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CRISIS MANAGEMENT BROCHURE

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THE BANK DRAMA

A year ago last August 23rd, an escaped Swedish convict walked into the main office of one of Stockholm's largest banks, the Sveriges Kreditbank, shortly after it had opened, bent on carrying out the most ambitious exploit of a long criminal career. He was well equipped. One hand hugged a loaded submachine gun under a folded jacket. The other hand held a large canvas suitcase whose contents included reserve ammunition, plastic explosives, blasting caps, safety fuses, lengths of rope, a knife, wool socks, sunglasses, two walkie-talkies, and a transistor radio. The convict wore gloves, and another pair was in the bag; he intended to give them to an accomplice who was not yet on the scene but whose appearance he confidently expected to arrange. The convict himself was thoroughly disguised: he was got up in a pair of toy-store spectacles and a thick brown wig; his cheeks were rouged; and his reddish-brown mustache and eyebrows were dyed jet black. In the hope of being mistaken for a foreigner, he spoke English - a required language in Swedish schools - with an American accent. For two days, while the convict remained in the bank, the police tried to figure out his identity, succeeding only when his voice, during a radio broadcast, sounded familiar to a sharp-eared detective. The convict proved to be Jan-Erik Olsson, a highly intelligent thirty-two-year-old thief and safecracker, who came from the south of Sweden; his past criminal activities had taken place in that area, and provincial police knew him as an expert in the use of explosives and as someone who had not hesitated to use a gun. Olsson had been convicted in February, 1972, for grand larceny. He had achieved a certain fame that year when an elderly couple in Helsingborg surprised him in the act of ransacking their house. Startled, the husband had keeled over, whereupon the wife asked Olsson to fetch heart medicine that her husband kept in the kitchen; the robber complied, then resumed his pillaging, finally departing with considerable loot. He had served about half of his three year sentence at the penitentiary in Kalmar, south of Stockholm, when he escaped while on furlough a couple of weeks before his arrival at the Kreditbank.

Olsson had scarcely entered the Kreditbank's street floor when a number of customers and forty assorted employees - tellers, mail-deposit clerks, secretaries, junior officials - knew that they were to have no ordinary Thursday morning; within seconds he had whipped out his submachine gun and fired at the ceiling, sending down a shower of concrete and glass. "I thought he was an Arab terrorist," Birgitta Lundblad, an employee of ten years' standing, who handled bank drafts from abroad, told me later. She was a year younger than Olsson. Fair and attractive in appearance, she commuted daily from Jakobsberg, a suburb less than a half hour away, where she lived with her husband - a civil engineer - and their two daughters, aged three and one and a half. At the bank, Birgitta's reputation was that of a diligent worker with an almost perfect attendance record. She liked the rhythm of her work and the responsibility that went with her duties; whenever she contemplated her future, she told me, it included the band and, of course, her family. At the time of Olsson's entrance, she recalled, she was wondering whether to investigate a sale of children's apparel at a nearby shop during her lunch break, but that possibility passed quickly from her mind with the violent stranger's arrival. All that mattered, it suddenly

seemed to her, was his next move. Still brandishing his submachine gun, he was announcing in English, "The party has just begun" - a line, police investigators later established, that he had recently heard while seeing an American movie about a convict on the loose. Instinctively, most of his terrified audience at the Kreditbank dropped to the floor, but some secluded themselves in a small repository for securities, and others, panicked or intrepid, or both, made for the exits, rushing pell-mell into Norrmalmstorg, perhaps Stockholm's busiest square, whose dominant feature is the Kreditbank's own squat, massive facade, five stories high.

Planting his transistor radio on a teller's counter, Olsson turned it on full blast, and the bank's marble interior abruptly reverberated to the sounds of rock music. As Olsson raised the volume, his eyes fell on a stenographer who was delivering a letter she had just typed to its author, in the loan department. She was Kristin Ehnmark, a spirited, black-haired woman of twenty-three. Kristin was personally destined to learn that Olsson was using the radio to pick up news of police reactions to his exploit, but when the jarring music filled the bank she could discern no method in his apparent madness. She told me, "I believed a maniac had come into my life. I believed I was seeing something that could happen only in America." Horrified, she watched Olsson take some rope from his canvas bag and hand it to a male bookkeeper, whom he commanded to bind her hands and ankles with it. On the floor in a matter of seconds, and shifting uncomfortably in her bonds, Kristin regretted the day she had ever left home--a gold-mining village in Sweden's far north. That had happened three and a half years before, when, in her last days as a teen-ager, she came south with a young man to whom she was engaged; he had been offered an excellent post in Stockholm and was refusing to accept it unless Kristin accompanied him. In the capital, she had taken the first job that came along--the one at the bank--hardly aware of it while her romance flourished. The romance had eventually foundered, though, and at that point she had realized that the world of banking wasn't for her. Impatiently, in the spring of 1973, she had decided to study social work, but the courses she needed, she had discovered, wouldn't be getting under way until September. Almost daily, Kristin told me, she had chafed over the delay, but today, August 23, 1973, her ankles struggling vainly in Olsson's rope, she realized more acutely than ever that she had lingered too long in the banking business. She was berating herself for this once again, Kristin said, when she sensed that she wasn't alone on the floor. Twisting herself onto her left side, she saw Birgitta lying nearby, as tightly bound as herself was. Scarcely had Kristin taken in this sight when she heard Olsson order the male bookkeeper to tie up yet a third employee--Elisabeth Oldgren, a twenty-one-year-old cashier in the foreign-exchange department, who had been with the bank fourteen months. Small and blond, she had brown eyes whose essential expression was one of unusual gentleness. Looking back, Kristin feels certain it was Elisabeth's eyes that accounted for the special care with which the bookkeeper placed her on the floor. Until Olsson brought Kristin and Elisabeth together, so to speak, they had had only the barest nodding acquaintance--a fact that seems astonishing to them now, for, as they were to discover in the next several days, they had much in common. Like Kristin, Elisabeth wanted to leave the bank. Elisabeth,

too, was awaiting admission to a school in the fall--in her case, a nursing school. And, like Kristin, Elisabeth had a love of the north country; though she had been born and brought up in Uppsala, only an hour out of Stockholm, more than once she had visited the Arctic region, whose frozen wastes, she said, reminded her of human loneliness. But such inward notions were far from Elisabeth's mind as the book-keeper lowered her to the bank floor. At that moment, she told me, she began thinking of her weekend plans. They called for her to be at a seaside kraftskiva--crayfish party--an annual summer festivity in Sweden. Dredging up every detail she could concerning the gala, Elisabeth said, she reviewed the transportation arrangements that had been made for the guests, the dress she planned to wear, the ritual of boiling the crayfish. It was only after she had exhausted such details, she said, that she was able to face up to what was going on in the Kreditbank building in Norrmalmstorg, and, in particular, to what Olsson was doing to her and to Birgitta and to Kristin. Months later, her voice incredulous, as though she were still being captured, Elisabeth said to me, "We were hostages--he wanted to negotiate for our lives!" She knew it, she said, when she heard Olsson shout to no one in particular, "I want to talk to the police!"

Olsson's wish was soon granted--many times over. Indeed, police were practically in the building at the time he uttered it, for Swedish banks, instead of relying on private guards of their own, have silent alarm systems to alert the police, who are kept thoroughly familiar with the locations and general layouts of all banks; someone--perhaps several people--had switched on the Kreditbank's alarm at the sight of Olsson's submachine gun. As a result, police were fast converging on Norrmalmstorg, and even taking steps to seal off the square's heavy morning traffic--it was close to ten-thirty--which began to give way to a small concentration of official vehicles. For Olsson, though, the first manifestation of police activity came in the form of Morgan Rylander, a sergeant in plain clothes who had been patrolling the area in a radio car. Responding to a police bulletin, Rylander entered the bank to find out what was going on. Plenty was, as he could quickly see; around him were the three bound hostages, the other employees, and the clients, cowed and scattered on the floor. Rylander faced Olsson's submachine gun. The two Swedes conversed in English, and Rylander identified himself as a policeman.

"Are you a high police officer?" Olsson asked.

"No, but I can bring you one," Rylander replied.

"O.K., do so," Olsson said.

To call headquarters, Rylander went up a broad wooden staircase to use a phone on the floor above, where the bank had its executive offices, and where, as the morning went on, the police, coming in through a back entrance, were beginning to install themselves. While he was gone, a second plainclothesman, Detective Inspector Ingemar Warpefeldt, appeared from above, halting near a pillar at the foot of the staircase; he was holding a revolver. Olsson didn't see him, but Birgitta did.

"Don't shoot!" Birgitta screamed.

Olsson wheeled. "Who are you?" he asked.

"I am a police officer. Drop your gun," Warpefeldt answered.

Olsson fired. The Inspector retreated, his right hand bleeding and, as it turned out, permanently damaged.

After Rylander returned with word that a high-ranking officer was en route, Olsson hazed him a bit. "Do you think I could miss you from here?" he asked, hefting his submachine gun. He was standing three yards from the Sergeant, who had sat down in a deep leather chair. When Rylander sat silent, Olsson said, "Let's have a song." Rylander sought to appease his supposedly American tormentor. He sang "Lonesome Cowboy." "I did it softly--I was also feeling lonesome," Rylander told me. Eventually, Olsson put Rylander to work, ordering him to clear the bank of unwanted people--everyone, that is, except Kristin, Elisabeth, and Birgitta. On Olsson's instructions, Rylander escorted numerous clients and employees out to the street in groups of two and three; at Olsson's sharp instigation, Rylander did the same with two armed policemen who had slipped into the ground-floor premises. With that, Rylander himself left the bank, relieved that he would again be taking orders from his usual superiors.

The high-ranking police official who came to treat with the criminal was Police Superintendent Sven Thorander, chief of the Stockholm Police District's Homicide and Violence Squad, who was a thoughtful man of fifty-six, spare and erect, with graying brown hair. Olsson showed him no deference. Welcoming him with raised submachine gun, the criminal ordered him to take off his coat and turn around. Then, satisfied that the official carried no arms, he opened negotiations, setting forth the terms that had to be met before he would release the hostages, at a time and place of his choosing. First, he told Thorander--still employing English--he wanted the police to bring him, his chosen accomplice, and he wanted it done that afternoon. Specifically, he said, the police were to deliver Clark Olofsson, who was serving a six-year sentence in a penitentiary in Norrköping, ninety miles southwest of Stockholm. Olofsson had engaged in armed robbery and acted as an accessory in the murder of a policeman; he had escaped from prison a number of times, once reaching Lebanon. Secondly, Olsson told Thorander, he wanted exactly three million Kronor (seven hundred and ten thousand dollars), half of it in Swedish currency, half in foreign money. Two pistols were to be a part of the deal--the submachine gun would be unwieldy for purposes of flight. Finally, Olsson demanded a fast getaway car. And when he used it, he stipulated, the hostages were to be in it with him and Olofsson, all wearing helmets and bulletproof jackets supplied by the police. For emphasis, he pointed the submachine gun at his three captives. "If anything happens to them, the police will be to blame," he told Thorander. Months later, when I talked to Olsson in prison, he told me he had been certain his demands would be quickly met. He had counted on two factors: a deep-seated Swedish aversion to violence, and the fact that a national election campaign was in full swing--a season, he believed, when politicians would not be apt to take a hard line that might result in violence to the hostages. Olsson said to me, "I had lives for assets. What could be more valuable?"

Unempowered to accept or reject the convict's terms, Thorander and his superior, Police Commissioner Kurt Lindroth, transmitted them to the Minister of Justice, Lennart Geijer, who, it happened, was known as an advocate of prison reform. From the outset, the Minister took an unalterable position--one in which he was backed by the Prime Minister, Olof Palme, and other Cabinet members. Under no circumstances, Geijer stated, must Olsson be permitted to leave the bank with the hostages. To allow that, he said, would be to undermine the very idea of an orderly society. On a tactical level, the Minister said, the police could have a free hand in managing the case, but there was to be no straying from the principle he had enunciated--and, of course, the safety of the hostages was to be borne in mind at all times. The police, I gathered while I was in Sweden, would have preferred a still freer hand in getting at their man, but they adhered to the Minister's directive. Olsson himself helped keep them in line. There was no temporizing with him. For example, when Thorander, in disclosing the government's position, asked Olsson if he would consider trading the hostages for Olofsson's company, the convict simply seized Elisabeth Oldgren by the throat and jammed his submachine gun against her ribs.

For six days, Olsson held sway over his hostages--one of the longest such episodes on record. Before it was over, his gun was fired again, explosives were set off, tear gas was sprayed, and the hostages were nearly hanged. For six days, the police waged a war of attrition, its stakes the rescue of innocent victims and the maintenance of social probity. Sweden was enthralled. The contest in Norrmalmstorg became known as bankdramat--"the bank drama"--and Olsson as ranaren--"the robber." Daily, the events in the Kreditbank dominated Sweden's front pages. Television broadcasts, normally limited to evening hours, went on throughout the day, with Swedish viewers hanging on the words of Arne Thoren, the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation's best-known commentator, who ordinarily covered foreign events. In Stockholm, in the August evenings, entire families would gather at the edge of Norrmalmstorg, gazing at the Kreditbank's bulky silhouette, trying to imagine what was going on behind it, puzzled that their country, stable and enlightened, should provide the setting for so unseemly an episode, prevalent though hostage-taking might be elsewhere. For the duration of the bank drama, all else appeared incidental. Certainly the national election--scheduled for September 16th--did, and even King Gustaf VI Adolf, long a revered figure, who was now dying at ninety, did not claim the thoughts of his subjects to the extent he otherwise might have. His Majesty's final days, though, did keep Swedes from looking upon the bank drama as merely a sensational event. An old Swedish friend of mine, an executive with a computer company, told me, "Gustaf Adolf stood for continuity and tradition and standards. It was his last favor to us to remind us of those things. But this affair stood for their very opposite."

As I thought about these and other aspects of the bank drama, I became increasingly curious about the kind of life that the hostages and their captors led during their six days together. What sort of community, if any, I wondered, could have sprung up between captors and captives? What was it that enabled the hostages to keep going when all control of their lives had suddenly been ceded to the whims of an armed stranger? How did the robber regard his prisoners during the event? In Sweden, I found that all of them were willing, even

relieved, to tell me of the days they had spent within the confines of the Kreditbank. Police officials spoke freely to me and provided me with their pre-trial investigation of the two convicts' activities in the bank: a five-volume report, compiled by Detective Inspector Ingemar Krusell, it includes testimony given by the principals; photographs of damage to the bank; tape recordings of conversations between Olsson and the police; notes kept by members of the trapped group; and other data. I was permitted to visit the bank robber. Prime Minister Palme received me and told me about direct talks he had had with Olsson and with one of the hostages while the robber ruled the bank. A police psychiatrist, Dr. Nils Bejerot, who was on hand throughout the bank drama's run, talked with me, as did two other psychiatrists--Dr. Lennart Ljungberg, at that time director of the psychiatric clinic of St. Goran's Hospital, and his colleague Dr. Waltrant Bergman, who took care of the hostages for ten days immediately after their rescue. Their patients, these two said, had come through the ordeal in relatively good shape, but that might well not have been the case. According to Dr. Ljungberg, many things that might have gone wrong inside the bank had not. As in a lifeboat at sea, he said, an outbreak of hysterics might have overcome the group; one or more of the hostages could easily have suffered an acute nervous breakdown; a misguided sense of heroism, perhaps masking a suicidal drive, might have inspired a hostage to struggle with Olsson over his submachine gun. But there was little point in this sort of conjecture, Dr. Ljungberg believed. Having met the hostages, he said, he felt he could suggest an underlying attribute that had helped sustain them in their particular captivity. Speaking cautiously, he said, "As it happened, each of them very much wanted to go on living. The same may have been true of the robber."

Shortly after four on Thursday afternoon, Clark Olofsson, a handsome, bearded criminal of twenty-six, brought by the police from his cell in Norrkoping, arrived at the bank. He was escorted in, handcuffed, through the back entrance and taken to the second floor, where the police maintained their base of operations throughout the siege. Next, Olofsson--or Clark, to avoid confusion--was freed from his handcuffs and sent down the staircase to the bank's street floor. In a puzzled way, he peered at Olsson for a moment, then asked, in Swedish, "What's going on here?" He studied the robber's features a while longer, and finally exclaimed, with a laugh, "Oh, it's you!" The two had done time together at the Kalmar penitentiary. Olsson's greeting was also in Swedish--his first use of the language. It didn't surprise his captives, who had come to suspect he was a fellow-countryman; he had been listening for hours to his radio's newscasts, all of which were in Swedish--their contents, as might be imagined, predominantly given over to the event he had contrived. He motioned Clark to a point away from the hostages, and the two conferred in private. Police Commissioner Lindroth, in an account of his own, writes, "With Olofsson's arrival, Olsson calmed down. He stopped shouting as loudly as he had been doing. He unbound the hostages." It is still uncertain whether Clark helped Olsson plot his grandiose scheme while the two were together at Kalmar. What is known, however, is that Olsson hid out in Stockholm from August 8th to August 23rd in the home of a woman friend of Clark's, who was about to bear his child. In the bank, Clark assisted Olsson in a variety of ways. He acted as an intermediary with the police, relaying Olsson's wishes, and occasionally his own, in quite forceful

terms. Using explosives, he blew open a cashier's drawer, which he emptied of an estimated ninety thousand kronor. He took the film from security cameras that had been automatically recording Olsson's every action, and burned it. In the first two days, during which the convicts had the run of the main banking floor, he frequently scouted its perimeter for signs of infiltrating police.

While reconnoitring in this fashion, he found Sven Safstrom, a kind of junior troubleshooter at the bank. A blond bachelor of twenty-five, tall and slender, Sven had hidden himself in a stockroom used for storing checkbooks and stationery supplies. Clark regarded him with distaste; by now, it appeared to him, it might be risky to evict this unexpected witness from the building. Reluctantly, he said to Sven, "Well, come and have a drink with us." Sven became a fourth hostage--a development that pleased him no more than it did his captors. As he was taken in tow by Clark, Sven recalls, he said to himself, "Well, I wonder what Mother will think now about my working here." It was his mother, Sven told me, who had helped him get his job at the bank. She was a government official, as was his father, and she had acted out of concern over what she took to be her son's slowness in finding himself--his most notable achievement before he came to the Kreditbank having been to sign on as a kitchen menial aboard a cruise ship bound for America. Getting into the routine at the bank, he had found that he liked his work there a little more than he had imagined he would. Smiling faintly, he remarked to me, "Whenever I didn't, I could just remember that being there wasn't my idea." In any event, he said, he seemed to be doing well as a junior executive, and though this pleased his parents, it neither surprised him nor persuaded him that he had yet found himself. Finding oneself, he believed, was something that went on all one's life. "It makes us curious about ourselves," he said. The day Clark led him to the robber, though, he told me, his curiosity about himself was at something of a peak. "I wanted to know if I would ever get out alive," he said. Olsson's reception of the male captive wasn't promising on that score. His first words to Sven were "We don't want any heroes here." Olsson then interrogated him, looking highly displeased when Sven revealed that he had learned how to operate a machine gun while undergoing military training. When I talked with Olsson, he told me of his suspicions concerning the unwanted hostage. Two days later, on Saturday, he said, he had put Sven to a test. That day, feigning sleep as he occupied an easy chair, the robber had let the submachine gun dangle from his lap, inches from the young executive's grasp. Sven had made no move. "I was glad for his sake he didn't," Olsson told me.

Olsson called his gun "my lawyer," he kept it always strapped to his arm. His first days at the bank, on the few occasions he chose to wander through his moneyed domain, he kept his hostages clustered close to him. He knew what he was doing, for in a small park opposite the bank and on the uneven rooftops that rimmed Norrmalmstorg were members of Commissioner Lindroth's special unit of skarpskyttar--sharpshooters--their precision rifles trained on the windows of the Kreditbank. Olsson afforded the patient marksmen no target, protected as he was by his entourage of human shields. "He never gave us an opening," Commissioner Lindroth says in his account. "If

we were to kill him, it had to be done with a single shot." On one of his walks, Olsson, spying sharpshooters in the park, fired at them, splintering a bank window. He did it, Olsson told me, to make the government understand that he was a desperate man, capable of anything. Thorander had informed him that he was not to be allowed to leave with the hostages, but the government, Olsson said, simply had to get it through its head that that was exactly what he was going to do. Through the bank's windows he could see a blue Mustang parked outside the Kreditbank doors; it was the getaway car that the police had delivered for the robber's use. With hostages in it, Olsson said, he knew exactly where to go. (Not that he told me, nor has he yet told police, who believe that a Swedish underworld figure, for half the three million kronor, had laid on a scaplane for Olsson, whose plan was believed to be to reach Lebanon.) But without the hostages, Olsson continued, he was certain that the Mustang would be nothing but a trap, notwithstanding a police guarantee of "safe conduct." Olsson was right. The guarantee was a phony, as Commissioner Lindroth himself admits in his record. For one thing, he writes, the police had monkeyed with the car; concealed in it was a radar device that would constantly give away the Mustang's location. Police helicopters were in the air, their crews assigned to follow the blue vehicle. Roadblocks had been organized on the outskirts of Stockholm. Extra guards had been posted at the capital's two airports. The car did have a tankful of gas, as Olsson had demanded, but its ignition keys were in police hands. In his report, the Commissioner declares, "We did not consider ourselves under any obligation to fulfill a promise that had been extracted from us."

As the government remained intransigent, Olsson decided to set up his headquarters in the bank's groundfloor depositionsvalv--safe-deposit vault--just as the police had set up theirs on the floor above. The vault was well away from the windows, and therefore from Lindroth's sharpshooters. Toilets were nearby, and so was the staircase, which served as a snacktrappa--literally, "chat staircase"--where criminals and police exchanged messages and carried out other transactions involving, for instance, food and money. As for the vault itself, it was a carpeted oblong chamber, forty-seven feet long, eleven feet wide, and seven and a half feet high. Its length notwithstanding, the room had a cramped appearance. Its walls were lined with sizable steel cabinets that housed six hundred safe-deposit boxes, containing clients' valuables. The room also held four small writing desks, chairs, plastic wastebaskets, overhead fluorescent lights, and a telephone, which soon became the main link connecting Olsson and the others with the police and with the rest of Stockholm. In Olsson's view, the strong room had the makings of a redoubt, for it had a narrow entrance and a thick steel door, if it ever became necessary, the robber foresaw, he could easily cover this entrance with his "lawyer." Inside the heavy vault door was an inner door, without a lock, for depositors to close if they wished privacy. Olsson, however, was more interested in the main door, which could be locked by hand only from outside the vault; whoever tried to lock it, he believed, would have to stand exposed in the doorway.

In any event, it appeared to Olsson, during a police siege the vault would make a good dormitory: keeping an eye on his captives would be no problem there; the place had a ventilation system; and, finally, it would provide good sleeping, since it was practically soundproof, even when its thick steel door was ajar. To be sure, as Olsson acknowledged to me later, the ubiquitous deposit boxes, the low ceiling, and the oblong shape, broken only by a small alcove about halfway along one side, gave it a close, oppressive quality. Olsson realized this early in the game, he said, after the group had passed but an hour in the vault, when Elisabeth complained of a sense of claustrophobia. The robber put a length of rope, perhaps thirty feet, around her neck and let her out for a walk. Elisabeth told me, "I couldn't go far and I was on a leash that he held, but I felt free. I remember thinking he was very kind to allow me to leave the vault." Later in the day, Olsson permitted Kristin and Birgitta to proceed to the lavatory, unleashed. Both returned, but not without experiencing small adventures. Out of Olsson's sight, both saw police crouched and hiding behind the staircase. One of the officers asked Kristin in a whisper how many hostages the robber had taken. "I showed them with my fingers," Kristin said. "I felt like a traitor. I didn't know why." The sight of the police also left Birgitta in conflict. She told me, "All I had to do was take a few steps toward them and I would be able to stop worrying about my two daughters. They were very much on my mind, but so were the other hostages, even though our lives had never crossed before. I was afraid I might endanger them if I didn't go back. I turned away from the police. I was part of a group--there didn't seem to be anything I could do about it."

Two or three hours after Olsson's takeover of the ground floor, the police, meeting half the robber's ransom demand, had tossed three canvas bags, containing Swedish paper currency worth three hundred and fifty-five thousand dollars, down the staircase. Examining their contents, the robber had branded them "funny money." The bills, it appeared, were crisp and were consecutively serialized; they would be highly traceable. Rejecting the bags, Olsson said he wanted old, rumpled money. The police spent nearly two more hours rounding up old bills. While he was waiting to become a rich man, Olsson decided to let the women (Sven had not yet been captured) use the phones on the street floor. Kristin talked with her mother, who had to be calmed. Elisabeth dialled in vain; her parents and her brother were not in their homes. Nor were Birgitta's husband and mother, and that was a bitter disappointment; she yearned to talk with one of them about the children. Only her dagmamma, or day mother, was home with them, and, dully, Birgitta informed her that today she would be home later than usual and asked her please to leave word for Mr. Lundblad that he was to warm up some leftover fish and to be sure and douse it with butter. When she hung up, Birgitta's eyes were wet. Lightly, consolingly, Olsson touched her cheek. "Try again; don't give up," he said.

Before the day was out, another phone call was to be made, its recipient Prime Minister Palme. The robber reached him at eleven in the evening. By then, Olsson had all the Swedish money he had demanded, Clark was with him, and an hour earlier police had provided him and his charges with a hearty repast, complete with a

supply of cigarettes and, by request, a cigarette lighter, the contribution of Superintendent Thorander. From Olsson's point of view, nothing remained but the climax of his plan--namely, escape with the hostages. Impatiently, late though the hour was, he picked up the phone in the vault and rang the one man in Sweden who could make that possible. "I took the phone at once," the Prime Minister told me. "I was alone in my office, waiting for a report on the King's health." The robber told Mr. Palme he wanted orders issued for his immediate departure from the bank with the hostages; failing that, he said, there would be no more hostages--unless, of course, he added tauntingly, the Prime Minister himself cared to take their place. There was no discussion of the robber's proposition, for the next sounds that Mr. Palme heard were frightened gasps from one of the captives. Olsson had seized Elisabeth by the throat and was telling the Prime Minister that he had one minute in which to change his mind, or the young woman would die. Mr. Palme told me, "He began a countdown, but when fifteen seconds were left he stopped, and I heard the phone go dead. It was a long day."

When Olsson rang off, the group turned in. The police had lent Birgitta a coat when, through Clark, she had let them know she found the vault chilly. Snugly wrapped in this, she slept in the rear of the room. Sven lay nearby, sprawled on the carpet. Settling her head on a canvas bag filled with a hundred and thirty thousand dollars worth of kronor, Kristin occupied the vault's middle section, as did Clark, who had made a slight clearing in the small alcove by shoving a chair and a writing table against a wall. At Olsson's direction, Elisabeth sat in an easy chair facing the doorway, an involuntary sentinel; were police to storm the room, she would pose an obstacle to their getting at the robber. At Elisabeth's feet was a second obstacle--an inanimate one. This was an explosive charge that Olsson had placed there, effectively mining the vault's entrance; as an early-warning device, a chair stood between the chamber's inner and outer doors, an empty soda bottle precariously balanced on its seat. On the floor behind Elisabeth's chair was Olsson, with the "lawyer," as always, fastened to his wrist. The group was in darkness, Olsson having turned off the lights. Weeks later, when she was free, Elisabeth told police investigators that the robber was chewing caffeine tablets as she dropped off. Wearied by the day's tumultuous events, she fell asleep quickly and slept deeply. After midnight, though, the chill in the vault awoke her. Just as she opened her eyes, shivering, she told investigators, the robber draped his gray wool jacket around her shoulders. Recalling his action when she and I talked, Elisabeth said, "Jan was a mixture of brutality and tenderness. I had known him only a day when I felt his coat around me, but I was sure he had been that way all his life."

Friday opened with two rounds from Olsson's submachine gun. At six that morning, a civilian and a uniformed policeman had appeared on the stairway and attempted to begin a colloquy with the robber. Before Olsson took aim the policeman had shouted his own name and had begun pleading with the invisible robber to mend his ways, and the civilian had been calling out, "Kaj, Kaj, I am your brother!" The two men, it turned out, had been flown to Stockholm from the south of Sweden, because the police, bungling, had decided that the still unidentified Olsson was Kaj Hansson, another escaped prisoner, who,

like Olsson, had a thick southern Swedish accent but who, unlike him, had specialized in bank robberies. The civilian was Hansson's brother, and the policeman an old and trusted friend; it was hoped that the two would be able to coax the convict to surrender. When Olsson fired, the two fled up the staircase, barely saving their necks. (On hearing a news report of the mistaken identification, Kaj Hansson phoned the police from Hawaii, where he was holed up, and indignantly denied that he would stoop to so foul a deed as taking hostages. For his trouble, he was extradited and returned to a Swedish jail.) Later on that day, when the police delivered newspapers, along with food and an ample supply of beer, Olsson laughed delightedly at accounts of the blunder, but at the time it was taking place he saw it as an insidious ruse of some sort. Incensed, he had phoned the police upstairs and told them so in no uncertain terms. While he was at it, he had also let them know that the night had passed uncomfortably. In a short while, two officers came down the staircase bearing various items of bedding, including paper sheets. In turn, the police had a request: Commissioner Lindroth wanted to inspect the hostages. The request was granted, Clark leading Birgitta, Elisabeth, Kristin, and Sven from inside the vault. The Commissioner, a brown-haired man in his middle fifties, looked closely at each. He was standing near the top of the staircase, his back against a wall, in a spot where he was safe from the robber's submachine gun. He had asked to see the four both to ascertain their condition and because he had been under pressure to do so from the hostages' parents, who were all solid citizens. Sven's as has been mentioned, were influential ones. Birgitta's were retired office workers. Elisabeth's ran a boys' boarding school near Goteborg. (A brother of hers, a computer analyst, kept offering to take his sister's place inside the bank.) Kristin's mother and father had come down from the north, Mr. Ehnmark choosing to neglect his tractor-rental business for as long as the bank drama lasted. Such information as the Commissioner had about the captured children of these parents indicated that they, too, were of a solid sort. Birgitta had been working since she was fifteen or sixteen, her first employment having been as an au pair in England and in Berlin. Elisabeth had had a similar post in Switzerland, and had also served on the kitchen staff of her family's boarding school. Nor had the Commissioner found out anything concerning Kristin and Sven that impugned their characters in the slightest. And yet, as he told associates immediately afterward, the inspection was charged with a strange atmosphere. The hostages, he reported, showed hostility toward him, their mien sullen and withdrawn. Kristin, he recalls, practically curled her lip at him. On the other hand, a peculiar amity prevailed between the hostages and Clark, and presumably, by extension, between the hostages and the robber, waiting in the wings. As the captives trooped out to the staircase, the Commissioner saw with astonishment that their manner with Clark was entirely relaxed, and at moments even convivial; nor was the hostages' attitude unreciprocated, for when Kristin and Elisabeth presented themselves before the Commissioner, Clark had an arm around the shoulders of each in a display of easy camaraderie. As the Commissioner subsequently told aides, there was nothing for him to do but conclude that he was up against a mystery whose clues, if any existed, were like none to

which he had ever been exposed. But the purpose of the inspection had been to check on the hostages' health, and here there was no room for mystification. The Commissioner made the following terse, factual entry in his account of the bank drama. "All the hostages seemed physically fit, and they all entreated me to let them leave the bank premises together with Olsson and Olofsson."

Shortly after his inspection, Lindroth described the encounter to reporters--who in turn, phoned the hostages, inquiring whether, as Lindroth had indicated, they were prepared to entrust themselves to Olsson's ministrations wherever he went. The resulting interviews, many of them in the form of broadcasts that included the hostages' voices, baffled the Swedish public, setting off a wave of theorizing about the captives' odd pliancy.

The day's most extensive interview, however, was not intended for public consumption. It was initiated by one of the hostages, Kristin, when, toward five o'clock, she phoned the Prime Minister, whom she knew only as a public figure. Though neither knew it at the time, the police were taping their conversation, and that is how it eventually came to light. Kristin and Mr. Palme, who were on the phone forty-two minutes, were worlds apart in their thinking--Kristin's remarks those of an individual thinking of self-preservation, Mr. Palme's those of a government head upholding the abstract ideal of social stability. The following are excerpts from the police transcript:

KRISTIN: I am very disappointed. I think you are sitting there playing checkers with our lives. I fully trust Clark and the robber. I am not desperate. They haven't done a thing to us. On the contrary, they have been very nice. But, you know, Olof, what I am scared of is that the police will attack and cause us to die.

PRIME MINISTER: But the police will not do that.

KRISTIN: I want you to let us go away with the robber. Give them the foreign currency and two guns and let us drive off.

PRIME MINISTER: But one can't do that. Consider the situation. They were robbing a bank and shooting at the police.

KRISTIN: The police would have shot first.

PRIME MINISTER: That doesn't matter. A very nice guy has been shot. That's not funny. (Inspector Warpefeldt had been a bodyguard for Palme's children.)

KRISTIN: Which do you think is better? That he has a wound or that six people will die?

PRIME MINISTER: If (the robber) doesn't pull the gun, no one will kill him....Can't you tell him that he should let you go?

