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Crisis intervention hostage situation
### Historical Perspective

1. Akman, Dogan P. "Homicides and assaults in 1.5 Hours October, 1975. Canadian Penitentiaries", Canadian Journal of Corrections, October 1966, Vol. 8 No. 4

2. Desroches, Fred "Patterns in Prison Riots", Canadian Journal of Criminology & Corrections 1975


4. Interpol, "1st International Symposium on cases Involving Hostages, February 1973." "Classified"

5. Kobetz, Richard W., "Hostage Incidents - the no policy priority"
REFERENCES


REMARKS: Over time there have been changes in the profile of prison disturbances. The focus of this brief introduction to the 7.5 hour program is to trace the evolution of prison disturbances of the 19th century to the present. The shifting emphasis of hostage taking as a strategy of the politically militant inmate and as a forum to highlight demands for improved prison programs and conditions will be central to this phase of the program. This introduction is to create an awareness of the rapid acceleration in the number of these offences during the 70's.

Preventive Measures
- information collection
- assessment
- communication
- dangerosity indicators


9. Dawe, D. "Proposed guidelines for staff to prevent and reduce adverse effects of hostage taking incidents"


REMARKS: This phase outlines the activities which are designed to prevent a crisis situation. Such topics include a system of information collection assessment, dissemination as well as the recognition of dangerosity indicators. Workshop attendees will be made aware that they can play a role to prevent hostage taking situations from occurring.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERIAL</th>
<th>TIME ALLOCATED</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th># NO. REFERENCES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 Hours</td>
<td>Hostage Taking Situation - psychological aspects - hostage taker typology - Stockholm syndrome - intervention role of ERT - hostage behaviour - Initial response of hostage and authorities - motivation and causes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Akman, Dogan P. &quot;Homicides &amp; Assaults in Canadian Penitentiaries&quot; &quot;Canadian Journal of Correction&quot; October 1966, Vol. 8, No. 4</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>Alan, H. &quot;Psychopaths&quot; 1972</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Dawe, D. &quot;Proposed guidelines to prevent or reduce adverse effects of hostage taking situations&quot;.</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Desroches, Fred &quot;Patterns in Prison Riots&quot; Canadian Journal of Criminology &amp; Corrections 1975</td>
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<td>17.</td>
<td>Goldaber, I., &quot;Checklist for negotiations in hostage situations&quot;</td>
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<td>18.</td>
<td>Hassel, C. V. &quot;The Hostage Situation&quot;</td>
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<td>SERIAL</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
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<td>CONT'D.</td>
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</table>
REMARKS: This area of the workshop is considered to be the core of the training package. It is designed to provide the potential hostage with a basic understanding of the dynamics of hostage taking offences. It is hypothesized that this knowledge can assist the hostage to play a positive role in the defusing of a highly volatile situation. It is intended that during this phase in the training program the motivations of hostage takers will be explored which will lead to the development of a personality profile for hostage takers. The emergency response team will also be discussed in terms of its role rather than its tactics in relation to guidelines for hostage behaviour.

Post-Crisis Activities
- incident reporting
- legal process
- the role of the media

28. Bosarge, B. B., "Developing Guidelines for Police/Media Relations in Hostage Taking Incidents"


30. Divisional Instruction No. 750 "Security of Information" dated March 4/75

31. Divisional Instruction No. 712 "Violations of the Criminal Code by inmates of penitentiaries" dated February 8, 1972

32. Goldaber, I. "Police/Media Relations - the eleven commandments of survival".


BK 34. New York State Special Commission on Attica, "Attica - the official report" New York Bantam Books
In every instance of a prison confrontation, whether it be of large or small scale, there is always the matter of "clean-up". It is imperative that all persons involved, even in a minor role, be aware of the accuracy of recall in order that reports be as factual as possible. Many of these reports could become the basis of crown evidence. The legal continuity-of-possession of certain exhibits that may be presented as evidence is a matter that will receive considerable attention during this session. Certain restrictions will be placed on information to the media during the early stages of post activities. The workshop attendee must be aware of such restrictions and be governed accordingly.

Recent Research
- hostage situations
- riot situations
- typology of hostage takers and rioters

35. Akman, Dogan P. "Homicides and Assaults in Canadian Penitentiaries," Canadian Journal of Corrections, October 1966, Vol. 8 No. 4
2. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, "Worldwide Criminal Acts Involving Aviation", 1974
3. Desroches, Fred, "Patterns in Prison Riots" Canadian Journal of Criminology and Corrections, 1975
24. Hassel, C. V., "The Hostage Situation"
5 CONT'D.

4. Interpol, "1st International Symposium on cases involving hostage, 1973"

36. MacDonald, A.L. "Prison Riots"


38. Sherwin, R. "Inmate Rioters and Non-Rioters - a comparative analysis"

31. Skelton, W. D. "Assaulters vs Defenders"

REMARKS: A considerable body of research is being accumulated at an international level on the increasing phenomena of hostage taking. This phase of the training is to reinforce the material already presented during the workshop. Discussion on studies which have been conducted will be related to the Canadian Penitentiary Service situation.
ADDITIONAL REFERENCES


41. D.I. 714 "Use of Force". February 25/74


44. "Emotional Dynamics in Group Violence". Archives of Criminal Psychodynamics Vol. 2 - 1957. Vernon Fox PhD


47. "Group Dynamics in the Prison Community", Morris G. Caldwell

48. Commissioner's Directive 120, Apr. 1/75


PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR STAFF

TO PREVENT OR REDUCE ADVERSE EFFECTS

OF

HOSTAGE TAKING INCIDENTS

D. Dawe,
Director,
Preventive Security.

RESTRICTED
PART ONE - INTRODUCTION

Hostage taking has become a more frequent method used by criminals to force acceptance of demands, to air grievances, etc. The staff of correctional facilities, by virtue of their employment may be vulnerable to the potential threat of hostage taking to a greater degree than most other occupational groups. Accordingly, it is imperative that immediate measures be taken to provide management, staff and community volunteers regularly present in correctional facilities, guidelines not only to reduce their personal vulnerability, but to increase preventive security measures to reduce hostage taking opportunity and to contribute to operational security response to reduce the adverse effect should a hostage taking occur.

PART TWO - DISCUSSION

Over-riding considerations

Just as protection of society is the over-riding consideration of all aspects of correctional activity so too must this principle be extended into institutional activity. To achieve the objective of protecting society - which includes not only the public at large but our staff and inmates - requires all persons associated with corrections to be mindful of the need to:

a. maintain institutional security;
b. ensure the preservation of life; and
c. prevent untoward occurrences.

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Preventive Measures

Preventive measures are not new. They interface with operations completely. Directives and practices have been in existence which have long recognized both the potential threat and the need for pre-planned effective response. Divisional Instruction 713 - Institutional Riots, Disturbances and Taking of Hostages - issued January 8, 1973, outlines the standards required in formulating orders and instructions to control riots and disturbances and provides direction to develop flexible, clear, concise contingency plans which coupled with preventive measures contribute to institutional and individual safety and security. Research into the phenomena of hostage taking is on-going and validates established experience in both prevention and response. Guidelines for the behaviour of prison personnel held as hostages were researched and published as part of a field placement assignment at CPS National Headquarters of an Ottawa University criminology student, J. Whorry, several years ago and updated recently by staff of the headquarters and Ontario Correctional Staff College. Preventive measures have been stressed in all of these efforts.

Pre-Incident Preventive Measures

The Commissioner of Penitentiaries in a letter to all Regional Directors dated 15 July 1975, directed increased involvement in preventive security by all staff and stressed the importance of the collection, collation, analysis and timely need-to-know dissemination of information. The importance of practicing preventive security in every activity especially the potential hostage situation cannot be over-emphasized. The following

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basic rules must be applied as pre-incident preventive measures:

1. Be aware of the potential hostage taking possibility;
2. Appreciate the importance of preventive security;
   a. Know the potentially dangerous inmates;
   b. Make disciplined observations and report them;
   c. Learn to identify, evaluate inmate actions and responses and report changes promptly;
   d. Learn to identify and react to inmate problems early;
   e. Report the unusual and significant; and
   c. Consistant with your duty, establish good inmate - staff relationships.
3. Learn and know your responsibilities to react to crisis situations.

Potential for being taken hostage

The taking of a hostage may be categorized as:

a. Impulsive; or
b. Planned.

Preventive measures may be applied against both threats. It has been said that the psychological profile of the typical hostage taker falls into one of three broad categories:

a. The terrorist;
b. The psychotic; or
c. The criminal whose wishes are thwarted.

In the correctional milieu all three categories are, to varying degrees, a constant presence and thus a continuing potential hazard. The New York City Police précis on Hostage Negotiations states "remember that hostages are taken solely for the purpose of gain". No evidence to the
contrary has ever been developed. The American Psychiatric Association's "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders", second edition, 1967, states that the term "Antisocial Personality" is a term reserved for individuals who are basically unsocialized and whose behaviour pattern brings them repeatedly into conflict with society. Legally, speaking such a person is sane. He/She is, under law, responsible for impulsive, self-serving behaviour and the U.S. prison population has been estimated (Alan Harrington "Psychopaths" 1972) at between 35% and 40% antisocial personalities. There is little doubt that a relatively similar proportion of Canadian prison inmates fit the same categorization percentages. Hermann Mannheim, in Comparative Criminology states that the sociopath most likely to take a hostage has most of the following characteristics in excess:

a. He feels that any type of attachment or affection to other people is a trap;

b. He fears and resents loss of freedom;

c. He needs immediate gratification;

d. He fails to learn from punishment;

e. He lacks guilt feelings although he understands and can feign guilt readily;

f. He is impulsive and the consequences of an act are inconsequential;

g. He is frequently a criminal recidivist;

h. He copes with anxiety by abusing people;

i. He is lacking personality in depth; and

j. He is capable of antisocial acts.
When one quickly reviews these characteristics in the context of the clients of the correctional system it would be difficult not to agree with Harrington. Yet at the same time the key is to react rationally to identify predict and control antisocial behaviour - the function of the criminal justice system - and the prevention of hostage taking is but an integral part of that function. The incidence of hostage taking in the correctional setting is increasing. The Canadian Penitentiary Service and Canadian Provincial correctional services have experienced, in recent months a marked increase of incidents perhaps due in part to the contagion factor. The potential for being taken hostage must, therefore, be recognized and accepted as a hazard to which all are exposed. There are prevention measures which can and are being taken; but, more effort could be applied.

PREVENTIVE SECURITY MEASURES
Preventive security measures are applied not only as a policy of government or a management device but as an individual basic reaction. There are six basic individual steps, all consistent with policies, practices, procedures and the views expressed by persons who have experienced hostage situations, which contribute to the prevention of such incidents.

1. KNOW THE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS
The identification of dangerous inmates is not by a simplistic or even accurate method to date. Studies are on-going to effect improvements. However, certain individuals by their previously demonstrated character and activity are obviously potentially dangerous. It is essential that staff who may be exposed to these individuals be aware of their potential. In a recent experiment, without being provided criteria, staff were asked to identify individuals whom they
considered to be potentially dangerous. It is significant to note that the result was double that arrived at by the use of the criteria recommended in the Mohr study but all persons identified through the Mohr criteria were included. Further, all of the individuals actually involved in hostage-taking incidents which have occurred within the Canadian Penitentiary Service in 1975 were identified as potentially dangerous in both surveys.

Accordingly, the potentially dangerous inmates have been identified nationally, regionally and institutionally. It is essential therefore that the individual staff members liable to come into contact with inmates not only be aware of the danger potential but in fact contribute to on-going efforts to improve the capability of the system to identify potentially dangerous inmates. One of the key factors to the identification process is the making and reporting of disciplined observations.

MAKE DISCIPLINED OBSERVATIONS AND REPORT THEM.

The correctional system is the bridge between the conviction and the return of an offender to society. We receive from the court the product of a law enforcement investigation and it is our responsibility to protect society and process the product - with available background information to the point where it is refined and prepared for finishing by the National Parole Board for a return to society. Throughout, the entire process is dependant upon information, observations and reports. Each component of the process has an obligation to the other and to society not only for the continuity of possession, and all that entails, but even more importantly for the collection, collation, interpretation, analysis and appropriate
dissemination of information essential to the entire process. The views, requirements and recommendations of police and the correctional services are not divergent. The views of programs and custody are not divergent. Emphasis may shift, but in all areas the primary responsibility remains constant - the protection of society and of the individuals who make up our society. We are all dealing with people, with individuals, with information concerning individuals, and we are supported by the might of the law as each of us is required to make judgment decisions which affect certainly the individual but in some cases perhaps even society as a whole. Only by working together, communicating, exchanging information in a timely, frank, objective and reciprocal manner can our primary objective be achieved. There is absolutely no conflict of interest. We are all inter and intra dependant. Correctional personnel depend upon the police, the courts and even the community to provide detailed data upon the circumstances which bring the individual to our cares. Displayed attitudes, characteristics and history are essential assessment factors and as much data as possible must be assessed in the initial stages of classification and reception; but the process must continue and everyone has a part to play. In a recent incident it was revealed after the incident was in progress that some two weeks earlier the principles and at least one of the victims had discussed the precise incident. The victim discussed - with at least two other persons not part of the correctional system - the information AND just hours before the incident expressed a foreboding which proved to be a tragic reality. The observations had been made but not reported. It is essential that we all learn to identify and evaluate inmate actions and responses and report changes, incidents etc., promptly.
IDENTIFY/EVALUATE/REPORT

One of the basic principles of a scientific study is observation, identification, evaluation and reporting. The law enforcement officer of twenty years ago on the beat knew his community, the activities and the people. The unusual immediately drew his attention. The correctional setting is readily comparable. A change in routine or activity must be noticed and explained. It could save a life. In this regard the correctional officer - the living unit officer - the visits and correspondence officer - the food services officer is by virtue of his employment and constant contact with inmates in the most crucial position. The extent and duration of his contact makes him/her the eyes and ears of the community - the early warning system. The early warning system is essential not only to the prevention role but to the total team approach to corrections. Classification, training, psychiatry, psychology, in fact every aspect of correctional life is a cooperative effort and dependant upon observation of activity - occurrences, reactions, and changes in pattern, appearance, etc. But, observation without report is useless. Why has there been a change or deviation? What does it mean? These are the answers sought but elusive and in fact impossible to obtain unless the team approach, communication, recording and reporting become an automatic on-going practice co-ordinated across all boundaries. Usually a hostage taking is precipitated by "an inmate problem" and becomes a total problem unless the problem is identified and reacted to at an early preventable stage in its development.
IDENTITY AND REACT TO PROBLEMS

Analysis of the crisis situations which have occurred in the correctional setting reveals that hostages have been taken for two basic reasons:

a. to effect escape; or
b. to draw attention to a problem (be it real or apprehended).

To imagine that efforts to escape incarceration would ever cease would be lunacy and there can be little doubt that attempts will continue to effect escape and that the seizure of hostages will be considered. Less predictable is the seizure of a hostage — in a disturbance or an isolated incident — as the result of efforts designed or impulsively acted upon to draw attention to or resolution of an inmate's problem. Incidents have occurred because an inmate felt that he wasn't getting medication on time, that he wanted a transfer, that conditions were unsatisfactory, etc. In some instances if the problem had been identified and reacted to without procrastination or waffle it may be that the ultimate violence might have been avoided. At the very least, recognition of the problem and consideration of the inmate's reaction could provide pre-incident warning if the observations are reported in a timely fashion.

REPORT THE UNUSUAL

In the fifth century B.C. the Chinese sage Sun Tzu wrote that "foreknowledge is the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move".

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In 1955 the second Hoover Commission in the United States stated that: "Intelligence deals with all the things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action." More simply stated one might remember that "to be forewarned is to be forearmed". All of the steps previously outlined, which in combination contribute to the prevention of incidents are valueless unless the forwarning is given.

Throughout the correctional system only one group is constantly and continuously in immediate contact with the clients - the security staff. A keeper is always on duty. The custody office is never closed. The initial response in an emergency is provided and coordinated from the custody office. Therefore it appears logical that the custodial senior man on duty should be the focal point for the collation of information. He, however, must NOT ignore the information: it must be recorded and analysed before it can become the mortar or thread which ties the whole picture together.

What should be reported? What is significant? Time and space do not permit a full thesis or exposé on this matter. However a basic rule is that the unusual, a change of routine, is significant and must be reported.

REACTION TO CRISIS

Crisis may arise at any time. Policies, practices, procedures have been developed to minimize the effect of crisis. Resources are available to deal with any and all situations. Teamwork is essential to the effective resolution of any crisis. The following guidelines have
been developed to facilitate efficient crisis reaction:

1. **Stay Calm** - in any situation clear, calm, thought, response and action reduces tension and the precipitation of unpredictable, rash and perhaps violent or tragic action.

2. **Communicate** - make others aware of the situation immediately to ensure the application of team response. Talk - the inmate may be quite emotional, and even fearful, although this reaction might not be apparent. By talking in a calm (friendly, if possible) manner, you may be able to cool the situation and help rationalize the situation.

3. **Limit the Situation** - do not carry, while on duty, large sums of money, credit cards, licences or other articles such as pen knives, that can be used as a weapon, or any other personal item that can be taken by an inmate and used for his advantage.

If capture is foreseeable and unavoidable hide or dispose of your keys and personal property if practical. As long as inmates do not have keys, a disturbance may be localized. The institution is able to maintain control over inmate movement in all except general riot situations.
A hostage is a prisoner. Behave as you would have the inmate behave if you were a guard. Go along with them and do as they say. The one limit to this is that if you see a safe opportunity to escape, or to safely overpower your captor (in isolated incidents) do not hesitate.

If the intention of taking two or more hostages is expressed, attempt to convince your captors that one hostage is as effective and easier to control. This may help to minimize the number of hostages and simplify the situation.

