurance Number
 - (2) Family Name
 - (3) Full given Names
 - (4) Date and Place of Birth
 - (5) Date taken on strength
 - (6) Clearance status
 - (7) Date of clearance
 - (8) Date struck off strength
 - (9) Oaths taken

b. Personnel Identification

All of the above plus

- (i) Date processed - photographed and fingerprinted.
- (ii) Identification card serial number.
- (iii) Cards lost/stolen
- (iv) Cards recovered.

c. Information Security

- (i) Guide to classification
- (ii) Infractions and Breaches
 - (1) Date
 - (2) location
 - (3) Data
 - (4) Source of Data
 - (5) Cause of Infraction/Breach
- (iii) Storage facilities.

d. Preventive Security Information

- (i) Nominal index of inmates
 - (1) Inmate number
 - (2) Social Insurance Number
 - (3) Family name
 - (4) Given names
 - (5) Aliases
 - (6) FPS
 - (7) Institution
 - (8) Date admitted
 - (9) Offences for which convicted, date & place
 - (10) Escape or violence record
 - (11) Classification assigned
 - (12) Temporary absences authorized
 - (a) Date
 - (b) Place
- (ii) Nominal Index of Protective Cases
 - (1) Inmate number
 - (2) Family name
 - (3) location
 - (4) Date declared Protective Case
 - (5) Reason
- (iii) Nominal Index of Special Cases
 - (1) Inmate number
 - (2) Family name
 - (3) Location
 - (4) Date declared Special Case
 - (5) Reason
 - (6) Special conditions

- (iv) Nominal Roll of Information Sources
 - (1) Source number
 - (2) Location
 - (3) Type of information
 - (4) Nominal index reference number
 - (5) Assessment
 - (6) handler

- (v) Incident Index

- (1) Type of incident
 - (a) Contraband
 - (aa) narcotics - state type
 - (ab) money
 - (ac) booze
 - (ad) weapons
 - (b) Violence
 - (ba) To staff
 - (bb) To other inmates - whom
 - (bc) Threats - to whom
 - (bd) Date
 - (be) Place
 - (bf) Circumstances
 - (c) Escapes
 - (ca) Date
 - (cb) Place
 - (cc) H.O.
 - (cd) Result
 - (d) Agitation
 - (da) Date
 - (db) Place
 - (dc) Particulars
 - (dd) Result
 - (e) Visitors
 - (ea) Date
 - (eb) Place
 - (ec) Reason
 - (ed) Result

- (2) Incident Frequency

(3) Persons Involved in incidents

- (fa) Inmate number
- (fb) Family name
- (fc) Given Names
- (fd) Date
- (fe) Place
- (ff) Type of Incident
- (fg) Participants

(4) Organizations

- (ga) Name of Organization
- (gb) History
- (gc) Principles involved
- (gd) Incidents if any
- (ge) Publicity Organ

(5) V & C

- (ha) Inmate number
- (hb) Location
- (hc) Date
- (hd) Reason
- (he) Result

Programming Requirements

The following information program cabability is required:

- a. Assembler - Compiler
- b. Block Edit
- c. Chain
- d. Copy
- e. CRT fix
- f. Databus - Interpret
Compile
- g. Dump
- h. DOS Fix
- j. bedit
- k. DOS Gen
- l. List
- m. Deskscribe
- n. Files locator
- o. Sort
- p. Merge
- q. Syslibrary
- R. Audit trail
- s. Passwords
- t. Update
- u. Indicator analyse

Computer Characteristics

CPS Preventive Security Division computer characteristic requirements are:

- a. Dedicated for security purposes
- b. Direct entry capable
- c. Direct retrieval capability
- d. Communications capable
- e. Pushdown stack capable
- f. Random access MOS memory
- g. Serial/Parallel memory
- h. Sequential memory
- j. Self-standing
- k. Removable cartridge disk
- l. Minimum 10K capacity - refer 12K.
- m. Universal terminal compatible
- n. Conversational mode capable
- o. Non-specialist operator capable

Annex F
To Memo HQ 601/74 (DPS)
Dated July 3, 1974

Printer Characteristics

Required Printer Characteristics are:

- a. Dot matrix
- b. Speeds 165 cps; 60 LPM
- c. Transmission: 100-9600 band
- d. Character buffer
- e. Sprocket paper feed
- f. Original and up to four copies
- g. Automatic motor control
- h. Audio alarm
- j. Fixed vertical/horizontal registration
- k. Remote select/deselect
- l. Coded character software
- m. Self-contained unit
- n. Plug to plug compatible

Disk System Characteristics

Disk system is preferred and should have the following characteristics:

- a. Symbolic orientation - no requirement for specialist operator programmers.
- b. Minimum directory 250 files of eight character names.
- c. Include interrupt driven cassette drivers, keyboard and screen.
- d. CTOS generated program compatible
- e. Direct run without conversion.
- f. Bit density 2000 BPI plus
- g. Operator controls Load, Run, Protect
- h. Fully enclosed disk cartridge capable
- j. Compact
- k. Expandable
- l. Standard I/O cable direct connect.

Annex H

to Memo HQ 601/74 (DPS)
Dated July 3, 1974

Communications Characteristics

If applied the following communications characteristics are essential:


- a. Bell system compatible - no special lines
- b. Modular - securable.
- c. Combine full and half duplex
- d. Acoustic coupler
- e. EIA terminal interface
- f. Operator control limited to Full or half duplex,
on or off
- g. Carrier detection indicator

Annex J
To Memo HQ 601/74 (DPS)
Dated July 3, 1974


Proposed System Configuration

The proposed system configuration is as follows:

CPS HQ
Preventive Security Division



Regions



MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL JOINT COMMITTEE
OF THE CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
AND THE FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL SERVICES

CHAIRMAN: J.-P. Gilbert, Member,
National Parole Board - Ottawa.

Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police

Supt. F.F. Fry,
Halifax Police Department.

Inspecteur Daniel Crépeau,
Service de police de la C.U.M. de Montréal.

Supt. M. Coulis,
Metropolitan Toronto Police.

Assistant Deputy Chief A.C. Biggs,
Winnipeg Police Department.

Inspector J.M.P. Molyneux,
Vancouver Police Department.

R.C.M.P. W.G. Pritchett,
A/Commissioner, R.C.M.P. - Ottawa.

National Parole Board and Service

W.F. Carabine,
Chief, Case Preparation - Ottawa.

G. Genest,
Director of Case Management - Ottawa

Louis Zeitoun,
Co-ordinator Community Resources - Ottawa.

Canadian Penitentiary Service

Robert Diguer,
Deputy Commissioner (Security) - Ottawa.

D. Dawe,
Director, Preventive Security - Ottawa.

Jean-Paul Lupien,
Director, Social Development - Ottawa.

ORGANIZED CRIME

TACTICAL CRIMES

- ARSON
- ASSAULT
- BLACKMAIL
- BRIBERY
- COERCION
- EXTORTION
- MONOPOLY
- MURDER
- THREATS

ILLEGAL BUSINESSES

- | | |
|----------------|----------------------|
| ARSON | INCOME TAX VIOLATION |
| ALCOHOL | LOTTERIES |
| BANKRUPTCY | LOAN SHARKING |
| BOOKMAKING | NARCOTICS |
| BLACK JACK | PROSTITUTION |
| CARDS & DICE | SMUGGLING |
| COUNTERFEITING | THEFT OF VALUABLES |
| FRAUDS | BONDS & JEWELLERY |



LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES

- | | | | |
|------------|---------------|------------------|-----------------|
| AUTO SALES | GARMENT TRADE | JUKE BOXES | LINEN & LAUNDRY |
| BEER | HOTELS | MOTELS | RESTAURANTS |
| EXPORTS | IMPORTS | VENDING MACHINES | |



BIG BUSINESSES

- | | | |
|------------------------|--------------|------------------|
| CONSTRUCTION | INSURANCE | LAND DEVELOPMENT |
| ENTERTAINMENT | LABOR UNIONS | REAL ESTATE |
| FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS | SECURITIES | TRUCKING |



ORGANIZED CRIME - by Walter R. Lee

Mr. Lee is a former member of the R.C.M.P. having served from 1940 to 1963 and during most of his service was connected with Criminal Investigation Branches in Nova Scotia and at "O" Division in Toronto. In the past eight years he has been employed as an Intelligence Officer with the Ontario Police Commission in Toronto where he is engaged in the co-ordination of Police activities in the fight against Organized Crime.