KRISTIN: They won't do that, and I'm not in the slightest afraid of him.

PRIME MINISTER: We are not going to let you go out on the roads.

KRISTIN: But, darling Olof, don't you understand that we are starting to feel the pressure here--all of us? I want to come out with these two guys....

PRIME MINISTER: Then the risks would be greater for you.

KRISTIN: No, you can take this down on a tape recorder and you can hear me repeat it over and over: I want to go with the robber, and no one will accuse you or anyone else. I have said so on the radio today. The whole Swedish people knows that we want to go with Clark and the robber.

PRIME MINISTER: What do you think will happen then? What will they do with the guns?

KRISTIN: Maybe they want to defend themselves against the police.

PRIME MINISTER: Uh-huh.

KRISTIN: But, dearest Olof, sweetheart, it may sound stupid, but I want to go with the two.

PRIME MINISTER: Why?

KRISTIN: Because I trust them. I know they would let us go as long as the police don't chase us.

PRIME MINISTER: But why do you think they will chase them?

KRISTIN: Of course--they want to catch them.

PRIME MINISTER: Is that so strange?

KRISTIN: You are the highest person in the country. You can save my life.

PRIME MINISTER: Yes, but I think the best way of doing that is not to let them out on the roads....They must sooner or later understand that this must not continue.

KRISTIN: May I go with them? I beg you, I take it on my own risk.

PRIME MINISTER: It makes no difference. We have the responsibility for everyone.

KRISTIN: But please, Olof dear, I am sitting here asking you for my life.

PRIME MINISTER: No violence will befall you from any authorities.

KRISTIN: Should I believe that? They have fooled us so many times. They have said they would not infiltrate the bank, but Clark went around and found policemen in several places.

PRIME MINISTER: Why do you suppose the police have not attacked?

KRISTIN: I don't know.

PRIME MINISTER: Don't you understand that it is out of consideration for you?....I can hear someone prompting you.

KRISTIN: No, there's no one behind my back....Why can't you make me Prime Minister for this evening?

PRIME MINISTER: (laughing) That can't be done....What if we let everyone in prison out?

KRISTIN: Yes. I understand we can't let everyone loose--that's not the question. We want to leave with the robber. He will let us go soon.

PRIME MINISTER: I don't believe that....The police will not harm you. Can you believe that?

KRISTIN: You must forgive me, but in this situation I do not believe it.

PRIME MINISTER: I think that's terribly unfair. Here are a great many policemen risking their lives, who have not moved aggressively in all this time. The purpose, of course, is to protect you.

KRISTIN: Of course, they can't attack us....He is sitting in here and he is protecting us from the police.

PRIME MINISTER: But the police don't want to hurt you. You can't believe that, can you?

KRISTIN: That's true, and do you know why? If the police come in here, he will shoot and then they will shoot, and then nobody has a chance to survive. If we stay here, I won't live....

PRIME MINISTER: But we must have a society of laws....We have to protect society. One should not be able through violent methods--

KRISTIN: Yes, one should not be able to do that, but there's an exception to every rule. If you were sitting here in my situation and I was Prime Minister, then, damn it, you would be calling me and asking for the same thing....

PRIME MINISTER: Can't you get the guy to put down his gun? Can't you explain that the whole thing is hopeless?

KRISTIN: No, no, it won't work.

PRIME MINISTER: Why not? Isn't he a human being?

KRISTIN: No, no, he's made up his mind.

PRIME MINISTER: You are unreasonable. One can't let people out on the roads with weapons and innocent people.

KRISTIN: You can tell me about society another time, but now, I tell you, I'm beginning to get angry. Call Norrmalmstorg and tell them everything is straightened out. Let us go with Clark and the robber....

The conversation ended with a sarcastic "Thanks for the help" from Kristin.

The telephone figured further in Friday's doings. Kristin's mother rang. When she did, Mrs. Ehnmark has recalled, it was Olsson who picked up the phone. "To whom am I speaking?" Mrs. Ehnmark asked. "They call me the robber," Olsson answered. "May I please speak to my daughter, Kristin Ehnmark?" "She's asleep. Do you want me to disturb her?" the robber asked. "Yes," Mrs. Ehnmark said. She had something on her mind, and she unloaded it in plain words when Kristin came to the phone. She wanted her daughter to know that she was extremely disappointed in her for having employed breezy language in a radio broadcast earlier in the day, during which Kristin had been as informal as she had been with Mr. Palme. To smooth things over, Kristin's father took the phone and inquired if his daughter, an inveterate poker player, had been winning many hands at the bank.

In another call, Elisabeth reached her mother and tried to allay her anxiety, telling her that things weren't as bad as the press made out. And Birgetta finally succeeded in reaching her mother, their conversation an outpouring of concern over the two children. When Birgitta hung up, her tears were more copious than they had been the previous day. In the minutes of the Stockholm Police District's pre-trial investigation, testimony is given that Olsson, sitting in an easy chair, drew her to his knees and consoled her. When I interviewed Birgitta at the bank, where she is back at her old job, she said, "The robber told me that everything would be all right if only the police would go away. I agreed with him then. Yes, I thought, it is the police who are keeping me from my children. The robber spoke gently. He said he had two children of his own. He said it was years since he had seen them, because of his criminal life, but that he could understand how I felt. As I listened to him, I thought--and I still think so--that if he had known I was a mother he would not have picked me as one of his hostages."

By now, Sven was also feeling gratitude toward Olsson. Before Kristin called the Chancellery, the robber had taken him aside and, as though indulging in shoptalk, said he was going to shoot him. However, Olsson had added quickly, he wouldn't kill Sven, as he had originally planned but would merely hit him in a leg; he would aim carefully, he promised. He explained the rationale of his decision; he had to shake up the police or see his chances for escape go glimmering. Surely, the robber said, Sven could understand that. In any event, he concluded, Sven was to stand by until he received a signal, and then was to proceed to the foot of the staircase, where the police could see his body fall; in the meantime, Sven could avail himself of all the beer on hand in order to buoy his courage. I learned about this from Sven as we strolled along one of Stockholm's quays on a pleasant Sunday morning. He said to me, "I still don't know why the signal never came. All that comes back to me is how kind I thought he was for saying it was just my leg he would shoot." Sven shook his head briskly, as though trying to clear it. "But the robber was not kind," Sven said insistently. "He was an outlaw who dared to take over our lives, who could have killed us. I have to force myself to remember that fact."

Sven's gratitude didn't surprise Dr. Ljungberg and his associate Dr. Bergman when I mentioned it to them. They knew it as a mechanism that characterizes hostages in general and, for that matter, just about anyone caught in what they termed "survival situations." Dr. Anna Freud has called the reaction "identification with the aggressor," and, I learned, it has to do with the deepest layers of one's being, stirring unconscious memories of one's earliest patterns of security and order. Responses like Sven's, Dr. Ljungberg said, had occurred among many prisoners of war in Korea and Indo-China. "In Auschwitz, too," Dr. Bergman put in. A native of Germany, she had emigrated to Sweden in the Hitler years. In order to survive, she informed me, Auschwitz inmates had tried to like their captors, just as Sven and the three young women had. In their case, it had impelled them to side with the robbers against the police; had they not done so, Dr. Bergman said, they might have been overwhelmed by "fear of death, chaos, and the elimination of all normal laws."

They were essentially healthy individuals, Dr. Ljungberg thought, but sometimes enduring an ordeal like the bank drama could call forth neurotic patterns that had previously been under control. "We hope there will be no chronic effects," Dr. Ljungberg said.

For the third successive morning, the bank drama began the new day with gunfire. This time, it was a policeman, halfway down the staircase, who shot, discharging a single cartridge from his pistol. He had no target. He wanted only to make a noise, his object being to draw some kind of response, even if it was an answering volley, from within the vault. No sound had issued from there since late the night before, when Olsson and the others had presumably retired, and here it was ten in the morning. Police had repeatedly yelled the robber's name from the staircase. They had even searched an adjoining building, a museum, on the chance that Olsson could have miraculously breached the vault's thick stone wall. The pistol shot had followed--a drastic effort to evoke signs of life. After that, a high-ranking officer named Jack Malm, wearing sneakers, stealthily descended the staircase; he carried a wooden window pole five feet long. He had volunteered for what he was doing; namely, approaching the strong room, whose outer door was a few inches ajar. At any moment, as Commissioner Lindroth has written, Olsson could have poked his submachine gun out the vault and cut down the advancing officer. Malm made his way circuitously, taking a route that led him behind and over bank counters and then along a wall, which he flattened himself against for several yards. At last, the vault door was within reach of the officer's pole. With a powerful thrust, he jabbed the door shut, after which, springing forward, he turned its handle, moving the lock cylinders into place. After the bank drama was over, the police learned that Olsson and the others, giving in after the wakefulness and tension of the past two days, had fallen into a deep sleep--assisted, no doubt, by their soundproof shelter. For a few seconds that Saturday morning, it looked as though Malm's courage might have been pointless, because there was still no sound from the vault. But then, the soda bottle having toppled from the chair, the vault's occupants, finally roused, ended their long silence with terrified screams and angry obscenities, which the police, directly overhead, could hear through openings in the ventilation system. Sven told me, "Seeing the door closed was one of the most frightening moments of the entire six days for me. Still sleepy, we were sure the police were going to storm the vault. Elisabeth was sitting right over the explosive charge--all of us were near it. Olsson's gun was in his lap. If the police had come in shooting, he would have shot back." There was anxiety, too, Sven said, lest the police resort to tear gas. The robber it seemed, had a theory about tear gas. He believed that after fifteen minutes its fumes did something to people's brains that made them idiots for the rest of their lives. Sven said, "He had told us that he would kill us all as well as himself rather than let us become that way. Hearing him say that, I remember, was another time when I thought of him as a very kind man."

With the enclosure of the entire group, the bank drama took on a different aspect. As Commissioner Lindroth put it, "Our chances of bringing the whole operation to a bloodless end had increased." He attributed this to what he termed a change in "the distribution of power." No longer, he pointed out, was the bank's street floor a no man's land for his forces. Now, moving about it freely, they first flung sandbags against the locked vault door, adding to the extreme unlikelihood of Olsson's suddenly forcing it from the inside and emerging with submachine gun blazing. Olsson, too, made new moves, his initial one being to block the vault's inner door. Figuratively speaking, he gave it a lock. Having turned on the vault's fluorescent lights when Malm struck, Olsson tumbled, almost hurled, safe-deposit cabinets, heavy with valuables, against the inner door. Unmindful of the fact that they were also blocking off the light switch, so that the fluorescent tubes could not be turned off, the robber didn't care which way the cabinets fell, just as long as he could satisfy himself that they were obstructing the inside door. He immediately, let the police know by phone what he had done. It was a formidable show of strength--and, Olsson told me, a calculated one. "I wanted the police to realize that they had someone who was very strong to think about," he said. "Before I disappeared from Kalmar, I prepared for the bank robbery by being in the best condition of my life. Every minute it was allowed me, I was in the prison gym, working out, keeping my weight right, building up my muscles."

As a result of Olsson's physical feat, the situation became one of barrier opposing barrier; the police could not simply decide to unlock the outer door and, taking their chances, invade the vault. The loss of this dubious option, however, didn't lessen Lindroth's optimism, which, it appeared, wasn't based solely on the fact that the group had been incarcerated. The Commissioner had also made psychological deductions concerning the robber, the most important one being that Olsson was a rational individual, all of whose moves were keyed to plausible self-interest. The police had established the robber's true identity the previous night, and Lindroth was encouraged to learn that it was Jan-Erik Olsson he was dealing with, for Olsson was known to take his standing in the prison community seriously; in jail he had once contemptuously knifed a child molester, whose ilk is considered the dregs of convict society. As Lindroth observed, if Olsson harmed the hostages, "it would make it very difficult for him to be accepted in the prison community." In Lindroth's estimation, Olsson was neither insane nor under the influence of drugs, nor was he a political fanatic willing to die for his cause. Had Olsson been any of these, both his capture and the hostages' survival would have been more uncertain propositions than they were. Lindroth was also impressed by the concern that both Olsson and Clark had shown when one of the hostages began to menstruate without benefit of proper supplies. The convicts had been adamant in insisting that the police must fill this lack forthwith if negotiations were to proceed. "The criminals could talk of nothing else," the Commissioner has said. "It led me to suspect that they might not possess a killer's instinct." In agreeing with the Commissioner's various insights, the police psychiatrist, Dr. Nils Bejerot, asserted, without explanation, that the more time the robber spent with his captives, the more likely the bank drama would end in his capitulation. Citing it as a psychological precept, Dr. Berjerot told me, "It is to be expected that after a point a bond of friendship springs up between victims and their captors."

After Saturday morning, the police put aside any pretense of negotiation. The initiative, now theirs, they moved ahead vigorously, fastening on the use of tear gas--Olsson's great bugaboo--as the solution to the bank drama. The strong room had seven vent holes in the walls that could serve as inlets for spreading the gas, but it was deemed a more reliable approach to drill holes in the ceiling--seven of them, of different sizes--and spray the gas through them directly into the chamber. This could be done with aerosol flasks; bombs were rejected as a less efficient delivery system. The gas dosage that experts prescribed was to be of sufficient strength to knock out the vault's occupants--after which, it was decided the police would have no difficulty unlocking the door and shouldering aside the robber's barricade. Doctors would be on hand to resuscitate captors and captives alike. Timing, though, was crucial to the police plan. A precipitate assault might only invite similar action on Olsson's part--that is, the murder of one or more of the hostages. With this in mind, Lindroth adopted what he called an "exhaustion tactic"--a policy of attrition, whose duration, it was hoped, would enable the robber to comprehend that, other than dying, he had no choice but to surrender. Lindroth and his cohorts would have preferred a faster-moving plan. They were impatient to complete their mission. "The country was at a standstill," Thorander told me. "No one could think of anything but the bank drama. We had to hire extra telephone operators at headquarters." Suggestions for ending the bank drama were coming in by the bushel--especially from old ladies. One believed that a concert of religious tunes by a Salvation Army band would break Olsson's resistance. Another urged that angry bees be sent into the strong room through the vents to sting the convicts into submission. A third wanted police to swab the floor outside the vault with soap, on the theory that if the vault door was then opened, Olsson, emerging, would slide into captivity.

Adjusting to the glacial tempo of the exhaustion tactic, the police busied themselves trying to find blueprints of the Kreditbank structure. They were after data about the vault. To drill holes and spray it effectively with gas, they needed to learn the thickness of its concrete, the plan of its electric wiring, and assorted other details, none of them easy to come by, since the bank building was nearly a hundred years old and had been rebuilt several times. Meticulously, the police gathered information about the materials and the construction of the safe-deposit cabinets, with which they might have to deal in breaking into the vault. They also dreamed up a number of contingency plans. Lindroth was never without qualms that some unforeseeable turn of events might bring about the defeat of his forces. Nor was it overlooked that fatigue could easily lead to the clumsy execution of decisions that had been carefully thought out. But Lindroth and his lieutenants had to discover that weariness could itself conceal its presence. This came out clearly when, at three in the morning on Monday--the fifth day of the bank drama--Olsson stalled the progress of his hunters with an ingenious maneuver that could have cost lives. Lindroth, obsessed with finishing his mission, was tempted to counter with instant action, and, according to police sources, his own ranking aides had to practically order their leader to hold off making any new moves. Lindroth's account of the bank drama takes scant notice of his subordinates' pressure, but it does acknowledge that the robber had

presented a sticky problem. Referring to it, the Commissioner writes, "In view of it, I decided...to postpone operations until two on Monday afternoon. We were very tired by then. Since Thursday, we had had only a few hours of sleep. I feared that our powers of judgment and our balance might be disturbed by lack of sleep."

Behind the closed door of the vault, the six inmates had recognized that the resolution of their collective fate, whatever it might be, was palpably closer at hand. At bay now, the robber, chewing his caffeine tablets, behaved more mercurially than he had before--his moods, as Elisabeth saw them, alternating between a tenderness and a brutality that had both become heightened. Kristin told me that, with the shutting of the door, her fear of death seemed to have sharpened. "I hadn't thought that was possible. I had never been close to death before," she said. "From the moment Jan made me his hostage, I was afraid he would suddenly kill me, but now it was the police I was afraid of--even more so than when I had talked with the Prime Minister. I felt hopeless. What difference did it make, I asked myself, which one of them did away with me?" A change of atmosphere pervaded the vault. Its fluorescent tubes glowed perpetually, their garish light reminding the group that, for all practical purposes, the electric switch was as inaccessible as the vault's lock. The days melted into each other--a block of undifferentiated time--so that later, when I talked with them, Olsson and the others were sometimes at variance on when this or that event took place. "We had watches, but they might just as well have been without hands," Sven told me. The plastic wastebaskets in the narrow strong room became the group's toilets. This had already happened the day before the vault was sealed, for late Friday afternoon the robber, suddenly mistrustful that "too many pigs are out there," had forbidden his charges to continue to use the bank's facilities. Birgitta, who was fastidiously groomed when I met her, told me, "The baskets were in the rear of the vault. We were discreet about each other's privacy." She added, "It was curious, but after the vault was closed I missed having pajamas--I hadn't before." Imprisoned again, Clark took to humming the hit melody "Killing Me Softly with His Song," the tune of which embedded itself in Elisabeth's memory. "I turn off the radio whenever that song comes on," she told me at her home, a hillside cottage of two rooms. She said she and Kristin had often clung together, Kristin dry-eyed, Elisabeth weeping quietly for no apparent reason. Occasionally, Elisabeth bothered to claim that she was crying because she had lost out on her invitation to her crayfish gala. Kristin said, "I envied Elisabeth. I think it would have helped to feel tears."

As might be expected, their common plight joined the hostages in a bond, but it was a weak one. Birgitta, in fact, admitted to a certain aloofness from her fellow-captives, and particularly from the two women. She said, "I was several years older than they and I had children. They hadn't yet had to face life the way I had." The four, forced as they were to fall back on their own resources, came to know themselves better, it appeared, rather than each other. "Each of us was very much alone," Sven said. Physically, of course, that was hardly the case, for when Olsson wasn't denying the hostages a sense of solitude, the police were. No sooner had the sneakered officer carried out his assignment than his colleagues, as part of their exhaustion tactic, bugged the strong room, placing microphones

on the outside walls against the ventilation holes. The equipment's staticky crackle was often the only sound that could be heard in the vault. Sensitive though the microphones may have been, they could be misleading, as was illustrated by a nightmare that Kristin had on Sunday afternoon--at least, she said, that is when she places it. Whenever it was, Kristin, asleep on her pillow of kronor, awoke screaming, "Don't! Don't!" Equable and benign, Clark was instantly at her side, soothing her until she was herself again.

A month later, when investigators were conducting their inquiry, Kristin was taken aback when police asked whether her screams were connected in any way with a sexual assault by the convicts. She was asked this not only because the microphones had picked up her screams but because, in talking freely of her captivity she had recalled in passing that now and then she had held hands with Clark--an admission that caused the police investigators to inquire, "Did you say you held hands with Clark?" "Yes," Kristin replied. "Perhaps it sounds a little like a cliché, but Clark gave me tenderness. Yes, we held hands, but there was no sex. It made me feel enormously secure. It was what I needed." Reminding readers that the criminals and their hostages were an attractive lot, as well as young and desperate, certain elements of the press harped repeatedly on the possibility that the strong room might be the scene of one long bacchanal. But in the aftermath of the drama the police were looking for something more specific. Their interest was in pinning whatever charges they could on the two convicts, and rape was among the possibilities, because in combing the vault after it was liberated laboratory technicians had found traces of semen on the carpet. Until this evidence was accounted for, it was held, the pretrial investigation would have to be considered incomplete. In the course of the questioning, which went on for a week, the laboratory technicians' discovery was eventually explained when one of the women hostages stated that Olsson had come to her while she was lying under a table and asked if he could have "a few minutes of her time."

According to the transcript, "It was evening--I'm almost sure it was Friday evening," the hostage said when asked to describe in detail what happened next. The first evening, she continued, someone else had shared that particular patch of floor with her, but the second evening she had been there alone. Looking for a place to stretch out, Olsson, coming by in the dark, had chosen a spot near her. Soon afterward, he had asked if he could lie beside her. The hostage had consented. She further testified, "He asked if he could caress me, and I said, 'yes, you may,' and he did. He said he had not lain with a woman for twenty-one months." She told police interrogators that her apparent acquiescence had been born of calculation. Explaining, she testified, "I thought that if I could get on an intimate footing with him, I might be able to persuade him to give up his whole enterprise, or maybe if some of the anxieties he surely had pent up within himself were relieved he would not want to go on with this whole thing. We had our clothes on, but he was allowed to touch my breasts and hips. He became rather excited and wanted to know if he could continue. He wanted to have intercourse."

The woman had refused, taking care, she testified, to do so in a light tone, "because I was afraid he would take over and be in charge." The robber had acceded to her wishes, largely, it appeared, because of his perpetual striving for respectability in the eyes of other convicts. "We consider men who rape women to be among the worst criminals in prison," he told the hostage. Nevertheless, Olsson had again become excited. But it had been to no avail, for now, as the hostage informed her questioners, "It was I who took the initiative." Sensing that she was in charge, she had told Olsson that she didn't see any point in his getting himself all worked up and gaining no satisfaction from "the few minutes" he would have with her. Olsson had got the message. He had slowly turned away from the hostage and proceeded to have the minutes with himself.

Like the crackling microphones, the telephone in the vault dispelled any illusion of solitude. Minutes after the police coup Saturday morning, Detective Inspector Bengt-Olof Lovenlo phoned from the floor above and asked Olsson whether he was ready to throw in the towel. "Go to hell," the convict answered. Lovenlo, known as B.Q., was more or less the official police telephoner, his principal qualification being a reputed expertise in gangster lingo; in practice, however, his jailbird jargon was so dazzling that he frequently had the robber and Clark quite confused. The two could speak directly with no one but the police on the phone, for once the door handle was turned the police intercepted all incoming and outgoing calls, in effect setting up a hot line between their floor and the vault. Phone calls, either way, were always events, their consequence usually a hardening of old positions. One such call led directly to another instance in which the hostages allied themselves with Olsson against the police. This, too, occurred Saturday morning, when Clark, with Olsson's concurrence, asked if the police would unlock the door long enough for one of the hostages to procure supplies that were badly needed; the members of the group, Clark informed Lovenlo, had taken a vote on the choice of supplies, the list of which included a plentiful supply of food, a hot plate, a chemical toilet, three rolls of toilet tissue, a plastic barrel with a lid, cigarettes, whiskey, toothpaste, toothbrushes, six pairs of wool socks, and six athletic warmup suits. Lovenlo sounded as though the proposal would be acceptable; naturally, he told Clark, he would have to consult with the Commissioner, but that, he estimated, shouldn't take more than fifteen minutes. Lindroth, however, rejected the proposal, on the ground that it "would have allowed Olsson to use his submachine gun through the open door." Moreover, the Commissioner took two hours to reach his decision, and by the time Lovenlo relayed it the group, convicts and captives alike, was thoroughly riled. They were even more so when, in the course of the same call, the Inspector gave a negative reply to a second request that had been hanging fire; namely, permission for each hostage to receive a single phone call from home.

Clark, scribbling on a blank bank form he came upon in the strong room, described the reaction to these rebuffs. His description, which the police found on gaining access to the vault, reads, "The girls want desperately to get in touch with relatives. B. O. had promised that everyone could expect a call from one relative. Naturally, he lied, as usual. The girls have begun to believe that

the police intend to sacrifice them and are only looking for an excuse to justify the massacre later on. The girls believe that the police will make sure that it was we who started it and that the police simply defended themselves, so that they can afterward regret that everyone was killed. The girls think this because under no conditions can they get in touch with their relatives to tell them... how the police are playing with their lives. Everyone in here is calm, and we have it, in fact, rather cozy as long as the police leave us alone."

When I interviewed Birgitta at the Kreditbank, I asked her if she agreed with Clark's words. She nodded. The cutting off of outside calls, she said, had hit her hard. "I lived for news of my daughters," she told me. "I didn't know what would become of them if I died. I asked myself if my husband would be able to take care of them. I hoped he would remember about the insurance." She thought more about Clark's words and nodded again. Perhaps, she conjectured, the police rebuffs had been part of Commissioner Lindroth's tactical campaign; if they were, she had not recognized them as such. "I was not exactly detached at the time," she remarked. "We were facing two threats, and one was all we could possibly handle. About the robber's threat we could do nothing--he was armed and we were with him. But we weren't with the police. We imagined we could protect ourselves against them. To imagine that, of course, meant believing in Jan."

Once cornered, Olsson gave increasing thought to his fears of gas, reminding his hostages now and then of his resolve to dispatch everyone if "brain damaging" fumes seeped into the vault. One of his first acts, on Saturday, was to stuff the vent holes with leftover newspaper, which he believed would hinder the introduction of gas. Olsson hoped that the newspaper might also partly block the microphones, but he guessed--correctly, as it turned out--that the police would still be able to figure out most of what was going on. Naturally, the robber's mind was primarily taken up, as it had been from the outset, with how to cash in his hostages to best advantage; it was never far from his thinking, Olsson told me, that the death of one or more of them could aid his cause. While mulling over these homicidal thoughts, he catered to the needs of his possible victims. He wiped away Elisabeth's tears, assuring her she would receive an invitation to another crayfish party. He was attentive to Kristin, giving her a bullet from his submachine gun as a keepsake. Sven was no trouble, behaving throughout with stalwart dignity. As for Birgitta, the robber told me, he apologized to her for having made her nervous enough to resume smoking cigarettes, which she had given up some weeks earlier. Olsson recalled her fall from grace for me. It had happened in the vault the day before the police locked it. Wanting a smoke himself, he had reached into a trousers pocket for a pack of cigarettes, then offered it around. Birgitta had hesitated. "No smoking is permitted in the vault," she had said. Grandly, the robber had given her dispensation. Thrusting the pack at Birgitta, he had told her, "The vault is mine. You may smoke."

Each show of friendliness on Olsson's part reinforced his leadership. As Sven put it, "When he treated us well, we could think of him as an emergency God." One of Olsson's gestures, in particular, appeared in a magnified light. Late Saturday afternoon, when it was a mystery whether the group would ever eat again. Olsson took from his pocket three pears that, unknown to the others, he had saved from a previous meal; seating himself at one of the strong room's tables, he carefully cut the fruit as exactly into halves as he could, then handed one piece to each member of the group. Elisabeth said, "I think the fruit would have tasted delicious even if we hadn't been hungry." The faintest outlines of a community became discernible. Sven invented what chores he could, his most notable achievement being the discovery of a large plastic carton into which he was able to dump the contents of the wastebaskets. Clark's manner had become detached since Saturday morning, but periodically he did hold whispered conferences with Olsson, away from the bugged vents. Like Sven, the women sought chores, unnecessarily moving furniture this way and that, or hopelessly trying to tidy themselves. Instinctively, the hostages aimed at pleasing the criminals. Referring to this, Kristin said to me later, "If someone likes you, he won't kill you." Elisabeth felt the same way. "I couldn't have stayed normal if I had opposed the robber," she told me. The closest anyone came to doing that was when Birgitta, on the very last day of the bank drama, stole Thorander's cigarette lighter from Olsson; it lay exposed while he and Clark were both napping--an unusual occurrence. "I thought they might use the lighter for detonating explosives," she told me. "I dropped it in my handbag. Jan was angry when he found that it was missing. I was afraid he was going to search us all, but luckily Clark had another lighter, and the robber cooled off."

Looking back, Kristin thinks that perhaps the bank drama attained its most harmonious moment on the one other occasion when the robber and Clark were both asleep. That was on Saturday evening, when Olsson, after warning everyone that he was a light sleeper, stared briefly at the inextinguishable fluorescent tubes above, then closed his eyes. The others followed suit--all except Kristin, who stayed awake a little longer than the rest. "We were like tired moths," she said. "The robber was in his chair, snoring, but not loudly. Elisabeth was near him. Who knew what he might do with her? Clark lay asleep not far from me. It was hard to believe he was a criminal, he looked so peaceful. Sven was restless, somewhere in the back of the vault, as was Birgitta. When thinking about home didn't get her down, she managed well. In the still room, all I could hear was the others breathing. For a minute or two, they were in rhythm. Quickly, I changed my breathing to be in time with everyone else's. That was our world. We were in the vault in order to breathe together, to survive. Whoever threatened that world was our enemy."

From Saturday morning on, Olsson awaited the next move by the police. It would determine his own, he knew, since his opponents held all the cards. Apart from realizing this, Olsson was without ideas. Certainly Clark, his manner increasingly distant, contributed none. In the long hours it took the police to prepare their gas attack, the occupants of the vault continued to while away the time as best they could. Sleep stole much of it. "When we slept, it was deeply,

there were so many shocks to recover from," Birgitta told me. Olsson's transistor radio also helped. Listening to news of themselves, Sven said, kept up morale. "It meant we weren't forgotten," he said. When it was music that came over the radio, Olsson sometimes danced a few steps by himself. He didn't look nearly as weird as he had on arriving at the bank, Birgitta recalled. His disguise had been gone since Friday, his mustache rinsed of its black dye, his bushy wig replaced by his own thinning hair. He moved gracefully as he danced, Birgitta told me, his teeth exposed in a broad smile. "He considered them beautiful," she said. "He could be vain and childish." As the others looked on, Birgitta, who had once taken a psychology course, gave him a personality reading, drawing a chart on which she listed his good and bad points; she rated him well in intelligence, capability, and vitality, but flunked him in stability. He took consolation in an interminable series of ticktacktoe games with Elisabeth, then regaled the group with the plot of a movie that he said had given him the idea of invading the Kreditbank. The plot had to do with a convict who, bored with prison life, escapes and holds up a bank, then makes it to Mexico, where he lives happily ever after. His own life in prison had been boring, Olsson told the hostages, who, listening closely, were clustered at the time around him and Clark. In prison, Olsson went on, he had become a Jack-of-all-trades, learning to knit, sew, and hook rugs. He had made military caps by the hundred, and when a guard saw fit to find fault with his handiwork Olsson had slugged him, and had been put in isolation as a result. Joining in the talk, Clark said he knew the isolation scene well--nothing but a padded floor and a door with a peephole. When he told the captives that he and Olsson had once been in the same penitentiary, the two convicts exchanged a rare smile. In their cellblock, Olsson interjected, Clark had always been the last to get out of bed; he himself had been the first, ready to get on with the day's labor. Birgitta asked why the pair hadn't tried to hold down regular jobs when they were free, the same as other people. "We don't care to punch clocks; we don't like to take orders," Clark replied. However, he said, he didn't want the others to think he saw no basis for prisons--public menaces couldn't be left to roam at will. But what was the use of prisons, he asked, if convicts had nowhere to go when they were released? "They give you fifty kronor when you leave, but what we really need is another chance to make ourselves a future," Clark said. In retrospect, Sven told me, he wonders why he and the other hostages didn't ask if they personally embodied the convicts' conception of another chance. Sven said, "We were all sympathy, taking in everything they told us. We acted as though they were our victims, not the other way around."

At ten-forty-five Sunday night, without warning, Londroth's drilling operations got under way, filling the vault with a piercing whine. Olsson immediately raised the volume of his radio, hoping for news that would explain the development, but none was forthcoming. He was aware that the noise overhead didn't necessarily augur an eventual use of gas, but he strongly suspected that that was its purpose. He decided that some counter measure was in order. Despite Clark's opposition, he planted an explosive charge in one of the vents. In putting distance between himself and the charge, the robber came upon Kristin and Elisabeth huddled together on the floor, hands clapped to their ears, a blanket over their heads. Patiently, he

advised them to do as he was doing--move farther away, beyond the small alcove. He told them, too, to forget about holding their ears but to keep their mouths open. Elisabeth said to me, "I remember thinking, Why can't the police be considerate like that?" A few seconds later, a jolting report was heard, its message unmistakable for Lindroth. "Olsson was demonstrating his will to resist," the Commissioner notes in his account. Surprised, the drillers stopped their work. The sudden silence appeared to excite Olsson; strutting and victorious in manner, he shouted imprecations through the damaged vent. His ranting bothered Sven, who told me, "I felt unsafe, seeing Jan act that way. I wanted to think of him as our protector. I asked him to calm down, which I didn't like doing." Olsson's behaviour also dismayed Clark. "There's no reasoning with Jan," he told the hostages, after which he seemed to lapse into a kind of torpor, his fingers aimlessly stroking his beard. The previous Friday, Sven told me, Clark had been an entirely different man, smiling and highly pleased with himself for having exploded the teller's drawer that had yielded in the neighborhood of ninety thousand kronor. Money, though, didn't mean much to Clark as the bank drama drew to a close, for on Monday, discouraged and withdrawn, he unaccountably set fire to money he had earlier taken from the drawer.

Before long, the drilling crews carried on, and Olsson, piqued, ordered the hostages to lie directly under the pounding equipment. He wanted them to judge for themselves, he said, the ruthless nature of their would-be rescuers; if the drilling continued, he told them, the ceiling might well collapse on them all. Sleep was now more than ever a fitful luxury, its onset, as Birgitta had said, largely the product of fright and tension. Birgitta herself, she told me, was able to fall asleep at one point, her slumber favored with a partly comforting dream. Recalling it she said, "I was behind a staircase at an opera house, and there was a night blue over everything. I had on a seventeenth-century costume, and so did everyone around me. Wherever I looked, there were friends and family and schoolmates I hadn't seen since childhood. I came out into the open air, and ahead of me was a golden coach with horses. I thought I saw my two daughters sitting in it, waiting for me. Then I awoke to the drilling."