Avoid movements which may be interpreted by the captors as threatening. Quick and unnecessary movements should be avoided for, though innocent in their intent, they may startle or threaten the captor(s) and result in physical harm to you. It is advisable to keep your hands in view of the captor(s).

Notify your captors immediately of any medical problems which you may have and your need for medication. Your physical health is important to all. Such information will be considered by the captor and may have an affect on how he deals with you.

In many instances hostages have been dressed in prison garb and moved to various locations in the institution to make identification and recovery difficult. If possible, as a hostage, indicate your location so that plans for your recovery can be considered.
4. Observe - Observe, in practical, the behaviour of inmates and make a mental note of the identity of inmates in possession of weapons.

5. Conserve your energy - A hostage is under physical and nervous strain. Rest is important for your mental as well as physical functioning. Do not waste energy needlessly, you may need it later.

Do not refuse food. To remain physically and mentally able you must eat. In a long waiting situation the medical authorities may feel it necessary to calm nerves.

Remain Outwardly Calm: Although physical harm is threatened, in order to control your behaviour and as a point in negotiation, your life is important to your captors. They are aware that the death of a hostage removes their bargaining power and invites the use of force to overpower them. It is in their interest to keep you safe. Panic and fear must be controlled. Sound judgement and moral courage are necessary.

6. Maintain Control - The goal for effective behaviour in a hostage situation is: Passive control on the part of the hostage -- where the hostage, through clear thinking and anxiety reducing actions, takes control of the situation without outwardly appearing to do so. This should lead to
minimizing the situation both in terms of the number of hostages held and in terms of the length of time they are held. This goal will be easier to achieve if the following three principles are understood and applied where possible:

(1) reduce anxiety in yourself and your captor(s): This principle provides a basis for clear and calm thinking for both parties and reduces the change of unpredictable, rash and sometimes violent action on the part of the captors;

(2) Maintain effective communication with the captor(s); this provides a basis from which reasonable decisions can be made. The hostage can known and understand the captor(s)' intentions and attempt to influence the captor(s)' behaviour as well as reduce anxiety in both parties.

(3) Watch the effect of your actions (i.e. words, attitudes, and acts) on the captor(s); this principle provides a basis for testing the first two principles. Any of your actions that do not reduce anxiety or interfere with effective communication must be altered immediately. If, on the other hand, your actions are effective, you know you are doing the best thing.

Reminders: (a) it is to be remembered that no one retains his authority when taken hostage;

(b) inmates generally view a disturbance and the taking of a hostage as a final act of despair. The inmates are anxious and afraid.

(c) Your plight is the subject of a co-ordinated team response effort.
THERE ARE SIX "DO NOTS"

1. **DO NOT BARGAIN:** Do not enter into any personal bargaining for your release.

2. **DO NOT AGGRAVATE:** Do not arouse the hostility of the captors. They are under stress and if stirred to anger may act irrationally. You are safe as long as you do not antagonize your captors.

3. **USE OF FORCE:** Do not use physical force when seized except to protect your life or to escape if success is certain.

4. **INJURY:** Do not indicate that you expect to be harmed. This expressed fear may actually contribute to your personal danger.

**PART THREE - CONCLUSION**

Hostage taking has become a more frequently utilized method of forcing acceptance of demands, of airing grievances, etc. Correctional staff are exposed to the potential threat. Preventive measures have been developed to reduce vulnerability and to contribute to operational reaction to such incidents. Staff should be made aware of both the preventive measures to which their contribution is essential and of the fact that policies, practices and procedures have been developed to provide a team approach to the safe, effective resolution of crisis situations.

D. Dawe,  
Director,  
Preventive Security,  
Canadian Penitentiary Service.
CRISIS INTERVENTION-
HOSTAGE SITUATION

TRAINING KIT

1 - TRNG. MANUAL
1 - AUDIO TAPE
1 - SET TRANSPARENCIES (36)
The protection of society is the over-riding consideration of all aspects of correctional activity. This principle consideration must be extended into every activity of the correctional system at all levels. To achieve the objective of protecting society - which includes not only the public at large, but, and even perhaps more important from a parachial viewpoint, our staff and inmates - demands that all persons associated with corrections be mindful of the need to:

a. maintain institutional security; and

b. ensure the preservation of life.

Hostage taking has become a more frequent method used by criminals to air grievances and generally to force acceptance of their demands. The staff of correctional facilities, by virtue of their employment are vulnerable to the potential threat of hostage taking to a greater degree than most other occupational groups.
The federal government, provincial governments, police and correctional associations and agencies and the public at large are concerned with the increasing incidents of hostage seizures. This involves the whole range of hostages seizures which occur in prison take-overs, escape attempts, and aircraft hi-jacking; seizure of business executives, diplomats, and cultural personalities; armed robberies, in which by-standers are seized to aid in escapes; and incidents involving mentally unbalanced citizens who seize hostages in an attempt to gain recognition.

The Director of Operational Security initiated a study to provide an overview of hostage taking events in the Canadian Penitentiary Service from 1970 to 1975 for the purposes of:

a. determining the nature and extent of the problem;
b. determining the causes and major contributing factors;
c. evaluating the adequacy of National policies;
d. evaluating operational performance; and
e. in consideration of the findings of the foregoing, determining the precise requirements of the service for more effective countermeasures.

Before considering the study results it is essential that all acknowledge the same basis or definition of "hostage taking" and for the purposes of this paper the Criminal Code of Canada section 247 definitions are applied without consideration of the time element. Further, it is significant to note that some
difficulty was encountered in conducting the research program due to a lack of centralized essential elements of information.

Following are summaries of the available recorded data respecting the incidence of hostage taking within or affecting CPS during the period 4 August 1970 to July 6, 1975.
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>No. of Inmates</th>
<th>Outside Accomplices</th>
<th>No. of Hostages</th>
<th>Occupation of Hostages</th>
<th>Time in Day</th>
<th>Hostage Threat</th>
<th>Type of Injuries to Hostages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/8/70</td>
<td>Warkworth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Classification Officer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Knife</td>
<td>Bruised Arm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/1/70</td>
<td>Dorchester (Sackville Hospital)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Knife by outside acc.</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/1/70</td>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CX</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Muscle &amp; card table legs</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/2/70</td>
<td>B.C. Penitentiary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CX</td>
<td>2 30</td>
<td>Knife</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/12/70</td>
<td>Leclerc</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Grounds Gang Officer</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Muscle</td>
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<tr>
<td>7/01/71</td>
<td>Kingston</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Instructors</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Knife</td>
<td>none</td>
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<td>5/01/72</td>
<td>Cowansville</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CX's</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Knife</td>
<td>none</td>
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<td>4/04/71</td>
<td>Kingston Riot</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>CX's</td>
<td>3 15 30</td>
<td>Knife</td>
<td>none</td>
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<tr>
<td>8/11/71</td>
<td>Kingston (enroute to Winnipeg - C.P. Air)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Stewardess</td>
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<td>6 inmates</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>
The foregoing indicates that the CPS experience over the period under review showed that there were a total of 28 incidents of which five occurred outside of the institution. The incident rate per thousand inmates has been:

a. 1970 - .6960 per thousand
b. 1971 - .4136
c. 1972 - .5391
d. 1973 - .6197
e. 1974 - 0
f. 1975 - 1.2522

Thus using the average number of incidents per year as a base line i.e. 5.6 - or the rate per thousand inmates - .7041 - the incidence of hostage taking in or in relation to CPS shows, in the first ten months of 1975 an increase of 101.03% over the previous high number of incidents.

On this basis it is not surprising that the government, our staff, the PSAC and the public should express concern. However, the positive aspect has not been clearly expressed and it should be.

We have compared our responses, studies, findings, procedures and proposed future courses of action with other Canadian law enforcement agencies, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the New York City Police, the Washington District of Columbia Police, the Munich Police in Germany, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Calgary City Police, the Metropolitan Toronto City Police and the Preventive Security Institute.
in Louisville, Kentucky, U.S.A. We find no conflict. In fact the Canadian Penitentiary Service is more advanced, more experienced and better prepared than most jurisdictions to cope with these incidents.

Commissioners' Directive 120 - Emergency Situations sets out policy governing the management and control of riots, disturbances and hostage taking events. It requires, as National Policy should, that the director of the institution will develop emergency plans, will exercise complete authority and consult.

Divisional Instruction 713 - Institutional Riots, Disturbances and Taking of Hostages has been described as "a conglomerate of philosophy, policy guidelines, procedures, background information and interesting views and observations": The self-assessor was, in my view, being hyper-critical. CPS has advanced even further than the law enforcement communities of North America by providing positive guidance for the major areas of concern:

a. the detailed development of Contingency Plans for institutions including guidelines for the management of hostage taking events;
b. the policy respecting the use of force in rescuing hostages; and
c. policies and guidelines respecting negotiations with inmates.
The old adage "Prevention is better than cure" is most applicable in these situations; but National Headquarters cannot provide prevention by direction. Nor can the Operational Security Division or anyone else resolve every situation. The whole situation depends upon teamwork.

Thus, while our various activities, all striving toward the same objective, may vary slightly the intent is the same and the responsibility shared by everyone here:

1. Be aware of the potential hostage taking possibility;
2. Appreciate the importance of preventive security;
   a. Know the potentially dangerous inmates;
   b. Make disciplined observations and report them;
   c. Learn to identify, evaluate inmate actions and responses and report changes promptly;
   d. Learn to identify and react to inmate problems early;
   e. Report the unusual and significant; and
   f. Consistant with your duty, establish good inmate - staff relationships.
3. Learn and know your responsibilities to react to crisis situations.

These are primarily preventive measures and they are supported by operational readiness to respond, as required, to any situation.
Preventive measures are not new. They interface with operations completely. Directives and practices have been in existence which have long recognized both the potential threat and the need for pre-planned effective response. Divisional Instruction 713 - Institutional Riots, Disturbances and Taking of Hostages - issued January 8, 1973, outlines the standards required in formulating orders and instructions to control riots and disturbances and provides direction to develop flexible, clear, concise contingency plans which coupled with preventive measures contribute to institutional and individual safety and security. Research into the phenomena of hostage taking is on-going and validates established experience in both prevention and response.

Preventive measures have been developed to reduce vulnerability and to contribute to operational reaction to such incidents. Staff should be made aware of both the preventive measures to which their contribution is essential and of the fact that policies, practices and procedures have been developed to provide a team approach to the safe, effective resolution of crisis situations.

D. Dawe,
Director,
Preventive Security Division,
Canadian Penitentiary Service.
CRISIS INTERVENTION - HOSTAGE SITUATION

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" 2 - Lesson Plan
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LESSON PLAN
CRISIS INTERVENTION

HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

Correctional Staff College (Ontario)

December 1975
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Riots - Hostage Situations - Sit-Ins

This one day workshop on Crisis Intervention - Hostage Situations has been designed with you the staff members of the Penitentiary Service in mind. It is the hope of the Service, that after these sessions are completed, you will be more knowledgeable with respect to riots, will be more capable of noting changes which might lead to disturbances, both minor and major, and will be better equipped to operate in a hostage situation.

Riots

From the early 1900's through 1950, riot situations did occur on a regular basis and were in most cases escape or conditions related. Conditions within the prison were very inhuman with training and recreation almost non-existent. In the case of escapes, the riot or disturbance was used as a coverup and escapes were often unsuccessful, resulting in the loss of life to both staff and inmate.

Surprisingly there were few hostages taken, in fact, at Kingston Penitentiary in 1932 inmates walked out of their shops and barricaded themselves in their cell block. Staff were caught up in the riot, but were allowed to walk away unharmed. This was also a peaceful riot in which there was no damage and was.../2
well organized. It is a known fact that one riot or disturbance often sparks others. This has been true in the past both in Canada and in the United States.

In the 1950's thru 1960's the rioting pattern was usually destructive in nature and the institution involved was put to the torch. During this period hostage taking was not common and deaths that occurred particularly in the United States were as a result of the initial action of the rioters during their vent of destruction rather than anything to do with hostages.

Hostage Situations

The 1970's brought a rash of incidents which included the taking of hostages and it is highly possible that skyjacking and other hostage taking events which were prevalent during this same period may have had some effect. Our own Service during the past 5 years experienced an increased number of situations which involved hostages.

Sit-Ins

Sit-ins also increased during the 1970's, but because of their peaceful nature, were much easier to control although just as difficult to resolve. It was some groups method of presenting demands to bring about change.

The workshop will consist of the following topic areas.
NOTES

Show Projectual A 1

Historical Perspective
- Riots
- Hostage Situations
- Sit-ins

Preventive Measures
- Information Collection and Assessment
- Communication
- Dangerosity Indicators

Show Projectual A 2

Hostage Taking Situations
- Psychological Aspects
  - Hostage taker typology
  - Stockholm Syndrome
  - Guidelines to Negotiators
- Intervention Role of Emergency Response Team
- Hostage behaviour
- Initial response of hostage and authorities
- Motivation and causes

Show Projectual A 3

Post Crisis Activities
- Incident reporting
- Legal process
- The role of the media

Recent Research
- Hostage situations
- Riot situations
- Typology of hostage takers and rioters
PREVENTION OF RIOT-HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

The protection of society is the over-riding consideration of all aspects of correctional activities. This principle must be extended into every activity of the correctional system at all levels. To achieve the objective of protecting society - which includes not only the public at large, but, and perhaps, even more important, from our viewpoint, our own staff and inmates - demands that all persons associated with corrections be mindful of the need to:

A. maintain institutional security; and

B. ensure the preservation of life.

Show Projectuals 1, 2 & 3

Hostage Incidents Note the increase in 1975, 11 incidents.

1970 - 1975 C.P.S.

Define Legal Meaning of Hostage Taking

Hostage taking for the purpose of these discussions will be viewed in the context of kidnapping and abduction as defined in section 247 of the Criminal Code of Canada, reading as follows:

Show Projectual 4

Kidnapping and Abduction

Kidnapping - Forcible Confinement - non resistance

247 - C.C.

1. Everyone who kidnaps a person with intent

A. to cause him to be confined or imprisoned
against his will;
B. to cause him to be unlawfully sent or transported out of Canada against his will; or
C. to hold for ransom or to service against his will, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for life.

2. Everyone who, without lawful authority, confines, imprisons, or forcibly seizes another person, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for five (5) years.

Section two would probably cover most institutional hostage taking incidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Show</th>
<th>Major Contributing Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Projectual 5</td>
<td>1. 50% of cases - Staff failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refer. #42</td>
<td>2. 40% of cases - Administrative failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projectual 6</td>
<td>3. 10% of cases - Inmate action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Staff Failure**

- Control of inmate movement
- General supervision
- Searching - frisking
- Locking and counting procedures
- Control of tools and equipment
- Control of contraband
- Failure to read, understand and follow Standing Orders
Administrative Failure
- Errors in judgement
- Inadequate supervision
- Failure to ensure that Standing Orders are updated - adequate
- Failure to ensure adherence to Standing Orders
- Failure to communicate information between departments - identification of problems
- Failure to act on inmate requests, complaints

Inmate Action
- Through no direct fault of staff or Administration
- Ability to circumvent procedures and controls

Potential for Being Taken Hostage
The taking of hostages may be categorized as:
A. Impulsive; or
B. Planned.

Preventive Measures
Preventive measures may be applied against both threats.

The psychological profile of the typical hostage taker falls into one of three broad categories:
A. the terrorist;
B. the psychotic;
C. the criminal whose wishes are thwarted.
All three types are found in every institution.
Administrative Failure
- Errors in judgement
- Inadequate supervision
- Failure to ensure that Standing Orders are updated - adequate
- Failure to ensure adherence to Standing Orders
- Failure to communicate information between departments - identification of problems
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The taking of hostages may be categorized as:
A. Impulsive; or
B. Planned.

Preventive Measures
Preventive measures may be applied against both threats.

Hostage Takers
Three broad categories of hostage takers have been identified. The motivation underlying the taking of hostages differs in these three categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Terrorist</td>
<td>Political - a fanatic who is committed to a cause.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Psychotic</td>
<td>Not rationally determined - a person who doesn't fully realize what he's doing, and is therefore unpredictable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Criminal whose wishes are thwarted</td>
<td>Personal gain - a person who simply wants something for himself (e.g. escape, changes in Institutional routine, etc.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All three categories are found in every institution. Estimates are that 35 to 40% of our inmates fit one of these categories, and are therefore potential hostage takers.

Dangerosity Indicators - General

The American Correctional Association has published a list of riot causes by use of hindsight to establish these and foresight to use these causes as indicators of potential disturbance situations. They are:

1. increased anti-social inmate activity
2. inept management
3. inadequate personnel practices
4. inadequate facilities
5. lack of prison activities
6. insufficient legitimate rewards
7. community unrest and agitation
8. unexpected changes in routine
9. breakdown of institutional communications

Refer. #11 Research of our Prison System by L. MacDonald

He submits these indicators or points to evaluate.

Is the 1. Prison becoming politicized.

2. Increase or decrease of inmate complaining.
3. Increase of offence reports.
5. Increase of assaults - guards - inmates.
Research points out that 35 to 40% of our inmates fit one of the aforementioned categories, and are therefore potential hostage takers.

**Dangerosity Indicators - General**

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Refer. #11  

Research of our Prison System by L. MacDonald

He submits these indicators or points to evaluate.

1. Prison becoming politicized.
2. Increase or decrease of inmate complaining.
3. Increase of offence reports.
5. Increase of assaults - guards - inmates.
7. Stabbings.
8. Escape attempts.
9. Does administration know real inmate leaders?
10. Does administration know the musclemen?
11. Does administration know who is running the major rackets?
12. What is the tension level of the institution?
13. Outside political agitation.
14. Has there been hunger strikes?
15. Refusals to work.
16. Sabotage.
17. Smuggling of contraband.
18. Requests for protective custody - reasons are the number increasing?
19. Is there active widespread participation in sports activities, social activities, if not, why?
20. How much cell time are inmates doing?
21. How do treatment and custody staff relate?
22. How is the staff management relationships?
23. Are small disturbances occurring?
24. Have programs been curtailed?
25. Increased attendance at sick parades.
26. Staff absenteeism.
27. Rate of staff turnover.