Despite the fact that in the past several years there have been numerous excellent accounts of the organized crime situation within the U.S.A., there has been no publication of similar material with regard to the scope of its activities in Canada.

Most people, when they think of organized crime, and this can be applied to people involved in law enforcement, as well as the general public, conjure up a picture of underworld violence and viciousness, spiced with glaring police and political corruption, such as has been portrayed for us in a melodramatic manner by movies, television and the news media in general. They are comforted by a thought that this type of lawlessness does not and cannot exist in Ontario and from this there has developed a certain degree of complacency. The fact is that stripped of its sensationalism, organized crime does exist as a serious problem in North America and that it recognized no international, state, provincial or municipal boundaries - in fact such boundaries are frequently used by organized crime for their own purpose - the very fact that they are organized on both sides of a territorial boundary in the face of unco-ordinated law enforcement in those areas, provides organized crime with a distinct advantage. Some distinction can be made between organized crime in certain areas of North America and Ontario. Our organized crime is the same organized crime that exists in other parts of North America - the difference is one of degree, rather than of type. It is the difference which provides law enforcement in Ontario with an edge and which enlightened law enforcement must use as a basis for its hope for ultimate success. There is still time to contain the organized crime problem before it acquires the frightening strength that it has acquired in some urban areas on this continent.

What is organized crime - It is synonymous with the Mafia? No it is not. The Mafia is a Sicillian based secret criminal organization, which has generally confined its activities to the western portion of Sicily. Luigi Barzini, the author of "The Italians" has this to say about the Mafia: "The Mafia is the world-famous illegal organization which rules over only one part of Sicily. Its threats are terrifying in Palermo, Partenico, or Agrigento, but are ignored in Massina, Catania, and Syracuse. It is not a strictly organized association with hierarchies written statutes, headquarters, a ruling elite and

an undisputed chief. It is a spontaneous formation like an ant colony or a beehive, a loose and haphazard collection of men and heterogeneous groups, each man obeying his entomological groups, each group uppermost in its tiny domain, independent, submitted to the will of its own leader, each group locally imposing its own rigid form of primitive justice. Only in rare times of emergency does the Mafia mobilize and become one loose confederation."

Is organized crime synonymous with La Cosa Nostra, the Mafia-like organization which exists in North America? Partly, but not completely. What is it then and why should we express such serious concern about it?

There is a classic historical pattern to the development of persons in organized crime. This is a pattern which can be applied generally to most organized crime figures not only in the U.S.A. but also in Canada.

In organized crime groups, there are certain tactical crimes which are employed in order to attain an objective. In the pattern, these tactical crimes would be utilized in the first stage to achieve an entry into and in some cases, a domination of illegal activities and businesses which are potentially in violation of the law. The profits from these illegal activities are again employed for the purpose of gaining entry or bringing about some advantage over other entirely legal competitors in the same field. It is important to note that the illegal activities are not abandoned. Their actual operation may be placed in the hands of lesser associates or employees with the principal devoting most of his time to the legitimate business, in order to insure its success and in order to gain therefrom a facade of respectability, which is to be found in the guise of a legitimate businessman. At this point, there can be a return flow of funds from the legal to the illegal business; if this should ever become necessary.

After a period of time, the profits which will be amassed from both types of business, and the insulation which protects the predator will combine in such a way, that he will challenge institutions which we categorize as Big Business, there no longer being any awe or fear of these powerful interests, the tactical crimes will still be employed as before. At this point, there is almost no area of profit or power in our society that can be placed beyond the reach of a criminal group.

This classic pattern describes the development of some of the most dangerous and most powerful figures in organized crime in the U.S.A. A closer examination will reveal to you that it also describes the development of certain persons known to us in Ontario.

The second chart depicts the "Full Face of Organized Crime" in a target formation. The centre of the target is designated as the hard core of organized crime. It is La Cosa Nostra which is the Mafia-like secret criminal organization peculiar to North America. There are 27 Cosa Nostra families known to law enforcement which are a part of a loosely knit confederation or organized crime families. Membership in the Cosa Nostra in North America is reliably estimated to be between 4,000 and 5,000. This is the group which is dedicated to the defiance of our criminal laws and which has been classified by our most eminent criminologists and sociologists as a criminal subculture, the members of which owe their loyalty only to their own organization.