Two hours elapsed before the drill penetrated the concrete ceiling, and when it did Olsson lost no time destroying its bit with a short-fuse charge; no one was injured. Replacing the bit, the police and the drilling crews persevered in their operations, at considerable risk. Soon, however, another crisis arose: the drill cut a hole large enough to sever the vault's electric wiring, leaving Olsson's redoubt in darkness. Whether or not this was done by design, the strong room wasn't long without light, for Olsson, enraged, yelled, "Put on light or I shoot!" Lovenlo phoned at once, and Clark answered. "What's the matter with you guys?" Clark asked "Give us light! Jan is out of his mind!" A short while later, police lowered a battery lantern, its rays casting a bleak, uneven glow over the disordered strong room. Lindroth's men returned to their labors. Now water, used as a coolant for the drill, began to come down in a thin but steady trickle, soaking the carpeted floor, wetting pillows and blankets. As the drilling went on, creating larger openings in the ceiling, the water spilled rather

than trickled. When the first of the holes was completed, police immediately covered it with a bulletproof glass shield, and then Lindroth, through Lovenlo, presented the robber with an ultimatum: Pass us your gun and explosives through the hole or we get tougher. Olsson shouted an obscenity, and again the vault shook with the familiar racket from above. But it didn't go on for long, because Olsson made up his mind that he, too, had better get tougher. The ultimatum was partly to blame, a police official conceded to me, but so was a news item, broadcast hours earlier, that the drilling operations were indeed aimed at turning the strong room into a gas chamber. Olsson, provoked to action, let the police know it when suddenly they heard shrill cries from below, loud enough to be heard above the drilling. Sven grabbed for the phone. His voice urgent, he shouted, "Don't send in gas, whatever you do." Police lowered, and quickly raised, a camera to ascertain for themselves what was going on. The hostages were in nooses. Olsson, assisted by Clark, had placed ropes around their necks. The four were standing before safe-deposit cabinets, the ropes knotted to handles of cabinet drawers; if gas fumes entered, Olsson was saying, the hostages would be strangled as they fell unconscious.

The time was then three in the morning, and it was at this juncture that Lindroth, himself exhausted by his exhaustion tactic, let his subordinates talk him into going home. Before the Commissioner left the bank, he directed that a bucket of provisions, including sandwiches and bottles of beer, be lowered to the strong room's inhabitants. Except for Olsson's pears, they hadn't eaten for more than fifty hours. Permitting the hostages to loosen their nooses, the criminals had them test the provisions first. None of the four would touch the beer, both because it looked strangely flat and because the bottle caps were askew. The hostages' suspicions were justified; police admitted to me that the beer contained a strong soporific. The captives did partake of the sandwiches. The two convicts waited half an hour to see if there were any ill effects. When none manifested themselves the robber and Clark took their share; with a finger, Olsson scraped the butter off his sandwiches, to use it to lubricate his submachine gun.

"At two on Monday afternoon, we met again," Commissioner Lindroth records in his account, referring to the moment when he and his lieutenants began their final deliberations on the bank drama. By then, in the strong room below, the three men and three women had endured another half day in their enforced habitat. For hours after Lindroth halted the drilling, Olsson had kept the hostages standing in their nooses. In the silence, the principal sound had been the occasional crackle of the microphones and of Olsson's radio; nothing was coming over the set, but Olsson left it on, in case something might. Birgitta had surreptitiously loosened her noose, but the robber, noticing, had sternly retightened it. She and Sven were directly behind the inner door, gazing at the barricade of overturned cabinets. The makeshift gallows, she told me, had no effect on her thinking; her mind was preoccupied with her family. Sven continued to acquit himself well. When Olsson asked him, toward five or six in the morning, if he was getting tired, Sven shook his head and inquired whether he could do the standing for everyone. Olsson told me, "He was a real man. He was ready to be a hostage for the

hostages." Elisabeth had her mind on her parents. In her helpless state, she told me, an immense affection for them took hold of her. She said, "They had done so much for me, I thought, it would be unfair for them to lose me this way. But it wasn't all welcome, the feeling I had. The past year, I had believed I was growing up, away from them." Kristin fought off sleep, partly to guard against her neck's being snapped, partly out of an animal-like alertness for signs of change--any change--in the quiet chamber. As the hours drifted by, with the robber's loop scratching at her neck, Kristin persuaded herself that the longer the bank drama lasted, the likelier it was that Olsson or the police would commit some irreversible error. "I was numb with fright," she said. "I wished I could just close my eyes, then wake up dead or alive." The radio continued silent, and Olsson, finally relenting, permitted the hostages to lift the nooses over their heads; at his command, though, they tucked the ropes into their clothing, keeping them ready for use again, pending developments.

Upstairs, Lindroth and his lieutenants, rested and shaved, attacked anew an agenda of old questions, most of them of a purely practical sort. In their thoroughness, the police considered the possibility that Olsson might have forced open safe-deposit boxes in a search for additional weapons. They wondered, too, whether his canvas suitcase contained other weapons. They discussed whether Olsson had set explosive charges in the strong room's doorway--a discussion that led directly to consideration of how best to open the strong room's door. Only volunteers, it was agreed, would be considered for storming the vault. The administering of tear gas was reviewed, and again the police vetoed employing gas bombs; these might not even explode, it was pointed out, since the soaked carpet would cushion their impact. Aerosol flasks, it was decided, were definitely the answer, each fitted with a thin metal tube, from which the gas would be expelled once the holes were completed. As for entering the vault, policemen could drop through the larger holes, but Lindroth and his colleagues ruled that out as foolhardy, for if Olsson was able to shoot, the men would make easy targets. With the help of an acetylene torch, the police would have to gain entry through the inner barrier. But pondering these manifold details, important though they might be, contributed nothing to answering the pre-eminent question that hung over the strategy session: Was Olsson actually capable of killing the hostages--was he prepared to commit murder at the probable cost of his own life? The police, of course, could only guess at the answer to that, but they did reach a decision concerning their own course of action. Summing up the deliberations, Lindroth wrote, "We decided to show Olsson our resolution. We no longer intended to give way to threats." The Commissioner cut off all contact with the strong room. He ordered that no more food or drink be lowered. The drilling proceeded.

Below, the drills, now penetrating the weakened ceiling with relative ease, brought down more water than ever; it continued to reach new levels, eventually attaining a depth of four or five inches in some places. Kristin took off a pair of wool socks that the robber had let her have from his bag; in the wetness, her feet were warmer without them. Others sat in chairs, making footrests of deposit-box handles or else perched themselves on writing tables. Beyond an occasional gibe at the police, there was little talk--no one

doubted that the end of the bank drama was imminent. Olsson, stretched out on a table, was showing signs of weariness. He was still armed, however, and not only retained his leadership but had the strength to remind the hostages that if and when he gave the order they were to don their nooses. When the drillers made a second large hole, Olsson recklessly climbed a cabinet and blocked it--"very effectively," Lindroth conceded--with the last of his leftover newspaper. As a third hole was being completed, the robber fired at a policeman who was trying to cover it with a glass chield; the bullet buried itself harmlessly in a protective sandbag. Olsson and the others made use of the water as it rose, sponging themselves with drenched remnants of paper sheets, or scopping it up with their hands to slake their thirst. At eight-thirty-five Tuesday morning, Olsson used his gun again, wounding an officer above in the left hand and left cheek; like his luckier colleague of a short while earlier, the man was covering a hole at the time. Several hours later, as their operations continued, police raised the battery lantern, leaving those in the vault to concentrate blindly on the sounds of drilling and of splashing water; this time, Olsson didn't protest the loss of light. "God, I was tired by then," he told me. Toward nine in the evening, the seven holes were completed, and the drilling came to a halt; moments afterward, police turned off the strong room's ventilation fan, and the elimination of its low whir added to the new quiet. "We all knew what was about to happen," Kristin said. In the darkness, awaiting the gas, Clark called out bitterly, "The bastards are going to get us again!" Kristin said to me, but I imagined that I understood a little how they were feeling."

On the floor above, a special unit was poised to administer the gas--a tricky job, one of its experts told me. The aerosol flasks--there were fifteen--had to be emptied simultaneously in one minute; great care had to be taken that their powdery contents, which would become atomized on leaving the tube, were not wasted on the walls of the holes--and, of course, great care had to be taken that Olsson didn't shoot the sprayers. Outside the vault, three volunteers, led by Detective Inspector Hakan Larsson, were primed to fight Olsson and possibly Clark. They were armed with sawed-off shotguns and had on gas masks but not bulletproof jackets, which, it was thought, might prove cumbersome for fast action. To spare the volunteers waste motion, other officers were assigned the specific task of unlocking the vault door; still others were to handle the manacling of the convicts. A half-dozen ambulances were parked in Norrmalmstorg. Medical teams were inside the bank, their ranks including anesthesiologists, who were to revive the vault's unconscious inmates.

Ignorant of these preparations, those in the strong room waited with spent forbearance. Minutes past nine, the gas came, noiselessly, insidiously. Police switched on the ventilation fan to disseminate it. Wearing gas masks, those above the vault lowered lamps through two holes to watch the scene below. Too late, Olsson played his trump. He ordered the hostages to put on the nooses. But there was no chance either to obey or disobey his last command, even though a foulup had occurred in the administering of the gas, the elaborate planning notwithstanding, so that the fumes weren't strong enough to cause unconsciousness. "Everything was out of

control," Sven told me. "All of us were on the wet floor, choking, vomiting, our eyes hurting, wanting air. The robber yelled, "We give up, let us out!" The others in the vault took up his cry. "Let's have your weapon," Lovenlo called down to Olsson. Eagerly, the robber cooperated, he and the police hoisting his submachine gun with the aid of a hook and a plastic cord. Unwilling to risk further delays, Olsson reminded the police of another weapon he had--his explosives. After a moment, he was told to open his door, upon which he would be able to surrender them to a policeman. Frantically, Olsson fell to dismantling his barricade. Clark and the others helped, but it was the robber who worked prodigiously at the task--racing to get out before, as he believed, the fumes left everyone demented. When the barricade no longer stood, he swung back the inner door, expecting to find a clear exit. The outer door, though, was open but a crack. Inspector Larsson was standing in it, armed, and looking grotesque in his gas mask; behind him, similarly armed, were his two comrades, and behind them, out on the street floor, were countless other police, their bustle and clatter the dominant sound. But even now, Olsson discovered, his eager cooperation was getting him nowhere, for Larsson appeared to be in no hurry. He wanted to know how he could be sure that Olsson wouldn't blow him up when he handed over the explosives. As is duly recorded in the official police investigation, Larsson said, "Get it through your head: I'll lose my cool if you try to blow off my arms." Olsson responded, "You just be calm. I'll do what I said." "Trust him!" Kristin called out; the other hostages, their eyes smarting, urged the same. Warily, Larsson told Olsson to hand him his safety fuses first, then the plastic explosives. Olsson complied as fast as he could. Disarmed at last, he listened to the police shout from above and through the crack, "Hostages first! Hostages first!" But there was not movement in the vault. The hostages kept their ground, rejecting rescue. Defiantly, Kristin shouted back, "No, Jan and Clark go first--you'll gun them down if we do!" Startled, the would-be liberators hesitated, then finally opened wide the outer door and made way for Olsson and Clark. As they stood framed in the doorway, the convicts and hostages quickly, abruptly embraced each other, the women kissing their captors, Sven shaking hands with them. Their farewells over, all six walked out of the vault, Olsson and Clark in the lead.

Out on the bank's main floor, the two convicts disappeared at once in a sea of uniforms and gas masks and weapons. Litter-bearers were on hand for the hostages, whom they gently urged to get on stretchers. Sven told me, "I didn't need one, but I didn't have the strength to say no." Outdoors, Birgitta, limp with relief, looked up at the August sky from her stretcher, taking deep draughts of the warm evening air; as she was lifted into an ambulance, she told me, she was conscious of crowds of strangers looking at her--all of them, she sensed, wishing her well. In her ambulance, Elisabeth told me, she wondered what had become of the criminals. "I was thinking that whatever was being done for us should be done for them," she said. Kristin wouldn't lie down. She sat up on her stretcher, looking for signs of Olsson or Clark. Just as she was leaving the Kreditbank building, she saw Clark; he was handcuffed, she said, and police were working him over, yanking his beard, clubbing him about the legs. Loudly, for all to hear, she called from her stretcher, "Clark, I'll see you again!" In Norrmalmstorg, surrounded by reporters and photographers, Thorander spoke a single sentence: "It's all over and no one's hurt."

The four hostages were taken to the psychiatric clinic of St. Goran's Hospital, where, as has been mentioned, they spent ten days in the care of Dr. Ljungberg and Dr. Bergman. In effect, the doctors administered first-aid, psychiatry, their primary objective, it appeared, being to persuade the patients that death did not necessarily lurk in the next instant--that an utter lack of tension was also a part of reality. To bring this about, the doctors tried various tactics, one of them being to ply the hostages with creature comforts. Each of the four was given a private room, in which the immediate horizon was masses of bouquets--the offerings, preponderantly, of sympathetic citizens. Favorite dishes were the order of the day, and there were baths for the asking. Birgitta recalls her first one with relish. "Ah, to soap away that sticky gas, to have on pajamas again!" she told me. The oddest whim of the patients was indulged, as when Kristin expressed a desire to sandpaper wooden saltshakers; Birgitta and Elisabeth busied themselves knitting and sewing. Elisabeth smoked her first cigarillo; luxuriating between clean sheets, her manner queenly, she made it known that she wished to dispose of the clothes she had had on in the strong room--all except a suede jacket, which she couldn't part with. Police retrieved belongings, old and new, from the vault. Kristin got back a pair of eyeglasses she had left behind, and Birgitta acquired the transistor radio, to do with as she would; Olsson had told the police that she could have it.

The clinic was off limits to the press. Only close friends and relatives could visit the hostages, who, of course, were free to visit each other. They didn't do this with any frequency, though--which surprised neither of the doctors in attendance. Dr. Ljungberg told me, "In the vault, they shared the pressures of a common emergency, but at the clinic they were on their own. They might or might not become friends, just as people do in ordinary life." Two of the hostages have in fact become friends--Kristin and Elisabeth. This past summer, they spent their second vacation together, the first having occurred when they left St. Goran's and went off to Cyprus. In the hospital, Kristin and Elisabeth reacted similarly on seeing their parents, each of the young women being conscious of an unfamiliar solicitude for them--the same concern that Elisabeth had known while in her noose. Kristin finally felt a flow of tears when her mother and father arrived. "They had given me life, and I had learned how much I wanted it," she said.

In an effort to free the patients of memories that might make for chronic difficulties, the doctors encouraged them to talk and talk about the bank drama. But when the hostages did, it turned out that they persisted in thinking of the police as "the enemy," preferring to believe that it was the criminals to whom they owed their lives. Repeatedly, Kristin told me, she found she was identifying herself with the criminals, on one occasion remarking to Dr. Bergman, "That was the morning we shot at the police." While at St. Goran's Elisabeth accused the doctors of seeking to "brainwash" away her regard for Olsson and Clark. The following day, however, she ingenuously inquired of Dr. Bergman, "Is there something wrong with me? Why don't I hate them?" Sven tried hard to do just that, but without success; it was beyond him, it seemed, to combine his rational condemnation of the convicts' deed with a sense of anger. Instead of venting his outrage, Sven told me, he found himself

contemplating the condition of prisoners in general. This was new for him, he said, his interest in social issues having been nil; apparently, he added, his captors' comments on prison life had set him thinking. It impressed him that Olsson could spend considerable time in prison and yet be drawn to crime again. As though testing his wings, Sven ventured to suggest, when we talked, that the government would do well to overhaul its rehabilitation policies for convicts. "Maybe, someday I'll visit the robber and Clark," he said. In the hospital, Birgitta seemed to her fellow-hostages to be remarkably composed. When I informed her of this, she was mildly surprised. Once she was out of the vault, she told me, her world was back in place, her family intact, her small daughters as safe as she was. With a slight shrug, she asked what else there was to do but carry on with one's existence. Her seeming insouciance, though, was open to question when, in July, 1974--nearly a year after the bank drama--she and her husband and children were driving south one weekend to see her in-laws. En route, they had to pass through the town of Norrkoping--the last she had heard of Clark, that was the location of his penitentiary. Birgitta asked her husband if he would be willing to stop there; he agreed. Clark was indeed still at the penitentiary in Norrkoping; Birgitta had made no arrangements to see him, but prison officials proved flexible. She and Clark conversed for a half hour, after which Birgitta rejoined her husband and the two girls, who had been sitting outside the prison in the family car. When we talked about it, Birgitta said that she wasn't sure why she had made the visit--only that she was aware of having heeded a powerful impulse. Nor was she sure why she was disinclined to go into what she and Clark had discussed. "It wasn't much, really, just memories," she told me, and then, when I had about concluded that she would say no more, she added, "Clark didn't say he was sorry for anything he'd done--he needn't have."

With the exception of Birgitta, the hostages continue to visit the clinic periodically. Sven is continuing to find himself. He is back at the bank, which has taken up quarters in a new building. Birgitta has also returned, industriously attending to duties in the foreign-exchange department. Kristin took a summer job there before going back to school, in September, 1974, for her second year of courses in social work. Elisabeth is studying at the Sophiahemmet Nursing School, in Stockholm. The four testified as witnesses last February, when Olsson and Clark were brought to trial for the bank drama, Olsson charged with violent robbery, kidnapping, and attempted murder and Clark with violent robbery. Olsson was given ten years, to be served concurrently with the balance of the three-year sentence he was already serving. Clark pleaded his own case, arguing that the police had forced him to abandon the safety of his cell and act as Olsson's accomplice. "The police have cooked up a thin soup," he charged. He did well as his own advocate, for while the judge at his first trial gave him a six-and-a-half-year term, an appeals court overturned the decision, ruling that, as Clark maintained, his entire participation in the bank drama had been under duress, first on the part of the police and then on Olsson's part. Ever conscious of his standing in prison society, the robber had been a willing witness in support of Clark's various contentions. Many Swedes, I found, believe that Clark played a double game, that is, if he could have escaped with Olsson he would have done so, but, failing that, he could always fall back on the

defense he used at his trial. In any event, Clark is now in prison for past crimes and will be there until May, 1979. Olsson will be imprisoned until October, 1983, at the maximum-security jail in Kumla.

The hostages, particularly Elisabeth, found it disquieting to rehash their experience in open court. Elisabeth told me that not until she testified at the trial had she faced squarely the depth of terror she underwent in the strong room. She had constructed a memory of her six days there, she said, but giving testimony under oath had upset it. In its stead, she had developed, after the trial, a fear that one of the convicts might escape and take her hostage again. Nightmares had beset her for weeks; she had been haunted by the serial number of Olsson's submachine gun, at which she had stared a thousand times while she was in the vault. At the time we met--months after the trial--Elisabeth was dispirited because she felt nothing toward her captors. That couldn't last, she said; they had put her through an ordeal that she must not forget. "Sooner or later everything will come back to me," she said.

Like the hostages, the police were deluged with congratulatory bouquets. As though taking curtain calls, Lindroth, Thorander, Larsson, Lovenlo, and the other heroes of the bank drama were photographed holding the flowers, the men's features fixed in expressions of stern modesty. In stately fashion, five hundred of Stockholm's leading citizens attended a banquet at police headquarters to celebrate the end of the irregular incident that had befallen in their city. The occasion was replete with happy announcements. Commissioner Lindroth, a principal speaker, awarded fifty-two engraved plaques to policemen, bank executives, doctors, electricians, and drilling crews. Augmenting the air of contentment, a high official of the Kreditbank made it known to the banqueters that his organization was donating seventy-five thousand kronor to the Stockholm Police District. Homage was paid the hostages. To the applause of the assemblage, the official revealed that each of the four would be given a bonus of ten thousand kronor (twenty-four hundred dollars) and a week's holiday, all expenses paid. Gold watches and two-week vacations went to bank employees who had been subjected to Olsson's obstreperous arrival at their place of business.

From Holland, West Germany, and other countries, deputations of law-enforcement officers came to Stockholm to learn the secret of the local police success. Behind his cluttered desk at police headquarters, Thorander told me that he had given freely of his time, taking the visitors to Norrmalmstorg, answering all questions, making documents available, telling of mistakes--the clumsily capped beer bottles, the inept briefing of the press, the failure to keep detailed records while the bank drama was in progress. Thorander doubted, though, whether he satisfied his foreign colleagues. Smiling wearily, he said, "The most important point I made to them was that there are no general rules for saving hostages."

When I arrived at Olsson's penitentiary, in Kumla, two hours by train from Stockholm, an administrative official frisked me, then conscientiously reminded me of two conditions to which I had agreed before leaving the capital. Olsson had laid them down in answering my request for an interview; through prison authorities, he had sent word that he would see me if I took no photographs of him and, secondly, if no one else was present at our talk. These amenities dispensed with, the administrative official turned me over to a hulking young guard, who led me down a long concrete tunnel until we came to an electrically controlled door that slid open when the guard identified himself to someone invisible. Emerging from the administrative building, we stood in an empty prison yard--a nondescript area of brown soil and rocks, overshadowed by a towering seemingly unscalable wall. It was an hour when the prisoners were at work indoors. As we crossed the yard, the guard, halting, spoke his only words. Looking up at a blue, cloudless sky, he said, "It's a beautiful day, but not in a place like this." Entering the building where the convicts live, we negotiated another remotely controlled door, then mounted a flight of stairs to a besöksrum--visitors' room. Abruptly disappearing, the guard locked me in. Later on, when we parted, Olsson would also be locked in the room by himself; in the few minutes I had had with the administrative official, he had told me that after being visited all prisoners had to strip and be gone over with a metal detector to insure that they had been given no weapons.

I awaited Olsson in a room of modest size that was tastefully appointed. An oak table of graceful design stood between two comfortable oak chairs. Taking up one corner was the room's largest piece of furniture, a leather couch; blankets and linen sheets were neatly folded at its foot. At Kumla, and in certain other Swedish penitentiaries, prisoners may have sexual intercourse with visitors, including prostitutes. Daylight came through a window that was crisscrossed with iron bars and alarm wires; a wall telephone was next to the door. In a few minutes, I heard a fumbling at the door, and there was Olsson, under escort. Vacantly, the guard looked from him to me, then withdrew. The robber appeared to be in great shape, buoyant, lithe, powerful; he was apparently keeping up his body-building regimen. He had blue eyes, reddish-brown hair with long sideburns, and a moderately flowing mustache. His garb consisted of dungarees and a T-shirt, and one of his exposed arms showed a tattooed mermaid, a memento of years before when he had wandered the world as a seaman; he had spent time in America, and no doubt that accounted in part for his accent. He smiled engagingly as he entered, flashing the brilliant white teeth that Birgitta had said he was fond of displaying. In his hands, when he arrived, were a ball-point pen and a manuscript, both of which he placed on the oak table. Seated on either side of it, we talked until the guard returned, an hour or so later.

Olsson was direct and responsive throughout. "I've been called Sweden's most dangerous man," he began. Giving me a moment to take in the absurdity of that notion, he added that if in fact any of his countrymen did think of him in that light they needn't lie awake nights. He had years and years to put in at Kumla, and when he was released Sweden wouldn't be his home. "Who would ever have anything to do with me in this country, after all the noise over

Normalmstorg?" he asked. He said he had counted his chances of success at the Kreditbank high--very high. He told me, "I believed I would go there in the morning and be gone with everything I wanted by five. But the police surprised me. They were so tough. It must have had something to do with the election campaign. I figured wrong--it didn't help me. Yes, politics, politics." He picked up the manuscript from the table and held it aloft; he himself was its author, he said. Much had been written about the bank drama, he granted, but it was the pages in his hand that gave the real story, the true one, of what had taken place. To judge by his darting eyes and urgent voice, the manuscript was for sale. But I was no customer. I merely nodded politely, impressed by the man's initiative; even though he was jailed, he had concocted a project to push in the outside world. In the next instant, however, he seemed something else. Waving the manuscript, he said, "This is my own sotry, you understand. To be a thief and a safecracker, that's easy. I've been those. But to take hostages in a bank in the middle of a great capital--there is something." His eyes held still, glorying in the memory of his exploit. He appeared oblivious of all else. Like Sven, I had a desire to denounce his deed. I told him that the hostages still made visits to the psychiatric clinic. "Elisabeth had nightmares for weeks after the trial," I said.

Replacing the manuscript on the table, he said, "I'm sorry to hear that," but his tone was objective, as though, having refrained from murdering the young woman, he had done all he could for her.

"Why didn't you shoot, at the end?" I asked.

He reflected a moment, then said, "I wanted to go on living. Maybe I don't do it so well, but that is my answer."

"Did you actually have it in mind to kill the hostages?"

Olsson nodded slowly. "In the beginning, I could have, easily," he said. "I was keyed up with my plan. Maybe I should have. After I gave up, there were police who told me that if I had killed just one of the hostages I could have had a plane out of Sweden. But I didn't need the police to tell me that. I knew it for myself."

Olsson stared out the barred window briefly and when he resumed talking I learned that the psychiatrists I interviewed had left out something: victims might identify with aggressors, as the doctors claimed, but things weren't all one way. Olsson spoke harshly. "It was the hostages' fault," he said. "They did everything I told them to do. If they hadn't, I might not be here now. Why didn't any of them attack me? They made it hard to kill. They made us go on living together day after day, like goats, in that filth. There was nothing to do but get to know each other." Olsson rose slightly from his chair. "Which one could I have killed?" he asked. "Elisabeth, helpless and crying for her crayfish party? Kristin, full of spirit, who could talk to Palme the way she did? Sven, a decent, brave man? Birgitta, who couldn't get those two kids of hers off her mind?" Olsson didn't regain his seat. The guard was at the door. When he entered, Olsson made as though to accompany me. The guard glared at him, shocked that the prisoner could forget, even momentarily, that he had to stay put and be gone over with a metal detector. As the door closed, Olsson was clutching the manuscript--perhaps his sole tangible asset. On his face was a flashing smile.

1st INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
ON CASES INVOLVING HOSTAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

The 1st International Symposium on Cases Involving Hostages was held at the I.C.P.O. - INTERPOL General Secretariat in Saint-Cloud and opened at 9:30 a.m. on 3rd February 1975. The provisional agenda was adopted and the delegates chose Mr. Jean Népote, Secretary General of the I.C.P.O. - INTERPOL, as Chairman of the Symposium.

ITEM 1: DESCRIPTIONS OF VARIOUS CASES INVOLVING HOSTAGE-TAKING

Several delegates analysed various cases of hostage-taking in their respective countries.

In ARGENTINA, there had been a large number of kidnapping cases, mainly in and around Buenos Aires. The criminals usually operated in groups of from 5 to 7 persons and the victims were usually industrialists or prominent businessmen whose movements had been closely observed beforehand. It had often been discovered that persons employed by the victims had given information to the kidnappers. Ransoms had usually been very high. It was not known if there were criminal gangs specialising in taking hostages. Generally, the police had been primarily concerned with ensuring the victims' safety. The Argentine Delegate described one case in which the police had been able to pin-point the place from which the abductors had telephoned the hostage's family. Further investigation led to identification of three suspects in that neighborhood, all of whom were known to have committed similar offences. Their arrest and questioning had subsequently led to discovery of the house where the victim was being held. A major police operation, including the use of helicopters, had then resulted in release of the hostage and the arrest of 8 criminals.

The AUSTRIAN DELEGATE described two cases where the criminal's motivations had differed as much as their modus operandi. In the first case, three prisoners had seized three hostages, including one woman and an examining magistrate and thus succeeded in obtaining a vehicle in which to escape from the detention

centre. After being kept under surveillance by the authorities for several days, during which time they changed hostages and vehicles on several occasions, they finally sought refuge in an apartment, which was subsequently surrounded by the police. By that time they were thoroughly tired out, and they surrendered shortly after the authorities obtained the assistance of a psychiatrist and the mother of one of the escapees and promised to transfer the criminals to a modern prison.

The second case was ideologically motivated. Two armed men took several hostages in a train crossing into Austria from Czechoslovakia, forced the hostages to accompany them on leaving the train, commandeered a car, and drove toward Vienna. Upon arriving at a small airport, they demanded a plane. Negotiations ensued, with the assistance of a psychiatrist. Eventually, the two abductors agreed to exchange their hostages for two police officers who would - and did - accompany the pair as they boarded a private plane. After thoroughly searching the aircraft, the captors freed the police officers, and the plane flew out of Austrian territory.

Members of the FRENCH DELEGATION then took the floor to speak about two other cases, both quite distinctive.

In the first case, as a plane was about to take off from Orly Airport, it was learned that an unknown number of hijackers were threatening to blow up the aircraft if they did not receive 20 tons of medicines. One particular passenger was pinpointed as most probably one of the hijackers. It was considered essential then to find out how many other hijackers there were. During the ensuing negotiations, two doctors, on the pretext of overseeing delivery of the medicines, were able to board the aircraft and thus learn that the hijacker had no accomplices. Later, police officers disguised as airport cargo handlers were able to board the aircraft to load the medicines. The loading operation lasted for two hours, sufficient time for the hijacker to become accustomed to the activity. A second group began to enter the aircraft through a hatch under the pilot's cabin, and the crew's activities during this operation momentarily distracted the hijacker, enabling the disguised policemen to capture him. The hijacker managed to fire his weapon but, fortunately, the shot hit only the bulletproof jacket that one of the policemen was wearing.

The second case occurred at a prison in France. Two hardened criminals - one of whom was an extremely dangerous murderer - went to the prison infirmary under the pretext of seeking medical care and, once there, they seized a female nurse and a guard and used them as hostages to emphasize the seriousness of their demand for two vehicles, a certain sum of money, and two machine-pistols. It soon became apparent that negotiating in the hope of tiring out the criminals was unlikely to succeed because of the cold determination of one of the captors. The criminals had blocked off the infirmary windows; thus it was impossible for the police to make use of sharpshooters. It was also impossible to use gas. Therefore, it was decided to attack. At four o'clock in the morning, using plastic explosives set in place by specialists, the police blew up the metal-plated infirmary doors. Two assault groups, accompanied by fire-fighting specialists, mounted the attack. Unfortunately, a tank of ether - which did not appear in the infirmary's inventory - caught fire, and the few seconds it took to extinguish the blaze was enough time for the captors to kill their hostages before being overcome. No real solution to the problem of police action against such criminal strongholds had yet been found.

In the UNITED KINGDOM in January 1975, there was an aircraft hijacking incident in which the police were never able to have direct contact with the hijacker himself; all negotiations had to be conducted through the aircraft captain. The hijacker had taken the aircrew as hostages and demanded to be flown to Paris; his secondary demands were confusing. After lengthy negotiations, the authorities decided to have the ransom delivered aboard the aircraft, but the captain was instructed to land at another airport in England, while attempting to make the hijacker believe he was landing in France. At the second airport, the hijacker was captured and it was then learned that his weapons were merely facsimiles. Difficulties in this case had arisen because reporters had been listening to the radio communications between the police and the aircrew and because, up to that time, the police had always counted on being able to have direct contact with hijackers - which was not possible in this particular case. Moreover, the crew of the aircraft was an internal flight crew and had had no special training for incidents of this nature. In light of these events, however, it was considered essential that all crews be trained to handle such emergencies.

The increased number of cases involving hostage-taking, whether for purely criminal or for ideological reasons, had spurred the Government of THE NETHERLANDS to delineate and co-ordinate the responsibilities of the various services concerned - local and national police forces, and judicial and police authorities. Special task forces had been set up, including sharpshooters, hand-to-hand combat experts, and armed forces units, as necessary. These task forces were under the command of local police chiefs. Plans had also been made for setting up "command centres", one to be located near the scene of the crime and another at the Ministry of Justice, where policy decisions were to be made. Protection and release of the hostages headed the priority list in the Netherlands, followed by capture and arrest of the criminals. The use of force was to be avoided to the greatest extent possible, and the police were to fire their weapons only under exceptional circumstances. Delaying tactics were to be used as much as possible to gain time for careful planning, but quick action could be taken if the circumstances warranted. The criminals were to be granted safe conduct, if they demanded it, only after the hostages were freed.

The Netherlands delegates described two very different cases that had been handled in different ways.

In the first case, in September 1974, three ideologically motivated Japanese nationals, armed with pistols and grenades, entered the French Embassy and took eleven persons hostage, including the ambassador. The captors demanded that one of their compatriots, at that time in prison in France, be released and that they be given a certain sum of money and an aircraft for fleeing the country. After negotiating for four days, the captors released the hostages and, accompanied by the prisoner released from the French prison, left the Netherlands in the aircraft.

In the second case, occurring only a short time after the first, four inmates of Scheveningen prison, armed with pistols and knives, took 22 persons hostage during a religious service and demanded to be released from prison. In this case, an attack was mounted by military task forces while the inmates were being blinded by high-intensity lights and being deafened by very loud noises from sirens and bullhorns. Moreover, a thermic lance was used on the steel-reinforced door, and the resultant smoke contributed to the desired effect. All the hostages were found to be unharmed.

