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THE APRIL 1971 KINGSTON PENITENTIARY RIOT

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Dans la soirée du mercredi 14 avril 1971 six détenus du Pénitencier de Kingston sortant de la salle de récréation se sont jetés sur cinq gardiens et se sont rendus maître de la prison. Ensuite, ils ont libéré les détenus de leur cellules et ont barricadé l'entrée au dôme, centre de contrôle du pénitencier. Les gardiens furent tenus captifs durant l'émeute tandis que les détenus chefs de file, ont exigé que le gouvernement négocie leur libération. Ce texte est une description des activités détenus et une reconstruction des incidents qui ont eu lieu durant cette révolte de quatre jours.

During the last night of the April 1971 Kingston Penitentiary riot, a group of inmate "undesirables" (sex offenders and informants) were dragged from their cells, tied to chairs in a circle, and viciously assaulted by another group of inmates. The assault took place on the dome floor of the prison in front of the inmate population, and resulted in the death of two prisoners, Brian Ensor and Bertrand Henry Robert. Following the riot, the Kingston Police Force conducted an investigation into the deaths and brought charges of Non-Capital Murder against thirteen convicts.


This paper is a day by day account of the April 1971 Kingston Penitentiary Riot. Events have been reconstructed from the statements made to the police by inmates who were in the prison throughout the riot. These statements have been checked against each other, against the trial transcripts, and against newspaper reports for accuracy and consistency.

After the riot ended and the prisoners had been transferred to the new penitentiary at Millhaven, a number of inmates informed prison authorities that they were willing to talk to the police.

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Two police officers interviewed each prospective witness; one wrote out the statement as the inmate gave it, and the other witnessed the signing of the statement. Forty-nine inmates made statements, and most of them agreed to appear as witnesses if they were called upon to testify. Some were reluctant, however, because they feared that they would be endangering their own lives by appearing in court. One man told the police:

I don't wish to go to court, but rather than see the goons get away with it, I think I would. If I did go to court, I would like to be transferred to some other institution.

In decisions concerning prosecution, Kingston Crown Attorney John Sampson had no trouble disposing of a large number of cases because of insufficient or conflicting evidence. For the thirteen inmates charged, he had statements from over twenty witnesses describing the role that each of the accused played in the attack on the "undesirables". Over twenty other men escaped prosecution because of insufficient evidence. Ten to fifteen other inmates were identified by ten or more witnesses as also having assaulted the men tied to their chairs. Mr. Sampson says that this latter group was not prosecuted because the cases against them were not as strong as the cases against the thirteen inmates charged, and that the inclusion of weaker cases might have damaged the very strong ones that he had.

Crown witnesses were no doubt aware of the fact that they were still living among inmates who had also been involved in the beatings and who had not been charged. They were also keenly aware that the assault and murder they had seen had been on "undesirables" — a category which includes informants. Thus the men who decided to give evidence were risking their lives. Several inmates known to be testifying against the thirteen accused were, in fact, assaulted by their fellow prisoners. Their identity was discovered despite the fact that a court order to the press prohibited the publication of the names of witnesses. It was discovered that an inmate from Collins Bay Penitentiary on day-parole was sitting in court, and was bringing back to prison the names of inmates who appeared as witnesses. These men were subsequently attacked

by Collins Bay prisoners. For their own protection, some of the inmates testifying were transferred to the Provincial Jail in Napanee. Even there, they were hounded and mistreated by the transient population, many of whom were ex-convicts. In another institution, an inmate who foolishly let it be known that he was going to testify was assaulted on several occasions and finally had to be moved for his own protection. Penitentiary authorities had to reinforce protective measures when a list of the names of the inmate witnesses fell into the hands of prisoners. Crown Attorney Sampson had reluctantly agreed to provide the lawyers for the defendants with a summary of the testimony of witnesses so that they could prepare a proper defence. He did so under the condition that the list not be shown to the accused. Despite this, one lawyer was seen handing the list to his client. Prison authorities later found copies of the "rat list" in several penitentiaries, one of them in a distant part of the country.

The feelings of many inmates toward informants ("rats", "stoolies", "squealers", etc.) are hatred and hostility. The following letter to the Editor of the Globe and Mail, Friday, June 28, 1972, by an inmate in Joyceville Penitentiary, illustrates these feelings:

In your editorial "Justice in the Prisons: the Inmate's or Ours?" (July 20) you say that the 40 men who testified against their fellow inmates, following the riot in Kingston Penitentiary 15 months ago were "adhering to the rules and responsibilities of the greater society".

This statement is patently absurd....These informers did not act out of any semblance of regard for either the rules of society or a sense of responsibility to anything other than their own personal gain.

The fact of their having been in the penitentiary (most of them have been rewarded by paroles since delivering up their comrades) clearly establishes their lack of that quality with which you dare to credit them. They are, all of them and to a man (if indeed such they can be called) of Japanese captors on their comrades in the prison camps and every bit as despicable.

...These informers live by no laws or conventions other than the law of personal gain or: "What's in it for me?" There motto is: "What is good or of benefit to me is right, and aught else matters, and everyone is expendable".

I will tell you what motivated them to testify against their fellows: fear and, possibly, a way out. Fear that as they too were informers, the same fate might await them, and the all-consuming desire to get out of prison. We, all of us, want out of prison, but fortunately not all of us are prepared to sell our principles, our souls, or our fellow man, in order to achieve this. But some are, such as the 40 whom you dare to invest with a social conscience....

Terry Forsythe,
Inmate, Joyceville Penitentiary,
Kingston.

Feelings such as those expressed above gave rise to numerous assaults on the witnesses and because of these attacks it became necessary for the Penitentiary Service to take special precautions to protect these men. This protection took the form of special confinement in a dormitory in Kingston Penitentiary. This meant that privileges and freedom were curtailed and that these inmates were not allowed to participate in workshops and recreational activities.

As well as being aware of the dangers involved in testifying, potential witnesses were no doubt aware that in cooperating with the police and the Crown Attorney, they might increase their chances for early release from prison. One inmate stated:

If I give evidence, my life will be in danger. It would be impossible for me to give evidence while still in the prison for I'd be placing my own life in danger. I'm eligible for parole in a month or so and if I'm granted parole I will be only too happy to tell my story.

The expectation of inmates that their testimony would lead to favourable parole consideration was born out of subsequent events. Following the riot, the National Parole Service interviewed each of the witnesses and submitted the cases to the National Parole Board for proposed action.

After the trial, Crown Attorney Sampson and the Kingston Police expressed concern for the well-being of the witnesses housed at Kingston Penitentiary. As a result, a conference was held in the Police Commission Room of the Kingston City Police Station on December 14, 1971. In attendance were police officers, officials of the Penitentiary Service and members of the Parole Service. The conference discussed the cases of twenty-two witnesses, paying particular attention to those inmates who were cooperative with police, and recommended that parole consideration be given to many of them. The following is an example of the type of statements which appear in the minutes of the meeting:

This man gave a statement and volunteered to testify. He was cooperative with the police throughout investigation and trial. He did not ask for favours and seemed solidly in support of law and order throughout...It was felt that this man should receive consideration because of the stand he has taken which in turn places his life in danger.

Special consideration for parole because of cooperation with the police is not irregular. One of the criteria for "Parole by Exception" under the heading "Special Representations from the Judiciary, Crown Prosecutor, etc." states: "Crown Prosecutor advises of unusual cooperation by inmate during investigation, etc". Another criteria for "Parole by Exception" is under the title "Preservation of Equity" and reads "inmate performed meritorious service to administration during institutional riot, etc".

Wednesday, April 14:
The Riot Begins

To the administrators of Kingston Penitentiary, Wednesday, April 14, 1971, seemed like any other day. Nothing out of the ordinary had been happening, and there were no signs of

trouble. Below the surface, however, a handful of inmates were making plans to seize and hold guards as hostages, and to capture the dome, the control centre of the prison. Several inmates have revealed in their testimony that they were aware of the planned takeover. One prisoner told the police:

On Wednesday, April 14, about 10:30 a.m., I was in the carpentry shop. I was on a ladder and I overheard three or four inmates standing below. They were discussing a previous attempt to grab hostages, how it had failed, and how this time they were going to pull it off.

Other inmates revealed that they had been asked, but had refused to take part. Still others reported that a rumour that there was going to be trouble that night had been circulating throughout the prison all day. Despite the fact that many inmates were aware that a rebellion was imminent, no one informed the Penitentiary staff.

Between 8:30 and 10:30 p.m., the inmates from range 2 were in the gymnasium for a routine recreation period. It was not unusual that a few inmates had decided to skip recreation that night, and remain behind in their cells. Aware that there was going to be an uprising, these inmates did not wish to become involved.

A few minutes before 10:30, the men from range 2, H block, lined up in the gym to be escorted back to their cells. Unnoticed by the guards, six of the men who lived in 2-H had been replaced in the line-up by six others. As they left the gym, these six men, led by inmate William (Billy) Knight, began to overpower the guards.

Ron Haggart, a journalist, and one of the men who negotiated with the inmates throughout the riot, describes what followed:

The rest of the lineup kept marching to their cells as usual. (Inmate Brian) Dodge was in the dome, fighting with (Guard) Flynn and demanding the keys, when the first men of the lineup were climbing the stairs and approaching guard Joseph Valliere at the entrance to 2-H. Valliere and the inmates could easily see through the iron railing of the balcony what was happening one floor below them.

"The minute the fight started", Valliere recalled later, "I glanced at the faces of the inmates coming up the stairs to try to get from the expressions on their faces what sort of a mood they were in."

"I immediately ordered them into their cells, saying, 'You don't want no part of this'. I read from their expressions, expressions of fear."

"I decided they didn't want anything to do with what was going on downstairs. So I ordered them into their cells."

The prisoners marched into their cells but, "About midway down the range", Valliere remembers, "I was grabbed and told that that was as far as I was to go, and not to give any resistance or I would be hurt. That was as far as I went."

All six of the guards were then herded into a cell corridor leading off the dome. But before he went, keeper Ed Barrett handed his wallet to an inmate. "Look after this", Barrett said, "and don't forget, I'll remember who you are." Four nights later, when Ed Barrett marched out of Kingston Penitentiary, the last hostage to be released, he got his wallet back, and the \$270 it contained.

After the last guard had been captured, the rebels set about releasing other prisoners. Keys taken from the guards opened some of the cells, but most doors had to be forced open with steel bars. Inmates who were not eager to be released were ordered out of their cells by prisoners who waved steel bars threateningly in their faces. The whole operation proceeded smoothly, and it was only a matter of minutes before the inmates were in control of the prison.

Billy Knight very quickly assumed leadership of the insurrection and summoned the inmate population to the dome. He addressed them from the third range and gave orders that there was to be no fighting and that the guards were not to be injured. Knight then directed the inmates to barricade all en-

trances and to destroy the prison. When he finished speaking, prisoners began smashing windows, furniture, doors, and everything else could be broken. Witnesses estimate that only fifty inmates (out of 500) took part in the destruction of the prison. The final damage measured in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.

After his speech, Knight proceeded to the gym where fifty inmates were still held captive. Immediately after the disturbance began, the officers in the gym ordered the prisoners to line up against the wall. Unlabeled the dome where the guards were unarmed, the gym contained a gun cage high on the wall where an officer armed with a rifle and hand gun helped maintain control. When Warden Arthur Jarvis arrived at the gym, Billy Knight was allowed in to speak to him. Knight promised the warden that the riot would remain peaceful, and ordered him to pull out his guards. Jarvis obeyed and left the gym with four officers through a side door. This left the remaining inmates free to enter the dome and join the riot. Some of the inmates who were in the gym expressed surprise that they were not made to leave through the side door as well.

Thursday, April 15:
The Inmates of 1-D

Inmates held in 1-D were the only men out of the 512 in the wings and cell area controlled by the rioting prisoners who were not released from their cells. This wing of the prison had an unfortunate reputation because it housed the prison "undesirables". This is a term used to describe sex offenders and informants, two types of inmates who rank low within the inmate social system. In prison, the child molester ("diddler") and the informer ("rat", "stool pigeon") are shunned and despised by other inmates. Their segregation in 1-D was, for the most part, to protect them from harm. Not all sex deviates are despised and abused, however. Homosexuals and men whose sexual offences have been restricted to adults rather than children are tolerated.

It is often common knowledge in prisons why a particular inmate has been incarcerated. Bertrand Henry Robert, for example, had tortured his children by sitting them on a hot stove. His case received much publicity, and when he arrived at Kingston Penitentiary, he had to be placed in 1-D for his own protection.

The background of other inmates held in 1-D was similar. One inmate was serving a sentence of twelve years for abduction and attempted sexual intercourse with an eleven year old girl. He also received five years concurrent for a charge of abduction of a female under sixteen years of age. Another inmate was serving four years for indecent assault on a female, while two others had been declared "Dangerous Sexual Offenders" (Sec. 661 of the Criminal Code) and were serving indeterminate sentences.

Not all prisoners housed in 1-D were sex offenders or informers. One young inmate had been placed in 1-D at his own request because he had refused to have sexual intercourse with other inmates and had consequently had his life threatened. Occupancy of a cell in 1-D was, however, prima facie evidence for other prisoners that an inmate was either an informer or a sex deviate.

Shortly after midnight, two inmates armed with metal bars climbed the barriers into 1-D. Stopping at the cell of inmate James Ball, they began to smash it open. Witnesses to the incident report hearing the assailants say to Ball: "Come out from under the bed, we are here to kill you". They heard Ball crying and screaming, "God have mercy on me". In the words of one inmate: "They worked him over for five minutes, and all the time they beat him they kept calling him a rat and a stool pigeon". It was reported by other prisoners that these two inmates had harassed Ball on several occasions before the riot.

A few minutes after the beating ended, another group of inmates entered 1-D and assaulted Ball again. Other prisoners in 1-D could again hear him crying and screaming. When a group returned a third time several hours later, they found that Ball had slashed his wrists. He was taken to the prison hospital which was still in the hands of the prison authorities.

Shortly after the second attack on Ball, a group of ten to fifteen inmates pulled a fire hose through the barriers at the end of the range, turned on the water and moved from cell to cell spraying the occupants. Some prisoners escaped the dousing by turning out their lights and hiding under the beds.

All Thursday morning, groups of inmates amused themselves by tormenting the men locked in 1-D. James Rice was told by one group to hide under his bed because there was going to be a killing. Clifford Saunders was told by an inmate who had previously harassed him that he was "drawing heat and could expect trouble". Others were told that they were going to be killed.

Violence was not limited to the inmates of 1-D or to this particular area of the prison. After Knight had arranged the release of the inmates in the gym, Ralph Lake entered the dome with the other prisoners and proceeded to his cell, which he found wrecked. Believing that someone was out to get him, Lake began searching for his friend, Harold St. Amour. On his way to St. Amour's cell, he was struck on the head with a pipe wrench by an inmate who accused him of being a "stoolie". In court, Lake described the incident as a "grudge fight". Lake proceeded to St. Amour's cell and related the incident. St. Amour hid Lake in his cell with two other inmates, Gary McCorkel and Melvin Travis, until Saturday night when they were discovered.

Sometime Thursday morning, Brian Ensor, who was occupying a cell in the general population, was assaulted by two inmates with metal bars. After the beating they dragged Ensor out of his cell with the help of a third inmate, and attempted to throw him off the third range. They changed their minds, and when later asked why, one of the inmates replied: "He was screaming too much".

While these incidents were taking place, and while the destruction of the dome was going on, the inmate leaders, Billy Knight, Immanuel Lester, and others, were communicating with the Warden and arranging meetings. Sometime Thursday morning, when Knight received word that Ensor had been assaulted, he visited Ensor's cell and found him standing in the doorway wiping blood off his head and face. Ensor's eyes were swollen and black and he had a cut on his head. Knight was about to remove Ensor to the radio room for his own protection, but on the suggestion of Barrie MacKenzie, he decided to lock Ensor in 1-D. Ensor was unwilling to go along with Knight, and had to be dragged to 1-D. He struggled all the way to the cell block, at the same time crying out, "Why me? Why me?"

Knight then summoned the inmate population to the dome and related what had happened to Ensor. Visibly angry, he told the inmates that the beating given to Ensor was precisely the sort

of thing that they didn't want to happen, and ordered a halt to all fighting and the harrassment of "undesirables". Knight and Lester had visited 1-D Thursday and told the inmates that they would not be harmed. This promise was to a large extent upheld while Knight remained in power. Knight's speech seemed to have some effect, since the beatings of 1-D inmates stopped and the harassment declined.

Kingston Penitentiary on Thursday afternoon contrasted sharply with the excitement and activity of Wednesday night and Thursday morning. The prison was relatively quiet as most inmates, exhausted from being up all night, spent the day sleeping.

Inmates in 1-D reported two more incidents of harassment on Thursday. Thursday evening someone threw a can of green paint onto the range. Also on Thursday night, three inmates armed with metal bars came into 1-D, opened the cells one at a time, and stole each inmate's tobacco and other possessions.

During the riot much was written in the press about the prisoner's security system for protecting the undesirables. They were depicted as men with a grievance, driven to desperate ends to gain attention for the wrongs done or about to be done them, yet at the same time restrained and reasonable enough to protect those whom society could no longer protect. Other than the speech made by Knight, however, this security for the inmates of 1-D was a myth.

Friday, April 16:
The Struggle for Power
and Leadership

On Friday, an inmate in the general population was accused by several other prisoners of being an informer, and was beaten up in his cell. Other inmates, hearing of the beating, went to the man's cell where they found him covered with blood and hiding under the bed. He was taken to the hospital and placed in the hands of the authorities.

After the riot began, Billy Knight became its acknowledge leader. It wasn't long, however, before his leadership was challenged, and a struggle for power developed. There were two

competing forces; one group led by Barrie MacKenzie and Norman McCaud, and another group led by Dave Shepley and Brian Beaucage. This latter group was described by other inmates as "a bunch of young punks", "the hard core", "the tough guys" and "the gorillas". The group included many who had earlier been tormenting the men in 1-D. They had also advocated killing the guards, and had previously convinced Knight and Lester to make an announcement to the authorities that for every shot fired, they would drop a guard's finger out the window.

Knight was able to exert some control over this group for a time. When, for example, Shepley advocated destroying the radio room, he was restrained by Knight. Shepley reluctantly yielded, but threatened to come back with his friends if the radio was turned off. Knight also broke up a fight Wednesday which had developed between members of this group and some of the captive guards.

On Friday afternoon, there was a disagreement between Knight and Lester, and Lester was removed from the negotiating committee and MacKenzie was placed on it. Lester was also prohibited from entering the radio room and from making announcements to the inmates.

Late Friday evening, the struggle for power reached a climax. Using a loud hailer supplied by the Army, Knight called the inmate population to the dome and began to address them, stating that negotiations were proceeding well and that they had nothing to worry about. Brian Beaucage, who was standing nearby, ordered Knight to "shut up" and seized the loud hailer. Beaucage then grabbed Knight by the throat and swung a metal bar at his head. The blow missed its target, and hit the metal railing. Barrie MacKenzie, who was also standing nearby, disarmed Beaucage and separated him from Knight. The incident occurred in front of the entire population, and many of the inmates watching from the ground floor demanded that Knight be allowed to speak. MacKenzie returned the loud hailer to him and Knight made his speech. Few inmates reported remembering what he said. MacKenzie then gave the loud hailer to Norman MacKenzie, who also addressed the inmates below.

Saturday, April 17

After McCaud's speech it was clear to everyone that Knight had lost his power, and the MacKenzie was now in charge. Knight remained on the inmate negotiating committee, and McCaud joined at MacKenzie's request. The meetings with the five-man

citizen's group continued throughout Saturday in the hospital wing of the prison. At these conferences, Knight spoke of prison conditions, "this sickness we spew back into society". MacKenzie turned to him savagely, "We don't want these ping pong prizes of yours". Exhausted both physically and emotionally, Billy Knight was given a sleeping pill and sent to bed.

On Saturday night, word was received from Ottawa that the Government was unwilling to negotiate, and that they were demanding the return of the prison to prison authorities by Monday morning or else the army would seize the prison by force. The inmate committee returned to the dome and called the inmates together to inform them of the Government's decision. McCaud replayed tapes of statements made by various members of the citizen's committee and read the Government's statement that there would be no concessions. He explained to the inmates that they had a choice — they could either give up the hostages and go out peacefully, or the Army would move in. MacKenzie addressed the inmates and stated that they had to make a decision. He stated that if they did choose to give up the hostages and go out, he would be the last man out, and bring the last hostage with him. He also said that he had the hostages, and that nobody was going to harm them. It was then suggested that the prisoners go off in groups and think it over, and come back in one hour and vote on the two alternatives. The inmates then returned to their cells to discuss the situation. One inmate approached McCaud and suggested that they would have to have a secret vote, and McCaud agreed.

Most inmates apparently were in favour of giving up. One inmate stated: "I circled around and in my opinion, about 80% of the inmates wanted to go out". Another said: "All the fellows I talked to wanted to give up".

While the prisoners were discussing the choice they were going to make, MacKenzie and McCaud returned to the hospital to inform the citizen's committee of what was taking place.

Shortly thereafter, the inmates were summoned back into the dome by the banging of metal bars on the railings. Dave Shepley was on the fourth range with "a gang of toughs", and he began to address the prisoners. He yelled that they were not going to give up, and told the group below that they were either with them or against them. Brian Beaucage, who was beside Shepley, was wielding a club and shout-

ing the same thing. They ordered everyone to come up to the third and fourth range. This was accompanied by name calling and threats of all kinds.

The 500 inmates listening to Shepley and Beaucage mounted the stairs to the third and fourth range to join them. Most witnesses have reported that they were afraid not to do so. As one inmate said: "I could see that the insane element had taken over, so I decided with my friends to go up to the third range". Another stated: "By that time nobody had any guts or nerve". This inmate had been standing on the third range and started down to the dome floor, but the threats made him turn around and go back up.

Shepley then directed the prisoners to prepare themselves for the attack by the Army. The windows and lights were smashed, mattresses were pulled out, and all the weapons and heavy objects were collected and placed on the top two ranges so that they could be thrown down on the army when they entered. Some inmates tore up pieces of sheets and wet them down to prepare themselves for a tear-gas attack.

Sunday, April 18:
The Beatings

Shortly after 12:00 midnight Shepley suggested removing the guards and the inmates from 1-D and seating them in a circle. Using the loud hailer, and acting as master of ceremonies, he ordered chairs to be placed around the dome radiator. A group of inmates led by Beaucage then rushed into 1-D and dragged the reluctant occupants out of the dome and tied them to the chairs.

The suggestion to move the guards was met with resistance by the inmates who had been protecting the officers throughout the riot. They indicated to Shepley and Beaucage that they were not going to give up the officers without a fight. Other inmates also shouted their disapproval at the idea of harming the guards. The idea was then dropped, and the "hard core" turned their attention to the "undesirables".

Shepley moved down to the dome floor and called to the inmates watching from the ranges above: "Do you know anyone who should be here?" He asked for "diddlers and finks". Inmate Kowalczyk went to St. Amour's cell where Lake, Travis, and McCorkel had been hiding, and ordered them out into the dome. Travis and McCorkel were forced out and tied to chairs, but Lake raced up to the third range and attempted to lose himself in the crowd which had been ordered out to watch the ceremony. Kowalczyk began climbing the stairs calling out Lake's name, and the men beside Lake pushed him out and forced him down the stairs. He was grabbed and dragged to the circle by Beaucage who said to him, "I've been waiting four and a half years to get you". In court, Lake testified that he had been apprehensive of something happening to him when the riot began. "The general thing was my offence for which I was serving a sentence of preventive detention as a Dangerous Sexual Offender. There was a lot of hostility in the general population over this kind of offence."

Once all the "undesirables" were tied to the chairs, Shepley addressed himself to the inmates on the upper ranges, and asked what should be done to them. Inmates began yelling back, "castrate them", "cut their throats", "kill them". Someone suggested breaking their noses and the beatings began with inmates on the dome floor systematically breaking the noses of the tied prisoners. Edward Fowler struck several men with his fist, and then twisted their noses to see if they were broken. James Oag approached each inmate, saying to him, "you have a lovely nose - I think I will break it for you". He seized each one by the hair, pulled his head back and smashed him across the bridge of the nose with a steel bar.

Shepley directed the proceedings from the dome floor, while Beaucage directed them from the third range. Over thirty inmates milled around the tied men and took part in the brutal assault which lasted several hours. The tied inmates were struck on the head, face, groin and ribs with fists, hammers and metal bars. Two inmates had their legs cut open with a knife, another had his arm burned with a cigarette, and another had his fingers broken. Brian Ensor was picked up and dropped on his face several times, and then urinated upon.

Inmates also urinated and poured salt into the wounds of other prisoners. At one point, sheets were placed over the men in the circle, and hot glue poured on their heads. Following this,

a group of inmates walked around the ring striking men across the head with metal bars in an effort to knock them unconscious. Inmates periodically passed out from the beatings, and when they came around, they were beaten again. Their assailants centered out for attention anyone who spoke or cried out in pain. The beatings continued for several hours, but they were carried on intermittently. Shepley ordered that music be played over the radio so that the dying men could "go high class".

At one point during the beatings, an argument erupted over whether Travis should be in the circle. Shepley used the loud hailer and asked the inmates if anyone knew whether he was a "stool pigeon" or not. Beaucage hollered down that Travis was a sex offender, and that he stays in the ring. Another inmate went down to talk to Shepley on Travis' behalf, much against Beaucage's wishes, and convinced him to release Travis. Travis was then taken out of the circle still tied to the chair, and placed under a stairwell. His only injuries had been a broken nose.

Ralph Lake was also moved out of the circle. Two other inmates produced a "submission from his trial" to prove that he was not a child molester. Lake was dragged out and placed beside Travis. Later they were both untied and treated. They survived the remainder of the riot without being harmed further.

The beatings lasted from early Sunday morning until dawn Sunday, and they ended when all the inmates in the circle were unconscious. Each was struck on the knee with a steel bar to ensure that he was not alive. Most witnesses to the assaults believed that all of these men were dead. Several of the victims have reported that they faked death in order to avoid being further assaulted.

After they were unconscious, they were dragged back to 1-D still tied to their chairs, and thrown on the floor. Some inmates were cut loose, and their bodies were piled on one another. A few of the inmates who had conducted the beatings returned periodically to see if any of their victims were still alive. Evidence indicates that Ensor was still alive in 1-D. Inmate Robert Robidoux was heard remarking over Ensor's body, "You're not dead yet you bastard, I'm going to finish you off". He then struck Ensor on the head with a steel bar until his body stopped quivering. Bertrand Robert regained consciousness for a few minutes after being placed in 1-D, but was unconscious when removed later that day. Ensor was dead when his body was found, and Robert died four weeks later in the hospital.

When the beatings began, most inmates left the dome and returned to their cells because they did not wish to witness them. Many others, however, remained to view the spectacle, and shouted encouragement, threw objects down on the "undesirables", or gave thumbs down signals when particular punishments were suggested.

No one, apparently out of fear, attempted to stop the assault. One inmate testifying in court stated that he made it look like he was going along with the whole affair. "If you tried to interfere", he said, "you were going to join them". When somebody he didn't know asked him what he thought, he replied, "Well I think they are getting what they deserve".

Another witness stated that he had cheered in the beginning, and that he had given a thumbs down signal. He said: "I had no love for these people, but I thought they were just going to be tied up. When they came in, I didn't mind seeing them getting punched a few times."

Most inmates apparently did not approve of the beatings, but were afraid to interfere. Typical of some of the reactions of spectators were:

"The scene in the dome was torture. It was horrible, a real torture chamber and sickening."

"After the beatings had only gone on for a short time I took sick at the sight of it and I left. It was the worst sight I ever saw in my life. I still think about it at night."

"I watched the beatings for about an hour; there was so much blood and suffering that it made me sick. I went to a cell and got sick to my stomach. I could not go back to see any more."

The only instance of inmates helping and protecting the "undesirables" occurred after the beatings had ended and they had been dragged back into 1-D. A few inmates entered the range, untied the men from the chairs and helped make them comfortable. When several of the assailants returned to 1-D to kill anyone still alive, inmates from the second range ordered them to leave the inmates of 1-D alone. The orders were obeyed, and other prisoners instructed the "undesirables" to lay still and play dead.

The End of the Riot

The beatings had begun while Barrie MacKenzie and the other inmate leaders were meeting with the citizen's committee in the hospital. When word got back to them about what was happening in the dome, MacKenzie was the only one who would re-enter the prison. He came back and announced to the prisoners that the army was coming in, and that sixty inmates could leave by the hospital exit immediately. At this cue, two hundred men rushed down to the dome floor and toward the hospital. Those inmates who had been in charge of the beatings began throwing steel bars and other objects down on those trying to get out.

The remaining inmates had to wait until prison authorities called out their name before they could leave. Most inmates watched an afternoon Stanley Cup hockey game between the Montreal Canadiens and the Chicago Black Hawks while they waited. Sixty inmates at a time were removed, and the guards were released, uninjured, one leaving with each group of prisoners. MacKenzie was the last inmate to leave, and he walked out with the last guard.

In the trial that followed, thirteen inmates were charged with Non-Capital Murder in the deaths of Ensor and Robert. These defendants were brought to trial before the Honourable Mr. Justice Henderson and a jury in Kingston, Ontario. The Court convened on October 23, 1971, and lasted until November 22, 1971, when twelve of the convicts pleaded guilty to manslaughter and one to assault. Three of them were already serving life, and their sentences could not be extended. The remaining men received additions to existing sentences that ranged from two to five years.

Two other trials also followed the riot. In one trial, eleven guards were charged with having assaulted inmates moved from Kingston Penitentiary to Millhaven. Prisoners testified that they had been systematically beaten with blackjacks and riot sticks. The guards were found not guilty in all counts brought against them.

In another trial, Billy Knight and the five other inmates who overpowered the guards and started the riot were charged with the forcible seizure of the six guards held hostage. The original charge of kidnapping was reduced after negotiations were conducted between the defence lawyers and officials of the Attorney-General's Department. While the five inmates pleaded guilty and received three years each, Knight pleaded not guilty. He altered his appearance for the trial by wearing a suit and glasses, combing his hair differently and growing a moustache. Only one out of four guards called as witnesses was able to identify Knight. Provincial Judge Donald Graham dismissed the case but stated that it was his opinion that Knight was more culpable than the five men he had sentenced. He added ominously, "There may be other events which direct the force of justice against that individual".

THE B.C. PEN: Two days last June

The clerk of the New Westminster, B.C. provincial court read the charge with a straight face. It was alleged by the Crown that three B.C. Penitentiary inmates wilfully and unlawfully murdered Mary Steinhauser, a prison classification officer. It was August 18, a little more than two months after Steinhauser - one of 16 hostages seized June 9 by the three in a desperate bid for freedom - was killed by a prison guard's bullet in the clumsy, bloody climax to the breakout attempt. Named on the murder charge were Dwight Lucas, Claire Wilson and Andy Bruce.

Lucas, 20, swarthy, wiry-haired, proud to the point of defiance, heard the charge and spoke out. "How come Hollinger's name is not on there?" he asked. "I want to charge him with murder and attempted murder on top of it." Lucas had been asleep in the penitentiary classification office, outside the vault where the hostages were held, shortly before 1 a.m. on the morning of June 11. The hostages had attempted to overpower Wilson, who was supposed to be keeping an eye on them in the vault, and a squad of guards had rushed to their assistance, opening fire. Bruce, holding a knife to Steinhauser's throat in the outer room, was critically wounded; Steinhauser was dead on arrival at hospital, of a bullet to the heart. There were no stab wounds.

The squad was led by Albert Hollinger, a security supervisor at the B.C. Pen. We know, from testimony at the judicial inquiry into the incident headed by B.C. Chief Justice John Farris (Last Post, October, 1975) that Hollinger deliberately mixed up the squad's guns afterwards in an attempt to conceal the killer's identity; we know too that one guard's name is linked with Steinhauser's death in scrawled graffiti inside the Pen. Nevertheless, the three inmate were charged with the murder, under an obscure provision of the Criminal Code which reads: "Culpable homicide is murder...where a person, for an unlawful object, does anything that he knows or ought to know is likely to cause death, and thereby causes death to a human being, notwithstanding that he desires to affect the object without causing death or bodily harm to any human being."

So the cons were holding the hostage, the guards charged the cons, the guards shot the woman, but the cons are charged with the murder. Once again the prisoner takes the rap; once again those in power have tried to justify a bungle by turning public hostility against a convenient scapegoat.

Society has failed the prisoner more than the prisoner has failed society. Most people know that, so prisons tend to be an embarrassment in a nation such as Canada, where an entire culture and ideology has been built around the concept of personal liberty. Prisons are shoved into the recesses of the public consciousness; they exist, but only as a vague deterrent. This is as governments and the ruling class would have it; the prison is not a fit subject for public scrutiny, but the prisoner is there to be conjured up ignorantly, if need be, for political advantage.

At time, however, prisoners demand that society pay attention to them. The matter is invariably approached with distaste, as a family would deal with a drooling insane relative. A lurid interest in the prisoners' behaviour is generally combined with much wailing and breast-beating about the inhumanity of the prison. Newspaper stories inform us of the "indignities" suffered by prisoners, but suggest that the cause is a lack of staff and money, and dwell at length on the "frustrations" of the authorities.

In British Columbia, the current round of half-hearted public examination of the prison system began last January when a 24-year-old B.C. Penitentiary inmate named Donald Oag forced a sheriff's officer at knifepoint to drive him into downtown Vancouver, where Oag disappeared into a shopping crowd.

Serving a manslaughter sentence, Oag had spent much of the last four years in solitary confinement, and he was one of a group of eight prisoners who had sued the Canadian Penitentiary Service for allegedly subjecting them to "cruel and unusual punishment" in the form of incarceration in "the hole" for unspecified reasons and indeterminate periods.

For more than a week after his escape Oag eluded a massive manhunt, sleeping under bridges and in abandoned buildings, emerging every so often to steal food, or money for food, Newspaper reaction was varied; one unforgettable headline screamed "Hungry killer terrorizes city", while a columnist suggested that Oag was acting more like a frightened "trapped animal" than a lunatic killer.

Shortly after Oag was recaptured - he surrendered without a struggle - the seven other convicts who were parties to the lawsuit appeared in federal court in Vancouver for the beginning of the trial. Handcuffed and heavily shackled, they listened as Judge D.V. Heald ruled that they could not be present together in court to hear the trial because, together, they constituted a "security risk". Thereupon, the trial was adjourned until this fall when the inmates were allowed to appear.

The courtroom experience of these inmates is only one example of the restrictions placed on them, which range far beyond the simple fact of incarceration inside prison walls. Once sentenced, they are subject to stringent rules of conduct, arbitrarily written and enforced, which bear no relation to the sins they are alleged to have committed. Some manage to survive the assault on their humanity; others react with violence, or - a more recent development - by trying to fight the system peacefully.

Andy Bruce was one of the eight inmates involved in the lawsuit. He was released from solitary this Spring, but the conclusion that the federal court's ruling (and its confirmation by the Federal Court of Appeal) had a direct effect on his decision to plan the June breakout attempt is inescapable. He's spent nearly two years in solitary confinement. His lawyer tells the story of one incident there in which a guard who mistook Bruce for another prisoner who was making noise ordered him to be quiet, then squirted tear gas in his face, forcing him to crawl to a wash basin to rinse out his eyes. Now he couldn't even be present to hear his own lawsuit; clearly there was little reason to have faith in due process.

During the last few weeks before the seizure of hostages, Bruce became acquainted with a prison worker who did not fit the para-military mould into which most are either pre-cast or fitted. That was Mary Steinhauser, the 32-year-old classification officer, with a master's degree from Simon Fraser University, who developed a curious, intense relationship with the inmate just prior to the hostage-taking. Mary had no close friends among her fellow prison workers; the details of her relationship with Andy came from a California professor named Nat Hickerson, a close friend who made a number of visits to Vancouver on personal business during the last year, and with whom Mary spent most of the last weekend of her life.

According to Hickerson, Andy began to visit Mary a few weeks before the incident in which she died, and by the week before the hostages were seized he was spending as much as three or four hours a day in her office. A classification officer's job is to interview prisoners regarding their placement in the range of activities offered in the penitentiary service - whether they are destined for minimum, medium or maximum security, and what their "rehabilitation program" will consist of - and to help organize group activities, arrange for prisoners to have the benefit of various services, and testify about them at parole board hearings. Naturally some classification officers take their duties more seriously than others; Hickerson and some ex-inmates of the B.C. Pen say Mary Steinhauser was one of the most accessible.

"Mary's office was a constant hotbed of activity," Hickerson says. "She made it available to prisoners to call their lawyers or to aid in any way in pursuing their legal rights. She refused to perceive her job as simply deciding whether a convict should be playing checkers or weaving baskets."

For Andy this was something new. "Andy found in Mary for the first time a human being, someone in the prison system, I think, he couldn't pigeonhole as a pig, and it intrigued him. He was in Mary's office every day, and he resented anyone else coming in. This was a problem, because he was a powerful figure inside the Pen, and she had other people to see.

"But she recognized in Andy an enormous mind. He just toyed with her. Everything she would suggest, he'd parry it. They had arguments. It developed into a relationship between two human beings that was a very intriguing relationship. They both highly respected each other, and yet they hated each other."

Ironically, Andy even taunted Mary, suggesting that he might seize her as a hostage and asking what she would do.

Hickerson recalls that on that final weekend, Mary was obsessed with Andy. Like many who are disillusioned with the state of Canada's prisons, Mary had not come to any definite conclusions as to what, if nothing, should replace them. "She thought a lot of the inmates were justly convicted," Hickerson says. "But she was always asking why they had to be in the B.C. Pen. Why couldn't they take them up north, somewhere where there was real work they could do, and let them roam around a bit?" With the demands Andy was making on her time and energy, the frustration of Mary's job had reached an intolerable level. Just before Hickerson left Vancouver on the day before she was taken hostage, Mary told him she'd decided to quit the Pen and return to school.

Shortly before 8 a.m. of Monday, June 9, Steinhauser was in her office in a structure known as the "classification building", about 100 years inside the main gate of the B.C. Pen. With her was another classification officer, John Ryan, a tall, bearded, balding Englishman who had taken photos at a social evening Steinhauser had helped the inmates organize. Ryan had just developed his prints and had shown them to Steinhauser. As he was leaving her office, he told the Farris inquiry into the hostage seizure, Bruce and Dwight Lucas came charging at him. Threatening to cut his throat, they pushed him along a hallway to a room outside a vault used to store old records and equipment. There he found other classification officers and a couple of inmates, also being held hostage. (The inmates were later released, when Bruce and Lucas determined that they were not "rapist" and "child molesters" from the Pen's "protective custody unit". A classification officer suffering from a heart condition was also released, leaving 15 hostages.)

According to the testimony at the Farris inquiry, Bruce was unquestionably the leader of the three, and the calmest during the drama. During almost the entire 41 hours, he sat on a couch in the ante-room outside the vault, holding a knife to Steinhauser's throat. Lucas, 20, flitted back and forth between this room and the vault where the other hostages were held, often erratic in his behaviour and comments, displaying little judgment. Bruce repeatedly told him to "cool it". The third inmate, Claire Wilson, 26, was even more spinny than Lucas; as the hours wore on, he would become progressively drugged and useless. He ventured outside the vault only once. Bruce and Wilson carried 15-inch kitchen knives and Lucas on with a nine-inch blade; the inmates also had dinner knives and a pair of scissors, and a couple of plastic containers of gasoline.

Their demand was simple - safe passage by air to a foreign country - but the inmates had no clear idea as to which nation might be willing to accept them. Bruce was later described as "a very political person" by his lawyer, and there were a few raised eyebrows when the inmates asked for "a member of the Marxist-Leninist party" to help negotiate their release, but it became apparent that this did not convey any political perspective other than the vague notion that such an intermediary might suggest a country which would accept the three.

A team of negotiators requested by the inmates was assembled, including two lawyers, a reporter, an open-line broadcaster and a radical journalist. They were given access to the vault where the hostages were held, and reported that the authorities were extending every co-operation. The inmates' demands for food, portable toilets, a radio and a television set were met. They also asked for and received an almost unlimited supply of tranquilizers, which they tested on the hostages before using. (Wilson and Lucas appeared unable to exercise must self-restraint in the use of drugs; hostage Ryan later testified he was afraid the inmates planned to drug and kill their captives.) Journalists covering the event were treated courteously, in contrast to previous incidents at the B.C. Pen.

Meanwhile, the penitentiary laid its plan for ending the siege. A rifleman was dispatched to the prison yard behind the classification building. In the event that a deal had been made to transport the inmates out of Canada, Warden Dragan Cernetic later told the Farris Inquiry, a team of sharpshooters would have surrounded the helicopter landing area with orders to pick them off it possible. Finally, two six-man "tactical squads", armed with penitentiary service .38 calibre pistols, were established.

One team was on duty at all times, with orders to move in with "fire power" if any physical harm was done to the hostages. Since the inmates were also in possession of gasoline, a third squad was established, this one armed only with fire extinguishers. How these squads were chosen, and the qualifications of their members for the heavy responsibility which their position entailed has never been made public. It is known, however, that the RCMP volunteered its services; the offer was declined.