Preventive Security Measures

1. Administrative measures - Specific
   - identify dangerous types
   - convey information of identity to staff
   - assess and if necessary revise Standing Orders
   - assess and if necessary revise movement procedures
   - assess and if necessary revise custodial procedures
   - refer to information re security weaknesses found in security surveys
   - screen visitors carefully - citizen groups
   - control visiting areas and visitors (inmate)
   - control all items and materials entering and leaving institution
   - control hobbycraft - supplies, etc.
   - control of vehicle traffic
   - investigate possible trafficking by staff
   - identify dangerous areas, eg. class dept., kitchen, hospital, visits and correspondence area, etc.
   - possible design weakness peculiar to institution
   - devise tool, equipment and weapons controls
   - process inmate grievances, complaints
Staff Failure

Identify the Potentially Dangerous

- know the potentially dangerous inmates
- assess your vulnerability when in contact
- know and follow safe procedures
- follow Standing Orders
- Don't take risky shortcuts

Make Disciplined Observations

- search out information on problem inmates
- pass on information you have to appropriate departments or individuals
- recognize changes in attitude - tension
- recognize changes in behaviour
- note when association changes occur
- write observation reports
- observe, and evaluate present procedures
- identify and suggest safer methods (if appropriate)
- recognize potentially dangerous areas, eg. recreation buildings, yards
- be cautious of two or three on one situations
- report your concern

Practice Safe Custodial Procedures

- don't become careless
- don't take unnecessary risks
- search conscientiously (vehicles, cells, etc.)
- frisk often and thoroughly
- follow prescribed methods (Standing Orders)
- control contraband
- check locking devices
- follow laid down locking and unlocking procedures
- practice careful key control
- count inmates accurately using prescribed procedure
- help enforce tool control
- follow safe procedures in prime danger areas
- segregation - dissociation
- follow Standing Order related to inmate visitors
- follow Standing Order re citizen participation groups
- supervise intelligently

Relationships
- develop and maintain positive interpersonal relationships
- watch for trafficking (report suspicious)
- don't become too familiar
- be interested and helpful - draw the line
- stay within your responsibility area
- 12 -

- be able to direct inmate inquiries to proper sources
- maintain a humble, but dignified respectful attitude towards all - staff and inmates
- act on complaints - real or fancied - report
- inmate must realize you will carry out your responsibilities objectively
Hostage Taking Situations

Introduction

The taking of a hostage is usually impulsive or planned. The hostage taker may, because of a planned escape which goes wrong, take a hostage to aid in gaining his freedom. This might be categorized as an impulsive act. On the other hand, an incident which was planned occurred at Warkworth Institution in the summer of 4 August 1970. Lorraine Barry, a Classification Officer, was to interview Inmate Lauzon, who was serving 7 years for armed robbery. Upon arriving, the inmate after a few words drew a long, sharp, knife-like weapon and threatened Miss Barry. He had her call the Assistant Director Inmate Training to come to her office under some pretext and upon his arrival forced him, on threat of injury to Miss Barry, to call the Administration for money. He took the two hostages and made his way to the parking lot. He forced the Assistant Deputy Warden (IT) to use his car and they proceeded to the Administration Building. On arrival the AD (IT) was sent in to get the money, while the inmate and Miss Barry remained in the car. No money was brought out and the inmate moved into the front seat of the car with the hostage and drove off.

While this was happening the O.P.P. were alerted and when the inmate made off they were under surveillance.
They travelled and stopped here and there around the area. They finally stopped and the inmate with the hostage moved into an open field. A member of the O.P.P. in civilian clothing, acting as a negotiator, talked the inmate into giving himself up. This was accomplished over a period of several hours with no injury or harm coming to Miss Barry or the inmate.

Psychological Aspects

Hostage Taker Typology

Psychological types of people you may encounter.

1. **Schizophrenic**
   (a) Has no thought train.
   (b) Simple, out of touch with reality.
   (c) Uninvolved and disinterested.
   (d) Unable to concentrate on any objective over period of time.
   (e) Can usually be handled easily
   (f) Can be handled by listening to what he says, keeping him talking, and forcing him to make decisions.

2. **Neurotic**
   (a) Knows what he is doing.
   (b) Well aware of situation and possible consequences.
   (c) In touch with reality, however, has an overbearing and unexplainable feeling about something which causes his irrational and neurotic behaviour.
They travelled and stopped here and there around the area. They finally stopped and the inmate with the hostage moved into an open field. A member of the O.P.P. in civilian clothing, acting as a negotiator, talked the inmate into giving himself up. This was accomplished over a period of several hours with no injury or harm coming to Miss Barry or the inmate.
Psychological Aspects

The primary psychological consideration in the hostage taking situation: Is the hostage taker rational or irrational? Cues indicative of irrationality:

a) bizarre behavior - strange movements or gestures
   - unintelligible speech (i.e., what he says doesn't make any sense)

b) delusions (i.e., he persists in a fixed belief that is contradicted by social reality)

c) hallucinations (i.e., he perceives objects that aren't really there)

d) excessive or inappropriate emotionality
   - crying uncontrollably
   - laughing uncontrollably
   - unusually quiet or speechless

If the hostage taker is rational, members of the negotiating team can reason with him. If the hostage taker is irrational, he cannot be reasoned with, but he may be talked down by a negotiator and convinced to release his hostage, or he may allow himself to be overtaken.
The Hostage Situation
Refer #18

Stockholm Syndrome

Because of the increasing trend of terrorist groups to use the kidnap/hostage tactic, some preliminary investigation has been conducted to determine the effect of captivity on the hostage. The tentative, and still largely incomplete, results of these inquiries have been somewhat startling, particularly with regard to the
change in the value set of the hostage. This phenomenon has been popularly dubbed the "Stockholm Syndrome", after an incident which occurred in Stockholm, Sweden. Female hostages were held in a bank vault by would-be bank robbers for several days and after their release expressed strong attachment to their captors, to the point of refusing to testify against them.

The degree of identification which the hostage may feel towards his captor, of course depends on the treatment he receives, but this does not appear to be the only factor. Almost all victims have admitted to this phenomenon to some degree. It may be that the stronger personality with a well-founded set of values is less swayed than the weaker personality who may actually feel guilt because he is made to believe that his previous lifestyle has been wrong and immoral. This may explain the seemingly total conversion of Patricia Hearst to the cause of the Symbionese Liberation Army.

The politically motivated hostage taker in particular may spend long hours in discussion and rationalization of his cause and his terrorist activities. It has been found this, plus the threat of death, is a crude effective yet unintended type of brainwashing. Most persons who have been victims in a hostage situation have found themselves cooperating to a much greater degree than they thought possible prior to the incident.
The long range psychic effect on the hostage is, as yet, not known. Whether the trauma created by being a victim will cause a permanent change in personality is an area which will require further study.

This identity syndrome is something that must be kept in mind by persons involved in negotiation and rescue operations. Most persons who have been hostages have found themselves being very docile and cooperative with their captors, sometimes to the point of failing to take advantage of carelessness or mistakes on the part of their captors which may have led to their escape.

**Guidelines to Negotiators**

1. **Measure emotional stability**
   
   (a) Determine with whom you are dealing and their psychological make-up.
   
   1. Common criminal - who can be successfully reasoned with.
   
      2. Psycho - who is unpredictable and has to be dealt with according to his mental state.
   
      3. Fanatic - who has total dedication and is tough to deal with.

   (b) Remember that the emotional stress affects the aggressor, the hostage, the negotiator and the persons at the scene.
Reason with aggressor according to his weaknesses

1. Common criminal - use good common sense and reason with him/them.

2. Schizophrenic - keep him talking and making decisions.

3. Neurotic - knows what he is doing and can be reasoned with.

4. Psychotic - very unstable, must be carefully reasoned with, can be set off by anything.

5. Psychopath - his own downfall is his ego, must concern himself with his own survival and constantly feed his ego. Remember that once he uses a hostage to escape, the hostage has less than a fifty-fifty chance of survival.

6. Paranoid - appeal to his ego, tell him he's the greatest, and if he were killed, who could fill his shoes to carry out his cause.

3. Never negotiate to supply weapons

4. Stall for time

   (a) Time saves lives.

   (b) Always say you have to go to higher authority.

   (c) Stall without spooking the aggressor.

5. Never offer suggestions

6. Never agree to a demand without receiving something in return.
7. **Keep perpetrator in a decision-making status.**

8. **Nurture his escape potential.**

   (a) If he feels all is lost, he may decide to harm hostages.

---

**Intervention Role of Emergency Response Team**

In the past the E.R.T. was better known in our Service as riot squads and was used for disturbances, hostage taking events and escapes. Initially this team consisted of staff who were called in and directed to perform emergency duties. Because escapes made up the majority of incidents the team was actually a large number of staff. Outside the penitentiary sector the E.R. Team is a much smaller group specially trained in the use of arms, gas, radio, and other emergency procedures. It usually consists of about 5 members who go through a thorough period of screening and training.

Our Service as yet have not made a policy decision and at the present time are not specifically training Emergency Response Teams. Hopefully this will change in the near future and there will be specialized training for 5 man E. R. Teams who will act as advisors to Directors and have response capabilities. Past experience both in our Service and in the United States, reveals that riot and hostage taking events in which death occurs are all too frequently caused by Institutional
or support staff who have not had specialized training. Consequently, with well trained E.R.T.'s the intervention role would be more positive in handling emergency situations.

Hostage Behaviour

Reminders
1. It is to be remembered that no one retains their authority when taken hostage.
2. Inmates generally view a disturbance and the taking of a hostage as a final act of despair. The inmates are anxious, apprehensive, and afraid.

What To Do

1. **Keys** If capture is evident hide keys and personal property if practical.

2. **Remain outwardly calm.** Although physical harm is threatened, in order to control your behaviour and as a point in negotiation, your life is important to your captors. Death of a hostage removes his bargaining rights. It is in their best interest to keep you safe.

3. **Limit the situation.** If the intention of taking two or more hostages is expressed, attempt to convince your captors that one is as effective as a group and easier to control.
4. **Give alarm.** If possible indicate to other staff that you have been captured. This should be done the soonest to allow the administration time to consider appropriate action.

5. **Medical Problems.** Notify your captors immediately of any medical problems as this will have some effect on the way they deal with you. Also if medication is required.

6. **Indicate location.** In many instances hostages have been disguised in inmate garb and moved to various locations. If possible, make people aware of your location so that plans for recovery can be considered.

7. **Movements.** Avoid movements that might be interpreted as threatening to your captors.

8. **Be a good prisoner.** A hostage is a prisoner. Behave as you would have the inmate behave if you were a Correctional Officer. Go along and do what they say. The one limit to this is that if you see a **safe** opportunity to escape, do so.

9. **Talk.** The principle of retaining effective communication is important. Your captors may be quite emotional and fearful, even though it may not be apparent. If talking increases their anxiety, take another tact.
10. Rumours. As a hostage one hears rumours. Try to assure inmates that they are rumours. Make attempts to correctly interpret what they observe. Don't get caught up in the rumour grapevine.

11. Observe. Observe what goes on including behaviour, identity, any weapons, etc.

12. Eat. Don't refuse food. You must remain in good physical and mental condition.

13. Rest. If you have opportunity rest so that you remain mentally alert.

14. Fall down. As soon as you are aware of an active attempt to overpower your captors, drop to the floor, so you will be out of the line of any firepower, and out of the way.

Six Do Nots

1. Do not bargain. 4. Injury
2. Do not aggravate. 5. Lie
3. Do not use force. 6. Carry personal property.

Initial Response of hostage and authorities

A. Hostage

1. Self-protection
2. Warning and reporting
3. Help
B. **Authorities**

1. Establishment of a perimeter.
2. Evacuation of non-essential personnel.
3. Isolation of those immediately involved.
4. Establishment of control.
5. If immediate resolution is practicable; or

Tactical Planning Phase.

**Motivation and Causes**

Man has almost an infinite capacity for good or evil limited only by technology. Throughout human history, his ability to alleviate suffering has only been exceeded by his ability to cause it. From the invention of the cross-bow, gunpowder, flight, small automatic weapons, and plastic explosives criminals have been able to main, kill, and control increasing numbers of innocent victims. Flight with all its many advantages to mankind was responsible for the term "skyjacker". Of particular national and international concern recently have been the taking of hostages to enforce demands. This criminal device is probably one of the oldest known to man. As far back as ancient Greece and Norse Sagas, political persons were held for ransoms. An updating of this phenomenon is the many political hostage situations which have occurred around the world in the recent past. Also of note is the terrorist groups who have also been active in hostage taking incidents.
We in the Penitentiary Service have been plagued with incidents of hostage taking. Often the inmates involved feel they have nothing to lose and their intentions are for escape, recognition or to create change.

Hostages for Escape

If an inmate is serving a long sentence and is serving it in a maximum security institution, he may look for opportunities to take hostages for escape purposes. He is aware of the power he wields if he holds a hostage. Because of the strict security measures employed in maximum security, an inmate thinking of escape would quite likely plan to take a hostage to ensure his successful escape. The fact that very few successful escapes occur does not deter him because he would block that out of his conscience or believe that he would be the exception. In the case of medium security it would be more than likely that an inmate would be mentally ill or forced into a position where, to him, a hostage seems the only way out. One must realize in medium security because of less tight static security, escape is more easily accomplished and hostages for the purpose of escape are less necessary.
Hostages for Recognition

The inmate who would plan to take hostages for the purpose of recognition could be at any level of security. He would likely be mentally unstable and be feeding his ego, or on the other hand he might be an activist who wants recognition for himself or a particular cause he is championing. An example of this would be the Patti Hearst case in which the perpetrators took her and demanded recognition of their organization by having large quantities of foods and goods made available and handed out to the needy. There was also much publicity through the newspapers and television in which the ideals of the organization were explained.

Hostages to Create Change

Some inmates, although not necessarily idealists, might take hostages to advertise the need for change. The publicity and opportunity for public voice is necessary in their eyes. This quite often would occur in conjunction with a riot or disturbance. At this time the list of changes are prepared and presented by the would be leaders. On occasion the power shifts from leader to leader and also the choice of negotiator is requested. The negotiator requested by the leaders of the inmates quite often is not in the best interest of the two factions, but is to meet the needs of the
individual. The nominating of some activists as occurred at Attica quite often create problems, confusion and slow down the resolving of the problem at hand.

Past occurrences in which demands of change have been accepted, created better programmes. Hopefully, if staff are aware of the feelings of inmate populations, steps can be taken to create changes and thus correct situations before they become problems which, to the inmate, can only be resolved by a riot and the taking of hostages.

There is no one hundred per cent sure way of stopping the taking of hostages. All that can be done is for staff to be aware of what he can do, if captured, and other staff involved can do to control the situation. Remember the most dangerous time of hostage taking is during the initial period of capture. The longer you are held, the better your chances of safe release.
POST CRISIS ACTIVITIES

Incident Reporting

At the conclusion of each crisis situation at an Institution, there is always the tremendous task of making and submitting numerous reports on all aspects of the incident. It is imperative that all persons involved in the crisis recall as accurately as possible, all information which would assist courts of law and/or administrative enquiries in determining causes of the problem, and the extent to which criminal charges may have to be laid. This task will have been simplified considerably if a plan for incident reporting has been previously formulated; that is, when a crisis is developing, plans should already be underway for Post Crisis Reporting.

A Plan For Incident Reporting

The following points could be considered:

(a) assignment of staff to record events;
(b) recording of events;
(c) preservation of physical evidence.

Assignment of Staff to Record Events

It would seem plausible to expect much factual and valid information concerning a crisis if certain staff were assigned to that precise responsibility. It is a matter of policy for Police Forces who may be engaged in public riot control to assign someone the
task of recording events as they occur. Certainly, there is application of this practice and policy in our Canadian Penitentiary Service.

Recording of Events

It may not always be possible for observers to be in close proximity to the "real action". This however could be compensated for by having various types of recording equipment such as VTR or 8 mm cameras with special zoom lens capabilities, and 35 mm cameras with telephoto lenses. The value of pictures cannot be overemphasized, because it is difficult for a defendant to refute the evidence of a photograph which establishes his presence and participation in a crime. Also, the use of cameras is a psychological deterrent in discouraging participation in unlawful activities because it has a tendency to destroy the feeling of anonymity. Many inmates will feel safe while participating in an unlawful activity if they think their personal involvement will remain unknown. Cameras could also be used to defend Penitentiary Staff in alleged brutality and reprisals in post-crisis activities - such as inmate movement from one area to another. Additional methods of recording events would be the use of small tape recorders and note pads.
Preservation of Physical Evidence

The success or failure of an investigation to a great extent is contingent upon the efficiency of staff to produce certain evidence such as weapons, equipment, clothing, fingerprints, etc. If such evidence or clues are damaged or destroyed, they are lost forever, and the task of reconstruction becomes almost impossible. The proper identification and preservation of such evidence is of paramount importance as it could be used in a court of law as incriminating evidence against an inmate.

Legal Process

The provisions of the Penitentiary Act and the Penitentiary Service Regulations are superimposed on the Criminal Code of Canada. That is, any inmate is liable to be tried in an outside court for offences that are violations of the Code. When such an offence is committed in an institution, the Institutional Head shall determine whether the offence is of a minor or serious nature. In a case of doubt, he should consult with the local Crown Attorney.

Serious Offences

All such offences should be reported immediately to local law enforcement authorities. Such authorities shall be given every reasonable opportunity to conduct...
their investigation. The institution shall arrange for availability of staff, inmates, and office space in order to enable the expedient progress of the investigation.