Those two cases were handled by very different means, and they were distinct from each other in other ways. In the first case, the Japanese nationals formed a homogeneous group and were very well trained, and very resolute; in the second case, the group was composed of disparate members (an aircraft hijacker and three ordinary law-breakers, of various nationalities). In the first case, the captor's demands were well-defined; in the second case, the inmate's demands were unclear and constantly changing.

In ITALY, kidnappings were a very serious problem, especially in Sardinia (54 cases between 1965 and 1972), in Calabria (13 cases), and in Sicily (8 cases). The police had solved 44 of those cases and had arrested 254 suspects. Preparations for kidnappings usually followed certain general lines: choosing the victim and assessing the possibility of obtaining a ransom, studying his habits, setting up a hide-out to be used until the ransom was paid, selecting routes to follow and vehicles to use. In most cases, police activity also followed a general pattern: determining the criminals' modus operandi, following up contacts and negotiations between the criminals and the victim's family, questioning the victim for information after his release, and identification and arrest of the kidnapers.

The Italian delegate described two cases. In the first case, involving the kidnapping of an engineer in Sardinia, the victim's family agreed to co-operate with the police. The person negotiating with the criminals thus let a police driver take him to a meeting arranged with the kidnapers and carried on his person a concealed microphone for tape-recording the discussions. From the tape-recordings, the police were able to determine what part of the country the criminals came from. Under the pretext that the entire ransom had not yet been raised, a second such meeting was arranged. The negotiator's car was equipped with radio transmitters emitting signals picked up by helicopters. Once the meeting-place had thus been discovered, policemen were brought in by helicopter, the escape routes were blocked, and two criminals were arrested. Traces of a fluorescent powder used to coat the banknotes in the ransom package were discovered on the criminals, and their subsequent statements enabled the police to locate the engineer, who was found unharmed.

In the second case, a search of a stable at a farm led to discovery of a trap door opening onto a tunnel leading to an underground room where a man was being held captive. He had been kidnapped four months earlier. The occupants of the farm were subsequently arrested.

In these two cases, the criminals' methods were characterized by swift action at the moment of actual kidnapping, fairly long delays before contacting the families in order to heighten their anxiety, patient negotiations with constant threats to the hostages' safety, imprisonment of the victims under harsh conditions, and demands for very high ransoms. These methods were typical of syndicated criminal activities, and investigations were being conducted with this fact in mind.

The JAMAICAN DELEGATE described two hostage-taking cases. The first case concerned an aircraft hijacking in which the hijacker found himself unable to deal with the panic reaction of one of the female passengers and gave chase when she rushed out of the aircraft, which was on a landing strip at the time. He was apprehended. It was subsequently discovered that he was mentally unstable.

The second incident occurred at a Jamaican prison. A prisoner took a guard as hostage and demanded to see the Prime Minister to obtain better prison conditions. The Prime Minister refused to negotiate with the man unless the hostage was released first. The hostage was released, and discussions on prison conditions were then undertaken.

One of the UNITED STATES DELEGATES reported on a hostage-taking case that occurred on 17th November 1974 when a mentally unstable person held the Philippines Ambassador and an Attaché as hostages inside the Philippines Embassy. During the man's initial attack he fired shots wounding the Attaché. The F.B.I., Executive Protective Service, and the Washington Metropolitan Police intervened swiftly. The Embassy was evacuated and the surrounding area was cordoned off. From outside the building, it could be seen that the Attaché was alive. The captor, with whom telephone contact was established about 90 minutes after the start of the incident, made several demands: that his son be brought from the Philippines to the United States (he believed the authorities was purposely preventing his immigration); that a married couple imprisoned in the Philippines be released;

that he be permitted to speak to reporters; that a colleague of his be brought to him; that a nurse be brought to the scene. He said he would commit suicide if his demands were not met within 24 hours. The identity of this man was quickly learned because he was one of the five persons having appointments with the Ambassador on that day. During the negotiations the authorities telephoned the President of the Philippines and subsequently learned that the couple in prison had refused to be released. Assistance from the man's lawyer was also solicited. The hostage-taker was then assured that his son would be allowed to leave the Philippines for the United States.

On the following day, after ten hours of negotiating, the man abandoned his plans and surrendered his weapon to the police. All persons involved, with the exception of the Attaché, were unharmed.

This incident had been totally unanticipated, since the hostage-taker had made an appointment to see the Ambassador. The risk of similar cases occurring could not be avoided unless excessive security precautions were taken. The authorities could not do much to prevent such incidents; only after the actual crime had been committed could they take any action. In the case in question, newspaper and television reporters had posed special problems for the authorities, in that they proved extremely aggressive. A press officer was assigned by the authorities to issue carefully prepared statements to the media representatives.

The United States Delegation presented a paper, entitled "Prevention Through A Coordinated Police And Government Response", containing additional details on this case and related matters; copies of the document were distributed to all delegations at the symposium.

The ARGENTINE DELEGATE said that freedom of the press should be respected but that abuses could not be tolerated in the name of such freedom. He said it was advisable to be very cautious in giving information to the press and to make it impossible for the media to listen in on communications between police and hostage-takers. Concealing transmitters in ransom containers had been effective in the past in helping the police identify criminals, he added, but other criminals had learned of this and had devised countermeasures.

The SWEDISH DELEGATION showed a series of slides of the armed robbery and hostage-taking that had occurred at a bank in Stockholm in 1973. The criminals and their hostages were locked inside the bank vault soon after the incident began. After several days of negotiating with the criminals, during which the amount of ransom money demanded was reduced by half, the police drilled holes down through the ceiling of the vault and were then able to lower a camera momentarily to photograph the scene. After consultations with psychiatrists and other doctors, who believed that the hostages' lives were not in danger because the hostages' attitude had almost become one of alliance with the criminals, the police were able to use teargas successfully.

During the discussion following the slide presentation, these two points were brought out:

- 1) Overall responsibility for tactical operations had been vested in the Chief of the Stockholm Police; the Prime Minister had been kept informed as the operations proceeded.
- 2) In consultation with experts on the type and the exact quantity of gas to use, the police had chosen type K-62 teargas as being best suited to their requirements.

ITEM II: POLICE TACTICS

1/General conditions determining the type of action to take

The SECRETARY GENERAL explained that before any action was taken, it was probably advisable for the police to obtain basic information about the events in progress - the number of hostage-takers, the number of hostages, the temperament of the criminals, etc. He asked the delegates to express their ideas on the subject.

A member of the NETHERLANDS DELEGATION said that the initial report to the police was very important for tactical reasons. Operations were sometimes initiated while the police were still poorly and insufficiently informed and such haste made the police more vulnerable to more dangers. He, therefore, felt it was mandatory to be fully informed in order to respond appropriately at the outset.

A member of the FRENCH DELEGATION said the authorities' position on the kind of action to take should be made clear; there were "hard-line" governments and other governments more likely to satisfy the criminals' demands, he explained.

The ISRAEL DELEGATE said that at the outset it should be determined if a given hostage-taking act was politically motivated or if it was committed for purely criminal reasons. The authorities first had to know the hostage-taker's motives before deciding what general course of action to follow.

A member of the BELGIAN DELEGATION recommended that the initial information on any crime involving hostage-taking be analysed immediately. A check-list, he continued, should be drawn up for use by all services to which such information might first be reported. When such an event occurred, a number of important questions had to be asked to obtain the minimum of information necessary for deciding what kind of alert to call.

A member of the ITALIAN DELEGATION asserted that a distinction should be made between cases in which the criminal did indeed want to alert the police, to provoke them to action or to sidetrack them, and cases in which the criminal did not want the police to intervene and, therefore, contacted only the victim's family.

A member of the NETHERLANDS DELEGATION pointed out that it was important for the police not to rush onto the scene of such a crime without being sufficiently informed about it. He said he was thinking about the policemen's safety.

A member of the UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION said he supported the idea of a check-list of information to be obtained.

A member of the BELGIAN DELEGATION also voiced his support for establishing a check-list, especially since in one case policemen who thought they had a straightforward case to handle had been killed upon arriving at the scene of the crime. In only a limited number of hostage-taking cases, he said, should the police attempt to use standard investigative methods. Modern-day cases of hostage-taking for ransom should be handled differently.

The AUSTRIAN DELEGATE said that his department considered there were four phases of police activity in such cases: alerting the competent authorities and task forces once the crime had been reported, analysing the situation, deciding on the course of action to take, and carrying out the decision through actual operations. In his country, he said, there were various contingency plans for various situations - e.g., aircraft hijacking, or prison riots. He also reported that command centres were set up in Austria and that each member of each command centre staff had clearly defined responsibilities.

During the ensuing discussion, in which BELGIAN, FRENCH, ITALIAN and NETHERLANDS DELEGATES took part, it was learned that obtaining complete information during the first phase was sometimes difficult and could result in substantial loss of time.

However, it was agreed that the information obtained during the first phase should be analysed carefully but without undue delay before further operations were conducted.

The delegates agreed also that it was important for the decision-making and operational authorities to have as thorough a knowledge as possible of the scene of the crime, and especially of places in which hostages were being held; such information could be obtained, for example, from building inspection reports and blueprints. Information of this kind had been invaluable to the French police at the time of the most recent hostage-taking case in France, which had occurred at Orly Airport; it had been essential for the police to know the layout of the airport rest-rooms.

The police needed to obtain as much information as possible not only about the place where the events were occurring, but also about the number of hostage-takers, their identities, their weapons, etc. In kidnapping cases, useful information could be obtained from members of the victims' families (according to the ARGENTINE DELEGATE) and from the family lawyer or priest (according to a member of the ITALIAN DELEGATION).

The discussion made it clear that a distinction should be made between hostage-taking acts committed purely in violation of ordinary criminal law and hostage-taking acts committed for ideological reasons. Making this distinction at the very outset, in view of the fact that different measures had to be taken in each case, was difficult.

A member of the UNITED STATES DELEGATION said it might be advisable to establish a system of code words (words with double meanings) for communications between embassy personnel and the police, which would enable the police to obtain from within an embassy as much information as possible on any disruption that might take place there.

Clearly, it was still not always possible to communicate with persons held hostage, even when communications equipment was available; the hostages, of course, had to allowed to use the equipment.

In the case involving the French Embassy at The Hague, which a member of the Netherlands Delegation had earlier described, one of the hostages had been able to supply the police with information on the number of hostages and on the hostage-takers' weaponry by dropping brief notes from a window.

2/Preparation of police intervention: the decision level

Several delegations at the symposium supported the BELGIAN DELEGATION's recommendation that separate decision-making command centres and operations command centres be set up. The decision-making command centres would be staffed at the highest level by government ministers, high-ranking police officials, etc. The operations command centres would be composed of the heads of the relevant departments (police, firemen, technicians, etc.). The decision-making headquarters staff should be careful not to usurp the responsibilities of the operations commanders.

It was further agreed that the composition of the command centres could naturally vary from country to country and from case to case.

A member of the FEDERAL GERMAN DELEGATION reported that all policy decisions on politically motivated hostage-taking acts occurring in his country were taken by a federal-level command centre composed of the federal Ministers of the Interior, of Justice, of Foreign Affairs, and, if need be, of Transport. Operational decisions in cases of that kind were made at a federal-level operations command centre.

For hostage-taking acts committed purely in violation of ordinary law, he added, command centres were set up in the Land (state) that was affected. Describing one case that had occurred in Federal Germany, the speaker indicated that it had been through such an arrangement that the Interior and Justice Ministers of the two Lander involved had been able to co-ordinate their decisions.

A member of the UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION indicated that the Chief Police Officer of the area had full decision-making authority in non-political cases. In cases of politically motivated crimes decisions were made by the political authorities, but the police retained authority to decide what actual operations to conduct.

Discussion on the subject brought to light the fact that, in cases involving violation of ordinary law alone, decision-making was the responsibility of the judicial authorities in many countries (e.g., the Procureur Général and his staff in Belgium).

According to a member of the AUSTRIAN DELEGATION, the Austrian Minister of the Interior was in charge of crime prevention, while the Minister of Justice had jurisdiction over cases involving crimes already committed. In practice, he said, the two Ministers constantly worked together, and the police acted on the basis of their decisions.

A member of the FRENCH DELEGATION reported that in most hostage-taking cases in France, Ministry-level decisions had been made.

The ARGENTINE DELEGATE said he believed it would be sound policy to include the operations commander among the persons on the policy-making command centre staff.

He further stated that in cases of kidnapping committed in violation of ordinary law alone, the value of evidence from members of the victims' families should not be overlooked.

In conclusion it was recommended that a permanent policy-making headquarters, composed in accordance with national variable and the various types of case that could be anticipated, should be set up in advance. This headquarters could include special advisers as they were needed in each incident.

Many delegations supported the statement of the ISRAEL DELEGATE, who said that the policy-making headquarters should be set up very close to the scene of the incident. The essential point was the the headquarters should be equipped with a good communications system that would enable the persons there to remain in constant contact with persons on the scene.

In some countries (Belgium and France among them), special rooms had already been earmarked for use as command centres at certain strategic places, such as airports, where incidents were liable to occur.

According to the AUSTRALIAN DELEGATE, whenever a case with political overtones occurred, the appropriate political authorities were consulted before any final decisions were made. But the Chief of Police always had the authority to decide what position to take and what methods to use.

He further stated that if decisions were made by a Command centre the smaller the number of people involved, the more likely it was that a satisfactory outcome would be found rapidly.

The UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION agreed.

The UNITED STATES DELEGATION reminded the participants of the paper entitled "Prevention Through A Coordinated Police And Government Response", previously distributed to the other delegations. The document was drafted on the basis of experience and reported on various coordinated phases of the authorities' activity in hostage-taking cases: the pre-attack phase, and the post-attack phase, or apprehension of the hostage-takers.

3/The options open; feasibility of various operations

- a) The first topic covered was the topic of police negotiations with hostage-takers. According to the AUSTRIAN DELEGATE, negotiation was useful in that it helped the police draw a psychological profile of the hostage-taker and helped them "buy time". A member of the FEDERAL GERMAN DELEGATION said that the moment for opening negotiations with hostage-takers should be carefully chosen in each case. In AUSTRIA, according to that country's delegate, policemen with special training in

psychology were used as negotiators. He said that help might also be obtained from persons outside the police profession (psychiatrists, family members, lawyers, clergymen, etc.). He noted that negotiations with persons taking hostages for ideological reasons were not conducted in the same way as negotiations with ordinary kidnapers.

In FEDERAL GERMANY there was a police service memorandum giving guidelines to follow in hostage-taking cases.

The UNITED STATES DELEGATION submitted a paper entitled "Psychological Guidelines for Hostage Negotiations" and distributed copies of it to the other delegations. The guidelines had been drawn up and recommended by a group of researchers and could be summarized as follows:

- Measure the past and present emotional stability of the hostage-taker;
- Evaluate the hostage-taker's dedication to his cause (his personal and/or ideological motives);
- Never negotiate to supply weapons to the hostage-taker;
- Staff for time; negotiations should never be conducted by the highest competent authority;
- Never offer suggestions to the hostage-taker;
- Never agree to any of the hostage-taker's demands without receiving something in return;
- Keep the hostage-taker in a decision-making situation in order to wear him down, but give him time to reflect on his decisions;
- Select the negotiator with care;
- If negotiation is fruitless and the lives of the hostages are at stake, make plans to intervene physically, but never give the hostage-taker the impression that his cause is a lost one.

- b) The second topic discussed was that of hostage-takers' demands and response to those demands, including techniques and tactics for paying ransom. From the ensuing discussion, to which the FEDERAL GERMAN, ITALIAN, ARGENTINE, and UNITED STATES DELEGATIONS contributed, it was clear that hostage-takers were asking for increasingly large ransoms, as much as several million dollars in many cases. Tactics used by hostage-takers when ransoms were to be delivered were becoming more and more sophisticated and tended to vary with the different factors in each case. For example, a meeting might be arranged for delivery of the ransom money at a given place; at that place, however, the person in charge of delivering the ransom would receive instructions to proceed to a second place, where he would receive further instructions, and so forth, with the result that the person in charge of dropping the ransom would not know his final destination. Moreover this practice would enable the captors to spot any persons following the courier. The speakers agreed that the police should be patient in overseeing the family members' negotiations with the hostage-takers, do their utmost to gain time in which to conduct their investigations, remain out of sight in their surveillance activities, and be as alert as possible to changes in the hostage-takers' tactics.

A member of the ITALIAN DELEGATION briefly described a noteworthy case (the kidnapping of Paul Getty III) in which the police had arrested the kidnappers and recovered the ransom money through careful investigation and the use of modern technology (use of a computer to record the serial numbers of the banknotes used in the ransom). The speaker said he would have a description of the case sent to the General Secretariat for publication in the International Criminal Police Review.

The UNITED STATES and ITALIAN DELEGATIONS participated in a discussion of whether or not a government should pay ransom, if it is demanded, when one of its nationals (businessmen, ambassador) is taken hostage abroad. The United States Delegation said that the U.S. Government usually refused to do so, to avoid involvement in such cases. Ransom payments, according to the U.S. Delegation, were made by members of the victims' families or by other private arrangements. A

member of the Italian delegation pointed out that in a recent case the hostage-takers had demanded ransom money in U.S. dollars and had said they would not release the hostage until after the money was deposited in a foreign bank.

c) and d)

The delegates then proceeded to discuss actual intervention itself and "the unforeseeable", including analysis of failure factors.

The delegates first sought to determine whether or not the authorities should honour the negotiated agreements they made with hostage-takers. From the ensuing discussion, in which UNITED STATES, SWISS, ITALIAN, AUSTRIAN, NETHERLANDS, FRENCH, MALAYSIAN, BELGIAN, and UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATES took part, it became clear that agreements made in conjunction with the taking of hostages were not freely made, in which case the police authorities were under no obligation to honour them. It was pointed out, however, that a distinction should be made between promises made by the police to ordinary criminals and promises made by a government to another government or its ambassadors in connection with ideologically inspired hostage-taking incidents. The latter were, obviously, bilateral agreements between governments, which it would be advisable to honour.

The delegates then embarked upon a discussion of failure factors. Several failure factors were mentioned, and the part played by newspapers and the other mass media was emphasized by several delegations. Radio and television broadcasts keeping hostage-takers informed about police tactics or about the severity of the sentences they were incurring were liable to create serious problems. The AUSTRIAN DELEGATE alerted those present to the danger of interference from passers-by, of possibly unfortunate incidents arising from panic on the part of the hostages, and of the feeling of solidarity that often grew up between hostages and their captors. It had been noted that hostages, after spending a fairly long time with their captors in a tense situation, had tended to align themselves with their captors. The ARGENTINE DELEGATE stated that hostages usually could not provide significant information immediately after their release, but that it could prove fruitful to question them later, when the shock effect had worn off.

The delegates then discussed what effects personal insurance contracts against kidnapping might have on hostage-taking cases. Some of the delegates believed that such contracts, issued by some insurance companies, provoked hostage-taking, and they wished to recommend to insurance companies that they cease to issue policies covering this risk. Other delegates said they thought the matter was a purely personal one and should be left to the discretion of each private individual. The essential problem they said, was protecting the victim's life and insurance companies could not be asked to refuse cover. The ARGENTINE DELEGATE pointed out how useful it might be if the bank accounts of hostages, of their families, and of their businesses could be blocked, to demonstrate to hostage-takers that ransom would not be paid under any circumstances. A member of the NETHERLANDS DELEGATION pointed out, however, that hostage-takers were unlikely to give up their demands even if that procedure was used.

Members of the ISRAEL, UNITED STATES, NETHERLANDS, BELGIAN, and JAMAICAN DELEGATIONS spoke in turn on post-operational studies of hostage-taking cases, with emphasis on analysing failure factors. It was considered to be of utmost importance to draw whatever lessons could be drawn from studying cases that had ended unsatisfactorily. The delegates declared that the case studies, moreover, should be made by a special group or committee and should concern the effect of the outcome of those cases on general policy rather than the immediate consequences of any error of judgement or action in any given case. The main purpose, they said, should be to determine whether or not general policy changes should be made because of specific factors in the handling of any one incident.

The NORWEGIAN DELEGATE then brought up the subject of police use of firearms. He mentioned an incident in which the hostage-takers had released the hostages, attempted to get away, and been killed by police. Various legal and practical aspects of such situations were mentioned, and the ensuing discussions centered on various possible interpretations of "legitimate self-defence" and "vital necessity" and on honouring promises made to hostage-takers, a subject which had come under discussion earlier.

The COUNCIL OF EUROPE OBSERVER reminded the delegates of the provisions of Paragraph 2, Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and he pointed out that "legitimate self-defence" could not be used to justify killing in order to defend property alone. He also said that a distinction should be made between personal acts, for which the right of "legitimate self-defence" could be exercised, and acts committed on behalf of governments, for which this right could not be exercised.

The AUSTRIAN DELEGATE reported on his country's laws pertaining to the use of weapons by the police. He said these laws permitted the use of firearms for protecting human life, whether it be one's own or another person's, for putting an end to rioting or rebellion, and for apprehending dangerous criminals and preventing their escape. The laws were in conformity with the European Convention on Human Rights, which had the status of constitutional law in Austria. In reply to a question, the delegate specified that the laws permitted the use of firearms in hostage-taking incidents when no other tactics could be used.

A member of the NETHERLANDS DELEGATION said he believed the problem could not be solved by discussing merely its theoretical aspects. It was essential to know what action to take at the actual time of the events. The primary objective of police forces in his country, he explained, was to ensure the hostages' safety; firearms were used only when it was necessary to do so to save the hostages' lives. Hostage-takers had to be rendered harmless, which meant that the police had to shoot to kill in some cases.

A member of the FEDERAL GERMAN DELEGATION described a hostage-taking case that had occurred in Hamburg; the police had used their firearms during the incident. The situation in Germany was not very clear; the police were authorized to shoot in cases of vital necessity, but they were not required to do so; if a policeman did not fire his weapon, he would not be subject to disciplinary action because of it.

In reply to a question, the COUNCIL OF EUROPE OBSERVER said that the laws of various countries could differ from the provisions in the European Convention on Human Rights; the latter were more restrictive than those in force in some European

countries. Similarly, the policies of a government might prove to be more restrictive than the policies of the police authorities under that government. A member of the NETHERLANDS DELEGATION said he thought it was essential to know definitely whether or not the police should fire their weapons when it became necessary to do so to defend human life.

Hostage-taking incidents had accentuated the urgency of determining with certainty whether a policeman could use his weapon when the life of a hostage was at stake, or whether "legitimate self-defence" only covered cases where his own life was in danger. No clear-cut answer could be given, inasmuch as any answer had to depend on the immediate circumstances of each case, on national laws, and on how those circumstantial and legal factors were interpreted. It should be borne in mind, however, that Paragraph 2, Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights did not list protection of property among the situation in connection with which deprivation of life is considered tolerable as a "legitimate defence".

In reply to a question on whether property or hostages were being defended in cases where persons took hostages and obtained vehicles, weapons, etc. for their getaway, the answer was that, while hostages were still being held, this fact could be evoked to justify the use of firearms, whereas if the hostages had been released, firearms could be brought to bear in preventing the hostage-takers from getting away.

The COUNCIL OF EUROPE OBSERVER pointed out that Paragraph 2 (b), Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights specified: "deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary (...) in order to effect a lawful arrest ..."

ITEM III: POLICE ORGANIZATION FOR COUNTERING THE TAKING OF
HOSTAGES

1. Existence of police intervention units, and
2. Other ways of countering the criminals.

In FEDERAL GERMANY, subsequent to the incidents that had occurred in 1972, task forces were set up in each Land (state). Three distinct command levels existed: the criminal investigation information service, special commissions and crisis centres, and various tactical operations commands. Two types of task forces, to carry out various field operations, were set up: task forces composed of sharpshooters, and task forces composed of border patrol officers. During actual operations in hostage-taking incidents, the two commando-type groups worked together under a unified command.

A member of the BELGIAN DELEGATION indicated that the Belgian Gendarmerie had set up a special task force to deal with hostage-taking incidents. He further specified that he did not consider it was up to the army to intervene in such cases.

In FRANCE there were local task forces in the Paris area and elsewhere in the country. The Paris area task force was composed of uniformed policemen and metropolitan-area detective volunteers accepted on the basis of their shooting proficiency. Outside the Paris area, there were local task forces whose members were uniformed policemen. The Gendarmerie also had two task forces.

In SWITZERLAND, the cantons had set up task forces and had included sharpshooters among their members. All the task force members received regional as well as local training, but only the instructors themselves were given standardized, national-level training. The Swiss authorities modelled this training on Federal Germany's programmes.

In FRANCE, there was a mobilisation procedure for immediately assembling some of the Paris area task force members; total task force mobilisation for Paris required more time.

In BELGIUM, the task forces were staffed 24 hours a day with men actually on duty; all task force members not on actual duty were on permanent stand-by at their homes.

The SECRETARY GENERAL noted that task force mobilisation was apparently conducted in two phases, usually: immediate mobilisation, in which only certain task force members were called in, and subsequent mobilisation of the other task force members, which required more time. The Secretary General then asked what the task force members did when everything was calm.

A member of the NETHERLANDS DELEGATION said that the situation was never absolutely calm, but that whenever there were no incidents to handle, the task force members performed routine duties while remaining on stand-by.

A member of the FRENCH DELEGATION said that task force members conducted their usual activities in their normal jobs (gang-busing squads, athletic instruction, etc.) when the task forces were not in action.

In FEDERAL GERMANY, persons on stand-by for the border protection task forces took various courses and continued their physical training. The members of other task forces, when not on actual task force duty, were given various other responsibilities (observation, surveillance, ambulance duty, demonstration control, crime investigation, etc.). However, no suitable stand-by duties had yet been found for sharpshooters.

The ARGENTINE DELEGATE explained that the department responsible for handling hostage cases in his country's Federal Police Force was the branch dealing with economic offences. He said that all persons concerned, therefore, were occupied with handling extortion and fraud cases as well as cases involving hostage-taking. In addition, past cases were studied in order to draw lessons for the future.

In the UNITED STATES, the Secret Service team members were full-time employees; the teams included weapons experts who were also police school instructors. They consisted of four groups of members who received continuous training. Secret Service assistance could be obtained 24 hours a day.

The SECRETARY GENERAL concluded that there were three types of task force organization: military or paramilitary task forces whose members were theoretically on duty at all times; task forces whose members were on permanent stand-by but performed police duties while waiting to be mobilised; and task forces such as those described by a Federal German delegate, whose members engaged in other activities.

A member of the FRENCH DELEGATION, replying to a question asked by the Israel Delegate, explained that key members of the Paris area task forces could be mobilised in just a few minutes' time during the day and within thirty minutes at night.

A member of the SWISS DELEGATION emphasized that, to meet exceptional circumstances satisfactorily and to reduce risks, it was absolutely essential to have especially well prepared special teams available.

3. Capturing the criminals after the release of hostages.

A member of the NETHERLANDS DELEGATION said the police should do everything possible to bring hostage-taking incidents to satisfactory conclusions before the criminals and hostages move away from the scene of the crime because he believed that that was the time when the police could take their most effective measures. A member of the FEDERAL GERMAN DELEGATION also held this point of view and added that, from the psychological viewpoint, every firm move by the police had an effect on the behaviour of the hostage-takers. A member of the SWISS DELEGATION stated that it was always preferable for the police to make decisions and conduct operations at an early stage of the incident because it was not always possible to predict accurately what the situation would be at a later moment. Contingency plans had been drawn up in Lausanne for instance, he said, for positioning radio-equipped policemen in various parts of the city to report on hostage-takers making a getaway. In 1974, the delegate added, radio-equipped taxi drivers and even amateur radio operators had lent their assistance to the police.

A member of the FRENCH DELEGATION emphasized how essential it was to identify and describe the hostage-takers in a given case as precisely as possible, to obtain their photographs and other information about them, and to publish national wanted notices as soon as the hostage-takers started to make their getaway. An incident that had occurred in Toulouse, he said, had highlighted the importance of this.

It was pointed out that helicopters were extremely valuable as observation and relay vehicles, especially when miniature radio transmitters were concealed by the police in criminals' getaway cars or within objects in the criminals' possession.

It was also pointed out that the police must be very careful to avoid making the hostage-takers feel menaced by the presence of helicopters, thus further endangering the lives of the hostages. In addition, the cost of using helicopters was very high.

Another point made was that helicopters should be used with the utmost caution and should remain in constant contact with police forces on the ground if they were used to keep track of hostage-takers making a getaway with their hostages, whereas helicopters could be used freely to locate and maintain surveillance over fleeing hostage-takers who had released their captives.

A member of the NETHERLANDS DELEGATION pointed out that a news service aircraft had been in the air in the vicinity of the French Embassy in The Hague at the time of the hostage-taking case there, and the hostage-takers had threatened to kill their hostages unless the plane went away.

In some cases, according to the delegates, helicopters had been useful (such as in keeping track of a kidnapper going through a swamp in the United States), but they had to be flown at altitudes great enough to make it impossible for the criminals to see them, and their value as observation vehicles could be reduced by weather conditions.

Helicopter pilots' skill and training were certainly important factors, but the use of helicopters could endanger the lives of hostages being held by their captors.

Policemen on motorcycles were used in the UNITED KINGDOM to keep track of getaway cars.

A member of the FRENCH DELEGATION declared that when hostage-takers' getaways could not be prevented, investigations should be followed up in other ways open to the police.

In some exceptional situations in the UNITED STATES, it had been agreed to exchange police officers for hostages; the police officer in each case had been equipped with a secret transmitting device. In one case, this procedure had enabled the police to keep track of the hostage-takers for several days.

According to a member of the FEDERAL GERMAN DELEGATION, the police might be well advised, if a hostage-taker asked for a getaway car, to provide one with a governor, making it impossible for the car to go excessively fast; this would help enable the police to achieve greater effectiveness in their operations after the release of the hostages.

A member of the NETHERLANDS DELEGATION said that if, after the negotiations the hostage-takers still held the hostages, no visible traps should be set along the available escape routes, and the police should not hesitate to inform the hostage-takers of the true nature of any unusual situations along those routes which might rouse their suspicions of a trap. (in an incident occurring in Amsterdam, for example, the police had informed the hostage-takers, as they prepared their getaway, that the airport access road was being repaired).

The AUSTRIAN DELEGATE spoke about a case in which he personally had been exchanged for one of the hostages. Several of the original five hostages in that case were elderly persons or invalids, all in need of professional care, and their physical and emotional states were such that the police had reason to believe a serious incident could occur. Consequently, the police decided that an exchange of hostages would be in the best interests of all the innocent persons involved.

The delegate further stated that once an aircraft, under the control of hostage-takers, had left the ground, the responsibility of the police came to an end and it was up to the civil aviation authorities and whatever governments where then involved in the situation to take decisions. No practical means had yet been devised for chasing after airborne hostage-takers.

ITEM IV: EQUIPMENT

Several type of equipment were discussed.

- 1) The ARGENTINE and FRENCH DELEGATES indicated that special sustained surveillance vehicles, from within which still and motion picture photographing of the outside situation could be carried on without attracting attention, were used in their countries and that they must be constructed with great attention to detail. In one case, the windows of a surveillance vehicle of this type misted over at the crucial moment.
- 2) The delegates agreed that minaturised radio transmitters concealed in hostage-takers' getaway cars and emitting signals receivable at a distance - by airborne units in helicopters, for example - were useful in keeping track of criminals at a distance.

A member of the ITALIAN DELEGATION indicated that the Italian army had loaned equipment of this type to the police. According to a member of the FEDERAL GERMAN DELEGATION, his country's police forces were building up a supply of "bugged" automobile accessories for all kinds of cars.

ARGENTINE and UNITED STATES DELEGATES said that equipment of this type was used in their countries and that they could send further written information on such devices to countries requesting it; the delegates pointed out, however, that all the documentation available at that time was written in highly technical language. Information on such devices could also be sent to the General Secretariat thus making it readily available on request.

- 3) The topic of telecommunications, especially communications between the policy-making crisis centre authorities and persons at the actual scene of events, was introduced by the DANISH DELEGATE. The AUSTRIAN and UNITED STATES DELEGATES confirmed that national-level government departments in some countries included operations or command centres with highly sophisticated equipment for communications with mobile units. Further discussion of the subject made it clear that some delegates believed the centres should have, in addition to standard telecommunications equipment, phototelegraphic equipment for transmitting copies of documents

in languages not written in Roman characters, and that they should make arrangements for calling in translators and interpreters when necessary.

The delegates pointed out that it was essential to have equipment available for maintaining continuous contact between command centre authorities and persons at the scene of events, and that it was advisable to conduct "dry-runs" and encourage high-ranking administrators, diplomatic corps officers, and even government ministers to participate.