In the next circle are found the active criminal associates of this hard core group. They are not members of La Cosa Nostra, but are closely associated with them in both legal and illegal activities, and in fact, it is members of this group who are most frequently subject to arrest and conviction, and who are better known to law enforcement agencies, than the actual members of the hard core group. The next circle denotes the professional associates, those members of the legal or commercial fraternity, who go beyond their own professional code of ethics thus make it possible for them to operate with such a degree of immunity. The fourth circle is the area of potential, political, judicial and police corruption. At this point it should be stressed that in our analysis of the organized crime picture within Ontario, we have found relatively little evidence of this type of corruption. Nevertheless, it is a fact that cases of such corruption have occurred and will continue to occur. Probably the most significant example is that situation which involved Lucian Rivard, an important international drug trafficker, which resulted in the Dorien enquiry and in the subsequent conviction of former Federal M.P. Raymond Denis for attempted bribery. In this case, associates of Rivard actually succeeded in promoting a contact within the office of the Prime Minister of Canada, within the offices of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, of course, without the knowledge of the Prime Minister or the other Ministers concerned. The bribery attempt was unsuccessful, but I believe it is important to acknowledge that the reason it was unsuccessful is that a lawyer, in private practice in the city of Montreal engaged as a special counsel for the U.S. Government, refused to entertain the proposal. There have been other cases as well, where evidence has shown that officials, if not corrupted, were at least corruptible. As I remarked previously, there is relatively little corruption in our province, but we must remember that a little corruption is all that is required to serve the purpose of organized crime.

Actually, it is by determining the extent and depth of corruption that it is possible to measure the extent of organized crime penetration into a community. To the degree that corruption exists in any area, organized crime will flourish.

A great deal of attention has been paid by law enforcement officials throughout North America in attempting to accurately define organized crime. Professor J. Desmond Morton, formerly of Osgoode Hall in Toronto, after having studied various organized crime definitions, concluded it was impossible to define in a strictly legal sense. Professor Donald Cressey, eminent Sociologist and Criminologist of the University of Southern California at Santa Barbara and the author of "Theft of a Nation", has arrived at a similar conclusion. I believe the most accurate definition would be that of a criminal conspiracy, with some additional aspects which appear to set it apart, from the ordinary criminal conspiracy with which we are all familiar. It is "a continuing and self perpetuating criminal conspiracy, which operates for a profit motive, and which thrives on fear and corruption and seeks to attain immunity from the law".

Efforts have been made to further define it in terms of the activities in which it becomes involved. But this is almost impossible, because of the fact that it has been found, particularly in this decade, that it will involve itself in any activity where there may be a large margin of profit. In general, organized crime conspires to carry out the following activities, but these should never be considered as a complete list, since the area of operation will vary from time to time, and from place to place, as the potential for profit presents itself.

Throughout North America they conspire to:

1. make billions of dollars from illegal and legal gambling,
2. make billions of dollars from loan sharking
3. make millions from the distribution of narcotics
4. make millions from stock frauds, on arson and insurance frauds
5. make millions from land development, real estate, and construction
6. make millions from tax evasion
7. control and corrupt labour unions, this can enable them to get their hands on the large pension fund monies which exist within labour unions,
8. make thousands of dollars from the manufacture and distribution of counterfeit money and counterfeit cheques
9. make thousands of dollars from legal and illegal liquor distribution
10. make thousands of dollars from prostitution rings
11. profit from illegal or fraudulent bankruptcies

12. acquire monopolies in certain service industries
13. make thousands of dollars from the protection racket

At this point, you are probably wondering how it is possible to state with conviction that La Cosa Nostra exists, and further, that its influence extends into the Province of Ontario. It is true that criminal informers have furnished law enforcement agencies with a great deal of information about this organization. We are all aware in the area of international subversive activities there have been numerous cases of political defectors of actual intelligence infiltration of the secret organizations. Unfortunately, it has never been possible for law enforcement to effectively infiltrate La Cosa Nostra. Up to the time of the defection of Joseph Valachi no member had ever defected to the extent of divulging the true nature of the organization. There are a number of other means of determining knowledge of the structure of the organization, and these means have been employed for the past several years in both Canada and the U.S.A. The contribution of Joseph Valachi has been substantial and a careful analysis of his story has proven to be basically the truth. It was possible for law enforcement to check many aspects of the story against known facts and in each such case the story was substantiated.