**Role of the Media**

During the crisis a press room should be established where news media representatives can be accommodated. All information released to the press shall have been previously, or shall be simultaneously relayed to the Commissioner. Press releases may be issued from time to time by the Director or his delegate, during the course of the crisis giving only factual information. On no account shall members of the Press be allowed to visit the disturbance area, (unless, perhaps, authorized by the Commissioner).

**Media Relations. — Commandments of Survival**

Since Penitentiary Operations and related incidents are newsworthy topics from a reporter's point of view, all CPS staff should make every effort to foster good relations with the Press. The following points assist us in achieving this objective.

1. Don't ever avoid the media.
2. Don't discriminate against any member or members of the media.
3. Don't be uninformed.
4. Don't ever fabricate.

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5. Don't ever exaggerate.
6. Don't say publicly anything you don't want on record.
7. Don't "take on" the media.
8. Don't continually report on your plans; talk about something concrete.
9. Don't be inconsiderate of the media's needs for access to those who have the facts.

RECENT RESEARCH

Hostage Situations

Prior to 1975, the incidence of hostage taking was rare. Two incidents are recorded where hostages died during the last few moments of the crisis; and in both cases, the victims died of gunshot wounds inflicted by rescue forces. Even in the American penal system, which has experienced many more hostage situations than our C.P. System all deaths of hostages during the past 50 years have been the result of wounds inflicted by assault teams as a result of their efforts to retake the prison. In our system, as in other penal systems in the world, trends confirm that the proportion of dangerous offenders will grow. As of June 1975, it was determined that 737 inmates in the C. P. System were considered dangerous offenders. At the moment, it has not been able to devise an acceptable dangerosity
prediction model capable of predicting the precise nature, location or timing of such violence; however, action is in progress now, on a priority basis, to develop such a capability. Recent research and the compilation of statistics will play a vital role in this task.

Recent Research and Statistics in Hostage Situations

July 1970 - July 1975

Show

Number of hostage events - 27
(including 4 outside of institutions)

   duration: 5 minutes

ii) Kingston - CP Air - Winnipeg - 1971 - Stewardess
   duration: 10 minutes

    receptionist and nurse
   duration: 6 hours, 30 minutes

iv) B.C.P. - transferee from Millhaven - Vancouver
    Airport - 1 CX Staff
   duration: 25 minutes

Show

Objectives:

   Escape - 18
   Transfers - 3
   Pardon - 1
   Publicity - 5
Injuries - Fatalities

1 death
no permanent injuries

Negotiations

5 - C.P.S. communications
8 - C.P.S. and outside communications
14 - No opportunity (escape)

Events by Security Classification

Maximum - 15
Medium - 10
Minimum - 2

Average Population

Staff: 4700 - 6200
Inmates: 7500 - 9000

Inmate Distribution: 35% - Maximum
50% - Medium
15% - Minimum

Numbers of Hostages and Inmates Involved

Total inmates - 68 (excl. KP '71 riot)
Average inmates per event - 2.5 (excl. KP '71 riot)
Total hostages - 58
Average hostages per event - 1.6
Hostages by sex: male - 47
female - 11
Show
projectual
31

Occupation of Hostages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CX</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orderly</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shop Instructor</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang Supervisor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classification Officer</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Staff</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storeman</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receptionist</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewardess</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Show
Projectual
32

Length of Time Held Hostage

Times range from 5 minutes - 3 days, 15 hours; 30 minutes.

Average time - approximately 6½ hours

Show
Projectual
33

Types of Weapons Used By Hostage Takers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knife</td>
<td>in 18 incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Razor</td>
<td>in 1 incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scissors</td>
<td>in 1 incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol</td>
<td>in 2 incidents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES

- 36 -

Dummy Pistol  
in 1 incident

Dummy Rifle   
in 1 incident

Physical force  
(no weapons)  
in 3 incidents

Show Projectual  

5

Contributing Factors to Hostage Incidents

50% of cases - Staff Failure  
(improper custodial procedures)

40% of cases - Administrative Failure  
(lack of adequate management, etc.)

10% of cases - Inmate Action  
(inmates have been successful through no  
fault of staff)

# 36

Riot Situations

The orderly operation of a prison depends upon  
the passive acquiescence of the controlled (cooperation  
of the inmates). This can be accomplished by minimizing  
the negative effects of incarceration. This tolerance  
by inmates is governed by satisfiable work programs,  
social development programs, and the absence of staff  
brutality and harrassment. This, in turn, is influenced  
by the political and social climate of society outside  
of prison. Thus we have a partnership with mutual  
obligations and expectations between staff and inmates.  
Any disruption of this routine increases the probability  
of violence. Our experience tends to prove this final  
thought because many of our riots have occurred when the  

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administrations were improving programs and tightening up control. Inmates apparently exploited the attendant disorganization of these changes. Research has determined that riots have been the vehicle of prison reform, although this is contrary to the beliefs of many prison officials.

Causes of Riots

Some of the causes commonly found to contribute to riot situations are as follows:

a) Public Attitude Toward Prisons

The attitude of the public toward prisons ranges from indifference to demands for more punitive measures. Many riots are not necessarily the result of bad prison conditions but rather from the belief of the inmates that the only way to gain public interest in improving such conditions is by rioting. Inmates believe that non-violent protests for remedial action accomplishes nothing, while riots sometimes do.

b) Lack of Proper Personnel

Correctional work is a very unique type of employment due to the many demands, frustrations and challenges which exist in a penal institution. Persons not truly dedicated to this challenge contribute very little to progress in penology. In many cases, it is felt that the negative aspects of correctional work
greatly outweigh the monetary rewards and thus there is considerable "turnover" in both security and professional personnel.

c) Problems Related to Offender Personalities

A leading cause of riots is the fact that in a prison population there are many disturbed inmates with a high degree of emotional instability and various other character disorders. Some inmates once in prison do not view violence as illicit and therefore may have no guilt feelings about their aggression. Consequently, the usual norms which have guided their behaviour outside of prison no longer apply once inside prison.

d) Idleness

Perhaps one of the most widely accepted causes for riots is inmate idleness. Idleness can result from a lack of meaningful employment programs, recreational programs and social development programs. The more energy an inmate directs towards positive programs, the less energy and time he will have to engage in illicit and nefarious ventures.

e) Poor Communications

Riots which are the result of policy changes might be averted if better communications existed between inmates and staff. There is a gap between the large managed group and the small supervisory group.
Each group tends to perceive the other as narrow, hostile stereotypes. Staff often see inmates as bitter, secretive and untrustworthy, while inmates often see staff as condescending, high handed and mean. Formal methods of communications between inmates and administration must exist.

f) Inequalities in the Judicial and Correctional System

Varying lengths of prison sentences and different institutional programs for similar offenders are perceived by officials within both the judicial system and penal system as "individualized" treatment. The inmate, however, interprets this as inequality within the system resulting in much resentment and discontent. Finding a remedial solution is a dilemma; one perhaps for which there is no satisfactory solution.

Typology of Hostage Takers and Rioters

Hostage Takers

This person may be the professional criminal type who is a rational thinker and wishes to refrain from unnecessary violence after weighing the odds. He may also be a psychotic type, tending to be irrational and quite unpredictable. C.P.S. studies of hostage incidents in our system have resulted in the following predictions:

a) in most instances he will be under 30 years of age;
b) he will probably use a knife to force his demands;

c) he has a record of violence;

d) it will be his first attempt at hostage taking.

Rioters

A crowd of people is a potential problem in terms of disturbances. Each person in the group is an individual with a background of family training or a lack of it. The behaviour, therefore, of each individual reflects his background training. The group situation offers an occasion for a person to take certain liberties that he would not ordinarily take. So therefore, the general pattern of behaviour is considerably different from that normally expected of the individual. When this theory is applied to an inmate population, which certainly has many negative characteristics, there is considerable potential for violence. Research shows that rioters possess some or all of the following characteristics.
a) Deep-rooted sense of inmate tradition.

The rioters are persons with truncated personalities, (lacking the expected normal element) whose natural habitat is prison. They are able to find outlet for all of their limited "facilities" in prison.

b) Lacks common sense and good judgement.

Sensible people don't lodge a protest by burning and destroying their homes, or by inflicting injuries on others.

c) Will make unreasonable or frivolous demands.

Many riots are marked by such demands as the removal of certain staff personnel, release of inmates from dissociation, amnesty, pardons, and immediate release from the institution with transportation to another country.

d) Enjoys attention and publicity that a riot brings.

Even when most inmate demands have been met, there is still a tendency for the rioters to want to hold out longer either for further concessions
or just for the joy and power derived from the hold out.

e) Rioters are usually younger than non-rioters.

f) History of violent behaviour and emotional disturbance.

Whatever the grievances of the rioters are, the assaulters usually have a previous history of violent behaviour.
CRISIS INTERVENTION - HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

Riots - Hostage Situations - Sit-Ins

This one day workshop on Crisis Intervention - Hostage Situations has been designed with you the staff members of the Penitentiary Service and other workers and visitors in mind. It is the hope of the Service, that after these sessions you will be better equipped to observe changes which might lead to disturbances and also more capable of handling yourself in hostage situations.

Riots

During the first half of the twentieth century, riots generally were orderly with little destruction or hostage taking and most were escape or conditions oriented due to inhuman conditions and lack of training and recreation. One fact worthy of note is that one disturbance may spark others in different institutions. Since 1950, rioting has developed into a more destructive pattern and widespread damage has occurred. Of interest also is the fact that most deaths occurred during the initial action rather than as a result of hostage taking.

Hostage Situations

The 1970's brought a rash of these incidents in the public sector and we in the Penitentiary Service did not escape hostage situations completely. There were increasing incidents which caused enough concern that this present workshop was created.

Sit-Ins

During the last five years, sit-ins have increased, but due to their usually peaceful nature have been easier to control with little chance of injury.

PREVENTION OF RIOT-HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

The Canadian Penitentiary Service is committed to a policy that will ensure the safety and security of the institution and provide that maximum efforts will be made to prevent injury or death to persons who are taken hostage in a prison disturbance. Because the circumstances will be different in each instance no hard and fast rules of procedure can be made that will be usable in every disturbance. Therefore, the methods to be used to resolve these problems, while based on the above policy will by necessity vary as the situation demands.
Legal Definition of Hostage Taking

Hostage taking will be viewed in the context of Kidnapping and Abduction as defined in section 247 of the Criminal Code of Canada, reading as follows.

Kidnapping and Abduction, Section 247 C.C.

1. Everyone who kidnaps a person with intent
   A. to cause him to be confined or imprisoned against his will;
   B. to cause him to be unlawfully sent or transported out of Canada against his will; or
   C. to hold for ransom or to service against his will, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for life.

2. Everyone who without lawful authority, confines, imprisons, or forcibly seizes another person, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for five (5) years.

Part two of Section 247 of the Criminal Code of Canada would, in most instances, be appropriate for institutional hostage taking situations.

Major Contributing Factors

Having assessed the hostage taking incidents that have taken place in our Service over the past five years it is clear that in fifty per cent of these cases staff failure was the reason the inmates were able to seize their captives and in forty per cent of the cases administrative faults were the major contributing factors. In only ten per cent of the disturbances could the staff and administration be absolved of any real blame. In these situations inmates were able to circumvent what is considered safe procedures and adequate administrative safeguards.

Potential for Being Taken Hostage

The taking of hostages may be categorized as:

A. Impulsive - unplanned - seizing an opportunity;
B. Planned.
Preventive measures may be applied against both threats. The psychological profile of the typical hostage taker falls into one of three broad categories.

A. The terrorist
B. The Psychotic
C. The criminal whose wishes are thwarted.

All three types are found in every institution. Research points out that thirty-five to forty per cent of our inmates fit one or more of the aforementioned categories and are therefore potential hostage takers.

**Dangerosity Indicators**

The American Correctional Association has published a list of riot causes by use of hindsight to establish these and foresight to use these causes as indicators of potential disturbance situations. They are:

1. increased anti-social inmate behaviour;
2. inept prison management;
3. inadequate personnel practices;
4. inadequate facilities;
5. lack of prison activities;
6. insufficient legitimate rewards for prisoners;
7. community unrest and agitation;
8. unexpected changes in routines;
9. breakdown of institutional communications.

As a result of research done by Mr. L. MacDonald into the operations of Canadian prisons he submitted the following indicators or points that should be evaluated from time to time.

1. Is the prison becoming politicized?
2. Are complaints increasing or decreasing?
3. Is there an increase of offence reports?
4. Are self-mutilation and suicides increasing?
5. Are officers and/or inmates being assaulted more frequently?
6. Do officers provoke inmates causing poor relations?
7. Are stabbing incidents taking place?
8. Has there been escape attempts?
9. Does the administration know the real inmate leaders - musclemen - who are running the rackets?
10. What is the tension level of the institution?
11. Is agitation from outside political organizations taking place?
12. Has there been hunger strikes - refusals to work - or sabotage?
13. Is there more smuggling of contraband?
14. Are requests for protective custody increasing?
15. Is there active widespread participation in sports and social activities - if not - why?
16. How much cell time are inmates doing?
17. How do treatment and custody staff relate to each other?
18. How are staff management relationships?
19. Are small disturbances occurring?
20. Have institutional programs been curtailed?
21. Are inmates attending sick parades more frequently?
22. Is staff absenteeism on the increase?
23. Is the rate of staff turnover increasing?

These points all relate to increased uneasiness on the part of both staff and inmates. While each point, if isolated from the others might not be cause for alarm, a significant combination of these factors should be investigated with the view to heading off impending problems.
Preventive Security Measures

The administration must make an objective assessment of administrative responsibilities from time to time to ensure that Standing Orders and procedures for the control of inmates are not outdated.

All Institutional staff have the responsibility to read, understand and follow Standing Orders and set out custodial procedures. To report unusual occurrences or behaviour and to bring to the attention of their superior officer any shortcomings they recognize, or concern they have. Incidents of staff failure will be avoided completely or reduced to the minimum if officers come to recognize those inmates who are dangerous, make disciplined observations, practice safe custodial procedures and develop and maintain good interpersonal relationships between themselves and the inmate population.

When line staff and the prison administrators understand and accept their shared responsibility and work together in a mutual attitude of cooperation the opportunities for inmates to become involved in these disturbances will be greatly reduced, even totally removed.

HOSTAGE TAKING SITUATIONS

Introduction

The taking of hostages is usually impulsive or planned. The hostage taker may because of a planned escape which goes wrong, take hostages to aid him in his attempt to gain freedom. On the other hand, a person may include the taking of hostages as part of their escape plan. This would be especially the case in maximum security institutions.

Hostage Taker Typology

1. Schizophrenic
   (a) Has no thought train.
   (b) Simple, out of touch with reality.
   (c) Uninvolved and disinterested.
   (d) Unable to concentrate on any objective over period of time.
(e) Can usually be handled easily.
(f) Can be handled by listening to what he says, keeping him talking, and forcing him to make decisions.

2. Neurotic
(a) Knows what he is doing.
(b) Well aware of situation and possible consequences.
(c) In touch with reality, however, has an overbearing and unexplainable feeling about something which causes his irrational and neurotic behaviour.

3. Psychotic
(a) Emotionally unable to understand or reason.
(b) Ability to reason is affected by his emotional state.
(c) Harbors great inner frustration and conflict.
(d) His actions, the words he uses, and the demands he makes often are clues to his mental condition.

4. Psychopath (criminal and non-criminal)
Non-criminal
(a) Appears normal and rational.
(b) Usually an extrovert and well liked.
(c) Undue dependence on others.
(d) Excellent con-man.
(e) Continued sexual experimentation.
(f) Desires immediate satisfaction.

Criminal
(a) Has no conscience.
(b) Hates with a passion, loves no one.
(c) Commits most violent acts - also capable of bunco.
(d) Most dangerous of all psychos.
(e) Will do anything to inflate ego.
(f) Thinks only of himself - has no regard for human life.
(g) Abuses, tortures, and mutilates body before death.
(h) Will execute a hostage without hesitation.
(i) No feeling for persons, but sometimes gets attached to animals.
(j) Commits violent crimes against persons, (rapes most, robs most, beats most).

5. Paranoiac

(a) Delusions of grandeur.
(b) Delusions of persecution.
(c) Knows his enemy.
(d) Many times small in stature.
(e) Born loser - socially insignificant.
(f) Absolutely dedicated to his cause.
(g) Can build a philosophy out of half truths.

6. Weak Personality

(a) Weak mind and is easily swayed.
(b) Will be a follower and dedicated to a cause until another strong minded person with a magnetic personality takes them over.

Stockholm Syndrome

Tentative and largely incomplete studies have revealed some startling discoveries, particularly with regard to the change in the value set of the hostage. This phenomenon has been popularly dubbed the "Stockholm Syndrome" after an incident which occurred in Stockholm, Sweden. Female hostages were held in a bank vault by would-be bank robbers for several days. During this time they formed strong attachments to their captors, to the point where
they refused to testify against them. Almost all victims of hostage taking events have admitted to this phenomenon to some degree.

Most persons who have been victims have found themselves cooperating to a much greater degree than they thought possible prior to the incident.

Guidelines to Negotiators

This list of guidelines will give you some insight into the various aspects to be considered by negotiators.

1. **Measure emotional stability**

   (a) Determine with whom you are dealing and their psychological make-up.

   (1) Common criminal - who can be successfully reasoned with.

   (2) Psycho - who is unpredictable and has to be dealt with according to his mental state.

   (3) Fanatic - who has total dedication and is tough to deal with.

   (b) Remember that the emotional stress affects the aggressor, the hostage, the negotiator and the persons at the scene.

2. **Reason with aggressor according to his weaknesses**

   (a) Common criminal - use good common sense and reason with him/them.

   (b) Schizophrenic - keep him talking and making decisions.

   (c) Neurotic - knows what he is doing and can be reasoned with.