- 4) A discussion followed on the subject of radio contacts between aircraft on the ground and airport control towers, and techniques for keeping these contacts confidential. A member of the UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION said that during a previously-described incident, radio contacts of this nature had been monitored by the news media, which had complicated the situation. It was pointed out that if there were devices to keep these contacts confidential, every country with an airline or an airport should be equipped with them. The delegates then spoke in general terms about devices for protecting the confidential nature of police radio communications. The FEDERAL GERMAN and CANADIAN DELEGATES said punchboard-operated communications scramblers and unscramblers were used in their countries; the scrambling codes could be changed by inserting different punch-cards into the transmitters and receivers. This equipment was effective and rapid, they reported, but costly.
- 5) The use of non-injurious weapons to render hostage-takers harmless was then discussed. Research was being conducted but no suitable substance had been produced yet. Experiments to determine the precise dose of medicinal products (soporifics, euphorics, etc.) to fire at the hostage-takers or to put into their food had been unsuccessful; moreover, hostage-takers very often refused all food brought to them. It was also pointed out that no drugs with instantaneous effects had been discovered up to that time, and that the delay between the administration and the effect of any known drug gave a hostage-taker sufficient time to act in a way that would be dangerous for his captives.

- 6) The last subject discussed under the heading "Equipment" was the technical problem of preparing ransom money for later identification of hostage-takers. The DANISH DELEGATE stated that it had often been difficult to procure large amounts of foreign currency hostage-takers had demanded it as ransom money. The Federal Reserve Banking System in the UNITED STATES had a supply of many different foreign currencies, but, if a rare foreign currency were demanded, there could be problems in procuring the appropriate amount. The UNITED STATES DELEGATES suggested that INTERPOL channels might be useful in such cases, when violations of ordinary law were involved. Moreover, they pointed out, procuring the amount of currency demanded could be an excellent way of "stalling for time".

A member of the SWEDISH DELEGATION asked if it was possible to obtain counterfeit banknotes, or chemically-treated banknotes that would become blank after a certain time, to use as ransom money for hostage-takers.

A member of the UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION said that the Bank of England had formally prohibited the use of counterfeit notes in such cases. Use of sufficiently deceptive counterfeit notes would lead to general circulation of large amounts of counterfeit currency; counterfeit notes of lower quality would not deceive hostage-takers. Giving self-destroying (self-bleaching) notes to hostage-takers could prove effective, but there would be the danger, nonetheless, that the practice would become known and that hostage-takers would keep their hostages for a certain period after the ransom was paid, until they could assure themselves that the money was genuine.

A member of the ITALIAN DELEGATION reported that the Italian police and banking authorities had set aside a supply of banknotes whose serial numbers were recorded in a computer; the notes were reserved for use as ransom money. This method had proved successful in enabling the Italian police to identify a number of hostage-takers. Other delegates remained unconvinced that this was an effective method of identifying criminals; they said they saw the use of marked notes or notes whose serial numbers were recorded more as a technique for expediting subsequent investigations and for demonstrating complicity in the crime. The Italian Delegate added that hostage-takers in his country had been known to demand and to obtain banknotes procured at different Italian banks; they did so to prevent members of hostages'

families from paying ransoms with banknotes whose serial numbers the police had recorded. Hostages' families, moreover, had been known to comply with the demands in many cases, which meant that they refused to co-operate with the police in a natural desire to avoid further endangering hostages.

The ISRAEL DELEGATE said he believed that national banks should make ransom money available to private banks. The ITALIAN DELEGATE stated that, even if the money were thus to become available, private banks would refuse to accept it if the family members said they would not use it.

The SECRETARY GENERAL suggested that police authorities contact bankers' associations for the purpose of seeking their help in solving problems connected with this subject.

A member of the BELGIAN DELEGATION said that the bankers' association in Belgium had been very co-operative in handling and preparing for cases of armed robbery. Definite contingency plans had been made; they included turning over trap banknotes to robbers, issuing an immediate alert, and notifying other banks of the serial numbers of the notes turned over to the criminals.

ITEM V: INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

The SECRETARY GENERAL described INTERPOL's position vis-à-vis hostage-taking acts. Hostage-taking, he said, was a criminal act punishable under various countries' penal codes. Like any other punishable act, a hostage-taking act could occur in an ordinary law context, in a political context, or in a context in which ordinary law and political factors both played a part. When a hostage-taking act was clearly of a political nature, handling the case through the INTERPOL structure was not permissible; but such cases, the Secretary General pointed out, arose less frequently than was commonly believed. Sometimes, he continued, hostage-taking incidents had international ramifications, and the news media reporting on such incidents often registered surprise at INTERPOL's non-intervention. There was an explanation, however; often such cases required handling by local authorities only, to the exclusion of international-level co-operation; or, less often, such cases were handled bi-laterally as by the Netherlands and France in the hostage-taking incident at the French Embassy in The Hague.

INTERPOL held a different position, however, in matters involving prevention of hostage-taking acts. In the prevention context, the distinction between politically-motivated acts and non-political acts did not come into consideration, inasmuch as the context of an act that had not yet occurred could not be predetermined. The Secretary General then reminded the delegates of the pertinent resolutions adopted in the past by various I.C.P.O. General Assemblies, and he mentioned some of the General Secretariat's relevant activities. He concluded that the Organization's policies and activities concerning hostage-taking cases were above reproach because no country had ever contested them.

The COUNCIL OF EUROPE OBSERVER drew the delegate's attention to the importance of "compatibility of charges" - the fact that an act was considered to be a punishable crime under the laws of both the countries involved in a case - for international co-operation. He noted that some European conventions were applicable only if "compatibility of charges" could be invoked in the countries concerned. He said it would be ideal if hostage-taking were given the same legal status as war crimes and violations of the Geneva Convention so that the principles of imprescriptibility and "international jurisdiction" could come into play. However, the existing situation seemed to preclude this solution. A more feasible solution, he suggested, would be to amend national laws so that they would permit prosecution for crimes committed outside the national territory. Resolution No (74)3, adopted by the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers on 24th January 1974, recommended that governments of member states, when they received requests for extradition concerning unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation, for hostage-taking, or for any other terrorist acts, take into consideration the particularly serious nature of these acts, when they have created collective danger to human life, liberty or safety, when they have affected innocent persons, and when cruel or vicious means were used in committing them. The Council of Europe Observer then stated that an alleged political motive should not be justification for not extraditing and punishing a criminal.

The DANISH DELEGATE then reported that the Nordic countries had set up a special working party on air security ("NALS"), comprising Nordic police authorities and Ministers with jurisdiction over air transport. The purpose of the "NALS" was to ensure the international exchange of information on matters involving air security.

A member of the UNITED STATES DELEGATION reiterated how important it was to establish international agreements on the security of civil aviation and expressed his disappointment over the unsatisfactory outcome of the Rome Conference, which had been expected to reinforce existing conventions.

The INDONESIAN DELEGATE presented a document on international co-operation to the General Secretariat.

The SECRETARY GENERAL pointed out that exchanging information on any type of case once it was over could be considered as a first step on the way to prevention. So far, the INTERPOL General Secretariat had circulated 76 international notices on hostage-takers; in only a very few cases had the General Secretariat refrained from doing so because of the allegedly political nature of the case. Publication of information on the criminals' modus operandi was not a problem, since that type of information was not presented in connection with any specific individuals or cases. Up to the present, the General Secretariat had always issued information about modus operandi in the form of circulars but it had recently been decided to devise and use a new type of international notice consisting of "modus operandi sheets", with a format enabling the NCB's to make more efficient use of the information at national level. The Secretary General pointed out, however, that the General Secretariat could transmit only as much information as it received; the amount and the value of that information therefore depended on the NCB's themselves. The Secretary General concluded his remarks by reminding the delegates that there was a special INTERPOL form to follow in reporting information on unlawful acts against civil aviation - the ORIGEN/AVIA form, containing several series of questions to answer, particularly about the criminals' modus operandi - and he said that the General Secretariat prepared General Assembly reports on the basis of that information. The same system could perhaps be extended to hostage-taking cases.

The delegates voiced their approval of the proposal.

A member of the FEDERAL SERMAN DELEGATION said that it had been necessary, in conjunction with some international cases of this type, for the NCB's concerned to keep in contact with each other by telephone; arrangements for ensuring the hostages' safety and for subsequently apprehending the hostage-takers had been made by that means. The conversations had,

however, made it clear that NCB's were not always well informed about ongoing air piracy cases and other similar cases occurring in their countries. Good inter-agency contacts between a country's NCB and police services was absolutely indispensable for exchanging whatever information might be required and for ensuring international co-operation.

The SECRETARY GENERAL added that the NCB's should not consider themselves to be self-sufficient, but should engage fully in their roles as pivotal points and transmitting agencies.

ITEM VI: PREVENTION

A member of the FRENCH DELEGATION gave a personal account of an incident to demonstrate that precautionary searches of persons and luggage at some international airports were unsatisfactory.

The SECRETARY GENERAL reminded the delegates that the 1973 INTERPOL General Assembly had adopted a resolution proposing that maximum security zones be created at each international airport. If such zones had actually been set up, it would have made it possible for security personnel to make thorough searches of threatened aircraft and to search the passengers and their luggage; that would have constituted an exceptionally effective deterrent measure.

ICAO had said, however, that the cost of setting up such security zones would be prohibitive and that they would create difficulties for air traffic control systems.

He wondered whether I.C.A.O. would not be well-advised to review INTERPOL's recommendation in the light of recent developments.

The I.C.A.O. OBSERVER said that he had taken note of the Secretary General's suggestion and would transmit it to his Organization. He pointed out that recommended security measures for international airports were listed in Annex No. 17 of the International Civil Aviation Convention (whose provisions were to enter into force on 24th February 1975), as well as in the I.C.A.O. Security Manual.

A member of the UNITED STATES DELEGATION said that, although preventive measures could never be 100% effective, they should constantly be reviewed in order to reduce the risks of hostage-taking. The United States representative to the I.C.A.O. would be informed of the proposals for maximum security zones.

A member of the UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION said he felt it was difficult to enact measures specifically designed to prevent hostage-taking; it would be more feasible and prevent aircraft hijacking more effectively. For example the United Kingdom authorities had extended their control measures to include passengers and luggage on domestic flights.

The JAMAICAN DELEGATE said much could be done to increase civil aviation security, such as organizing night surveillance of aircraft on the ground and assigning airport perimeter guards. Security checks of passengers should be conducted at the very moment of boarding.

The SECRETARY GENERAL thanked the delegates for their co-operation and for the tact they had shown in the discussions.

The 1st International Symposium on Cases Involving Hostages ended at 3:45 p.m. on 5th February 1975.

Police code for siege survival

Advice for hostages: Help your captor have a nice day

From the rash of recent kidnappings in Europe - in which terrorists have held bystanders hostage under threats of violence and even death has emerged a survival code for the captive hostages.

Dr. Peter Scott, a British forensic psychiatrist called in to advise the police in London's two recent kidnap-sieges (the first in October when four black gunmen held six Italians hostage in a basement restaurant for five days; the other in December when four politically motivated Irish kidnappers held a middle-aged couple hostage in their central London apartment for six days), has advised the British public that from the moment when a citizen is taken hostage "do what you are told by your captors, don't resist, and above all don't show hostility."

Dr. Scott, who monitored the Irish kidnappers' conversation picked up by powerful bugging devices in the adjoining apartment, was able to analyse the captors' mood and advise police how to treat them - what tone to use when speaking to them over the telephone, when to give them food and the psychologically right moment to urge them to surrender.

In Britain, and Europe also (there have been two long kidnap-sieges in Holland recently), the paramount concern of the besieging law enforcement forces is the well - being of the hostages.

"The first few minutes are the most dangerous," says Dr. Scott. "So do everything possible to demonstrate in-offensiveness and compliance." As time goes on the situation should ease, but a crisis caused by physical fatigue, inaction and pent-up emotions is liable to erupt on the fifth day.

Before that though, Dr. Scott suggests the captives should try to establish some sort of relationship with their captors. "Just remember that outside is an enormous and powerful organization working non-stop night and day to get you out safely. If you care to swap stories or do a little physical training together (as some of the London hostages did), there is nothing against that. The longer the siege lasts, the safer you are."

Police in Europe have demonstrated unequivocally now they will make no deals with kidnappers, and "once this is accepted...the problem is not how or in what circumstances are you (the hostages) coming out, but only when and whether dead or alive".

To this end, the doctors are involved: "While the whole operation is in police hands, experts from a number of disciplines are accepted in the team, including three senior doctors from the prison medical service. The principal objectives are:

"First - discourage short cuts through the use of violence (storming in with dogs, gas, ultra sound) which are constantly suggested outside.

"Second - give factual advice about the physical requirements and state of health of captors and their captives.

"Third - by patient observation to help in assessing the emotional state, and if possible the intentions of the captors, so that command can make realistic decisions and the interrogator can pitch his conversation accordingly".

Depending on the outcome of these determinations, the police have the choice of adopting severe measures, withholding food, water and other necessities on the one hand, and on the other extreme, keeping them healthy and comfortable "in the sure knowledge that the boredom and stress of contemplating the inevitable will surely and safely conquer in the end".

To hostages and police besiegers alike, Dr. Scott warns: "It seems crucial to be very cautious, to play things down, and not show any fangs, in the dangerous early stages. If there is to be bargaining over the six sandwiches or 12, let it be done with humour".

HOSTAGE INCIDENTS

the new police priority

Extremists of all political ideologies and criminals seeking to effect an escape have discovered that the taking of hostages is often a highly effective tactic in the battle against superior forces. Law enforcement officers throughout the world are daily responding to:

Prison takeovers and escape attempts in which hostages are seized.

Aircraft hijacking

Seizure of business executives, diplomats, athletes, and cultural personalities.

Armed robberies in which bystanders are seized to aid in escapes.

Incidents involving mentally unbalanced citizens who seize hostages in an attempt to gain recognition.

These incidents have been steadily increasing since 1968, when a world wide rash of aircraft hijackings and political kidnappings began. In New York City alone, there were 120 police actions involving hostage situations in 1970; this figure escalated to over 300 incidents in 1973. More recently, the criminal tactic of hostage taking to facilitate escape attempts was dramatically brought to the world's attention when two female hostages were murdered at the Texas State Penitentiary in Huntsville in August 1974.

There is every indication within the law enforcement intelligence community that hostage-taking incidents will not only continue to occur, but will increase in intensity and the degree of serious harm which the perpetrators inflict upon the victims. For example, perpetrators have now served notice that they will indeed execute hostages when their deadlines for demands are not met; the brutal murder of a German banker being held hostage aboard a British aircraft in Tunis in November, 1974, is a grim warning that many more hostages will be executed by perpetrators who are not satisfied by the progress of negotiations. Similarly, the April, 1973, execution by the Armed Forces of the Revolution terrorist group of Count Karl von Spreti, Federal Republic of Germany's ambassador to Guatemala, has since intimidated governments and multinational corporations into paying increasingly larger ransom sums to political terrorists who grow bolder with each new incident. In addition, corporations are paying millions of dollars to terrorist groups in "protection" money.

While recent events have illustrated that hostage-taking incidents may occur almost anywhere, in every nation there are certain individuals who may be considered as high-risk potential victims of criminal and political terrorists.

Political ideologists and terrorist groups seize hostages in order to over-throw, disrupt, or exert pressure upon the existing government; obtain the release of so-called political prisoners; obtain money to advance their revolutionary aims; and obtain converts to their revolutionary cause. Their most easily identifiable victims include high-level employees of corporations and financial institutions, government employees of all ranks, and persons representing governments in a semi-official capacity, such as athletic teams.

The fleeing felon or prison inmate who seizes hostages does so to obtain his personal freedom; he attempts to use the hostages as a human bartering device or as a shield to assure him a safe exit. Here the potential victims are less easy to identify. While it is safe to assume that any employee of a correctional institution may become a hostage, potential hostages of the fleeing felon include anyone within his span of control at the time he makes his attempt.

Of the two classes of perpetrators described above, the politically motivated hostage taker is the most dangerous and poses the greatest threat to the security of nations and private corporations for he is often fanatical to the point of murder and suicide. However, the police response to both types of hostage takers always has the same objective: to seek the return of the hostage unharmed and to capture the perpetrator.

While the threat to world security posed by hostage takers has been recognized by law enforcement officials, at the same time they are aware that the international police community may be unprepared to deal effectively with this problem. Questions have been raised within the law enforcement profession about whether the police are prepared to deal with new forms of terroristic activities, especially terrorism with a political motive.

There are several factors which have thus far inhibited the development of an effective and well-coordinated police response to hostage-taking incidents on the international level.

Primarily, hostage taking as a criminal and terroristic tactic is a relatively new, but growing, phenomenon. Prior to 1968, hostage taking was an almost unheard of tactic; in 1968, however, political kidnappings and skyjackings began to occur with increasing frequency, intensifying to the point where today there are almost daily hostage-taking incidents of one form or another. Two reasons for the growing popularity of hostage taking can be isolated:

(1) there is a "contagion" factor present in society which spurs imitative acts and

(2) society itself is not only becoming more violent, but is more readily accepting violence and the threat of violence.

The contagion factor was present in the rapid escalation of aircraft hijackings, according to Dr. David Hubbard, a psychiatrist who conducted extensive interviews with skyjackers. The spread of this contagion factor can be attributed in part to the international media, which intensely publicize all available details surrounding these events. This publicity not only triggers imitative acts but also provides imitators with detailed guidelines which enable them to develop innovative techniques in order to be successful in their own meticulously planned crime. The contagion factor also gains momentum when law enforcement agencies fail to mount an effective defense against the hostage taker and he succeeds in his crime.

In addition to the contagion factor, there is evidence that society itself is not only becoming more violent but is more readily accepting violence and the threat of violence. According to Professor Hans Toch in his study *Violent Men*, the probability of violence increases with each new act of aggression; violence is habit forming. As Toch explains, aggressors start seeing elements of past violent encounters as they approach fresh situations and they begin to respond routinely. Society's reaction is similar in that each new violent incident eventually becomes "routine" to the public. For example, a dramatic hostage-taking incident which is the first of its kind to strike a particular nation or state is given saturation coverage by the media; the second incident of this nature receives less publicity until subsequent "routine" incidents receive hardly any attention at all. The public interest level is ultimately judged to be one of boredom, unless each new incident involves enough drama and suspense to arouse new interest.

If Toch's thesis regarding the habit-forming nature of violence is correct, then the number of hostage-taking incidents will most likely increase in the forthcoming years, considering the nature of society in conjunction with the contagion factor present in these crimes.

However, law enforcement administrators currently find it difficult to prepare an adequate defense against, and response to, these incidents, given the newness of the phenomenon. When a new form of criminal activity appears, the usual response by law enforcement has been to deal with each incident as it occurs, hoping for a successful tactical outcome. As more and more incidents of a similar nature occur, and a pattern becomes discernible, law enforcement administrators can then begin to collect and analyze

data and develop technologies for response. In many cases, such as the civil disorders of the 1960's it took several years and many disorders, deaths, and injuries before adequate response technologies emerged.

In the universe of hostage-taking incidents, the international law enforcement community is currently in "Phase one" - reacting spontaneously to each incident, attempting to free the hostages and capture the perpetrators, and beginning to discern a pattern.

If it takes several years for law enforcement agencies acting individually to reach "Phase Two" - developing coordinated professional technologies for defense and response - then many more lives will be needlessly lost, for those who would create hostage-taking incidents, particularly terrorist groups, have developed technologies and information-sharing networks for more advanced than present law enforcement efforts in this area. Patterns visible in an analysis of political hostage-taking incidents have indicated that there is coordination between terrorist groups; these groups maintain an active underground information network for the sharing of technical information, money, personnel, and weapons.

Conversely, there is no existing network specifically established to enable law enforcement administrators to share information on hostage-taking incidents on an international level. As a result, when dealing with hostage takers, the police are facing the unknown.

Recognizing that the international law enforcement community needs to develop a professional defense and response capacity against hostage takers, INTERPOL recently sponsored the first International Symposium on Cases Involving Hostages at its headquarters in Saint-Cloud, France, from February 3 to 5. The purpose of the symposium was to bring together police administrators responsible for combating the taking of hostages in order that they could recount their experiences and exchange ideas. Delegates from approximately 40 nations, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Council of Europe, and International Civil Aviation Organization met to discuss police tactics, organization, equipment, international cooperation and the prevention of hostage incidents.

As delegates to the INTERPOL symposium emphasized, the immediate objective of the international law enforcement community should be to develop tactical plans and training programs in order to respond professionally to hostage-taking incidents. While tactical response plans must ultimately be designed by individual departments to meet their specific needs, there are, however, existing commonalities which relate to each type of hostage-taking incident.

The first step in developing a tactical response is to gather facts on all known hostage-taking incidents, categorize incidents by type (e.g., predatory, escape, political, or homicidal), analyze the data for commonalities and differences, and develop typologies for each type of incident. The typologies will provide a composite frame of reference for each type of incident and constitute a necessary step in the development of hostage incident operational plans and training programs.

Each typology should contain the following categories:

1. Description of incident which precipitates the taking of hostages (e.g., an armed robber attempting to escape).
2. Procedures of becoming barricaded and type of common barricades (e.g., common bank physical layouts).
3. Procedures followed in initial police response.
4. Establishment of inner perimeter.
5. Establishment of outer perimeter.
6. Creation of command post.
7. Employment of negotiating team.
8. Description of actions and events inside the barricade.
9. Examination of outside factors which assist/interfere with police operations, including public information.
10. Method of concluding the incident.

In conjunction with the development of typologies on hostage-taking incidents, a corollary objective should be to develop profiles of both perpetrators and victims in order to assist with police planning and the protection of high-risk level victims.

Before law enforcement administrators can adequately prepare defensive operational plans to deal with criminals who seize hostages to secure their demands, the police must be aware of the socio-psychological characteristics of the perpetrator. Thus, it is necessary to classify perpetrators into categories and prepare detailed profiles on them. For the police commander preparing to respond to a hostage-taking incident, detailed profiles of perpetrators are one of the most important tools available to him in determining the likelihood of whether the negotiation process will be his most feasible alternative, as compared to an immediate tactical response. For example, an analysis of the Black September terrorist group prepared by the Committee on Internal Security of the U.S. House of Representatives characterized Black September terrorists as "fanatical to the point of suicide".

An awareness of this type of information about a perpetrator allows the police commander to prepare operational plans which more adequately anticipate how the situation will develop.

Similarly, the police commander needs to know what reactions to expect from various types of hostages-victims while they are being held captive. The science of victimology is a relatively new companion field to criminology. Victim profiles were first developed in 1948 by Dr. Hans von Hentig and have since proven to be valuable in such areas as the development of rape prevention and burglary prevention programs. Once the police understand the factors which consciously or unconsciously motivate a person to become victimized, they can then, in turn, develop programs which teach potential high-risk victims to take safety precautions.

In addition to providing invaluable information to aid in the pre-incident planning process, victim profiles also prove extremely beneficial to police tactical commanders responding to a hostage-taking incident. The police administrator at the command post and the negotiator who is communicating with the perpetrator must be aware of how the victim is reacting to the situation in which he has been placed; is the victim remaining calm or is he antagonizing the perpetrators? Is it likely that a female victim will exhibit symptoms of hysteria or will she react in a maternal manner toward the perpetrator? The answers to such questions can be predicted somewhat accurately from well-prepared victim profiles, derived from a careful analysis of previous and similar incidents.

Following the development of the typologies on hostage-taking incidents, perpetrators, and victims, the third step in preparing to respond to hostage incidents is to develop models of tactical procedures and negotiation techniques for various types of hostage-taking situations.

Designing model response technologies is a necessary step in the development of valid training programs and materials. Since a hostage-taking incident generally involves two phases - the tactical operations phase and the negotiation phase - model technologies should be developed for each phase. These separate models should then be interwoven to provide a complete operational plan for the handling of an incident. It will be necessary to develop several models to correspond with the various types of incidents which may occur.

Each model should contain a consecutive list of steps of follow in handling a specific type of hostage-taking incident. However, since any incident which involves human behavior will likely vary from established norms, each model should also contain alternative courses of action to follow. In addition to procedural steps, these models should also contain:

1. Manpower allocation and deployment requirements.
2. Tactical equipment allocation and deployment requirements.
3. Communication equipment allocation and deployment requirements.
4. Contingency requirements (such as food supplies, medical equipment, escape vehicles, etc.)

Finally, each model should contain an evaluation component to assess its validity during an actual hostage-taking incident.

Once tactical and negotiation procedural models have been developed the fourth step should involve utilization of these models to prepare hostage-training materials and programs.

Valid, rather than speculative, police training programs in the handling of hostage-taking incidents have become mandatory with the rapid international escalation in the number of these incidents. The goal of a training program should be to teach police personnel how to utilize proper tactical and negotiation procedures to save the lives of the hostages, bystanders, police officers handling the incident, and the perpetrators. In order to effectively accomplish this goal, police must be trained to respond to a hostage situation in a truly professional manner; any action taken by them must be clear, decisive, and well coordinated, with officers working as teams, knowing and understanding in advance what their particular roles and tasks will be.

At present, however, a number of factors inhibit the development, implementation, and evaluation of effective hostage incident training programs in police departments. These factors include:

Inadequate identification and understanding of the nature and causes of hostage-taking incidents.

Inadequate identification of the roles and tasks of police personnel who respond to hostage-taking incidents.

Inadequate identification of the objectives to be achieved by police personnel in fulfilling identified roles and tasks in hostage-taking incidents.

Inadequate evaluation of the achievement of the objectives established for identified roles and tasks.

Inadequate relationship of existing training programs to the knowledge and skills actually required.

Inadequate incorporation of contemporary learning techniques in hostage situation training programs, such as role-playing exercises.

Inadequate sharing of information on effective training programs and research among law enforcement agencies and institutions.

Inadequate training materials.

Aware that these deficiencies exist, the IACP's Professional Standards Division began in early 1974 to develop a hostage incident training program for police administrators. This 35-hour seminar, entitled "Hostages: Tactics and Negotiation Techniques," is currently being conducted in seven nations, with enrollment restricted to police commanders.

Based upon an analysis of hostage-taking incidents which are occurring throughout the world, the seminar focuses upon three types of incidents confronting police departments incidents which are linked, potentially linked, or nonlinked. (A linked hostage-taking incident generally involves terroristic groups; the perpetrators involved in the actual incident have accomplices on the outside, at unknown locations, who can exert pressure upon the police. A potentially linked incident is one which produces a "contagion" or imitative factor, e.g., aircraft skyjacking incidents produced a host of similar, and often identical, incidents. A nonlinked incident is one in which the perpetrator acts on his own, often on the spur of the moment, during the course of a robbery or other crime when he finds his escape routes blocked.)

Looking at the immediate future, it is fairly safe to predict that world law enforcement agencies will more frequently be facing terrorists and criminals who have seized hostages to secure their demands. As the professional association for the international law enforcement community, the International Association of Chiefs of Police recognizes its responsibility to develop technologies for the protection of public safety in all nations. It is our objective that these international hostage incident training seminars will serve to stimulate the development of departmental operational plans and policy guidelines and ultimately prevent additional deaths and injuries resulting from the criminal tactic of hostage taking.

Hostage-Incident Response

Patrol officers are usually responsible for the initial police response at the scene of hostage incidents. To clearly understand their role in such situations, police officers must be familiar with the tactics of hostage-takers and the procedural steps involved in the negotiation process. Such knowledge may help to save the lives of hostages, bystanders, and police officers.

Since 1968, hostage-taking by political extremists and criminals has steadily increased, and there is every indication that the frequency of hostage incidents will continue to rise. The most notorious incidents are international hostage-takings for political purpose, a matter in which most local police departments will not become involved. Nevertheless, police officers should be familiar with the tactics of the political extremist since their methods are being employed increasingly by criminals and others in situations where local police are responsible for intervention. Police officers should be prepared to respond to armed robbery attempts where bystanders have been seized to aid criminal flight, to jail and prison disorders where hostages have been taken as ransom for prisoners' demands, to family disputes and other highly emotional situations where violent persons hold victims for irrational reasons.

The tactic of taking hostages is often viewed by criminals as a highly effective method of coping with superior law enforcement forces at the scene of a crime. The optimum settlement that the police try to achieve in such cases is to seek return of the hostages unharmed and take the criminals into custody.

THE PERPETRATORS

For law enforcement personnel to effectively intervene in hostage-taking incidents, they should be aware of the general characteristics of those who most frequently engage in such acts. Knowledge of the perpetrators' characteristics helps to determine whether the negotiation process is feasible or whether an immediate tactical response is required. Those who are most frequently involved in hostage-taking are generally classified as terrorists, escaping felons, rioting prisoners, and emotionally violent persons.

TERRORIST: Hostage-taking by terrorist groups have become a common event in recent years. A 1974 study conducted by the U.S. House Committee on Internal Security identified more than 400 such incidents worldwide that took place between 1968 and 1973. This figure includes only "international" cases, incidents in which terrorists crossed national borders to attack or where victims were selected because of their citizenship or political affiliation. The study did not consider political kidnappings of a domestic nature or criminal kidnappings where monetary gain was the sole objective of the criminals.

It is estimated that there are over 21 terrorist organizations in the United States today that are seeking the downfall of American institutions. Add to these another 16 terrorist groups in the Middle East, 10 in Africa, 10 in western Europe, and many more in South America, Burma, Japan, and the Philippines, and the potential for terroristic activity by these groups is evident*. An additional threat is that other groups, not necessarily terroristic or political in nature, may borrow and use the same tactics to achieve their aims.

Political ideologists and terrorist groups seize hostages in order to overthrow, disrupt, or exert pressure upon an existing government; obtain the release of so-called political prisoners; obtain money to advance their revolutionary aims; and obtain converts to their revolutionary cause. The targets of terrorist groups frequently include high-level employees of corporations and financial institutions, government employees of all ranks, and persons representing governments in a semi-official capacity, such as athletic teams.

The terrorist poses the greatest of threats because he is often fanatical to the point of murder and suicide. Terrorist may also use unknown accomplices outside of the hostage incident to influence public opinion and to exert pressure upon the police to meet their demands.

When a terrorist group holds hostages and makes non-negotiable demands for the release of prisoners, provision of weapons, or promise of amnesty, they should be advised at the outset that these demands will not be met. Once the terrorist become aware that these demands are non-negotiable, an immediate impasse is reached and they are left with a limited number of options. The terrorists can choose to kill the hostages and commit suicide, which is unlikely, they can surrender, or they can lessen their demands to more realistic proportions and enter into negotiation.

*Conrad V. Hassel, "The Hostage Situation: Exploring Motivation and the Cause," "Police Chief, Sept. 1975, p. 56.

Although some fanatical terrorists will not lessen their demands because of strong commitment, most terrorists will react to the reality of the situation and negotiate. Once terrorists admit that they are willing to settle for less than initially demanded, law enforcement officials have gained the psychological advantage and negotiation is possible.

ESCAPING FELON: Quicker response by police has increased the occurrence of confrontations between officers and felons at crime scenes. When felons feel trapped at a crime scene, they sometimes choose to seize hostages to use as shields during escape attempts or as a barter for their freedom.

Since the felon's act of taking hostages at a crime scene is aimed toward a rational end, his safety and freedom it can be assumed that negotiations are possible with this type of criminal. Initially, however, the situation poses as a real threat to the safety of the hostages. The felon is caught in an unplanned situation and is confused, frightened, and fearful for his own safety. He is being forced to make snap decisions in a crisis without the opportunity to assess the situation realistically. At this point, police officers should suggest that he "cool off," analyze his position, and reflect on the consequences of his acts. This serves to channel the criminal's thought in the direction of negotiation. Once the situation has stabilized, preliminary negotiations can begin.

Armed felons who take hostages when trapped often imitate the behavior of political terrorists. Terrorist rhetoric is employed to make their position appear uncompromising. In such cases, the criminals' convictions should be doubted, if their original actions have no political overtones. The rhetoric is probably more of a bargaining tool than an expression of deeply held commitment.

PRISONERS: Local police officers are usually called to intervene in jail and prison hostage situations when correctional authorities feel that additional manpower is needed to control the revolt. Use of local police in such situations is viewed by many penal experts as highly desirable since a potentially violent confrontation between correctional personnel and inmates may permanently damage future working relationships in the institution.

The time factor, which gives the rioters a chance to collect their thoughts and to "cool off", has worked both for and against law enforcement in prisoner riots. Allowing prisoners a stabilization period often permits the leaders to exploit their position and consolidate their leadership. Immediate action taken before prisoners can organize and arm themselves may well be less costly in certain cases.

MENTALLY DERANGED: Increasingly common are incidents where a mentally deranged person takes family members as hostages. Extreme care in these situations must be exercised since the disturbed person is not capable of acting rationally. Attempts should be made to identify and reduce the emotional stress that is usually the precipitating factor in these incidents. The passage of time in itself usually helps to reduce the captor's anxiety. Police officers should maintain a calm attitude and avoid any acts that may threaten an emotionally ill person.

PATROL'S RESPONSE

Because many hostage incidents develop impulsively during the commission of other crimes, patrol officers should consider immediate intervention if the hostage-taker has not gained physical control of the crime scene and victims. In such a case, officers must exercise caution, recognizing that the safety of the victims is paramount. They must also act confidently, recognizing that intervention at this crucial point in time cannot wait for the police specialist*.

Immediate intervention by patrol officers is not appropriate when suspects control the crime area and hostages. Police assault in these cases would needlessly endanger the lives of police officers and hostages. The patrol objective here is to contain and analyze the incident. Observing the following procedures, patrol officers will be able to stabilize the incident and facilitate the negotiation process.