During the years 1962 to 1966 a great deal of audio surveillance was carried out by law enforcement authorities in North America. One such operation was conducted on the premises of (Raymond Patriarca) the head of the Cosa Nostra family, which is prominent in the New England States, and has its headquarters in Providence, Rhode Island. A part of this operation became public knowledge during the subsequent prosecution of L. T. a family member. A number of the transcripts became a part of the evidence in the prosecution, and these were subsequently subjected to professional analysis.

Professor Robert Blakely, who until recently was on the faculty of Law at Notre-Dame University, and who has, during the past several years, acted as a consultant to the President's Crime Commission, the United States Senate Judiciary Commission and the American Bar Association Minimum Standards for Law Enforcement, testified in 1968 before the State of New Jersey Senate Committee on Law and public Safety. Professor Blakely is also a member of the American Civil Liberties Union, and at the same time is one of the most outspoken advocates of the principal of electronic surveillance and wiretapping as a means to fight organized crime. He subjected these transcripts to analysis and it is his analysis which follows although I should say that a number of other professionals in the field of law enforcement and organized crime have also analysed this material, and have arrived at similar conclusions:

- .. That there is an organization called La Cosa Nostra
1. That it is headed by a body called "the Commission"
2. That it is broken up into groups called "families"
3. That families are headed by "bosses"
4. That families are staffed by "underbosses"
5. That families are staffed by "caporegime" ie, captains
6. That the Commission can run families in the absence of a boss
7. That the Commission makes the boss
8. That the Commission must approve new members
9. That the Commission settles disputes
10. That the Commission holds hearings
11. That the Commission acts by voting
12. That the boss of the family engages in the following:
 - A. he intercedes for members in other groups
 - B. he orders members to live up to personal obligations
 - C. he orders members to live up to illegal, business obligations
 - D. he grants or withholds permission to operate illegal businesses
 - E. he settles the division of the profits of illegal businesses
 - F. he declares when necessary "martial law"
 - G. he is kept informed of the illegal activities of his associates (kidnapping)(murder)
 - H. he arranges bail
 - I. he arranges to hold illegal business during incarceration
 - J. he can delay a death order for convenience of others
 - K. he worries about his image with up-coming members
 - L. he has contacts with the legitimate world which gives him influence in the following areas:
 - a. affecting the decision of state attorneys-general
 - b. affecting the decision of high ranking state police officials
 - c. affecting the granting of legitimate licenses
 - d. affecting parole decisions
 - e. affecting probation decisions
 - f. affecting sentences
13. That the boss insulates himself from possible criminal investigation
 - A. he shows concern for scientific investigation
 - B. he uses public phones under special arrangements
 - C. he sees people by appointments
14. That members are referred to as "a friend of ours"
15. That members are brought into the organization by a ritual
16. That members transfer from family to family
17. That members are ordered to kill
18. That some families have in excess of 150 members
19. That a family of 120 is "small"
20. That the organization is nation-wide:
 - A. Providence, Rhode Island
 - B. Chicago, Illinois
 - C. New York, New York
 - D. Baltimore, Maryland
 - E. Washington, D. C.

- F. New Jersey
 - G. Boston, Massachusetts
 - H. Miami, Florida
 - I. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
22. That the organization is international:
- A. Canada
23. That members are involved, inter alia, in the following illegal activities:
- A. murder
 - B. kidnapping
 - C. extortion
 - D. fraud
 - E. bribery
 - F. perjury
 - G. loan sharking
 - H. gambling and
24. That members are involved, inter alia, in the following legal activities:
- A. legal gambling
 - B. labor unions
 - C. race tracks
 - D. vending machines
 - E. liquor

Among those with whom Patriarca had direct or indirect dealings are the following:

1. Jerry Angiulo - underboss in the Patriarca family.
2. John Biele - a caporegime in the Vito Genovese family in New York City.
3. Joseph Bonanno - head of a family in New York City.
4. Anthony Corallo - a caporegime in the Thomas Lucchese family in New York City.
5. Eddie Coco - a caporegime in the Thomas Lucchese family in New York City.
6. Patsy Erra - "enforcer" for Mike Coppola, a caporegime in the Vito Genovese family in New York City.
7. Carola Gambino - head of family in New York City, successor to Albert Anastasia.
8. Vito Genovese - head of family in New York City, successor to Frank Costello and Charles Luciano
9. Thomas Lucchese - head of family in New York City
10. Salvatore Mussachie - underboss in the Joseph Profaci family in New York City
11. Sam Rizzo - caporegime in Steve Magaddino family, Buffalo New York.
12. Henry Tamelo - "messenger" in the Patriarca family

We agree with Professor Blakley's analysis in its entirety and especially that portion which establishes the fact that La Cosa Nostra is international in scope and has interests in Canada. We must view organized crime as a North American phenomenon.

There have been other transcripts, similar to the Patriarca transcripts; among these, of particular interest to Canada were those referred to as the De Cavalcante transcripts. These were obtained during the same period of time and dealt exclusively with problems the organization, caused by the activities of Joseph Bonanno, the boss of one of the New York families. These have added much to the knowledge of the structure of the organization, the names of many of its members, and respective positions within the various families, as well as the names of the members of the National Commission.

We have now reached the point where we acknowledge the existence of organized crime as a serious problem in certain areas of the United States and have accepted conclusive evidence of a close relationship between that organized crime and organized crime in Canada, or to bring it closer to home, in Ontario.

We are aware of the fact that some members of La Cosa Nostra live in Ontario and in Quebec, that they are in fairly regular communication with family members in the United States that they help each other with the various legal and illegal schemes, that they are frequently co-conspirators, that they are co-conspirators with active criminal associates who are not members of La Cosa Nostra. The number of La Cosa Nostra members in Canada is small. They do not control crime in Ontario. In fact, they do not control crime anywhere in North America, although in some areas they have been able to exercise considerable control over such crimes as gambling, narcotics distribution, loansharking and the protection racket.

We do not believe at this time that we have a distinctively Ontario Cosa Nostra Family; rather, it is our opinion, based on such evidence as is available to us, that there are members of more than one such family in our territory and these, along with a much larger number of active criminal associates, are responsible for many of various profitable crimes which I have just referred to. Probably the highest ranking family member in Ontario would be a "capo" or "lieutenant". We are able, with reasonable certainty, to identify only about 30 persons who would be actual members; non-member criminal associates would outnumber these members 10 or 20 to one. It is both unfair and discriminatory to label all organized crime as either Mafia or La Cosa Nostra inspired. It is true that some persons of Italian origin are a distinct part of organized crime, but it is also true that persons of all other racial origins are also known to be involved.

To arrive at this position of awareness of the existence of organized crime in our midst, is only the first step in a comprehensive program. The arriving at this position has by no means, been a simple operation. Most police forces have historically been complaint-oriented. This is to say that they deal with the investigation and

the prevention of crime in the conventional manner. First there is a complainant, and thus it is possible for the police to commence their investigation, already knowing a number of the essential elements of an investigation or charge. They know who has been victimized they know how they know where and when. The missing element is the identity of the perpetrator.

When dealing with organized crime, because of the fact that we rarely have a complainant, and we rarely know exactly what crime is being perpetrated, we must commence with a person known or suspected of being involved in organized crime, and we must endeavor to learn everything that is possible to learn about him; his habits, his financial situation, his criminal and business associates, and even his family, and ethnic background. Having established this, it is necessary to analyse all of the facts and endeavour to determine what criminal activities he is currently conspiring with others to carry out. This process is known as criminal intelligence, and for any who have known military service, the purpose and methods of operation is very similar to that of a military intelligence operation.