   (d) Psychotic - very unstable, must be carefully reasoned with, can be set off by anything.

   (e) Psychopath - his own downfall is his ego, must concern himself with his own survival and constantly feed his ego. Remember that once he uses a hostage to escape, the hostage has less than a fifty-fifty chance of survival.
(f) Paranoic - appeal to his ego, tell him he's the greatest, and if he were killed, who could fill his shoes to carry out his cause.

3. Never negotiate to supply weapons.
4. Stall for time.
   (a) Time saves lives.
   (b) Always say you have to go to higher authority.
   (c) Stall without spooking the aggressor.
5. Never offer suggestions.
6. Never agree to a demand without receiving something in return.
7. Keep perpetrator in a decision-making status.
8. Nurture his escape potential.
   (a) If he feels all is lost, he may decide to harm hostages.

Emergency Response Teams

In the past E. R. Teams in the Penitentiary Service were known as riot squads. There was little training, the groups were large and unwieldy, and they were used most often on escapes. Now the design of the E. R. Teams are radically changed. They consist of teams of five members including the commander. They are well trained with specific assigned rolls such as: arms, gas, radio or other emergency procedures. Many police forces have organized groups such as this and they have proved highly successful.

Our Service has not made a policy decision, but there are strong indications that we may have such teams. Past experience both in our Service and in the United States reveals that fatalities that occur during riot and hostage taking events frequently are caused by institutional or support staff who have not had specialized training.

Hostage Behaviour

Reminders

1. It is to be remembered that no one retains their authority when taken hostage.
2. Inmates generally view a disturbance and the taking of a hostage as a final act of despair. The inmates are anxious, apprehensive, and afraid.

.../10
What To Do

1. **Keys.** If capture is evident hide keys and personal property if practical.

2. **Remain outwardly calm.** Although physical harm is threatened, in order to control your behaviour and as a point in negotiation, your life is important to your captors. Death of a hostage removes his bargaining rights. It is in their best interest to keep you safe.

3. **Limit the situation.** If the intention of taking two or more hostages is expressed, attempt to convince your captors that one is as effective as a group and easier to control.

4. **Give alarm.** If possible indicate to other staff that you have been captured. This should be done the soonest to allow the administration time to consider appropriate action.

5. **Medical Problems.** Notify your captors immediately of any medical problems as this will have some effect on the way they deal with you. Also if medication is required.

6. **Indicate location.** In many instances hostages have been disguised in inmate garb and moved to various locations. If possible, make people aware of your location so that plans for recovery can be considered.

7. **Movements.** Avoid movements that might be interpreted as threatening to your captors.

8. **Be a good prisoner.** A hostage is a prisoner. Behave as you would have the inmate behave if you were a Correctional Officer. Go along and do what they say. The one limit to this is that if you see a safe opportunity to escape, do so.

9. **Talk.** The principle of retaining effective communication is important. Your captors may be quite emotional and fearful, even though it may not be apparent. If talking increases their anxiety, take another tact.

10. **Rumours.** As a hostage one hears rumours. Try to assure inmates that they are rumours. Make attempts to correctly interpret what they observe. Don't get caught up in the rumour grapevine.

11. **Observe.** Observe what goes on including behaviour, identity, and weapons, etc.
12. **Eat.** Don't refuse food. You must remain in good physical and mental condition.

13. **Rest.** If you have opportunity rest so that you remain mentally alert.

14. **Fall down.** As soon as you are aware of an active attempt to overpower your captors, drop to the floor, so you will be out of the line of any firepower, and out of the way.

**Six Do Nots**

1. Do not bargain.
2. Do not aggravate.
3. Do not use force.
4. Injury
5. Lie
6. Carry personal property.

**Motivation and Causes**

Historically we have had riots and hostage taking incidents for many centuries. In the Penitentiary Service the inmate is motivated by his personality and the environment in which he is living. He often feels he has nothing to lose and so attempts to escape, seek recognition or create change.

**Hostages for Escape**

The strict security measures employed at maximum security would certainly compel the escapee to consider this method because of the number of incidents in the past. The fact that the chance for success may be minimal does not alter the situation in the eyes of the escapee as he would consider his plan foolproof. He sees the hostage as power for him to wield to have his demands met.

**Hostages for Recognition**

The type of individual who would become involved in this situation could be unstable and feeding his ego or he might be an activist championing a cause.
Hostages to Create Change

Some inmates, although not necessarily idealists might take hostages in an attempt to create change. Quite often this occurs in riot situations where pressure can be applied through the hostage for public hearing in which complaints can be aired. The 1971 disturbance at Kingston Penitentiary would be an example of this type of situation.

There is no one hundred per cent sure way of stopping the taking of hostages. All that can be done is for staff to be aware of what he can do, if captured; and other staff involved can do to control the situation. Remember the most dangerous time of hostage taking is during the initial period of capture. The longer you are held, the better your chances of safe release.

POST CRISIS ACTIVITIES

Incident Reporting

At the conclusion of each crisis in an institution, staff are faced with the responsibility of documenting all the facts surrounding the incident. Accuracy of reports cannot be over-emphasized because not only will accurate reporting assist in determining causes and criminal responsibility, but also play an important role in the prevention of future incidents.

A Plan For Reporting

Each institution should have a well formulated plan for reporting if a crisis occurs. The following points should be considered:

Assignment of Staff

Certain staff members should be assigned the responsibility of recording facts during the crisis. After a crisis it is difficult to recall with accuracy all the information concerning events as they took place.

Recording Events

Various methods could be utilized such as video tape recorders, tape recorders, 8 mm movie cameras, 35 mm still cameras, and simple note pads.

Preservation of Physical Evidence

Physical evidence such as weapons, equipment, fingerprints and clothing, is invaluable in such matters as enquiries and criminal
prosecutions. Once evidence has been lost, destroyed, or mishandled it is lost forever and the task of determining causes and blame in serious incidents becomes extremely difficult.

Legal Process

When criminal offences have been committed in an institution, the institutional head shall determine if they are serious or minor. All serious offences should be reported immediately to the local law enforcement authorities who shall be given every assistance reasonable to conduct their investigation.

Role of the Media

During a crisis, facilities should be arranged to accommodate the press. Since public relations are important, press releases must be made through proper channels. Good relations with the press will be enhanced if the following points are adhered to:

Media Relations - Commandments of Survival

1. Don't avoid the media.
2. Don't discriminate against the media.
3. Don't be uninformed.
4. Don't fabricate.
5. Don't exaggerate.
6. Don't say anything you don't want on record.
7. Don't challenge the media.
8. Always tell the media something concrete.
9. Don't be inconsiderate of the media's needs for access to those who have the facts.

RECENT RESEARCH

Hostage Situations

Prior to 1975 the incidence of hostage taking was rare. In Canada, two incidents are recorded where hostages died and in both cases the victims died of gunshot wounds inflicted by rescue forces. Trends confirm that the proportion of dangerous offenders will grow. As of June 1975, it was determined that 737 inmates in
Canadian Penitentiaries are considered dangerous offenders. Steps are now being taken to devise an acceptable dangerosity prediction model capable of predicting the nature, location and timing of such violence. Recent research will play a vital role in this task. The following is an account of statistics compiled on hostage situations from July 1970 - July 1975.

Number of hostage events - 27

(including 4 outside of institutions)

   duration: 5 minutes

ii) Kingston - C.P. Air - Winnipeg - 1971 - Stewardess
    duration: 10 minutes

iii) Archambault - 2 inmates - Prov. Psy. Hospital - 1973
    receptionist and nurse
    duration: 6 hours, 30 minutes

iv) B.C.P. - transferee from Millhaven - Vancouver airport
    1 CX Staff
    duration: 25 minutes

Objectives

Escape - 18
Transfers - 3
Pardon - 1
Publicity - 5

Injuries - Fatalities

1 Death
no Permanent injuries

Negotiations

5 - C.P.S. communications
8 - C.P.S. and outside
14 - No opportunity (escape)

Events by Security Classification

Maximum - 15
Medium - 10
Minimum - 2
Average Population

Staff: 4700 - 6200
Inmates: 7500 - 9000

Inmate Distribution

35% - Maximum
50% - Medium
15% - Minimum

Numbers of Hostages and Inmates Involved

Total inmates - 68 (excl. KP '71 riot)
Average inmates per event - 2.5 (excl. KP '71 riot)
Total hostages - 58
Average hostages per event - 1.6
Hostages by sex: Male - 47
Female - 11

Occupation of Hostages

CX - 25
Doctor - 1
Nurse - 2
Orderly - 1
Shop Instructor - 6
Gang Supervisor - 1
Classification
  Officer - 15
Program Staff - 2
Recreation Officer - 1
Storeman - 1
Receptionist - 1
Stewardess - 1
Teacher - 1

Total 58

Length of Time Held Hostage

Time ranges from 5 minutes - 3 days, 15 hours, 30 minutes
Average time - approximately 6 1/2 hours

Types of Weapons Used By Hostage Takers

Knife in 18 incidents
Razor in 1 incident
Scissors in 1 incident
Pistol in 2 incidents
Dummy Pistol in 1 incident
Dummy Rifle in 1 incident
Physical force (no weapons) in 3 incidents

Contributing Factors to Hostage Incidents

50% of cases - Staff Failure
(Improper custodial procedures)

40% of cases - Administrative Failure
(lack of adequate management, etc.)

10% of cases - Inmate Action
(inmates have been successful through no fault of Staff)

Riot Situations

The orderly operation of a prison depends largely upon the cooperation of the inmates. This can be accomplished in part by minimizing the negative effects of incarceration through meaningful work programs, social development programs and the absence of staff brutality and harassment. Other factors which influence the operation of institutions are political and social pressures outside of prison, and change in institutional routine. Some of the causes commonly found to contribute to riot situations are as follows:

- public attitude toward prisons
- lack of proper personnel
- problems related to offender personalities
- idleness
- poor communications
- inequalities in the Judicial and Correctional systems

Typology of Hostage Takers and Rioters

Hostage Takers

This person may be a professional criminal type who is a rational thinker, or a psychotic type who is an irrational thinker.
C.P.S. studies of hostage incidents have resulted in the following predictions:

- in most cases he will be under 30
- he will probably use a knife
- he has a record of violence
- it will be his first attempt at hostage taking

Rioters

A crowd of people is a potential problem in terms of disturbances because each individual may take certain liberties that he would not ordinarily take. Therefore, the general pattern of behaviour is different than normally expected of the individual. Apply this principle to a prison population with its many negative characteristics and you have a potentially explosive situation! Research shows that rioters possess some or all of the following characteristics:

- deep-rooted sense of inmate tradition
- lacks common sense and good judgement
- will make unreasonable or frivolous demands
- enjoys the attention and publicity that a riot brings
- rioters are usually younger than non-rioters
- history of violent behaviour and emotional disturbance

Conclusion

All of the foregoing information on this handout has been based upon research and statistics conducted and compiled in both Canada and the U.S.A. It has been prepared for you as a guide in the prevention of, and the proper management of riot or hostage situations.
TO

All Directors
Ontario Region

FROM
DRD Security (Ont)

SUBJECT
Preventive Security - Hostages

1. Attached is a copy of Commissioner's memorandum dated 15 July 1975 (with attachment) to the Regional Director. The Commissioner's concern is clearly indicated.

2. The Regional Director expects you will immediately institute the procedures outlined in paragraph 2 of the Commissioner's memorandum. You should impress on your A.D. Security the importance of regular searching, surveillance of inmates etc. This should also be brought to the attention of all other staff since security is the responsibility of every CPS employee.

3. Only by conscientious thorough application of security procedures can we ever hope to reduce or prevent hostage taking incidents.

H. Neufeld
Deputy Regional Director (Security)
Regional Headquarters (Ontario)

HN:ma.
C.C. CSC (Ont)

RESTRICTED
OTTAWA, K1A 0Z9
July 15, 1975.

Regional Director,
Ontario Regional Headquarters,
P.O. Box 1174,
Kingston, Ontario
K7L 4Y8.

Dear Sir:

PREVENTIVE SECURITY - HOSTAGES

The sharp increase in the incidence of hostage taking and institutional violence has caused high priority consideration to be given to a review of existing directives, instructions and procedures which exist to prevent hostage taking or other violence. A formal Commission of Inquiry is in progress studying the B.C. Penitentiary incident of 9-10 June 1975 and will undoubtedly present recommendations designed to enhance our preparedness to cope with future situations and it is not our intention to pre-empt the inquiry, however certain information has been received which indicates a further potential hazard to classification officers, NPS staff and possibly members of the National Parole Board. Accordingly, you are requested to ensure that procedures are implemented in each institution to frequently search all areas frequented by staff and inmates, to search areas where inmates awaiting interview may congregate and further to ensure the searching of inmates to be interviewed and the removal of any item which may be used as a weapon from such area or interviewee. Additionally, you may wish to consider the implementation of increased surveillance over such areas to provide prompt detection, alert notification and response to any untoward incident.

Attached for your information, guidance and dissemination to staff are copies of a short précis on Hostage negotiations reprinted from the October 1974 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. Your attention is directed especially to page five "Negotiating Techniques and Policies" which are consistent with CPS Policy.

Yours sincerely,

André Therrien
Commissioner.

340 Laurier Ave West
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0P9
Defusing Human Bombs—
HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

By
LT. JOHN A. CULLEY
Office of the Chief
of Detectives
Police Department
New York, N.Y.

"Just as we would send only trained bomb squad personnel to defuse a bomb, so too, we should send only trained negotiators to deal with these emotionally explosive hostage situations."

Inspector Michael J. Codd, who was appointed police commissioner in January 1974, just prior to the Williamsburg incident, Chief Codd had reviewed and approved plans for handling hostage situations, plans which he had been working on with various units of the police department since September 1972. The primary purpose of these plans was the preservation of the lives of hostages, officers, and captors.

Upon responding to the scene, Chief Codd assessed the situation and ordered immediate implementation of the hostage plan. No political test was going to receive its "baptism under fire" and be put to a true test. As it turned out, the policy of "waiting" provided time for the hostages to escape, and ultimately the four felons surrendered with no further bloodshed. Greater loss of life was prevented through careful planning, coordinated efforts, and great restraint on the part of all the police officers at the scene. The plan had worked.

Hostage incidents have been increasing since 1972; therefore, law enforcement agencies throughout the country have to concern themselves with this trend. Since human lives are

(Reprinted from the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, October, 1974)
"... the newly formed Psychological Services Unit was called upon to supply... a psychological understanding of the hostage-taker."

The patrol area commander is the only person who can authorize the discharge of weapons except in emergency self-defense situations such as the felon attempting to charge a containment team.

The New York City Police Department's plan consists of three phases with patrol, emergency service, and detective units responding and carrying out predetermined, specifically delineated duties and responsibilities.

Phase I, the containment phase, occurs at the initial location when the hostage is first taken. Phase II, the mobile phase, goes into effect if a demand for a vehicle or other means of escape is made by and granted to the felon. Phase III, the relocation phase, is principally a duplication of Phase I, but at a new location.

The Detective Bureau's responsibilities under this plan are to provide specially trained detectives for negotiations during Phase I, to provide escape and chase vehicle operators for Phase II, and to function as containment teams during Phase III pending arrival of the special emergency service containment teams. This article deals primarily with the role of the detective negotiator in hostage situations.

Why Negotiate?

In addition to its overriding concern for the preservation of human life, the New York City hostage plan contains a unique innovation that is a departure from the traditional police response to such situations—buying time through the use of detectives specially trained in psychological techniques for hostage negotiations. Det. Harry Schlossberg, a New York officer who possesses a Ph. D. in clinical psychology, researched the existing psychological writings on hostage-takers and found little on the subject. Working in conjunction with other members of the department, he developed profiles of the typical hostage-taker. They fell into three categories:

- The professional criminal who has his escape blocked during the commission of a crime.
- The psychotic with a depraved mind, and
- The terrorist or fanatic with a cause.

A methodology of crisis intervention was developed for such situations in order to ease anxieties and tensions, and if possible, to allow the felon to assess the situation rationally. This is done by our detective hostage negotiator engaging the abductor or felon in conversation.

Time is a most important factor working for the police. As a general rule, Dr. Schlossberg notes, the more time the felon spends with the hostage, the less likely he is to take the hostage's life, because they become acquainted and develop feelings for one another.

Commissioner Michael J. Codd
"As a general rule... the more time the felon spends with the hostage, the less likely he is to take the hostage’s life..."

In addition to allowing this transference of feelings to take place, the passage of time also gives the police an opportunity to prepare for different eventualities and permits the felon to make a mistake. Mistakes by the criminal, when the police are prepared for them, are the “luck” you read about when a hostage situation is brought to a successful conclusion. As someone once observed: “Luck is the residue of careful planning and proper preparation.”

Why Detective Negotiators?

It takes a singular type of individual to deal unarmed, face to face, with an armed felon holding a hostage. He must be cool, resourceful, mature, and most of all, effective in verbal communication. Successful detectives have developed these attributes through their experience in dealing with the public, interviewing witnesses, and interrogating suspects.

Selection

The following criteria were used to select the members of the Detective Bureau Hostage Negotiating Team:

Volunteers only,
Good physical condition,
Mature appearance,
Good speaking voice,
Skilled interrogator, and
Representatives of various ethnic and racial groups, if possible, the ability to speak a foreign language.

The 68 members of the Detective Bureau who were finally selected and trained as hostage negotiators consisted of 1 lieutenant, 3 sergeants, and 64 detectives, 2 of whom were women. This group included 12 blacks, 12 Hispanics, and 41 Caucasians. The languages spoken by the group included Italian, Spanish, German, Hebrew, Yiddish, Greek, Polish and Ukrainian. In addition four members of the department who are not members of the group speak Arabic and are available as translators.

Electronic Equipment. All members were familiarized with and had to qualify in the use of a miniphone wireless transmitter and recorder and in the use of electronic tracking devices which utilize range and relative bearing features that can be quite valuable in Phase II.