The next day, Tuesday, the federal cabinet met for two-and-a-half hours to consider the situation. Some effort was made to contact foreign embassies to see whether any country might accept the three inmates; Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau later indicated that in any event the government would have gone back on a promise of safe passage. ("We would hound them wherever they were," he told a reporter.) A Canadian Forces helicopter stood ready to ferry the convicts to the Vancouver airport. Nine nations refused the government's entreaties; finally, on as-yet unidentified country offered to take Bruce, Lucas and Wilson, incarcerate them immediately, and return them to Canada.

Any chance of implementing even this dubious solution vanished, however, when Jim Murphy, regional penitentiary director, whom Solicitor General Warren Allmand reached at home, failed to communicate the offer to his underlings or to the negotiators. "I didn't feel that I was at liberty to do so or that anything would be gained by sharing this information with the negotiators or with the inmates," Murphy told the Farris inquiry.

Nevertheless, on that Tuesday night, the intermediaries noticed a cooling in the authorities' attitude toward them when they returned to the penitentiary from a dinner break. At one point, a broken conversation over a walkie-talkie radio concerning a plan to "go in when they passed the ice in" was heard, but the suggestion was vetoed by Cernetic.

At the same time, however, prison nurse Al Hadvick (who heads the prison guards' union) had received a whispered message from one of the hostages, to the effect that they planned an attempt to overpower the convicts at 11 p.m. Hadvick nodded his approval. He suggested to his superiors that it might be "an advantageous time to move", although he had misgivings because Steinhauser was "getting a bit hysterical" and he was afraid she might interfere with such a plan. Cernetic claims, however, that the authorities' policy was not to initiate any hostage breakout attempt, and Hadvick managed to signal the captives that the attempt should be called off.

Just two hours later, the hostages apparently tried it anyway. Prison nurse Tom Hudson had relieved Hadvick of his post outside the door to the vault shortly after midnight on the morning of Wednesday, June 11. He told the Farris inquiry that he had asked another nurse, Patricia Graham, to watch the door while he went to the washroom. Bruce was fixing Demerol, Lucas too was in the outer room but was asleep, and Wilson was in the vault but was apparently so out of it that Bruce felt him untrustworthy, and had Lucas confiscate his knife. As Hudson entered the washroom, he heard "a shout, screams and a banging sound", and Graham shouted: "Tom, there's something going on in the back".

What was "going on" was that the hostages had overpowered the dopey Wilson and were in the process of tying him up. From the evidence heard by Farris inquiry, it seems fairly certain that there was no signal from the prison authorities for a hostage breakout attempt - that it was simply the result of 41 hours of mostly sleepless frustration, and a conviction, as one of the hostages put it, that "there would be several dead by morning" if nothing were done. (It is also certain, however, that the hostages knew any breakout attempt would immediately be supported by tactical action on the part of the authorities.) In any case, once the hostages moved, the authorities considered themselves released from any obligation to stay cool, and the prearranged plan went into effect. Hudson ran out of the building to the trailer a few paces away and yelled "Hit it." to security director Leech and Albert Hollinger, the guard supervisor who had been designated the "unit commander" of the tactical squad on duty. Leech got guards into position outside the building; Hollinger went into the classification building to rally his troops.

Led by Hollinger, the six-man squad, armed with .38 calibre revolvers, took up their positions in a matter of seconds and smashed the opaque windows to give themselves a clear shot. Without naming Hollinger, Leech testified at the Farris probe that the squad commander ordered the inmates to "throw down your weapons, release the hostages." According to Hudson, Bruce waved his knife at Mary Steinhauser's throat and yelled, "I'll kill her." Eight shots were fired; two struck Bruce in the jaw and spleen and one pierced Steinhauser's heart. Hollinger then collected the guns, on the incredible pretext that Bruce, Lucas or Wilson might have grabbed one of them. (Wilson was bound hand and foot, Bruce critically wounded and there were about 10 guards in the room to subdue Lucas.) No report of which guard carried which gun was kept.

Leech's testimony regarding the surrender order allegedly given the prisoners was uncorroborated at this Farris inquiry, at least in public. No such order was heard, furthermore, by prisoners who have sworn affidavits relating what they saw and heard from their cells as close as 100 yards away. These prisoners did, however, hear something else; as related in the October Last Post, they claim there was an interval between the shooting of Bruce and that of Steinhauser, but the Farris probe ended without hearing this evidence. It also refused to hear testimony from Andy Bruce, who has cancelled his plans to make his story public because his health is not good and he fears reprisals from prison guards. (He will, however, have his day in court at his trial.)

This is only one of the ways in which the power of the inquiry was circumscribed, by the government which set it up and by Farris's refusal to take public evidence into sensitive areas. From the start, the Trudeau cabinet was more interested in deflecting public criticism of the penitentiary system away from itself than it was in a thorough investigation of the Steinhauser killing. The probe was set up under the Penitentiaries Act, which provides only a \$400 maximum fine for an individual convicted of refusing to testify, upon conviction in provincial court. By contrast, a royal commission may hold a recalcitrant potential witness in contempt indefinitely. When the 14 surviving hostages and the members of the tactical squad refused to discuss in public the final moments of the drama at the B.C. Pen, there was little the commission could do, except hear them in private. To initiate a prosecution would have been pointless.

Trudeau also made it clear in announcing the Farris probe that he did not expect it to delve into the actions of his cabinet, or into government policy with regard to such incidents. Although the official terms of reference did not exclude such examination, the commissioners apparently respected the prime minister's wishes in this regard. Therefore the government has not been held to account for its apparent refusal to consider sending the prisoners out of the country with no strings attached, or for its lack of action on penitentiary reform.

Had the prison employees testified in public, we might know who initiated their uprising, whether it resulted from communication with prison authorities, whether indeed Steinhauser was shot several seconds after Bruce and after she begged not to be shot, and whether any of the tactical squad member bore a particular grudge against Steinhauser or Bruce. (We do know, for instance, that security director Leech hated the leader of the breakout attempt; he testified that "Bruce and I have an understanding that we are just not personalities who get along.

He considers me as a hard-nosed correctional officer and I consider him as an inmate of some degree of notoriety.") In addition, the inmates' lawyers were excluded from the in-camera session, so the adversary system which is supposed to be the best way of getting at the truth was not in operation during the most crucial testimony.

The result was that the hostages were allowed to pick and choose the questions they wanted to answer, at least at the public sessions, and they stuck to lurid details of their captor's behaviour during the ordeal. Ryan told of Lucas sticking a knife in his ear and tipping a bottle of mercurochrome in his eyes, threatening to shave heads and referring to the hostages as being "on death rows". Another said Lucas wore gloves and sneered: "I better keep the gloves on because if we start killing I don't want my hand to slip in the blood." Not exactly the behaviour of polite society; on the other hand, the circumstances were somewhat strained.

This testimony appeared calculated to paint the prisoners as little better than animals, a favourite view even among those who claim to be in sympathy with the prisoners' cause. Radio open-liner Gary Bannerman, a negotiator in the incident, is fond of saying: "You treat them like animals, they'll act like animals." A more astute assessment might be that human beings treated like animals react like human being - that Bruce, Lucas and Wilson exhibited forceful, decisive, logical action on the mental level at which human beings are supposed to perform, in answer to the cruelty and inhumanity of prison life.

There were other obstacles to a full investigation of the incident. Commission counsel John Rowan was a provincial prosecutor until he recently took up private practice. Too often, he simply led witnesses such as regional director Murphy and warden Cernetic through their evidence, bridging their pauses with such hard-hitting questions as: "And what happened then?" He did not, for example, quiz Cernetic on the make-up of the "tactical squad".

For their part, the inmates' lawyers were bound to be circumspect in their questioning. Their clients faced not only the murder charges but counts of unlawful confinement, attempted extortion and possession of dangerous weapons. Their defence might be prejudiced by what came out at the inquiry. With the Prisoners' Union Committee excluded, the only potential opposition was the Steinhauser family, but it apparently lacked either the money or the inclination to do so. The Trudeau government refused to pay for a lawyer to represent the relatives at the inquiry.

Serious lapses in prison security also came to light in the Farris probe, and the commissioners' report undoubtedly makes extensive recommendations in this regard. Security is naturally a major problem in an institution such as the B.C. Pen, and since prisons are not a place on which the government likes to spend any more money than necessary, security is difficult to maintain. There is not enough money to hire enough guards, and the low wages encourage corruption - as Mary Steinhauser found to her dismay. But to suggest the hostage incident was caused by a lack of security is like saying Indochina was liberated because the U.S. didn't have enough troops there; it blames the result on the inadequacy of the precautions. Yet it was on this point, rather than the conditions which gave rise to the incident, and the penitentiary authorities were most extensively grilled.

The only witness who testified about the nature of the prison system was called on July 2, a day when prison workers across Canada walked out to "mourn" Paul Gosselin, one of their number who was killed during an escape by a prisoner he was escorting to hospital. The witness was Inger Hansen, government-appointed ombudsman for the penitentiary service, who described some of the conflicts which exist inside Canadian Prisons. Farris agreed with her that solitary confinement was "inhumane"; she testified further that many inmates thrown in solitary become suicidal and more violent than when they went in. Hansen also offered the opinion that prisons are better located in smaller communities, where townsfolk are more receptive to work release programs and prison guards are more likely to see each other socially and discuss inmates.

One of the most serious conflicts in the larger prisons, Hansen continued, is between prison guards and non-security personnel such as classification officers. The guards see the prison's primary function as immobilizing prisoners; the "bleeding hearts" want to mobilize them to lead useful lives. The apparently prompted the commissioners to ask Cernetic later whether Mary Steinhauser was sufficiently "security conscious"; he replied that she "implicitly trusted her clients, and if she had any doubts, she tried to resolve them by talking to other inmates".

Cernetic later testified that he would have like the authority to call in an "outside" tactical squad such as the RCMP which had no "emotional ties" with the Pen or anyone working there. There is no indication, however, that the commissioners were sufficiently interested in conflict within the prison service to ask the hostages or the members of the tactical squad whether it had any bearing on any part of the hostage incident.

At this writing the secret Farris report reposes in the office of Penitentiary Commissioner André Therrien, who has said that if it is ever made public the parts which bear on "penitentiary security" will be deleted. This term, of course, is potentially sufficiently broad to exclude all the major questions concerning the hostage-taking which still remain: who killed Mary Steinhauser, was she shot before or after Bruce, how were the "tactical squads" organized, what is the source of the desperation which leads to such incidents.

As a forensic investigation, the inquiry was a joke. It raised far more questions than it answered. But it was, from the start, an attempt to divert the attention from the federal government's unwillingness to dismantle a prison system which can only give rise to more such tragedies.

As a means of ensuring that public outrage over the Steinhauser killing was restricted to the familiar hand-wringing and tongue-clucking, it appears to have been largely successful. Editorialists who rapped the commissioners on the knuckles when the gaps in testimony became to glaring have been silent since the chief justice fingered Albert Hollinger as the man who tampered with the evidence. And you can hardly say at this point that the prisoners have widespread public sympathy.

The Farris diversion poses the question: why is the Canadian state so intent on seeing the maximum-security institution retained? We are used to hearing that the Canadian system of justice is more interested in punishing crimes against property than crimes against people. The penitentiary system bears out the opposite conclusion: most inmates at the B.C. Pen and other maximum-security institutions have been convicted of violent crime against individuals, often not related to crimes against property such as bank robberies.

The answer must be that the convict is a convenient enemy. War against an external foe has always been a mechanism for unifying a nation behind the leadership of a particular class. War against an internal foe, the criminal, serves a similar purpose - perhaps even better, since the alleged threat is more easily perceived. If the worker is a wage slave, and has not yet found a way out of that position, the thought of someone getting for nothing what he works so hard for is infuriating. The fear of an irrational attack, if skilfully whipped up, can be enough to divert attention from more important political or economic concerns.

In the U.S. Richard Nixon began a war on "crime in the streets" soon after he was elected president. In recent weeks, the Trudeau cabinet is said to be focussing on two main problems: economic conditions and "peace and security" in the streets. Trudeau himself has said the two questions are directly linked; crime increases as the economic situation deteriorates. The retention of the maximum security penitentiary is thus assured, in all likelihood. We are all potential criminals as well as potential victims. A full prison is our reassurance that crime doesn't pay - either for the present day criminal, or for us, if we should be tempted to transgress.

The role of punishment in the corrections system, in fact, is enjoying renewed attention from criminologists who are disillusioned with the admittedly dismal performance of most "rehabilitation" schemes. "Retribution" is the password to a developing school of thought which holds that the main justification for punishment is to reassure the populace that justice is being done.

"The way that the criminal law operates is to rely on and reinforce the popular view that because of offender committed a crime, it is right that he should be punished," states a recent report on the B.C. provincial corrections system. In this view, punishment should fit the crime - a sacrilege to the rehabilitationists, who believe passionately that punishment should be tailored not only to the criminal act, but also to the circumstances, and above all, to the individual. The retributionists, by contrast, say that "the offender in choosing to commit a crime is also choosing his punishment, and is settling the balance which his unfair intrusion into the sphere of his neighbour's rights through criminal conduct has created."

The reaction against rehabilitation stems partly from a number of studies which show that methods now in use have failed significantly to reduce the rate of repetition of offences, partly from some U.S. horror scenes in which "rehabilitation" took the form of scary behaviour modification, and partly from the fact that indeterminate sentences and other "rehabilitative" techniques put too much arbitrary power over an inmate's life in the hands of prison authorities and social workers. In fairness, it would have to be said that rehabilitation never got the money or the imagination it needed; the disillusionment of Mary Steinhauser would seem to be evidence of that.

But those who now argue for a return to punishment for punishment's sake appear to recognize the value of the prison system as a means of social control. Rehabilitation said: "Society is best protected in the long run, when the offender is 'made over' so that he will no longer act at the expense of others". Retribution says: "Society (i.e., the social order) is best protected when the offender is publicly dealt with according to a well-defined set of laws, so that everyone can see the consequences of a criminal act." Is it a coincidence that this theory is resurfacing at a time when rising unemployment and other economic difficulties carry the prospect of a general increase in crime?

The reaction to the failure of rehabilitation has also taken another direction. There are those who argue that a system which did not include incarceration, or at least did not include maximum-security prisons, would be the most sensible way of dealing with modern crime.

A strong advocate of this position is the U.S. writer Jessica Mitford, who argues in *Kind and Usual Punishment* that the vast majority of prisoners could be turned loose and would pose no more threat to society than the average person walking the street. There would be a few repeat offenders (although some of the worst crimes, such as murder, show an extremely low recidivism rate), but in social terms this would be far outweighed by two factors: first, prisons swallow an enormous amount of tax money, and second, there is much evidence to suggest they create, or at least confirm criminals rather than steering them on the road to a normal life.

Meanwhile, life at the B.C. Pen and in Canada's other prison goes on. It's a life of monotonous routine at times, but the prisons have always been places of ferment, and inmates are becoming resourceful in trying to fight back.

In late September, the federal court resumed its hearing of the lawsuit brought against the Queen and B.C. Pen Warden Cernetic by Andy Bruce, Donald Oag and six other Pen inmates or ex-inmates, alleging that indeterminate solitary confinement on vague grounds constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" contrary to the Canadian Bill of Rights.

A deposition from Oag, now in Ontario's Millhaven Penitentiary, said he has tried 10 times to kill himself while in prison, including a dive through a third-storey window while he was undergoing treatment for wounds inflicted in an earlier suicide attempt. Another time, he said, he slashed his wrists with bits of razor blade: "I was taken to the prison hospital and stiched up....I was sent back to the hole. They just put a bandage around it and I cut up again the same night. I just tore the thing open, tore the bandage off and tore the cut open, just tore it open with my fingernails. Then I was taken to a hospital."

Andy Bruce described the psychological deterioration of the people who surrounded him in solitary at the B.C. Pen and Prince Albert penitentiary. "They start to drag you down with them. They're just not there. They're just not in this reality. Pretty soon you start understanding them and you know you're in trouble." One inmate who tried to hang himself "said he had a 'machine' in his head, a thing he called a machine." What bothered Bruce most about solitary? "Not being given a reason why you're up there and not knowing when you're going to come down".

Prison rebellion is clearly a challenge to state power. Whether it is a serious challenge to the economic system will only become clear as the revolt becomes stronger. It will be interesting, and probably chilling, to watch the prisoners who are still in "this reality" as they clash with the Trudeau administration's new-found concern for "peace and security".

Collective Behavior at Attica

An accurate rendering of changes in the profiles of social disturbance in the prison is made difficult when the standard abstractions of "collective behavior" are mixed with the dominant motif of the "total institution." Long before the events at Attica, I had begun to question versions of inmate behavior tied to the "custody-treatment" dimension or to Sykes and Messigner's utilitarian notion of the "pains of imprisonment," or indeed to any concept of the prison which views it as primarily an autonomous "community".

Unfortunately, penological history provides almost no help. Except for histories of prison reform movements, there is such a poverty of scholarship that the prison appears as a historyless administrative unit, broken from time to time by riot. History is most at home when it traces processes of social conflict which develop, in which the incipient becomes the full-blown. So the historian has left this seemingly dreary landscape to the tender mercies of the sociologist. Thus we are burdened with timeless abstractions about the "inmate subculture" the "inmate code," and so forth.

TYPES OF PRISON DISTURBANCE

The poverty of penological history is an illusion. There are changes over time in the profile of prison disturbance. To advance the discussion, I will suggest two main historical types and argue that Attica exemplifies a third. Let us call these types: (1) the mass escape; (2) the prison riot; and (3) the expressive mutiny.

(1) Mass escape as a mode of prisoner behavior was associated with a prebureaucratic society and in America with the frontier. To escape from a dungeon is a dangerous enterprise. Mass escape required shared ingenuity and motivation, some common hope of taking up a new life, concealing one's past, even leaving one's home territory. In this early epoch, the prison was unashamedly brutal and was designed for incapacitation and severe punishment. Prison revolt was commonly put down with deadly fury by officials and guards back up by deputized locals since every disturbance implied the real probability of a mass breakout followed by spoilation of areas adjacent to the prison.

(2) Prison riot - which dominated the 19th and early 20th centuries - involved a struggle to improve conditions within the prison rather than an attempt to escape from it. Within the armed perimeter, power struggles occurred over the meager privileges prison had to offer. Such riots were often nicely timed to provoke the intervention of the prison reform movement and sometimes led to changes in paroling practices,

better food, less punishment for breaking prison rules or fewer rules.

In the 20th century riot increasingly tended to run in cycles. The riot cycle implied swift communication and contagion reflecting the creation of state systems of corrections, standard penological practices, and a nationwide convict subculture.

The most recent cycle of riots (1952-1953) began in the disciplinary cellblock of the world's largest prison in Jackson, Michigan, and spread to dozens of prisons in the United States and abroad. One hypothesis maintained that these riots were sparked by inner-prison struggles for control between the "custodial" and "treatment" points of view among the staff. These struggles threatened to change the inmate status quo and led to a preventive counterrevolution led by a corrupt inmate priesthood which preached the inmate code as a means of retaining privileges.

(3) Unlike the riot, the expressive mutiny is not primarily focussed on winning power, maintaining privileges or improving conditions within the prison. It aims to communicate the inmate's plight to the public so far as he understands it. It is a new form of disturbance not merely a temporary reflection of new left influence among a group of politicized black convicts. The prison is used as an arena in which to stage dramatic renditions of inhumanity and rebellious gestures of inchoate despair and apocalypse. Demands for improvements in prison conditions appear side by side with borrowings from the Black Power movement, the student movement, and the revolutionary sect. The entrepreneurial spirit of the escape artist is replaced by the organizational methods of the militant.

Clearly, convict disturbances take different forms over time reflecting both prison conditions and dominant attributes of society.

THE AGE OF TREATMENT

To understand the causes of the expressive mutiny, one must trace the evolution of the New Penology from its beginnings in the latter half of the 19th century to its total victory over corrections in the decades of the 1950's and 1960's.

Treatment began with the growth of new professions - social welfare, probation, parole, psychiatry - which entered the prison (along with teachers, vocational instructors and counselors) in the decades preceding World War I. Its greatest innovation and most hated product was the indefinite sentence. Its second major stage was victory over correctional administration and the permeation of entire systems with the philosophy and practice of correctional treatment. The "correctional therapeutic community" - as it came to be called in California - in its common form, went no further than individual and group counseling, an

intense "bull session" which syphoned off inmate discontent into relatively harmless verbal abuse. In its most extreme form - the California Adjustment Center - treatment combined "max-max" confinement with a future of indeterminateness. Even parole - under this system - was increasingly perceived by inmates as a trap instead of a privilege.

More important than the victory of treatment has been the secular decline in opportunity for the ex-offender in a modern technological society which demands uncoerced, skilled, and motivated activity from its employees. I have defined correctional treatment as a "redoubling of efforts in the face of persistent failure". Inmates once believed in these efforts. This belief plus the introduction of treatment programs, group counseling, parole outpatient services, and so forth, managed to keep the lid on our volatile dungeons for two or three decades. Attica may be seen as a typical disturbance of the Age of Treatment and an indication of the beginning of its decline.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

The idea that the inmates at Attica revolted against brutality or repression is untenable. Empirically, the so-called "pains of imprisonment" were lessening, certainly not increasing. The precipitating cause of the revolt was the disintegration of discipline combined with the "hope" aroused by the new reform administration of the New York prison system. For those who like to exercise the sociological imagination, the expressive mutiny might be described as a temporary burst of chiliastic fervor and action physically constrained within and by the architecture of penology. Many prisoners at Attica locked themselves into their cells or attempted to "escape" the militants into the hands of the guards and officials. Their behavior reflected fear and rejection of modes of political and ideological protest which have no direct and visible payoff for inmate welfare.

I must rely on newspaper reports in briefly describing four characteristics of inmate collective behavior at Attica.

(1) Militant inmate leadership: The prison riot was frequently sparked by violent "psychopaths" and normally disintegrated into chaos within a few hours or days. The militant leadership at Attica locked up this kind of emotionally unstable element and through its energy (and the willingness of the officials) maintained a negotiating stance through 5 days of turmoil. Still, like the traditional prison leadership, there was a good proportion of armed robbers as one would expect from previous research. Also, three white inmates were apparently executed after a drumhead court lasting a few minutes because they were regarded as "rats." Fierce adherence to the "rat complex" is a characteristic of convict leadership.

The militant group at Attica was a convict elite, banded together in self-protection, with its own "leadership table," set apart from the other inmates. Factional and strategic differences within the leadership group were jealously guarded. Officer Morris, a hostage, may overstate the matter when he calls the rank-and-file "hostages," but elements of apathy, terror, and uneasy support were probably intermixed. He says:

It was my opinion they thought they were going to start a revolution. They would never have agreed to any settlement. They wanted the troopers to come in and kill a lot of people to start things in the street....I'd say about 50 of the men wanted this and another 150 went along with it because they were members of the group....I'd say there were about a thousand inmates in the yard that didn't want to be in the yard - I think they were hostages the same as I was.

The insurrection took place after an "influx of newcomers" previously "involved in riots" who tended to form"...a number of organized fractions: Black Muslims, Black Panthers, Young Lords." I am quoting Officer Rhodes, another hostage:

The Muslims preached peace and loving...bit the Black Panthers and Young Lords wanted to go into it like a small war. I was talking to a Muslim (this was before the outbreak) and he said they were planning to take a lot of hostages but there wouldn't be any brutality.

Of the 2,200 inmates at Attica, 1,200 were in D-yard, some forced to participate by the militant leadership group. According to one estimate, about 800 of these 1,200 "... wanted no part in the revolt."

The leadership shared an essentially prepolitical idea of revolution as a big ghetto riot sparked by starting "things in the street". Most covered their faces to make reprisals and indictments more difficult when the end came as they knew it must. Using John Irwin's terms, this group appears oriented to "convict" rather than "thief" values. The Panther style, the "macho" posture and the Black Power rhetoric are clear borrowings from outside militant groups.

(2) Ecstatic Solidarity: Even the most apathetic inmates in D-yard were drawn in by the collective enthusiasm, and potential critics silenced by the unitary public reality. This state of "negative bondedness" is similar to that found among Freedom Riders in a maximum security cellblock in the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman. This study led me to conclude that there is a "....special quality to the social bondedness of the closely confined." I called it "ecstatic solidarity." D-yard

was not an ordinary cellblock, but this concept may help explain seemingly irrational features of behavior during these 5 days.

An initial ideological solidarity grew slowly among the leadership cadre. I quote Officer Aldrich, a hostage:

They started an Afro-American class in the school about six months ago, taught by an inmate, which was bad in my opinion. Anytime you went in the room they would change the subject. We thought they might be planning things. We couldn't sit in the class all the time because we only had one officer on each floor, with over 100 inmates.

We had been noticing large gatherings of inmates, especially Muslims, in the yard and we reported it. At one time they called the big shot of the Muslims, (Norman) Butler, down front and discussed it with him because inmates weren't allowed to congregate that many at a time...this was finally allowed.

Various disparate groups had linked up by the time the revolt occurred. Social control in a prison is always tenuous, of course, and the combination of lax discipline, inmate organization, and hope for change made insurrection a likely outcome.

D-yard was an intense cauldron of public behavior since everything taking place was directly observable and constantly monitored by armed guards on the walls equipped with rifles with telescopic sights. The yard was broken by the leadership table and the marked-off "compound" for the hostages. On display, the inmates had to regard their every action as, willy-nilly, relevant to staff. They were an audience for their own actions, and simultaneously actors in a pageant displayed provocatively to guards and reporters and, ultimately, the world at large. The leadership table was, intermittently, a focus for cognitive attention, a center for action, a negotiating session, and a court of last resort. During harangues and speeches given by the "outside negotiators" the crowd aligned temporarily into a mass meeting except that it was still under close observation.

This unitary sociation broke down during the lulls between mass meetings and social order became more tenuous. Warren H. Hansen a doctor and observer, reports an episode which took place on Saturday, September 11:

Suddenly, a band of blacks dressed in a bizarre array of costumes (including priests' vestments taken from the prison chapel) and brandishing makeshift weapons (including assegais, bats and clubs) approached the hostages' compound. One guy had a spear about

10 feet long. Hell, he was showing his teeth and jumping up and down like a Watusi. The hostages' security guard kept of this band of men until Brother Richie arrived and, after a long discussion persuaded the surrealistic vision to go away.

The episode may appear bizarre to an outside observer, but I can recall similar episodes of pageantry (minus the threat of violence) in which the Freedom Riders in Parchman paraded down the corridor of their cellblock dressed in sheets miming integrationist morality plays for the benefit of the indignant guards.

Ecstatic solidarity in D-yard was tenuous and tiring and had to be constantly reinforced by the ideological injunctions of the leaders and the "out-side negotiators." It was partially and differentially shared by larger numbers depending on the moods of enthusiasm, despair, and hostility which break over mass gatherings as events unfold.

From these accounts, written for nonscientific purposes, one should be wary of interpreting inmate enthusiasm or silence as support for the actions and strategies of the militant leadership. Many con-wise men (probably a majority) may have had private doubts about what was being said and about the outcome. But, there are only two classes in a prison, and the convict body (even in normal times) is constrained to say nothing in public favoring the "screws." It would have taken extraordinary personal courage to disturb the public "reality" imposed on collective life by the "spokesmen" and their cothinkers from outside, especially after the execution of the three white inmates.

(3) Magical thinking: Richard McClerry's leading study indicates that the belief systems of "incorrigibles" are characterized by authoritarianism, personal "toughness," the inmate code, belief in a rigid leadership hierarchy, and a doctrinaire adherence to criminal values. Normally, however, convict leaders are "moderates" and seldom do they seek out Armageddon as they appeared to do at Attica.

A New York Times chronology states: "Rebel leaders had often expressed a willingness to die, but many inmates in the yard thought that gas, fire hoses, and rubber bullets were the worst they had to fear." In addition, prisoners apparently believed that they would receive amnesty and perhaps deportation to a foreign country. Clark Whelton reports that a prisoner asked one of the members of the outside negotiating committee: "What's this I hear about foreign countries?" The answer: "There are four Third World and African country people across the street from this prison, prepared to provide asylum for everyone who wants to leave this country for this purpose. (Shouts and pandemonium from the inmates)."

The speaker later explained his final speech this way: "I thought if they were going to die, at least they should know that people were with them all over the world." But if the inmate rank and file thought they were going to die why did they act on the belief that they faced rubber bullets?

Another committee member added, after the hostages and inmates had been killed by very un-rubber bullets, "I knew I should have ...gone to the microphone and said: "they're saying things here that they may believe, but there's no hope that you're gonna get complete amnesty." I didn't have the courage to say that to that particular crowd."

Inmates are normally aware that taking hostages is an act of war and that officials feel little hesitation in using deadly force. Twenty-six of their 28 demands had been accepted by Commissioner Oswald. Yet they played the game of preparing to cut the hostages' throats to the end. Did the bonds of "ecstatic solidarity" so intensify the currents of magical thinking that many inmates literally ceased to be themselves?

(4) Social bluff: When the showdown came, the hostages' throats were not cut despite that elaborate preparations and reiterated threats. The State police acted as if they were convinced that the inmates were not bluffing by unleashing a deadly hail of shotgun pellets the moment they entered D-yard. (I doubt one could make a convincing case that the leaders meant what they said but were frightened or deterred.)

The everyday world of the prison is an interpersonal jungle and bluff in the form of "front" is a familiar form of brazen effrontery in which the winner maintains his "cool" and the loser has himself locked securely in a cell. In social bluff, the rhetoric of intransigence is essential, for the game is lost if contrary verbalizations surface. It appears that an element of social bluff is needed to explain the final denouement.

Social bluff is treated humorously in the works of Tom Wolfe, who provides telling examples of how poverty officials elicited stereotyped threats from clients who quickly caught on. For a good salary, one of the officials - the Flak Catcher - assumed the ignoble but socially useful role of a good natured but truly frightened bureaucrat. Day-after-miserable-day he sallied forth to be "Mau-Maued" by the demonstrators who assumed the role of angry blacks with theatrical triumph.

When social bluff enters the prison, comedy is replaced by tragedy. The outside negotiating committee was dominated by person suggested by the militant leadership. This committee had a middle group of poverty lawyers and politicians. The members chosen by the Governor had no influence on the currents of enthusiasm which dominated D-yard. This unprecedented committee apparently played a major role in convincing the prison officials - and perhaps the Governor - that the inmate leaders were in deadly earnest, and not bluffing, in their threats to kill the hostages.

CONCLUSION

The combination of ideology, militance, magical thinking, and social bluff which shaped collective behavior at Attica indicates that the inner, autonomous process of the prison is a myth. Unfortunately, the official investigating committees may concentrate on these purported inner "causes" and thereby come up with little of value.

By using the term "mutiny" I underscore sociologist Erving Goffman's permanent contribution. His idea of the "total institution" is still useful for understanding the prison. Ultimately, however, the prison is not a "place" at all any more than a factory is a set of machines in a building. The prison lies at the intersection of penal law, judicial action, correctional administration, penal architecture, prison reform movements, legislative enactment, professional treatment ideology, social research, generalized public beliefs, and broad political moods. All of these would have to be taken into account before a final version of the events at Attica can be understood.

THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ATTICA

By William L. Wilbanks

Forty-three persons died at Attica Correctional Facility between September 9 and 13, 1971. Thirty-nine of that number were killed and more than 80 others were wounded by gunfire during the 15 minutes it took the State Police to retake the prison on September 13. With the exception of Indian massacres in the late 19th century, the State Police assault which ended the 4-day prison uprising was the bloodiest 1-day encounter between Americans since the Civil War.

The New York State Special Commission on Attica was asked to reconstruct the events of those September days and to determine why they happened. The nine members of the Commission were designated by Chief Judge Stanley Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals and the presiding justices of the four Appellate Division Departments of the New York State judicial system and subsequently appointed via an executive order of the governor to conduct an impartial citizens' investigation of the Attica riot. The citizens' committee, chaired by Dean Robert McKay of the New York University Law School, became known officially as the Special New York State Commission on Attica and unofficially as the McKay Commission.

Arthur L. Liman was chosen as general counsel and he selected a staff which, at its peak, included 36 full-time investigators plus a number of part-time workers. In the course of a 7-month investigation the Commission and its staff interviewed over 2,500 persons, including 1,600 inmates of Attica, 400 correction officers, 270 State Police personnel, 200 National Guardsmen, 100 sheriffs and deputies, members of the citizens' observer team at Attica, and representatives of the news media. The Commission also interviewed and took testimony from Governor Nelson Rockefeller and his executive staff as well as from Commissioner Russell G. Oswald and his staff. In April 1972 the Commission held 13 days of public hearings in Rochester and New York City which was televised in New York State over public television. On September 13, 1972, the Commission released both a written and televised report so that the study would reach the widest audience possible. The 515-page written report has been published in paperback and the television documentary was shown nationwide on educational television on September 13, 1972. Prints of the film are being made available to interested groups who wish to view it.

Selected highlights will now be presented from the four main sections of the written report: (1) What is Attica? (2) Why and How It Happened? (3) The Negotiations (4) The Assault and Its Aftermath.

What Is Attica?

The Attica Correctional Facility in September 1971 was not perceptibly better or worse than the other maximum-security prisons which at that time housed nine of every 10 adult

male offenders incarcerated in the States system. Attica is every prison and every prison is Attica. The Atticas of this country have become lethal crucibles in which the most explosive social forces of our society are mixed with the pettiness and degradation of prison life, under the intense pressure of maintaining "security".

The promise of rehabilitation had become a cruel joke. If anyone was rehabilitated, it was in spite of Attica, not because of it. Statistics show that three-quarters of the men who entered prison in New York State in the sixties had been exposed to the "rehabilitative" experience in prison before. If Attica was a true model, then prisons served no one. Not the inmates who left them more embittered than before. Not the correction officers, who were locked into the same confinement and asked to perform an undefined job made impossible by the environment. Not the prison officials, who became accomplices in maintaining the fiction that maximum-security prisons serve a useful purpose. And not the public, which requires penal institutions that serve a useful role in the reduction of crime.

Why and How It Happened-The Mounting Tensions

The civil rights movement of the decade previous to 1967 left a legacy of frustrated hopes, tremendous frustrations of powerlessness, and a climate tending toward approval of violence as a form of protest. The Kerner Commission found:

A new mood has sprung up among Negroes, particularly among the young, in which self-esteem and enhanced racial pride are replacing apathy and submission to "the system".

In 1967, 23 American cities with large black populations erupted in fury and violence. The Kerner Commission concluded that there was no evidence of any planning or conspiracy behind the riots. Rather, each riot was a sudden and violent eruption of an "explosive mixture which has been accumulating in our cities since the end of World War II".

That Commission's report showed how pervasive discrimination and segregation had aggravated problems in black ghettos "where segregation and poverty converge on the young to destroy opportunity and enhance failure".

The American black was not alone in his frustration with the performance of the traditional organs of society. Student

and antiwar protests introduced an entire new wave of protests and backlash, largely by white youth, ending in blood in Chicago and death at Kent State. The toll notwithstanding, the actions on the streets by civil rights proponents, students, and antiwar protesters seemed to many alienated members of society to have accomplished what the democratic processes had not-to have focused attention on the needs for basic change. In virtually every aspect of American life there was declining respect for an authority which seemed incapable of fulfilling promises of democracy and equality.

Attica was not insulated from this changing social mood. Every month new inmates came from New York City, Buffalo, Rochester, and other urban areas, bringing with them the anger, frustration and alienation engendered by their experiences in the cities. The young black inmates of 1971 were products of the conditions the Kerner Commission found in the cities in 1967, and in prisons like Attica they found conditions even more repressive than those they had known on the streets. They were joined by a new breed of white inmates- young, better educated than before, and involved in drugs- and by Spanish-speaking inmates from the urban barrios who were not prepared to accept the situation in which they found themselves.

Correction officers and prison administrators reacted to the defiance of authority in traditional ways. They attempted to maintain respect for authority by disciplinary action against those who were seen as "defiant" or "agitators". As efforts by inmates to organize and engage in group activity mounted "ringleaders" were transferred to other institutions and lists were kept of "subversives".

In addition, the general challenge to authority included a challenge to the very right of prison authorities to impose additional sanctions. Inmates were more likely to take the matter to court and the courts did not prove entirely unresponsive to their complaints. For example, in response to a Federal court decision in May 1970 Department of Corrections officials in Albany instituted new rules relating to disciplinary proceedings to conform with the requirement that due process be given to inmates.

Attica's all-white correctional staff from rural western New York State was comfortable with inmates who "knew their place", but unprepared and untrained to deal with the new inmate, much less to understand him. Unused to seeing their authority challenged, officers felt threatened by the new inmate. Viewing the recent relaxation of rules and discipline, the intervention of the courts, and the new programs for inmates,

they felt that their authority was being undermined by Albany and that their superiors were not backing them up. The officers became increasingly resentful and insecure. The result was, inevitably, daily confrontations between the new inmate and the old-style officer. Thus, in the summer of 1971 Attica was caught up in an era of decline and rejection of authority.

The confrontations were accompanied by increasing societal awareness among inmates and the growth of organizations inside the institution determined to spread the consciousness and try to make changes. Groups such as the Muslims, Black Panthers, and Young Lords gained adherents and held meetings. In the months prior to September 1971 there were a series of organized protest efforts at Attica. Some had moderate success, but others ended only in the discipline of participants.

For the black inmate in Attica, the atmosphere on September 8, 1971, was not unlike that in the cities before the holocausts of Harlem, Watts, Newark, and Detroit. Sit-ins, demonstrations, and petitions had been met with excuses, delays, and repression. Organized, peaceful efforts had been rebuffed or ignored. Inmates and guards alike later commented, "The tension was so thick around here you could cut it with a knife". No organizers were necessary; no plans were required; no leaders needed. As in the cities in 1967, the situation itself was explosive. All that was needed was a spark to set it off.

The Spark: Wednesday, September 8, 1971

The initial explosion on Thursday, September 9, came in reaction to an incident the previous day which provoked anger and resentment among inmates in two companies in A block. A misunderstanding in the exercise yard on Wednesday afternoon led to an unusually intense confrontation between officers and inmates, during which a lieutenant was struck by an inmate. The officers were forced to back down. That evening, two inmates were removed from their cells to segregation, precipitating angry name-calling, hurling of objects from cells, and vows of revenge along the two galleries. Many inmates were convinced that the two inmates were beaten on the way to segregation (though in fact they were not) even though officers in the yard that afternoon had promised them that this would not occur.

The Explosion: Thursday, September 9

The following morning, uneasiness lingered on in 5 Company, one of the two companies from which the two inmates had been

removed the previous evening to segregation. This company of 42 inmates was used as a dumping ground for "difficult" inmates. An inmate who had been locked in his cell for throwing a full can of soup at an officer the previous evening was released from his cell by fellow inmates. A decision was made to return 5 company to their cells after breakfast instead of allowing them to go to the exercise yard as usual. The door to the yard was locked and a lieutenant, who had assured the inmates the day before that nobody would be beaten, approached the company as it was lined up in A tunnel awaiting word as to why the door to the exercise yard was locked. As he reached the column of inmates and before he spoke he was attacked. The uprising was underway.

The Conflagration Spreads

After an initial outburst of chaotic violence, rebellious A block inmates regrouped and set upon the locked gate at "Times Square", which separated A block from the rest of the institution. The gate gave way giving the rioters access to the center square and the keys which unlocked the gates in three directions. From Times Square, inmates from A block spread throughout the prison with little resistance, attacking officers, taking hostages, destroying property. As the rebellion reached other areas, some inmates joined in actively, but the majority tried to escape to secure areas, or were simply caught up in the tide.

The authorities were slow in responding, due largely to the absence of a riot control plan, the lack of available manpower, and an antiquated communications system. Connected with other parts of the prison only by single-line telephones, those in the administration building could not appreciate the full extent of the trouble, or summon help, until it was too late. Within two hours the inmates had control of four cellblocks and all of the yards and tunnels, and 1,281 inmates had gathered in D yard with other 40 hostages.

Was It Planned?

The Commission found no evidence that the Attica uprising was planned, either by avowed revolutionaries or anyone else. The evidence points in the other direction.

Although the Commission has been able to document in some detail the growth of inmate organizations and the planning of nonviolent protests at Attica, it has found no indications that these organizations or other inmates, were considering a take-over of the prison. At most there was talk of a prisonwide sit-down strike.

Although correction personnel frequently cited the increasing militancy among inmates, the circulation of radical literature, and the growing influence of political groups among the inmates, they were unable to point to concrete indications of advance planning for a take-over of the prison. In fact, two of the top three supervisors at Attica believed that the uprising was spontaneous.

The course the rebellion took on Thursday morning leads to the same conclusion. If a take-over was planned, it would not have been planned to commence in an enclosed area, such as A tunnel, where access to the rest of the prison was presumably sealed off by iron gates. The company which started the violence had just come through Times Square, where the keys to four corridor gates were kept, and had seen the gates locked behind them, all without incident. A planned rebellion would surely have been touched off before the moment the inmates were confined to A tunnel, with no immediately apparent avenue of escape and no guarantee of access to the rest of the institution.

No one, inmates or officials, could have anticipated that the Times Square gate had a defective weld and would give way. Before the gate broke, the A block inmates called to inmates trapped in other corridors to join in the uprising, but their entreaties fell on deaf ears.

The rioters did not take over the prison according to any rational plan. After the violence had subsided and the hostages were taken, the inmates continued for at least an hour to act in a manner inconsistent with the idea that there were any preexisting plans. For example, invading inmates set fire to the metal shops and deserted them after taking hostages and

thus left behind large quantities of volatile materials, tools, and machines that could be used for making weapons.