LOCATE: Determining the exact location of the hostage scene is critical to containment of the incident. The building, floor, and room where the captors are situated must first be identified before officers can be positioned to confine the criminals' movement. The immediate area should be cleared of all other persons.

ISOLATE: After the police officers have established their containment position, they should not attempt to enter the secured area. Nevertheless, they should be constantly prepared to make an assault if the lives of the hostages appear to be seriously threatened. Officers should shoot only if they are convinced that the perpetrators are prepared to kill the hostages. If shooting begins, officers must be ready to launch an all-out assault and enter the secured area.

Normally an assault at this stage is not necessary, and patrol officers should retain their blocking positions until members of special weapons and tactics teams are positioned to relieve them. The positioning of special weapons assault teams should be carried out as soon as possible in case an assault on the hostage location is necessary.

*Training Key # 231, "Robbery Response", outlines intervention procedures to be used during robberies to avoid hostage situations.

The withdrawn patrol force should establish a perimeter around the area and cordon it off. By establishing a perimeter area, patrol officers create a clear line of fire completely around the hostage-takers' area of control. Traffic and citizens should be detoured from the area, and arrangements should be made with the utility companies to cut off the service in this area, especially telephones. Resumption of utility services can be used as a bargaining point in later negotiations.

EVACUATE: The isolated and adjacent areas should be evacuated whenever tactical conditions permit. Removal of uninvolved persons not only ensures their safety, but also greatly facilitates subsequent police action. Whenever possible, evacuees should be detained in a location (school or national guard armory, for example) where food and sanitation facilities are available since the incident may last for hours or days. Evacuees should be questioned for pertinent information about the location and about any persons who may be hostages. Unfortunately, the evacuation of heavily populated high-rise buildings may simply not be practicable and police action will have to proceed without it.

Even though loudspeaker commands or door-to-door notices have ordered evacuation from a building, it should never be assumed that all innocent persons have cleared the area. Experience has shown that some people will remain in their homes rather than follow police instructions, especially when they are frightened. Also, special arrangements may be needed for the removal of the elderly and sick. Evacuees should be instructed to securely lock their doors and, if manpower can be spared, police should guard the buildings.

Community relations personnel should be deployed to deal with groups and individuals who may convene at the police lines. At the scene of hostage incidents, long-standing community resentment against governmental authority may surface and be exploited by rumor, resulting in crowd members threatening or taking action in support of perpetrators. Because of the potential for misinterpretation of police action, community relations officers should move through the crowd, explaining the situation and the role of the police in securing a peaceful settlement to the incident and the safe release of the hostages.

The scene of a hostage incident invariably attracts a large number of news media representatives. Designated public information officers will need to arrange for the requirements of news media personnel, prepare statements, and answer reporters' inquiries. Although it is desirable to accommodate the news media, reporters cannot be allowed to interfere with the police operation. Reporters should be restricted to designated locations and kept out of the command post and other areas where police operations are being conducted.

Officers manning the police lines around the incident should be kept informed of new developments so that they are constantly prepared to act appropriately if the incident extends to their position. Important information can be channeled in an uncomplicated manner to officers on the perimeter. For example, pictures of the perpetrators should be circulated among officers to facilitate identification in case the criminals break out of the building.

EQUIPMENT: Police personnel should make maximum use of available equipment to monitor the actions of the kidnappers from a relatively safe position. To better observe the hostage location without unnecessarily endangering police personnel, television cameras, periscopes, or contrivances such as mirrors on rods can be used.

Other optical aids that have proved to be quite useful in hostage incidents are binoculars, telescopes, and night-vision devices. Binoculars are especially good for line personnel who may be called upon to move. The telescope is used primarily from a fixed surveillance location. Night-vision devices are designed specifically for surveillance in low-light situations.

Closed-circuit television cameras can be used to monitor the interior as well as the exterior of a hostage area. Exterior monitoring can be accomplished by setting television cameras in the street or on top of buildings. When police have access to a wall adjoining the hostage scene, a television camera can be used to view the crime scene through a small hole made in the wall. No special lens is required and the diameter of the hole needs to be only as large as that of an ordinary lead pencil. Audio surveillance can similarly be maintained by using a spike microphone driven through a common wall or a contact microphone placed against the wall.

If the holding place of the hostages is an office building, speakers in any Muzak or public address system can be quickly converted by an electronics specialist to provide audio surveillance. All that is necessary is to intercept the pair of speaker wires at any point in the building and attach an amplifier. Shotgun or parabolic microphones can be used when a highly directional microphone is needed in a closed area.

In addition to surreptitious monitoring of the hostage area, the police should also establish communication with the kidnappers. Since the building's utilities will have been cut off, including telephone service, new communications devices, such as a special telephone line, portable radios, or a bullhorn, will need to be put in operation.

Not to be forgotten when considering necessary equipment are protective and offensive items for police personnel. Body armor, shotguns, rifles, and tear gas should be issued to designated officers. Barricades, ropes signs, and portable radios will be needed by the officers at the perimeter.

Relief areas for police personnel, a work area for news media personnel, and a standby area for utility and medical personnel and their equipment are required, particularly at the scene of a long seige.

EVALUATING THE SUSPECTS

After the scene has been brought under physical control, the police must try to evaluate the hostage-takers' motives and capabilities. Officers should canvass the area and interview all persons who may have knowledge of the situation to establish the number and identity of the hostages and kidnappers and the types of weapons involved. If the identity of a hostage-taker is known, his spouse, parents, siblings, neighbors, or friends should be contacted and interviewed. Often such persons can provide police officers with valuable information about the perpetrator's behavior and reasoning process.

Obtaining the medical and mental history of the perpetrators and their hostages is important. Knowledge that someone is sick, mentally disturbed, or alcoholic, for example, will enable police officers to better understand the situation. Professionals such as doctors who have dealt with the kidnapper should be interviewed and either brought to the scene or kept available for consultation.

EVALUATING THE VICTIMS

Preliminary study of the effects of captivity on hostages has been somewhat startling. Most hostages are extremely docile and cooperate completely with their captors, sometimes to the point of failing to escape when given the opportunity. This phenomenon has been dubbed the "Stockholm syndrome" after an incident which occurred in Stockholm, Sweden, in which female hostages were held in a bank vault by trapped would-be bank robbers for several days. After their release, the hostages expressed a strong attachment to their captors and refused to testify against them.

The degree of identification which the hostage may feel toward his captors of course varies with the time spent with the hostage-taker and the treatment he receives, but this does not appear to be the only factor. Almost all victims have admitted to identifying to some degree with their captors. It may be that the stronger personality with a wellfounded set of values is less swayed than the weaker personality, but this cannot be proved conclusively.

The politically motivated hostage-taker in particular may spend long hours in discussion with his victim in an attempt to justify his cause. It has been found that this form of persuasion coupled with the possibility of imminent death, is a crude yet effective type of brain-washing. It may even cause the victim to question his values and life-style.

This identity syndrome must be kept in mind by law enforcement personnel, especially when an attempt is made to predict the probable reaction of victims during the incident. Specific information obtained from family and friends about the hostages' emotional condition and their probable behavior in stressful situations must therefore be viewed cautiously.

The Stockholm syndrome has a reciprocal side. It has been an axiom in hostage negotiations that the more time the hostage spends with his abductor, the better the survival chances of the hostage. Just as the hostage may gradually accept the kidnapper, so the captor may become sympathetic toward the position of his victim.

NEGOTIATIONS

Because the hostage negotiating process is a complex activity, police departments are advised to designate and train personnel who will serve exclusively as negotiators at the hostage scene. Although the negotiators are usually regularly assigned to other police duties, at the scene of a hostage incident they should not be used as tactical personnel or given other duties. Negotiators should only be used for one purpose - to mediate the demands of the hostage-takers. Ideally, negotiations personnel should mirror the hostage-taker with regard to nationality, ethnicity, languages spoken, and sex. The officers used as negotiators should have demonstrated an ability to intervene successfully in crisis situations.

Organizationally, the supervisors of the tactical and negotiation teams should report to an operations commander at the on-scene post. Although the chief will have ultimate responsibility for police action, he should not serve as the negotiator nor should the hostage-takers know of his presence at the scene. When the hostage-taker's demands need to be negotiated, the negotiator will have to go to the chief, thus giving both of them more time to consult with other officials and to develop counter proposals if needed. Ordinarily, the practice of bringing into the negotiations operation family members and other relatives, friends, and various authority figures (ministers, teachers, political, and community leaders) known to the perpetrator should be avoided since the effect these persons may have is unpredictable. The conduct of the negotiation process is a specialized endeavour, and maximum control over the process is best maintained by restricting its management to those trained to conduct it.

SUMMARY

Successful police intervention in hostage situations requires use of a dynamic blend of appropriate tactical responses and of negotiation techniques developed by behavioral scientists. The patrol officer plays an important role in the tactical response. He is usually the first at the scene of the hostage-taking, and his initial reaction to the situation can mean the difference between life or death - for himself as well as others. It is the patrol officer who must decide whether immediate intervention is the best course of action. If it is not, the patrol officer is responsible for obtaining basic information about the hostage-taking and containing the incident so that special weapons and tactics teams can be deployed and negotiations begun.

In negotiating the return of hostages unharmed, use of personnel trained in the behavioral sciences is essential since the police response largely depends on an understanding of the perpetrators' motives and likely actions. Cool-headed police leadership is also required to coordinate police intervention in hostage situations.

DISCUSSION GUIDE

1. Time is an important element which can be used advantageously by police officers to prevent a hostage situation from developing or to facilitate the release of hostages unharmed. Discuss the two ways in which time may be an important response factor:

- A. Preventing Hostage Situations

...Where possible, patrol officers should intervene immediately to prevent a hostage situation from developing.

...Even if the officers are not altogether successful, they may place the would-be hostage-taker in a vulnerable position.

...Officers should remember that immediate intervention is practical only when the hostage-taker has not gained control of the situation.

- B. Stabilizing the Incident

...The first few minutes of a hostage incident are the most dangerous.

...The criminal is confused, thinking and acting under extreme pressure.

...Time should be used to decrease the tension, allowing the hostage-taker a period to recognize the reality of his plight.

...After the stabilization period, negotiations can be started.

2. The specific procedures to be used in the negotiation process depend largely on the nature of the circumstances encountered; however, there are general guidelines that may be followed in most hostage incidents. Discuss the following negotiation factors:

...Establish communication with the hostage-taker as soon as possible by closed-line telephone or provide him with a walkie-talkie.

...Follow the cardinal canon: Keep the perpetrator talking to you as long as possible.

...Recognize that as long as the perpetrator is talking, the opportunity remains for a successful negotiation.

...Interview the spouse, parents, and siblings of the perpetrator to gain further insight into the perpetrator's behavior and reasoning process.

...Contact psychologist, clergyman, lawyer, and probation/parole officer who have dealt with the hostage-taker and request that they come to the command post or make themselves available for consultations.

...Set no demands other than agree to trade the release of the hostage for the perpetrator's safety in surrender.

...Accept no deadlines from the perpetrator.

...Never give him anything without getting something in return.

...Establish with the perpetrator a manner by which food and beverages and other personal needs will be made available to him and the hostages.

...Make certain that nourishment provided is ample and attractive, reflecting a concern for the perpetrator's physical condition.

...Do not introduce drugs into food or beverages.

...Determine if the hostages are bound or able to move about.

...Ask to see the hostages so that you can assess their well-being and movement potential.

...Do not show over-concern for the welfare of the hostages.

...Conduct assessments on a continuing basis of the perpetrator's willingness and ability to negotiate and his rationality, noting the following indicators: his continued participation in the negotiating process, his lessening of demands, the uneventful passage of deadlines set by him, and his more considerate treatment of the hostage.

...Continue to do everything possible to consume time, in the expectation that the perpetrator's resistance to agreement will collapse or that he will miscalculate the situation, enabling police officers to make the apprehension.

...Settle with the perpetrator on his negotiable demands, if possible, to convince him to yield the hostage for his own safety in surrender.

...If it will move him to an optimum settlement, indicate that you will agree to reasonable demands between his surrender and his booking. Inform him that you personally will escort him to the booking - and so do.

...As a further attempt to reach an optimum settlement, agree that you will seek to get concurrence from any individual he designates to ride to the booking with him and you.

...If the perpetrator insists upon it and it will bring him to yield the hostages and to surrender, agree to arrange a meeting with media personnel.

Acknowledgement

Dr. Irving Goldaber, 6 Stratford Court, North bellmore, N. Y. 11710, provided valuable assistance in the formulation of the negotiation concepts contained in this Training Key. Dr. Goldaber is a private consultant and an adjunct professor of sociology at Brooklyn College, University of New York.

QUESTIONS

The following questions are based on material in this Training Key. Select the best answers.

1. The Stockholm syndrome refers to:
 - (a) The critical importance of time in negotiating a bloodless settlement.
 - (b) The political motivations of certain terrorist groups.
 - (c) A possible reaction of hostages.
 - (d) Negotiation principles that have been followed successfully in Europe.
2. Immediate intervention at the scene of a potential hostage-taking:
 - (a) Is a specialized function best carried out by SWAT teams.
 - (b) Unnecessarily endangers the lives of innocent persons.
 - (c) Is a good tactic where superior police manpower exists.
 - (d) Is appropriate when the hostage-taker does not control the situation.
3. The longer the negotiation period, the more likely that:
 - (a) The incident will end peacefully.
 - (b) The hostage-takers will increase their demands.
 - (c) Police assault will be required to rescue the hostages.
 - (d) The demands of the hostage-takers will have to be met by police.

ANSWERS

1. (c) Many hostages gradually identify with their captors.
2. (d) Immediate intervention should be considered when the scene is not controlled by the hostage-takers.
3. (a) Once negotiations begin, time works to the advantage of the police, eroding the will of the hostage-takers.

HAVE YOU READ . . . ?

THE POLICE CHIEF. "Hostage Incidents: The New Police Priority," Richard Kobetz. International Association of Chiefs of Police, Eleven Firstfield Road, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760.

An article that analyzes hostages incidents and the police priority.

THE POLICE CHIEF. "The Hostage Situation: Exploring the Motivation and the Causes," Conrad V. Hassel. International Association of Chiefs of Police, Eleven Firstfield Road, Gaitherburg, Maryland 20760.

An article that discusses the personalities of hostage-takers.

HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

What is a hostage situation?

Types of hostage situations:

1. Traditional
2. Escape Oriented
3. Prison
4. Mentally Disturbed
5. Political

.../2

What are our objectives in hostage situations?

Policy Formulations:

Alternative Procedures for Implementation of Policy:

Psychological Guidelines:

1. Measure emotional stability.
2. Evaluate dedication to cause.
3. Never negotiate to supply weapons.
4. Staff for time.
5. Never offer suggestions.
6. Never agree to a demand without receiving something in return.
7. Keep perpetrator in a decision making status.
8. Nurture escape potential.

9. Select negotiators with care.

1. Measure Emotional Stability:

A technique of investigation which has been used by famous detectives throughout the world.

Psychological Aspects:

The first attempts to explain human behaviour centered around demonology and many still cling to these beliefs. Today, however, most accept the premise that man's behaviour stems from an unbelievably complex mixture of beliefs, emotions, training, ego, environment, attitude, experiences, self-concepts and physical well being. The study of these elements in the manner in which they affect the individual fall within the realms of physiology, psychology and sociology. Each of these areas must in turn be studied very carefully if one is to achieve an overall view of why individuals react in a given manner.

There are currently two major theories which attempt to explain criminal activity:

1.

2.

The first theory is based on the fact that all people have a limit to the amount of frustrations, stress and anxiety they can endure. Moreover, it is postulated that this limit is different for each individual due to constitutional, psychological and sociological variables. In other words, one individual may be able to cope with a great amount of stress due to a strong constitution, sound sociological makeup and a well structured psychological environment. Another person lacking in one or more of these elements would break under the pressure.

Psychiatrists, to a large extent, attempt to utilize a basic theoretical framework to explain all behaviour, criminal and otherwise, briefly it states that:

1. Everyone has basic inherent needs which are constantly seeking satisfaction.
2. The extent and the method by which these needs find fulfillment during early childhood directly influences or dictates the type of personality which will emerge as the person grows older.

The hierarchy of needs according to Abraham Maslow are:

Psychoanalysis (freudian), while agreeing with the psychiatrist on the importance of the individuals early experiences attempts to explain behaviour in terms of the formulation, strength and conflicts between the three functions of the unconscious mind. Namely, the Id, Ego and the Super Ego.

From a physical-psychological point of view, crime can be defined as an individual reaction to some type of frustration, stress or anxiety resulting in behaviour defined as unlawful by the culture. These frustrations may be the result of almost any real or imagined situation. Nevertheless, it usually stems from physical disabilities, inner hostilities, peer group requirements and/or from various inconsistencies within our culture.

With this definition of crime in mind, it might be said initially that all the various functional mental disorders are the result of the individual's attempts to overcome his feelings of stress or anxiety. According to the basic theory, man is thought to possess several basic instincts and the capacity to choose the methods by which they can be satisfied. These instincts and the methods utilized for their satisfaction thus form the basis of behaviour and determine to a great extent the essential nature of the personality. During the process of growing up, the individual finds that the fulfillment of these instincts must be controlled or restrained for legal, moral or cultural reasons. However, attempts to conform often result in various degrees of frustration and anxiety. Anxiety is a most painful and distressing condition and can normally be tolerated for only short periods of time before panic sets in. Man is, therefore, confronted with a dilemma:

1. He can disregard social controls, customs, etc., and proceed to satisfy his instincts, or,
2. He can utilize one or more of an elaborate set of defense mechanisms. (Defense mechanisms are automatic mental responses and thought patterns designed to protect the mental well being by blocking, hiding or redirecting anxiety.)

The technique an individual chooses will depend to a large extent upon the influence of the Super Ego, or the conscience, and reflects the degree to which he has accepted the customs of his culture. If his Super Ego is strong and the socialization process has been adequate, he will probably choose one or more of the defense mechanisms. On the other hand, if his Super Ego is weak or absent, if because of some physical defect he is unable to handle stress, or if the socialization process for the pertinent culture has been inadequate, his decision will be based primarily upon the Ego function, i.e., the most realistic and most direct method of satisfying his need.

It is the employment of these defense mechanisms which in the last analysis forms the basis for the various mental illnesses. This does not mean that an occasional utilization of one or more of the defense mechanisms is abnormal. On the contrary, everyone sometimes finds it necessary to defend himself against mental injury in this manner. As a matter of fact, some of the greatest figures of history found fame because of the utilization of various defense mechanisms. It is only when these defenses are habitually or inappropriately utilized that a mental disorder is indicated.

Criminal activity, of course, can result from either the person's direct violation of society's customs in order to satisfy his instincts or from the manner in which the defense mechanisms are utilized.

Due to the extreme amount of stress and anxiety found in the typical hostage situation, three psychological phenomenon must be considered, these are:

1. Body space.
2. Eye power.
3. The Stockholm Syndrome.

Another law of human behaviour must be kept in mind at all times during any such high stress situations, this is the relationship between emotion and reason.

Biological Considerations:

Individuals are sometimes unable to withstand stress because of actual physical defects. In such circumstances the person may behave irrationally or even violently in spite of the fact that he knows it is wrong.

Psychological Considerations:

When the inappropriate use of one or more of the defense mechanisms becomes so common as to entirely dominate or limit a significant portion of the person's activity, he is usually considered to be suffering from some type of mental disorder. These disorders usually manifest themselves in irregularities of behaviour, perception, thinking, orientation, memory, consciousness and/or emotional feelings. For classification purposes, the various disorders have been broken down into a number of rather broadly defined groups. Two of them, the neuroses and the psychoses, are of particular interest to law enforcement. A third group, the personality or character disorder, which appear to evolve from abnormal socialization processes, are also of interest to this field and will be the third group discussed.

Psychoneuroses (Neuroses)

A psychoneurosis is defined as:

Psychoneurotic reactions are rather common in our society today. Surveys indicate that perhaps as high as from 30 to 50% of the

patients applying for treatment in the clinics and hospitals throughout the nation are neurotic to some degree. Most are a relatively non-aggressive and law abiding group of people. Based on the definition of the condition, it is obvious that there is considerable hostility and inner conflict involved in many of the neuroses; however, because of the person's personality makeup, this hostility is in most cases based on feelings of guilt or inadequacy and directed against himself. It is for this reason that the neurotic seldom engages in anti-social conduct.

Several types of criminal behaviour, however, are encountered occasionally. Some of the more common types are: kleptomania, pyromania, exhibitionism, voyeurism, fetishism, pedophilia and obscene phone calls. Such serious crimes as rape and murder, while rare, can also occasionally result from this condition. Further, while not a crime in some states, people afflicted with certain neuroses are prone to suicide. This presents a definite police problem.

Psychoses

Psychoses are defined as:

These abnormalities are, strictly speaking, malfunctions of the mind to such a degree that it no longer operates in a satisfactory manner (satisfactory, that is, in the sense that the normal mind is functioning in a manner cognizant of the existing circumstances). Psychoses are normally characterized by gross behavioural changes and disorders of speech and thought. Often there are also changes in the ability to express or experience emotional reactions.

Within the functional category there are a number of behavioural patterns which exhibit the above abnormalities to a greater or lesser degree. For our purposes we have grouped these conditions into four general categories according to their major behavioural characteristics. These four groups are:

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.

Any complete diagnostic description of the major groups, their causative factors and detailed characteristics is beyond the scope and intent of this course. Our primary purpose is to become familiar with the patterns of behaviour associated with mental disorders so that we may be better able to communicate and prevent the needless loss of life. We will, therefore, limit our discussion to those psychotic reactions most frequently encountered.

Simple Schizophrenia

Hebephrenic

Catatonic

Paranoid

Paranoia or Paranoid State

The second type of psychosis to be discussed is paranoia or paranoid state as it is sometimes called. Although quite similar in many respects to paranoid schizophrenia, the paranoid state is considered separately because of the following distinguishing characteristics:

The typical individual afflicted with paranoia is over 30 years of age and has a personality quite similar to that found in the developing paranoid schizophrenic. His delusions and distortions of reality are usually centered around his work, family, community, government or in some cases, a specific individual. Unlike his schizophrenic counterpart, the feeling that he is being persecuted often has some basis in fact. This fact, however, has become greatly distorted and intensified and no amount of evidence will convince him that he is wrong. Attempts to do so will usually result in an irritable, defensive evasiveness. He spends most of his time trying to interpret the disparaging plans of those around him. He is suspicious of everyone. Occasionally, delusions of grandeur may appear, the individual may claim to be a genius and the inventor of some type of mechanism which defies the law of nature. On the other hand, he may claim to be a prophet and set up some religious cult. Again, the claim may be that he is loved by some famous personality whose feelings cannot be revealed because of possible adverse publicity.

The paranoid individual, like the paranoid schizophrenic, is a prolific letter writer. However, his letters show little evidence of mental abnormality and are often quite plausible in nature, providing that the original delusion of persecution or grandeur is accepted. Letters of this type usually request help in dealing with a person or an organization which has been treating him unfairly without cause.

The law enforcement officer comes into contrast with this particular abnormality more often than any other psychotic reaction since the paranoid often initiates complaints and legal action against his persecutors in such a manner that on the surface the complaints seem quite valid. Occasionally, under the delusions of grandeur the individual may run up large hotel or entertainment bills which he cannot pay, or he may write bad checks in various amounts. The primary danger inherent in this condition is the possibility that the individual, feeling persecuted, will elect to take matters into his own hands or that he will become depressed and suicidal because he cannot cope with his enemies.

Political Paranoias - Group Dynamics

The Manic-Depressive Reactions (Affective)

The third group of psychoses to be considered are defined generally as:

This group of reactions involve severe disturbances of thought and mood. The age of onset is usually between 25 and 60 and it is more common in women. Possibly more than any type of psychosis, the manic-depressive reactions are characterized by periods of psychotic behaviour separated by intervals of relative rationality. During the manic phase, the individual can be described as a bubbling extrovert, the life of the party, full of energy and emotionally responsive. This period of self-confidence may involve pranks, obscene jokes or open hostilities. As in the case of the paranoids, the manic may, during this phase, write numerous letters, many underlined words and exclamation points. Such letters usually offer instructions or give the writer's opinions of the subjects involved. This manic phase is a period of sexual excesses both for the male and the female; formerly chaste individuals may become promiscuous. The manic phase at its most acute stage fulfills the popular conception of the "raving maniac" and during this particular time the individual can be quite aggressive and extremely dangerous.

The depressive phase of this illness is the exact opposite of the manic phase and appears to be associated with people who have always been rather timid, insecure and sensitive to criticism. With the onset of the disease, they usually exhibit symptoms of chronic fatigue and a loss of non-existing physical ailments. These people characteristically indulge in excessive self-criticism and delusions of unworthiness. As the disorder intensifies, they often feel that they are "being eaten away from the inside" as a result of their sins and the possibility of suicide becomes a reality. Of interest to law enforcement

is the fact that homicides are committed by such individuals and the victim is almost invariably a loved one. Occasionally, the homicide will be followed by suicide.

Involitional Psychotic Reactions

Personality or Character Disorders

Personality or character disorders are defined as:

Quite unlike the neuroses and psychoses which are attempts to adapt to the stresses and frustrations of life; there is no agreed-upon body of knowledge which adequately explains the personality disorder.

Many, however, believe this abnormality to be caused by:

Whatever the cause, the result appears to be some type of defect in the actual structure of the personality. This defect results in a life-long maladjustment of character which is usually noticed at an early age.

The character disorders are grouped into three types:

1. Disturbances of personality patterns.
2. Disturbances of personality traits.
3. Sociopathic personalities (psychopaths).

Of these three, the sociopath or psychopath as he is often called, is by far the greatest problem for law enforcement and the only one which we will consider here.

The primary characteristics of the sociopath are:

Although the term sociopath is of relatively recent origin, the disorder certainly is not new. Early in the nineteenth century, Prichard described individuals afflicted with this disorder as being "morally insane" and Benjamin Rush believed that they were victims of a deranged "will". Later, the terms "constitutional psychopathic inferior" and "psychopath" came into general use. Currently, there are some indications that the word sociopath is being replaced by "antisocial personality".

Whatever the designation, however, to the law enforcement officer this individual means trouble. As a general rule the sociopath is intelligent, witty, personable and totally without moral or ethical scruples. While he is most often encountered in property crimes such as forgery and confidence games, he is capable of any type of offence if it will best satisfy his needs.

The sociopath is literally a free agent and recognizes no laws which are not of assistance to him in obtaining something he desires. The extent of his criminal activity is possible best shown by a 1963 survey of Sing Sing Prison which revealed that roughly 35 percent of the inmate population were probable sociopaths.

Sociological Stress Considerations

2. Evaluation and Dedication to Cause
3. Never Negotiate to Supply Weapons
4. Staff for Time
5. Never offer Suggestions
6. Never Agree to a Demand without Receiving Something in Return

7. Keep Perpetrator in a Decision Making Status
8. Nurture Escape Potential
9. Select Negotiators with Care

"YOU ARE HOSTAGES."

Scene: a Dutch prison. Perpetrator: four young convicts, brandishing guns. Victim: a visiting choir

By Edward Hughes

Behind the forbidding walls of Scheveningen penitentiary, on the outskirts of The Hague, 13 prisoners were gathered in the chapel for the Saturday-night Mass. Facing them stood the chaplain, Father Antonius de Bot, two guards and 19 devout Roman Catholic laymen from outside: members of a visiting choir, some with their children.

Suddenly, as the choir leader raised his hand for the first hymn, two convicts leaped forward and fired pistols into the ceiling. "You are hostages." they shouted, and ordered singers, guards and priest against a wall.

The two pistol-carrying desperados were Adnan Nuri, 23, a lean wiry Palestinian hijacker who had destroyed an airliner on Dutch soil eight months before, and Jan Brouwers, 27, a hardened felon doing seven years for holding a farm family hostage after a 1973 bank robbery. Now, other convicts not in the plot hurried out of the room. But two stayed to join the armed leaders: Daan Denie, Brouwers' partner in the 1973 escape, and Mohammed Koudache, a convicted thief from Algeria.

For weeks, under the cover of hymn singing at these Saturday-night services, Nuri and Brouwers had furtively discussed plans to break out of the prison. They agreed on the chapel as their starting point because the bare-brick, rectangular room would be relatively easy to defend. There was a single, massive steel door leading to the outside corridor. The small windows along the side walls had thick translucent panes and, because the chapel was also used for movies, had heavy shades to black them out. The prison guards were unarmed, so their capture would provide no weapons. But, incredibly, Brouwers had managed to have two pistols smuggled in. And on October 26, 1974, Nuri and Brouwers made their attempt.

Now, as they waved the guns about, they bawled their first curt order: "Give us a walkie-talkie." With a radio link established, Nuri next demanded to be reunited with Sami Tamimah, a shrewd 22-year-old fellow Arab who had led the skyjacking that had landed them both in jail. Officials had carefully kept the two apart.

But Nuri and Brouwers knew that they urgently needed a stronger leader than themselves to parlay possession of hostages into a full-blown escape.

As the convicts yelled orders, terrified hostages huddled on chairs or the floor. Some wept. The senior guard, Arnoldus ("Nol") Kloosterman, 47, quietly walked among them offering words of reassurance. He was especially concerned about Constant Van Limbergen, 61, who suffered from a heart ailment; also Marie Pannekoek, painfully crippled by arthritis, who had come with their young daughter to hear her husband sing.

The convicts snapped off most of the lights, plunging the chapel into eerie semidarkness, and drew the shades tight over the thick windows. The little community inside the hall became a world of its own.

The first alarm, shortly after 7:15 p.m., had brought dozens of police swarming to the prison. Searchlights soon played their beams on the gloomy complex of 19th-century buildings; sharpshooters took up positions around the 20-foot wall. Civilian authorities rushed to the scene: the Lord Mayor, Police Commissioner, District Attorney, the Queen's Commissioner. Also the Attorney General of Southwest Holland, quiet, deliberate Baron Warmold va der Feltz; District Psychiatrist Dr. Dirk Mulder, who had interviewed the convicts frequently in prison tests; and Dr. Johannes Jansen, a young lecturer of Arabic at the University of Leiden. This group set up a Crisis Center in a room less than 100 feet down a corridor from the beleaguered pris on chapel. Technicians soon were installing a telephone line to supplement the walkie-talkie hitch with Nuri and Brouwers.

From the Ministry of Justice, van der Feltz received firm orders: At all cost, protect the hostages. But unless their lives were directly threatened, do not let the convicts escape; success by Brouwers and Denie would encourage every other convict in The Netherlands to try the same thing. Raw force would be used only as a last resort. Accordingly, psychiatrist Dirk Mulder counseled a calm, unhurried approach and, with the others, worked out a detailed strategy:

First, create bonds between captors and captives. Friends seldom harm each other in moments of crisis. Send in playing cards and games.

Second, stall for time. Delay creates uncertainty and fatigue. This should cause the captors to lose their initial élan and become easier to handle.

At first the convicts remained arrogantly confident. On Sunday, a doctor was allowed in to examine the ailing Van Limbergen, but Brouwers exploded at the sight of an assistant carrying a cardiograph machine. "Get him out of here."

But between outbursts, the Crisis Center subtly began undermining their cockiness. Thus, when Brouwers excitedly shouted into the walkie-talkie, "Now here are more of our demands." Mulder replied, "All right, Jan, but please not so fast. Let me find a pencil." Minutes passed before he "found" the pencil and called back.

It became a contest to invent new ways to stall. Once Nuri angrily shouted, "Why didn't you call back about that request I made four hours ago?" Interpreter Jansen replied, "Sorry, I thought you were going to call us back. "Oh," said Nuri, sounding almost apologetic.

By Sunday evening, the convicts had relaxed enough to free five hostages, including the limping Mrs. Hannekoek. These brought valuable information: some of the captives and convicts were sitting together playing klaverjas (a card game), and one of the children was making crayon drawings under convict Daan Denie's guidance. "Call me Uncle Daan," he told the boy.

Denie's wife, allowed into the chapel for a visit later, reported that, now, after so many hours with little sleep, the convicts were tired and quarreling with each other. She said her husband wanted to surrender, but feared Brouwers' ire. To exploit this, and add to the divisions and uncertainty among the convicts, the next time Denie was on the walkie-talkie, psychiatrist Mulder commented, "What a shame, you've done this, Daan. You only had a few years to serve." Witnesses inside the chapel later reported that Denie burst into tears.

For almost two full days the Crisis Center managed to stall off demands that Tamimah be brought to the chapel. Now Nuri was desperate for the guidance of his wiser colleague, and on Monday at about 3 p.m., he abruptly announced that he would start shooting hostages if he got no satisfaction by 3:30. "Who's first?" Nuri asked. Father de Bot replied, "If anyone, me." But then Nol Kloosterman quietly stepped forward. "I am responsible here. I will be the first." With the other hostages lined up facing the wall, the guard walked to the middle of the room, folded his arms, and waited.

As the minutes ticked by and the radio remained silent, the terrified hostages stood stock-still, not daring to move. Nuri and Brouwers paced the floor, fists clenched. At last, just before the deadline, the walkie-talkie crackled to life.