Emergency Rescue Ambulance. Each team member learned to operate the emergency rescue ambulance, a full-track armored personnel carrier. This training also included the use of its auxiliary equipment, that is, the public address system, intercom, radio equipment, fire-fighting system, and first aid gear. In the Williamsburg siege, this vehicle was used to rescue officers and civilians who were pinned down by gunfire from the felons. It also served as a safe base for the start of negotiations.

Vehicle Operation. Instruction was given in the operation of the specially equipped escape and chase vehicles, including auxiliary equipment. Special attention was paid to those streets and routes from various locations in the city to airports or other destinations which would offer us the best tactical advantage.

Liaison. Hostage team candidates received 2 days of training with Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on jurisdictional matters and cooperation with other agencies including the Federal Aviation Administration. One day of training was held at John F. Kennedy International Airport and La Guardia Airport with the Port of New York and New Jersey Authority Police. We integrated our plan with their emergency programs.
Retraining. In addition to this initial program, debriefings are scheduled to critique every significant hostage situation that takes place anywhere. During such critiques, “Monday morning quarterbacking” and speculation are encouraged. From the situations under study, officers gain new insights and learn new techniques.

Working Detectives

Members of the Detective Bureau Hostage Negotiating Team are working detectives assigned to various squads throughout the city. Once their training as hostage negotiators is completed, they are returned to their permanent commands and resume their normal investigative duties. They are placed in predetermined slots in the duty chart for adequate coverage, and their names are entered on a roster for primary response to a hostage situation within their borough of assignment. At the beginning of each tour of duty, the detective area command ascertains which members performing duty within the borough are trained negotiators. Should a hostage situation occur during the tour, the detective area command will notify such members to respond. Seven negotiators are dispatched to the scene of each hostage incident. If there are not seven negotiators on duty within the borough, the adjacent boroughs are notified to dispatch their negotiators.

The reason seven negotiators are utilized is that two are needed as communicators—one member is the primary communicator whose responsibility it is to establish rapport and voice identification with the felon, and the second member assists in developing patterns of questions, analyzes the entire situation, and communicates with the command post and the other five members are assigned as follows:

As relief.
As secondary negotiators should the first team be unsuccessful at establishing rapport.
To operate escape and chase vehicles if necessary, and
To function as a containment
... the negotiator should ... not portray himself as the ultimate decisionmaker. The felon should be made to understand that there is someone over the negotiator.

Negotiating Techniques and Policies

Since no two hostage confrontations are alike, there can be no standardized format for negotiations. Each situation is treated individually. However, the following techniques have been developed as a result of our experiences.

The negotiator should have a mature appearance so that he will be perceived by the hostage-taker as a person of authority. During the negotiations, the negotiator should command the respect of everyone, but he should not portray himself as the ultimate decisionmaker. The felon should be made to understand that there is someone over the negotiator. This allows the negotiator to defer decisions and buy time. It also allows him to maintain rapport with the felon when demands are delayed or turned down because he is not the one who is denying the felon’s requests.

Usually the easiest type of hostage-taker to deal with is the professional criminal. He is considered a relatively rational thinker who after assessing the situation and weighing the odds, in most cases, comes to terms with the police and refrains from unnecessary violence or useless killing.

The psychotic individual, on the other hand, presents a different and somewhat more complex problem. He tends to be irrational and, therefore, less predictable. His actions, the words he uses, and the demands he makes are often valuable clues to his mental condition. The psychotic harbors great inner frustration and conflict. He may even feel a degree of pleasure from his precarious predicament, as he now finds himself important and the center of attention, a position which may be unique in his life. Time works for the police in this instance because the psychotic is emotionally tense and expends a great deal of physical and psychic energy which eventually wears him down.

The fanatic or terrorist group creates an even more difficult hostage situation. In a sense, they can be viewed as a group of psychopaths with a cause, all under the leadership of one of the group. When caught in a criminal act, many of them rationalize their behavior by claiming to be revolutionaries who are merely seeking social justice. During the Williamsburg siege, just such a position was taken by the four stickup men. In these situations, the resolve to die for their cause may deteriorate with the passage of time, and time allows for mistakes to be made.

In any of these cases if the felon kills one of several hostages during negotiations, action should be taken to save the lives of the remaining hostages, because once he kills one hostage he is likely to kill more.

Practically all demands are negotiable but one—supplying weapons. If the felon is bluffing with an unloaded or bogus weapon, giving him a gun would truly create a real danger.

Conclusion

If an analogy might be made, a hostage negotiation situation can be compared to a “bomb scare.” Just as we would send only trained bomb squad personnel to defuse a bomb, so too, we should send only trained negotiators to deal with these emotionally explosive hostage situations. The training of bomb squad personnel stresses what makes a bomb tick and how to defuse it; the psychological training we give our hostage negotiators stresses what makes a hostage-taker tick and how to neutralize him.

To date, the services of the negotiators have been utilized in more than 15 hostage situations. Several of these incidents had resulted in the taking of human life during the initial crime; however, in every case, once negotiations had begun the situation was successfully terminated with the hostage released unharmed and the abductors apprehended.

CONVICTIONS

During fiscal year 1974, there were 15,210 Federal convictions in FBI cases. This was the largest number in FBI history, exceeding the previous high in fiscal 1973 by more than 5 percent.

KIDNAPPING CONVICTIONS

During fiscal year 1974, there were 96 convictions under the Federal Kidnapping Statute, compared with 71 the previous year, resulting in 19 terms of life imprisonment and other sentences totaling more than 928 years.
CANADIAN PENITENTIARY SERVICE

PREVENTIVE SECURITY DIVISION

OTTAWA, Ontario
October 1st, 1975.

PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR STAFF

TO PREVENT OR REDUCE ADVERSE EFFECTS

OF

HOSTAGE TAKING INCIDENTS

D. Dawe,
Director,
Preventive Security.
PART ONE - INTRODUCTION

Hostage taking has become a more frequent method used by criminals to force acceptance of demands, to air grievances, etc. The staff of correctional facilities, by virtue of their employment may be vulnerable to the potential threat of hostage taking to a greater degree than most other occupational groups. Accordingly, it is imperative that immediate measures be taken to provide management, staff and community volunteers regularly present in correctional facilities, guidelines not only to reduce their personal vulnerability, but to increase preventive security measures to reduce hostage taking opportunity and to contribute to operational security response to reduce the adverse effect should a hostage taking occur.

PART TWO - DISCUSSION

Over-riding considerations

Just as protection of society is the over-riding consideration of all aspects of correctional activity so too must this principle be extended into institutional activity. To achieve the objective of protecting society - which includes not only the public at large but our staff and inmates - requires all persons associated with corrections to be mindful of the need to:

a. maintain institutional security;
b. ensure the preservation of life; and
c. prevent untoward occurrences.
Preventive Measures

Preventive measures are not new. They interface with operations completely. Directives and practices have been in existence which have long recognized both the potential threat and the need for pre-planned effective response. Divisional Instruction 713 - Institutional Riots, Disturbances and Taking of Hostages - issued January 8, 1973, outlines the standards required in formulating orders and instructions to control riots and disturbances and provides direction to develop flexible, clear, concise contingency plans which coupled with preventive measures contribute to institutional and individual safety and security. Research into the phenomena of hostage taking is on-going and validates established experience in both prevention and response. Guidelines for the behaviour of prison personnel held as hostages were researched and published as part of a field placement assignment at CPS National Headquarters of an Ottawa University criminology student, J. Whorry, several years ago and updated recently by staff of the headquarters and Ontario Correctional Staff College. Preventive measures have been stressed in all of these efforts.

Pre-Incident Preventive Measures

The Commissioner of Penitentiaries in a letter to all Regional Directors dated 15 July 1975, directed increased involvement in preventive security by all staff and stressed the importance of the collection, collation, analysis and timely need-to-know dissemination of information. The importance of practicing preventive security in every activity especially the potential hostage situation cannot be over-emphasized. The following
basic rules must be applied as pre-incident preventive measures:

1. Be aware of the potential hostage taking possibility;
2. Appreciate the importance of preventive security;
   - a. Know the potentially dangerous inmates;
   - b. Make disciplined observations and report them;
   - c. Learn to identify, evaluate inmate actions and responses and report changes promptly;
   - d. Learn to identify and react to inmate problems early;
   - e. Report the unusual and significant; and
   - c. Consistant with your duty, establish good inmate-staff relationships.
3. Learn and know your responsibilities to react to crisis situations.

Potential for being taken hostage

The taking of a hostage may be categorized as:

- a. Impulsive; or.
- b. Planned.

Preventive measures may be applied against both threats. It has been said that the psychological profile of the typical hostage taker falls into one of three broad categories:

- a. The terrorist;
- b. The psychotic; or
- c. The criminal whose wishes are thwarted.

In the correctional milieu all three categories are, to varying degrees, a constant presence and thus a continuing potential hazard. The New York City Police précis on Hostage Negotiations states "remember that hostages are taken solely for the purpose of gain". No evidence to the
contrary has ever been developed. The American Psychiatric Association's "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders", second edição, 1967, states that the term "Antisocial Personality" is a term reserved for individuals who are basically unsocialized and whose behaviour pattern brings them repeatedly into conflict with society. Legally speaking such a person is sane. He/She is, under law, responsible for impulsive, self-serving behaviour and the U.S. prison population has been estimated (Alan Harrington "Psychopaths" 1972) at between 35% and 40% antisocial personalities. There is little doubt that a relatively similar proportion of Canadian prison inmates fit the same categorization percentages. Hermann Mannheim, in Comparative Criminology states that the sociopath most likely to take a hostage has most of the following characteristics in excess:

a. He feels that any type of attachment or affection to other people is a trap;
b. He fears and resents loss of freedom;
c. He needs immediate gratification;
d. He fails to learn from punishment;
e. He lacks guilt feelings although he understands and can feign guilt readily;
f. He is impulsive and the consequences of an act are inconsequential;
g. He is frequently a criminal recidivist;
h. He copes with anxiety by abusing people;
i. He is lacking personality in depth; and
j. He is capable of antisocial acts.
When one quickly reviews these characteristics in the context of the clients of the correctional system it would be difficult not to agree with Harrington. Yet at the same time the key is to react rationally to identify predict and control antisocial behaviour - the function of the criminal justice system - and the prevention of hostage taking is but an integral part of that function. The incidence of hostage taking in the correctional setting is increasing. The Canadian Penitentiary Service and Canadian Provincial correctional services have experienced, in recent months a marked increase of incidents perhaps due in part to the contagion factor. The potential for being taken hostage must, therefore, be recognized and accepted as a hazard to which all are exposed. There are prevention measures which can and are being taken; but, more effort could be applied.

PREVENTIVE SECURITY MEASURES

Preventive security measures are applied not only as a policy of government or a management device but as an individual basic reaction. There are six basic individual steps, all consistent with policies, practices, procedures and the views expressed by persons who have experienced hostage situations, which contribute to the prevention of such incidents.

1. KNOW THE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS

The identification of dangerous inmates is not by a simplistic or even accurate method to date. Studies are on-going to effect improvements. However, certain individuals by their previously demonstrated character and activity are obviously potentially dangerous. It is essential that staff who may be exposed to these individuals be aware of their potential. In a recent experiment, without being provided criteria, staff were asked to identify individuals whom they
considered to be potentially dangerous. It is significant to note that the result was double that arrived at by the use of the criteria recommended in the Mohr study but all persons identified through the Mohr criteria were included. Further, all of the individuals actually involved in hostage-taking incidents which have occurred within the Canadian Penitentiary Service in 1975 were identified as potentially dangerous in both surveys.

Accordingly, the potentially dangerous inmates have been identified nationally, regionally and institutionally. It is essential therefore that the individual staff members liable to come into contact with inmates not only be aware of the danger potential but in fact contribute to on-going efforts to improve the capability of the system to identify potentially dangerous inmates. One of the key factors to the identification process is the making and reporting of disciplined observations.

MAKE DISCIPLINED OBSERVATIONS AND REPORT THEM.

The correctional system is the bridge between the conviction and the return of an offender to society. We receive from the court the product of a law enforcement investigation and it is our responsibility to protect society and process the product - with available background information to the point where it is refined and prepared for finishing by the National Parole Board for a return to society. Throughout, the entire process is dependant upon information, observations and reports. Each component of the process has an obligation to the other and to society not only for the continuity of possession, and all that entails, but even more importantly for the collection, collation, interpretation, analysis and appropriate
dissemination of information essential to the entire process. The views, requirements and recommendations of police and the correctional services are not divergent. The views of programs and custody are not divergent. Emphasis may shift, but in all areas the primary responsibility remains constant - the protection of society and of the individuals who make up our society. We are all dealing with people, with individuals, with information concerning individuals, and we are supported by the might of the law as each of us is required to make judgement decisions which affect certainly the individual but in some cases perhaps even society as a whole. Only by working together, communicating, exchanging information in a timely, frank, objective and reciprocal manner can our primary objective be achieved. There is absolutely no conflict of interest. We are all inter and intra dependant. Correctional personnel depend upon the police, the courts and even the community to provide detailed data upon the circumstances which bring the individual to our cares. Displayed attitudes, characteristics and history are essential assessment factors and as much data as possible must be assessed in the initial stages of classification and reception; but the process must continue and everyone has a part to play. In a recent incident it was revealed after the incident was in progress that some two weeks earlier the principles and at least one of the victims had discussed the precise incident. The victim discussed - with at least two other persons not part of the correctional system - the information AND just hours before the incident expressed a foreboding which proved to be a tragic reality. The observations had been made but not reported. It is essential that we all learn to identify and evaluate inmate actions and responses and report changes, incidents etc., promptly.
IDENTIFY/EVALUATE/REPORT

One of the basic principles of a scientific study is observation, identification, evaluation and reporting. The law enforcement officer of twenty years ago on the beat knew his community, the activities and the people. The unusual immediately drew his attention. The correctional setting is readily comparable. A change in routine or activity must be noticed and explained. It could save a life. In this regard the correctional officer - the living unit officer - the visits and correspondence officer - the food services officer is by virtue of his employment and constant contact with inmates in the most crucial position. The extent and duration of his contact makes him/her the eyes and ears of the community - the early warning system. The early warning system is essential not only to the prevention role but to the total team approach to corrections. Classification, training, psychiatry, psychology, in fact every aspect of correctional life is a cooperative effort and dependant upon observation of activity - occurrences, reactions, and changes in pattern, appearance, etc. But, observation without report is useless. Why has there been a change or deviation? What does it mean? These are the answers sought but elusive and in fact impossible to obtain unless the team approach, communication, recording and reporting become an automatic on-going practice co-ordinated across all boundaries. Usually a hostage taking is precipitated by "an inmate problem" and becomes a total problem unless the problem is identified and reacted to at an early preventable stage in its development.
IDENTITY AND REACT TO PROBLEMS

Analysis of the crisis situations which have occurred in the correctional setting reveals that hostages have been taken for two basic reasons:

a. to effect escape; or

b. to draw attention to a problem (be it real or apprehended).

To imagine that efforts to escape incarceration would ever cease would be lunacy and there can be little doubt that attempts will continue to effect escape and that the seizure of hostages will be considered. Less predictable is the seizure of a hostage - in a disturbance or an isolated incident - as the result of efforts designed or impulsively acted upon to draw attention to or resolution of an inmate's problem.

Incidents have occurred because an inmate felt that he wasn't getting medication on time, that he wanted a transfer, that conditions were unsatisfactory, etc. In some instances if the problem had been identified and reacted to without procrastination or waffle it may be that the ultimate violence might have been avoided. At the very least, recognition of the problem and consideration of the inmate's reaction could provide pre-incident warning if the observations are reported in a timely fashion.

REPORT THE UNUSUAL

In the fifth century B.C. the Chinese sage Sun Tzu wrote that "foreknowledge is the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move".
In 1955 the second Hoover Commission in the United States stated that: "Intelligence deals with all the things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action." More simply stated one might remember that "to be forewarned is to be forearmed". All of the steps previously outlined, which in combination contribute to the prevention of incidents are valueless unless the forewarning is given.

Throughout the correctional system only one group is constantly and continuously in immediate contact with the clients - the security staff. A keeper is always on duty. The custody office is never closed. The initial response in an emergency is provided and coordinated from the custody office. Therefore it appears logical that the custodial senior man on duty should be the focal point for the collation of information. He, however, must NOT ignore the information: it must be recorded and analysed before it can become the mortar or thread which ties the whole picture together.

What should be reported? What is significant? Time and space do not permit a full thesis or exposé on this matter. However a basic rule is that the unusual, a change of routine, is significant and must be reported.

REACTION TO CRISIS

Crisis may arise at any time. Policies, practices, procedures have been developed to minimize the effect of crisis. Resources are available to deal with any and all situations. Teamwork is essential to the effective resolution of any crisis. The following guidelines have
been developed to facilitate efficient crisis reaction:

1. **Stay Calm** - in any situation clear, calm, thought, response and action reduces tension and the precipitation of unpredictable, rash and perhaps violent or tragic action.

2. **Communicate** - make others aware of the situation immediately to ensure the application of team response. Talk - the inmate may be quite emotional, and even fearful, although this reaction might not be apparent. By talking in a calm (friendly, if possible) manner, you may be able to cool the situation and help rationalize the situation.

3. **Limit the Situation** - do not carry, while on duty, large sums of money, credit cards, licences or other articles such as pen knives, that can be used as a weapon, or any other personal item that can be taken by an inmate and used for his advantage.

If capture is foreseeable and unavoidable hide or dispose of your keys and personal property if practical. As long as inmates do not have keys, a disturbance may be localized. The institution is able to maintain control over inmate movement in all except general riot situations.
A hostage is a prisoner. Behave as you would have the inmate behave if you were a guard. Go along with them and do as they say. The one limit to this is that if you see a safe opportunity to escape, or to safely overpower your captor (in isolated incidents) do not hesitate.