Even when all the inmates reached D yard there was a long period of chaos and internal bickering among inmates before organization emerged. In fact, most of those who took an active role in organizing the yard, drafting demands, and, later, negotiating with the state, had not been involved in the initial outbreak of violence and did not join it when the rioters reached their area of the prison.

The Negotiations

The negotiations were not planned - they just developed. When the Commissioner first arrived, the police were not prepared to retake the prison. By the time sufficient assault forces had been summoned, the negotiations were under way and Commissioner Oswald chose to continue them reluctant to the end to undertake any action which would imperil lives.

A settlement based on a series of penal reform measures-the 28 Points-was negotiated by the Commissioner with the observers, but was rejected by the inmates on Saturday night because criminal amnesty was not included. With that rejection, the negotiations were, in effect, dead. The observers placed their remaining hopes in a plea to the Governor refused. After the inmates rejected a last-minute appeal on Monday morning to accept the 28 Points, Oswald, with the Governor's concurrence, ordered the assault 4 days, almost to the hour, after the uprising began.

Why did the efforts at peaceful settlement fail? In the Commission's judgment, many factors contributed to the failure of the negotiations. Among the most important were the following:

The observers' committee was not constituted to serve a mediation function-it was too unwieldy in number and racked with ideological differences.

Many inmates could not accept on faith that, once they had released the hostages, the state's promises would be kept.

The inmates were intransigent in their demand for amnesty and the state was unwilling to grant it.

However, no alternative to total amnesty was explored by either side.

A majority of inmates would have accepted the 28 Points without amnesty but were fearful of speaking out against the inmate spokesmen.

Inmate spokesmen with knowledge of three inmate deaths must have been encouraged in their demand for complete amnesty by fear that they would be held accountable for the murders.

When the state showed a willingness to negotiate and made concessions, many inmates gained an inflated view of their bargaining power.

The Commission agreed with Commissioner Oswald that the State should not adopt a firm policy against negotiation with inmates holding hostages but that administrators must have flexibility in responding to prison riots. If the prison can be retaken immediately without lethal force, the authorities should do so. Any delay may provide the inmates with the opportunity to arm themselves and once that occurs the option to use nonlethal force to quell the uprising may be lost. The Commission believes that the possibility of a negotiated settlement must be fully explored before using lethal force. In addition, the Commission suggested that the following principles will improve the chances for a peaceful settlement:

The state should insist that all negotiations take place on neutral ground between the representatives of the inmates and the state. Direct negotiations are preferable to the use of outsiders.

Though the prisons must be subject to continuous public scrutiny by the press, negotiations during a riot are not the occasion to exercise that function and thus negotiations must be negotiated privately.

Before terminating negotiations, and commencing an assault, the inmates must be made to understand that the alternative to a settlement is an armed assault with guns.

The Governor's Decision

The Commission concluded that Governor Rockefeller should have

gone to Attica but does not mean to suggest that his failure to appear at Attica was the cause of the deaths and casualties that followed. Full amnesty was the paramount issue at all times and there was no evidence before the Governor that the inmates were prepared to accept less. However, even if one could be certain that the Governor's appearance would not have led to a settlement, the gravity of the situation warranted the Governor's presence because the critical decision to retake the prison involved great risk of loss of life.

The Commissioner's Decision

All officials realized that any police action to rescue the hostages would actually present the greatest threat to them. Why then did the State order the assault?

The decision was based upon the belief that basic principles—as well as lives—were at stake in the uprising. The uprising constituted an insurrection against the very authority of the State, and to tolerate it was to concede a loss of sovereignty over the rebels. The decision to retake the prison was not a quixotic effort to rescue hostages in the midst of 1,200 inmates; it was a decisive reassertion of its sovereignty and power. While all State officials were concerned about the safety of the hostages, they had finally reached the conclusion that, after 4 days of negotiations, the need to reassert the authority of the State over the rebels outweighed the risks of an assault.

The Assault and Its Aftermath

When the failure of the negotiations left the State with no alternative but to retake the prison by force, officials from the Governor on down expressed concern that the force employed be only the minimum necessary to restore order. However, that concern was not translated into effective restraints, and, in fact, the assault of September 13, 1971, and its aftermath were marred by excesses. Thirty-nine persons were killed by gunfire and 80 others suffered gunshot wounds during the assault. One of every 10 persons in D yard that morning was struck by gunfire and more than a quarter of the hostages died of bullet wounds. The following are some of the conclusions

of the Commission as to why so many injuries and deaths occurred.

The hostages were indistinguishable in their dress from inmates.

The state police were equipped with shotguns, loaded with "00" buckshot pellets which would spread at distances exceeding 30 yards and hit unintended targets, creating a high risk of injury and death to unresisting inmates and hostages when discharged in or into the prison yard. No specific safeguards were developed to avoid hitting hostages and unresisting inmates with the spread and overfire from shotgun blasts.

The tactical plan left the decision on whether to discharge a weapon to the discretion of each individual trooper. Gas masks inhibited verbal communication and no alternative means, such as hand signals, were developed for transmitting fire and cease-fire orders or other instructions once the assault was under way.

Many correction officers fired their weapons from the blocks during the assault as the Governor's orders that they should not participate was never communicated to them.

There was much unnecessary shooting. Troopers shot into tents, trenches, and barricades without looking first.

Finally, the Commission concluded that the deficiencies in the assault plan were not the result of callous indifference on the part of police officials, nor were they the result of a casual attitude toward the enormous situation confronting them. They were the result, rather, of assigning a new kind of mission to a force of men that was neither trained nor equipped for the occasion. The deficiencies in the plan were not perceived-and are still not acknowledged in all instances-by the police commanders or state officials. No one reviewed or questioned the assault plan except superficially. It is doubtful that state leaders even realized that the only prospect for retaking the prison without indiscriminate shooting rested on the individual judgment and self-restraint of 211 tense, frightened, frustrated, angry men and their separate "reasonable beliefs".

Guns were not the only inflictors of pain at Attica that day; in the aftermath of the assault, hundreds of inmates, stripped of their clothing, were brutalized by correction officers, troopers, and sheriffs' deputies. Though State officials expected immediate physical reprisals against inmates in the aftermath of the rebellion, they did nothing to prevent them. National Guardsmen and other outside observers, as well as a few troopers and correction officers, confirmed the almost universal inmate descriptions of widespread beatings, proddings, kickings, and verbal abuse of the vilest nature. Reprisals were especially severe in segregation, where the suspected leaders of the uprising were taken. Forty-five percent of the inmates who had been in D yard suffered bruises, lacerations, abrasions, and broken bones.

No effective steps were taken on September 13 to see that reprisals did not occur and no satisfactory explanation has been given for that failure. An uprising in which inmates had demanded above all that they be treated as human beings thus ended with their being treated inhumanly. The Commission concluded that men whose profession it is to uphold order should not permit their emotions to interfere with their responsibilities. Also supervisory officials should not look the other way and allow resentment and anger to reign where there is a desperate need for reason and restraint.

The authorities were well aware that the assault might result in a large number of gunshot casualties and, in fact, publicly expressed relief when it was all over that the toll had not been higher. However, they failed to make adequate provision in advance for the evacuation and treatment of the wounded. When sufficient medical personnel arrived they were shocked at the conditions prevailing and amazed that they had not been alerted hours prior to the assault. Miraculously no one died solely because of the delay in receiving medical attention. Nevertheless, the agony of the wounded was immeasurably increased by the lack of prompt treatment. Of all the needless suffering at Attica, this was the most easily avoidable. The fact is that no one assumed the responsibility for making the necessary arrangements.

PATTERNS IN PRISON RIOTS

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Un des genres les plus courants en Amérique du Nord depuis 1950 c'est d'attaquer et de s'emparer des gardes comme otages et d'entamer des pourparlers pour leur libération. Ce texte est un examen des diverses méthodes appliquées par les émeutiers des prisons y compris les étapes initiales d'une émeute, les genres de leadership et de violence et le traitement des otages. Y sont compris également des discussions sur la théorie des émeutes de prisons et leurs incidences aux fins des négociations pour y mettre fin et pour les prévenir.

During a riot at Kingston Penitentiary in 1932 inmates walked out of their shops and barricaded themselves in their cell blocks. Even though guards were caught up in the disturbance, the inmates made no effort to take them as hostages. The demonstration was peaceful and organized, and there was no attempt to destroy prison property.

The April 1971 Kingston Penitentiary riot illustrates how riots have changed in their pattern. During this riot the inmate leaders seized guards as hostages, and forced the prison administration to negotiate for their lives. They threatened to cut off a guard's finger for every shot that was fired, and warned that they would kill all their hostages if an attempt was made to retake the prison by force. The leaders also ordered the destruction of the prison, and damage estimates after the four day riot exceeded five hundred thousand dollars.

These features of the 1971 Kingston riot, the seizure of hostages and the negotiation for their release, as well as the widespread destruction of the institution, are common to most North American prison riots since 1950. Before that time, prison demonstrations tended to be peaceful and non-violent.

Initial Stages of a Riot

The beginning of present day prison riots is marked by a spree of destruction which usually involves only a small proportion of the inmate population. Small groups of inmates spread throughout the prison, attacking guards, taking hostages, setting fires, releasing other prisoners from their cells, and raiding the hospital or commissary for supplies of drugs, food and cigarettes. Many inmates sniff glue and experiment with pills and drugs that have been smuggled into the prison or taken from prison medical supplies. This initial stage of a riot generally lasts no more than a few hours, and takes on the appearance of a wild party. A guard who observed the beginning of the Attica riot describes what he saw:

There were no indications of concerted activity — inmates were running about in all directions, joking, eating ice cream taken from the officer's mess, and in general acting like a group of pranksters whose lark would soon be over.

While some inmates eagerly join in the festivities, the majority of the prisoners remain passive and attempt to escape from the riot or watch from a distance. Most simply mill about, talk amongst themselves, watch the activity about them, and seek out friends.

A major concern of inmates once a riot begins is personal safety. Inmates fearing being attacked by other prisoners will often remain in their cells or turn themselves over to prison authorities. Many prisoners in the Kingston riot reported that they did not want to become involved, and did very little during the four-day disturbance. Most armed themselves, and banded together with friends for protection. One inmate reported that he and his brother slept in the same cell, and stayed together most of the time: "We were just interested in not getting killed or injured, and eventually transferring to another institution". After a few days, many inmates, out of boredom, fatigue and fear, are ready to turn themselves over to prison authorities at the first opportunity. At Kingston, when it was announced that sixty inmates could leave by the hospital exit, over two hundred men rushed toward the door in an attempt to get out.

Riots rarely involve the entire inmate group, either because guards succeed in locking certain cell blocks and thus confine prisoners not already in the rioting group, or because some prisoners remain orderly or even help in the quelling of the riot. At Kingston, most inmates were unaware that a disturbance was about to take place, and those who were did not notify the authorities. Several inmates who were approached and asked to help in the take-over stated that they wanted no part of it. Other men, knowing that there was going to be trouble that evening, chose to remain in their cells rather than attend recreation. Even after the riot had begun, many were still reluctant to join in.

Often, however, they are caught up in the storm and forced to participate by other convicts who threaten them with make-shift weapons. At Attica, armed rioters swarmed throughout the galleries announcing, "We are taking over; are you with us or against us?" On one gallery, inmates decided that they would vote on whether or not to join them. Although most voted against joining, the vote was ignored, and the armed rioters surrounded them and forced them into the yard.

In two disturbances that occurred at San Quentin Prison in 1968, the inmate leaders, although urging a non-violent demonstration, used death threats to ensure widespread participation. In Kingston, as in Jackson, convicts had their cells opened by rioters who ordered them out. A survey by the McKay Commission after the Attica riot found that sixty-three per cent of the inmates reported that they did not want to participate in the disturbance.

Prison Riot Leadership

For some inmates, prison is home. They orient themselves to the informal inmate social system, and they strive within its boundaries to achieve status, power and privilege. One hypothesis which can be drawn from some of the sociological theories of prison riots is that inmates who orient themselves to the inmate social system. Since escape attempts are rare, the men who play leadership roles during riots may be expecting other benefits such as a rise in status in the eyes of fellow inmates, or an opportunity to exercise power.

Leaders of riots are very much concerned about how they appear in the eyes of their peers. In the inmate social system, as in many social groups, certain roles are accorded a good deal of respect. One such role is the argot role of "real man" or "right guy". A "right guy" is a convict who adheres to the inmate code, who does not exploit others, and who shows concern for other inmates.

A "right guy" is always loyal to his fellow prisoners. He never lets you down, no matter how rough things get. He keeps his promises; he's dependable and trustworthy. In his dealings with the prison officials, the "right guy" is unmistakably against them, but he doesn't act foolishly..."

Inmate leaders always attempt to portray themselves as "right guys" during prison riots.

The goals of inmate leaders appear to be the exercise of power and the achievement of status. To this end they have developed two strategies. By using guards as hostages, and monopolizing the means of communication between prison officials and the inmate population, leaders force the administration to recognize them as spokesmen for all inmates. In order to secure the safe release of hostages, prison officials must negotiate with, and often submit to, the demands of the leaders of the riot.

The second strategy for gaining status and maintaining power is to make up a list of grievances or demands, and present them to the prison officials. This, in effect, justifies their leadership to other inmates because the grievances generally condemn prison conditions, and the demands call for improved conditions for all inmates. These grievances usually receive much publicity, and in most cases inmates demand as one of the conditions for the release of hostages that their grievances be made public, and that they be allowed to talk to newspaper reporters. In one instance, inmates demanded as a condition of surrender that the deputy warden make a speech to the inmate population stating that the leaders were "big shots", that they had won their demands, and that they had not let the rest of the prisoners down. It appears that leaders of prison riots are intent on receiving much publicity for their "cause" and themselves, and are very concerned with how they appear to other inmates and to the general public.

Often when a riot begins there are no acknowledged leaders. Only one of the six inmates who started the Kingston Penitentiary riot played an active part in the leadership after it had begun, and even he was later ousted. At Attica, the inmates who were to emerge as leaders and negotiators had nothing to do with the start of the riot:

Most of those who took an active role in organizing the yard, drafting demands, and later, negotiating with the state, had not been involved in the initial outbreak of violence, and did not join in it when the rioters reached their area of the prison.

A power struggle is not uncommon, and leadership is invariably maintained, if not achieved, through the use of force. At Kingston, three separate groups were struggling for power, and the leadership changed hands three times. Billy Knight, with the help of some friends, immediately seized power. A second group, described as a "gang of toughs", attempted later to unseat Knight by preventing him from making a speech. Brian Beaucage, the leader of this group, grabbed Knight while he was addressing the prisoners, and swung a metal bar at his head. The blow missed, and Beaucage was disarmed by Barrie MacKenzie. Still later, when MacKenzie and his associates were out of the prison in committee meetings, Beaucage and his friends took control of the prison through the threat of violence. In this case, as in others, the confrontation can be seen as a struggle between conservative and violent forces.

Once power is obtained, riot leaders use force or the threat of violence to control other inmates. At Kingston, reluctant inmates were ordered out of their cells to join the riot by armed inmates, and later, they were again ordered out of their cells to witness the beating of the "undesirables".

During the Ohio Penitentiary riot of 1952, a dozen die-hard prisoners blocked the path of 1,200 inmates who wanted to end the riot and return to their cells. Inmates had initially been forced to participate in the disturbance by these same riot leaders.

Typically, a band of armed enforcers or security guards is appointed by the leaders to keep inmates in line and enforce the rules. At Attica, leaders immediately laid down some strict rules: drugs were forbidden; homosexual activity, even by consent, would detract from the gravity of the situation, and was outlawed; fighting among inmates was prohibited and, there were restrictions placed on inmates' movements. The penalty for violation of any of these rules was to be death. It seem ironic that the very repressive system of government that inmates claim they are rebelling against is replaced by a tyranny that is far more restrictive and punitive than the one they attempted to change.

Violence During Riots

The prison is a closed world, and everything that happens to an inmate is discussed and made the basis of an assessment. Reputation is one of the criteria that determine an inmate's position in the social hierarchy. Conditions of age, prison experience, socio-economic background, and offence are some of the factors that can affect one's reputation. Offence tends to be a negative criterium:

Certain types of offences tend to degrade a man's status in the eyes of his fellow inmates, whereas few offences carry an automatic bonus of prestige.

One inmate hated almost universally in prisons because of his offence is the sex offender; specifically, the child molester. Because convicts can gain status and deference through the use of violence, the sex offender as a legitimized target of aggressive inmates, lives in constant fear of being assaulted or murdered. Marcus, in his study of Dangerous Sexual Offenders in the British Columbia Penitentiary, quotes a sexual offender:

If you live long enough in one of these institutions, you come to the realization that what really makes things tick here is hate. The inmates hate the guards, the guards hate the inmates, and together they hate the sex offenders. The sex offender is considered to be the lowest form of life, and is treated as such almost universally. He is beaten,

spat upon, his possessions are fair game for theft or destruction, and he is usually accorded some semblance of the silent treatment. The life of the sex offender in this institution is one of a constant state of siege, never allowing him to relax his guard completely in any manner.

Often such inmates will go to great lengths to hide their offences. Morris and Morris report a case where a man who was believed to have raped an 8 year old girl (the victim was 18) was kicked badly and placed in isolation for protection. The offender attempted to spread the rumour around that he was serving eighteen years for murder, instead of eight years for rape, even going so far as to put a "1" before the "8" on his cell card.

Not all sex offenders are hated and abused, however. Homosexuals or men who have raped women are usually tolerated. During the Kingston riot, a number of homosexuals put on a performance on the dome floor for the benefit of other prisoners. Wearing priest's robes taken from chapel, they celebrated mass while committing homosexual acts upon each other. They did this unmolested, and there were no occasions throughout the four day riot of homosexuals being assaulted by other inmates.

Another type of convict "undesirable" despised by his fellow prisoners is the informer. The "rat" or "squeaker" as he is called, not only breaks the inmate social code, but he is also a threat to others. Because of this, the informer, like the sex offender, must be segregated for his own protection.

Whenever a riot develops, inmates of these types find themselves at the mercy of the rioters and the riot leaders. Many instances of attacks on "undesirables" during riots have been documented. Martin, in describing the events of the Jackson Prison riot, notes that the cell block in which the riot began held troublemakers as well as men who needed protection. Of this latter group, he writes: "They were trapped there by the riot". Martin also describes how the inmates during the riot mercilessly beat up an informant:

They had broken into the mailbox in the block and found a note a stool-pigeon had written previously to Deputy Bacon. He was a childish obese burglar. Ward ordered him brought down to the Office, and as he entered, Ward's lieutenants blackjacked him. They couldn't knock him out; infuriated, they forced him to the floor at knife-point and kicked him in the head. "I have never seen or heard of a man absorbing so much punishment", a witness has said.

In another prison riot at the Utah State Prison in 1957, one inmate who had previously led a riot in 1951 was severely beaten. When newsmen asked inmates why, one prisoner replied: "He was not too popular. He was classified as a rat if you wanna put it that way". In the Ohio State Penitentiary riot of 1968, a convict had his throat slashed by fellow prisoners because he was believed to be an informer.

During the Attica riot, a news reporter was interviewing two inmates, Barry Schwartz and Kenneth Hess, about the origin of the revolt when they were interrupted, and the two inmates summoned to a table where the leaders gathered. A tribunal found the men guilty of being informers. They were then stripped, blindfolded, and led away into D-Block. Later, a guard watching D-Block saw Hess appear at the fourth floor window. The guard heard him shout: "They're cutting my throat". As the guard watched, the inmate climbed down to the third storey, where he was grabbed and pulled inside. When the riot ended, the bodies of the two men were found with their throats cut and with more than thirty stab wounds. Nearby was the body of a third inmate, showing the same pattern of multiple wounds. Later reports on the riot describe a group of executioners that performed the murders.

Assaults by aggressive homosexuals often take place during riots. Sometimes a gang of wolves will prowl the prison looking for victims to rape. Martin describes an incident during the Jackson Prison riot:

The inmates went berserk. They smashed their beds and toilets, broke into the boiler shop and procured straight razors, screamed and

yelled and slammed cell doors and milled about in the narrow corridors. A sexual orgy began. A blonde pretty young forger, a true homosexual whose mother had made him wear dresses as a child, and who in prison had to be kept in permanent segregation because he could not avoid homosexual entanglements, was raped by 14 men who formed a line at his cell door when it was unlocked. Afterwards, in hysteria, he was carried downstairs and Ward called for a stretcher and sent him to the prison hospital. Another inmate was beaten up for sport. He was only 18, and feeble-minded.

During the Kingston riot, two inmates entered a cell in 1-D and raped a young inmate. Earlier, inmate leader Barrie MacKenzie had protected two young convicts afraid of being raped. He found them in their cells crying, and he kept them with him for the duration of the riot.

Attacks on "undesirables" are justified by inmates who argue that the victim is getting what he deserves; a technique of neutralization that Sykes and Matza have termed "the denial of the victim". The argument is simply that the injury against sex offenders and informers is not an injury at all; rather it is a form of rightful retaliation or punishment.

By a subtle alchemy, the (deviant) moves himself into the position of an avenger, and the victim is transformed into a wrong doer.

Interestingly enough, the method convicts use to legitimize their assault is to set up a court to decide on the guilt of the alleged offender. At Attica as described above, Schwartz and Hess were brought before a tribunal to be tried. The charges were laid, evidence heard, and a finding of guilt delivered. The sentence was death, and the two unfortunate men were then executed.

At Kingston, the "undesirables" were dragged out and tied to chairs on the dome floor, while all the inmates gathered on the upper ranges to watch. One inmate, acting as a prosecutor, walked around the circle of chairs with a loud speaker and accused the captives of being child molesters or informers. He addressed the inmates above as though they were the judge and jury, and called for a verdict and a sentence. At one point he approached one of the tied men and struck him in the face, stating:

"I am your prosecutor, you animal". Other inmates also played the game and acted out the roles of prosecutor and executioner. Many went about accusing the tied men or questioning them as to why they had been kept in the security wing of the prison. One prisoner while striking another over the head with a metal bar, repeated over and over: "Why did you burn your children? What made you do it?"

The convicts watching the assault from the upper ranges suggested punishments, passed verdicts by giving a thumbs down signal, and shouted encouragement to the men conducting the beatings. They rejected proposals to cut the throats of the "undesirables" or burn them alive.

During the beatings, two men were moved from the circle and untied after having been found "not guilty". Other inmates produced evidence that these two convicts had not been child molesters.

The harrassment and assaults on "undesirables" is not limited to the duration of riots only. Inmate "undesirables" in all of our penitentiaries must be segregated from the general population for their own protection. Informants and sex offenders are ostracized by other inmates, and are constantly tormented and subjected to verbal and physical attacks. A riot for these men means that the protection afforded them by the officials of the prison has broken down, and that they are at the mercy of inmates who bear them a grudge.

The Treatment of Hostages.

In most North American prison riots, guards are seized and held captive by inmates, and in most instances they are protected by inmate leaders and released unharmed after the riot. The guards themselves report on their experiences in different ways. After the Trenton Prison riot, the hostages said that they had not felt that they were in grave danger. Guards in the Montana Prison riot, however, had greatly feared for their lives, and had removed and loosened clothing in case gasoline was thrown on them and set afire. In the Jackson Prison riot, the leaders appointed armed inmates to protect the guards against attack by excited or revengeful prisoners. They also released several guards during the negotiations as a "sign of good faith" on their part, and they released an elderly guard because they were afraid he might die. Kingston Penitentiary inmates also released a guard as a "sign of good faith".

During the Trenton riot, a guard who had suffered a heart attack was released, and all hostages survived the ordeal unharmed. At Attica, the hostages were encircled and protected from hostile inmates by a group of inmate "guards". The first day of the disturbance, the rioters released twelve officers and civilian hostages who had been injured. The remaining captives were given inmate clothing, blankets, and even mattresses which convicts in the raid-soaked yard did not have. Guard Philip Watkins said that while convicts at first kicked him and broke his arm, eventually another prisoner stopped them. Later he was addressed as "sir", given cigarettes, hot meals, and a prison doctor was allowed to treat his arm.

Many convicts appear eager to stay on the good side of their hostages. In the Montana riot the leaders released an injured guard and another officer who was a diabetic. As one guard related:

Some of our captors seemed quite concerned about our comfort, and told us they would have sandwiches and coffee for us soon. They asked us how we were doing, and if they could get us anything.

Despite the fact that guards were protected, they were very often still in danger. When negotiations bogged down in Attica, the prisoners marched hostages into view, and an "executioner" pulled back their heads and held knives to their throats. No one doubted that they were prepared to kill their hostages. Yet, when the seige by the State Troopers had ended, not one of the guards killed had been murdered by the inmates; all had died from bullet wounds. One of the hostages found his life spared by a convict assigned to kill him, who whispered instead: "I don't have the heart to do it. I'm only going to prick you". The guard said that the prisoner nicked him enough to draw blood, then lay down on top of him so that other convicts would not notice he was still alive. Other hostages also reported their lives being spared by sympathetic inmates who refused to execute them. One group of guards was thrown into a pit and splashed with gasoline, but the convicts changed their minds about setting them afire.

In the Jackson riot, one inmate was killed by advancing National Guardsmen. The rioters gathered around the cell block where the guards were being held captive by the inmates, and demanded that a guard's head be thrown out. When none was forthcoming, they tried to smash their way into the block. The leader in the block ordered one guard to be thrown out in order to appease the rioters. Some inmates objected to his choice because they liked this particular man. Another was sent out and miraculously eluded the mob under police guns.

In Kingston, several attempted were made on guard's lives by aggressive inmates, and if it had not been for the physical intervention of others, they would have succeeded. Immediately after the riot had begun, the six correctional officers were hustled off into a corridor on the first range and inmate guards were set up to control and protect them. Later the hostages were moved to the fourth range, and then shuttled frequently between two ranges. Inmate Barrie MacKenzie made them change into prison uniforms, and arranged to have the gate at the entrance to the range guarded. Thursday morning, when the army arrived at Kingston Penitentiary, tensions mounted, and some men made a rush to seize the guards, but the inmate security force held firm and repelled the attackers. Still later, when MacKenzie was returning from a meeting, he spotted inmate Brian Dodge leading a guard along a corridor. Dodge was being pursued by two other inmates who were yelling: "You can't kill him - let him go". MacKenzie ordered Dodge to release the guard, and Dodge obeyed.

On Saturday evening the leadership fell into the hands of a group of violent inmates. This group dragged sex offenders and informants out onto the dome floor, tied them to chairs arranged in a circle, and unmercifully beat them until they were all unconscious. At one point, Dodge demanded that the correctional officers be handed over to be executed. Other convicts involved in the beatings also wanted to kill the guards, but were prevented from doing so by other inmates.

The pattern in prison riots seems to be that correctional officers are well protected from harm by inmate security forces. Guards, if harmed, usually receive their injuries during the initial stages of a riot when inmates released

from their cells are on a rampage throughout the prison. The slight injuries that the Kingston officers received were obtained when they were first overpowered. At Attica, several guards were assaulted in the early moments of the riot, and one guard died from his injuries. Injured hostages are in general, released by inmates so that they can obtain medical treatment. In both Attica and Kingston, as in other riots, inmates quickly came to the aid of guards and offered protection. Once leadership has been established, particular inmates either take it upon themselves, or are assigned the task of protecting hostages from would-be assailants. In many cases, they must fight off other inmates who attempt to kill the hostages. This is in sharp contrast to the treatment of "undesirables", where seldom does anyone attempt to interfere when they are being assaulted.

Theories of Prison Riots

Correctional administrators generally contend that unfortunate prison conditions are responsible for riots. The list usually includes such items as overcrowding, insufficient budget or lack of classification or segregation facilities.

This explanation referred to as the "power keg theory", assumes that these factors create in the inmate population feelings of frustration, bitterness and unrest, which eventually explode into a riot or disturbance. This rebellion is triggered by a "spark" such as bad food, or a rumour of guard brutality. Two elements must be present according to proponents of the theory; a foundation of dissatisfaction, and an incident that sparks dissatisfaction into rebellion.

This theory is not without its opponents, the most vociferous being Clarence Schrag who claims that these defects cannot be regarded as major causes. He points out that most of the shortcomings mentioned were characteristic of correctional systems for many decades, and that progress in overcoming some of these weaknesses, although slow and difficult, has been fairly consistent. If deficiencies in training and treatment programs were riot causes, for example, then the incidence of inmate rebellion should have decreased instead of increased after World War II. Another criticism Schrag makes of the "power keg theory" is that administrative deficiencies are encountered with some frequency

in institutions that avoid inmate revolts as in institutions that are affected. Riots have occurred in old institutions that were excessively large, overcrowded, and lacking in treatment programs, but they have also occurred in some of the newest facilities of moderate size, comparably well staffed, operating modern treatment programs. Furthermore, many of the riots seemed to occur at precisely that point in time when correctional authorities were initiating program improvements, tightening controls, and developing staff training measures. The evidence is that administrative changes, even though they were viewed as beneficial and necessary, were frequently associated with tension and anxiety among both staff members and inmates.

Schrag concludes that the administrative deficiencies identified in various investigations cannot be the sole cause of riots because the conditions in question were neither unique to the time immediately preceding the riots, nor were they restricted to the institutions involved.

Another theory of prison riots is the belief that they are started by inmates who wish to use the riot as a cover for an attempt to escape. This belief is not substantiated by the facts, since virtually none of the riots since 1950 involved attempts at escape. In the Jackson Prison riot in 1952, for example, the inmates involved in the riot asked the guards to lock the door to their cell block; escape seemed farthest from their minds. As Lloyd Ohlin states:

The significant fact of the riots is that they did not involve attempts to escape, but represented an effort on the part of the inmate community to dramatize prison conditions and command a public hearing.

In the above statement, Ohlin touches upon another theory of prison riots. This theory holds that inmates start riots because they have certain demands and grievances, and they believe that they can only achieve their goals by rioting and obtaining public sympathy. Inmates riot because they feel that they need public opinion to gain reforms. This view is held by the American Correctional Association Committee on Prison Riots (1964). They quote the Christian Century magazine:

The riots result we believe not from bad prison conditions or practices, but from

the belief of prison inmates that the only way in which they can gain public interest in improving such conditions is by rioting. Non-violent protests or requests for remedial action, prisoners believe, never accomplish anything. Riots sometimes do.

There seems to be some evidence to support this position. Whenever a riot takes place, inmate leaders usually present the administration with a set of demands, and begin negotiating for concessions and reforms. As well, a common pattern in prison riots is for the rioters to demand newspaper, television and radio coverage. In the Kingston riot, inmates refused to discuss their grievances with the Warden or his staff, but demanded and were allowed a press conference. In wishing to have their grievances made public, inmates obviously expect public opinion to be supportive of their objectives and methods.

If this theory is valid, then some inkling as to why a riot arose may be obtained from the demands made by prisoners. But in some riots, no substantial demands are ever made, and the rioters, it appears, simply have had a general desire to "raise hell". There is also the belief of some prisoners and prison officials that the demands and the bargaining process are only second thoughts of the prisoners. Ohlin points out that the demands of inmates are often made up after riots have started. He feels that they show little conscious awareness of the underlying causes of tension and unrest in the institutional community. Schrag notes that there is initially little consensus among inmates regarding their complaints and demands and a semblance of unity on these issues is attained only after lengthy and heated debate.

A Kingston Penitentiary inmate observed that after the riot had begun the leaders had a meeting to discuss what they were going to demand: "They sat around and thought up a few beefs and wrote them down". During the 1971 riot at Attica, Commissioner Oswald reacted favourably to most of the prisoners' demands at their initial confrontation, but, to his surprise, they hardly seemed to take note of his responses. One of the inmate leaders said to him: "There ain't going to be no fast negotiations".

Martin provides an example from the Jackson Prison riot, 1952, of inmates discussing their grievances:

Ward (the leader of the rebellion) found the other rioters purposeless. "They had no more idea what the hell they wanted than flying in the air. That's why I took control" (said Ward). "I was six or eight hours with some of the leaders trying to see why the hell they were doing it. They couldn't think of anything. One guy had a friend that the deputy wouldn't let him go around with. That was his complaint. It was some of the silliest damn things I ever heard in my life."

It is no wonder, then, that the officials that attempted to negotiate with these inmates got nowhere, and that even after all the inmate demands had been met, they still refused to give up. These observations lend support to the contention that inmate demands are only secondary, and are not the causes of the riot. The demands serve the purpose of helping the riot leaders maintain power. Power and control become a problem for leaders when competing groups arise.

The time soon arrives when the riot leaders must announce their objectives, and the plans by which these objectives are to be obtained if they are to continue to wield control. Plans and objectives, other than those involved in obtaining control over the institution, had been given little thought up to this point. But the leaders rapidly learned that control and authority rarely function as ends in themselves, and that power is soon dissipated unless it is used to gain other objectives.

Inmate demands arise only after the riot has begun and are therefore not the cause of the riot, but rather function to help leaders justify and maintain power.

Another explanation of riots from a sociological perspective is based on the relationship of inmates to each other and to the staff. Prison riots, according to this theory, are a result of prison officials interfering in the inmate social system. The argument is as follows: A correctional officer needs a degree of inmate cooperation in order to keep the prison running smoothly. His stock of punishments and rewards are insufficient, and the best offer he can make is to ignore minor offences, or ensure that he never places himself in a position to discover infractions of the rules. Under this system some inmates are able to rise to elite positions where they exert a degree of control over others. Once among the elite, inmates will attempt to maintain this position, and the inmate elite will therefore contribute to the maintenance of the social order of the prison, and will suppress any form of behaviour among other inmates that would disrupt routine and endanger their position. They find it in their interest to aid in securing custodial objectives. As Cloward states:

We suggest that the official system accommodates to the inmate system in ways that have the consequence of creating illegitimate opportunity structures. We suggest, further, that certain prisoners, as they become upwardly mobile in these structures, tend to become progressively conservative. This ideological conversion takes place because these individuals develop a vested interest in maintaining the higher positions they have gained. Seeking to establish their relative advantage over other inmates, they are anxious to suppress any behaviour that might disturb the present arrangements.

Once prison officials attempt to "tighten up", or otherwise threaten the inmate social structure, the deposed inmates either actively encourage insurrection, or find that their power has fallen into the hands of less stable inmate leaders.

The theory developed by Hartung and Floch argues that prison officials in the past have allowed a semi-official inmate government to run the prison. Referring to the time period before the wave of riots in 1952-53, they point out that in many prisons inmates had been given important work assignments to key prison officials. Inmates in these jobs often had power

and influence over other inmates, and maintained order in the prison so that their positions would remain secure. "In return for being allowed to operate the prison semi-officially, the inmate leaders relieved the warden of the burden of discipline." When new prison administrations attempted to dissolve the inmates semi-official governments, the elite no longer could control or exert a conservative influence, and no longer had a vested interest in doing so.

The position of Gresham Sykes and Richard Cloward is similar to that of Hartung and Floch. They differ in that they make no reference to semi-official inmate governments, but they argue that an unofficial inmate self-government arises and exerts a conservative influence on the rest of the inmate population.

Sykes argues that guards overlook small infractions of the rules, and that those inmates oriented to the theme of inmate cohesion and opposed to creating disturbances are likely to be favoured in the "patterns of corruption" which grow up between guards and inmates. These inmates have a great influence over other inmates, and their efforts to maintain the prison equilibrium and to curb conflicts and disorder are presented as being in the interest of other prisoners. When the custodians strip the elite of their power, when they destroy the system of illicit privileges, of preferential treatment and laxity which has functioned to maintain his position,

the unstable elements in the inmate population have an opportunity to capitalize on the tensions of prison life, and to rise into dominance. The stage has been set for insurrection.

Cloward concurs with Sykes on the process by which certain inmates rise into elite positions. He refers to unofficial rewards such as overlooking minor infractions of the rules as an "illegitimate opportunity structure". He differs from the position taken by Sykes, and the position of Hartung and Floch in that he argues that the deposed inmate leaders start trouble to retain their position. He also argues that once an inmate elite has been created, a riot may be precipitated without any official intervention. As other inmates try to join the elite and find their way blocked, they become aggressive and rebellious. Eventually, they may be able to start a disturbance.

The Montana Prison riot provides an example of a riot started by an inmate leader who had fallen. Inmate Jerry Myles had been a powerful "con-boss", able to levy tribute on other prisoners until removed. Myles' following among the inmates quickly melted away, and the formerly powerful "con-boss" complained bitterly to the warden: "Prison is my home and you're making it a tough place for me to live". He blamed the Deputy Warden and a guard named Jones for having him demoted, and threatened to kill them both. Because of these threats he was placed in solitary. He eventually broke out and with his 19 year old homosexual "kid", murdered the Deputy Warden and started a riot.

The assumption underlying these three theories is that there is in prisons an informal inmate society or social structure. Within this society, inmate leaders support some of the norms in which guards are interested: maintaining order, suppressing a potential riot, or not assaulting guards. Support of these norms is based on interests that happen to coincide; they lack the foundations of shared values and social bonds. Any change in the situation may cause this limited area of concurrent interests to disappear. When the social system of the prison is changed by officials, this undermines the cohesive forces at work because the position of the inmate elite is undermined.

Prior to the Kingston Penitentiary riot, a dozen inmates were transferred to a new maximum security prison at Millhaven. The remaining prisoners were to be transferred in the near future. Rumours circulated throughout the prison and they depicted Millhaven as having tighter security and closed circuit television. Kingston Penitentiary authorities have noted that the rumours and uncertainty about Millhaven cause a great deal of anxiety among the inmate population prior to the riot. Prisoners complained bitterly that the little privacy that they had would be lost once they were moved. If, as Cloward argues, the social structure of the prison, and, therefore, the position of the prison elite is to a large extent based on an illegitimate opportunity structure, then a change of location and an increase in security and surveillance would mean a disruption or elimination of those opportunities that tended to support the status quo. This being the case, inmate leaders whose positions were threatened would no longer have any reason to control troublemakers. As well, they may themselves have started the riot in order to demonstrate to other prisoners, and even to the public, that they were important.

The facts, as they are known, support the theory that the riot was due to a disruption, or threatened disruption, of the inmate social order. It is now known what positions in the inmate social structure were held by the inmates who started the riot or by those inmates transferred to Millhaven.

Riot Prevention

Many prison riots appear to begin quite spontaneously and without warning, catching prison officials totally off guard. Sometimes, however, there are signs that are not noticed. If there is any validity in the sociological theories of prison riots discussed (and there appears to be some) then prison officials should beware of any action that might tend to upset the informal inmate social system. A "tightening up" of security or a shifting about of inmates are two possible ways by which this might happen.

At other times, signs of trouble are noticed but not acted upon. Many guards at Attica, for instance, sensing that there was likely to be trouble in the prison, had begun, several months prior to the disturbance, to leave their wallets at home and to carry only lunch money with them to work. The significance of this was not picked up by Attica prison administrators. At Kingston, the tension caused by the upcoming move to Millhaven was similarly dismissed by officials.

Negotiating the End of a Riot

Whenever inmates take over a prison and capture hostages, their usual strategy is to make a list of demands and present them to prison administrators. The lives of hostages are threatened unless demands are met or if there is an attempt to regain the prison. The decision that the government faces is whether to negotiate or to attempt to take the prison by force. The main consideration is the safety of the hostages and concern for their well-being is used as an argument by those who advocate restraint and by those who advocate force. In an analysis of all United States prison riots since the Civil War, David Garson has shown that a policy of restraint is the best course of action for prison administrators. His historical analysis reveals that official force and not inmates assaults account for the overwhelming number of inmate deaths and injuries in prison riots. Furthermore, with only one exception which occurred nearly half a century ago, hostages have never been killed by inmates regardless of what action officials take. Although many prison riots were

ended by force without deaths or injuries, the use of force in many other riots directly resulted in the deaths of guards and inmates. Garson also argues that there is no evidence to show that a policy of restraint encourages further rioting.

Negotiating with inmates is not a popular or pleasant chore, but seems to be a much wiser policy than the use of force. In negotiating, prison officials should not expect a quick and easy settlement. As indicated earlier in this paper, the demands of inmates are often not the cause of the disturbance and they are made up only after the riot begins. In some instances, rioters refused to give up even after all of their demands have been met. It appears that riot leaders enjoy the power and prestige they have and wish to hold onto it for as long as they can. With this in mind, prison negotiators might begin negotiations from a tough stance and gradually make concessions. Once all reasonable demands have been met, it will be difficult for inmate leaders to justify to other prisoners their retention of power. One guarantee that the government should make is a promise that there will be no physical reprisals once the prison is turned over to prison authorities.

Another point for authorities to keep in mind is that most inmates are not interested in being part of a riot. If the situation allows, inmates should be given the opportunity to turn themselves over to prison officials. This would tend to undermine the position of inmate leaders and might bring about a quicker settlement. Inmate leaders, if they can, will no doubt move to prevent the prisoners from leaving the riot scene. When inmates at Kingston moved to leave the prison by the hospital exit, they were showered with debris by inmates in the upper range.

The Kingston riot ended when the government announced that they refused to negotiate any further and that if inmates did not turn over the prison within a specified time the army would take the prison by force. The ultimatum was delivered shortly after the thirteen "undesirables" had been beaten into unconsciousness and the penitentiary was returned to officials within a few hours. Garson notes that a number of riots have been "easily" ended with ultimatums (the threat of force). If threats are to be carried through, however, the events at Attica indicate that indiscriminate shooting can only lead to the needless deaths of both inmates and hostages (who are usually forced to wear inmate uniforms). If a prison is to be taken by force, the use of unloaded firearms will undoubtedly minimize the number of injuries and deaths.