Clapping the set's receiver to his ear, Nuri listened. Then, gun in hand, he turned toward Kloosterman - and waved him back to the other hostages. The authorities had agreed to let Nuri confer with his ex-chief outside the chapel.

Tamimah, however, proved reluctant to meet him. He was contemptuous of Nuri's joining forces with such criminals as Brouwers and Denie. And, when Nuri declined to surrender, Tamimah messaged: "I leave you to your fate."

The rebuff stunned Nuri; he and Brouwers had to devise the getaway. They talked out the problem Monday night, and on Tuesday called the Crisis Center with the first specific set of demands: a bus be brought to the prison, and a Boeing 707 to be made ready at Schiphol Airport.

At 8 a.m. Wednesday, Jasen called on the walkie-talkie. "Good morning, Nuri," he said. "Today the authorities are going to discuss details about the plan and bus you asked for."

But the Crisis Center was plotting an entirely different outcome. After three-and-a-half tense days, the convicts seemed luggish; on the walkie-talkie, their words were often slurred, their requests hesitant. Mulder suggested that they would shortly be reaching an exhaustion level at which it might be safe to use force.

Each day, an elite Royal Netherlands Marine company formed to deal with terrorist action, the B.B.E. (Close Combat Unit), had spent hours in an unused cellblock practicing an assault on the chapel. Led by Major Roy Spiekerman van Weezenburg, they had a large diagram of the chapel, updated with information furnished by released hostages. The hostages usually lay or sat along the left side of the room, the convicts on the opposite side. One commando team would charge directly at the convicts, while others screened the hostages from gunfire.

But how to get through the chapel's steel door, locked from the inside? A plan to use explosives was rejected as too dangerous. Much of Tuesday night was spent in a stealthy attempt, with special locksmith tools, to remove the key from the outside so the door could be opened with a master key. When that failed, the decision was made to cut through the steel with a thermal burning bar: a long, slim, hollow tube filled with steel and aluminum alloy wires and connected to an oxygen tank. Once lit, this device spews flame and molten metal at 4,000 C. A trial run by Wim Christiaanse, son of the manufacturer, showed that the burning bar could cut the metal around the lock in six seconds. He was ordered to rehearse with the B.B.E.

The break-in was scheduled for the early morning hours of Thursday. While the assault squad waited, and the door was being cut through, other marines outside the chapel would punch open the windows and aim their guns inside. To increase confusion among the convicts, sirens would begin an earpiercing wail.

At precisely 3:49 a.m., Major Spiekerman flicked on his radio and cried, "Bingo." Within seconds, Christiaanse was at the door, the tip of his thermal bar flaming white. But then, to everyone's horror, the fire sputtered and died; the long, flexible tube connection to the tank had kinked and cut off the oxygen. Spiekerman swore as Christiaanse frantically rushed to re-ignite his torch.

By now, the sirens were shrieking their banshee wail. To add to the din, Spiekerman ordered one of his men to start firing at the steel door. In a moment Christiaanse was back. This time, no snag - the torch carved out the lock and, seconds later, a dozen marines raced through the open door. In the dark, convicts and hostages alike ran or crawled across the floor in confusion. Then one marine hurled a flare into a corner, immediately filling the room with brilliant light.

Troops racing up the right side of the room quickly grabbed the bewildered Nuri, who had been sleeping in a corner. On the left, Brouwers pounced onto one inert hostage and held him for protection, firing his pistol at the windows. But when the marines came at him, he dropped his weapon. The other pair of convicts had their hands in the air from the start, crying, "Don't shoot."

After 105 hours, the ordeal of Scheveningen was over. In the prison rotunda, a throng of bone-tired police and civilian officials cheered the hostages as they slowly emerged from the chapel, some weeping, some laughing. All Holland sighed with relief.

Modern society, for all its technology, often seems helpless against the armed desporado holding innocent hostages to gain his ends. In Scheveningen, Holland's subtle blend of patience, bluff, psychology and force was a model of the best technique devised yet to deal with this vicious crime.

There is just one irony to mar the picture. Three weeks later, Adnan Nuri and Sami Tamimah won their freedom, on the demand of four murderous skyjackers who took over a British Airways plane in the Middle East. Their whereabouts remain unknown.

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THE HOSTAGE SITUATION:
Exploring the Motivation and the Cause

by

Conrad V. Hassell

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CONRAD V. HASSEL has been with the Federal Bureau of Investigation for 14 years, presently assigned as Special Agent Supervisor and a member of the faculty of the FBI National Academy, Quantico, Virginia 22135. He holds a B.A. degree in English literature and philosophy from the University of Portland (Oregon), M.S. in criminology from California State University/Long Beach, and a J.D. degree from Duquesne University (Pittsburgh, Pa.). He has been admitted to the bar in the District of Columbia and is a member of the National Advisory Committee Task Force on Disorder and Terrorism.

THE HOSTAGE SITUATION:

Exploring the Motivation and the Cause

By Conrad V. Hassel

Man has almost infinite capacity for good or evil limited only by technology. Throughout human history, his ability to alleviate human suffering has been paralleled only by his ability to cause it. With each new advance in weaponry -- the long-bow, crossbow, flintlock, small portable automatic weapons, and plastic explosives, the criminal has been able to control, maim, or kill increased numbers of innocent victims. Without a sophisticated system of air transportation, the term "skyjacker" would never have been coined. The criminal also has a worldwide audience for his more spectacular depredations through a highly developed system of electronic communications.

Of particular national and international concern recently has been the phenomenon of taking hostages to enforce demands. This criminal device is probably one of the oldest known to man. It is found in ancient Greek and Roman mythologies and the Norse sagas. It has been used by every generation and almost every culture. At certain times in history, it was even more common than it is today. Medieval rulers regularly hired assassins to murder or hold for ransom political enemies. In recent years, political events in Algeria, Kenya, and Vietnam are replete with examples of kidnapping and murder. It would appear that neither the tactic nor the motivation for the taking of hostages are recent innovations in criminological theory.

Concern with this phenomenon has increased as a result of the upsurge of incidents in recent years. According to a 1974 study prepared by the House Committee on Internal Security, from 1968 to 1973 there have been over 400 individual acts of terrorism of an international nature where terrorists crossed international borders to attack or in which victims were selected because of their affiliation with a foreign state, i.e. diplomats, foreign business men, etc. Many of these acts involved the taking of hostages. This statistic reveals only a fraction of the incidents which occurred during those years since it does not include political kidnappings purely domestic in nature or nonpolitical kidnapping where the motive was personal again.

One useful, if not precise method, of viewing the kidnap/hostage situation is examining the subject's motivation. Since human motivation is intrinsically a multifaceted phenomenon and in many cases unclear, even to the subject himself, some social scientists may consider this method less than exact.

THE RATIONAL POLITICAL MOTIVE

The term "rational" is used here to describe the thinking process of the perpetrator. His psyche is relatively normal, unimpaired by a mental disease or defect. "Rational" does not describe the logic of the cause espoused by the subject. His cause, which may be highly irrational in the eyes of a majority of persons, is the sine qua non of his actions; however, except for his belief in the cause, he would be in all respects rational. In this case, such dedication is not the result of a pathological mental disease, but stems from his environment, training, and education. He views himself as the antithesis of a criminal; he is a patriot, a freedom fighter.

The zealot acting because of a firmly held belief is not a new phenomenon either in U.S. or foreign history. If one believes that his people, liberty, or country is in imminent danger from a repressive regime, he may feel impelled to act, either to forestall this event or publicize it to an uncaring world. Whether the situation is actually as perceived by the person so acting is of no immediate moment to victims.

This attitude appears common in such diverse organizations as the Weather-underground, Black September, The Irish Republican Army, and The Tupamaros. The individual philosophies may, to a degree, differ, but the dedication is the same.

The Marxist ethic

The overwhelming majority of terrorist organizations presently active both here in the U.S. and in foreign countries are oriented towards a Marxist philosophy. An examination of the Marxist stance points out the wide gulf between those who fanatically dedicate themselves to this cause and those who view the world in the traditional Judeo-Christian terms.

According to Marx, the 'raison d'etre' of man is to bring closer to reality the revolution of the proletariat, where the small power elite which controls the wealth of the world is overthrown by the downtrodden masses to whom such wealth justly belongs. Therefore, all significant acts of the Marxist revolutionary must be measured against the only moral reality, does

this action contribute to the revolution? The conventional mores such as truth, honesty, and the values reflected in the Ten Commandments are dismissed as bourgeois morality and are considered merely imperialistic devices to maintain the status quo.

The Marxist view is abundantly reflected in the writings of his followers. Mao Tse-tung says, "Power grows from the barrel of a gun," not from the consent of the governed. Che Guevara wrote, "People must see clearly the futility of maintaining the fight for social goals within the framework of civil debate."

There are over 21 terrorist organizations in the U.S. today, most of which subscribe to the Marxist position and view the U.S. as the main bastion of imperialistic aggression. Add to these, 16 such organizations in the Middle East, 10 in Africa, 10 in western Europe, and many more in Burma, Japan, and the Philippines, and the potential for terrorism is evident.

A notorious tactic frequently employed by these groups has been the kidnap-hostage phenomenon. In the U.S., the Hearst kidnaping and various politically motivated skyjackings have occurred. In foreign countries, citizens of the U.S. have been held hostage, i.e., in Khartoum, two American diplomats were held hostage and murdered by a Palestinian extremist group. In Latin America, U.S. businessmen and diplomats have been held for ransom and sometimes brutally murdered.

With the increase in such activity, it is essential that those in law enforcement who must deal with representatives of these extremist groups understand and fully appreciate the Marxist ethic.

Commitment to cause vs. publicity

When a highly trained and motivated group of terrorists is holding hostages and making demands, an immediate impasse is reached when the demands are non negotiable, i.e., release of prisoners, amnesty, etc. If the terrorists are advised

at the outset that the demands will not be met, they are left with a limited number of options, three of which are: (1) choose martyrdom, kill hostages, and commit suicide; (2) lessen demands to more realistic proportions and continue negotiations; or (3) surrender.

If the terrorists lessen demands, then their commitment to the cause is not as strong as they originally had proclaimed. Once the terrorist admits he is willing to take less than he initially demanded, the psychological advantage reverts to the law enforcement negotiator. Time now becomes the ally of the besieger rather than the besieged.

If it is felt that the terrorist will kill hostages and choose martyrdom, a useful device might be to withhold the media from the terrorist, thus eliminating his ability to publicize his martyrdom. The Marxist view is such that a sacrifice without the cooperation of the press would be useless. The martyrdom of a comrade to the cause would not be broadcast around the world to inspire others.

Measuring the degree of commitment of the terrorist is admittedly a chancy procedure and one that is prone to miscalculation. The dedication of the Japanese Red Army at the Lod Airport attack in May of 1972 was evident in the virtually suicidal concept of the operation, and it resulted in 26 dead and 80 wounded.

However, the ability to gain media coverage by the terrorist usually predominates in the planning of his activities.

Cooperation of the media

It is a rare terrorist who is willing to make a private sacrifice of his life. Such sacrifice becomes acceptable, even desirable, if it will serve the cause. If, however, the media will not cooperate with the terrorist, and the terrorist will only be known as a deranged criminal and his act one of wanton cruelty rather than revolutionary heroism, he may well modify his demands and surrender.

It is impossible and most undesirable for the press in a free society to be in any way controlled or manipulated. Law enforcement must rely on voluntary restraint exercised by the press. Such voluntary restraint does not happen accidentally, but is the end result of openness and honesty between law enforcement and media, mutual understanding of mutual problems. Such an attitude of cooperation requires an interaction of ideas and information which should replace some current hostile attitudes including mutual mistrust and suspicion.

The one most important precept to be kept in mind when considering the terrorist is to judge his actions from his, not society's, perspective. Judge his option as he would from the Marxist ethic. Will the action further the cause of the revolution? If, viewed logically from that perspective, it will not, he may not kill, but surrender.

THE MOTIVATION OF ESCAPE

With increasing frequency, a situation occurs in which the perpetrators are trapped inside an establishment that they intended to rob, but quick police response precludes escape forcing the subjects to take hostages. This is perhaps the most common situation faced by law enforcement in the U.S. The plight of the trapped armed robber is perhaps initially the most volatile and dangerous to both hostages and police. Until the situation is stabilized and contained by police and both sides settle down to a pattern of negotiation, the possibility of injury or death is very real. The immediate response of law enforcement is such a situation should be to contain and stabilize and to engage in no precipitous acts that might provoke a response against hostages by a nervous gunman.

Statistically, time is on the side of law enforcement in this type of situation. The most famous and successful use of time under extreme provocation was perhaps the Williamsburg incident in January of 1973 when four armed gunmen were thwarted in an attempt to rob a sporting goods store and took twelve hostages. The siege ended 47 hours later with the safe recovery of all hostages and the surrender of the robbers.

The performance of the New York Police Department in this highly charged situation was no accident. It was the result of farsighted leadership and intensive training in both psychology and tactics. Much of this training was innovative and broke new ground in the theory and practice of hostage negotiations.

If the political terrorist can be considered a basically rational personality, the same is true of the armed robber. His action of taking a hostage is aimed toward a rational end, the avoidance of capture. It is, therefore, appropriate to treat him as rational. Being sane, he can usually be made to see that his continued intransigence does nothing to enhance his position, especially if escape is impossible and any harm to hostages will merely make his position worse.

It is not unusual that the armed robber who takes hostages when trapped will imitate to some degree the behaviour of a political terrorist. In the Williamsburg incident, the subjects used Black Muslim rhetoric, and a Black Muslim minister was called to the scene to assist in negotiations. In such cases, the depth of the subjects' religious or political convictions is in serious doubt. The original action took on no religious significance until the subject were trapped. Such zeal seems to be more of an ego-bolstering device rather than a deeply held commitment.

THE PRISON HOSTAGE SITUATION

It is an unfortunate fact in our society that some prisons tend to be the garbage heaps into which the worst and most violent among us are discarded. This is particularly true of the large foreboding fortress-like maximum security institution.

With our more liberalized parole, probation, and early release programs, and the reluctance of the judiciary to sentence to institutions other than those who are a danger to the society at large, those sentenced to the maximum security institutions are a microcosm of that which is worst in society.

When hostages, usually corrections personnel, are taken the threat to life is acute. Often desperate men, who feel they have nothing to lose, dominate the leadership of such revolts. The time factor has worked both for and against law enforcement in prison riots. However, allowing the prisoners time generally permits the leader of such a revolt to exploit his position and consolidate his leadership. He is able, therefore, to create a formidable bastion which cannot be neutralized except by loss of life. Whereas action taken immediately, before the prisoners can organize and arm themselves, may well be less costly. Attica is an example of a situation where prisoners were allowed sufficient time to organize.

Great care must be taken in the selection of a negotiator who represents legal authority. Radical activists, often chosen as negotiators by the inmates, appear for the most part to be detrimental to the negotiations. Such individuals tend to become advocates and accomplices of the inmates. They are able to aid in the organization of the rioters, sophisticate their demands, and even bolster the courage of those who might be persuaded to surrender.

What prisoners usually demand in a hostage situation is freedom. This is normally a nonnegotiable demand either by strong policy or state law. Thus the primary demand cannot be met under any circumstances. The negotiable demands range from prison food to amnesty for the rioters. As long as the situation allows the prisoners to exercise power denied to them by legitimate society, i.e. manipulate the press, negotiate with the warden, or even the governor of the state in some instances, there is no incentive to surrender. Perhaps isolation and reason would be the most effective way to handle this situation. However, there is no panacea. Many of those found in the prison setting are explosive personality types who tend to act out violently; that's why they were sent to prison in the first place.

THE MENTALLY DERANGED

When one who is suffering from delusions and hallucinations takes a hostage, that person, to some degree, sets the rules. He

is reacting from, what to him is, overwhelming stress. He is compelled to take action to relieve that stress. This may include the taking of hostages, even members of his own family. He cannot be appealed to on a rational basis because he does not view the world in a rational way. He may have a sense of mission much like Sam Byck who planned to crash a commercial aircraft into the White House. In January, 1974, he attempted to carry out his scheme and commandeered an airliner at Baltimore-Washington International Airport, killed the pilot, wounded the copilot, and eventually when his plan failed, committed suicide. He called his plan "Operation Pandora Box".

A second relatively frequent mental aberration is a form of severe depression where the only logical answer to life's stresses and pain is suicide-murder, usually of family members. There is also the phenomenon of the severely deranged person who firmly believes he is threatened or persecuted by others and sets out to take revenge upon them for their imagined crimes against him. This situation may easily lead to the taking of hostages to enforce clearly irrational demands.

If, in fact, stress is the precipitating factor in this type of situation, then logically attempts should be made to reduce stress. The passage of time in itself is usually helpful, coupled with a calm attitude toward the subject by the negotiator. Nothing should be done to increase anxiety such as a precipitous show of force.

It is well to remember that such persons are as delicately balanced as a hair trigger; those who deal with them must proceed on that assumption.

Contrary to some authorities in this area, there does not appear to be sufficient data at this present moment in the history of behavioural science to classify precisely all those persons who might be inclined to take hostages. The most frequently mentioned types are the inadequate personality or those suffering from paranoia. Undoubtedly, these persons are represented among those who engage in this activity, but do they represent the majority? Perhaps, the person relatively free from any mental disease, but who is acting in accordance with a deeply ingrained, though antisocial value set, also engages in such acts.

THE SOCIOPATHIC PERSONALITY

The studies concerning the sociopath seem to indicate that the sociopathic personality is responsible for an inordinate proportion of crimes. He also makes up a significant percentage of our prison population. If this be the case, it is logical to assume that he represents a significant number of those who engage in hostage taking, particularly the trapped armed robber and the prison rioter.

The primary personality trait of the sociopath is lack of conscience, in fact lack of all humanity. His only concern is "Can I get away with it?" Appeals to him must always be couched in terms of what is best for him. He will not hesitate to kill hostages, law enforcement officers, and, in some instances, even himself, if such act is sufficiently dramatic. He is extremely impulsive and unable to delay gratification, so those over whom he has control are in constant danger. Moreover, if the hostage is female, rape becomes a very real possibility.

Although the sociopath is not mentally ill in the traditional sense, he represents a potential bombshell in any hostage situation because of impulsive behaviour and total lack of concern for others. It has been an axiom in hostage negotiations that the more time the hostage spends with his abductor, the better the chances of the hostage. This is because of a type of common bond which appears to grow between the two. If the felon is a sociopath, however, he is unlikely to develop such warm feelings for anyone, including the hostage. His only reaction will be based on opportunity and self-indulgence.

THE VICTIM

Because of the increasing trend of terrorist groups to use the kidnap tactic, some preliminary investigation has been conducted to determine the effect of captivity on the hostage. The tentative, and still largely incomplete, results of these inquiries have been somewhat startling, particularly with regard to the change in the value set of the hostage. This phenomenon has been popularly dubbed the "Stockholm-Syndrome" after an incident which occurred in Stockholm, Sweden, in which female hostages were held in a bank vault trapped by would-be bank robbers for several days and after their release expressed a strong attachment to their captors, to the point of refusing to testify against them.

The degree of identification which the hostage may feel toward his captor of course varies with the treatment he receives, but this does not appear to be the only factor. Almost all victims have admitted to this phenomenon to some degree. It may be that the stronger personality with a well-founded set of values is less swayed than the weaker personality who may actually feel guilt because he is made to believe that his previous lifestyle has been wrong and immoral. This may explain the seemingly total conversion of Patricia Hearst to the cause of the Symbionese Liberation Army.

The politically motivated hostage taker in particular may spend long hours in discussion and rationalization of his cause and his terrorist acts in furtherance of that cause with the victim. It has been found that this, plus the possibility of imminent death, is in effect, a crude, unintended, yet an effective type of brainwashing. It may cause the victim to reassess his values and lifestyle. Most persons who have been victims in a hostage situation find themselves cooperating with their captors to a degree they would not have thought possible prior to the incident.

The long-range psychic effect on the hostage is, as yet, not known. Whether the trauma of being a victim of a kidnap could lead to a permanent change in the personality is an area which will require further study.

This identity syndrome must be kept in mind by law enforcement personnel, especially when an attempt is made to predict the probable reaction of the victim or to count on his assistance and cooperation in his own release. Most persons who have been hostages found themselves to be extremely docile and cooperative with their captors, sometimes to the point of failing to take advantage of carelessness or mistakes on the part of their captors which may have easily led to escape.

A COORDINATED RESPONSE

The hallmark of any police reaction in a kidnap/hostage situation must be the blending of tactical response and behavioural know-how. This requires the development of team tactics using blocking and containment forces. It requires expertise in weapons use, deployment, and instant communications; and it requires the use of behavioral experts coordinated by cool-headed and pro-

fessional leadership. This is a challenge which is being met by many police departments.

The phenomenon of the hostage situation has had the positive effect of bringing together the professional expertise of law enforcement and the behavioral sciences. The mutual respect and understanding which is being engendered has led to sophisticated training programs for the police in this vital area.

Admittedly, much of that knowledge which would enable police or anyone to predict human motivation and response is not known. However, detailed analysis of each new hostage situation by professionals in law enforcement and the behavioral science increases the ability of the police to refine their response while adding to that body of knowledge which will save lives.

TRUST-THE KEY TO HOSTAGE INCIDENTS?

By Lynda Laushway

"I had to develop a trust with him if I was going to save my life. For him to see me as an enemy was a danger to my survival. For him to start to trust me meant he would be less able to kill me", recalls Lorraine Berzins, Program Consultant, Living Units and Human Relations, Canadian Penitentiary Service.

In the summer of 1970, Lorraine, then a classification officer at Warkworth Institution, near Peterborough, Ontario, was taken hostage in her office by an inmate. For eight hours she was held captive at knifepoint. A series of events involving Lorraine ranged from leaving the institution with her captor by car, escaping at one point and being recaptured, and the car breaking down so that subsequent negotiations with the police took place in a nearby farmer's field in the scorching mid-day sun.

After driving around for several hours in an unmarked police car, with two unarmed police officers, the situation finally culminated on a beach near Cobourg, with the inmate's peaceful surrender following a rendezvous with his family.

Throughout the day-long ordeal the hostage-taker was, according to Lorraine, "...very, very frightened. ... I started to try to reassure him, and I slowly discovered that he was more frightened than I was". A relationship developed between Lorraine and her captor in which "...not only did the hostage identify with the hostage-taker, but the hostage-taker also identified with the hostage. He became less and less able to kill someone whom he was identifying with... That's a very positive thing that can lead to a resolution that's non-violent for everyone concerned". Lorraine describes the empathy she developed for the hostage-taker as, "...it didn't for one second mean that I approved of what he was doing, or that I sympathized with him as having a legitimate grievance. It was always very clear to me that what he was doing was endangering me and it was endangering him. Yet, in spite of that reality, I cared about his life".

Throughout the negotiation process, Lorraine asked the police to comply with the hostage-taker's demands. He was threatening that the two of them would run cross country if they did not provide him with another car. Lorraine had lost her shoes in her first escape attempt and did not feel that she had the physical or mental stamina for the run so she supported this request. Lorraine also felt that when she was alone with the hostage-taker she was more in control of his behavior. She said, "...there were moments when we established an

equilibrium and I believed that things would work out. Whenever outside influences interfered with that equilibrium it all had to be redone". The negotiators did not understand Lorraine's motivation for supporting the hostage-taker's demands. She warns negotiators, "...don't start to treat the hostage as an enemy because that just makes the situation more difficult to resolve... If negotiators force hostages to take sides, they're going to side with the hostage-taker for survival reasons".

Lorraine found that specific dynamics occurred during her period in captivity. She found that, "I had this very strong feeling that my life wasn't as important to the negotiators as it was to me; the cold, hard principle of 'This inmate is not supposed to be doing this. We musn't let him get away', seemed more important to them than saving my life". Lorraine explains her negative feelings toward the negotiators, "If your way of coping with anxiety is to project blame onto other people, you're obviously not going to project it onto the hostage-taker because that's too dangerous. You have a big stake in that relationship. The easiest target is the outside authorities". She feels that this is a fact that negotiators must be aware of in handling hostage situations.

Many of the feelings which Lorraine experienced have been shared by other hostages. In Stockholm, Sweden, in 1973, four people were taken hostage. The dynamics of their interaction with their hostage-takers have since come to be known as the "Stockholm Syndrome". Lorraine describes this as "... a psychological process whereby, in identifying with the hostage-takers as a means of survival, the hostage's judgment can become impaired and he or she can be blinded to the reality of the dangerousness and delinquency of the hostage-taker".

Although Lorraine sees the identification aspect of this process as a positive phenomenon, whether or not a hostage's perception is distorted as a result is a different matter, and one which she relates to the individual hostage's particular preconditioning and his or her ability to resolve the "cognitive dissonance" that may be occurring. Lorraine says, "If we find we are responding positively to someone, it is sometimes difficult to reconcile this with the knowledge that that person is doing something harmful. There may be a clash between our different perceptions of the person's "good qualities alongside his criminal behavior, or between what we feel emotionally for him and what we know rationally about him. If a person is not trained

or experienced enough to be able to accommodate the seeming contradiction of the two, he may need to deny one in order to preserve the other. The hostage, to preserve the trust that his survival depends on, may need to see his captor as "all good" to resolve the dissonance and maintain harmony between them. The outside authorities may be facing a similar dilemma: they may need to see the hostage-taker as "all bad" in order to justify the drastic action they feel like taking.

The article entitled, "A Reporter At Large", in the November, 1974, edition of the New Yorker, describes the Stockholm hostage-taking in detail. The author, Daniel Lang, states that after the hostage drama was over, the Swedish hostages "... persisted in thinking of the police as "the enemy", preferring to believe that it was the criminals to whom they owed their lives". In order to develop a peaceful solution to a hostage-taking situation, Lorraine believes "the negotiators should try to use the relationship between hostage and hostage-taker to bridge the gap between the two sides". She feels they should "...negotiate in a way that reduces the enemy camp feeling, and get all parties down to a level of person-to-person, where they can sensibly discuss the question of, 'How can we resolve this situation without anybody dying?'"

Lorraine feels that "...life is most important, not only the hostage's life, but the hostage-taker's as well... Often you can save both if your're willing to give a bit more time to it... The buying of time is extremely important".

What precautions can be developed for hostage-taking situations? From the viewpoint of a Penitentiaries employee, Lorraine says, 'I would like to see all our staff trained to think through how they can deal with an angry person, how they can help calm him down, how to handle a power struggle, and how to recognize their own part in it...to me it's training that involves having reflected on the issue and consequently being more prepared if an emergency should arise".

Lorraine feels that this training has wider relevance since, "... anyone who works in a penitentiary has daily confrontations with angry inmates... Any learning related to the extreme situation of hostage-taking would have practical relevance to everyday work." "A hostage-taking

incident usually arises as a result of a long build-up of mistrust and desperation", says Lorraine, and "...if your real concern is saving life, then you have to give the inmate an opportunity to back down gracefully...not to back down in a way that is so totally humiliating that killing or being killed is better".

HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION

All police officers should be familiar with the principles of negotiation since, in the absence of trained specialists, they may be called on to establish the proper climate for negotiation or to act as negotiators. Successful negotiation procedures are characterized by patience, open communication, and a willingness to work together and bargain. The negotiating officer must constantly be aware that his ability to act is limited by the perilous situation of the hostages.

Although the most heavily publicized hostage incidents are of an international and political nature, the officer's need to understand hostage negotiation principles is based on the increasing number of local cases such as those involving the attempted escape of a felon or prisoner or the beserk actions of a spouse toward his family.

Ideally, hostage negotiation should be conducted by specially trained personnel who are extremely skillful at intervening in crisis situations. However, such specialists are not always immediately available for duty at the scene of a hostage incident. It may be hours before a suitably trained negotiator can be brought to the hostage scene. During this time, other police officers may be called on to act as substitute negotiators, and they must therefore have a basic knowledge of the role that successful negotiation requires.

Negotiation Principles

Negotiation Principles are not easy for police officers to learn. From recruit school on, the police officer is taught how to take charge of a situation. His primary role is to manage people and events, whether it is a simple traffic accident or a complicated homicide investigation. He is forceful because he frequently deals with dangerous persons. He is strong-minded because his job requires that he act that way. He often has to quickly resolve problems on the scene. After years of acting expediently and authoritatively, it is not easy for a police officer to step into a situation where he cannot quickly direct the outcome of the event. In a hostage situation he comes face to face with an armed felon to discuss how the situation can be resolved.

As a negotiator, the police officer must be aware of the limitations that a hostage incident imposes on his ability to act. Typically, the police officer assists those in danger by eliminating the threat. In a hostage situation, however, the police officer's primary concern is to preserve the status quo until a trained negotiator is available to resolve the issue. The realistic goals of the officer are to establish a working relationship with the hostage-taker, obtain information about the incident, set the stage for further negotiations, and consume time. The ultimate goal of negotiation is to trade: the safe release of the hostages in return for the safety of the hostage-taker in surrender.

COMMUNICATION: Essential to hostage negotiation is establishing and maintaining open communication. Good communication has three basic characteristics that the police officer must encourage when establishing the proper climate for successful negotiation. First, the police officer must elicit specific information about the incident so that he and his superiors can fully understand the situation and work with the hostage-taker on a realistic basis.

A second ingredient of communication is that the hostage-taker and the police officer "speak a common language". Encountering a suspect who speaks a foreign language or broken English is an obvious example of how communication may be a complex problem. However, the negotiating officer should not overlook the fact that many words carry a "street language" meaning different from standard English. The hostage-taker will be carefully considering every word that the officer speaks. The negotiating officer must, therefore, use words that correspond to the perpetrator's language style. The officer must remember that what he says - if not stated appropriately - may be misinterpreted. This could be disastrous in a hostage situation.

When it is necessary for the police officer to ask a question, he should frame the question so that the answer necessarily extends the conversation - and consumes time - rather than ends it abruptly with a "yes" or "no" response. For example, the question, "If we can't provide you with an airplane, will you take a car?" forces an immediate and unwanted decision. In addition, the act of choosing an alternative for the perpetrator makes him feel that he is being controlled. The officer should allow the hostage-taker to feel that he is in control. A better way of ex-

pressing this thought to the hostage-taker is, "We will try to get you an airplane, but if that's not possible, what do you want to do?" Although the response may not differ in essence from the first question, the hostage-taker is given an opportunity to suggest his own alternatives, reinforcing the illusion that he is "calling the shots."

A third requirement of effective communication is that the officer remain attentive at all times and show his interest in what is being said. In a hostage situation, this is not always easy to do. The police officer will naturally be apprehensive, fearing for his life and the lives of the hostages. Moreover, the officer will be trying to observe all he can to gain a full knowledge of the details of the incident, i.e., the number of suspects, the number and condition of the hostages, the weapons of the assailants.

The hostage-taker will partially interpret the attentiveness of the negotiating officer by the way he acts. For this reason the nonverbal communication of the officer is very important. The officer should keep in mind that his body communicates as much as his words. For example, effective eye contact with the suspect is essential. It shows that the officer is truly interested in negotiating and not merely there to obtain tactical information.

NEUTRAL PARTY: The police officer who negotiates a hostage incident cannot strictly speaking be neutral. His ostensible goal may be to negotiate a settlement that is agreeable to all parties, but both the officer and the hostage-taker recognize that they operate under an uneasy truce. Since the hostage-taker understands that the police officer cannot be 100 percent neutral, he will constantly evaluate the officer's sincerity during the negotiation process. The hostage-taker accepts the police officer as the third party primarily because he is convinced of the officer's sincerity and recognizes that he needs the officer to obtain an agreeable settlement.

To maintain this acceptable role, the police officer must meet the expectations of the hostage-taker. The officer must put aside his personal feelings and avoid any expression of moral judgment. He should try to make the negotiation intimate by being open, warm, and sincere. The officer should always talk

in a low voice, lower than that of the hostage-taker. Whenever possible, the officer should initiate discussion of subjects of mutual interest.

A cardinal assumption that the police officer must make is that the behavior of the hostage-taker make sense to him. The act of taking hostages is an attempt to satisfy some need, whether the need is to escape apprehension, further a radical cause, or gain personal recognition. Understanding the behavior of the hostage-taker enables the police officer to develop a better rapport and to plan police strategies.

WORK RELATIONSHIP: Open communication leads to the development of a positive working relationship when the negotiator and hostage-taker feel that they have a shared goal. In most instances, this process involves lengthy discussion of what the police cannot promise to do. The police officer should not avoid disagreement about goals, but he must ensure that the discussion of incompatible objectives strengthens the working relationship rather than inhibits the negotiation.

For example, if the hostage-taker demands weapons and ammunition, the police officer should not simply say so. He should ask the suspect what he would do if the positions were reversed. This de-personalizes the negative answer and attributes it solely to the conditions over which the officer has little control. The police officer will know that he is achieving a working relationship when he and the hostage-taker are able to disagree without personal hostility.

There are two types of hostage-takers with whom the police officer will not in all probability be able to establish a working relationship. Because of his fanaticism, the ideological terrorist typically does not make bargains until his position is completely hopeless, and even then he may prefer death to an unsatisfactory settlement. Hostage situations involving political terrorists, however, usually require a prolonged negotiation period, and officer participation in these instances should be limited to establishing preliminary communication.