If the intention of taking two or more hostages is expressed, attempt to convince your captors that one hostage is as effective and easier to control. This may help to minimize the number of hostages and simplify the situation.

Avoid movements which may be interpreted by the captors as threatening. Quick and unnecessary movements should be avoided for, though innocent in their intent, they may startle or threaten the captor(s) and result in physical harm to you. It is advisable to keep your hands in view of the captor(s).

Notify your captors immediately of any medical problems which you may have and your need for medication. Your physical health is important to all. Such information will be considered by the captor and may have an affect on how he deals with you.

In many instances hostages have been dressed in prison garb and moved to various locations in the institution to make identification and recovery difficult. If possible, as a hostage, indicate your location so that plans for your recovery can be considered.
4. **Observe** - Observe, if practical, the behaviour of inmates and make a mental note of the identity of inmates in possession of weapons.

5. **Conserve your energy** - A hostage is under physical and nervous strain. Rest is important for your mental as well as physical functioning. Do not waste energy needlessly, you may need it later.

Do not refuse food. To remain physically and mentally able you must eat. In a long waiting situation the medical authorities may feel it necessary to calm nerves.

**Remain Outwardly Calm**: Although physical harm is threatened, in order to control your behaviour and as a point in negotiation, your life is important to your captors. They are aware that the death of a hostage removes their bargaining power and invites the use of force to overpower them. It is in their interest to keep you safe. Panic and fear must be controlled. Sound judgement and moral courage are necessary.

6. **Maintain Control** - The goal for effective behaviour in a hostage situation is:

Passive control on the part of the hostage -- where the hostage, through clear thinking and anxiety reducing actions, takes control of the situation without outwardly appearing to do so. This should lead to
minimizing the situation both in terms of the number of hostages held and in terms of the length of time they are held. This goal will be easier to achieve if the following three principles are understood and applied where possible:

(1) reduce anxiety in yourself and your captor(s): This principle provides a basis for clear and calm thinking for both parties and reduces the change of unpredictable, rash and sometimes violent action on the part of the captors;

(2) Maintain effective communication with the captor(s); this provides a basis from which reasonable decisions can be made. The hostage can known and understand the captor(s)' intentions and attempt to influence the captor(s)' behaviour as well as reduce anxiety in both parties.

(3) Watch the effect of your actions (i.e. words, attitudes, and acts) on the captor(s); this principle provides a basis for testing the first two principles. Any of your actions that do not reduce anxiety or interfere with effective communication must be altered immediately. If, on the other hand, your actions are effective, you know you are doing the best thing.

Reminders: (a) it is to be remembered that no one retains his authority when taken hostage;

(b) inmates generally view a disturbance and the taking of a hostage as a final act of despair. The inmates are anxious and afraid.

(c) Your plight is the subject of a co-ordinated team response effort.
THere are six "do nots"

1. **Do Not Bargain:** Do not enter into any personal bargaining for your release.

2. **Do Not Aggravate:** Do not arouse the hostility of the captors. They are under stress and if stirred to anger may act irrationally. You are safe as long as you do not antagonize your captors.

3. **Use of Force:** Do not use physical force when seized except to protect your life or to escape if success is certain.

4. **Injury:** Do not indicate that you expect to be harmed. This expressed fear may actually contribute to your personal danger.

**PART THREE - CONCLUSION**

Hostage taking has become a more frequently utilized method of forcing acceptance of demands, of airing grievances, etc. Correctional staff are exposed to the potential threat. Preventive measures have been developed to reduce vulnerability and to contribute to operational reaction to such incidents. Staff should be made aware of both the preventive measures to which their contribution is essential and of the fact that policies, practices and procedures have been developed to provide a team approach to the safe, effective resolution of crisis situations.

D. Dawe,
Director,
Preventive Security,
Canadian Penitentiary Service.
March 27, 1972

Mr. L. MacDonald,
Field Placement Criminology
Student.

MINTER TERM PAPER - PREVENTIVE SECURITY INDICATOR STUDY.

Dear Mr. MacDonald:

In accordance with the terms of reference prescribed by the faculty and pursuant to agreement with the Canadian Penitentiary Service (CPS), your field placement with the Preventive Security Division has called upon your background. The first phase of the assignment exposed you to the enriched antecedent research available and to the remarkable lack of data available in Canadian Penitentiary Service records, including the reports of Administrative Inquiries which would permit the prior detection of incident indicators and thus the provision of a prevention capability. You were assigned to research available literature, including academic studies, texts and CPS records and reports of incidents or riots and disorders to identify a program of research which would permit the prior detection of pre-incident indicators established as being a significant factor in prison disturbances. Office accommodation, central registry facilities, communications and limited clerical support was provided by CPS Preventive Security Division.

Two major term papers were requested; they were both submitted on time. This study still not, however, is completed by that date and some favourable discussion with the Deputy Commissioner Security took place with a view to continuing the study project through the summer - as a student summer employment program - and on through the 1975-76 academic year.

The purpose of this memorandum is to initiate the work already performed to meet faculty requirements respecting field placement, and to provide preliminary direction for continuance.

Although my function is to provide general field placement, project guidance I must comment upon all aspects of the student's participation for him to obtain optimum benefit and for the faculty to similarly benefit from this experience. Initially, it is difficult, without a copy of the criminology course outline to take advantage of theoretical training to couple with practical assignment for cost-effective resource utilization. Reading assignments may have been inadvertently be duplicated. Secondly, from a management view there may be some slight differences in report/paper requirements which through
increased communication between the faculty and the field placement instructor, could be resolved to mutual advantage and ease of preparation for the student. For example, Mr. MacDonald's first paper was prepared using extensive quotations and footnote references but the footnotes on my copy were conspicuous by their absence: the purpose of his paper was buried in a short paragraph at the top of page three; an extensive table of contents was provided but one was at loss to determine where the purpose ended, where the discussion began, the order or rationale of the conclusions; and, normally one would have expected to find case recommendations following the conclusions rather than ignobly listed in an Appendix. These observations, however, should have been accepted as constructive criticism based upon management's (or at least one manager's) wishes in respect of format.

The second, attached, paper I found corrected these earlier deficiencies and demonstrates objectivity and application not only of the theories learned in formal class activity but the practicalities of the working milieu. For the winter term, you were asked to concentrate on:

a. Recreation of the Collective Violence Research Project Questionnaire;

b. Research to establish profiles of violent and dangerous inmates who participated in disorders and diagnosis of their behavioural patterns preceding such violence;

c. Analysis and cross-reference of disturbance reports covering the period 1 January 1964 to 1 January 1975;

d. Research, from existing records inmate sub-culture establishing inmate leadership profiles of the disturbances identified and analysed at e. above;

e. Correlate and analyse the occurrence of disorder indicators i.e., four, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, thirty, twenty-six, thirty-one, thirty-two, thirty-three, thirty-seven, and thirty-nine from Annex V with the result of e. above and the findings of S.A. Shuster in respect of escapes; and

f. Prepare a paper for presentation by April 15th, 1975 reporting the results of your research.

Your paper received on March 13, 1975, describes the primary purpose of your research as:

"to isolate some common variables related to pre-disturbance situations so that an impending disturbance might be identified and corrective action taken to reduce or prevent such occurrences".
This purpose was achieved. The researcher did re-write and improve the Collective Violence Research Questionnaire; he did research the profile of victims and dangerous locator; he found the available database inadequate; and he was not able to correlate and analyze disorder indicators. I am satisfied that the objective of the Field Placement was achieve.

In respect of the paper itself I feel I must comment before completing and attaching the Student Evaluation Form. The paper is well written, displays a logical approach, from a management position, to a potentially serious information gap and offers what appears to be an effective approach to resolution.

My major concern lies in the correlation and analysis of the pre-incident indicators - the practicalities of operational management. I am not convinced that Yilin and Vilzack's study is a valid one and at page four I was disappointed to find that while their research was referenced the sampling produced nine categorizations which were not correlated to this paper. I was personally very impressed with the research conducted (as discussed verbally I was particularly pleased to see that my own practical application is supported by the theoretical findings and recommendations) to such an extent that while resources - budgetary constraints and operational priorities - will not permit full adoption of the recommendations Mr. MacDonald is being requested to continue his activity on a full time basis from April through September.

The required Student Evaluation Form is attached.

I have been very pleased to have the co-operation and assistance of Mr. MacDonald during this University year and am sufficiently impressed with his efforts to recommend not only his summer employment this year but also his return on field placement next year and further greater participation by C.P.S. and the University in practical field placement assignments.

D. Daxe,
Director,
Preventive Security,
Canadian Penitentiary Service.

C.C. Deputy Commissioner Security

C.C. C.A. Talbot, Coordinator of Field Practice
C.C. Dr. T. Cragier, Director of the Centre of Criminology
C.C. Dr. J. Ciale, Centre of Criminology, University of Ottawa.
C.C. Miss J. Hickey.

Attachment.
A Report On
The Study Of
Pre-riot Indicators

D. Dawe
Dept. Preventive Security

A. L. MacDonald
Introduction

This study was undertaken as a result of concern expressed by the Director, Preventive Security over the continuing occurrence of major and minor disturbances in the Canadian Penitentiary Service. It was hoped that by examining circumstances concerning these disturbances pre-disturbance indicators could be identified. Disturbances from maximum, medium and minimum security institutions in the Canadian Penitentiary Service were examined from the period January 1965 until December 1974.

The rationale for attempting to find disturbance indicators follows principles of sound management, humanitarianism and resocialization as institutional goals cannot be accomplished while the facility is in a state of insurrection. It also follows from social defence theory that the best cure of a problem is prevention of that problem through self-correction.

Purpose and Scope of This Study

The primary purpose of this study was to isolate some common variables related to pre-disturbance situations so that an impending disturbance might be identified and corrective action taken to reduce or prevent such occurrences. The focus of the study was to be on the time previous to the actual disturbance (i.e. increased offence reports, high tension, etc.). The relevant information was to be located in the Penitentiary
Definition of Terms

For the purpose of this report the following working definition of terms has been adopted:

variable - a constant characteristic of an event that has different degrees of magnitude so that individual events differ to the degree they possess the variable.

cause - the force that produces the effect, events associated in one way relationships so that occurrence of one thing leads to occurrence of another.

indicator - something that points out, shows, suggests or gives a sign. Cause can be an indicator but an indicator is not necessarily a cause.

major disturbance - an occurrence of riot proportions such that institutional personnel require outside assistance.

minor disturbance - occurrence generated by at least three inmates that interrupts the good order of the institution.

Review of Literature

The writer will now examine some of the relevant literature in the field of prison riots. It has been noted that there has only been one study centering on the problem of pre-riot or disturbance indicators. Five sources from the enclosed bibliography are reviewed below.

The first study, conducted by psychiatrist Douglas Skelton, analysed two groups of inmates after a major...
American prison riot. The first group assaulted with intent to severely injure a number of correctional officers while the other group risked their lives to save the officers. Skelton established a profile of the assaulters that emphasized past patterns of violence, younger inmates, emotional disturbances, paranoid trends and sexual psychopathology. This research appears to indicate that a profile of potential violence prone individuals can be established by a relevant research team.

Justin Ciale, in his article on prison riots, suggests that there are certain individual happenings that precede riot situations. They are: knifings, stabbings, assaultive behaviour, hunger strikes, refusals to work, sabotage, contraband smuggling, inmate leadership swings, lack of communication between the inmate-staff structure, and high frustration levels. These would appear to be indicators of impending institutional trouble, however, the pattern and degree of required intensity of these variables is not speculated upon. One is able to use a common observational approach with this material.

The American Correctional Association has published a list of riot causes by the use of hindsight to establish these and foresight to use these causes as indicators of potential disturbance situations. They are:
1) increased anti-social inmate activity
2) inept management
3) inadequate personnel practices
4) inadequate facilities
5) lack of prison activity
6) insufficient legitimate rewards
7) community unrest and agitation
8) unexpected changes in prison routine
9) breakdown of institutional communication.

The above mentioned processes can be identified as they occur and can predict potential disturbance situations. As above the frequency, intensity or combination of required variables is not mentioned.

Lloyd Ohlin and Richard Wilsnack in a recent study of preconditions for major prison disturbances found that prison disturbances were unpredictable and that no variable correlation could be achieved.

Questionnaires returned from the largest state correctional institution for adult male felons in thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia were analyzed. The questionnaire elicited information on conditions in the institutions between January 1971 and June 1972 and the occurrence of riots or other forms of collective resistance during this period. Conditions were grouped in nine categories: external pressures, publicity, administrative destabilization, reform gestures, staff conflict, strains on staff, deprivation, population pressures, and prior incidents. The questionnaire was designed to determine whether these preconditions or others were related to prison unrest.
Nine prisons reported riots, fifteen others reported other forms of collective resistance, and sixteen reported no disturbances. The findings show that although prisons affected by rioting usually experience other forms of disturbance as well, the conditions in prisons that have riots are not the same as conditions in prisons that have only non-riot incidents of inmate resistance. There appear to be few preconditions necessary in themselves for rioting or other forms of resistance, but these preconditions typically occur in combination.

Only a third of the prisons studied suffered fund reductions or shortages; however, 70 per cent of these later had disturbances. Censorship of reading matter was practiced to some degree in most of the prisons, but particularly in the prisons reporting riots. Where unrest took forms other than rioting, it was preceded by more peaceful presentation of grievances in nine of the ten cases for which data existed. Riots were most often preceded by escapes and by an absence of grievances related to inmate separatist groups. Finally, there was some type of disturbance in eleven of the thirteen prisons that reported an increase in assaults among inmates. The only conditions that are consistently related to resistance without rioting are conditions inside the prison among inmates. Rioting, on the other hand, seems dependent not only on conditions inside the walls but also on the state of prison administration and the involvement of the public and officials...
outside. No single variable or combination of variables was found to be both necessary and sufficient to predict a prison disturbance.

The last two studies under review deal with research methods available for correctional problems.

John Marsh suggests that operations analysis be applied to corrections, especially the riot situation. The specific technique is quantitative analysis as all components and their relationships involved in a riot situation could be systematically measured, related, analysed and quantified.

He states that a systems approach would, 1) find out which elements seem to precede or cause a prison riot and what are their critical levels, 2) be able to plot a trend in a particular institution towards or away from a riot and thus measure activity levels and 3) know what types of inmate and institutional activities seem to counteract or contraindicate an inmate revolt. He states this process would require the services of highly skilled behavioral and social science researchers not law enforcement, corrections, judicial or political figures who have presided over past institutional riot post-mortems.

The final article by Joseph M. Firestone concerns civil riot processes. The interesting concept in this article is Firestone's use of advanced research techniques to breakdown, measure and analyze the riot process variable. This process requires a considerable amount of skill and ability but it demonstrated that it can be done.
Methodology

The method chosen to facilitate this study was an ex post facto causal-comparative design which entails observing some existing consequence (a riot) and searching back through the data for plausible causal factors. The results were then to be analyzed by multiple regression through computer utilization to attempt to obtain reliable and significant results that could be used as indicators.

Twenty-five separate disturbance reports were selected from central registry (see list - Appendix A). An open-ended pre-riot variable card was designed on the basis of hypothesized relationships between variables and the disturbance (see card Appendix B). The cards were to be broken down by security level, year, month and day of occurrence. The next step was to investigate the disturbance reports and record on the variable card for correlation analysis. It was at this point that the research disintegrated. The main focal points of the official reports have been in the past to find limited causes, describe events during the disturbance, identify major participants and to outline what action was taken by staff. The information required by this study was not available as little or no thought had been given to conditions that existed prior to the disturbances.

Findings

As the research project remains incomplete due to lack of data, the writer has no official indicators to report. The writer will relay some superficial findings. Of the 25 disturbances reported 15 or 60% occurred
in maximum security, 5 or 20% occurred in medium security and 5 or 20% occurred in minimum security (refer to Appendices C and D for breakdown as to month of the year and day of the week controlled for security level.) The universe of disturbances is of such a minor number that the results contained in the tables is inconclusive.

The writer has also found what he believes to be certain inadequacies in present procedures at C.P.S. The methods for reporting occurrences of importance from the field is greatly deficient. There appears to be no standardized procedure for what, when and how to report a disturbance. The writer knows from his previous experience in the field that certain disturbances of serious magnitude have occurred but no mention can be located in the files of central registry (i.e. The racial disturbances at Collin's Bay Institution in 1974). It appears that the present system of boards of enquiry is inadequate in reliability and consistency.

The writer also notes the lack of formal in-service operational research being conducted by C.P.S. When one reviews the operational research component of our armed forces representing external social defense and compares it with operational research conducted by our internal social defence forces, even taking into consideration the differences in budget, there is an appreciable discrepancy. The writer suggests that this present project is of such magnitude that it requires the attention of a
competent research team.

There is also a lack of trained individuals in the field who can conduct a thorough board of enquiry. The present system of having in-service personnel, who may be of lower rank than the individual being interviewed, conduct enquiries is inappropriate, especially if the enquirer works directly under the enquiree. It is also questionable whether an employee can objectively question another person that is a fellow employee. The writer does not suggest an inquisitional witch hunt but the establishment of a process for obtaining more objective and factual reporting.

The writer submits a list of variables that he has interpreted from his review of the pertinent riot literature, the enquiries and reports, located in central registry and his field experience. They are:

1) Date of occurrence, day of week, hour of occurrence, where? how many involved? - staff and inmates.

2) Is prison becoming politicized? is the inmate stating that he is incarcerated because of an oppressive government?

3) Has there been either an increase or decrease in inmate complaining? What is normal and what is not? Have those that usually complain stopped doing so?

4) Has there been an increase of offence reports? Give weekly breakdown for last six months. How many inmates convicted and sentenced to segregation. How many transferred because of discipline problem.
5) Has there been self-mutilation, suicide attempts or suicides. Report weekly breakdown for last 6 months.