Inmate "Undesirables"

As mentioned before, for inmate undesirables a riot means that the protection afforded them by segregation and official control of the prison has broken down and that they are at the mercy of those who bear them a grudge.

With this in mind, two recommendations can be made. One proposal is that whenever a riot occurs, penitentiary officials should take into account the lives of "undesirables", as well as the lives of captured guards when negotiating.

A second recommendation is that consideration be given to housing "undesirables" in special institutions. This can be justified not only as a method of protecting them during riots, but also a means of protecting them for the full length of their sentence. If the government continues to support long sentences for sexual offenders, then it has a special responsibility to ensure the safety of these inmates.

Another argument in favour of providing special institutions for "undesirables" is that these types of inmates cannot benefit from the various programs that exist in prisons. At present, they are held in segregation units within the prison, and cannot make use of the facilities available to other inmates. They cannot work in the shops or take part in recreation or other group activities because of the danger of being attacked. They are, in short, subjected to additional punishment by being deprived of the use of these facilities. For these reasons, therefore, the federal government should consider using special institutions to house inmate "undesirables".

VIOLENCE IN PRISON

By John P. Conrad

ABSTRACT: Although many factors contribute to the establishment of a violent culture in American prisons, the incidence of violent acts is extremely low. Staff efficiency and the nearly universal expectation of release upon good behavior have offset the factors which theoretically would indicate high incidence of violence. Activity programs as well as concerted efforts to create a correctional milieu have also been effective in keeping the incidence of violence at a low level.

The place was Hall, Sweden's "preventive detention" prison for chronic offenders. My guide was Fred, a portly fellow in his mid-thirties, an embezzler and a social critic. He had been assigned to me because he spoke more fluent English than anyone on the staff. Most of his mature years had been spent in Hall and institutions like it, and he had given much thought to their problems. He was delighted to deal with my questions from a theoretical base. Like many of his fellow countrymen, he was quietly confident that Swedish ways are the best and perfectly willing to explain them.

I asked him about the incidence of violence at Hall - in about so many words. Insignificant, he replied. I must understand that the superintendent had taken good care to observe the wellknown sociological principle that repression from above is balanced by an equal amount of resistance from below. If the repression is unreasonable, then there will be an explosion of comparable force and unreason. Therefore, Herr M-, the superintendent, wisely kept repressive measures to the minimum required for good order. There was seldom any violent behavior at Hall, even though most of the residents (to use the term which Fred preferred) were serving long sentences and many of them had been guilty of violent crimes. Fred indicated that he knew that the tranquility of Swedish prisons, as he had described them, was in contrast to the violent unrest in American prisons. He courteously refrained from stressing the point.

Like most people who have read about our prisons in the news or who have viewed terrifying scenes staged in them for the cinema, Fred believed that American correctional institutions are jungles of tempered steel and reinforced concrete. The clichés were as vivid in his mind as stereotypes of the unseen always are. He knew about the "shiv" anonymously plunged into the back of a "rat" or a "punk",

about the furious clamor of the mess-hall riot, about the bullets sweeping the yard clear of mutinous convicts. Fred had seen and read about these excitements, as most Europeans have, and, with some exposure to the literature of criminology, he was able to construct a theoretical framework to account for them.

Reasons For Violence

We might well expect that American prisons would be violent-much more violent than they are. The reasons are many, and they add up to a plausible case. Let us inspect them.

First, American prisoners are violent people. In California, we have reviewed the records of substantial samples of our prisoners in some detail. Over 60 per cent of them have records of violent offenses of some kind or other. (It is impressive to note the frequency with which a sequence of such entries as "Assault with Force; Robbery, second degree; Assault and Battery; and Suspected Robbery" is abruptly terminated with the entry "Possession of Narcotics". Some ranges of alternatives are exceedingly narrow.) Between 15 and 20 per cent of our prisoners are serving terms for offenses in which they actually inflicted violence; a considerable number more threatened violence.

Second, prisoners seem to be getting gradually worse. Nearly all prison staff think this is true, and certainly there are good reasons supporting their intuitions. In California, prison populations are increasing more slowly than they used to, whereas the percentage placed on probation is steadily increasing. Between 1960 and 1964, the number of felony defendants placed on probation rose from 44 per cent to 51 per cent. In a long-range view, this is a praiseworthy accomplishment by the courts, and most observers would agree that it should be heartily encouraged. But this is the kind of progress which is made only at the expense of concomitant shifts in the prison population. If we look at the distribution of California prisoners by offense groups, we discover that the number of check-writers, usually the stalwarts of law and order in the prison community, has declined from about 15 per cent in 1958 to about 9 per cent in 1965. The number of robbers in the population has risen from 21 per cent to nearly 25 per cent. This is a curve which has been sharply rising for the last three years. A determined state-wide strategy to increase the use of probation may be counted on to accelerate this tendency. New legislation

New legislation providing for subsidies to counties which reduce the rate of felony commitments to prison will motivate judges to place more check-writers and thieves on probation, thus increasing the concentration of violent offenders in prison. There is good reason to agree with the warden whose forebodings of more recalcitrant and fewer tractable prisoners are based on accurate observation and rational forecasting.

Third, there are the given elements of the prison situation. Most prisoners are from the lower social classes. They come from sections of our megalopolis in which violence in some form or other is familiar from infancy to maturity. We have never been able to study the distribution of social classes in California prisons, but it is certain that Class V on the Hollingshead-Redlich scale is vastly overrepresented. Of this class, the authors make the following observations relevant to our problem:

Forty-one percent of the children under seventeen years of age live in homes that have been disrupted by death, desertion, separation, or divorce ... Laws may be broken and the moral standards of the higher classes flouted before the children's eyes day after day ... A deep-seated distrust of authority figures pervades class V persons from childhood to old age. Suspicion is directed toward police, clergymen, teachers, doctors, public officials, public health nurses, and social workers... They express their resentments freely in the home and in other primary groups. Children hear them, believe them, and react to targets of their parents' hostility in ways that are generally approved by their parents... Hostility breeds more hostility... To survive, the class V child or adult must repress his feelings and attitudes. These, however, tend to be expressed by acting out against society, members of the family, or the self.

On the streets on which Class V lives, there is no more love of violence than will be found in other parts of town. But its use is accepted as a natural means for gaining ends—from the discipline of the young to the possessions of another. The experience of violence is imported every day into the prison.

Fourth, violence is the lingua franca of the prison. Its disciplined use is the basis of order. The officer in the tower and his colleague on the gun-walk in the cell block exemplify the use of violence to gain objectives just as surely as the robber with his pistol. Violence is a

language which everyone in the prison speaks; for some it is the only means of reliable communication.

Fifth, the prison is an organization which depends on coercion to gain compliance. As Etzioni has theorized, compliance to coercive measures is gained at the cost of alienation of the subjects of the system. The prison is the archetype of a coercive organization; the prisoners are alienated from the objectives and norms of the staff. Certainly, order and obedience are among the highest objectives of any penal organization. Alienation can take many forms, but in this compliance structure it is reasonable to suppose that much of it would be channeled into acts of violence.

Sixth, the American prison is a community of the anonymous. In the long lines of denim-clad young men, who can tell who is mad and who is sane, who is aggrieved and who is indifferent, or who is armed and who is not? If one tried, one could not possibly know even a significant fraction of the thousand, two thousand, or more men who share one's abode. One can be sure that many are dangerous. There are never enough officers around to be sure that sudden death at the hands of an irrational stranger, or perhaps a real enemy, is not a present hazard, rather than an unlikely eventuality. It does not call for much miscalculation to decide that a weapon is the best insurance of safety.

Seventh, there is no denying that mass violence in prison sometimes gains objectives which inmates could not otherwise hope to achieve. Unpopular wardens have been removed; food has been made more palatable; and disliked programs have been changed. The cost is terrific, and the method is unreliable, but desperation has been effective where all other measures have failed.

The Low Incidence Of Violence

I could go on with more contributions to a theory of penal violence. Examples come readily to mind; I am not leading up to a paradox by which theory points to universal violence and experience points to its absence. All prison wardens worry about mass disturbances and sudden death. The more closed the prison, the greater is their concern. Even in Sweden, where Fred extolled the wisdom of his keepers, I have seen wrecked cell-furnishings and heard from less

panegyrically inclined inmates of tensions bursting and blows struck. Nevertheless, in spite of the convincing case which can be made for expecting incessant violence, the fact is that its incidence is small and the numbers committing it are smaller. The epidemic of riots which swept the country and alarmed penal pessimists in the early 1950's has dwindled off into sporadic occurrences, often illuminating, for all to see, the exceptional incompetence of the management.

How much violence should we expect? In California in 1964, there were exactly 146 fights and stabbings recorded in our prisons. The rate per hundred inmates was 0.62, higher than the previous year when the rate was 0.40, but still reflecting that the violence which might be so abundantly justified in theory actually produces less than one man in a hundred who acts as our hypotheses would predict. Depending on how the term is defined, there were two or three collective disturbances, none of them seriously extending the capacity of the custodial staff. In the same year, the rate per 100,000 for homicide, aggravated assault, and rape consolidated to about 159 for the community at large, or about a fourth the rate of violent acts in prison. Considering the irregular distribution of violence in the community at large, it is highly probable that there are a number of urban settings in which life and limb are more in jeopardy than in our most hazardous prison. It is certain that in some of our facilities personal safety is far more assured than anywhere at all outside.

What accounts for a picture so inconsistent with theoretical expectations? As with most phenomena in which the behavior of human beings is involved no one cause can be assigned. Among the most obvious forces for peace and good order in the yards and cell blocks is the efficiency of the custodial officer. The wretched fellows who occupied our towers and patrolled our yards in return for political services rendered are gone for good. We still have time-servers and a substantial number of "indifferents", to adopt Presthus' useful term, but they are all exposed to a modicum of training and expected to adhere to a minimum standard of performance. Competence is a powerful force for good order; without it, no correctional facility can be safe.

A second factor making for good order in the contemporary penal scene is the consistency of expectations. Nearly all inmates know that eventually they will get out, but that

conduct which is inconsistent with good citizenship will delay the process. Aggressive behavior is impossible to write off in weeks or months. With so much to lose, only the desperate, those who have truly lost or never really had hopes for a successful return to society, can afford to be violent. These are the men who are most surely dangerous, but the task of restoring their hopes is not always impossible. So long as such a man can learn and gain some reward for learning, there is a cure for desperation. Not all penal administrators, especially those of the old school who pride themselves on the manly art of punishment, understand that unrelieved despair is a virtually certain prelude to violence.

A third factor in the reduction of violence is constructive activity. We would like California prisoners to be busier than they are, but the hundreds of aimlessly idle men, cheated out of the hard labor they were sentenced to, who used to roam the yards of San Quentin and Folsom, have been reduced to dozens. Many of those who are working are not working hard, and some of the jobs at which they are working could not be described as productive. But correctional administrators have acquired a horror of idle hands; their Puritan forebears could not have been more concerned about the mischief which Satan finds for them.

Finally, although some California prisons are much too big by any criterion except the most penny-wise economy, and all are bigger than we would like them to be, we have done what we could to create communities within them. The art of managing a therapeutic milieu has not been mastered to anyone's satisfaction, but there is little question that this approach to management reduces the anonymity of prison life which alarms the most experienced inmate. Such communities are still islands in most institutions, but their effectiveness in reducing tension when all the rest of the institution has boiled up into a disturbance has already been demonstrated on several occasions. As skill and means accumulate, we can expect that all our large institutions will seem much smaller.

What I have described sounds too bland to be true. Can we truly say that prison violence is limited to the homicidal paranoia of a few "gorillas" and that everybody else can be considered on the way to salvation by vocational training and milieu therapy? If so, why not relegate the killers to slots where they can do the least possible harm and to each other only, leaving the "right guys", the "regulars", and the "square johns" to their more constructive devices? More and more, this kind of classification is

taking effect. We now have in sight a "special security facility" in which the unregenerately murderous will be concentrated and kept till new lights dawn or the juices of hatred run dry.

There will be left many thousands of men, mostly in their twenties, serving terms which average thirty months. They are bored, sexually deprived, angry, guilty, and without much reason for hope. They have good reason to know that they are bad, and the guns on the walls, the elaborate precautions against escape, and the behavior of their fellows will remind them of the evil of their ways. What keeps order in these places is still a precarious balance of flimsy hopes for the future, the preference for easy time, some training and treatment strategies, and the implicit threat of violence from the staff.

Parolee Violence

Some of the men who emerge from this regime will inevitably commit new crimes of violence. In California in 1964, out of a total of 17,548 men on parole, 125 were convicted of armed robbery. Most of these robbers perpetrated their offenses without physical harm to their victims. During the same year in California 11 parolees were convicted of homicide. And of the 185 men returned to prison for the commission of violent crime (including the 125 robbers), 78 had previously been guilty of violent crimes.

Statistically considered, these figures and the percentages they represent are trivial. They are not trivial to the victims, to the police, to the paroling authorities, or to the public scanning the headlines. There is an inescapable moral obligation on prison staff to avoid releasing an offender likely to commit violence. The bind which this moral obligation creates is excruciating when it collides with the obligation to release eventually nearly all inmates when they meet the ordinary requirements of the system. Unfortunately, neither statistics nor clinical principles nor social science theories provide methods for predicting, beyond chance, the likelihood of violent behavior. However, to increase time served by a few months accomplishes nothing except an increase in prison costs and population. Unless the system operates in good faith and keeps its promises to everyone reasonably well,

disaster is in the offing. The balance of latent violence maintained between staff and inmates will be upset as soon as there is a general sense that more time is being served or that significant groups are being treated unfairly. When administrators are uneasily aware that the equities are under continuous and vigilant scrutiny, is it any wonder that terms are set more by policy than by individual merits?

Conclusion

The social sciences will probably never achieve the reliability in measurement and prediction which are commonplace in the physical and life sciences. We can only hope to improve on common sense or, perhaps, to add to our store of that meagerly available asset. Our examination of correctional experience with violence indicates that it is not as prevalent as some might suppose that there are ways of keeping it under fairly good control, and that experience in prison does not produce a significant amount of violent behavior among released prisoners. From the evidence, we can only conclude that there are few men so alienated from the conventions and norms of American culture that they will give allegiance to violence as right and proper. No matter how identified they may be with subcultures which expect and tolerate violence, the first allegiance is to the dominant culture which defines the infliction of physical harm on another as wrong. It is a wrong which is sometimes rewarded but the gains are so likely to be offset by penalties that, even for a frequently violent man, the decision to take up the gun or knife will be exceptional. If satisfactions can be gained in other ways, other ways will be chosen.

And yet, there are some principles which can only be maintained by a shiv.

Frank W- is a not unfriendly looking man of early middle age. He is a little bald, tanned in the summer from daily workouts in the Folsom exercise yard, and his once-bulging muscles are slowly submerging under layers of fat. He wears a white monkey suit when indoors, the standard uniform in the Adjustment Center. He has killed several fellow inmates in the twenty-five years he has spent with us and has attempted to kill many others, usually with sharpened bedsprings, well-ground spoons, and other painstakingly homemade weapons. I asked him what he hoped to gain by conduct which has, so far, only increased his

time.

"I cannot stand a rat; a-rat who don't mind his own business and always talking to them bulls".

"What have you got against the bulls?"

"I haven't got anything against bulls-they got their job to do and they do it".

"So why shouldn't a guy talk to a bull?"

"Because a con should mind his own business and stay away from bulls".

"But so far you aren't getting anywhere in this campaign against the rats".

"I'm going to cut any ---ing rat who don't mind his ---ing business".

"Why does it make so much difference to you?"

"That's my own ---ing business".

We shall have to keep him where he is. He is a piece for a sociological museum.

FORCE VERSUS RESTRAINT IN PRISON RIOTS

G. David Garson

The 1971 tragedy at Attica has prompted a controversy over whether a policy of force or restraint should be used to settle prison riots. Many prison administrators maintain that restraint encourages further resistance. This article analyses the official policy (restraint or force) adopted at each nationally reported prison riot since the Civil War. According to this historical analysis, a policy of restraint does not encourage further rebellion, and it is almost without exception more successful than force in preserving human life.

Crushing Power", reads an 1884 manual on riot control, "exercised relentlessly and without hesitation is really the merciful, as it is the necessary, course to be pursued". In the wake of the 1971 Attica tragedy, the doctrine of crushing power is being re-examined: Was the policy of force pursued at Attica merciful? Were the forty-three deaths "necessary"? Could not Commissioner Russell Oswald have pursued a strategy of restraint and have avoided direct confrontation with the prisoners?

Just as the urban riots and presidential commissions of the 1960's correspond to earlier disorders with their equally ineffective investigative commissions, the recent revolt at Attica relates to a long history of prison uprisings, ensuing calls for reform and bureaucratic and legislative inertia.

The following analysis of prison riots since the Civil War can be used to assess the relative merits of using either force or restraint in prison riots. Hundreds of administrators have faced revolts, many of them not unlike Attica. What did they do? What has been the result of force? Of restraint? Is it true, as reinforcement theory suggests, that failure to use force merely encourages further rebellion? Or is it true, as frustration-aggression theory suggests, that force merely heightens levels of frustration and thereby encourages later outbreaks of violence?

Early Prison Riots

Taking into account the growth of the inmate population, we can still say that there was less prison violence in the nineteenth century than there is today. The modern riot awaited the development of the modern prison. Nineteenth

century prison reports and prison reform literature rarely referred to rioting. When riots broke out in the twentieth century, contemporaries perceived them as a new phenomenon.

Most of the riots that occurred between 1865 and 1913 involved escape attempts and often resulted in the death of one or two prisoners. The pattern of taking hostages and negotiating for reforms emerged later, but some of these early rioters did build barricades (as in the 1907 riot at Plattsburgh, N.Y., where authorities used guns and water hoses to break a barricade constructed by some three hundred rioting inmates). Similarly, race as a factor in prison riots has early precedents. For example, in the 1912 riot at Wyoming State Prison some 350 convicts lynched a black prisoner, setting the scene for the escape of twenty inmates and the death of three guards.

Ten of these early riots involved fatalities, but we do not know how all ten were resolved. One prison takeover was terminated by the threat of force; one, by force without fatalities; and one, by force resulting in the death of an inmate. Three riots were met with force although they did not involve prison take-overs. One of these led to the death of an inmate. A policy of restraint-isolating the rioters, negotiating with them, or waiting them out - was not pursued in any of these early riots.

The First "Waves" of Prison Riots

Referring to the prison disturbances of the early twentieth century, social historian Blake McKelvey noted, "For the first time in the age of penitentiaries a wave of prison riots broke the monotonous routine". These riots alarmed penal administrators because they were larger and more political than those that occurred in the late nineteenth century. The radical sloganeering of Attica is part of an emerging pattern whose roots go back to these first waves of prison riots.

In 1913 the Sing Sing Penitentiary in New York was being investigated by a state commission on prison reform appointed by Governor William Sulzer. Through this commission and grand jury action, Sulzer was able to oust Tammany-appointed Warden Kennedy and replace him with James Clancey. The prisoners reacted to Clancey's arrival by setting a fire that destroyed four buildings. According to Clancey, the inmates were intent on discrediting him politically. The riot began when Clancey entered the yard for inspection, with inmates breaking two hundred windows in a brief outbreak. Clancey asked the men to return to their cells, but only one offered to do so, a black trusty thought to be an informer. On the way to his cell the

trusty was jumped by five men and critically slashed.

Clancey had the inmates locked in the yard rather than forcing them to return to their cells. The guards later stated that a more serious riot was prevented by this policy of restraint, which was pursued in spite of one inmate's assault on another. (Compare Attica, where such an assault was used to justify a policy of "crushing force"). The outbreak ended without further serious trouble, marking the first major and successful use of restraint.

The 1913 Sing Sing riot may be interpreted as a reaction to the disorderly system under Warden Kennedy or the anticipated "tightening-up" of prison rules. The next major riot involving a fatality was in 1917 at Joliet Penitentiary, Ill., where nine hundred convicts rioted over the "tightening" of visiting rules. As prisoners set fires and attacked firemen, the warden called in troops. The inmates were driven back with bayonets, and one was clubbed to death. Here a policy of force saved property but involved the sacrifice of a human life.

In 1927, more than a thousand inmates at Folsom Prison, Calif., took control of a cellhouse, holding seven guards hostage. The outbreak was precipitated by a frustrated escape attempt in which two guards were knifed and an inmate was accidentally shot to death. Officials settled on a policy of force when prisoners refused an ultimatum to return to their cells. In the attack, eight inmates were killed and one guard died of "excitement". When tanks arrived and the warden threatened to flood the prison, inmates surrendered, releasing the hostages. Again, a policy of force had left tragic results in its wake.

The fact that rioters had taken hostages and killed them influenced prison administrators to use force, although there was no assurance that this policy would preserve human life. One of the first riots in the 1929-30 riot series illustrated this. In 1929 the convicts at Colorado State Prison barricaded themselves in a cellblock after an abortive escape attempt in which three guards were shot with a smuggled gun. More guards arrived and localized the disturbance, but the prisoners held seventeen guards hostage and issued an ultimatum threatening to kill three of them if a car and a clear escape road were not provided. When these conditions were refused, four guards were killed and thrown from the cellhouse window one at a time over a two-hour period. The officials began their attack by dynamiting the inmates' stronghold. This forced inmates back into another part of the cellhouse, which was also dynamited. The inmates were running out of ammunition and, as authorities mobilized machine guns and a 75 mm. cannon for a final assault,

the inmate leader shot his four lieutenants and himself, ending the revolt.

A policy of force can be successful without involving fatalities. The initial phase of the 1929 riot at Clinton Prison, N.Y., left three inmates dead; two of the three were killed while attempting to escape. The officials decided on a policy of force but not broadside attack; although several buildings were burned, the uprising was suppressed in a few hours without further fatalities. Similarly, one week later, two prisoners were killed during the early phases of the Auburn riot, also in New York. The authorities ordered state troopers and guards to clear the yard with rifle fire. This direct attack ended the riot without further fatalities.

These two uprisings were exceptions; a strategy of force has frequently resulted in inmate deaths. For instance, in a second riot at Auburn prison in 1929, rioters held the warden and some guards hostage, demanding a car and safe passage. Officials agreed to these conditions but, when the leaders of the revolt emerged to enter the car, they ordered an attack in which two inmates were killed. At Leavenworth Penitentiary, Kans., that same year, an attack was ordered on rioting prisoners, driving them back "inch by inch", killing one and wounding several others. Similarly, in 1931, Joliet Penitentiary officials used guns and tear gas to deal with more than a thousand rebelling prisoners. One inmate was killed and three were wounded.

The use of force at Leavenworth in 1929 can be contrasted with the earlier use of restraint at the same prison in 1915. In 1915 convict miners captured guards and a university group touring the prison mines and used them as hostages to demand better food and working conditions. The revolt was ended peacefully through negotiations that promised better food and meetings with an inmate committee to discuss working conditions. This method of dealing with a major outbreak - avoiding violent confrontation and incorporating reform demands - may well have been the sort of model applied at Attica in granting all but two (albeit crucial) inmate demands before reverting to a policy of forceful suppression.

The 1952 Riot "Wave"

In five of the 1929-1930 riots, at least nineteen prisoners died when a policy of force was pursued, while none died in those few instances when authorities implemented a policy of restraint. In spite of these figures, prison administrators

continued to favor the traditional strategy of crushing force. Restraint was considered (1) a risk to hostages after the Colorado State Prison riot, the only riot where prisoners had killed hostages; (2) a risk to further property damage, particularly through fire; (3) a futile response to unacceptable inmate demands for escape.

The 1952 series of prison riots was preceded by a revival of prison reform, which was checked by a lack of funds during the war. Federal Commissioner of Prisons Sanford Bates noted:

The (1952) disturbances were in many cases accompanied by the capture of hostages or prison employees by the rioters, and on reflection it can thus be understood that they were literally made possible by the greater liberties accorded to our inmates. If we were willing to return to the rigid program of separate confinement without liberties, we could prevent them.

The new strength of reform gave new importance to the strategy of restraint as evidenced at one of the earliest riots in the 1952 series, the Michigan State Penitentiary riot. After taking hostages and causing damages estimated at \$2-billion, inmates demanded a long set of reforms and concessions. Choosing a policy of restraint, Governor G. Mennon Williams negotiated and agreed to demands for liberalized parole and no retaliations. In spite of the politically embarrassing publicity, Williams agreed to all of the demands, including one for a steak and ice cream dinner "with all the trimmings". An extremist inmate leader threatened to kill the hostages, but Governor Williams' politically courageous stand avoided casualties of any sort and advanced reform in the state.

Similarly, Massachusetts Commissioner of Corrections Maxwell Grossman ended a 1952 revolt at Concord by agreeing to investigate inmate charges of mistreatment. The guards charged "coddling" of prisoners, but the policy of restraint embodied in the agreement contrasted sharply with force used elsewhere and its tragic results.

The fatalities that occurred at twelve prison riots in the 1950's were the first since three convicts and two guards were killed at Alcatraz in 1946. Nine of these twelve riots involved guards shooting prisoners while executing a policy of force. One involved a guard shooting an escaping inmate; one, the suicide of riot leaders as guards forced their way into a cellhouse; and one, an inmate killing a fellow inmate. Moreover, even though twenty-five prison riots in the 1950's involved the taking of hostages, no hostages were killed

regardless of whether the riot was ended by force or by restraint. This demonstrated that the safety of hostages was not a plausible justification for a strategy of force, particularly when this strategy often led to inmate deaths.

The record of force during the 1950's is worth noting. During the 1952 "Halloween uprising" at Ohio State Penitentiary, where inmates caused damages estimated at \$1-million, guards opened fire, killing one inmate and wounding two others. A shift in policy from force to restraint led to the prisoners' surrender the following day. There were no more casualties. In the 1953 riot at Santa Fe, two inmates were killed when guards rushed barricaded rioters who were holding hostages and demanding better treatment, better food, no retaliations, and an interview with the governor, the prison board, and the press. The coroner's jury ruled the killings to be justifiable homicide; yet, in view of the reasonable demands and the repeated success of restraint and negotiations, many wondered whether the homicides were necessary.

Outrage against the policy of force became more intense in August 1953 when guards opened fire at Monroe, Wash., to put down an inmate rebellion. The prisoners claimed that the attack - which killed one inmate, blinded one, and wounded two others - began as the riot was ending. The inmates said that the slain convict had been waving his undershirt as a symbol of surrender; the guards claimed self-defense.

At the Jefferson City uprising in Missouri, one of the largest 1954 prison disturbances, the warden reportedly refused (1) to send in guards to lock up prisoners who wanted to defect from the rioters, (2) to send in guards to retrieve hostages when their surrender was offered, and (3) to negotiate. With the governor's support, the warden ordered a thousand law officers to attack the rioters. Four inmates were killed and fourteen wounded. During a smaller riot the following month at the same prison, another inmate was shot to death when he was allegedly throwing furniture and setting small fires.

The philosophy that both inmates and hostages must risk their lives during the forceful suppression of a prison riot was expressed by a sheriff who put down a 1955 revolt at a county jail in San Antonio: "They'll have to kill the hostages. I'll call their hand and go in there shooting. I don't believe in giving in to them, and the guards knew what they were getting into when they got their jobs". Fortunately, in this as in other cases, the inmates chose a policy of restraint and no hostages were killed.

Officials have not always shown the same concern for the lives of inmates. In 1955 prisoners at Lincoln Penitentiary, Nebr., rioting for the reinstatement of a reform-oriented prison superintendent, caused damage estimated at \$100,000. Officials chose to suppress the disturbance with force. One inmate was shot in the back, and a photograph of the riot showed half a dozen guards or police aiming at fleeing convicts in the prison yard.

Forceful suppression of prison riots does not always lead to "success" at the expense of human life. In fact, part of the attraction of a policy of force is that it can be successful without involving fatalities. In at least twenty-seven prison riots in the 1950's - including major revolts at Boise, Idaho; Chester, Ill.; Jackson, Mich.; Lincoln, Nebr.; and New York City - a policy of force was implemented and no deaths occurred. (One of these riots took place in El Reno, Okla., where a precedent was set for Attica inmates when six rioters asked for deportation to the Soviet Union.) However, virtually all loss of life in prison riots during the 1950's can be attributed to the strategy of force. Almost no deaths occurred at those riots where officials pursued a policy of restraint, and in those cases reform was further advanced than where force was used, at least in the short run.

A policy of restraint successfully ended riots at Raleigh, N.C.; Muncie, Ind.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; and in Minnesota, Oregon, Washington, Wyoming, Montana, Utah, and Tennessee. During the 1950's when a policy of restraint was implemented, rioting inmates did not kill hostages or fellow prisoners. The 1955 riot at the Wyoming State Penitentiary provides an example of this approach. The riot began when inmates broke prison windows and seized four guards as hostages. When guards threw tear gas, the inmates threatened to drop a hostage from a window. The governor chose to negotiate and secured the release of the hostages and the inmates' surrender after agreeing to the dismissal of two guards, better medical care, no general reprisals (except for the inmate who had slashed a guard during the riot), better food, reduction of maximum time in solitary confinement, better recreation, and formation of inmate councils as well as a full investigation.

Recent Prison Riots

Prison riots were less frequent in the period after 1955, but they did not disappear. In 1968 an intense series of riots, of which Attica is a part, began.

In the 1960's there were only two prison riots that involved fatalities before 1968. The first, at Menard State Penitentiary, Ill., involved inmates killing three guards and stabbing five others before barricading themselves in the prison kitchen with hostages. Although rioters' demands for seeing newsmen, better recreation, and better medical treatment were ignored, no attack was ordered and the inmates eventually surrendered without harming the hostages.

The second riot occurred at the Hawaii State Prison in Honolulu, when a fight broke out in the prison yard between opposing factions involved in smuggling barbiturates into the prison. In this struggle two inmates were killed by fellow prisoners and a third was shot by a guard after he had shot an inmate.

The riots before the 1968 series were generally small and did not involve prison take-overs. Only three involved taking hostages, and these were settled peacefully through restraint or negotiations. However, when inmates did not take hostages, authorities usually chose a policy of force (nineteen cases). At the Hawaii State Prison riot this policy involved fatalities. Only one of these riots was ended through negotiations and four by other means (such as spontaneous dispersal). Thus, by 1968 a pattern had developed for dealing with riots - a strategy of restraint when hostages were involved and a strategy of force when they were not.

The question remained, however, whether this pattern would be adequate should a period of more serious rioting return. The test came with the 1968-71 series of prison riots, the third major "wave" in American history.

The 1968-71 riot series was different from the two earlier "waves" in two major respects. First, between 60 and 80 per cent of the riots were black-related, a clear contrast with earlier riot periods. Second, well over a third of the riots occurring between early 1968 and April 1971 (sixteen) involved the holding of hostages (white). Moreover, the nation was in the grip of a law-and-order reaction that followed the urban riots and student disturbances of the 1960's. The result was a move away from the earlier pattern of using restraint and negotiations in hostage cases. Ten of the sixteen 1968-71 riots involving hostages were ended by ultimatums or force without fatalities.

The deaths that occurred during the 1968-71 riot series were

related to the policy of forceful suppression at the expense of human life. At a 1968 riot in Raleigh, N.C., unarmed guards tried to herd rioting inmates back into their cells. When this failed, twenty-five officers fired into the crowd, ending the riot by killing five inmates and wounding seventy-eight. Similarly, in 1970 three prisoners were killed at Soledad Prison, Calif., by a guard who fired into a brawling crowd when the rioters refused to respond to his verbal and whistle commands. Later, a nationally coordinated campaign was launched to investigate these deaths.

Despite the numerous examples of restraint successfully ending riots without fatalities and the solid evidence that force often leads to inmate deaths, prison officials, asserting that force had caused "only a few" deaths, seemed more inclined than ever to use force in all cases. Force appealed to the instincts of wardens, guards, and all those in favor of law-and-order in the ideological sense of the term.

In spite of this general trend, some administrators implemented restraint, avoiding fatalities and advancing prison reform. The March 1968 riot at Oregon is an interesting example of this countertrend since it provides a comparison with Attica. Seven hundred rebelling inmates took eleven hostages and threatened to kill them if their demands were not met. State Corrections Administrator George Randall negotiated with the rioters and agreed to their demands for improved medical and psychiatric care, an elected inmate council, and other major concessions. Unlike Oswald, his counterpart at Attica, Randall, in the interests of prison reform and human life, agreed to the demand for a new warden. Contrary to arguments raised during the Attica rebellion, Randall's action did not lead to spreading disorder in this or other state prisons.

Restraint was used successfully in hostage cases throughout the 1960's until the Ohio State Penitentiary uprising in August of 1968. Nine guards were taken hostage when 350 prisoners rioted in protest against "sadistic guards". The rioters' demands for no reprisals and amnesty for their riot activities, including property damage and nonfatal injury to guards, were rejected as "unreasonable", although similar concessions had been granted in several earlier riots. Governor Rhodes ordered an attack to free the nine hostages. In this revival of the doctrine of "crushing force", five inmates were shot to death and eleven wounded, when five hundred National Guardsmen and the police charged through a hole blasted in the prison wall. As in all other riots in the 1960's the hostages were freed alive. The success of forcibly freeing the hostages obscured the fact that - with

only one exception which occurred nearly half a century ago - hostages have never been killed by inmates regardless of what action the state takes.

Following the Ohio riot there were nine other disturbances involving hostages in which authorities pursued a policy of force or threat of force (ultimatums). Significantly for the decision at Attica, six of the uprisings occurred in New York. Of these six, four were "easily" ended with ultimatums. The remaining two, occurring in Brooklyn and Kew Gardens, N.Y., were ended when Mayor John J. Lindsay ordered the prisons retaken by force, a step that involved hand-to-hand combat and resulted in hundreds of injuries to inmates and guards. Thus Lindsay pursued an appealing political policy: he pleased the liberals by agreeing to meet with rioters, by granting reasonable (minor) reforms, and by not incurring fatalities in his ultimate policy of force, and he appealed to law-and-order voters by not agreeing to increasingly radical demands and by ending the riot through force rather than negotiations.

In Conclusion, Attica

Given this historical background, the tragic decision at Attica in September 1971 is easier to evaluate. The decision to use force at Attica is directly related to the country's general shift toward the right. This position has been articulated by Spiro Agnew in his commentary on Attica, which concludes, "In taking the necessary steps to end the confrontation at Attica, Gov. Nelson Rockefeller acted courageously. Those who would have had him act otherwise have yet to learn the paramount lesson of our century: that acquiescence to the demands of the criminal element of any society only begets greater violence".

With regard to prison rioting, this statement is palpably untrue. First, there is no evidence that when prisoners' demands are granted there is either more or less rioting than when they are ignored. Second, to the extent that officials have granted prisoners' demands, prison reform has been advanced. Indeed, prison rioting has been one of the main vehicles for prison reform, each riot series reawakening and promoting further reform advances.

Were the steps taken at Attica really "necessary"? The use of force and its tragic results might have been avoided if either of the following conditions had prevailed: (1) the

demands for amnesty and a new warden were accepted, or (2) restraint and siege were considered feasible alternatives.

The demand for the appointment of a new warden was granted in Oregon three years earlier and did not lead to further disorder. Similarly, there were precedents for granting amnesty to inmates who had injured guards or at least for limiting reprisals to the perpetrator of a specific crime against a person. Attica officials refused to offer amnesty for general or specific criminal actions.

More important that the administration's refusal to accept the rioters' demands is the question of whether they should have pursued a policy of force. If the administration had pursued a policy of restraint, the deaths at Attica might have been avoided in that prisoner leaders would have had trouble maintaining inmate support with most of the demands already accepted.

Several arguments have been advanced in support of the Attica attack. It is argued that the attack was necessary to preserve the lives of the hostages. However, the historical record of previous riots involving hostages shows that virtually none has involved the murder of hostages even in spite of threats to do so, regardless of whether the administration pursued a policy of force or restraint.

Second, it is also argued that the attack was necessary to protect inmates from each other. Again, the dozens of riots on record belie this assumption. Historical analysis shows that (1) official force, not inmates' assaults, accounts for the overwhelming number of inmate deaths and injuries in prison riots; (2) the spirit of unity among prison rioters did not significantly alter the rate of inmate "casualties" over what it was during normal operation of the prison; and (3) inmates were killed or injured by their fellow-inmates primarily in the early phases of rioting (when there was an opportunity to act on grudges), long before the state implemented force.

Third, it is argued that a longer riot would have led to rioting elsewhere or further riots at the same prison. Reinforcement theory suggests that restraint in prison riots encourages further rioting. Its more extreme advocates argue that prison reform itself encourages rioting. For example, when the attack on barricaded inmates began at Attica, Commissioner Russell G. Oswald stated that, "To delay the action any longer would not only jeopardize innocent lives

but would threaten the security of the entire correctional system in the state". An analysis of major riots shows that they attract attention and inspire other revolts but that this effect is not related to their duration. Nor is there any correlation between the use of force and the number of riots that later occur in that institution or state system.

Fourth, another justification for this attack is that it prevented the prisoners from continuing their preparations for defense - officials were aware that the prisoners were digging trenches. This argument is irrelevant to a committed policy of restraint. Such a consideration applies only when a policy of force has already been determined to be ultimately necessary.

Restraint is not popular among law-and-order voters. They argue that it has been applied only in cases where its "success" was certain and that is this policy had been pursued in riots where force was used, even more lives would have been lost. This argument assumes (1) that prison administrators choose between force and restraint on the basis of how they can prevent loss of life, not on the basis of attitudinal predispositions and social pressures; and (2) that the success or failure of restraint can be predicted. There are no historical cases to support these assumptions. A more plausible view has been expressed by Albert Morris, editor of Correction News:

In general my impression is that there has been unnecessary resort to force and that this reflects the cultural sets and training of the responsible prison officials and the enormous pressures for quick, simple, decisive restoration of order and submissiveness exerted in such crises.

Whatever its political defects, restraint has been categorically more successful than force in preserving human life.

EMOTIONAL DYNAMICS IN GROUP VIOLENCE

Vernon Fox, Ph.D.

Violence in prisons is as old as the prisons themselves and constitutes human reaction to man-made stimuli in one type of setting. This prison setting serves to exclude many factors perhaps present in violence outside of prison, thereby circumscribing and simplifying the phenomena to proportions readily observable. While hardly a year has gone by since prisons began in which a prison riot was not reported, objective observation has been so limited that the dynamics of rioting behavior have gone generally unexamined.

The patterning of prison riots has undergone considerable change in the past several decades with the development of large, industrialized prisons. The traditional prison riot generally involved a small group of prisoners, a simple and single objective, and direct action toward it. Beginning with the series of riots in 1912-13, the American prison riot became a large-scale and complex phenomenon with multiple demands and rather complex inmate leadership. By the time the 1927-29 series had been reported, the general pattern of phases had emerged. Most of the major riots displayed successive periods of (1) general confusion among inmates and prison administration, (2) emergence of leadership on both sides, (3) attempts to find or build up issues, (4) dislodging the inmates by force or negotiation to re-establish custodial control, and (5) the public relations phase in which explanations and reassurances were given to the voting public by those entrusted with political leadership.

The Michigan prison riot of 1952 gave an excellent opportunity to observe the reactions of individuals within groups engaged in perpetrating and containing violence. As a participant-observer, the writer was able to view the inmate and administrative groups in stress and to follow their changing reactions with the shifting power structure within the total situation. It was a simple yet intriguing task, for the reactions could be observed in bold relief with a minimum of camouflage. In a strange stress situation, the defenses of individuals were fluid, interacting with the mode of the reactions of a multiplicity of individuals.

Making the situation even more complete for the observation of group behavior during violence, there were actually two separate riots. One was the well-defined resistance of 179 inmates in 15-block, the segregation unit, holding twelve officers hostage at one time. The other was the diffuse and disorganized melée of 1,600 to 2,600 (the exact number was never established) inmates in the 57½-acre prison yard.

It was Sunday evening, April 20, 1952, when 179 segregated inmates in 15-block captured the four officers on duty in the block and took control. The inmate leadership was unknown and, as far as could later be determined, was actually at this point non-existent. Inmate Ray Young had tricked an inexperienced guard into opening his cell door, had taken his keys after threatening the officer with a home-made knife, and had released the other inmates on the third gallery. He had never held leadership, however. In the administrative group, Warden Julian N. Frisbie and Deputy George L. Bacon, in charge of custody, held leadership by virtue of their positions. They had talked by telephone and from the distance from the corridor gate to the 15-block entrance to Earl Ward, to "Crazy Jack" Hyatt, Russell Jarboe. Tony Mazzone, Jimmy Breeze, Jerome Parmentier, and others. The inmates had protested against alleged brutality in 15-block and the presence there of vicious weapons, but there was no obvious leader at this time.

There appeared to be a struggle for power and leadership in 15-block. A dozen inmates had made the office of 15-block their headquarters, each voicing his own ideas and comments, each crowding toward the barred window of the 15-block office. When absurdly extreme views were shouted, other inmates laughed derisively or countered the statement in a condescending manner. Some inmates wore the caps from the hostage officers' uniforms. One inmate, Earl Ward, participated neither in extreme views nor in condescending decisions, but was calmly in evidence in the center of the inmate group. It was to him that inmate leadership eventually fell, and quickly. Apparently, his calmness and practicality offered stability to the group.