Neither are the insane usually capable of following a rational negotiation process. Based on available information, consultation with physicians, psychologists, or psychiatrists to determine the hostage-taker's frame of mind and likely behavior is

recommended. Until professional guidance can be obtained, the police officer-negotiator should limit his communication with the insane hostage-taker so as to avoid any tragic mistakes. Especially when dealing with the mentally ill hostage-taker, the police officer must remember that the suspect considers his behavior rational and expects to be treated as if others perceive the situation similarly.

CONSUME TIME: Throughout the negotiation process, the police officer should do everything possible to consume time. One consideration is that the longer the negotiation period, the more likely is the chance that the hostage-taker will make a tactical error that permits the police to make a safe apprehension. Time also tends to wear down the resistance of the hostage-taker. The long hours of controlling the hostages, anticipating police tactics and worrying about survival have a draining effect that frequently forces the suspect to recognize the reality of his position and leads to his surrender.

A tactic to prolong the negotiation is for the police officer to inform the hostage-taker that all requests and tentative agreements will need to be cleared with high-ranking police officials. The negotiator can then consume a great deal of time acting as a messenger between his superiors and the suspect. For this reason, high-ranking officers in a position to make decisions should not personally take part in the negotiations.

The passage of time also provides the police officer with increased opportunity to influence the hostage-taker. As the working relationship between the two grows stronger, the negotiating officer can begin to suggest to the perpetrator alternative ways of viewing the incident and perhaps alternative courses of action.

WIN/WIN SOLUTION: Hostage negotiation is often regarded as either a subtle means of outmanoeuvring a suspect who is overwhelmed by the complexity of a situation for which he is ill-prepared or as a tactical prelude to an all-out confrontation. Although these extremes characterize some negotiation situations, hostage negotiation is more typically a bargaining process. Bitter and intractable conflict is uncommon, and in only a few hostage situations does one party get everything he wants. Most hostage negotiations center on finding an appropriate point of agreement.

Agreement during hostage negotiations is usually achieved when the negotiator redefines the problem in such a way that the hostage-taker is willing to yield certain demands in return for other alternatives. This process is not a compromise in the traditional sense where both parties yield their positions. As an example, in an incident where a hostage needs medical attention, the officer may convince the suspect to release the injured hostage in return for a minor concession. Important here is the fact that the police officer has influenced the hostage-taker to think about and accept an alternative. Once the hostage-taker begins to redefine his situation, he may more readily consider the need to surrender.

SURRENDER: Although the police officer is usually replaced by trained personnel at some point in the negotiation process, he must be prepared to participate fully. An opportune moment to conclude the negotiation may come early in the process before the arrival of specialists, or the hostage-taker may refuse to negotiate with anyone other than the original officer.

When the hostage-taker indicates that he intends to surrender, the police officer must explain the procedure to him. The suspect will undoubtedly be frightened and apprehensive about what will happen to him when taken into custody — a potentially dangerous combination of emotions. The police officer must prepare the hostage-taker adequately, explaining basic procedures such as the necessity to handcuff arrested persons.

In reaching a final agreement, the police officer may have to make certain concessions, such as permitting the suspect to talk to a news reporter, minister, spouse, or parent. Any reasonable agreements that the negotiating officer makes should be carried out to avoid unnecessary complications and to maintain police credibility when faced with similar incidents.

Negotiation Procedures

Unlike general negotiation principles, negotiation procedures followed in hostage incidents depend primarily on factors such as a number of suspects and incident locations. Whether the hostages are in immediate danger of injury or death, requiring police intervention, is another condition that can be judged only by the police officer at the scene of an actual hostage incident. However, there are general guidelines that can be followed in most cases.

ENTRY: After the hostage incident has been stabilized*, the police officer designated as the temporary negotiator should make initial contact with the suspect. If use of a telephone is not possible, the officer should employ any means available, for example, a patrol car's loud speaker system or a portable loud speaker. The officer should identify himself, request a meeting, and ask if there are any parties requiring medical assistance.

When a meeting is arranged, the police officer should approach the scene unarmed, with his hands raised, and clearly showing he is unarmed. His shield and identification card should be pinned to his clothes. No attempt should be made to disguise the true identity of the police officer. Such a tactic would likely fail, would hinder the development of trust that is basic to negotiation, and would needlessly endanger the lives of the hostages and police officer.

OBTAIN INFORMATION: Initially, the police officer should do no more than listen to the hostage-taker. Typically the suspect is scared and will try to impress the officer with boasts and threats. The hostage-taker is likely to brag about his control of the situation. He will also threaten to kill the hostages if the police make any "false" moves.

The suspect's "bark" can tell a lot about his potential "bite". The negotiating officer should listen carefully for any information that indicates the suspect's true situation, such as the number of accomplices, the location of the hostages, or the types of weapons in the suspect's possession.

The negotiating officer should carefully observe the physical and emotional condition of the hostage-taker to evaluate whether he is likely to or capable of negotiating. Where the suspect is beyond reason and the lives of the hostages appear to be in imminent danger, tactical alternatives instead of negotiation should be implemented.

AVOID MISTAKES: There are three common mistakes that the negotiating officer must be careful to avoid. The first error is to lose patience. It is paramount that, once the negotiation process begins, it be continued until a settlement is achieved. Usually successful negotiations take only a few hours, but the police officer must be mentally prepared to negotiate for a much longer period. The officer must ensure that arbitrary deadlines are not set by either side.

A second mistake is for the police to precipitate action. During the course of negotiations, the police may be subject to pressures to resolve the incident quickly. They should not be influenced to act hastily. Negotiations have their twists and turns, and frequently potential settlements fall apart. This should not be misinterpreted as the end of the negotiation, necessitating tactical action, but a temporary impasse.

A third critical mistake is for the negotiating officer to make value judgements about the hostage-taker. The police officer should concentrate on maintaining a dialogue with the suspect and not try to impose his own values. Successful negotiation is achieved when the negotiator remains objective and able to resolve a grave situation without violence.

DISCUSSION GUIDE

1. Based upon your departmental policy and procedures, how would you react to the following demands made by a hostage-taker?
 - ... The perpetrator demands that he be allowed to move the hostage into another area.
 - ... The perpetrator demands an airplane be provided for him to leave the country.
 - ... The perpetrator demands an escape vehicle and he intends to take a hostage with him.
 - ... The perpetrator demands that you send a certain person (spouse, parent, friend, enemy) to him.
 - ... The perpetrator demands weapons and ammunition.
 - ... The perpetrator is wounded and demands a doctor to treat his wounds.
 - ... The perpetrator demands drugs.
 - ... The perpetrator demands alcohol.
 - ... The perpetrator demands a meeting with the news media.
 - ... How would your reaction differ if the negotiator determined that the perpetrator will harm or kill the hostage?
2. Overall control of the police response to a hostage incident usually is the responsibility of an operations commander. The supervisors of the tactical and negotiation teams report to the operations commander, who makes the final decisions about how to handle the situation. Clear communication among supervisors and command and tactical units is therefore essential. In certain situations, however, the commanding officer may deem it best not to inform the negotiator of tactical plans. The commander may do this to ensure that the negotiator can maintain his integrity in dealing with the hostage-taker without the associated problem of deliberately making false statements. Discuss under what circumstances this is an appropriate strategy.

3. Many of the principles discussed in this Training Key may be employed by the police officer when managing other conflicts. Discuss how the following conflicts could be handled.

... A person threatening suicide is ready to jump off a bridge or building.

... A neighborhood conflict exists between rival teenage gangs.

... A mentally deranged person is creating a disturbance.

Acknowledgment

Dr. Irving Goldaber, 6 Stratford Court, North Bellmore, N.Y. 11710, provided valuable assistance in the formulation of the negotiation concepts contained in this Training Key. Dr. Goldaber is an associate consultant for IACP and an adjunct professor of sociology at Brooklyn College, City University of New York.

QUESTIONS

The following questions are based on material in this Training Key. Select the best answers.

1. Which of the following is not an element of the communication needed to negotiate a hostage situation?
 - (a) Always agreeing with the hostage-taker.
 - (b) Developing basic information about the incident.
 - (c) Speaking a "common language".
 - (d) Remaining attentive and interested.
2. Of the personnel listed below, who should engage in the face-to-face negotiation with a hostage-taker?
 - (a) Chief of Police
 - (b) Commander of the Patrol Division.
 - (c) Commander of the SWAT team.
 - (d) A non-command officer.
3. Which of the following hostage-takers would the negotiator find the most difficult to bargain with?
 - (a) An escaping felon.
 - (b) A disturbed spouse.
 - (c) A mentally unstable person.
 - (d) An insane hostage-taker.

ANSWERS

1. (a) The hostage-taker will doubt the sincerity of an officer with everything said or demanded.

2. (d) An officer not having the authority to make decisions should serve as negotiator so that he can consume time relaying messages between the hostage-taker and command personnel.
3. (d) It is assumed that all hostage-takers are mentally unstable to some degree; however, negotiation becomes virtually impossible only when the suspect is insane.

HAVE YOU READ ... ?

CRISIS INTERVENTION AND THE POLICE: SELECTED READINGS.
International Association of Chiefs of Police, Eleven Firstfield
Road, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760.

A collection of articles, essays and training materials to guide the police administrator in the training of crisis intervention personnel.

Defusing Human Bombs -

HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

By Lt. John A. Culley

Office of the Chief of Detectives

Police Department, New York, N.Y.

"Just as we would send only trained bomb squad personnel to defuse a bomb, so too, we should send only trained negotiators to deal with these emotionally explosive hostage situations."

In the early evening of January 19, 1973, four armed men entered a sporting goods store in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, N.Y., and attempted a robbery. One of the proprietors activated a silent alarm, and uniformed officers from the local precinct and emergency service division responded in patrol cars. During an exchange of gunfire which ensued, one police officer was killed and two others wounded. One suspect was also wounded. The felons, thwarted in their escape, seized 12 persons who were in the store at the time and held them as hostages. The store was practically impregnable and contained a wide variety of weapons and ammunition. This marked the beginning of a tense drama which was to last 47 hours and become known as "The Siege of Williamsburg."

In overall command of police personnel engaged at the scene was Chief Inspector Michael J. Codd, who was appointed police commissioner in January 1974. Just prior to the Williamsburg incident, Chief Codd had reviewed and approved plans for handling hostage situations, plans which he had been working on with various units of the police department since September 1972. The primary purpose of these plans was the preservation of the lives of hostages, officers and captors.

Upon responding to the scene, Chief Codd assessed the situation and ordered immediate implementation of the hostage plan. No hypothetical case, the plan was going to receive its "baptism under fire" and be put to a true test. As it turned out, the policy of "waiting" provided time for the hostages to escape, and ultimately the four felons surrendered with no further bloodshed. Greater loss of life was prevented through careful planning, coordinated efforts, and great restraint on the part of all the police officers at the scene. The plan had worked.

Hostage incidents have been increasing since 1972; therefore, law enforcement agencies throughout the country have to concern themselves with this trend. Since human lives are at stake, the challenges facing police officers in such situations are delicate and critical. If there is no proper planning and training, or if police actions are impulsive or uncoordinated, lives may be lost unnecessarily.

Initially utilized in the formulation of the New York City hostage plan were the standard patrol, detective, and emergency service units of the police department. Then the newly formed Psychological Services Unit was called upon to supply a new and valuable adjunct to the department's existing methods for combating hostage situations, namely a psychological understanding of the hostage-taker.

The success of any hostage plan hinges on a team approach, good communications, and coordination of tactical maneuvers under one commander. In all hostage situations occurring in New York City, the on-the-scene commander is the uniformed patrol area commander. (New York City is divided into seven patrol areas, each commanded by an assistant chief.) The rationale for this is that he is the senior officer most familiar with the locality involved and the one who, when the incident is over, will still be left to deal with community reaction to the handling of the situation. Once the initial confrontation is over and the situation is contained, the patrol area commander is the only person who can authorize the discharge of weapons except in emergency self-defence situations such as the felons attempting to charge a containment team.

The New York City Police Department's plan consists of three phases with patrol, emergency service, and detective units responding and carrying out predetermined, specifically delineated duties and responsibilities. Phase I, the containment phase, occurs at the initial location when the hostage is first taken. Phase II, the mobile phase, goes into effect if a demand for a vehicle or other means of escape is made by and granted to the felon. Phase III, the relocation phase, is principally a duplication of Phase I, but at a new location.

The Detective Bureau's responsibilities under this plan are to provide specially trained detectives for negotiations during Phase I, to provide escape and chase vehicle operators for Phase II, and to function as containment teams during Phase III pending arrival of the special emergency service containment teams. This article deals primarily with the role of the detective negotiator in hostage situations.

Why Negotiate?

In addition to its overriding concern for the preservation of human life, the New York City hostage plan contains a unique innovation that is a departure from the traditional police response to such situations — buying time through the use of detectives specially trained in psychological techniques for hostage negotiations. Det. Harvey Schlossberg, a New York officer who possesses a Ph.D. in clinical psychology, researched the existing psychological writings on hostage-takers and found little on the subject. Working in conjunction with other members of the department, he developed profiles of the typical hostage-taker. They fell into three categories:

The professional criminal who has his escape blocked during the commission of a crime,

The psychotic with a depraved mind, and

The terrorist or fanatic with a cause.

A methodology of crisis intervention was developed for such situations in order to ease anxieties and tensions, and if possible, to allow the felon to assess the situation rationally. This is done by our detective hostage negotiators engaging the abductor or felon in conversation.

Time is a most important factor working for the police. As a general rule, Dr. Schlossberg notes, the more time the felon spends with the hostage, the less likely he is to take the hostages life, because they become acquainted and develop feelings for one another.

In addition to allowing this transference of feelings to take place, the passage of time also gives the police an opportunity to prepare for different eventualities and permits the felon to make a mistake. Mistakes by the criminal, when the police are prepared for them, are the "luck" you read about when a hostage situation is brought to a successful conclusion. As someone once observed: "Luck is the residue of careful planning and proper preparation."

Why Detective Negotiators?

It takes a singular type of individual to deal unarmed, face to face, with an armed felon holding a hostage. He must be

cool, resourceful, mature, and most of all, effective in verbal communication. Successful detectives have developed these attributes through their experience in dealing with the public, interviewing witnesses, and interrogating suspects.

Selection

The following criteria were used to select the members of the Detective Bureau Hostage Negotiating Team:

- Volunteers only,
- Good physical condition,
- Mature appearance,
- Good speaking voice,
- Skilled interrogator, and
- Representatives of various ethnic and racial groups with, if possible, the ability to speak a foreign language.

The 68 members of the Detective Bureau who were finally selected and trained as hostage negotiators consisted of 1 lieutenant, 3 sergeants, and 64 detectives, 2 of whom were women. This group included 12 blacks, 12 Hispanics, and 44 Caucasians. The languages spoken by the group included Italian, Spanish, German, Hebrew, Yiddish, Greek, Polish and Ukranian. In addition four members of the department who are not members of the group speak Arabic and are available as translators.

Training

The group underwent an intensive 4-week training course which was conducted at various locations throughout the city as well as in the classroom. Training consisted of the following subjects:

PSYCHOLOGY. The greatest emphasis was placed on intensive psychological training to prepare team members to analyze various situations and develop strategies using psychological techniques rather than force to obtain the safe release of hostages. The point of the training was to provide a basis for understanding and anticipating the hostage-taker's moves as well as his possible reactions to police tactics.

PHYSICAL TRAINING. This encompassed general ungrading of physical condition as well as weapon-disarming methods and techniques of unarmed self-defense.

FIREARMS. Firearms training included the .38 caliber revolver, 9 mm submachine gun, .223 caliber sniper scope rifle, shot-gun (double barrel and pump), 37 mm tear gas launcher, .25 caliber automatic, and .22 caliber Derringer. Candidates wore bulletproof vests during the firing of all weapons.

ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT. All members were familiarized with and had to qualify in the use of a miniphone wireless transmitter and recorder and in the use of electronic tracking devices which utilize range and relative bearing features that can be quite valuable in Phase II.

EMERGENCY RESCUE AMBULANCE. Each team member learned to operate the emergency rescue ambulance, a full-track armored personnel carrier. This training also included the use of its auxiliary equipment, that is, the public address system, intercom, radio equipment, fire-fighting system, and first aid gear. In the Williamsburg siege, this vehicle was used to rescue officers and civilians who were pinned down by gunfire from the felons. It also served as a safe base for the start of negotiations.

VEHICLE OPERATION. Instruction was given in the operation of the specially equipped escape and chase vehicles, including auxiliary equipment. Special attention was paid to those streets and routes from various locations in the city to airports or other destinations which would offer us the best tactical advantage.

LIAISON. Hostage team candidates received 2 days of training with Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on jurisdictional matters and cooperation with other agencies including the Federal Aviation Administration. One day of training was held at John F. Kennedy Airport and La Guardia Airport with the Port of New York and New Jersey Authority Police. We integrated our plan with their emergency programs.

RETRAINING. In addition to this initial program, debriefings are scheduled to critique every significant hostage situation that takes place anywhere. During such critiques, "Monday morning quarterbacking" and speculation are encouraged. From the situations under study, officers gain new insights and learn new techniques.

Working Detectives

Members of the Detective Bureau Hostage Negotiating Team are working detectives assigned to various squads throughout the city. Once their training as hostage negotiators is completed, they are returned to their permanent commands and resume their normal investigative duties. They are placed in predetermined slots in the duty chart for adequate coverage, and their names are entered on a roster for primary response to a hostage situation within their borough of assignment. At the beginning of each tour of duty, the detective area command ascertains which members performing duty within the borough are trained negotiators. Should a hostage situation occur during the tour, the detective area command will notify such members to respond. Seven negotiators are dispatched to the scene of each hostage incident. If there are not seven negotiators on duty within the borough, the adjacent boroughs are notified to dispatch their negotiators.

The reason seven negotiators are utilized is that two are needed as communicators — one member is the primary communicator whose responsibility it is to establish rapport and voice identification with the felon, and the second member assists in developing patterns of questions, analyzes the entire situation, and communicates with the command post — and the other five members are assigned as follows:

- As reliefs,
- As secondary negotiators should the first team be unsuccessful at establishing rapport,
- To operate escape and chase vehicles, if necessary, and
- To function as a containment team at a new location should the felon move the hostage.

Negotiating Techniques and Policies

Since no two hostage confrontations are alike, there can be

no standardized format for negotiations. Each situation is treated individually. However, the following techniques have been developed as a result of our experiences.

The negotiator should have a mature appearance so that he will be perceived by the hostage-taker as a person of authority. During the negotiations, the negotiator should command the respect of everyone, but he should not portray himself as the ultimate decision-maker. The felon should be made to understand that there is someone over the negotiator. This allows the negotiator to defer decisions and buy time. It also allows him to maintain rapport with the felon when demands are delayed or turned down because he is not the one who is denying the felon's requests.

Usually the easiest type of hostage-taker to deal with is the professional criminal. He is considered a relatively rational thinker who after assessing the situation and weighing the odds, in most cases, comes to terms with the police and refrains from unnecessary violence or useless killing.

The psychotic individual, on the other hand, presents a different and somewhat more complex problem. He tends to be irrational and, therefore, less predictable. His actions, the words he uses, and the demands he makes are often valuable clues to his mental condition. The psychotic harbors greater inner frustration and conflict. He may even feel a degree of pleasure from his precarious predicament, as he now finds himself important and the center of attention, a position which may be unique in his life. Time works for the police in this instance because the psychotic is emotionally tense and expends a great deal of physical and psychic energy which eventually wears him down.

The fanatic or terrorist group creates an even more difficult hostage situation. In a sense, they can be viewed as a group of psychopaths with a cause, all under the leadership of one of the group. When caught in a criminal act, many of them rationalize their behavior by claiming to be revolutionaries who are merely seeking social justice. During the Williamsburg Siege, just such a position was taken by the four stickup men. In these situations, the resolve to die for their cause may deteriorate with the passage of time, and time allows for mistakes to be made.

In any of these cases if the felon kills one of several hostages during negotiations, action should be taken to save the lives of the remaining hostages, because once he kills one hostage he is likely to kill more.

Practically all demands are negotiable but one - supplying weapons. If the felon is bluffing with an unloaded or bogus weapon, giving him a gun would truly creat a real danger.

Conclusion

If an analogy might be made, a hostage negotiation situation can be compared to a "bomb scare". Just as we would send only trained bomb squad personnel to defuse a bomb, so too, we should send only trained negotiators to deal with these emotionally explosive hostage situations. The training of bomb squad personnel stresses what makes a bomb tick and how to defuse it; the psychological training we give our detective hostage negotiators stresses what makes a hostage-taker tick and how to neutralize him.

To date, the services of the negotiators have been utilized in more than 15 hostage situations. Several of these incidents had resulted in the taking of human life during the initial crime; however, in every case, once negotiations had begun the situation was successfully terminated with the hostage released unharmed and the abductors apprehended.

CHECK LIST - HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

1. PREPARE OPENING STATEMENT (INTRODUCTION)
2. TAKE GUN OFF (SITUATION DEPENDING)
3. WHAT IS SUBJECT WEARING?
4. WHO HAS MADE CONTACT WITH SUBJECT?
5. WHAT WAS SAID? - IF PREVIOUSLY CONTACTED.
6. HOW MANY HOSTAGES?
7. TRY TO IGNORE HOSTAGE(S) .
8. USE COVER IF POSSIBLE.
9. DON'T TELL SUBJECT 'NO'.
10. DON'T VOLUNTEER INFORMATION.
11. ATTEMPT TO MAKE SUBJECT TALK OF ANYTHING & EVERYTHING.
12. REPEAT HIS STATEMENTS, IF YOU ARE LOST FOR WORDS (TECHNIQUE) .
13. MAKE SUBJECT FEEL IMPORTANT.
14. DISCUSS HIS (SUBJECT'S) DEMANDS.
15. CALL SUBJECT BY 'NAME' IF POSSIBLE (TECHNIQUE) .
16. DON'T CUT SUBJECT OFF WHEN HE IS SPEAKING - LET HIM TALK.
17. NEVER MAKE EVALUATIONS OR PROMISES YOU CANNOT KEEP.
18. SEEM TO AGREE WITH HIM - "THAT'S GOOD, BUT....."

NEGOTIATOR CHECK LIST

1. WHAT? (Situation)

- A. What has occurred?
- B. Who initiated call? (From where?)
- C. Time of occurrence?
- D. Injuries
 - 1. Police
 - 2. Suspect
 - 3. Hostage
 - 4. Others
- E. Has contact with suspect been made?
 - 1. What kind?
 - 2. When?
- F. Is the situation locked in?

2. WHERE?

- A. Suspects located?
- B. Hostages located?
- C. Non-hostages?
- D. Floor plan?
 - 1. Ingress - egress
 - 2. Telephones
 - 3. Observation points - suspect of us;
by us of suspect?
- E. Weapons?
 - 1. Firearms
 - 2. Explosives
 - 3. Chemicals
 - 4. Others
- F. Life support - Basic human needs?
 - 1. Needs
 - 2. Desires

3. WHO?

- A. Suspect(s)?
 - 1. Identity
 - 2. Description - physical and clothing
 - 3. Photo
 - 4. I.D. Check
 - 5. Psychological and medical profile
 - 6. Other factors
Input from family, friends

B. Hostage(s)?

1. Identity
2. Description - physical and clothing
3. Photo
4. I.D. Check
5. Psychological and medical profile
6. Other factors
Input from family, friends

C. Non-Hostage(s)?

1. Identity
2. Description - physical and clothing
3. Other factors
Input from family, friends

D. Are there other relevant personnel?
(Suspects captured, hostage released, witnesses?)
Have they been interviewed?

4. WHEN?

- A. Deadlines
- B. Timed mechanisms? (vaults, alarms, lights,
sound systems, locks)

5. WHY?

- A. Reasons?
- B. Demands?
- C. Ultimatums?

CHECKLIST FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

Prepared by:

Dr. Irving Goldaber
Associate Consultant
Professional Standards Division
International Association of Chiefs of Police
Eleven Firstfield Road
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760

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Chiefs of Police

ORGANIZATION

The negotiating process is a technical one and an involvement in a hostage situation is an even more complex activity. For this reason, police departments are advised to set up a hostage negotiating team and give its members the training they will need to successfully deal with a hostage incident, should one occur. The members of the team, who would serve in this negotiating capacity on an on-call basis while continuing in their regular, full-time assignments, should mirror the population's composition with regard to nationality, ethnicity and languages spoken, with both sexes, of course, represented. The officers recruited for the unit should possess empathic and sensitive personalities and be drawn from among those officers who have demonstrated an ability to intervene successfully in crisis situations. A local psychiatrist should be designated as an on-call consultant to the unit.

The rationale for creating a specialized unit, stemming as it does from the complicated nature of hostage negotiations, makes it strategically unsound to involve other officers with other responsibilities in the actual negotiating process. But, since the actions of the unit will necessitate the utilization of various kinds of support personnel, the commanding officer of the hostage negotiations team should either have sufficient rank to enable him to draw freely upon this other needed manpower or be responsible to an officer possessing rank, who would, in turn, make the support personnel available.

For the same reason, the often utilized practice of bringing into the negotiations operation family members and other kin, as well as friends of the perpetrator - let alone authority figures (e.g., ministers, teachers, community leaders) known to the perpetrator and possibly known to the department - is to be avoided. The conduct of the negotiations process, again, is a professional endeavour. Since there are endless opportunities for the development of complications, maximum control over the process is best maintained by restricting its management to those individuals who might exert a positive influence upon the perpetrator could be considerably helpful. Their involvement, however, might exacerbate the problem if the perpetrator's experience with them was more negative than even the individuals involved may have reason to believe. It is anticipated that what may be gained by the inclusion of these individuals will be more than made up by the skilled and systematic approach of the professionally trained team personnel.

Therefore, when a hostage situation occurs, a command station should be set up in the area. If the officer in charge of the negotiations team is of sufficient rank, then he will direct and coordinate the containment, negotiations, crowd control, community relations and media relations activities. If he is responsible solely for the hostage negotiations and not for the other aspects of the police action involved, then the superior officer to whom he reports will intergrate his role with the other areas of concern.

The checklist presented here to the officer in charge, deals with the negotiations per se and some critical activities of the support personnel. The list is neither of options nor imperatives to be followed rigidly. It is, rather, an inventory of suggested actions to be adapted to the resources of a particular department and to the needs of the situation at hand. Since many items listed are capable of producing different responses when particular variables are present, and thus each hostage situation is a unique one, in the final analysis, the judgment of the officer in command, made with a maximum amount of available data, will play the decisive role.

It should be noted that hostages are taken by perpetrators for a variety of reasons. These situations include the burglar who is attempting to facilitate his escape, the ransom-demanding kidnapper who has planned his moves with care, the psychopathic personality with anti-social goals, and the fanatical terrorist who is seeking political ends. Since these types of perpetrators operate for different purposes, the police response to them should take their objectives and their likely actions into account. For the police the objective is always the same: seeking the return of the hostage unharmed and the capture of the perpetrator. The needs to recover the hostage unharmed and, hopefully, to seize the perpetrator in similar condition will sometimes make it necessary to permit the perpetrator to escape from the scene of action. Before an attempt is made to kill the perpetrator, the officer in command must weigh the likelihood that the perpetrator would kill the hostage against the possibility that the hostage could be recovered and have decided that the shooting of the perpetrator is the only way to save the hostage.

PROCEDURES

1. Check records to determine the perpetrator's identity, personal history, criminal history, medical history, and mental history.
2. Clear the area of all civilians.
3. Bring in sharpshooter support personnel. Locate these officers outside the perpetrator's range of vision. Make certain, however, that the perpetrator knows that he is covered by sharpshooters.
4. Bring in medical support personnel, appropriate equipment and standby ambulances.
5. Bring in the consultant psychiatrist.

6. Put the psychiatrist in touch with - if perpetrator has a history of mental treatment - practitioners who have dealt with him.
7. Bring in the spouse, parents and siblings of the perpetrator, if available, to gain further insight into perpetrator's behavior and reasoning process.
8. Bring in judo-trained support personnel for use as appropriate.
9. Bring in support officers with an ability to create on-the-spot costumes for the masquerading (whenever appropriate) of the judo-trained officers.
10. Bring in support officers familiar with electrical and mechanical devices to deal with situations in the negotiating, or (should it move to that point) the getaway phase of activity.

11. Create contrivances, such as mirrors on rods, to make it possible to view as much of the perpetrator's action as possible.
12. Bore peepholes, if this is possible, to observe the perpetrator's movements and behavior.
13. Seek to obtain multi-views of the perpetrator's movements.
14. Insure that audio communication with the perpetrator will be maintained. Utilize a bullhorn, if he is within hearing range.
15. Place a walkie-talkie in such a way that the perpetrator can pick it up, giving him a communications link to your walki-talkie.

16. Bring telephone company personnel to the scene. Have them alter the perpetrator's telephone capability so that he can reach only you and you can reach him.
17. Set up, if possible, a listening-in system into the perpetrator's area of control.
18. Clear the line of fire outside the perpetrator's area of control.
19. Insure that the lighting of the scene of action will be adequate. Bring in back-up emergency power supply.
20. Deploy community relations personnel to deal with community groups and individuals.

21. Establish linkage with a food supply operation to provide for the perpetrator and hostage.
22. Establish with perpetrator a manner by which food and water will be made available to him.
23. Make certain that the food is ample and attractive, yet not fancy.
24. Do not introduce drugs into the food.
25. Do not send alcohol into the perpetrator. Permit a limited number of cans of beer to be included with the food supply. Be aware that the purpose of this is to introduce a social element into the picture.

26. Give the perpetrator anything he asks for except weapons.
27. Do not permit any officer to enter into the perpetrator's area of control, as he too could be taken hostage.
28. Make certain that the perpetrator knows with whom he is negotiating.
29. Set no demands, other than a trade of the release of the hostage for the perpetrator's safety in surrender...as long as the perpetrator is not seriously harming the hostage.
30. Accept no deadlines from the perpetrator.

31. Be prepared to move in on the perpetrator if he begins to seriously harm the hostage, weighing the decision of the action against the likelihood that the perpetrator will proceed to kill the hostage.
32. Determine if the hostage or hostages are bound or are able to move about.
33. Ask to see the hostage or hostages so that you can assess their well-being and movement potential.
34. Use smoke rather than bullets if you are convinced that the perpetrator has run out of ammunition and that the hostage or hostages are not located in one area in close proximity to each other. Make certain that the smoke is applied in a heavy concentration.
35. Shoot only if you are convinced that the perpetrator is prepared to kill the hostage and die for it. Aim for a one-shot kill.

36. Conduct assessments on a continuing basis on the perpetrator's willingness and ability to negotiate.
37. Note the following indicators of the perpetrator's willingness and ability to negotiate: his continued participation in the negotiating process, his lessening of demands, the uneventful passage of deadlines set by him, and considerate treatment of the hostage.
38. Follow the cardinal canon: keep the perpetrator talking with you as long as possible.
39. Recognize that as long as the perpetrator is talking, the opportunity remains for a successful negotiation.
40. Begin, as the time of shift change nears, to phase in replacements gradually for on-duty officers.

41. Do not use gas.

42. Conduct assessments on a continuing basis of the perpetrator's state of rationality.

43. Move in upon him if you have concluded, with expert psychiatric advice, that he has become irrational and destructive. Recognize that this move is a showdown action.

44. Continue to do everything possible to consume time, in the hope that the perpetrator will be worn down into agreement or be led to a miscalculation on his part facilitating his capture.

45. Settle with the perpetrator, if possible, for his yielding the hostage for his own safety.

46. Indicate, if it will move him to this optimum settlement, that you will personally escort him to the booking.
47. Agree, as a further attempt to reach an optimum settlement, that you will seek to get concurrence from any individual he designates to ride to the booking with him and you.
48. Agree, if the perpetrator insists upon it and it will bring him to yield the hostage and surrender, to arrange a meeting with the mass media personnel.
49. Introduce to the perpetrator the idea of the meeting with the media, if he does not come to it himself.
50. Agree, if there is not yielding by the perpetrator to any of the foregoing, to provide a getaway vehicle and a procedure for egress from the area in return for the release of the hostage.

51. Agree, if the negotiation moves to this position, to provide the getaway vehicle and a procedure for egress from the area without his agreement to release the hostage. Be aware that the likelihood is very great that additional opportunities will present themselves to recover the hostage alive.
52. Do not agree to the release of any individuals from your custody whose freedom the perpetrator seeks, nor agree to transmit any demand for the release of individuals in custody elsewhere.
53. Consult, if the perpetrator insists upon leaving the country, with appropriate federal authorities.
54. Secure, if the negotiation moves to this level and he is permitted to leave the country, the release of the hostage as a condition for his egress.

55. Permit him, if he is authorized to leave the country and the situation has moved to this point in the negotiation, to take the hostage with him, recognizing here that the likelihood is overwhelming that governments to which the perpetrator flees will release the hostage, if not the perpetrator also.
56. Equip any air and ground getaway vehicle provided to the perpetrator with electronic tracking devices. Mark the rooftops of ground equipment with reflecting paint.
57. Recognize, if the perpetrator has been permitted to egress, that the department has acquiesced in the perpetrator's getaway, but that it has not agreed to it.

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