To operate a crime intelligence system within a modern police force, presents a serious problem from the very outset. Most police forces now find it necessary to establish a workload for their personnel, and in order to do this, they are obliged to weigh the tangible results such as prosecutions, convictions, crimes prevented, or lives saved, or revenue collected by police action. These enable Chiefs of Police to prescribe suitable job performance standards for their personnel. For obvious reasons, job performance statistics are not readily available for crime intelligence officers and a Chief of Police is therefore faced with the prospect of carrying a police officer or several officers on the strength of the force who are not supervisors and do not produce the type of crime statistics, which lend themselves to the creation of job performance standards.

The Ontario Police Commission recognizes the problem of organized crime, and first reported on its existence and extent in a preliminary report published in 1964. As a result of that initial enquiry and of recommendations contained therein a criminal intelligence division was established with the Commission in 1965. Since that time the work of alerting the police forces of this province to the problem of organized crime, and of training carefully selected members of these forces in the field of crime intelligence has been continued.

Since 1966 there has existed in Ontario an association of intelligence officers, known as Criminal Intelligence Services of Ontario (C.I.S.O.) It is comprised of intelligence officers from the major municipal police forces of Ontario, with representation from the Ontario Provincial Police, the Quebec Police Force, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Montreal City Police, the Intelligence Officers of the Ontario Police Commission, and several other agencies, who specialize in particular aspects of investigation

directly related to the organized crime field. Total membership in the organization now stands at 41. These men have all been thoroughly trained in the important aspects of organized crime and the function of crime intelligence. The training has taken place at several seminars, which have been sponsored by the Commission at the Ontario Police College in Aylmer, Ontario. The seminars were the first of their kind in North America and have attracted a great deal of interest in other sections of Canada and throughout the U.S.A. The members of C.I.S.O. are engaged on a continuing basis in gathering intelligence with respect to those persons in this province who are involved in organized crime. The Ontario Police Commission provides the central records and analysis centre for the association and maintains continuous liaison with similar organizations throughout Canada and the U.S.A. Our knowledge of organized crime is growing steadily, and there have been a number of tactical successes which can be directly attributed to the efforts of the organization.

There have been many problems in arriving at the position in which we stand today. The support which has been received from the Chiefs of Police in the Province of Ontario, as well as from the Commissioner, and the Officers of the Ontario Provincial Police and the Commissioner and Officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police has been tremendous. I am sure that if the citizens of this province could ever be made aware of the dedication and unselfish devotion to duty of the men whom they employ as their Chiefs of Police, they would be far less prone to offer the multitude of criticisms which has been aimed at many of these officers in recent years.


It should also be stressed that since the establishment of the Intelligence Division of the Ontario Police Commission in 1965, there has been complete government support to every constructive program which has been presented in an effort to combat organized crime in Ontario. As an example of this, I would like to point out that during 1967 my partner, Herb Thurston, and I were invited to Washington, D.C. to take part in some discussions with the professional staff engaged in compiling material for the President's Crime Commission. (Incidentally, the work of this Commission and the publication "The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society" together with the various task force reports on law enforcement and the administration of justice must be credited with being one of the finest and most comprehensive studies ever completed.) The professional staff of this project were among the most knowledgeable people in their respective fields in the western hemisphere. For us, it was a highly profitable visit, but one feature of our discussions greatly impressed us. With very few exceptions, the recommendations contained in the report were those which had already been implemented or recommended and being given further study here in Ontario. My purpose in mentioning this is to stress particularly to those engaged in law enforcement and the administration of justice in Ontario, that they are privileged to be a part of what is probably

the most progressive and exciting approach to law enforcement which can be found anywhere on this continent. Insofar as organized crime is concerned, the steps which have now been taken, provided the program can be aggressively pursued should undoubtedly place us in a prime position to control any further inroads of organized crime in our society.

Much remains to be done in the fight against organized crime and with changing times, changing laws and changing crimes it may well be an endless exercise. Despite this, we can face the future with optimism, based on the conviction that we have a full appreciation of the problem and have tailored our programs to meet them as adequately as possible.

Canadian Security Gazette
May, 1971

THE FULL FACE OF ORGANIZED CRIME



CANADIAN PENITENTIARY SERVICE

SECURITY OF PERSONNEL

1. The Government of Canada has made it mandatory that, before a person is employed in a position requiring access to information classified confidential, secret or top secret, that person must be security cleared to the appropriate degree prior to access to such information. It is with this in mind that the security clearance program has been initiated within the Canadian Penitentiary Services.