DISORGANIZATION

Early Monday morning, the writer, assistant deputy warden in charge of individual treatment, walked to the window of 15-block with a newsman and Mr. Seymour Gilman, assistant to Commissioner of Corrections Earnest C. Brooks. It was obvious from the conversation that the inmates were disorganized, did not know what they wanted, and that Mr. Gilman displayed extreme anxiety in his attempt to delineate the issues. He nervously jotted down notes on a scratch pad, spoke in a high-pitched and strained voice, repeatedly asked Ward what he wanted, and displayed random and jerky movements in general. Ward was calm and poised, but his facial expression suggested contempt and impatience. Mr. Gilman was a man of notably low tolerance to frustration, became worried over minor events, and could not postpone answers for long without developing anxiety. This did not stand him in good stead in a stress situation.

With this exhibition of anxiety and pressure, he irritated Earl Ward, the inmate with whom he was talking. When he promised to "investigate", Ward told him not to be too silly. When he promised Ward honor camp placement if he would surrender, Ward became angry and told Mr. Gilman to get away from the window and never come back. Mr. Gilman obeyed. The writer remained and talked in generalities with Ward in an attempt to learn as much as possible about his reactions without placing him under stress.

Warden Frisbie had retired from the Marine Corps, a highly decorated officer who had led the assault on Guadal-canal. He had been accustomed to commanding regiments of well-trained Marines. Facing this situation with a few untrained prison guards had left him perplexed and immobile. As Assistant Deputy Warden in charge of custody, George L. Bacon, who prided himself in being a "man of action", found himself and his untrained guards virtually helpless and lost in a futile and frustrating situation. Not knowing what else to do, Warden Frisbie had retired to seclusion. Deputy Bacon had developed fatigue, inability to concentrate, and random nervous activity to the extent that he had become ineffective and was taken to his residence to recuperate. By this time, then, Warden Frisbie had stopped trying to talk with the inmates, Deputy Bacon had become ill and had to be taken home to rest, and nobody else had related to the inmates.

To the writer's failure to threaten them and the absence of anxiety-producing pressure, the inmates responded by announcing that they would talk only to him. This was the logical result of being exposed to a prison official who did not exert pressure by demands for action, thereby the inmates' defenses were not taxed in this area. The inmates were not ready for definitive action, and the sort of pressure Mr. Gilman had exhibited had made them uncomfortable by demanding immediate answers that did not yet exist. The writer did not tax their defenses. By the inmates' response and by default of other members of the administration who had reached intolerable anxiety, then, the writer emerged in the leadership role for the prison administration. This situation was outwardly recognized and emphasized by Warden Frisbie on Tuesday morning when he told a questioning newsman, "Go see Fox, he's running this show."

The decision not to storm the block was unanimous among the available administrative representatives after learning the backgrounds and personality structures of several of the men in 15-block who were holding the hostages and after a report from the chief engineer who reported on the structural strength of the cell-block. Forty-four of the men were serving for homicides, about that many serving life sentences, and two dozen more had already demonstrated their ability to kill on other occasions. They were already in maximum punishment status in Michigan, a non-capital-punishment State, and had little further to lose by further homicide, in some cases. The "psychopath" diagnostic label appeared frequently in the records of the men. Earl Ward was subsequently diagnosed as a paranoid psychopath by Dr. Gustav Gilbert of Michigan State's Department of Psychology, an independent consultant who corroborated previous diagnoses. "Crazy Jack" Hyatt had attacked Governor G. Mennen Williams in 1950 when the governor had visited the branch prison at Marquette. Consensus was that storming the block would have produced carnage.

One of the discussions in the administration group which not so unanimously agreed upon was the question as to how to serve breakfast. The warden made the decision. He decided that the men from the north-side cell-blocks would do the same. The inmates from the north side marched to the dining hall, had breakfast, returned, and permitted themselves to be locked up. The inmates on the south side were unlocked, 500 entered the dining hall, somebody yelled, "There's salt in the coffee.", somebody threw a tray and the fight began.

Eight more officers were captured and placed in 15-block by the south-side inmates. The inmate store, commissary, butcher shop, and kitchen were looted and destroyed. It is noteworthy that the laundry was destroyed as an act of aggression, for that assignment was noted for its harsh discipline of inmates who worked there. It is noteworthy, also, that destroyed were the greenhouse, gymnasium, the auditorium that housed the music assignment, and other places where it was suspected that prison politicians operated or where favoritism to inmates was shown. The hospital, headed by the respected Dr. Russell Finch, and the religious fixtures were spared, completely untouched.

The yard had to be cleared before adequate attention could be given to 15-block. It was conjectured that a face-to-face relationship with inmates would tend to level them by occupying their attention long enough to distract them from their immediate violent purpose. Small groups could then be taken off the yard. In the yard, men known by the writer were spoken to in friendly terms, like, "Come on, Joe, let's get out of here", and every man directly spoken to came willingly and some anxiously. One or two others would generally also come. After several trips, some men approached the writer requesting to be taken off the yard. It was obvious that many men wanted no part of the riot, but did not want to appear reluctant to the other inmates. After about an hour, the writer, working alone, had taken more than a hundred men off the yard that way, with the largest group being about seven men. It was further conjectured that if a ringleader from 15-block would go on the loud-speaker, the inmates in the yard would be easier to move. At 15-block, inmate Jimmy Bishop said he would do it at one o'clock, two-and-a-half hours away.

When the writer went to 15-block at one o'clock to get Bishop, events laid the basis for future successful negotiation. Not finding Bishop in the block, the writer walked around the block to find him, only to be surrounded by rioting inmates, shouting epithets at the warden, deputy warden in charge of custody, and the parole board. The inmates at this point appeared to be frenzied and disorganized. They were shouting for the warden to be fired, Deputy Bacon to be killed, and the parole board to be abolished. A man on the fringe of the group that surrounded the writer was shouting, "Grab him. Grab him." Don't let him work that psychology stuff on you."

A quick evaluation eliminated the possibility of violent escape. A show of fear would have resulted in reciprocal action by the inmates. Rather, deliberate and calm conversation was initiated, regarding the demands to eliminate the parole board and the legislative processes that would be involved. After a few minutes, dramatically looking at his watch, the writer said, "Now, if you fellows will excuse me, I'm going to talk with Ward", turned toward 15-block, the inmates opened a pathway, and the writer walked out of it.

Ward's facial expression and verbal comments suggested that he had seen a man he considered to be devoid of fear, and he fraternally told the writer to take precautions for his own safety. Here was a riot leader talking over the fear of prison administrator. This relationship enhanced immeasurably the eventual release of all hostages, unharmed.

The riot in the yard had grown from a diffuse "pinic" to a full blown melée, though still disorganized. Small bands of inmates attended to the tasks that interested them most, with no overall leadership. James Hudson, a colored lifer, paretic and limited, volunteered that he had been the leader in the yard, and it was established that he did lead a small group who captured several guards in the yard and put them into 15-block. Hudson was of limited intelligence, according to the tests, but he was keenly sensitive to injustices, economic, social, penal, and racial. He was vociferous in his denunciation of authority. Several months after the riot when he was being tried for kidnapping - a futile activity for a first degree murder lifer in Michigan - Hudson wore into the courtroom the Communist emblem on his sleeve and a picture of Stalin in his cap. The confused riot situation had given Hudson an opportunity for leadership. Leadership of these small groups apparently went to those men whose plan of action selected men from the larger group who like a particular plan of action or who did not want to be left out entirely.

In an attempt to provide some sort of overall leadership, the writer prepared an outline of a speech for inmate Jimmy Bishop, who had voluntarily come to the radio room from the south yard. His theme was that he was a 15-block ringleader, that 15-block had started the fracas, and that the boys in the yard were trying to "hog the show", that they should go to their cells and permit 15-block to negotiate with the administration. The men in the yard responded with jeers and catcalls, which indicated that their attention had been distracted somewhat from the separate ventures to listen to an overall message. The writer took the microphone, acknowledged that some of their complaints had been heard before, that the warden was interested, that food could be brought in as soon as the yard was clear enough to permit us safely to bring it, and asked that the men get in a cell, in groups or singly. There were

no jeers, suggesting, at least, that communication was effective. The emotions of the men in the yard seemed to be generally diffuse excitement with a few small groups accomplishing specific purposes, such as capturing officers, looting the commissary, and putting provisions in 15-block. There was no concerted effort to attack prison personnel viciously and directly.

When the Michigan State Police were mobilized, they moved into the prison through the freight gate in the south wall. Gunfire killed an inmate, and the police literally battered the rest toward the cellblocks, injuring several inmates and sustaining several injuries, themselves. Opinion at that time was that the killing of the inmate was unnecessary, certainly contributed little to the resolving of the violence, but was the action of one State Trooper who was just as excited as the inmates. Because of public relations, it was not discussed. The coroner's jury reported later that the inmate was killed by an unidentified officer in the performance of his duty.

When the man was killed in the yard, Ward had Officer Curry thrown to the crowd to kill in retaliation, thereby leaving eleven hostages in 15-block. When Curry was rescued, however, Ward threatened to retaliate with one of the eleven officers left in his control. Before doing it, however, he telephoned the warden to tell him about it. When the warden told him the inmate had died of cancer, Ward decided that everyone would lie to him about that. He called for the writer, the last one whom he trusted, and he received a momentary delay for purposes of autopsy, but eventually obtained the correct reply - "Gunshot." Relationship with Ward had actually been suspended during the trouble in the yard. He was identifying with the inmates rather reluctantly, however, and he and "Crazy Jack" Hyatt referred to the damage in the yard as a "crying shame". Ward was in a tense situation. The writer believes that he was holding at bay other inmates who would have torn all the hostages limb from limb. While he was preparing to kill the officer with proper ritual, he was told that unarmed institutional officers had not done it, and he accepted the thesis that in order to get proper vengeance, they would have to get a State Trooper, none of whom were in their control. This saved the writer's relationship with Ward, in that no lie was attempted, and simultaneously saved the life of the guard. It is the writer's contention that Ward, himself, did not want to kill the guard, but was responding to the pressures of others in the process of containing the extremes. His throwing an unpopular guard to the crowd to kill and his delaying tactics when the responsibility became his suggest the existence of this situation. The writer gave him a way out, which he took immediately, and which reinforced the writer's relationship with Ward.

The identity of the inmate leadership in 15-block was unknown during the early hours. During conversations at the window of 15-block, Earl Ward, "Crazy Jack" Hyatt, Jerome Parmentier, Russel Jarboe, Jimmy Breeze, and others participated. It was observed, however, that during or following statements, each would look at Ward for approval. This approval was generally forthcoming, except in cases of extreme behavior, when he grinned and gently corrected the statement without offending the inmate. Ward was apparently a moderator, whose lack of anxiety and whose emotional control provided an attitude of confidence. The others made more rash statements, displayed greater anxiety, and appeared to look to Ward for support.

Earl Ward was obviously the leader of this group. The strength of his leadership remained, for the moment, enigmatic. Ward demanded food. Food was important. The writer subsequently offered a "steak and ice cream" dinner to them "when they were ready" to come out. Though the steak was known to be utility grade served almost weekly to the entire prison, more akin to shoe leather than tenderloins, the symbolic "steak and ice cream" was considered to be contributory to surrender motivation. It was known that food had been pushed into 15-block during the melée in the yard. The basic question involved was not the food, however, but the status of Ward's leadership. If he obtained food, his position would be strengthened. If he did not, his position could be weakened. Further, the manner in which he handled the mundane task of mass feeding in an anarchical situation would give an evaluation of his capacity for leadership. The writer wanted to strengthen Ward's position because he was a moderator and would contain the extremes. Further, the relationship thus far had suggested optimism for successful negotiation with him.

Coffee and sandwiches on a push-truck were brought to 15-block. After a short argument, Ward was persuaded to break down the barricade, open the door, and permit the writer to push the cart into 15-block with the help of two inmates. This was important, for if the inmates could open the doors and see a prison official standing there, reinforced by coffee and sandwiches, it would condition toward an easier opening the second time, and the third, and the fourth. Sometime, it could be used. Ward instructed the men to enter the disciplinary corridor, placed the truck by the narrow door from which men emerged, took their portions, and went upstairs to eat. That afforded an answer about Ward's leadership. He was competent enough to feed 179 men evenly and smoothly. He was a leader strong enough to negotiate for the inmates. As long as the administration did not jeopardize him Ward would contain the extremes.

Leadership in the inmate group had fallen to a personality who represented moderation in his particular group. Men like "Crazy Jack" Hyatt were not moderate. Ward displayed little anxiety and prostrated a poised rational control. Ward's I.Q. of 112 compared favorably with his group, but he was still in contact with them. More intelligent men in the block, like Bellew (I.Q. 140-plus), furnished ideas which Ward used selectively. Bellew was known and respected among the inmates as a sort of scholar who had, at one time, written for the prison newspaper. When the inmates were dissatisfied with the demand that a letter be written to the parole board to explain the inmates' grievances when the original demand was the complete abolition of the parole board, Bellew prepared a multi-paged document attacking parole board policies, which Ward passed to the writer as further elaboration of the inmates' point of view. Ward used Bellew on occasion to modify and dissipate the views of the extremists on both sides. He referred to Bellew for advice when the writer was convinced that they both knew they were in agreement and were acting out a control situation by modifying the extremes. Ward's tall, well-proportioned frame and his masculine and handsome countenance gave him the confident appearance of one in command. Even more important, he moved slowly and deliberately, so that he communicated with everyone in his group. He paced himself well in relation to the group he led.

While the leadership in the administration had fallen to the writer by default, it was observed that essentially the same dynamics had selected leadership for the inmates as was operative in the administrative group. Those who did not pace themselves to the situation developed extreme anxiety. Those who had experienced intolerable anxiety crippled themselves. In the administrative group, the assistant deputy warden in charge of custody had had to be taken home to rest. The warden had thrown up his hands on Tuesday morning and told questioning newsmen, "Go see Fox". Commissioner of Corrections Earnest C. Brooks and Commissioner of State Police Donald S. Leonard were puzzled by the 15-block situation and were rendered sufficiently insecure about it that neither man ever approached the block. Nobody else was in significant evidence during the emergency. The writer simply displayed security in acquaintance with inmate thinking, assumed an attitude of confidence without constricting anxiety, and thereby facilitated communication between the inmate group and the administrative group.

GROUP COHERENCE AND BREAKDOWN

At the time of emergency of leadership, group coherence was strongest. The administrative group included Commissioners Leonard and Brooks, Warden Frisbie, and the writer. All major decisions were discussed, approved unanimously, and implemented by this group. The inmate group had a strong leader who had surrounded himself with a hard core of ringleaders, and kept themselves separated from the milder or reluctant supporters who may have dissipated the drive to continue resistance.

By Tuesday morning, Ward had enough security that he was able to say he did not know what the inmates wanted, that the mutiny was a spontaneous and opportunistic affair, but that as long as the situation was such as it was, they would have to have some concessions. Inmate Ray Young had shaped a knife from part of his bed, grinding it down on the concrete floor, as many knives are made in prison. When he tricked an inexperienced guard into opening his cell, it was not part of a larger pre-arranged plan. When he used the guard's keys to open the cells of other men on the gallery, plans were arranged on the spot. This occurred in the segregation and disciplinary unit, where custodial control was strongest and, according to inmate sources, most oppressive. While this was to be expected in the segregation and disciplinary unit, perhaps, that expectation made the reaction of men to custodial pressures no less logical. While the result was, in the writer's opinion, a generalized revolt against custody, the custodial pressure was no more extreme than that found in many other prisons. The inmates found no real complaint in the prison as a whole, and the ringleaders told a governor's investigating committee later that Michigan's was the best prison in which they had ever served. There were no real issues. Consequently, issues had to be constructed. Ward needed help in building up some issues. He told the writer, "You know prison administration. I know the prisoners' complaints, Between the two of us, we should be able to work up a good set of demands."

The writer prepared the terms, eleven of them originally, but cut down to eight by eliminating "needless" ones. The demands were prepared by starting with inmate complaints and going to what would be acceptable to the prison administration. For example, the second inmates' demand was to fire all the officers who had had anything to do with the brutality in 15-block. After finding insufficient evidence to convince a jury about anyone, it was suggested that they prevent a recurrence by having the counselors go into 15-block regularly to interview men. The terms was finally stated, "Permit the counselors free access to the disciplinary cells." When the eleven terms were completed - later cut down to eight - they were all innocuous, but they all had the appearance of substantial demands without mention of brutality, food, or other usual items found in prisoner demands. These items were omitted because the writer did not consider them part of the real underlying situation. Brutality was not condoned by the administration and, while it did occur in isolated instances, disciplinary measures were taken against the offending officer when it appeared. Food was considerably better in quality and quantity and in the budget than in many institutions the writer had seen. These items were omitted from the terms, firstly, because they made no contribution to the real situation and, secondly, as a representative of the prison administration and the State of Michigan, the writer held the terms only to those items desirable to the administration and which would not in any way be embarrassing to it.

While the issues had been built up, it had to be assured that the inmates would claim them. They responded to suggestion that they announce their terms to the world by radio and press. Ray Young and Russell Jarboe were escorted from 15-block to the radio room amid photographers and newsmen, where they read their demands to the world. When they returned to 15-block, Ward released one hostage as a token of good faith, responding to the humane treatment the prison administration had afforded. Another hostage was released on Wednesday for the same reason. The inmates had claimed the terms, and were forced by their pride to make them the basis for negotiations. In the meantime, the administration appeared to be resisting, though considering, these terms.

Fatigue and strain were beginning to show among the inmates. This was manifested late Tuesday afternoon and evening when several inmates were beaten unmercifully and thrown out of the block, after they had suggested surrender in view of the humane way the administration was treating them. By Wednesday, Ward had excluded some of the original ringleaders, including Russell Jarboe, from the inner circle for "weakening". Fatigue and strain were reinforced by the fact that the administration was not threatening them, so the unifying advantage of oppression at this point was absent from the inmate group. Ward reported, however, that, "Our discipline is terrific."

It was obvious that Ward was beginning to tire and that group coherence he had enjoyed so well on Tuesday morning was fast slipping. It was obvious, too, that Ward and his lieutenants would take drastic measures to preserve their leadership. The staged scuffle the warden heard over the telephone on Wednesday night, after which "Crazy Jack" had screamed, "I'm in charge, now. We want action.", had been built up by circumstances to such an extent that newspapers reported that Ward had been killed. Actually, Ward had decided to get some sleep, and was sufficiently secure and confident that he could dramatize it. Still, the tensions in the inmate group were great. The exhilaration of the new situation had worn off, not having been reinforced by tangible administrative resistance. Shifts in the routine of living, involving sleep, customary diet, and some security of a sort, had demanded greater individual accommodation. Fatigue and stress had reduced the energy which each individual could invest in object relationship. A generalized countercathexis made group activity difficult. Ward and the ringleaders who had not "weakened" had to hold their group together by force and fear.

The administrative group was experiencing the same type of breakdown of coherence. The fatigue and strain began to manifest itself as persons who had previously functioned as a coordinated group now began to emerge as individuals. Commissioner Brooks became interested in placating and protecting Governor G. Mennen Williams at all costs in the public relations and political area. Warden Frisbie held news conference after news conference, apparently also interested in the public relations aspects, but partially as an attempt to keep busy in a situation where he felt lost. Commissioner Leonard of the State Police decided that it was time for a show of force. The writer interpreted Commissioner Brooks' behavior as that of a loyal political appointee who was trying frenziedly to protect his boss in an election year at any cost. Anything and anybody was expendable to accomplish this purpose. Warden Frisbie considered action necessary, knew not what to do in this situation, and spent his efforts attempting to explain to the public through the newsmen. Commissioner Leonard needed favorable publicity for his forthcoming venture into politics, and his legal and law enforcement background suggested that a successful show of force against a situation already unpopular with the citizenry would provide the publicity. Commissioner Leonard was scheduled to retire from the State Police within the week and enter the Republican primary election for the gubernatorial nomination.

The writer told him that of all times for a show of force, now was not it - that all this tension would be released and carnage would be the most probable reaction. Nevertheless, Commissioner Leonard moved in hundreds of pounds of TNT and many small arms. Relations between Leonard and the writer broke when Leonard was accused of using this situation to promote his candidacy for the gubernatorial nomination on the Republican ticket, just one week away. Henceforth, the writer was engaged in steadying the administrative group as well as the inmate group, wondering all the time which would precipitate the blood-bath.

ESCAPE FROM STRESS

An escape from intolerable anxiety and stress on both sides had to be found. Under the strain, everyone was looking for an acceptable way out of the situation. It had to protect those inmates and civilians who had become ego-involved in the situation. It had to be in a frame of reference in which each could be permitted to think he had accomplished his purposes. Otherwise, frustration brought to issue on either side could fast have resulted in bloodshed.

Wednesday night, after Ward's dramatic exit, "Crazy Jack" Hyatt's wild rantings had newsmen and the administration frantically trying to decide what to do. The writer was opposing Commissioner Leonard's proposed blasting, but it was receiving some consideration from others.

The final terms were prepared - eight of them - typed and signed by the administration and the writer took them to 15-block about one-thirty Thursday morning. The inmates had decided that they had been hoodwinked. There was no mention in the terms of food, brutality, and other items more important to the inmate than generalities in the terms. The inmates were reminded that they had announced the terms as theirs, that they were general principles that could go down in history, like the resolutions of the American Prison Congress of 1870. Hyatt doubted that the governor's signature was real. After a half-hour of argument, Ward signed the contract.

They would not surrender until Friday noon, however, because Ward had promised the inmates another night of "freedom". Many had dates with the fourteen uncontrollable homosexuals who had been in segregation when 15-block was taken over. Sexual tensions in prison, where there is no legitimate outlet and fewer sublimations, are even more intense than in free society where normal and legitimate outlets and sublimations are only severely restricted. These tensions, biosocial in etiology, furnish impetus to many unconscious motivations of behavior not adequately explained on the conscious level. There is evidence to support the thesis that these sexual tensions contribute to the unconscious motivations to revolt against prison authority. Over and above these unconscious motivations are the overt homosexual releases which alleviate the tensions of the personalities most intensely disturbed in this area. When even this source of release is cut off by segregation and discipline, the tensions and anxieties become intolerable. When these segregated individuals found some freedom in the company of other individuals who complemented their needs, the release of tension was sufficiently rewarding to make tolerable much discomfiture in other areas. Consequently, personalities seeking release from sexual tensions were not ready to give up without a fight the source of that release. Others had old grudges they wanted to settle in their own way. The tension was reduced only slightly, for they were not ready yet to come out.

The Detroit Free Press carried the headlines Thursday morning, "Governor's Promise Ends Prison Riot". It had been a release from the governor's office earlier that morning. The governor was telephoning Commissioner Brooks, who was, in turn, pressuring the writer to get the inmates out of 15-block. When one of the prisoners escaped, surrendered to prison authorities, and reported that Ward's pending surrender was a double-cross, Commissioner Leonard shouted for force. Commissioner Brooks told the writer to get the men out of 15-block within one hour or they would turn it over to the State Police. The writer objected strenuously. Commissioner Leonard waited until we were in the huge rotunda, surrounded by newsmen, when he announced dramatically, "I will not sit on this power keg another twenty-four hours." The writer objected so strenuously that Commissioner Brooks relented, sent him home to rest, promising no action until one o'clock, when the writer was to return for further consideration of action.

Ward telephoned the writer's residence and began to ask for medication of some sort for some ill inmates, but the writer took the opportunity to ask Ward to give up Thursday for personal reasons. The following day was the writer's birthday, some of the boys in neighboring Albion wanted to give a party, and that would not be possible with a riot going on. Ward asked what had gone wrong, stating that this was inconsistent behavior on the part of the writer. The writer did not dare tell Ward that either he would come out or be blasted out, for a defiant reply would surely have been Ward's response. On the theory that if Ward could be placed on the proposing end of the idea, he would, be his pride, sell it to himself and to others, he was asked to "talk it over with Jack and call back". When he called back, Ward agreed to surrender at four o'clock Thursday afternoon, but the writer would have to convince the other boys that Ward was getting no personal advantage and making no deals.

Commissioner Brooks was told that they would surrender at four o'clock and not to blast. The writer prepared a speech that went on the loudspeaker at three-thirty. That speech was a do-or-die effort. It had not only to protect Ward from those inmates who might think he had made a personally advantageous deal with the administration, but to goad reluctant inmates from their immediate purpose that night out of their bastion to meet their public. They were told that their leaders had won every point they had asked, that they were men of their word, and that they said they would come out a four o'clock. They were congratulated for bargaining in good faith.

Promptly at four o'clock, the doors of 15-block swung open. The rank and file of inmates backed out with their hands raised and were searched for weapons by three ringleaders on each side of the outside door. When the inmates were out, the ringleaders went back into the block. The remaining eight hostages were brought, clean-shaven, to the 15-block office, joined by fourteen ringleaders. The writer went into the block to accept surrender in the dramatic manner dictated by Ward. He turned over the keys of 15-block, the ringleaders went out, the officers went out, and with Earl Ward at the left and "Crazy Jack" Hyatt at the right, the writer emerged from 15-block to end the riot.

An adequate escape from stress had been found. The participating inmates expressed their relief and gratitude that the tension had ended and that they had not experienced undue degradation in the process. The administration had successfully reestablished custodial control without losing a hostage and without conceding anything that they did not want anyway. It remained for the broader public relations phase of rioting to furnish a more complex and diffuse expression of aggression.

CONCLUSIONS

The patterns of group behavior and the emergence of leadership in this case study of the dynamics in group violence follow rather closely the theoretical structures already found in the literature. Leadership ability apparently is dependent upon the principles of balance or moderation, movement at the right pace without depreciation, sensitivity to inequalities in morale and situations, and judicious accommodation or compromise, as well stated by Titus(1). Leadership in an originally leaderless situation, according to Guetzkow(2), is dependent upon the individual's leadership ability, his goals and their appeal to the group, and his personality and its interaction with similar factors in other personalities in the group. Follower needs, according to Lindgren(3), are for material support, ego support, love and acceptance, affiliation with the group, needs for submission, a structure and conformity not difficult to adopt, and an identification with group goals. Earl Ward in the Michigan riot provided for the inmate group all these follower-needs satisfactions.

The struggle for power between inmates and administration and between prisoners and prisoners also followed the theoretical structures. The suggestibility of crowds anxious for action of some kind, the lack of individual responsibility, and group delineation of ideas and goals as interaction continues were all vividly observed as so well discussed by McDougall(4). Power is the faculty of getting others to do things, willingly or unwillingly(3). The capture of officer hostages by the inmates, the negotiations and consideration of the use of force by the administration, the threatened killing of hostages by the inmates were but a few examples of this struggle for power. The more power one side obtained, the more helpless and anxious the other side felt, a situation which was termed a "battle of nerves" in which Governor G. Mennen Williams said, "We flew by the seat of our pants", as each side balanced each other with measures and countermeasures. Finally, the struggle for power was won by the administration with the re-establishment of custodial control, but only after the inmates were convinced in their frame of reference that they had forced the administration to come to terms.

The implications of the emotional dynamics reviewed in the case study of group behavior in prison are broad, involving the entire administration of prisons and correctional programs. The treatment orientation of the total programs would appear to be more capable of manipulating the emotional forces contributing to the economic balance of pressures designed to result in changed human behavior than would forceful custodial suppression of undesirable behavior.

The implications here point to the necessity for a psychological orientation and a knowledge of human behavior for all personnel who come into contact with prisoners. Experiments with rats in mazes show that punishment is more effective than reward in changing a specific act, but the secondary results of punishment over a long period of time are uncontrollable and sometimes much more undesirable than the act the punishment was designed to modify, thereby making the use of punishment unwise, even in rats. Even the rats can not be used for another experiment after such conditioning. Experimental neurosis can be produced in rats by punishment, but it can not be done with reward. The human being, with the addition of abstract thinking and symbolic behavior, reacts to punishment even more intensely than rats. In the human being, then, even more than in rats, punishment sets up secondary reactions over and above the modification of a specific behavioral trait that are too complex to control. Reward, while admittedly less effective experimentally in modifying specific behavior, but not much less effective, does not set up secondary undesirable and uncontrollable compensatory behavior. Further, it is suspected that the introduction of abstract thinking and symbolic behavior in the human being would enhance the effectiveness of reward over that experimentally demonstrated in lower animals. The treatment oriented prison would eliminate punishment as a method of obtaining discipline within the institution as well as in the total crime prevention program. A small social hospital with a system of out-patient clinics for pre- and post-institutional treatment and prophylaxis to replace the modern prison would appear to be a logical hypothetical consequence implied by this case study of group behavior.

It becomes more obvious than ever before that prison administrators must be well selected. The man-of-action, while glamorized because of vicarious identifications, is likely to be impatient, compulsive, and unable to tolerate anxiety. Such men-of-action in the Michigan riot were rendered helpless, dead weight, and the frustration literally prostrated one of them. Use of psychiatric examinations and projective techniques to eliminate from responsible administrative positions in prisons those personalities unable to tolerate anxiety would contribute to the judicious, consistent, and effective operation of correctional institutions.

SUMMARY

The Michigan prison riot of 1952 afforded an unusual opportunity to observe individuals and group behavior under the stress of perpetrating and containing violence. Two separate riots, the mutiny within the segregation unit, which began Sunday, April 20, and the diffuse melée in the prison yard the following day, made more complete the opportunity to observe the fluid defenses of individuals reacting and interacting with each other in a strange situation of group stress.

Almost complete confusion and disorganization was observed in the early stages, both among the inmates and the prison administration. While the prescribed organization gave structure to the administration, the new stress situation functionally rendered that structure impotent, for the personalities leading that structure were ineffective in that situation, a condition discussed theoretically by Guetzkow(2) and Lindgren(3). Warden Frisbie, retired as a Marine brigadier general found himself in a stress situation with a group of untrained prison guards in place of the battalions of U.S. Marines to which he had been accustomed in stress situations, and he did not know what to do. Assistant Deputy Warden George Bacon, in charge of custody, became a man-of-action rendered helpless; the frustration caused a nervous breakdown, temporary in nature, and he had to be taken home to rest. The inmates, in the early stages of riot, were not organized, either. They opened frequently the door of 15-block, the segregation unit, and came out to display inhumane weapons they had found and to show off a hostage guard. Simultaneously, armed custodial personnel did not have the presence of mind then to enter the open door with relative safety during this period of disorganization. The inmates had no idea what they wanted, other than to express generalized aggression. They did not even have clear-cut leadership, though they tended to support those more articulate inmates willing to vocalize aggression, about a dozen men who could then be termed the ringleaders.

Functional leadership emerged among the inmates and in the administrative group by essentially the same dynamics. Among the inmates, there were extremists who wanted to draw and quarter the officer hostages and other extremists who wanted to cease rioting. Inmate Earl Ward emerged as the calm and collected leader who moderated the extremes, paced himself well in relation to the group he led, and was able to tolerate anxiety without being stampeded. More and more inmates supported him until he emerged as the leader among the inmates. As Assistant Deputy Warden in charge of Individual Treatment, the writer emerged as leader of the prison administration in this situation because of an ability to tolerate anxiety without excess frustration. The writer was

acceptable to the inmate leadership because he did not exert the pressure that would have threatened the inmates and raised the defenses against intensifying anxiety.

The yard was cleared by the Michigan State Police Monday afternoon, and the stress situation narrowed to a "battle of nerves" between the writer as administration leader and the inmate leadership in 15-block holding twelve hostages. Issues had to be built up in order to provide a basis for negotiation. Beginning with complaints the inmate leadership verbalized, the writer translated suggested demands into eleven terms (eventually reduced to eight) which were acceptable and desired by the administration, as well. In order to identify the inmates with these terms before they became aware of their importance, two inmates announced the terms to the news media on Tuesday afternoon.

Following announcement of the terms came the long period of waiting for the tension in the inmate group to cause sufficient disintegration of group coherence to permit their easy surrender. The inmates began beating up the inmates who wanted to surrender and throwing them out of the cell-block. Simultaneously, several officer hostages were released as tokens of good faith. Fatigue and strain eventually created sufficient anxiety so that an escape from stress was sought. In the meantime, the strain in the administrative group was also breaking up cohesiveness. Personalities who had functioned as a group began to emerge as individuals. Persons who could not tolerate anxiety began to call for force. State Police Commissioner Donald S. Leonard prepared to blast the cell-block and announced dramatically, "I'll not sit on this powder keg another twenty-four hours!" As stated by Walter and Peg McGraw, "Fox became the lone hold-out against force." (5)

After the inmates had agreed during the early morning hours on Thursday to come out on Friday morning, Governor Williams and the administrative group demanded that the writer dislodge them on Thursday. Commissioner of Corrections, Earnest C. Brooks, gave the writer one hour to do it, but rescinded the ultimatum in the face of vigorous protest from the writer. The inmates were not ready to come out. The terms to which they had agreed were of no consequence, but they had been inextricably identified with them by the news media. The sexual tensions that had been building up were very important for, besides overt homosexual release, they furnished impetus for many unconscious motivations involving resistance against authority.

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A device had to be found to permit everyone to escape from stress that would permit him, simultaneously, to think he was winning. The writer prepared a speech, after consultation with inmate leader Earl Ward, which was designed to protect Ward from suspicion from other inmates that he had made a personal deal and, at the same time, that would goad the inmates out of the cell-block to meet their public. The writer spoke over the loud-speaker, lauding the inmate leadership for winning their points, congratulating them for bargaining in good faith, and announcing that they had agreed to surrender at four o'clock on Thursday afternoon. It worked well. The inmates surrendered, custodial control was re-established and the immediate violence was over.

The makings of revolt appear to be present wherever man holds his fellow man captive for any reason. Weak administrations provide positions of favor to the more capable prisoner, who exerts a type of social control on the inmate body. Riots occur in prisons without that control, where administrations strong enough to make themselves felt have well delineated the functional demarcation between administrations and inmate. A strong administration can operate effectively, however, and without riots when adequate communication between administration and inmates obtains. This communication between groups can be formalized through inmate councils and radio talks by the warden and other administration officers. Much more important, however, is the informal, face-to-face relationship between administration and inmate which can be achieved only through the treatment oriented custodial officer with an understanding of personality development and the needs of men. Only in such a framework can tensions mounting toward riot be sensed early enough to provide substitute channels for aggression or its amelioration by diffusions.

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A veteran of the Second World War who saw hard fighting with the infantry in Italy, H.W. Hollister ran into rough going after his discharge and wound up in the penitentiary. He is now out on parole, but the memory of his incarceration is a vivid one, particularly the strong-arm tactics of the prisoners, not the guards, which he described in the following article and which are no doubt in large measure responsible for many prison outbreaks.

WHY PRISONERS RIOT

by H. W. Hollister

Maybe it is time, now that everyone else has had his say on the continuing problem of prison riots, that a former convict should make some observations on the subject. A lot of analyses of the problem have been made during the past couple of years, and a lot of solutions proposed; but most of them have managed to sound more like the product of laboratory experiments than the result of a good close look into prison itself. And nowhere does this show up more plainly than in the unanimity with which the analysts have placed the blame primarily on external "trigger" factors - overcrowding, poor food, parole policies, psychological pressures generally - while almost completely disregarding the large and obvious part played, first, by what can loosely be called convict nature and, second, by deep-rooted convict tradition.

It seems to be a general assumption that a prison riot springs into existence either directly, from just grievances, or indirectly, from the tensions peculiar to prison life which make trifling grievances seem large and insupportable. Normally, since rational people risk disaster in search of a better future only when they feel that the present has become intolerable, this would be a reasonable assumption. But who said convicts were rational people?

There is plenty of evidence to show that they aren't - a determining percentage of them, anyway - and no plan to tackle the problem of prison disorders is likely to be of much practical value unless it takes this fact into account. The first and most obvious evidence is simply one of definition. A person of sound common sense, even if his moral standards should permit such carryings-on, doesn't clean out the office safe - the combination of which is known only to his employer and himself - and still report to work the next morning. He doesn't boast of his thefts to pickup girls or other such doubtful confidantes, or flash his stolen roll in public, or do any of the braggart,

exhibitionist, nonsensical things that are reported in the crime news of every daily newspaper. This common inability of smalltime lawbreakers to conduct their affairs in a manner consistent with their own best interests seems to ensure that prisons will always be a collecting ground for men of erratic nature, with yawning gaps in their thinking machinery.

This is not to quarrel with statistics which place the convict's intelligence quotient nearly as high as that of his counterpart in free society; it is merely to say that he lacks the particular quality of mind - call it clear-headedness and plain common sense - which would let him think in an orderly manner and arrive at sensible conclusions. Nor is it to say that all convicts, or even most of them, are positively aberrant. It is only to say that the same "determining percentage" of them are - and in prison this percentage need not be large, although in a general, unclassified prison it is likely to be.

For eight years I did time in just such a penitentiary, under administrations representing opposite extremes of penological thought. This period produced a 400 per cent turnover in prison population; half a dozen work stoppages - one of them an institution-wide six-day hunger strike; numerous sporadic disturbances of shorter duration; at least two fires of incendiary origin; and one full-blown riot, with all the attendant violence and destruction.

For two of those years prison discipline was almost nonexistent. Never, probably, were inmates of a general penitentiary granted a standing of greater dignity and freedom as a matter of policy. Never did they have less cause for bitterness and resentment. Never did they have more to gain by cooperating with a truly bold and forward-looking prison program. And never was reason so lightly overthrown and privileges so joyously abused.

The details make pretty strident reading. In a single cell block, more than a hundred window frames were glassless at one time - the panes having been kicked out in protest against poor reception on the institution radio hookup or to express some other passing dissatisfaction. Guards, especially "good" guards with records of mildness and fair dealing, were given a miserably hard time; and several guards, good and bad, were engaged in bare-knuckle combat by convicts made brave with home-brewed pruno. Inmate goon-squads, self-appointed and armed with heavy bunk chains,

seized the opportunity to roam the tiers, squaring accounts with individual inmate enemies.

These conditions of limited-chaos were the handiwork of a relatively small, energetic band - perhaps no more than 10 per cent of the inmate body - encouraged by the approval of the rest of the lunatic fringe and the neutrality of practically everyone else. Disorder was clearly a minority action - or, more exactly, a collection of individual actions that only superficially resembled organized rebellion. Yet the most obvious characteristics here - total irresponsibility, indifference to consequences, wanton destructiveness - are a primary ingredient in most collective inmate actions, and they spring from fundamental aspects of mass convict nature.

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If your first experience with prison revolt is of the slow-building, inevitable sort growing out of general resentment and just indignation, it is easy to assume that disorder can come no other way; that an uprising cannot mature without whole-hearted main-line support. But many times a full-scale riot has taken place when hardly a man participating is genuinely convinced that violence - or rebellion of any sort - is either right or necessary.

Except under truly intolerable prison conditions, sensible prisoners oppose a strike, and still more a riot, for they know that sooner or later rebellion is almost sure to leave them worse off than before. Violence inevitably brings restricted privileges, tightened discipline, an uprooting of the routines that make for doing easy time. As indicative as anything of the "differentness" of convicts as a social group, therefore, is the nature of the causes for which they will unite in extreme action. I have known demands to be made, under threat of strike (and strikes can early explode into riots), that pepper be provided for the main-line dining tables; that clean socks be delivered to the cells daily; that unemployed prisoners be permitted to swim in the stream used for generating the prison's power. A leader of one action vigorously insisted that the terms of peace include that "they turn my brother out of the hole", where he was doing time for breaking prison rules and getting caught.

The closer you look into the matter of prison insurrections, the more of this demented sort of thing you find. One of the few really justified strikes to happen during my time in prison was engineered to obtain the release of inmate

committee members who had wound up in the hole after pushing through a good many reasonable and badly needed reforms. The strike lasted two days and was successful. Besides granting the main point, the prison administration agreed to the election of a permanent inmate council. As a member of a pro tem committee, it fell to me to take the word to the regular committeemen and to see them released. Four of them accepted the news enthusiastically. The other two - the committee chairman one of them - refused to quit lockup because, they complained, it had been their show and we, the main line, had "sold them out". The proportion here - two to four - seems like a fair one to keep in mind.

Later, near the end of a six-day hunger strike, I was named to establish some sort of Liaison among the council members scattered among the three cell blocks. All of the demands that mattered had by that time been met by the prison administration and state officials - including the one calling for the hiring of a new warden. It was a clear-cut victory for the main line, and it was only too apparent that nothing but disaster would come of crowding our luck. Yet in spite of all this, at least three of the eight-man council, backed by a whopping percentage of the main line, were for holding out longer - either in the hope of gaining further concessions or just for the joy of holding out.

With all this advance warning, the spectacle, two years later, of a "causeless" riot shouldn't have been surprising. The strike began with a demand for better food, which the administration granted almost at once. It has been conclusively demonstrated, however, that nothing can so quickly arouse leaders of wildcat uprising to full belligerency as the simple granting of demands: The return of peace always brings to an end their moment in the sun. It worked that way this time. Nobody was able to advance any plausible grievances, although a score of not very convincing pretexts were tossed about, to an accompaniment of soapbox exhortations and failing arms, during the hours that the project was gaining momentum. There simply weren't any plausible grievances to be had. In spite of this, when the administration made a show of force, something like twenty-four hours after the affair began, the strike turned almost immediately into a riot. The first building put to the torch was the laundry, containing a fair share of the main-line wash. Then the canteen was broken into and plundered.

Then the storehouse for inmate recreation and athletic supplies went up in flames. Some of the rioters attempted to fire the dining room, one floor beneath the prison hospital, but were dissuaded by cooler heads.

It is easy to say that such irrational behavior is an expression of accumulated, perfectly normal resentment of captivity. But sensible people don't lodge a protest by pulling their homes down about their ears. Yet upward of a half-dozen times a year, this phenomenon of self-flagellation is repeated in the nation's prisons.

Why is it that no dissenting voices are raised before the pot boils over? Why is it that the great majority of prison uprisings appear, from beginning to end, to be an expression of the popular will? It is here that convict tradition comes into the picture.

The troubles lies almost entirely in the fact that there is no loyal opposition in prison; that opposition, especially to any form of rebellion against authority, is usually taken as prima-facie evidence of disloyalty. And among prisoners, nothing is quite so assiduously to be avoided as the suspicion of selling out to the enemy. Convicts, contrary to the notion popular with Hollywood producers and novelists, are not quite the hard-riding individualists that their excursions into outlawry might indicate. Their outcast state has made them all the hungrier for social approval, even if it must be the approval of fellow outcasts. The rarest thing in prison is the convict who chooses to stand against group opinion. Even nonparticipants and non-believers decline to rise up and protest the din that disturbs their peace, or the disorders that threaten their well-being or even their lives. They prefer to obey the prison world's First Commandment and "do their own time". In this light it isn't at all surprising that an entire inmate body should give at least passive support to a strike leader who demands that the brother be released from legitimate punishment in the hole. There is really nothing else for them to do.

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All this leads to some general conclusions that seem to have escaped most of the people who are trying to find out how to cure the epidemic of prison riots.

1. Convicts, however many exceptions there may be, are generally not mature, fully developed people; and it is about

time for high-minded idealists to stop assuming that they will respond to corrective techniques in the same way that normal adults would. Nothing could be farther from the truth than the notion that prisoners are a representative cross-section of the human population, who, through mischance or uncharacteristic impulse, happen to land in jail. For the most part, notwithstanding any number of incidental virtues that may be found among them, they are truncated personalities - a separate breed whose natural habitat is prison and who find an outlet for all of their limited facilities in prison surroundings. From a therapeutic view, the important thing is to find and to concentrate all corrective efforts on the relatively small percentage who are complete human beings capable of assigning the responsibilities of free citizens.

2. By all the tests that can be applied, it is perfectly clear that the greatest threat to prison order always lies in the small group of violently unstable men, usually at least mildly paranoid, which every prison holds. It is equally clear that convicts of this sort respond to specific kinds of treatment in a quite predictable way. They will respect strict discipline and not much else. And with absolute dependability they will interpret kindness or a softening of discipline as a sign of weakness to be exploited. Obviously, then, the first requirement of prison management is to curb this element - vigorously, using whatever means are necessary.

3. But in a general, all-purpose prison, this isn't as easy as it sounds. The disciplinary standard of any prison has to be geared to the requirements imposed by the most troublesome element in the total group - and one man's discipline, after all, is another man's repression. It is obviously neither just nor wise, from a morale or security view, to impose on tractable prisoners the relatively severe disciplinary measures necessary to whittle the paranoiacs down to size. It doesn't seem enough, then, merely to suppress the style-setters of anarchy. As soon as they are identified they should be shipped off, bag and baggage, delusions and pretensions, to a separate, maximum-discipline institution. And if no such institution exists - as in the case of all one-prison states - it should be provided.

4. This would mean that the old technique of inmate classification would have to be relied on - but with a difference. Maximum-discipline prisons have always existed, but they are regarded as a special preserve for

escape risks and "bad men" who for security reasons need closer watching. It is a perfectly safe bet that there are several prison wardens in the nation today who recognize (perhaps belatedly) that it is less disastrous that it is less disastrous that an occasional convict should escape, if it comes to that, than that his prison should go up in flames at the hands of a flock of bobby-soxers. And the danger signs are easy to spot. It is the convict who swaggers in his walk, who shoulders a guard out of his path, who makes a theatrical production of his contempt for authority, and not the convict who gets caught with a pair of bar-spreaders in his mattress, who is the real threat to prison security.

If the experience of recent years means anything at all, it means that these are at least some of the principles on which the answer to wildcat riots must be based. Demonstrations can still be expected to occur, of course, as a last-resort means of calling a really hopeless state of affairs to attention.

Meanwhile it might as well be recognized that the simple fact of revolt doesn't by a long shot indicate the presence of real grievances, and that an uprising needn't have any element of good faith or good sense about it. Too often it hasn't had. The goal of sensible convicts, after all, is to get out of prison, not to run one.

WHY PRISONERS RIOT

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Finding valid, consistent, and reliable information as to why prisoners riot defies most standard methods of gathering data on human behaviour. Official reports and most articles on the subject focus on overcrowding, poor administration, insufficient financial support, political interference, lack of professional leadership, ineffective or nonexistent treatment programs, disparities in sentencing, poor and unjust parole policies, enforced idleness of prisoners, obsolete physical plant, and a small group of hardcore and intractable prisoners.¹ Psychological viewpoints focus on aggression and acting-out personalities in the prison population.² Yet, while all the conditions mentioned in the sociological approaches exist in most prisons, the majority have not experienced riot. Further, all major prisons hold aggressive, hostile, and acting-out people. This leads to concern as to why these factors have been identified as causes of riot when riots have occurred in a small minority of prisons.

An examination of official reports following riots discloses a similar propensity for generalities and platitudes regarding causes of riots. These same conditions are consistently identified as causes of riots almost everywhere. The purpose of official reports, of course, is political in the sense that they give assurance to the general public after a riot that the remaining power structure in the prison has analyzed the causes, taken corrective measures, and merits the confidence of the public in that their interests will be protected. Investigating committees from governors' offices, legislatures, or other political directions seek simplistic answers that seem to structure their interpretations in accordance with the best interests of their own identifications. Reinterpretation of the situation has to occur frequently. Sometimes, the focus is on the predisposing causes, such as poor morale among the inmates fostered by poor food or injudicious or misunderstood paroling policies. Sometimes, it is more aimed at the precipitating causes, such as a confrontation between an officer and some inmates. Sometimes, it has been explained as an attempted mass escape that the administration successfully contained.

Many consultants who are invited from outside the jurisdiction as impartial experts tend to protect the person or group who invited them, which is ethical and logical. Diplomatic writing is a consultant's art. Other consultants invited from outside generally are not sufficiently well acquainted with the nuances and underlying intricacies

of the power structure to understand as well as they might all the factors entering into a local situation. Whether the governor or the legislative committee chairman of an opposite political party was the source of the invitation seem to make a difference in the tone of the report. An impartial investigator must be aware of the political climate and what will and what will not be accepted in some political settings. Some reports have been rejected by political leaders, others have been used for political purposes, while many have just been shelved. In any case, the use of these reports for finding the real causes of riots must be tempered pending corroboration from other sources. Frequently, though, these reports may set the tone for further interpretation by the news media, political leaders, and writers of documentaries.

Identifying the causes of riot, then, is tenuous when official reports or statements after the riot are considered along. Clearer vision can be obtained from news reports written during the riot. In decreasing order of validity and reliability, the materials that comprise this presentation are from (1) news stories during 20 serious riots since 1940 as reported in The New York Times during the action, (2) this writer's experience during the Michigan prison riot in 1952, (3) lengthy discussions with inmates involved in four prison riots, (4) conversations with prison personnel involved in seven prison riots, (5) literature concerning prison riots, (6) official reports and official statements after the riot, and (7) general literature on aggression, civil disturbances, and violence.

Causes must be divided into predisposing causes and precipitating causes. Just as in civil disobedience, there has to be a "readiness" to riot. Then, there has to be a "trigger". Too frequently, the predisposing causes have been used as causes for prison riots and the precipitating causes have been identified as causes for civil disorder. Neither is a cause, in itself. The total social situation, with emphasis on the interaction or lack of it between dominant people and subjugated people, either in the prison or in the ghetto, must be evaluated to determine why people riot. It cannot be based simplistically in overcrowding, political interference, lack of treatment programs, or any other simple answer.

Patterns of Riot

The way to make a bomb is to build a strong perimeter and generate pressure inside. Similarly, riots occur in prisons where oppressive pressures and demands are generated in the presence of strong custodial containment. Riots are reported more frequently from custodially oriented prisons. Even the riot in 1962 in the progressive and relatively relaxed District of Columbia Youth Centre at Lorton,

Virginia, involved suppression, real or imagined, or the Black Muslims.

Riots are spontaneous - not planned - detonated by a spontaneous event. The inmates know who has the weapons and who has the force. The inmates know that no administration ever has to negotiate with them. Planned disturbances end in sitdown strikes, slowdowns, hunger strikes, and self-inflicted injury. Escapes do not begin with disturbances unless they are planned as a distraction, though the disturbance may end in escape attempts. The spontaneous event that detonates the riot may be almost anything from a fight in the yard that expands, someone heaving a tray in the dining hall, to a homosexual tricking a new officer to open his cell, as happened in the Michigan riot in 1952. Violent riots must happen spontaneously. Otherwise, they would not happen. There has to be pressure, though, that builds up the predisposition or readiness to riot and a spontaneous precipitating event to trigger or detonate the riot.

Riots tend to pattern in five stages, four during the riot and one afterward. First, there is a period of undirected violence like the exploding bomb. Secondly, inmate leaders tend to emerge and organize around them a group of ringleaders who determine inmate policy during the riot. Thirdly, a period of interaction with prison authority, whether by negotiation or by force, assists in identifying the alternatives available for the resolution of the riot. Fourthly, the surrenders of the inmates, whether by negotiation or by force, phases out the violent event. Fifthly, and most important from the political viewpoint, the investigations and administrative changes restore order and confidence in the remaining power structure by making "constructive changes" to regain administrative control and to rectify the undesirable situation that produced the riot.

The first stage of the riot is characterized by an event that triggered the unbridled violence. The first stage is disorganized among the prisoners and, too frequently, among the prison staff as well. It is at this point that custodial force could alter the course of the riot but, in most instances, custody is caught by surprise and without adequate preparation so that there is little or no custodial reaction other than containment. As a result, the riot pattern is permitted by default to move to the second stage.

The second stage is when inmate leaders emerge and the administrative forces become organized. Inmate leaders who emerge from this violence are people who remain emotionally detached sufficiently so that they lend stability to the inmate group. They "don't panic". They "keep their cool". As a result, they attract around them lesser inmate leaders or "ringleaders" who, similarly, do not panic but need to be dependent upon "the boss". In this manner, an inmate leader can gather around him probably two to six "lieutenants," each with some delegated authority, such as watching hostages, preparing demands, and maintaining discipline in the rest of the inmate group. Further, the inmate leader, like most political leaders, takes a "middle-of-the-road" position where he can moderate the extremes and maintain

communication. In a prison riot, some inmates want to kill the hostages. Other inmates want to give up and surrender to the administration. The inmate leader controls these two extremes in a variety of ways and stabilizes the group into a position in the center.

The third stage is a period of interaction between inmates and prison officials. It has taken several forms, though they can be classified generally into (1) negotiation and (2) force or threat of force. No administration has to negotiate with prisoners, but the chances for negotiation are greater when the prisoners hold hostages. The chances for force or threat are greater when the prisoners do not have hostages. In either case, the decision on the part of the inmates to surrender is subject to the general principles of group dynamics. When the inmate group is cohesive and their morale is good, the prisoners will maintain the riot situation, whether faced with force or negotiation. When the group cohesion begins to disintegrate by some inmates wanting to surrender, others wanting to retaliate, and the leadership wanting to maintain the status quo, the administration may manipulate it for an early surrender. This disintegration of group cohesion may be promoted by negotiation or by force or threat of force, depending upon the situation. In case of negotiation, the group cohesion is diminished by the administration's demonstrated willingness to negotiate and by the personality of the official negotiators who convey a feeling of trust and confidence. The group can be disintegrated, also, by gas, rifle fire, and artillery shelling, all of which have been used recently in American prison riots. The less destructive approach, of course, is to await disintegration of cohesion by periods of inaction that places strain to hold the group together on the leadership by fatigue and impatience. Faced with this situation, the leadership frequently has to look for an honorable way out of a disintegrating situation.

The fourth stage, or surrender, may be the inmates' giving up after being gassed and shot at or they may surrender in an orderly way either after force or threat of force or by negotiation. Political interference at the wrong time in the prison riot can affect the total situation in terms of negotiation, surrender, and subsequent investigations and administrative decisions.

The fifth stage, that of investigations, consolidation of the remaining power structure, personnel and policy changes followed by political fall-out, is really the most important stage, since it sets policy for the prison and the system for years to come. Editorials and news commentators suggest solutions and interpretations. Administrators have to respond satisfactorily to pressures from interest groups. This is why "get tough" policies become important

after riots, even though they tend to intensify the problems.

Riots do not occur in prisons or correctional institutions with exceedingly high morale. Neither do they occur in prisons where the morale is so low that the prisoners endure penal oppression in a docile manner or break their own legs and cut their own heel tendons. Riots occur in prisons where inmates have medium to high morale and where some conflict appears in the staff, probably between treatment and custodial philosophies, and probably when the program is in a state of transition from one type of procedures and objectives to another.

Riots occur in prisons where there is a tenuous balance between controlling behavior and changing behavior. If there is a full commitment to either, riots do not occur. The riot itself, however, results in a political decision to control behavior. Consequently, the behavior changing in treatment forces always loses in a riot, at least in the immediate future.

There is also a direct relationship between news coverage by the mass media and the incidence of demonstrations, riots, and civil disturbances.³ This is one reason why riots tend to cluster in terms of time.

One of the factors that contributed to the prison insurrections of 1952 was the decision of the administration to reverse the drift toward greater inmate control.⁴ Abuses of official rules were curbed, preferential treatment for favored prisoners was eliminated, and the social system of the prison was "reformed" in the direction of the image of what the free community thought a maximum-security institution should be.

During the Riot

Guidelines for action during the riot are important. The custodial staff is frequently untrained and the administration is just as frequently caught by surprise. Action during the riot has to be planned ahead of time and modified according to the situation.

During the first stage of a riot, the disorganized inmates could well be effectively faced with force. As a matter of fact, most riots appear to have been vulnerable to custodial force in the early stages because of the disorganization on the side of the inmates. If disorganization occurs on both sides, however, then the

riot cannot be contained early. Immediate custodial action could have altered the course of several riots. The lack of training, preparation, or even expectation of riot has resulted in disorganization on both sides for hours.

During the second stage, after the inmates have organized and their leadership begins to emerge, there is the question as to whether force should be used. No prison administration ever needs to negotiate with rioting prisoners. The prisoners know this. If hostages are held, then negotiation becomes a real possibility, depending upon other factors. If the inmates holding the hostages are young, reformatory-type people with short sentences and have not already demonstrated their capability to kill, if they are psychiatric patients who cannot organize into a team, or if their majority can see parole sometime in the future, then negotiation is not necessary. In the Michigan riot of 1952, the decision to negotiate was not made until after the files of the inmates holding the hostages in 15-block had been reviewed. In that situation, negotiation was apparently the only way to save the lives of the hostages. This was supported by subsequent reports by inmates, nationally known clinical psychologists, and consultants brought in for impartial investigation.

The third stage of the riot is determined by the nature of the situation. If no hostages are held or if the prisoners holding hostages are not hard-core intractables with nothing to lose, then force or threat of force is appropriate. If the hostages are considered to be in serious danger, the administration is placed in a real dilemma in determining action because lives have to be considered in relation to public and internal reaction and consequences. If waiting for fatigue to reduce the cohesion of the rebellious inmate group will accomplish the objective, then force is not necessary.

The fourth stage of the riot is the aftermath where investigations, reinterpretations, and scapegoats are involved. There is not much the prison administration can do about this because the real power lies in the political structure. Free movement of newsmen and free access to information, both inmates and staff, is the only logical approach to take during this period. In this way, the administration can demonstrate that it is attempting to hide nothing, that it recognizes it has problems, and is openly and honestly seeking the best solutions.

In summary, official reaction to riot is dependent upon the situation. As in judo, the reaction is determined by the action of the adversary. No negotiation is needed where no hostages are held or where they might be held by short-term prisoners not considered to

be dangerous. Out-waiting might be an approach in doubtful situations. An overshoot of force is becoming decreasingly effective in American society and it invites unnecessary derision from some segments of the public.

Administrative Do's and Don'ts

Discretion, rather than negotiation or force, is at issue while handling a riot. A basic principle of police work or any other type of social control in a democratic society is to use the minimum amount of force and destruction needed to accomplish the objectives.⁵

Discretion is based on knowledge. Consequently, the first approach for a correctional administrator to improve his program is to increase the educational level of his staff by more selective recruitment and by inservice training. In modern democratic society, inservice training should be directed toward the social and behavioral sciences. This can be achieved by bringing neighboring junior colleges and universities into the educational program of the prison.⁶ An understanding and knowledgeable prison staff from the custodial employee to the warden is important in the discretionary or decision-making process. It is this staff that determines whether a confrontation occurs or is avoided and, if it occurs, how it will be handled or accommodated. This is why they need to know social problems, personality development and problems, criminology and correctional procedures, as well as the law, particularly as it relates to civil rights.

The correctional officer is the key to riot prevention, although a rough and harsh custodial lieutenant, captain, or deputy warden can use policies and behavior to neutralize the good work of a hundred officers. The entire custodial force has to be treatment-oriented, just as the entire treatment staff has to be aware of custodial problems, in order to emerge with an effective correctional program.

Readiness to riot results from the predisposing causes, such as bad food, oppressive custodial discipline, sadistic staff quick to write disciplinary charges against inmates, and general punitive attitude by administration and line personnel. The precipitating cause that "triggers" the riot is very seldom the real cause. As previously mentioned, a bomb is made by constructing

a strong perimeter or casing and generating pressure inside. It blows at its weakest point, but it has to be detonated. The detonation is not the "cause" of the explosion, although it "triggered" it.

During the riot, the inmates want to smash the system that keeps them hopeless, anonymous, and in despair, and they will destroy at random.⁷ They become so alienated from society that they regard violence as right and proper. Good treatment programs and an accepting custodial staff tend to reduce this problem. A relaxed atmosphere in a prison that avoids this alienation is most important for the eventual correctional objective and to avoid riots.

How to achieve a relaxed atmosphere is sometimes difficult for the administrator because it appears that he is "taking sides". Custodial personnel are generally concerned with good discipline, which is sometimes interpreted as "nipping problems in the bud" and is translated into overreaction to minor offenses and oppressive custodial control. Many treatment personnel, on the other hand, are in a relaxed atmosphere because it tends to lower the inmates' defenses and permit casework and psychotherapy to be better achieved. The inmates, of course, find the relaxed atmosphere more comfortable, so they favor it. This places the treatment staff "on the side of the inmates," although for different reasons. It is sometimes difficult for an administrator to interpret to the custodial staff the reasons for promoting a relaxed atmosphere in the prison. This is another reason for providing education and inservice training in behavior and social problems to all staff.

Good food, plentiful and well prepared, is important to maintaining a prison. Napoleon's famous remark that an army marches on its stomach could be applied to any group of men. Food becomes a primary source of pleasure to men deprived of many of the comforts of normal life. Consequently, the prison administration cannot realistically compute food costs on the basis of nutritional needs alone. The emotional needs are important. An institutional program can make a lot of mistakes if it has a good kitchen that provides plenty of food. Conversely, food is a tangible item on which can be focused all the discontents and deprivations of the prison. Many riots have begun in or near the dining room. Food simply becomes a tangible substitute target for other complaints. Consequently, an administrator should spend a little extra time and effort to find a good steward to handle food services and pay special attention to the food budget.

Despite the other abuses, riots do not occur in prisons that are essentially run by inmates. There are some Southern prisons where selected inmates carry guns and guard other inmates. All the generalities attributed to riot causation exist, but no riots have occurred in these prisons. This is because the inmate leaders have a vested interest in the status quo and will protect it.

Inmate leadership is present in all prisons, as leadership is present in all groups of people. The constructive use of inmate leadership is an obvious way to avoid riots. Some type of inmate self-government that involves honest and well supervised elections of inmate representatives to discuss problems, make recommendations and, perhaps, even take some responsibilities from the administration could be helpful. Possibilities might be some control of those activities related to formalized inmate activities like manuscripts sent to potential publishers, pricing hobbycraft items for sale, or processing inmate activities like Alcoholics Anonymous or chess clubs. In an era when movements to unionize prisoners appear, such as in West Germany and Sweden, and when litigation initiated by inmates result in court rulings that change conditions and procedures within the prisons, it is in the interest of the administration to know the inmates' thinking and their action. In any case, downward communication is not enough.

The pattern could be taken from student government functioning under a university administration. It could be taken from a civilian government operating under military occupation by the victors after a war, such as those civilian governments in Germany and Japan after World War II. The pattern in the Federal Bureau of Prisons and some other systems has been the inmate council, where elected inmates discuss problems and appropriate policies with the prison administration, making recommendations and suggestions. A suggestion box system for inmates might be instituted if other approaches appear to be too innovative. Regardless of how it is organized, it should promote upward and downward communication between inmates and prison administration and it should provide the inmate leadership with a vested interest in the status quo.

In summary, good communication can avoid the predisposing causes of riot. Whether by inmate council, inmate self-government programs, suggestion boxes, or free up-and-down communication of any

type, knowledge by the inmate leadership of situations and their reasons can eliminate most predisposing causes. Establishment of the therapeutic community where inmates take responsibility for the improvement of other inmates, such as in the Provo Experiment in Utah in 1958-1964, the Minnesota State Training School at Red Wind, and some other places, would also provide a vested interest for the inmates in the institution and its program, as well as a constructive attitude. Raising the educational level of the prison staff, especially the correctional officers, would reduce the predisposing causes. Their better understanding of personality development and social problems would provide them with the capacity for discretion that would, in turn, reduce the precipitating causes. Prison riots can be eliminated when upward and downward communication, combined with discretionary use of authority, reduces the probability of serious confrontation that should not have to occur in a democratic society.

CONTROL OF VIOLENCE IN A MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON OR THE
TAMING OF THE FEW

John J. Fitzpatrick and Stanley I. Kruger

We would like to share with you today some of our thoughts, ideas, and plans around a problem which we feel is of great concern to everyone working in the correctional field; that is, the control of violence. Violence in a maximum security prison creates problems which permeate every aspect of institutional life. The chronic anxiety aroused among inmates and personnel alike determines in great part the security measures undertaken to maintain control of the prison. This concern with the violent inmate controls the extent, quality and variety of rehabilitative programming possible, and in addition assists in perpetuating society's stereotype of, and attitude toward, all public offenders. The periodic outbursts of violence experienced in all prisons presents to the public the impression of vast numbers of inmates perpetually engaged in committing mayhem. This illusion leads to distrust of all inmates, makes liberalizing legislation difficult, and presents the stereotype of the TV bad man who is unworthy of trust, employment, respect, or a chance, regardless of his offense or state of rehabilitation. In reality, however, we know that there is a relatively small percentage of inmates engaged in such activities. How frequently is heard the comment, "10% of the inmates takes 90% of our time". The general result of this lopsided reality is that many institutions find themselves in the position of the school teacher who gears her academic program to the slowest pupils, thus diverting her attention from the brighter students and preventing them from advancing in line with their capabilities.

Because of the all-pervasiveness of the problem of violence it is necessary to devise methods for control. One pragmatic, historical and successful method is to remove the man from the prison population. However, there is increasing recognition that isolation as a method of dealing with violent inmate is not, in and of itself, conducive to a healthy adjustment preparatory to a return to the general prison population or to society. In desperation this method is still often used exclusively. Out of such desperation one administrator suggested that, -"those inmates who are carriers of the dangerously communicable disease of violence", be remanded to custody as administrative problems rather than attempting to provide a program that, he feels, at present offers little hope. We suggest that this approach alone, through exclusion from treatment, forever rules out the possibility of developing effective techniques for program planning and treatment of the violent inmate. For it is only through continued contact with the difficult inmate, and evaluation of present methods that newer ones can be tried, evaluated, and if necessary discarded for still newer ideas. Isolation, in and of itself, does provide

effective controls during the period of restraint. Unless something else is done, we feel that only further trouble can be anticipated. In part, this view is based on a follow-up study in Massachusetts Correctional system's Departmental Segregation Unit where serious problem inmates are segregated. The men who spent a minimum period of 6 months in segregation were followed after their return to the institution population. Of those returned over 50% had been in further difficulty in a relatively short period of time. If these men are unable to control their behavior within the close confines of the prison structure, can we reasonably anticipate or expect them to function adequately upon release? And in the final analysis our prime responsibility is the protection of society. The establishment of specialized units or institutions for dealing with the problem inmate is another attempt at devising a method to solve this problem. This often requires additional buildings, personnel and programming. In most states our correctional institutions historically have not been overwhelmed with legislative generosity. For this reason one might find the possibilities in this area somewhat limited. It, therefore, behooves us to seek ways in which we may make maximum use of what is already available. As Sanger Powers stated in his presidential address of 1961, "We don't need 'new horizons' or 'new frontiers,' new concepts or techniques in corrections so much as we need to make effective use of the people, the programs, the skills which are already available. We have somehow been lacking in the willingness or resourcefulness incorporate in our correctional programs the great body of knowledge we presently have concerning human behavior, personality development, and the correction of criminal conduct".

The plan that we are proposing today is designed to make use of the existing facilities and personnel at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole. This institution was opened in 1955 for the purpose of housing the most serious recalcitrant offenders who were previously confined in the old Charlestown State Prison. Four months later, a clinical unit, known as the Counseling Service, was established. The service was conceived as a collaborative enterprise with personnel from both the Department of Correction and the Department of Mental Health, Division of Legal Medicine. The present complement consists of psychiatrists, psychologists and psychiatric social workers. This unit has evaluated over 600 cases during the past 6 years and 275 inmates have been seen in intensive individual and/or group therapy. It is from the experiences culled in this organization that we have derived our current thinking. The inmates seen in this

mental health unit included a number who might appropriately be described as violent. They were the strong arm men, the impulsive and explosive, the bullies of the weak, the collectors of debts and the predatory homosexuals.

In an early attempt at dealing with these inmates we evolved a project of forced group therapy. This group was composed of men released from segregation on the condition that they attend group therapy for a period of 6 months. They were permitted to remain at liberty within the institution only so long as they attended the group sessions. As a result they attended faithfully, but initially refused to participate. Instead, a conspiracy of silence prevailed throughout the early sessions. One inmate brought a book which he read throughout each session while another stretched out on a table for an afternoon nap, a third slept with his head on the table, and others slouched in chairs facing away from the leader. During this period the leader periodically clarified what he felt the group's behavior indicated; that is, they were furious at being forced to come to the group, they came to get out of segregation but this didn't mean that they had to talk and they weren't going to trust this character who was working for the administration. These comments resulted in the group responding with rage at authorities as personified by the therapist. At one point this rage culminated in an inmate standing over the leader, threatening to smash him with an ashtray if he uttered another word. Fortunately, the therapist kept his mouth shut. Although some of these feelings were worked out in subsequent sessions, the group unanimously chose to terminate at the end of the six months period. It is interesting to note, however, that all but one member voluntarily asked for therapy within a year.

A follow-up study of a group of similar inmates who were confined in Cherry Hill, the segregation section of the old Charlestown Prison, at the time of the 1955 riots, gives an indication of what might be expected with even minimal planning. This riot involved a small group of inmates who had been confined in segregation for long periods of time and was the end result of a number of less serious incidents. Shortly after the riot psychiatric examinations were administered by personnel of the Massachusetts Mental Health Center. In a number of reports, recommendations

relative to management were offered in addition to diagnostic impressions. Following is an excerpt from an evaluation of a leading figure in the Cherry Hill riot, an inmate who had participated in a riot several years before and one who was a constant source of difficulty to the administration:

The summary of the psychiatric examination stated, "There are indications of considerable creative ability, high intelligence, good organization, and strong intellectual drive. On the other hand there is extremely poor control over his powerful emotional impulses; he may be expected to be quite explosive and unpredictable in his emotional reactions. Specifically I would expect him to react strongly against authority and to be insistent on having his own way. However, the evidence of overconformity suggests that he is willing to conform for his own immediate gain".

The recommendations included, (1) "Help him to be as contented and useful a member of prison society as possible, gaining recognition from the outside (2) Psychotherapy, (3) Constructive outlet for his creative ability, and his emotional and intellectual drive so that it is not discharged in destructive activity, e.g. creative writing, study of prison reform, etc".

Our study, conducted six years after this evaluation indicated that the inmate had a single disciplinary report in 1956 and one in 1958. He was in individual therapy for 1½ years, learned to operate a linotype machine, and became the editor of the institution's newspaper. In addition, he was a leading figure in a dramatic group which presented a number of productions to the public, participated in a Speech-Crafters group which studied techniques of public speaking in conjunction with similar community groups, and volunteered as a subject of research for several university studies. A year ago he requested commutation of his sentence and in support of this he received recommendations for consideration from numerous correctional personnel.

Although a single case from the Cherry Hill group has been cited, our study clearly indicated that institutional adjustment among this group of inmates improved considerably when program recommendations were made and implemented, and these results were achieved primarily through the efforts of custodial personnel.

The foregoing gives credence to our belief that much can be accomplished over a period of time when personnel are interested in and committed to assisting, even the most troublesome inmates. For the most part, in our experience, work with the violent inmate has been carried out by either custodial or

treatment personnel, but not as an integrated team. Effective control of violence can be reached only through careful diagnosis, planning, implementation and coordination among all institutional departments.

The following will give some of the ideas and programming currently being developed in our institution for the control of the violent inmate.

Implicit in our approach is an underlying assumption that every inmate has the capacity and potentiality for change. The problem becomes one of finding techniques to enable socializing changes to occur. The inmates we are discussing are, basically motoric people who tend to respond to stress with a stereotyped and often inappropriate response of violent motor activity. Therefore it is necessary to interrupt and control this pattern of behavior through removal from the prison population into isolation. This initial step is therapeutic, as well as custodial, and serves two purposes. First: it protects other inmates and personnel and secondly, allows the inmate to calm down and think. By removing him from the population his characteristic mode of response is blocked. At this point, although we have locked him up, we do not throw the key away. It becomes our responsibility to introduce more suitable expressive modes for exploration by the inmate. A recent study done by one of our consulting psychiatrists indicated that there are certain adjustment phases through which men in prolonged segregation go. These include; first: a period of marked anxiety and resistance against all authorities. During this period all the characteristic modes of defense are used but they offer only a temporary reduction of the anxiety. Second: there is a period of disorganization with increased anxiety, apathy, depression and periodic loss of control. Third: There is a recognition of the reality of their confinement which leads to new levels of approach. This may be characterized by fantasy, passivity, dependency, and petulance. The final phase comes after being informed of imminent release from isolation. This period is characterized by increased tension and fear about the loss of controls. In fact, some inmates have refused to return to the institution proper, and one stated after spending a number of months in segregation, "If the other guys knew how peaceful and quiet it was in here there wouldn't be enough room to hold them all". This is not the point at which we wish to arrive.

Before describing a hypothetical case which will show the process by which we hope to control violence, let us tell you the story of the fellow who goes to buy a jackass. He goes to friendly Bob's used jackass lot and says, "I'd like to

buy a well behaved, tractable jack-ass". So Bob says, "It just happens I've got one in stock. Horatio here was raised psychologically, so all you gotta do is scratch him behind his ears and he'll do whatever you want". Our friend says, "I'll take him".

So he takes the halter and starts walking away; whereupon Horatio digs in his heels and refuses to budge. Friendly Bob, the jack-ass dealer, sees this; trots up and says, "Step aside". He picks up a BIG 2 by 4 and hits the beast a resounding whack across his rump, then walks around the front and picks up the halter, scratches his ear and the animal follows. The buyer is standing and watching this, and he says, "Now, wait a minute. You told me all I had to do was scratch him behind his ears and he'd do whatever I wanted. Now you go beating him with a beam. What kind of psychology is that?"

To which the dealer replies, "Sure he's psychologically trained, but first you got to get his attention."

Now to the composite case of Charlie Finiardy to illustrate the process by which we will attempt to control the violent inmate. Charlie, a 23-year-old inmate, was sentenced to 7-10 years for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. Shortly after his arrival in the institution he became involved with a gang as a debt collector. One of his early jobs resulted in his fracturing the debtor's jaw with a lead pipe. This act simply added to numerous other difficulties with both inmates and officers, whom he saw as always picking on him. Within several months of his arrival he had built up a less than enviable record of disciplinary reports. Obviously, Charlie needed a belt in the rear to get his attention. He was placed in isolation for 15 days and then was moved to Departmental Segregation unit.

During the initial period he created innumerable difficulties, challenging the officers, defecating on the floor, and throwing feces and food at the officers. This behavior slowly decreased and with two months he began showing signs of depression, with difficulty in sleeping, eating, and complaints of stomach upset. The Segregation Unit's personnel, aware of these problem of adjustment, referred the inmate for consultation. On evaluation, he was seen as agitated, struggling with feelings of hopelessness and wanted to talk to someone. As a result of the evaluation

therapy was started on a regularly scheduled basis. In the early phase of therapy the inmate ranted against the administration personnel, accusing them of depriving him of his civil rights, railroading him into segregation, and unfair treatment by the custodial staff who were stealing his food. The therapist continually pointed out the realities. In effect, he was banging his head against a stone wall, he was hurting no one but himself, and that he would remain in segregation as long as he continued to act inappropriately. At the same time the therapist through his acceptance, attention, and interest, demonstrated his willingness to help Charlie to help himself. After five months of weekly interviews Charlie began to trust the therapist, told him he knew he was not out to "shaft" him as he saw the rest of the world doing, and began to ask questions about what he could do to help himself. At the same time the segregation unit's personnel reported improving behavior. On this basis the administration transferred him to room detention where he was allowed out of his room for meals and therapy only. This move was the first in a series of steps, the purpose of which was to slowly remove external controls as the existence of internal controls was demonstrated. This is analogous to child-rearing where the child demonstrates increasing maturity his responsibilities and privileges are increased.

At the time of transfer to room detention each member of the classification board began interviewing him for the purpose of developing a total institutional program. In addition, group therapy was initiated with other inmates with similar problems. Group was helpful as other members had experienced similar feelings, insight producing because it pointed out the self-destructive aspects of his behavior, cathartic because it provided an additional area for blowing off steam rather than acting, and a source of strength for it provided a feeling of worthwhileness without the previously necessary ingredient of violence. It also produced a sense of belonging and kinship. Several weeks after release from segregation Charlie became involved in a violent argument with his block officer, refusing to return to his room following lunch.

The question of the meaning and handling of this incident was raised by the disciplinary board with the Treatment Coordinator. It was felt that this action was a possible indicator or a lessening of internal controls and it was decided that there was a need for clear definition of limits and reinstatement of external controls was recommended. On the basis of this Charlie was returned to the segregation

unit where he was kept for three months, before being released to room detention again.

The classification board meanwhile completed its evaluation and made specific recommendations regarding work assignment, education, recreation, religious counseling, avocation and medicine. These recommendations were put into effect over a period of time and in order of assumption of responsibility in the prison community. In effect, first we work, then we play. Free time activities such as recreation, avocation, and movies were granted on the basis of good work performance and responsible behavior. It was necessary to continually clarify our position that privileges were to be granted on the basis of positive actions rather than the mere absence of negative action. It was over three years from the time of Charlie's admission to the segregation unit to a full resumption of activities in the prison community.

This case illustrates what we consider would be effective use of available institutional facilities and personnel. In reality, however, our approach to now, often has been piecemeal, uncoordinated, and incomplete. Even so we have had some positive results.

With the forced group therapy program all but one of the inmates seen applied for further help. This indicates that they had been effected positively by the therapy. However, this program had a time limit of six months which considerably reduced the potential efficacy of this approach, since it permitted termination just as the men were getting seriously involved. From this we have learned that all programs designed for work with the difficult inmate should be flexible and based on the current needs of the inmate.

Our Cherry Hill follow-up demonstrated that recommendations in any area; custody, therapy, avocation, industry, religion, or education, could be of potential use if there were efforts made to implement and co-ordinate them. Additionally, other violent inmates have been seen in therapy during the past six years. Eight of the most difficult were seen individually for periods ranging from one to two and a half years. A follow-up indicated that four show marked behavioral improvement, one maintained a marginal adjustment, one continued to get into repeated difficulty, and two had psychotic breakdowns and were hospitalized.

The greatest barriers which we see to effective implementation of a program such as we have suggested are the lack of

communication and coordination. It is not enough to have a classification board that meets regularly to make recommendations. In addition there must be one person designated with the responsibility and authority to see that recommendations are transmitted. He must be charged with interpreting to the personnel and dealing with the potential anger that may be generated by a feeling of being told what to do. Finally, he must see that the recommendations are implemented. If this were done, all personnel would be aware of what was happening to the inmates in their charge. They would know of the personal problems, changing mood and types of situations that might precipitate incidents. They would participate in, and be a part of, administrative decisions and program planning, prior to their being put into effect. The effect of this would be a tendency to prevent blow-ups and violent incidents.

In summary, we feel that the problem of violence is of great concern to everyone working in the correctional field. That the violent offender must be segregated from the institution population for a period of time. That, as his basic problems involve his relationship with other human beings, he can be helped only through the establishment of meaningful relationships with other people. That he must be helped to develop internal controls. That access to positive solutions for his problem of adjustment must be available. That his integration back into the inmate population must be a carefully coordinated process, which provides for the resumption of responsibility first, with privileges granted later. That this can best be achieved through a unified philosophy held by all correctional personnel and expressed through effective communication and coordination.

THOUGHTS ON DISTURBANCES

IN PRISON

P.H. SHAPLAND

This article is based on a talk given to a series of conferences for staff in certain Midland Region Prisons.

IT IS difficult with certainty why disturbances occur in prisons. Each interested group has its own opinions about the causes of disturbances and these naturally place the emphasis at different points. Journalists, for example, stress political factors outside the prisons and slack management inside; criminologists emphasise lack of treatment facilities and low financial investment in prisons; prison staffs point to interference from outside in running the prison, intractable prisoners and the undesirable effects of publicity; inmates and ex-inmates refer to unsuitable staff, lack of individual treatment and general system; official reports call attention to shortage of staff, lack of staff training and heterogeneous populations. The situation, therefore, is rather like the search for causes of crime. There is no single cause but each interested group of people will contribute opinions based on their own special experience--the late Dr. Kinsey¹, for example, aid in 1955 that some riots are caused by tensions arising in normal prisoners from sexual frustrations. No doubt for some cases but by no means all, and what remains is the fact that many of the conditions mentioned exist in many prisons but disturbances are relatively rare. So what we need is a simple framework which highlights what seem to be the most relevant factors.

Vernon Fox² says "The way to make a bomb is to build a strong perimeter and generate pressure inside". In a maximum security prison the strong perimeter is obvious (less obvious are the effects on inmates of making escape more and more difficult). Pressure inside the strong perimeter is determined by two factors --kinds of inmates and the nature of the controlling system.

Hugh Marriage³, senior psychologist at South East Regional Office, has recently completed an illuminating study of the disturbances which occurred in adult male prisons during the last half of 1972. The purpose of this was to see whether any of 11 variables derived from the prison index could predict the extent of the disturbances. The variables included size of prison, age of inmates, age at first offence, previous convictions and proportion of sentence to be served. As expected, the results suggested strongly that the prisons holding the more serious offenders are more disturbance prone and that the bigger prisons have bigger disturbances. The most interesting feature, however, was the effect of combining the variables to maximise prediction of disturbance. The best prediction was given by high personal average sentence length together with low age. Personal average sentence length is a measure developed by Hugh Marriage and is the average length of sentence including the present, which an inmate has served. This means that it may be possible to account for the extent of a disturbance in terms of two simple characteristics of the inmates in the prison. Factors like regime and management style may affect only the form of a disturbance once it has started. This study needs repeating of course and its conclusions at this stage are tentative but apart from that it demonstrates the necessity for continuous monitoring of characteristics in the prison population in order to give adequate warning about the build up of high risk men. (Hugh Marriage's study used only information available on the prison index. Other variables will also be important. Psychiatric history, for example, is obviously relevant: the distance a man is away from home may be).⁴ It is interesting to compare this finding with Herbert du Pareq's⁴ comments in his report on the disorder in Dartmoor Prison in 1932. He refers to the emergence of a prisoner whom he described as being of the "motor bandit" or "gangster" class. He noted that sentences upon these men were necessarily severe and that they were usually young, determined and adventurous. He went on to say: "Their qualities, directed into evil channels, have made them great powers for evil, and with many years of monotonous imprisonment facing them, they may well think it worth while to take great risks. They are dangerous in two main ways: first because they will be prepared to take great risks themselves to retain their liberty: secondly, because they are capable of exercising great influence over the weaker-minded prisoners".

The second factor which generates pressure is the sort of control or the nature of power used in the prison. Because most inmates do not want to be inside and because basically the staff's job is to keep them there, the control structure is coercive--it rests ultimately on the use of physical force. At this point it is

worth comparing the way other kinds of organisation like industry, hospitals, universities and so on, control their members and what the members feel about the controls they are subjected to. The power of industrial organisations, for example, is mostly based on control over material resources like money. Educational organisations, on the other hand, use the power of symbolic rewards and esteem like certificates and degrees. By and large, students are in sympathy with the aims of the institution so that their involvement is positive. The involvement of industrial employees can be described as neutral--they may or may not be in sympathy with the aims of the organisation. Inmates, however, certainly do not feel committed to the aims of the prison and their involvement tends to be negative. Thus, a coercive control structure leads to alienated inmates and the degree of alignment or negative feeling will vary directly with the degree of coercion applied to carry out the controlling function. As it is possible to monitor characteristics of the inmates it should also be possible to devise a system for monitoring the effects of the control system. To provide, in other words, a number of pressure gauges for the prison. Here we have no research studies to help us. It may be that useful measures can be derived from information which is already recorded: for example, the incidence and distribution of disciplinary reports, the number of petitions and applications, sickness rates and acts of sabotage. This kind of variable may provide a swift pointer to the state of morale or degree of contentment which exists. Or it may be that we need to devise new methods in order to monitor tension. Certainly we shall need to pay more attention to the development of management information systems within the prison.