2. You may ask "why do we need security of personnel?" The object of a security clearance is to verify to supervisory staffs that the person concerned is regarded as being sufficiently reliable to be entrusted with information classified up to and including the same level as that indicated on the security clearance certificate. The verification of reliability is determined by conducting an investigation into the background of a person for a sufficient period of time and in sufficient detail to provide assurance to his or her personal integrity and his or her general suitability to be entrusted with the nature of information. While a security clearance cannot positively guarantee the loyalty and reliability of a person, it ensures that, in so far as our resources will permit, an approved and uniform system of inquiry has been followed and that, in the absence of any personal adverse knowledge, supervisor staffs may permit access without undue concern.

3. Divisional Instruction no. 751 is now an accomplished fact and will be available to you very soon. This document is based on a Cabinet Directive which is applicable not only to the Canadian Penitentiary Service but to all federal government departments and has been in effect over a period of many years. I suggest you make yourself thoroughly aware of the contents and requirements of this D.I. A working knowledge is a necessity for all Assistant Directors (Security) as you are the people who will be the pivot for the Security of Personnel Program at institutional level.

4. Security is everybody's personal responsibility. Every person who fills a supervisory role is responsible for ensuring that all individuals who are subordinate to them are security cleared to the proper level.

5. To ensure uniformity of procedures in the processing of requests for security clearances, criteria have been established by the Government. These criteria reflect the minimum standards which must be met before a security clearance may be granted and the same criteria apply to all. When a person has been investigated with favourable results, his security reliability is officially acknowledged by the granting of a security clearance.

6. There is a widespread belief that disloyalty to Canada is the only bar to a security clearance and that subversive persons are the only ones that we must be careful about. This is not true. It has been established in the past the majority of people found to be security risks were perfectly loyal Canadian citizens. Unfortunately, due to a defect or weakness in their personal characters, they should not have been entrusted with classified matter. Dishonesty, intemperance, susceptibility to blackmail, boastfulness or just carelessness are character weaknesses. After a thorough and careful examination of a case, a person's loyalty or reliability still remains in doubt, that doubt must be resolved in favour of C.P.S.

7. To-day, a great deal of emphasis is placed on the rights of the individual. An employer has rights too. The employer has a right and an obligation to protect himself in order to do this he must establish policies and conditions. Therefore, security clearance is a condition of access and thus a condition of employment. No one has a "right" of access to classified matter and no man's freedom are infringed when access is denied. To deny a security clearance is not tantamount to accusing him of a crime. The point at issue is whether or not the individual can or should be entrusted with classified matter. Although no person has a "right" to a security

clearance, he does have the basic right to earn a living, and if at all possible, he should not be denied the opportunity to earn a living. Care must be taken to ensure that this principle is maintained. It may be necessary to re-assign a person who is not clearable, or even cause his removal from the Public Service. Such action is the responsibility of the Security Clearance Review Board which assures the greatest public protection and the minimum harm to the person.

8. It is not my intention at this time to go into the mechanics or procedures which you are required to follow in order to obtain a security clearance for your personnel. However, I would like to draw your attention to some of the pit-falls encountered so far.

a. All questions on the personal history form must be completed. Should the required information not be available an explanation stating the reason must be attached to the P.H.F., signed by the subject, on plain paper 14" x 8½".

b. The P.H.F. must be signed by the subject;


c. Paragraphs 10 and 11 must be completed for a ten year period. Any gaps in dates must be accounted for by an explanation;

d. In the case of mother-in-law, maiden name must be shown.

The completion of the P.H.F. is set out in form Pen 1088A, Guide to Completion of Personal History Form. This together with Divisional Instruction 751 should be adequate for you to produce a first rate document. Those of you who are in the Pacific, Ontario and Quebec Regions will soon be able to consult your Regional Preventive Security and Investigations Officer for assistance and guidance

not only in the Personnel Security Program but also in all facets of preventive security.

9. There may be many questions which you have in mind relating to the Security of Personnel Program. At any time I hope you will ask questions and talk freely to your Preventive Security Personnel, they are here to help. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have in respect to the Personnel Security Program.




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