I am suggesting, therefore, that there are three factors--the secure perimeter, the kinds of inmates and the nature of the control system--which inherently predispose the prison to disturbance. The bomb, however, needs a detonator before it can explode and in the prison will be some precipitating factor which leads to the disturbance itself.

Precipitating factors can be grouped in three categories--perceived injustices, general frustrations and external events. Perceived injustices on the part of the inmates is the commonest and also the most serious precipitating factor. At Dartmoor in 1932, for example, the punishments awarded by the governor were felt to be unduly severe; feelings also rose when the minimum time on a work party before a labour change was raised from three to 12 months. This precipitating factor is concerned with inmates' feelings about specific features of the regime. This helps to distinguish it from the second category where the feelings are more general and may be seen in terms of frustration

rather than injustice. Behaviour, like some of the sit downs last summer, may arise from feelings of boredom, the need to seek attention, the wish to copy others, or just for kicks. All these serve to reduce frustration in a situation where the inmate is relatively powerless. Well worth comparison here are certain kinds of industrial sabotage which "frequently embody common feelings of hostility towards machinery and authority", as Laurie Taylor³ puts it in his very relevant paper on the motives and meanings of industrial sabotage. The third category of precipitating factor comprises organisations and events outside the prison, together with the prevailing climate about protest in society. P.R.O.P., happenings in another prison and maybe the general industrial situation are examples of these.

The prison situation is by its nature predisposed to disturbances and there will be precipitating factors which lead to the disturbance itself. This in turn may or may not need a trigger event. Disturbances themselves may be classified in terms of riots and demonstrations. A riot is spontaneous, unplanned and triggered by a single event like a fight or breaking glass; a demonstration on the other hand, which can take the form of a go slow, a strike, a sit down, is planned and used for a more constructive purpose.

So the bomb explodes, the disturbance happens. The form it takes, the amount of violence involved and the length of time it goes on will be determined by the kind of regime and the management structure in the prison. In other words, the nature of the communications in the prison will determine how much the explosion is cushioned and its destructive effects minimised. We talk a lot about this word "communications" but a lot of the time we have no answers to the kind of questions we are asking, we do not know, for example, what the most appropriate management structure is for a maximum security prison or indeed whether there is a most appropriate one. We cannot really answer questions about the role of the inmate in prison nor specify the role of the officer. Three aspects of communications deserve some comment:

INTER-GROUP RELATIONSHIPS

The most obvious inter-group relationship is between inmates and staff. Then within each of these larger groups are sub-groups. Within the staff there are divisions between uniformed and non-uniformed staff, specialists and non-specialists, senior and junior, and so on. It is not difficult for the thinking of one group about another to become distorted and stereotyped and no doubt all who work in prisons can quote examples of this from their own experience. The point I wish to make is the need for both staff and inmates to discriminate between that which is real in

their behaviour and that which they project on to one another. Most often the opportunity for this will be in the various meetings which occur in the prison, especially as the move towards consultative management is increasing the frequency of these. But meetings among prison staff tend to be unpopular; this is not surprising when the tasks of the meeting are unclear so that the roles of the members are confused. Beyond that, however, I suspect that prison staff, and inmates, when coming to a meeting have expectations of what is going to happen. The hope is that discussion which get rapidly translated into action so that change occurs; and those participating in the process will enjoy a rosy glow of job satisfaction. When such hopes are unfulfilled, faith in consultation can easily disappear. All staff need to learn how to use meetings more effectively and most would benefit from some preparation for their role in them.

THE PURPOSE OF CONTROL

As I said earlier, the prison control structure is coercive--it depends in the last resort on physical force, so control tends to be a negative idea associated with undesirable behaviour like disobedience, violence and rioting. This suggests that control should be seen as a means to an end and not an end in itself. Vernon Fox (op cit)⁶ touches on this point and I take it this is what Alastair Papps⁶ is saying in his paper on "Control-Treatment". In the absence of movement towards objectives other than control, control itself becomes merely custodial which in the long run is self-defeating.

BARGAINING

Over long periods inmates can only be controlled through their own cooperation. The goals of inmates and staff will overlap to the extent that no one enjoys a state of anarchy for long and that an ordered existence for most of the time is in most people's interests. This entails give and take, or a bargaining situation. This is one of the ways in which an officer on a landing, for example, exerts control in his dealings with inmates. Most of the time this sort of bargaining is unofficial and informal. In times of stress, however, during or after a disturbance, the bargaining or negotiation becomes official and formal. Perhaps we need to look at ways of institutionalising conflict in the prison situation by formalising rather more the bargaining situations which occur in order to maximise the investment which inmates themselves have in an ordered existence. (For a very well documented development of this argument see Robert Reich's paper on "Bargaining in Correctional Institutions").

From this brief discussion of disturbances some general conclusions stand out. There is the complexity of the prison as an organisation which makes it hard to disentangle the factors involved. So it becomes easy to call a precipitating factor, like poor food, the cause of a disturbance and proceed to overlook more intangible things, like staff-inmate relationships, because they are so difficult to unravel. The prison is intrinsically an unstable organisation so that conflict is inevitable and disturbances are to be expected. The problem therefore is how to institutionalise the conflict so that its effects are constructive and not destructive. This means looking at the prison in directly political terms, recognising that there are groups in the prison with different objectives and different kinds of power to achieve them. The issue is the sharing of power.

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Ambush Attacks

Unprovoked attacks of police officers have occurred with increasing frequency in recent years, taking the lives of many officers, injuring many more, and creating serious morale problems within law enforcement agencies nationwide. Nothing presents a greater danger to the safety and efficiency of police officers than does the ambush attack. Training Keys # 217 and 218 examine the nature of these attacks and suggests measures to counter them.

Ambush until recently has probably meant to most police officers what it still means to most citizens, a surprise attack on a wagon train of settlers by a renegade tribe of Indians, a group of 1930's hoods "eliminating the competition" in neighborhood restaurant, or a platoon of soldiers waiting in the shells of bombed-out buildings for an enemy column to enter the city - all viewed from a theater seat or an easy chair in front of a television. During the past several years, however, the word ambush has gained an additional, a more personal, meaning for police officers, for increasingly they have become the victims of ambush attacks.

From 1969 to 1973, 56 police officers were slain during ambush attacks. Thirty-one of these victims were entrapped in carefully planned assaults; twenty-five officers died in unprovoked attacks that did not involve any extensive pre-planning or element of entrapment*. Most of these ambush attacks were executed by persons, who had no previous connection with their victims, although in a few instances the assailant was known to the officer and personal motives for the attack could be inferred or became evident. In all cases, there had been no direct police action that would provoke attack. If there is any single characteristic shared by a majority of those who attack police officers, it is that most have a criminal record. The following percentages are based on the criminal histories of 965 persons arrested for murdering law enforcement officers between 1962 and 1971*:

Offenders previously arrested	73 percent
Offenders previously convicted	58 percent
Prior arrest for violent crime	37 percent

*Crime in the United States, 1973. Uniform Crime Reports, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., p. 47.

*FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. Federal Bureau of Investigation, U. S. Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., 1972, Vol. 41, No. 3, p. 6.

It is frequently said that police officers are assaulted and ambushed because they and their uniforms symbolize to certain violent persons unjust societal authority. Regardless of its validity, this statement is of no practical value to police officers. They certainly share the hope that our society will become more cohesive and less violent, but of immediate concern to police officers faced with the daily threat of ambush are the known facts about the characteristics of sudden assaults.

This Training Key discusses the peculiarities of ambush attacks and identifies efforts that can be made to reduce the risk of unprovoked assaults on police officers. Training Key # 218 reviews specific countermeasures that can be used by police officers caught in an ambush.

AMBUSH CHARACTERISTICS

Because thousands of police officers are assaulted under various circumstances each year, there is a need to distinguish the ambush attack from the common assault that officers have been trained to expect and counter*. Suddenness, surprise, and lack of provocation are the identifying features of the ambush. Generally, the attack begins and ends within seconds, or if there is a follow-up attack, within a couple of minutes. The assailant achieves surprise by either attacking from a concealed position or gaining proximity to the victim officer without arousing his suspicion. The element of surprise, of course, excludes the possibility of immediate provocation.

Although attacks can and do occur in various situations, the target of most ambush attempts is the uniformed officer in or near his marked vehicle. The evening and early morning hours, periods of limited visibility, are when virtually all ambush attacks occur. The ambush of police officers is both an urban and a rural problem. The majority of attacks that occur in cities take place in crowded residential areas where density of population provides the assailant with protection from police detection prior to the attack, good fields of observation and fire exist, numerous escape routes are available, and opportunity for refuge in the immediate vicinity of the ambush site is present. In some residential neighborhoods, the assailant may be able to exploit prevailing hostility toward the police. In rural areas, there is no locational pattern to ambush attacks. Some have taken place on isolated roadways in sparsely populated sections, whereas others have occurred in more populated areas.

*During 1973 alone, there were an estimated 62,300 assaults on police officers resulting in 127 deaths. Crime in the United States, 1973, op cit., p. 45.

Since the ambush of police officers takes so many forms, it is not possible to positively determine the degree of planning and preparation that goes into the typical assault. It seems probable though that most ambushes are hastily conceived, that most are usually crimes of opportunity.

TYPES OF AMBUSHES

There are three general categories of ambush assault: the sniping incident where a firearm is used by an assailant from a concealed position, the direct assault where the assailant attacks at close range without any effort to conceal himself, and the coordinated attack where two or more assailants using firearms open fire at close range from preselected positions.

Sniping ambushes are generally executed from distances of 50 or more yards, and in most cases the sniper fires only once and then retreats. When a sniper feels that his location is well protected and not readily observable, he may carry out a longer attack. The direct assault is carried out at close range by assailants who depend primarily on the element of surprise. In most direct assaults the assailant simply approaches the officer on foot and attacks him suddenly from a distance of several yards. These attacks are extremely violent because of the probability that the officer will be able to fight back or, at least, identify the assailant. Coordinated attacks are not as common as the other two types of ambush. When they do occur, however, these attacks are the most deadly form of ambush. A coordinated ambush is typically executed at close range by two or more assailants crossfiring from preselected positions.

EFFECT ON MORALE

No other type of violence has such immediate and drastic effect on the morale of law enforcement personnel as does the ambush assault. Police officers accept the fact that they may risk bodily injury while performing their duties. They know that occasionally they will be part of violent situations; it is an inherent part of maintaining order and fighting criminal activity. Such is not the case with an ambush attack.

The suddenness, the deliberate malice, and the unpredictability of the ambush attack sharply distinguishes its psychological effect on officers from the kind of violence that is accepted as part of the job. The nature of police work complicates the problem of how officers react to ambushes because their job is to meet the needs of people, and they cannot therefore adopt an overly defensive attitude of extreme caution and still perform their duties well.

Even well-trained and experienced police officers are seriously affected by the threat of ambush. The fear, tension, and suspicion an officer experiences daily procedures in his mind the image of a hostile society in which all citizens are potential threats to his life. Unfortunately, his behavior toward the public will probably reflect this attitude.

MANAGEMENT'S ROLE

Positive police leadership can help to improve the poor departmental morale often created by the threat of ambush attack. Police officials should react quickly and decisively to threats to the safety of personnel. The response of management should be to improve and preserve morale by limiting the risk of ambush assault.

Police officers expect that unprovoked attacks against members of their department will be considered and treated as exceptional cases. Most police executives will respond to such events with a balanced, vigorous effort to identify and apprehend the assailants. Where arrests are made, police leaders should ensure that the suspects are promptly and fairly prosecuted. This is a particularly important job, for if persons guilty of police ambush escape proper punishment, police morale will be seriously damaged.

THE COMMUNITY'S ROLE

That good police-community relations is more than just a desirable theoretical goal is no more clearly evidenced than by the part these relations can play in decreasing the threat of ambush. A cooperative community that respects its police force represents a decidedly adverse setting for ambush attacks. The opportunities for detection and apprehension of the assailant are increased, as are the chances of his attack being thwarted. If the community is supportive of the police and the assailant is a local resident, many of the tactical advantages of operating in home territory become disadvantages. In a community hostile toward the police, for example, the assailant has little fear that he will be apprehended solely because he is known to the residents; in a community that is sympathetic to the police, however, the residents who know and can identify the assailant become a threat. Faced with an environment that is hostile to him, rather than to the police, the would-be assailant is less likely to attempt an ambush of police officers.

Some ambush attacks are preceded by events in which there have been elements of conflict between the community and the police. The police shooting of a criminal suspect, claims of police brutality, sensational reporting of an incident by the news media, and the spread of distorted rumors all can provide the spark that triggers an ambush attempt.

The connection between police-community relations and assaults on police officers is often easily identifiable when an attack follows closely a controversial incident. But what of the ambush attacks of police officers that do not closely follow such an incident or that occur in another community. Although not necessarily, they, too, may be connected. For example, an incident in California may bring forth deep-rooted hostility toward the police and may result in an ambush attempt in New York.

To detect the build-up of hostility toward police within communities, the police need good rapport with citizens as well as an intelligence system. The feelings of citizens can be reliable indicator of future problems. If police officers receive information from the community about uneasiness or distorted rumors, they should report it so that the problem can be defused. In turn, it is the responsibility of intelligence units to ensure that police officers on the street receive relevant information. The collection, analysis, and preparation of intelligence data is a worthwhile enterprise when the results are placed in the hands of police officers and not merely filed in an officer cabinet.

Where there is no cooperation between the police and the community, the safety of officers is needlessly jeopardized. Public hostility or indifference toward the police creates a climate that increases the likelihood of ambush. In some instances, ambush attacks against police officers have undoubtedly received encouragement or at least tacit approval from the community. When this occurs, the assailant may continue to commit attacks and stimulate others to do the same.

METHOD OF PATROL

The wearing of various types of undercover body armor is a factor that could help reduce the risk of officer death or injury, especially during the first critical moment of an attack. Advances in technology and design are now bringing the use of police armor into the realm of practical consideration. Some armor vests, designed to be worn concealed under the uniform, are relatively comfortable, do not hinder movement, and are hidden from public view.

The controversy over the safety merit of the one and two-man patrol unit generally intensifies when threats or actual ambush assaults occur. Many police officers feel that the best possible protection both for the public and for themselves is use of the two-man patrol. It appears, however, that the exclusive use of either one- or two-man units will not solve the problem of ambush attacks. What needs to be considered are the realities of life regarding the sharp increase in attacks on police officers. There are areas in nearly every jurisdiction where it would be foolhardy to deploy officers in one-man cars.

Similarly, there are many areas where it would be a waste of manpower to deploy two-man cars. The criterion for assigning two-man cars in certain areas should be the frequency of multiple arrests and of arrests of persons who resist or who carry weapons. Essentially, two-man units should be placed in areas where there is a high frequency of confrontations beyond the capability of one officer to handle adequately.

The effectiveness of back-up units in ambush defense is as uncertain as the questionable superiority of either the one- or the two-man unit. Depending on the situation, the sight of two police vehicles with officers clustered in full view may present a target that invites ambush, or it may represent a show of force that deters such assaults.

OFFICER ALERTNESS

Although ambush is characterized by surprise, a police officer's first line of defense against being assaulted is his ability to anticipate danger by remaining alert for danger signs at all times. The signs of danger are as varied as an officer's job. Sometimes he will receive an unmistakable warning from his environment, perhaps an easily observable deviation in the pattern of normal activity within his patrol area. Other times, the only indication of potential danger will be a vague suspicion that he feels toward a specific person or situation.

When it precedes an ambush attempt, however, the realization that a situation requires caution is not enough to protect an officer from injury or death. It must be accompanied by appropriate defensive action. The following example shows how an officer safely escaped an ambush attempt by remaining alert and acting swiftly and effectively.

Walking his beat, a patrol officer turned onto a street that was usually crowded with residents trying to escape the summer heat of their homes. This particular evening, however, the block was deserted. The officer immediately withdrew into a doorway recess and radioed for assistance. The patrol car that responded searched the block but discovered nothing tangibly wrong. Nevertheless, the patrol officer was called back to headquarters, and his area was patrolled by a two-man unit for the balance of the night. Several days later an informant told the officer that, on the night of the incident, a young man had been boasting about plans to kill the patrolman. The suspect was arrested and admitted that the informant's story was true. His plan to kill the officer had been thwarted by the reaction of the intended victim and the appearance of a patrol car*.

*Ambush Attacks: A Risk Reduction Manual for Police, The Police Weapons Center, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Gaithersburg, Maryland, 1974, pp. 28-29.

In this incident, the officer's response to an unusual situation was as important as his perception of potential danger. If the officer had tried to investigate the matter on his own, instead of withdrawing and requesting assistance, he probably would have been attacked.

Unfortunately, not all of those who ambush police officers are as inept as the boastful young man in the case above. Many attacks are carried out after the victim has been lured into an ambush trap. Entrapment techniques vary, but all have the common purpose of maximizing the vulnerability of the police officer to unprovoked assault. The assailant selects an attack location, time, weapon and then attempts to attract his victim by deception. The bait for the ambush trap may be a false report, a planned fight, or any action that is likely to draw the attention of an unsuspecting officer.

The officer's best defense against entrapment techniques is again his ability to sense danger in the form of unusual behavior or circumstance and to take positive action. For example, telephone calls received by the dispatcher reporting incidents at odd hours or places should not be taken at face value. The officer receiving such a message should request a call-back number from the party. The dispatcher should verify the telephone number, name, and address of the caller by using cross-reference directories. The officers assigned to the scene should be informed immediately of whether it has been verified as a legitimate call. Another ruse used by assailants is to act suspiciously or actually commit a crime in full view of an officer to gain his attention. Pursuit by the officer leads him into a carefully planned ambush.

Some danger signals are peculiar to specific incidents. For instance, when investigating a reported residential burglary, the officer should note whether the house lights are on before getting out of his vehicle. If the caller had identified himself as a homeowner who had been burglarized, he will usually either meet the officer on the street or the house lights will be on. If the lights in the house are off and the homeowner is not found, it is possible that the call was fraudulent and used to attempt to entrap the officer. When an officer responds to a reported street robbery or is called to intervene in a disturbance, he should watch for a crowd as he approaches the scene. These types of incidents invariably attract curious onlookers, and their absence would indicate the possibility of entrapment.

Some danger signals are very general, such as lighting at night. The street, alley, or hallway that is not lit should be approached cautiously; the light may be malfunctioning or it may be an entrapment tactic. Activity and sound levels have to be accounted for as well. The patrol area that usually bustles with the movement and sounds of residents but that unexpectedly lacks activity indicates possible danger for police officers. Places that provide little means of escape, such as dead-end streets and alleys and elevators (which may be inoperative) are likely sites of ambush attacks. In all of these instances, the officer must be able to evaluate the potential significance of a danger signal within the context of the total situation.

Alertness to the signs of possible ambush, however, does not always protect officers from being assaulted. Despite exercising all reasonable caution, an officer can suddenly find himself the target of an unprovoked attack. When this occurs, his life will depend on how well and how quickly he takes protective action.

SUMMARY

Virtually an unknown occurrence until the past decade, the ambush attacks of police officers has become so prevalent that the police mission in this country is threatened. If not checked, unprovoked assaults of police officers could force law enforcement agencies to spend too much time and money on ensuring the safety of personnel and not enough on maintaining and improving service to the community.

But such is the nature of the ambush attack. More than the life of one officer is lost when he dies in an ambush; the morale of the entire police profession suffers serious wounds. To reduce the threat of ambush attacks calls for positive police leadership, good police-community relations, and properly trained and equipped police officers. Without efforts in these areas, the incidence of unprovoked assaults is likely to increase, further damaging the ability of the police to do their job.

Until the causes for ambush attempts of police officers are isolated and eliminated, however, the overriding concern of individual officers will continue to be very basic one - survival when attacked. It is what the officer does immediately when ambushed that is the most significant survival factor, and this is the subject of the following Training Key.

DISCUSSION GUIDE

1. Police-community relations can be a significant factor in deterring the threat of ambush attacks. Generally, the community that cooperates with its police force presents a disadvantageous setting for an assailant to attack officers. Where there are good relations between the community and police officers, the chances of ambush attacks being successful are minimized and the likelihood of the assailant being apprehended is maximized. Discuss the nature of police assaults or ambushes in your jurisdiction to determine whether police-community relations have played a part in either their occurrence or absence.

2. Discuss the following known facts about the ambush attack of Police officers:

A. Ambush Characteristics

...The attack generally begins and ends in seconds.

...The assailant achieves surprise by attacking from a concealed position or getting close to the officer without arousing his suspicions.

...The uniformed officer in or near his patrol car is the most likely ambush target.

...Ambush can occur on any day, although most likely to take place during the evening and early morning hours.

...The ambush attack of police officers occurs in both urban and rural areas.

...In the city, most assaults take place in residential areas.

...In the country, there is no locational pattern to attacks of officers.

...Generally, most ambushes are not the result of extensive planning.

b. Types of Ambushes

(1) Sniping

...The sniping incident is where an assailant uses a firearm from a concealed position.

...Sniping ambushes are generally executed from more than 50 yards and are of short duration.

(2) Direct Assault

...The direct assault is where the assailant attacks from close range without any attempt to conceal himself.

...The element of surprise is most important to assailants who attempt direct assaults because the officer may be able to counter offensively.

(3) Coordinated Attack

...The coordinated attack, where two or more assailants using firearms attack from preselected positions, are most deadly.

...These attacks call for extensive planning on the part of the assailants.

3. Although many small departments cannot afford to maintain specialized intelligence units, there are steps that these departments can take to gather and disseminate information. Local sources of information include the field records that patrol officers provide daily. The community itself, local businessmen and residents, is another source of intelligence, as are informants who provide valuable leads. Other sources, on the state and national levels, include the records of police departments and other criminal justice agencies and the National Crime Information Center. Discuss what your department can do to gather information on the following:

...Unprovoked attacks on police officers and use of entrapment techniques.

...Individuals who have threatened or injured police officers.

...Criminals who repeatedly are involved in violent acts.

...Individuals whose behavior indicates a disordered and violently antisocial personality.

QUESTIONS

The following questions are based upon material in this Training Key. Select the best answer.

1. Which one of the following patrol units provides the most safety to police officers from ambush attack?
 - (a) Two-man patrol unit.
 - (b) One-man patrol unit.
 - (c) Two-man unit with each officer alternating foot patrol.
 - (d) None of the above.

2. Which one of the following statements is generally true of ambush attacks?
 - (a) Most assailants are members of criminal organizations.
 - (b) Most ambushes are carefully planned.
 - (c) Most assaults are hastily conceived.
 - (d) Personal revenge plays a part in most ambushes.

3. The direct assault ambush attack is characterized by:
 - (a) The assailant attacking at close range without any effort to conceal himself.
 - (b) A long-range attack carried out from a concealed position.
 - (c) The use of firearms by two or more assailants from a preselected position.
 - (d) The assailant will fire only one shot and then generally retreat.

ANSWERS

1. (d) There is no direct relation between the threat of violence and the type of patrol unit.

2. (c) Most ambushes are crimes of opportunity.

3. (a) The direct assault ambush is carried out at close range by an assailant whose primary advantage is the element of surprise.

HAVE YOU READ . . . ?

Training Key # 172, Entrapment Bombing Techniques and Tactics. International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., 11 Firstfield Road, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760.

This Training Key discusses some of the tactics currently being used to lure police officers into bombing ambushes.

Special Weapons and Tactics

The success of special intervention operations at the scerfe of a high-risk emergency, such as a hostage-taking, often depends on the actions of the patrol officer whose responds first. By properly containing the incident, reporting the known facts of the crime, and establishing an inner perimeter to prevent criminal escape, patrol officers prepare the way for special team members. Patrol officer knowledge of the operations, training and equipment needs of special teams improves the overall police response to high-risk emergencies.

To answer the increasing number of high-risk incidents, such as sniper attacks and hostage takings, law enforcement agencies are creating specially trained and equipped units. These units have various names including Emergency Service Squad, Tactical Operations Unit, Special Operations Group, and Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT), but they all have the same primary goal, which is to protect lives and property during confrontations with armed, fortified criminals. The means needed to protect lives and property may vary from an immediate all-out assault to an extended negotiation period.

The creation of SWAT teams stems from the recognition that the traditional police response is neither suitable nor adequate in certain life-threatening emergencies. The uncoordinated effort of a few patrol officers armed with service revolvers is likely to fail when they face heavily armed criminals who are positioned to resist arrest. The task of intervening in such situations can best be accomplished by a group of highly disciplined officers training and equipped to oppose organized, armed resistance.

SWAT CONCEPT

The old adage that, "a gun and a badge do not a policeman make" can be recast as, "an automatic rifle and a flak jacket do not a SWAT team make" to apply to the professionalism demanded of SWAT members. Excellence cannot be achieved on a casual basis, nor does it depend entirely on sophisticated equipment. For these reasons, the SWAT concept emphasizes training, attitude, confidence, teamwork, information, controlled use of firepower, and self-control. The sucess of SWAT team should be measured by its ability to control high-risk situations without the use of unnecessary force.

This concept sharply contrasts with the glamorized and distorted image of SWAT as presented on television and in the movies. For the most part, SWAT has been depicted fictionally as an elite group of police officers who are trained, armed, and dressed like military commandos and whose mission is to track and kill an "enemy". This picture of SWAT is not only misleading but it may be counter-productive as well. It can create adverse public opinion of the police and kindle hatred and violence among the criminal element. More critical, such characterization may influence a department's formation of SWAT units, resulting in squads that are haphazardly organized, provided with ambiguous directives, inadequately trained, poorly equipped, and staffed by officers who have not been selected for their physical or psychological fitness.

SELECTION AND TRAINING

Selection of SWAT personnel is made from among sworn officers of a department who usually perform regular duties on a day-to-day basis even after they become members of the team. Whenever officers are assigned specific duties, such as robbery investigation or narcotics work, they are selected because of certain abilities and characteristics. The same is true for SWAT teams. Records of SWAT team members must indicate exemplary performance in their regular duties. They must be in good physical condition and should receive psychological testing to ensure that their emotional make-up is suitable for this kind of assignment. They should be capable of performing effectively and calmly in tense situations and display initiative, job interest, and dedication to police service. SWAT teams must be composed of officers who display a tremendous amount of confidence and self-control.

Since members of SWAT teams are assigned to regular duties, they are expected to participate in the normal in-service training activities of the department. However, their training must go beyond standard in-service activities, and the team members must develop and maintain the special skills required of SWAT teams.

SWAT training should be an ongoing process so that each team member is physically and mentally prepared to cope with high-risk situations at all times. Besides contributing to constant preparedness, continual training provides SWAT members with the opportunity to develop and maintain the teamwork that is necessary to effectively control dangerous situations.

In addition to rigorous physical and extensive firearms training, SWAT training should include night operations, camouflage and concealment procedures, building entry and search tactics, rappelling techniques, use of chemical agents, and first aid care. SWAT members should study the activities and techniques of terrorist groups and become familiar with the types of emotional disorders that cause certain individuals to behave violently. Such training helps the police officer to understand how a suspect might react, what motivates him, and how best to deal with him.

Typically, being a member of a SWAT team means accepting additional duties. SWAT election and training procedures should not, therefore, interfere with an officer's regular police duties. During regular duties, members of SWAT teams can impart their knowledge of special operations to other officers. Many SWAT tactics can be utilized by patrol officers during regular duties.

EQUIPMENT

To control situations where criminals are heavily armed, SWAT team members need to be equipped with special weapons, Semi-automatic rifles, shotguns, and high-powered anti-sniper rifles are usually in a SWAT team's arsenal. Each shoulder weapon should be equipped with a sling and noise suppressors should be available. Each team member should also carry his service revolver as a back-up weapon. Although team members are assigned specific weapons, each unit member should be required to regularly qualify with all special weapons issued to the team so that he can replace other officers in an emergency. The caliber of weapons used should be standardized so that ammunition is interchangeable.

The weapons and equipment needed to deal with a high-risk contingency must be readily transportable. Each team member may stow SWAT equipment in the trunk of his vehicle. If this is not possible, the equipment could be kept in the car trunk of a field supervisor who is likely to respond to a major incident.

Highly specialized equipment such as rappelling gear and manhole cover hooks and extra weapons and ammunition can be housed in a van. The van should be large enough to transport an entire team and to be used as a mobile command post.

SWAT apparel should consist of a dark-colored, two-piece fatigue uniform, bullet-resistant vests, jump boots and web gear with canteen, ammunition pouch, gas canisters, and first-aid kit. Dark leather gloves should be worn or carried in case window glass needs to be broken. Each team member should carry a flashlight, gas mask, signal light, knife, and portable radio. Some SWAT teams prefer use of flex-cuffs rather than metal cuffs. The former weigh less, are not noisy, and do not reflect light. Additional equipment that should be readily available includes binoculars, maps, rappelling gear, ropes, ladders, manhole cover hooks, pry bars, bolt cutters, and gas grenade launching equipment.

TEAM ORGANIZATION

The composition of a SWAT unit depends largely on the size and requirement of the agency. A small police department may need only a single SWAT unit, consisting of a two-man team, whereas a large agency may require several large SWAT units.

In addition to department size and mission, the number of personnel assigned to SWAT units depends on administrative considerations such as available personnel and resources.

Regardless of size, the team should train and respond to any assignment as a unit. Each member should be cross-trained to perform all of the duties of other team members. Each team should be organized and trained so that it can work in conjunction with other teams during intricate operations. Teams from small agencies, which may depend on the other's assistance in emergencies, should be similarly equipped and trained together where possible.

INITIAL RESPONSE

Patrol officers are usually the first law enforcement personnel to arrive at the scene of emergencies including incidents where armed suspects are holding hostages or are barricaded. In such cases, patrol officers must determine whether immediate intervention is appropriate. When direct assault is not appropriate, the patrol objective is to determine the exact location and nature of the incident, relay all available information to the dispatcher, and begin to contain the movement of the criminals*. It is the dispatcher's responsibility to notify the ranking on-duty officer of the emergency.

Police officers should position themselves so that they have a clear view of all entrances and exits from the incident scene. When only two officers are initially present, the best coverage is maintained by the officers taking up positions in opposing quadrants. The quadrant method of perimeter control consists of viewing the incident location as a square or rectangle. Each officer, by positioning himself at a diagonally opposite corner of the square, can observe two sides of the crime scene. Inner perimeter control positions should be places where control can be exercised yet where cover or concealment is readily available. Persons should not be allowed to enter the inner perimeter, and those leaving the location must be identified and interviewed as to their knowledge of the incident.

Units responding to the patrol officers' request for assistance should not drive into the inner perimeter zone; they should park about one block from the location and proceed from there on foot. The officers who initially established the perimeter can direct responding units to various positions.

A command post must be situated in a location that facilitates control of the operation. The command post should direct the establishment of an outer perimeter of sufficient area to create a buffer zone of control. The outer perimeter controls movement into and out of the general area. When possible, the outer perimeter should be located out of firing range of the crime scene.

*Training Key # 234, "Hostage-Incident Response", discusses in detail containment procedures to be followed by patrol officers.

When SWAT teams have assembled at the incident location, they should relieve the patrol officers in the inner perimeter positions. Replacement of regular officers with specialized personnel is advantageous when an external building assault is required. However, if there are not sufficient SWAT teams to effect building entry and maintain the inner perimeter, then the patrol officers will retain their positions on the inner perimeter while the SWAT team is positioned for entry. SWAT team members should remain positioned for quick entry even where negotiations for a peaceful settlement have been initiated.

PREPARATION

Planning and preparing for a police mission is important under any circumstance; it is crucial to SWAT operations. Before undertaking a mission, the following questions should be answered:

- What is the purpose of the mission?
- Where are the criminals located?
- Who are the criminals?
- How are they armed?
- How are they equipped?
- Are the criminals organized?
- What is their number?
- Are there snipers in the area?
- Will the command post remain in its present location throughout the operation?
- Are lines of communication with the command post and other police units available throughout the mission?
- Are other law enforcement officers, firemen, or civilians in the area?
- Are they aware of the mission?
- Are maps, photographs and building plans available?
- What are the best points of entry?
- What are the best alternative entry points?

A primary source of this information is the patrol officer at the scene of the emergency. His first-hand reports to the dispatcher, which are relayed to other police personnel, provide the SWAT team with much of the information needed to initiate successful operation.

Once these general questions have been answered, more specific planning can begin. In most cases, time will work to the advantage of the SWAT team. While speed is important, it is secondary to preparation.

BUILDING ASSAULT

The entry point for a SWAT team should be determined by studying the floor plans of the building under seige and its surrounding areas.

Entry should be made from the least vulnerable point of observation and whenever possible, the search should begin at the top of the building and carried out moving downward through the building. This search method may provide the SWAT unit with a psychological advantage that can lead to a tactical one. The criminals may hear the movement of the searching officers overhead and move closer to ground level to find possible escape routes. If the criminals attempt to flee the building from near the ground level, they can be apprehended by officers maintaining the inner perimeter.

Before selecting an entering point, the SWAT team should observe as much of the building's interior as possible using periscopes or contrivances such as mirrors or rods. If entry is to be made through a locked wooden door, a jimmy tool or crow bar can be used to pry the door open. If the door is made of steel, the lock cylinder can be twisted off with vice-like tools and the locking device punched out. Using a shoulder weapon to shoot the lock out is a last resort only.

When entry is to be made through a window, team members should try to find an opened or unlocked window. If a secured window is the point of entry, it should be broken completely out to avoid injury from jagged glass remains.

Regardless of which entry point is utilized, officers should wait momentarily before entering to avoid ambush fire. A periscopic device should be used to observe the interior for the criminals or any booby traps or channeling obstructions they have placed inside. Moving quickly beyond the opening to eliminate exposure time, the first assault officer should seek cover in a predetermined location in the room. If cover is unavailable, he should squat in the combat firing position, minimizing his vulnerability as a target.

The next officer to enter either waits for a signal or pauses momentarily and then moves into the opposite side of the room. He waits to avoid possible gun fire directed toward the first officer's movement through the opening. By taking up positions on opposite sides of the room, officers are prepared to bring direct fire on the criminal. When the location of the criminals is unknown, officers entering the building should point their weapons toward the portion of the room not in their sight. It is likely that the criminal will be in a position where he cannot be hit by direct fire through the doorway.

After entering the building and searching the immediate area, the team is ready to search the remainder of the building. The method of entering interior doors should be the same method used when moving through exterior doorways. When the team enters the hallway, a designated member should provide cover to prevent surprise attacks by the criminals from adjacent rooms. Team members should keep low and present as small silhouette as possible, utilizing maximum cover and crawling if necessary to designated positions. A periscopic device can be used to peer around corners and doorways.

As the team moves down a hallway, it should search the nearest room first, while other team members guard the hall. Each subpart of the room should be searched in the same manner as the main room - one officer moving in and the other officer pausing just a moment and then moving through. After the room has been searched, the team returns to the hallway and continues with the next nearest room.

When moving up or down a stairway, the lead officer's weapon should be positioned for immediate and effective fire. Although the second officer should not have his weapon cocked because of the danger of accidental firing, he should have it positioned for immediate firing at areas away from the preceding man.

When the criminals have been captured or eliminated, the search team should continue its search pattern until the entire building is secured. The continued search will ensure that all accomplices, hostages, and victims are found.

SUMMARY

A SWAT team is made up of personnel who are specially equipped and trained to intervene in high-risk situations. SWAT team operations supplement, rather than replace, the patrol function in emergencies. Even in jurisdictions having specialized emergency teams, patrol officers are responsible for making the initial decisions that are crucial to the effectiveness of further police action. Officers will find that many of the principles and tactics employed by SWAT teams are applicable to incidents encountered during their regular patrol duties.

DISCUSSION GUIDE

1. Discuss why many police departments have established specially trained and equipped units to handle high-risk situations:

- ...Traditional patrol response is not suitable for high-risk incidents involving sniper fire or armed, barricaded suspects.

- ...Perpetrators of these incidents are usually prepared and capable of resisting the efforts of one or two officers armed with service revolvers only.

- ...The uncoordinated response of many officers in a highly emotional situation is often futile and can result in tragic consequences.

- ...Police officers are trained to function as individuals, make independent judgments, and use their discretion.

- ...Such training, although essential to the conduct of the police mission under normal circumstances, poses a problem in a high-risk situation requiring coordinated effort and teamwork.

- ...The task of stopping attacks in high-risk incidents can best be accomplished with a small group of highly disciplined officers using special weapons and tactics.

- ...The unit's activity is designed to neutralize the opposition with judicious application of deadly force.

2. In most police departments, members of SWAT units are regularly assigned officers performing normal daily police duties. The unit is activated only when needed and for training. Beside intervening in high-risk incidents, such as the scene of armed, barricaded criminals, discuss other times SWAT teams can be utilized.

- ...protect police officers from sniper attack when officers engage in controlling a riotous crowd.

- ...maintain high ground security for visiting dignitaries.

- ...protect command post established at a major incident from sniper fire.

3. It is imperative that each member of a SWAT team be in communication with the other members while on assignment. When the team is moving close together, hand and arm signals are best used. Where team members cannot see each other, each unit should have and utilize a portable radio. A radio unit with a mike clipped on the shirt and ear plug speakers may be ideal. Discuss the communication system your SWAT teams use.

4. The use of chemical agents to disable barricaded criminals is frequently considered in SWAT operations. Discuss the basic technique in using tear gas against barricaded criminals.
 - ...When the room occupied by the criminal is known, projectiles or expulsion grenade should be fired into adjoining rooms to prevent his movement.
 - ...Before entering the location of the criminal, an expulsion grenade should be used.
 - ...The officer should wait a short period to allow the room to be completely engulfed with chemical fumes before entering.
 - ...In an attempt to avoid tear gas, the criminal may hide in the bathroom, wrapping his face in wet towels and running water in an effort to avoid the gas.

5. Use of police dogs to help search a building should be considered when the exact location of the suspects is not known. Because of their extraordinary smell and hearing senses, canines have a distinct advantage over humans in detecting hidden persons. Although the life of a police dog is more expendable than that of an officer, canines should not be employed indiscriminately against armed, barricaded suspects. Since canines will directly charge armed men, the dogs' life may be sacrificed in these circumstances with no tactical advantage gained.

QUESTIONS

The following questions are based on material in this Training Key. Select the best answers.

1. In the selection of SWAT personnel, which of the factors is considered most important?
 - (a) The candidate's ability with firearms.
 - (b) The candidate's ability to react under pressure.
 - (c) The candidate's understanding of terrorist tactics.
 - (d) The candidate's dedication to the police profession.

2. Whenever possible, building entry by a SWAT team should be made:
 - (a) At the ground level.
 - (b) Through a ground level window.
 - (c) From the top of a building.
 - (d) Through a door.

3. Which of the following is not a responsibility of the patrol officer at the scene of a high-risk emergency?
 - (a) Determine whether immediate intervention is appropriate.
 - (b) Determine the location and nature of the incident.
 - (c) Begin to contain the incident.
 - (d) Establish an outer perimeter around the crime scene.

ANSWERS

1. (b) The first requirement of SWAT team members is to function professionally in crisis situations.
2. (c) Descending from the top of a building seals off all avenues of escape.
3. (d) The outer perimeter is established simultaneously with the command post.

HAVE YOU READ . . . ?

Ambush Attacks: A Risk Reduction Manual for Police, International Association of Chiefs of Police (Gaithersburg, Maryland), 1974, 106 pages.

A detailed study of ambush attacks against police officers. Recommendations for improved police tactical procedures, equipment, and training are made.

FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, "SWAT - The Los Angeles Police Special Weapons and Tactics Teams" (Washington, D. C.), April 1972.

A description of the Los Angeles Police Department's SWAT Team.

OPERATIONS ANALYSIS AND CORRECTIONS

By John J. Marsh

Introduction

From the Manhattan Project of World War II to the Weapon System concept of the Missile Age the genius of American science and industry has proved itself more than equal to the challenge of research needs in the national defense sector.

Current concern in the political and social sector regarding the "quality of life" clearly points up a challenge equal to that of national survival in a military sense. Can any of the procedures and techniques by which we responded to the challenge of Axis Totalitarianism and Soviet Sputnikery be applied to the myriad of our social and environmental problems? What of the modern managerial and evaluative systems of science and industry in dealing with crime and corrections?

Don Gottfredson, research director of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, described the situation with respect to information bases for evaluating correctional rehabilitation programs as "deplorable". This statement was made in 1967. Do things look any better now?

Dr. George Beto in his presidential address to the American Correctional Association in 1970 said.

"The future will bring more research. I know of no institution, unless it be organized Christianity, which has shown a greater reluctance to measure the effectiveness of its varied programs than has corrections. We engage in many allegedly rehabilitative practices but we have little to show that they are successful in achieving the objectives which we have set for ourselves, namely redirecting and restructuring the life of the offender. Many of our programs may be good, they may be effective, but they are based upon an unvalidated assumption; we have no assurance - without effective measurement found in research - that these programs are effective and successful".

A specific type of research is known as evaluative research. It is the research we do to determine how things are going - it is product evaluation - it is very pragmatic and result oriented. There are several approaches that can be used in research evaluation in corrections. One most effective to use in the evaluation of the total environment is operations analysis.

Analysis Defined

Operations analysis has been defined by one of its leading

practicioners and theoreticians, Charles J. Hitch, as "the use of systematic quantitative analysis to aid in the making of management decisions".

The key words are "systematic", "quantitative", "analysis" and "decisions". It is systematic in that it involves all of the components and their relationships that are involved in the situation and its result(s).

Thus it is scientific and goal directed. It is quantitative in that every attempt is made to measure the components, their relationships and effects.

The analyst is the first to admit that some things virtually defy measurement but he insists that every effort be made to do so as this is a sine qua non for the evaluation of results and the selection of alternatives.

Analysis is the point at which considerable ingenuity must be used to assemble the quantified elements and relationships in such a way that they lead to and facilitate the decision process. The analysis may take the form of charts, diagrams, tables or, most often, mathematical formulae.

Finally, the analyst would be the last person to suggest that the mathematical result of the analysis is actually the decision. The decision is made by humans, the mathematical results of the analysis and the computer that very often help to produce those results are simply tools to facilitate the human judgement process which leads to a decision.

Second Basic Concept

A second basic concept essential to this discussion is really a part or sub-element of operations analysis but, like Dr. Frankenstein's creation, it has become more important than its creator. It is an expansion of the analysis or model building part of the process into an entity of its own.

It must be remembered that, like all true scientists, the operations analyst considers process as important as product and that the process is valuable even when it does not lead to a viable conclusion. Operations analysis techniques should be used when we suspect that they may not produce a quantifiable result; the process produces a better understanding of the problem and its components than any other method even when we cannot produce quantifications for the decision maker.

A. H. Parker gives the following as the objectives of model building:

1. It trains people in the performance of complex tasks.
2. It provides a research tool.
3. It aids in decision-making in the following manners:
 - a. As a study of complex systems for the purpose of system design where interactions are too complex to be understood and simulation can provide insight.
 - b. As a test of proposed solutions and hypotheses.
 - c. As a quantification of the improvement anticipated from the use of a proposed analytically derived solution.
 - d. To prove the value of proposed changes and to present them in a manner that enhances acceptance of change and facilitates implementation.

The final concept to be explored is to consider the nature and purpose of corrections. One statement of the purpose is that it is to operate a system of facilities to confine persons committed thereto for the purpose of their removal for the safety of society while every effort is expended to develop their ability to function as mature and ethical persons who are sensitive to the rights of others and who are able and willing to act with responsibility in the society they will eventually be released to.

The Thesis

From these three concepts flows a thesis. The thesis is that application of the operations analysis techniques will enable us to maximize the purpose of corrections through the analysis and quantification of the elements and relationships of all parts of the correctional environment in their individual and collective impact upon that purpose.

Most pertinent is the position that many wardens and other correctional personnel find themselves in continuously, that of rushing from one crisis to another, reacting to what has already happened without a clear understanding of why it happened and what to do to prevent it in the future. Far worse is that when things are going well in the institution there is little objective judgement as to the real causes.

Recent issues of journals in the fields of operations analysis, social science, education and medicine as well as other fields discuss methods and applications of systems analysis, data

processing, mathematical modeling, etc., but none have as yet contained any discussion of these concepts applied to correctional facilities, systems, etc.

An Application

One possible application of operations analysis in corrections will serve to show the value of this approach. The application is taken through various stages that the operations analyst goes through to perform his function. There is no data to use but a discussion of how it will be obtained and a possible model that can be used are presented. One problems of corrections that has a significant relationship to the rehabilitation goal is that of the prison revolt.

This problem should be well suited to operations analysis and a study of it may lead not only to its alleviation but to a better understanding of the convict rehabilitation process, which in turn will enable the corrections worker to develop a better mix of environmental components to maximize rehabilitative growth and development for each particular inmate type.

The riot is only one of several situations which could be evaluated with this technique but it is the best one to use to introduce operations analysis to the correction field. This is because the riot is a clearly identifiable event and stimulates much interest and concern. Most of all it has an impact that generates a great demand and support from all sectors for analysis and evaluation.

Systems Appraisal

A systems approach to the problem of prison revolt requires first that objectives be established. In this instance the objectives are (1) to find out which elements seem to precede or cause a prison riot and what are their critical levels, (2) to be able to plot a trend in a particular institution towards or away from a riot and thus have a "thermometer" to measure current and predict future "health" of that institution and (3) to know what types of inmate and institutional activities seem to counteract or contraindicate an inmate revolt.

The proposal is to examine several riots or disturbances in recent times in prisons. For statistical purposes there should be as many situations studied as possible, 30 is the ideal. The purpose is to look for all the factors present which could conceivably have any effect, pro or con (pun intended), on the behavior of the inmates and the staff vis-a-vis a riot or similar disturbance. Up to this point what is proposed is not unlike what has been done on a very limited basis in the past. There are major differences, however, from here on.

First, the persons who would be performing the study would be objectives trained researchers in the behavioral and social sciences, not law enforcement, corrections, judicial, or political figures who have done the post-mortems in the past in response for the demand to fix the blame while the ashes are still warm.

Secondly there would be an open minded approach with no preconceived ideas, old traditions, etc. There would also be a heavy emphasis on the recent findings of social psychology, environmentalism, ethnology, life space behavior determinants, etc.

Finally as this team of researchers made their observations they would construct arbitrary measurement scales. In many instances these would be highly subjective but as long as the same scale is used in all cases there is no problem in the subsequent mathematical analysis.

The exchange of views among all the observers would tend to keep all of the measurement scales similiar.

Some of the measurement scales will not require subjective judgement but will be very objective. Square feet of living space per inmate or ratio of inmates to correctional staff are examples. The subjective and arbitrary measurement scales would apply to such matters as the quality of the food, the attitude of the staff towards the inmates, the physical appearance of the confinement areas, etc. Even here, by use of existing or specially designed attitude or value scales, a high degree of objectivity is possible.

Factor Number Problem

It is rather obvious at this point that there is a problem in determining the number of factors to be evaluated. The number is infinite and will include many that are virtually

uncontrollable by the prison authorities; Societal attitudes, the political process, the ethnic mix of the region are all examples.

All factors must be measured or quantified if there is any chance that they could be related to the riot. Cost and time are limitations. It must be remembered that this exercise is a search for information and understanding and there must be a beginning even if it is not as complete as desired.

Simultaneous with the evaluation and identification of the factors that seem related there is to be a measurement of the riot. This is a collective judgement and a severity scale of one to 10 might be used with the final score being a consensus of the individual observers. Considerable discussion would be necessary to determine what causes a severity judgement - loss of life, taking of hostages, fire building damage, duration of riot, etc. Again the use of many judgements for each situation and the evaluation of many situations will tend to equalize the deviations caused by personal bias. This is the basis of all statistical research.

Final Data

At this point the data looks something like this:

- (1) A degree of agreement about the environmental factors from the observers as to their possible relationship to riots. These factors may have been present in some or all of the riots. These are negative as well as positive factors and may number into the hundreds.
- (2) For each specific factor in every riot or disturbance there is a consensual numerical value assigned.
- (3) For each riot there is also a measurement on a severity scale.

Now is the time for the mathematical modeling, electronic data processing and the computer. There are several techniques which can be used, including a method familiar to research statisticians known as multiple regression analysis.

This is an approach which determines the degree to which each factor, singly and in all possible combinations, is significantly related to the result, in this case the prison disturbance.

Common Technique

Another commonly used technique that could be applied is that of the matrix model in which algebraic formulae can be used to help select the factors to be concentrated on by applying their cost in resources to their probability of effect. These preceding excursions into the world of statistics and data processing are admittedly very superficial and are, at best, a very light treatment of very involved procedures. What has been done, however, is to give an indication to the non-statistically oriented corrections person and a challenge to the non-corrections oriented statistician that they should get together.

In the decision making stage, when the corrections system must deal with the results of the operations analyst efforts, it must be remembered that:

1. The inmate and his environment are in a constant state of flux. A single reading on a "thermometer" is not enough. Either a trend or a continuation of an unacceptable "high" must be present. There are certain "anti-bodies" present in the inmate population to prevent revolt. Strengthening these as a preventive is better than after-the-fact employment of "riot forces".
2. All courses of action must be measured in economic terms. The high cost of a particular course of action is less of a barrier if it has a 90% chance of preventing a disturbance than if it only has 10% chance. The economic cost of the factors must be considered as well as their probability and degree of success and the probability of the situation we are trying to forestall.
3. In the area of social engineering, more than any other, the statistics and mathematics are only catalysts to clarify and quantify alternatives. They are no substitute for judgement and are suspect when they seem to contradict logic.

It can be postulated that the state of a penal institution, like most social institutions, can be plotted on a continuum. If revolt is at one end, then the other can be said to be the Utopian goal of zero recidivism and 100% rehabilitation. In this paper an analysis of the organizational state with respect to one end of the continuum has been discussed. It is fundamental that the other end is also being indirectly evaluated at the same time. A direct analysis of the positive, rehabilitation

end can be performed with essentially the same procedures by plugging different components into the research procedure, statistics and mathematical models.

Conclusion

From Herman Kahn's war studies at the Hudson Institute to some efforts at the local level on pollution and other urban problems there have been increasingly successful efforts to use operations analysis to manage and predict psycho-social events. The operations analysis technique and point of view is flexible enough to satisfy the liberal, exact enough to please the conservative, truth-seeking enough to fascinate the academician and pragmatic enough to entrance the disciplinarian.

Several authorities and one state level task force have suggested that prisons have proved a failure at reform or rehabilitation and should be closed. This may be so but to arbitrarily close them down without knowing why they have failed and how and where they have had some successes is sheer folly. Errors in medicine that are final are the subject of a pathological analysis to find the reason. For this reason, if no other, we must evaluate corrections before we decide to commit it to a burial place for moribund institutions.

Corrections personnel will fail if they do not consider all aspects of the inmate and the correctional environment. Whether we want to prevent upheaval by inmate revolt or, more important, increase the development of mature and responsible persons, we must evaluate and quantify what we are trying to do, what means we are using, and what progress we are making.

Operations analysis is an excellent technique which hasn't been used. It deserves a chance.

GROUP DYNAMICS IN THE PRISON COMMUNITY

Morris G. Caldwell

The thesis upon which this paper is predicated may be briefly stated: A scientific knowledge of the dynamic interrelations existing between social groups within the prison community is indispensable to the prison administrator, warden, deputy warden, heads of prison departments, and other members of the prison staff. The orderly operation of a prison or prison system depends primarily upon a sociological understanding of the nature of the functional relations existing between the formal personnel groups and the informal inmate groups within the prison community. These functional relationships may be comprised under the caption, "Group Dynamics". In other words, this paper deals specifically with the dynamic relations existing between the informal social structure of the prison community and the formal social structure. The data for this paper are based upon investigations of prisons in five mid-western and southern states, and previous studies of the prison community.

The prison community is a relational system in which a number of persons, inmates and personnel, interact overtly and covertly with one another according to specially prescribed rules of behavior. Within the confines of the prison locale, inmates and staff participate jointly in many of the common social relationships and activities found in "free" communities outside prison walls. These relationships and activities include the production of agricultural and industrial products, the utilization of health services, the acquirement of academic, vocational, and industrial education, participation in religious services, participation in recreational activities and programs, and cooperation in many other communal activities. However, the prison relational system presents a dichotomous community consisting of the formal prison structure and the informal prison structure. Professors Hayner and Ash have attempted to distinguish these two structures by using the term "prison community" to indicate the formal prison organization and the term "prisoner community" to signify the informal group structure. Nevertheless, these two parts of the prison structure are inseparable. Definite functional relationships exist between them, which directly affect the success or failure of prison administration and the rehabilitative programs. Wardens, superintendents of correctional institutions, and other prison administrators should be keenly aware of these functional interrelationships.

Theory Of Informal Groups

An informal social group may be thought of as a number of persons possessing established patterns of social interaction, similar social attitudes, social values, and group loyalties, mutual interests, and the faculty of cooperation in the performance of a natural function. Membership in informal groups may range from a minimum of three persons to as many as twenty-five or more, depending upon the needs and interests of the persons concerned. The members generally display similar types of attitudinal behavior and adhere to the same set of social values. An important interest of informal groups centers around the cooperative performance of a natural function. In a prison community for adult males this function may be the making of moonshine liquor, gambling, or engaging in homosexual practices. The informal group may logically be designated as a "natural group" because of its universal existence and the fact that it emerges naturally in all types of environments and social situations to fulfill personality needs not satisfied by formal organizations. These informal groups have been delineated in large industrial organizations, labor organizations, business establishments, the army, college and university fraternities and sororities, women's dormitories, boys' clubs, churches, and in many other establishments where persons interact with one another. The informal group is similar to Cooley's concept of the primary group in that contacts are intimate face-to-face contacts. Also, the informal group may be regarded as a "natural group" since the interactions occur spontaneously and naturally as contrasted with the prescribed rules for group behavior in the formal group.

The formal group according to Professor Gittler orders the relations between persons in "explicit rules set down in constitutions, established precedents, charters of incorporation, and directives... Interpersonal relationships of members are impersonal, formal, deliberate, rational, and planned". Thus, it is apparent that the concept of the informal group presented above can readily be distinguished from the formally organized group.

Formal Organization Of The Prison

For the purpose of carrying out the legal and administrative objectives of the prison program, the civilian personnel is organized into a number of closely related formal prison groups. These formal staff and personnel groups have the responsibility for organizing the work, maintenance, and

rehabilitative programs of the prison, and classifying the inmates into formal work groups and maintenance units for the accomplishment of these same prison objectives. These formal groups, both personnel and inmate, are coordinated and integrated into a functioning social system in an administratively efficient prison. This system constitutes the formal group organization and formal social structure of the prison.

In a typical prison for adult male offenders, the formal organization includes the warden at the top of the hierarchy, a deputy warden in charge of custody, a deputy warden responsible for the rehabilitative program, the prison guards, superintendent of prison industries, superintendent of prison farms, superintendent of prison road camps, director of classification, clinical psychologist, prison physician, superintendent of education, the chaplain, recreational director, institutional parole officer, and perhaps other specialized personnel. These functionaries, which head up the formal personnel groups, give leadership and direction to the prison program, and are responsible for executing the work and rehabilitative programs of the prison.

Informal Organization Of The Prison

The available data indicate that a very large proportion of prison inmates are organized into small informal, natural or primary groups, based upon common interests or the performance of natural functions of some kind. These informal groups, which may relate to such activities as "moonshining", gambling, sexual perversion, or the manufacture of weapons, are only loosely coordinated into an overall informal prison system, because of restrictions placed upon them by the formal system. Nevertheless, the informal prison system exists as a very real threat and potent danger to the formal prison program. At any rate a state of covert conflict, "psychological warfare", or open hostilities may develop between the groups constituting the two systems. If the conflict becomes too severe, the informal groups may go "underground" and perform many of their activities "sub-rosa".)

The informal prison organization of a certain medium-sized women's prison recently presented the unique and amazing phenomenon of two opposing and conflicting linear type sub-systems or series, which may be designated as Series "X" and Series "Y". Each series consisted of a number of

informal personnel groups and informal inmate groups united in a chain-like sort of arrangement (Chart 1). Series "X", which was headed by a high-ranking prison official, may be represented as consisting of six informal groups, "a", "c", "d", "e", and "f". Series "Y", captained by one of the prison matrons, may be shown as comprising six other informal groups, "m", "n", "o", "p", "q", and "r". Each series developed effective methods of gossip and rumor, conflict, espionage, aggression, and spying on the other side. The leader of Series "Y" developed ingenious methods of discovering, sabotaging, and upsetting the secret plans of the "X" Series of favored cliques. The leader of the "X" Series, with strong moral support of her clique sisters, retaliated in kind. The leaders of both series had strong political support outside the institution. Neither side was strong enough to overthrow or destroy the other. Thus, the institution reached a battle stalemate along its 38th parallel", with no possibility of a permanent truce.

Types Of Informal Prison Groups

Donald Clemmer found that informal prison groups were based upon such factors as "mutual home background, association in crime, expressed or unexpressed homosexual attraction, mutual toleration by a forced propinquity, and the wish of a submissive personality to share in the prestige of a notorious and dominant criminal and the men who plot and plan for future crime". Also, the pursuit of common interests and the desire to participate in the performance of one or more natural functions should be added to the foregoing list of factors motivating informal group formation and behavior.

On the basis of on-the-spot investigations in a selected number of men's prisons, it is possible to differentiate a number of important informal inmate groups as follows:

(1) The politicians or "Big Shots". The politicians have achieved distinction as a group in the prisoner community because of their checkered criminal careers and participation in one or more notorious crimes. Their chief functions in the prison consist in seizing power, and the planning of sabotage, strikes, riots, and future prison breaks.

(2) The "Right Guys". The right guys exert tremendous power and influence over other inmates in enforcing strict observance of the "prisoners' Code". They are eternally vigilant in exploiting all opportunities for better jobs, improvement in living conditions, and eventual discharge.

(3) The "Moonshiners". The moonshiners comprise those inmates who engage in the secret manufacture and sale of moonshine liquor to other inmates. The ingredients of this spirituous concoction may include shaving lotion, listerine antiseptic, shoe polish, rubbing alcohol, sugar stolen from the commissary, and perhaps other available components. This liquor is in considerable demand by the "long termers", neurotic prisoners, and depressed inmates who require exotic stimulation.

(4) The Dope Peddlers. In many institutions a small informal group of inmate dope peddlers has the monopoly on the distribution and sale of narcotics at exorbitant prices to fellow inmates. Narcotics are often smuggled into an institution by unreliable guards and irresponsible visitors, who act as liaison agents for the drug traffic. The hazards of prison dope peddling are very great; however, the financial returns are fabulous, and the inmate consumer receives temporary release from the monotony, routine, and tensions of prison life.

(5) The Larceny Boys. The larceny boys make a special business of stealing the personal belongings of unsuspecting prisoners and selling the loot to still other inmates. This practice is not generally regarded by the inmates as petty larceny, but as part of a larger program for "sharing the wealth". Crime is regarded as a phenomenon of free competitive society, and not of communal society such as a prison.

(6) The Gambling Syndicate. Gambling in prison is often organized into a hierarchy consisting of several informal gambling groups. A monopoly of gambling may exist within the institution whereby the Kingpin at the top of the hierarchy exacts a toll, tax or levy from the stakes of each game played. Recently the chief gambler at a certain institution was released on parole with sufficient capital to start three legitimate businesses.

(7) Leather Workers. The leather workers consist of one or more informal groups which devote all of their leisure time to the manufacture of artistic leather goods for sale to the public. These leather products consist of purses, handbags, watchbands, briefcases, and other leather items.

The prison administration generally encourages this type of work because of the vocational values, skills, and techniques acquired by a selected number of inmates.

(8) The Religionists. Many prisons have one or more fanatically religious groups which believe in giving emotional expression to their radical religious beliefs at any time or place within the institution. They read the Scriptures aloud, pray long and fervently, and sing hallelujahs in the prison shops and factories, and in their cells. They believe that the "Spirit of the Lord" is upon them at all times. Jehovah's Witnesses is one of the most important of these informal religious groups.

(9) The Homosexuals or "Wolves". The prison community is abnormal in that it is a one-sex community. The prison rules and regulations strongly disapprove of all types of sex expression. The resulting sex repression and frustration create an environmental climate within the prison conducive to the emergence of homosexuality, which may take the form of promiscuity, prostitution, or even "marriage". The marital form of homosexuality may be preceded by courtship and dating behavior, and consummated by an actual "ceremony". In a medium sized adult male prison, we were recently able to identify 50 married pairs, or a total of 100 homosexuals, not including the prostitutes. Tremendous social pressures in the form of bribes, or threats of bodily harm or death are applied to the innocent new inmate to yield during his first few nights in prison. Once initiated into the "fraternity of homosexuals" the neophyte is powerless to escape from the informal sexual system.

(10) Manufacturers of Weapons. The prison also has its informal inmate groups secretly engaged in the production and sale of weapons to other inmates, such as knives, saws, hatchets, black jacks, whips, and the like. These weapons are purchased by other inmates for one of the following purposes: (a) as personal protection against the aggressive trends of other inmates; (b) as a weapon used by homosexuals to protect their "gal-boys" against the sexual advances of other inmates; and (c) to increase the inmate stockpile of inmate weapons in the event of a possible prison riot or prison break and escape.

(11) The Spartans. The Spartans, an absolutely harmless informal group, are primarily interested individually and as a group in displaying their physical bodies in the nude.

They take great delight in strutting about the locker rooms, showers and toilets, flexing their muscles, displaying their sexual organs, and exhibiting the hair on their breasts as evidence of masculinity.

All inmates are aware of the existence of these informal inmate groups, and the possibilities for "mutual aid" between them during periods of crisis, riots, escapes and wholesale prison breaks. However, because of strict discipline by the formal prison organization, these informal groups may be only loosely coordinated into an overall system during prison "peace times".

Status Systems in Prison

Status means position or standing accorded the individual inmate by his fellow inmates. Status does not necessarily imply high standing, but simply position along the social scale. Role, on the other hand, is the pattern or type of behavior which the inmate builds up within himself in terms of what other inmates expect of him. Role consists of activity; status is the place achieved by an inmate on the prestige scale. Prison status may be either ascribed or achieved. Ascribed status is generally formulated in advance by cultural definition, and signifies some characteristic feature, such as age, race, intelligence, or family background of the inmate. Achieved status is acquired by the individual inmate because of choice, special ability, or unique achievement. Factors in the achievement of status may include previous criminal record, observance of the "prisoners' code", personality, educational status, work placement within the prison, type of custody, informal group membership, type of visitors, and type of political connections with the outside world.

Data from several prisons show that prison inmates and prison personnel behave in terms of a deeply-entrenched status hierarchy, a well-developed behavioral patterns are the principal factors which assign prison personnel to a superordinate position and prison inmates to a subordinate position in the status system. Prison life is a status continuum or prestige scale. Each individual inmate achieves or is assigned a position on this scale by his fellow inmates.

Caste and Class Aspects Of Prison Organization

The prison community displays many features of caste and class behavior. The warden, prison officials, guards, heads of

departments, and the prison rehabilitative personnel constitute the upper caste, while the inmates form the lower caste. The foregoing division is evidence of caste structure because the opportunities for vertical mobility on the "social ladder" are exceedingly limited. The relations between these two social strata are formal and impersonal. Members of each stratum regard the members of the other caste as stereotypes, rather than as personalities. The officials and other prison personnel expect and demand obedience, humility, and deference from the inmate group. The members of the inmate group, on the other hand, anticipate these caste-like requirements, and respond overtly and artificially by submissive behavior and submerged hostility toward the prison upper caste. However, these hostile attitudes and aggressive trends towards the upper caste may often find expression in flagrant criticism of the prison administration, high-level intrigue, and open rebellion in the form of prison riots.

Stratification in the form of social classes may be found in both the upper prison caste and the lower inmate caste. However, class lines are more sharply differentiated in the inmate group. The inmate group or lower caste in most prisons may be sub-divided into five major social classes as follows.

(1) The upper class, consisting primarily of the politicians and others with superior status. This group is interested in social power and the control of inmate public opinion.

(2) The middle class, consisting of the "right guys", is vitally interested in preserving and enforcing the "Prisoners' Code".

(3) The lower class includes the uneducated, unskilled, the mentally retarded, and abnormal sex offenders.

(4) The neophytes or "fish" consist of the newcomers, who are principally young first offenders.

(5) Stool pigeons or social outcasts. These inmates are lowest in the social scale, because of their espionage activities conducted in behalf of the prison administration.

In southern prisons with large proportions of Negro offenders, the inmate group or lower caste may further be subdivided into a white sub-caste and a Negro sub-caste--each sub-caste retaining its own distinctive class system.

Inmate Leadership

Inmate leadership in the prison community differs greatly from democratic leadership in the free community. This difference may be accounted for on the basis of such factors as inmate

individualism, lack of opportunity for consensus, and the fracturing of the prison community into small informal groups or cliques. These factors produce conditions within the prison favorable to the assumption of leadership roles and political power by the long-term recidivist. His status within the institution may be greatly enhanced by the commission of acts of aggression and violence, by possessing a "gal-boy" as a marital partner, the wearing of a mustache, and by displaying psychopathic behavior. Prison culture is organized primarily around the social values and grandiose ideas posited by these dangerous and unreformable criminals. Socialization (prisonization) for the inmate population may involve conditioning to the anti-social attitudes and criminal behavior patterns of these dangerous recidivists.

The Prisoners' Code And Prison Culture

The prison has a distinctive culture of its own, which is transmitted to each newcomer and handed down from one generation of inmates to the next. Prison culture consists of habit systems, behavior patterns, prison customs and folkways, the prisoners' code, and prisoners' attitudes and opinions toward the prison system, prison personnel, and the major social institutions in "free society". Specifically, prison culture may also include the prison folklore and mythology built around such historic events as outstanding prison riots, daring prison breaks, protracted sit-down strikes, dramatic deeds of perseverance, fortitude and valor by prison inmates, and previous criminal exploits of some of the nation's dangerous criminals.

The prisoners' code, as stated above, constitutes a fundamental part of prison culture. This code determines the type and extent of legitimate interaction between guards and inmates. The code prohibits fraternization with guards or other prison personnel. In fact, inmates are discouraged from talking to guards except on business matters. The code stipulates that key information regarding plots, impending riots or prison breaks should never be given to the administration. Prisoners are taught never to squeal on fellow inmates. Inmates are not supposed to notify prison officials of escapes or attempted escapes. In fact, the code even approves the giving of material assistance to inmates planning escapes. The code strongly disapproves giving information to the administration regarding the membership, purposes, activities, and programs of the various

informal prison groups. A strong spirit of cooperation and sense of loyalty develop between inmates in their various dealings with one another. Finally, the code prescribes humility and deference toward prison officials, and cooperation with the rehabilitative personnel as the surest method of securing an early parole. First offenders are indoctrinated with the "morality" of the code upon incarceration; the recidivists are already well-acquainted with its tenets from previous incarcerations.

The Process Of Prisonization

The term "prisonization", originally coined by Clemmer, is synonymous with prison acculturation. It includes all the various ways by which inmates or informal inmate groups take on new prison culture traits, and incorporate them into their own manner of living. Prisonization is the process by which the individual inmate acquires the customs, folkways, mores, institutional behavior patterns, and the general culture of the prisoner community.) Eventually, the new inmate, in order to secure favorable status, is forced to adopt patterns of behavior in line with the culture of his fellow inmates. He accepts their system of social values, and becomes highly sensitive to their criticism, threats, and applause.

The extent or degree of prisonization, as pointed out by Clemmer, is influenced by the inmate's personality, his social relationships prior to incarceration, affiliation with an informal group, type of work placement, and the acceptance or rejection of the prisoners' code. The determinants of optimum prisonization include such factors as a long sentence, maladjusted personality, lack of contact with family and friends outside the prison, membership in informal inmate groups, uncritical acceptance of the prisoners' code, institutional work placement with kindred personalities, and participation in forbidden activity, such as sex perversion or gambling. The process of optimum prisonization implies socialization of the individual inmate to the point that he willingly shares the traditions, memories, attitudes, values, and loyalties of the prisoner community.

Implications Of Informal Groups For Prison Administration and Rehabilitation

Numerous articles in professional, scientific, and popular journals have attempted to explain the causes of the recent

wave of prison riots in several of the nation's major prisons during the last four years (1951-1954). These academic interpretations have been supplemented by radio roundtables, and committee reports under such captions as: "Prison Riots-Why?" "Prison Riots and Disturbances", and "What is Wrong with American Prisons?" These sources list such well-known causes as inadequate financial support, sub-standard personnel, enforced idleness, lack of professional leadership, absence of rehabilitative programs, overcrowding, political interference, and the sentencing practices of the courts. However, the principal cause of all these riots and disturbances was never mentioned in any of the foregoing treatises on the subject. The basic cause may be found in the social structure of the prison itself, and the nature of the functional relations between the formal personnel groups and the informal inmate social groups within the prison community. Either prison administrators and criminologists are generally ignorant of the existence of these groups, or they refuse to recognize them other than as subversive and rebellious elements in the prison population.)

An analysis of the behavior of these informal groups is absolutely essential to successful prison administration. The prison warden cannot successfully prohibit the activities of these groups or eliminate them altogether, anymore than he can request his inmates to desist from eating, sleeping, or breathing. Group formation in prison is a "natural process", which cannot be thwarted, but it can be guided. The progressive prison administrator will utilize this last alternative. He will formulate policies and approve rehabilitative programs with a full knowledge of the existence of informal inmate groups, and manipulate his institution strategically in terms of the probable behavior of these groups.

Recommendations

The conflict situation prevailing in many American prisons as a result of the clash between two opposing social systems, can be remedied, at least in part, by the adoption of certain progressive correctional and therapeutic methods, and preventive measures. The custodial and rehabilitative programs of the prison can be greatly strengthened by the utilization of the following measures: The scientific classification of inmates; the use of informal group leaders in certain aspects of the prison program; individual

psychotherapy for seriously maladjusted personalities; group therapy or guided group interaction, a prison counseling system along the lines of Michigan's Southern State Prison, comprehensive education programs (academic, vocational, industrial, and social), an inmate council or grievance committee, constructive use of leisure time, continued research of inmate social groups, and the establishment of many phases of prison life on a democratic basis.

However, in addition to the foregoing preventive measures intended for inmate groups members of the prison staff need to understand, not only the theory, but the practice of group dynamics as well. They need to know "how to operate" intelligently and function strategically in a community of two conflicting but functionally related social systems.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

- ALTRUISTIC - Unselfish, having primary regard for the interests of others or of the group.
- ANOMALY - An abnormality associated with criminal constitutions, physical irregularities.
- ANOMIA - Normlessness, without foundation, disorganization, demoralized socially.
- ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY - (see sociopath)
- ANXIETY - A painful state of expectation concerning an impending but yet unknown condition.
- ASTHENIC - A type of physical make-up characterized by slender build, flat chest and poor muscular development.
- ATAVISM - Inheritance of characteristics from remote ancestors.
- AUTISTIC - Unresponsive to environmental stimuli, self-centered.
- AUTONOMY - Possessing the right and power to determine one's own course of action, independence.
- AUTOSOMES - Pairs 1 through 22 of the 23 pairs of chromosomes found in each cell of the body.
- CASE STUDY - Research conducted by analyzing specific incidents.
- CATATONIC - A Schizophrenic reaction characterized by complete withdrawal from reality and a propensity to assume fixed positions.
- CHARACTER DISORDER - (See Personality Disorder)
- COMPULSION - An uncontrollable urge to perform specific and sometimes purposeless acts.
- COMPULSIVE PERSONALITY - Behavior characterized by rigid adherence to one or more rituals designed to relieve anxiety.
- CONTINUUM - A continuous whole, quantity or series, a thing whose parts cannot be separated or separately discerned.

CRIMINOGENIC - Having to do with the causation of criminal activity.

DENFENSE MECHANISM - A psychological defense employed in reaction to stress, anxiety Blame or criticism and enabling the person to avoid awareness or guilt of the conditions.

DELUSIONS - False beliefs; erroneous judgements; fixed and intensely maintained in the mentally ill; ie. delusions of grandeur.

DEMONOLOGY - Belief during 15 to 18 century that Mental Illness was caused by demons or the devil. This belief dictated "treatment" of Mental Illness in form of torture and execution to cast out the demon.

DENIAL OF REALITY - Refusal to accept existence of undersirable feelings, wishes, memories, impulses, traits, fantasies and/or realities.

DEPRIVATION - To keep from having, using or enjoying to be without.

DEVIANT - Variation from the usual, behavior which violates the normal pattern.

DISSOCIATION - Undesirable thoughts wishes and feelings are separated from the normal consciousness and function separately ie., duel or multiple personality.

DYAD - A basic interacting group, two individuals.

DYSFUNCTION - Malfunction.

DYSPLASTIC - A body type characterized by various aberrations such as glandular disturbances and growth disorders.

DYSSOCIAL - Not social, social activity which does not consider custom or law.

ECTORDERM - Outer layer cells of embryo from which is formed the nervous system, skin, teeth, etc.

ECTOMORPE - Body build characterized by flat chest, thin body and poor muscular development.

EEG - electroencephalogram, a device which electronically records the changes in brain waves.

EGO - That part of the personality which possesses consciousness maintains identify and relates to reality.

- EGOISTIC - The attitude of using others for the purpose of achieving personal happiness.
- EMBRYO - A fetus, an animal in its earliest stages of development in the uterus.
- EMPIRICAL - Relying or based solely on experiment and observation.
- ENDOCRINOLOGY - The study of the ductless glands and the sympathetic nervous system of the body.
- ENDODERM - The inner layer of cells of the embryo from which is formed the lining of the digestive tract and other internal organs.
- ENDOMORPH - Body build characterized by softness and roundness of body, usually heavy set.
- EPILEPSY - A chronic condition of the nervous system characterized in severe cases by convulsions and unconsciousness.
- FEEBLEMINDNESS - A condition of incomplete mental development due to hereditary factors. See Retardation, also applied to anyone of reduced mental capacity.
- FIXATION - A condition in which some aspects of the personality is halted at an incomplete stage of its evaluation. Often accompanied by pre-occupation with some specific object or article.
- FOLIE A DEUX - A psychosis occurring simultaneously in two persons who are intimately associated by emotional ties.
- FRUSTRATION - Emotional tension caused by being prevented from achieving a desired objective or goal.
- FUNCTION - Type or types of action for which a structure or organism is capable or meant to perform.
- FUNCTIONAL DISORDER - Deviant behavior due to a pattern of poor adjustments, presently considered to be of non-organic origin.
- FUGUE STATE - Long term amnesia.
- GLYCOGEN - Substance produced in animal tissues, particularly the liver and muscles, which is changed into sugar (Glucose) as the body needs it.

- HALLUCINATION - False perception; ie. hearing, smelling, seeing or other sensory perceptions which are imaginary.
- HEBEPHRENIC - A schizophrenic reaction. A psychotic condition characterized by laughter or giggling, talking and gesturing to self.
- HYPOTHESIS - A supposition or idea tentatively accepted to explain certain facts but not yet tested.
- ID - The primitive unorganized portion of the personality which is concerned only with a desire for pleasure.
- IDENTIFICATION - Increasing feelings of worth by identifying self with person or institution of illustrious standings.
- INTROJECTION - Incorporating external values and standards into ego structure so individual is not at their mercy as external threats.
- INTROVERTED - Withdrawn, why.
- INVOLUTIONAL - Change of life. A Diminishing of size or Power.
- INVOLUTIONAL MELANCHOLIA - A Psychosis, characterized by depression, despondency and tendency suicidal.
- ISOLATION OF AFFECT - Defends against undesirable feelings etc. by repressing emotional aspect.
- KLEPTOMANIA - A neurotic reaction characterized by compulsive stealing.
- KORSAKOV'S PSYCHOSIS - A condition resulting from chronic alcoholism and characterized by defects in memory, orientation and the willingness to relate suggestions of imaginary incidents or experiences as true.
- LIBIDO - The driving force behind all human activity.
- MANIA - A condition characterized by an overactive behavior pattern, excessive interest, etc.
- MANIC-DEPRESSIVE - A psychosis. Behavior which is characterized by a pattern of variation between deep depression and high optimism. This behavior is often (but not always) cyclic and the moods change independant of the individual desires or realistic factors.

MASOCHISM - Behavior which is directed toward self injury, may be mental or physical.

MATURATION - The process of becoming fully developed, a mental capacity which will accept legal and moral responsibility for action.

MELANCHOLIA - Depression

MESODERM - The middle layer of cells in an embryo from which are formed the muscles, bones connective tissues, etc.

MESOMORPH - Body build characterized by high development of muscles - a muscular build.

METABOLIC - Concerning the process of food digestion and excretion of waste products along with the production and regulation of heat.

MINORITY GROUP - An ethnic or special interest group within a larger population; any category of persons forming less than a majority of the total population.

MORALLY INSANE - A condition in which the individual is without a conscience. (See Sociopath)

MORES - Customs that are considered conducive to the welfare of society.

MOTIVATION - The incentive which initiates the process of conscious and purposeful activity.

NEOPLASM - A general term meaning tumor.

NEUROSIS - A mental disorder resulting from the individuals inability to resolve his anxieties.

NORM - A standard or criterion for judging the character or conduct of an individual, group or function.

NORMALITY - Living in a manner acceptable to the majority of the people in a particular culture.

OBSESSION - A thought which persistently forces itself into the conscious mind.

ORGANIC - Pertaining to the physical organism.

OVER-COMPENSATION - Covering up weakness by emphasizing desirable trait tor making up for frustration in one area by over-gratification in another.

- PARANOIA - A psychosis characterized by a single, well systematized delusion.
- PARANOID - A psychosis of the schizophrenia variety characterized by a totally illogical, disoriented delusion.
- PATHOLOGY - The conditions, processes and results of a particular disease or condition.
- PEER GROUP - People of the same rank, ability, age, personality, quality, etc.
- PERSONALITY - The sum total of the characteristics of an individual.
- PERSONALITY DISORDER - A defect in the structure of the personality. Life-Long patterns of inflexible or limited behavior caused by defective development of the personality structure.
- PHOBIA - An irrational, unfounded dread of an object, person, act or situation.
- POST-PARTUM - A psychotic depression with schizophrenic symptoms in the female which follows the child bearing process.
- PREDISPOSTION - A previous inclination or tendency.
- PROGNOSIS - A prediction on the course of an illness.
- PROJECTION - Avoiding undesirable feelings etc. by relocating impulse or trait in another person.
- PSYCHOPATHIC - (See Sociopath)
- PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGIC - Pertaining to the relationship between the emotions and the physical functions of the body.
- PSYCHOSEXUAL - Relating to the mental or emotional components of the sexual instinct.
- PSYCHOSIS - A broad category of severe mental illnesses characterized by loss of contact with reality, personality disorganization, delusions and hallucinations.
- PSYCHOTIC - A person who is suffering from a psychosis.
- PYKNIC - A body type characterized by roundness of contour, squatness, fleshiness, etc.

- RATIONALIZATION - Changing undesirable feelings, wishes, memories, impulses, traits or fantasies into something more desirable.
- REACTION FORMATION - Preventing dangerous desires from being express by exaggerating opposed attitudes and types of behavior and using them as "barriers".
- RECIDIVISM - To fall back; habitual or chronic relapse; the habitual criminal; a criminal repeater.
- REFERENCE GROUP - The group whose opinions, attitudes and values are significant to a particular individual.
- REGRESSION - Avoiding undesirable feelings etc. by reverting to a previous stage of maturity.
- REPRESSION - Keeping undesirable feelings, wishes, memories, impulses, traits or fantasies from entering the conscious mind.
- RESTITUTION - The mechanism of relieving the mind of a load of guilt by restitutive acts.
- RETARDATION - Lack of intellectual capacity as a result of disease, injury, malnutrition or lack of environmental stimulation.
- ROLE PLAYING - Carrying out the behavior required in a given role or position, even if assigned only temporarily.
- SANCTION - Permission or approval of any act or form of behavior (positive sanction), disapproval of same (negative sanction).
- SCHIZOPHRENIA - A psychosis which has several such categories, characterized by inappropriate affect, delusions, hallucinations and disorganized thought process.
- SIMPLE SCHIZOPHRENIA - A form of schizophrenia characterized by relatively good contact with reality emotional apathy and withdrawal from society.
- SOCIAL CONTROL - The processes by which society or any sub-group secures conformity to expected form of conduct.

SOCIALIZATION - The process of training an organism in the accepted conduct and values of the group or society.

SOCIOPATH - (Psychopath, Antisocial Personality) A personality disorder characterized by an inability to establish warm personal relationship, disregard for mores, absence of guilt feelings, recidivism, dependence, sexually maladjusted, extroversion and inability to delay gratification.

SOMATIC - Of the body, physical

SOMATOTYPE - Body type, a physique classification system which is correlated with personality types by William H. Sheldon.

STEREOTYPE - An emotionalized image which one group has of another, simplified and often caricatured, and changed only little by direct experience.

STRESS - Frustration, strain, pressure, tension; often used as a synonym to anxiety.

STRUCTURAL - Pertaining to the physical organization of an organism or institution.

SUBCULTURE - A group or society within a culture whose values, norms, and role expectations are different from the culture.

SUBICTAL - Not detectable by clinical methods, usually refers to epilepsy.

SUBLIMATION - Gratifying or working off frustrated sexual desires in nonsexual activities.

SUPEREGO - The conscience of the mind, the monitor of good or bad activity.

"SUPERWOMAN" SYNDROME - (XXX) A chromosomal abnormality in which the cells contain a total of 47 chromosomes, the extra one of which is a female sex chromosome.


SYMBOLISM - Transferring feelings or impulses from the original object or person to a substitute.

THEORY - A statement of apparent relationships or principles surrounding a certain observed phenomena which has been verified to some degree.

UNDERPRIVILEGED - Deprived of fundamental social rights and security through poverty, discrimination, etc.

VALUE - A value is a norm, a socially accepted goal, an object of group approval.

VALUE JUDGEMENT - A value judgment is an esthetic, moral or ethical judgment; a proposition which is not subject to empirical text because it asserts a value not a fact.



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