6) Have there been inmates assaulting guards or inmates or guards assaulting inmates? Breakdown for last 6 months.

7) Guards provoking inmates.

8) Stabbings within last six months. How many?

9) Escape attempts in last 6 months. Weekly breakdown.

10) Does administration know real inmate leadership? Identify.

11) Does the administration know the musclemen.

12) Does the administration know who is running the major rackets?

13) What is the tension level of the institution? extremely tense, very tense, tense, not tense. Weekly receding for last six months.

14) Has there been outside political agitation within last 6 months?

15) Hunger strikes.

16) Refusals to work.

17) Sabotage.

18) Smuggling of contraband.

19) Requests for protective custody. Weekly breakdown for past six months.
20) Number of inmates in protective custody, punitive segregation and administrative segregation.

21) How is the recreation program - well organized, organized, or unorganized.

22) How is participation in the recreation program. Weekly breakdown within last 6 months. Is this normal participation?

23) How much cell time are inmates doing in an average day.

24) How do treatment and custody staff relate to each other.

25) How does management relate to line staff. Authoritarian or group involvement. Efficient, inefficient, task or people oriented.

26) Small disturbances. Weekly breakdown for 6 months.

27) Curtailment of programs. Within last 6 months. Why?

28) Attendance at inmate sick parade. Weekly breakdown within 6 month period.

29) Rate of staff illness absentee rate. Weekly breakdown within 6 month period.

30) What percentage of inmate population identified as members of organized crime.

31) How was disturbance discovered.

32) Was there guard inmate interaction.

33) How much time devoted to staff training managers and line staff.
34) Age of prison itself.

35) Rate of staff turnover.

36) What are the main inmate training programs. What is the instructor's opinion of mood within last 6 months.

37) Does institution have an inmate committee? Is it responsible or irresponsible. Are prison leaders on committee.

38) Average age of population (5 youngest and 5 oldest).

39) Average age of classification staff, correctional officers. Average amount of experience.

40) Any other relevant happening that may indicate the disturbance would occur. What is normal and was this a sign of abnormality.

41) Psychiatric, psychological and classification profiles of riot leaders - both overt and covert leaders.

42) Inmates in institution who have a previous history of agitation or instigation of disturbances.

43) Percentage breakdown of budget utilized in institution.

The above list of variables could be incorporated by the field into a report indicating the atmosphere, environment and functioning of an institution prior to a disturbance thereby allowing a more factual and accurate representation of the event under examination. If anything it will give the security department a better feel for the institution.
The writer has also noted that the mechanical process of collection and storage of information has not kept pace with modern technology.

Recommendations

If it is the desire of the C.P.S. to locate and identify pre-disturbance indicators it is this writer's recommendation that a qualified operational research team be put on the problem. It is also recommended that a systems approach to penitentiary and correctional problems be examined as it is felt that the problems that befall the correctional sphere at this time requires a more complex approach than the single input approach.

The writer recommends that qualified individuals be located in the field to ensure proper documentation and reporting of occurrences of interest to promote factual information collection and dissemination.

In regard to dissemination and collection of information the writer recommends the investigation into possibilities of coming into the 20th century with the utilization of the computer.

The list of variables that was submitted as potential indicators of pre-disturbance situations should be used as a guide for collecting relevant pre-disturbance information. The difficulty in this approach is the lack of consistency in describing and measuring each individual characteristic. The writer has been unable to discover in what order, intensity or frequency these alleged variables should occur to predict a disturbance.
The last and most serious recommendation is that operational research and program evaluation be brought out of the sterile inconsequential area within which it is now functioning and located in the field where it would be most beneficial.

Comments
The writer's most serious recommendation is that research and evaluation be institutionalized and formulated into a routine to provide a continuous source of guidance for policy planning and decision making. The first question that comes to mind is: Will the research staff, if placed actively into the field, be busy collecting data to support the paper planning and programming of already existing but nebulous services or will they pursue academic or arcane research only of interest to themselves. It was stated in Challenge of Crime in A Free Society that research is an instrument for reform and policy making and that while research itself could not provide final answers it could provide data crucial to making informal policy judgement. The writer thinks that the benefit of operational field research will be two-fold. It will discredit the false myths and shibboleths that much of our policy is founded upon and establish a scientific body of precise knowledge to build a new structure upon which sound policy and practice will be based.

An implication of the above recommendation is the...
automation of input data with the integration of research and operations records.

In the past, as well as for the present study, reliance has been placed entirely upon files created in the field for administration or casework. These records have proven to be deficient for both operations and research. Operational records vary greatly in completeness and in their terminology of description of an item's magnitude or quality. Operational records are bulky and inefficient for informational retrieval due to long narrative reports. Therefore compilation of statistics or indicators from these records are error prone and inconclusive. The conclusion is that operations records were not designed for research purposes, as this study has demonstrated, as the records did not record the required information.

What the experts suggest as a remedy is report content analysis to formulate tested precoded forms that are both methodologically reliable and valid and can easily be fed into a computer. The experts caution that this process requires a considerable amount of skill to avoid collection of unimportant input information.

To conclude, what has been suggested is two approaches to the problem of finding pre-riot indicators. This writer's approach has proven faulty. One approach is to establish a systems analysis department to apply modern systems technology to the complex problems found
in corrections. The second approach would be to utilize the Solicitor General's research department to evaluate, test and formulate structured descriptions for the variables listed in the above findings in order to formulate a pre-coded report form for computer analysis.

For further clarification and elaboration it is suggested that experts in the related fields be contacted.
# Appendix A

## List of Disturbances Investigated

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Number of disturbances by year

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Appendix D

Disturbance by Month

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Disturbance by Week

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* day not recorded on file
MAN HAS ALMOST INFINITE CAPACITY for good or evil limited only by technology. Throughout human history, his ability to alleviate human suffering has been paralleled only by his ability to cause it. With each new advance in weaponry—the longbow, crossbow, flintlock, small portable automatic weapons, and plastic explosives, the criminal has been able to control, maim, or kill increased numbers of innocent victims. Without a sophisticated system of air transportation, the term “skyjacker” would never have been coined. The criminal also has a worldwide audience for his more spectacular depredations through a highly developed system of electronic communications.

Of particular national and international concern recently has been the phenomenon of taking hostages to enforce demands. This criminal device is probably one of the oldest known to man. It is found in ancient Greek and Roman mythologies and the Norse sagas. It has been used by every generation and almost every culture. At certain times in history, it was even more common than it is today. Medieval rulers regularly hired assassins to murder or hold for ransom political enemies. In recent years, political events in Algeria, Kenya, and Vietnam have replete with examples of kidnaping and murder. It would appear that neither the tactic nor the motivation for the taking of hostages are recent innovations in criminological theory.

Concern with this phenomenon has increased as a result of the upsurge of incidents in recent years. According to a 1974 study prepared by the House Committee on Internal Security, from 1968 to 1973 there have been over 400 individual acts of terrorism of an international nature where terrorists crossed international borders to attack or in which victims were selected because of their affiliation with a foreign state, i.e., diplomats, foreign businessmen, etc. Many of these acts involved the taking of hostages. This statistic reveals only a fraction of the incidents which occurred during those years since it does not include political kidnappings purely domestic in nature or nonpolitical kidnapping where the motive was personal gain.

One useful, if not precise method, of viewing the kidnap/hostage situation is examining the subject’s motivation. Since human motivation is intrinsically a multifaceted phenomenon and in many cases unclear, even to the subject himself, some social scientists may consider this method less than exact.

THE RATIONAL POLITICAL MOTIVE

The term “rational” is used here to describe the thinking process of the perpetrator. His psyche is relatively normal, unimpaired by a mental disease or defect. “Rational” does not describe the logic of the cause espoused by the subject. His cause, which may be highly irrational in the eyes of a majority of persons, is the sine qua non of his actions; however, except for his belief in the cause, he would be in all respects rational. In this case, such dedication is not the result of a pathological mental disease, but stems from his environment, training, and education. He views himself, as the antithesis of a criminal; he is a patriot, a freedom fighter.

The zealot acting because of a firmly held belief is not a new phenomenon either in U.S. or foreign history. If one believes that his people, liberty, or country is in imminent danger from a repressive regime, he may feel impelled to act, either to forestall this event or publicize it to an uncaring world. Whether the situation is actually as perceived by the person so acting is of no immediate moment to victims.

This attitude appears common in such diverse organizations as The Weather-underground, Black September, the Irish Republican Army, and The Tupamaros. The individual philosophies may, to a degree, differ, but the dedication is the same.

The Marxist ethic. The overwhelming majority of terrorist organizations presently active both here in the U.S. and in foreign countries are oriented towards a Marxist philosophy. An examination of the Marxist stance points out the wide gulf between those who fanatically dedicate themselves to this cause and those who view the world in the traditional Judeo-Christian terms.

According to Marx, the raison d’etre of man is to bring closer to reality the revolution of the proletariat, where the small power elite which controls the wealth of the world is overthrown by the downtrodden masses to whom such
the Marxist revolutionary must be measured against the only moral reality, does this action contribute to the revolution? The conventional mores such as truth, honesty, the values reflected in the Ten Commandments are dismissed as bourgeois morality and are considered merely imperialistic devices to maintain the status quo. The Marxist view is abundantly reflected in the writings of his followers. Mao Tse-tung says, "Power grows from the barrel of a gun," not from the consent of the governed. Che Guevara wrote: "People must see clearly the futility of maintaining the fight for social goals within the framework of civil debate." There are over 21 terrorist organizations in the U.S. today most of which subscribe to the Marxist position and view the U.S. as the main bastion of imperialistic aggression. Add to these, 16 such organizations in the Middle East, 10 in Africa, 10 in western Europe, and many more in Burma, Japan, and the Philippines, and the potential for terrorism is evident. A notorious tactic frequently employed by these groups has been the kidnap-hostage phenomenon. In the U.S., the Hearst kidnapping and various politically motivated hijackings have occurred. In foreign countries, citizens of the U.S. have been held hostage, i.e., in Khartoum, two American diplomats were held hostage and murdered by a Palestinian extremist group. In Latin America, U.S. businessmen and diplomats have been held for ransom and sometimes brutally murdered. With the increase in such activity, it is essential that those in law enforcement who must deal with representatives of these extremist groups understand and fully appreciate the Marxist ethic. Commitment to cause vs. publicity. When a highly trained and motivated group of terrorists is holding hostages and making demands, an immediate impasse is reached when the demands are nonnegotiable, i.e., release of prisoners, amnesty, etc. If the terrorists are advised at the outset that the demands will not be met, they are left with a limited number of options, three of which are: (1) choose martyrdom, kill hostages, and commit suicide; (2) lessen demands to more realistic proportions and continue negotiations; or (3) surrender. If the terrorists lessen demands, then their commitment to the cause is not as strong as they originally had proclaimed. Once the terrorist admits he is willing to take less than he initially demanded, the psychological advantage reverts to the law enforcement negotiator. Time now becomes the ally of the besieger rather than the besieged. If it is felt that the terrorist will kill hostages and choose martyrdom, a useful device might be to withhold the media from the terrorist, thus eliminating his ability to publicize his martyrdom. The Marxist view is such that a sacrifice without the cooperation of the press would be useless. The martyrdom of a comrade to the cause would not be broadcast around the world to inspire others. Measuring the degree of commitment of the terrorist is admittedly a tricky procedure and one that is prone to miscalculation. The dedication of the Japanese Red Army at the Lod Airport attack in May of 1972 was evident in the virtually suicidal concept of the operation, and it resulted in 26 dead and 80 wounded. However, the ability to gain media coverage by the terrorist usually predominates in the planning of his activities. Cooperation of the media. It is a rare terrorist who is willing to make a private sacrifice of his life. Such sacrifice comes acceptable, even desirable, if it will serve the terrorist, and the terrorist will only be known as a deluded criminal and his act one of wanton cruelty rather than revolutionary heroism, he may well modify his demands and surrender. It is impossible and most undesirable for the press in a free society to be in any way controlled or manipulated. Law enforcement must rely on voluntary restraint exercised by the press. Such voluntary restraint does not happen accidentally, but is the end result of openness and honesty between law enforcement and the media, mutual understanding of mutual problems. Such an attitude of cooperation requires an interaction of ideas and information which should replace some current hostile attitudes including mutual mistrust and suspicion. The one most important precept to be kept in mind when considering the terrorist is to judge his actions from his, not society's, perspective. Judge his option as he would from the Marxist ethic. Will the action further the cause of the revolution? If, viewed logically from that perspective, it will not, he may not kill, but surrender. THE MOTIVATION OF ESCAPE With increasing frequency, a situation occurs in which the perpetrators are trapped inside an establishment that they intended to rob, but quick police response precludes escape forcing the subjects to take hostages. This is perhaps the most common situation faced by law enforcement in the U.S. The plight of the trapped armed robber is perhaps initially the most volatile and dangerous to both hostages and police. Until the situation is stabilized and contained by police and both sides settle down to a pattern of negotiation, the possibility of injury or death is very real. The immediate response of law enforcement in such a situation should be to contain and stabilize and to engage in no precipitous acts that might provoke a response against hostages by a nervous gunman. Statistically, time is on the side of law enforcement in this type situation. The most famous and successful use of time under extreme provocation was perhaps the Williamsburg incident in January of 1973 when four armed gunmen were thwarted in an attempt to rob a sporting goods store in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, New York. Because of quick police response, the gunmen were trapped inside the store and took twelve hostages. The siege ended 47 hours later with the safe recovery of all hostages and the surrender of the robbers. The performance of the New York Police Department in this highly charged situation was no accident. It was the result of far sighted leadership and intensive training in both psychology and tactics. Much of this training was innovative and broke new ground in the theory and practice of hostage negotiations. If the political terrorist can be considered a basically rational personality, the same is true of the armed robber. His action of taking a hostage is aimed toward a rational end, the avoidance of capture. It is, therefore, appropriate to treat him as rational. Being sane, he can usually be made to see that his continued intransigence does nothing to enhance his position, especially if escape is impossible and any harm to hostages will merely make his position worse. It is not unusual that the armed robber who takes hostages when trapped will imitate to some degree the behavior of a political terrorist. In the Williamsburg incident, the subjects used Black Muslim rhetoric, and a Black Muslim minister was called to the scene to assist in negotiations. In such cases, the depth of the subjects' religious or political convictions is in serious doubt. The
THE PRISON HOSTAGE SITUATION

It is an unfortunate fact in our society that some prisons tend to be the garbage heaps into which the worst and most violent among us are discarded. This is particularly true of the large foreboding fortress-like maximum security institution.

With our more liberalized parole, probation, and early release programs, and the reluctance of the judiciary to sentence to institutions other than those who are a danger to the society at large, those sentenced to the maximum security institutions are a microcosm of that which is worst in society.

When hostages, usually corrections personnel, are taken the threat to life is acute. Often desperate men, who feel they have nothing to lose, dominate the leadership of such revolts. The time factor has worked both for and against law enforcement in prison riots. However, allowing the prisoners time generally permits the leader of such a revolt to exploit his position and consolidate his leadership. He is able, therefore, to create a formidable bastion which cannot be neutralized except by loss of life. Whereas action taken immediately, before the prisoners can organize and arm themselves, may well be less costly. Attica is an example of a situation where prisoners were allowed sufficient time to organize.

Great care must be taken in the selection of a negotiator who represents legal authority. Radical activists, often en as negotiators by the inmates, appear for the most part, to be detrimental to the negotiations. Such individuals tend to become advocates and accomplices of the inmates. They are able to aid in the organization of the rioters, sophisticate their demands, and even bolster the courage of those who might be persuaded to surrender.

What prisoners usually demand in a hostage situation is freedom. This is normally a nonnegotiable demand either by strong policy or state law. Thus the primary demand cannot be met under any circumstances. The negotiable demands range from prison food to amnesty for the rioters. As long as the situation allows the prisoners to exercise power denied to them by legitimate society, i.e., manipulate the press, negotiate with the warden, or even the governor of the state in some instances, there is no incentive to surrender. Perhaps isolation and reason would be the most effective way to handle this situation. However, there is no panacea. Many of those found in the prison setting are explosive personality types who tend to act out violently; that's why they were sent to prison in the first place.

THE MENTALLY DERANGED

When one who is suffering from delusions and hallucinations takes a hostage, that person, to some degree, sets the rules. He is reacting from what to him is, overwhelming stress. He is compelled to take action to relieve that stress. This may include the taking of hostages, even members of his own family. He cannot be appealed to on a rational basis because he does not view the world in a rational way. He may have a sense of mission much like Sam Byck who planned to crash a commercial aircraft into the White House. In January, 1974, he attempted to carry out his scheme and commandeered an airliner at Baltimore-Washington International Airport, killed the pilot, wounded the copilot, and eventually when his plan
A second relatively frequent mental aberration is a form of severe depression where the only logical answer to life’s stresses and pain is suicide-murder, usually of family members. There is also the phenomenon of the severely deranged person who firmly believes he is threatened or persecuted by others and sets out to take revenge upon them for their imagined crimes against him. This situation may easily lead to the taking of hostages to enforce clearly irrational demands.

If, in fact, stress is the precipitating factor in this type of situation, then logically attempts should be made to reduce stress. The passage of time in itself is usually helpful, coupled with a calm attitude toward the subject by the negotiator. Nothing should be done to increase anxiety such as a precipitous show of force.

It is well to remember that such persons are as deli- cate balanced as a hair trigger; those who deal with them must proceed on that assumption.

Contrary to some authorities in this area, there does not appear to be sufficient data at this present moment in the history of behavioral science to classify precisely all those persons who might be inclined to take hostages. The most frequently mentioned types are the inadequate personality or those suffering from paranoia. Undoubtedly, these persons are represented among those who engage in this activity, but do they represent the majority? Perhaps, the person relatively free from any mental disease, but who is acting in accordance with a deeply ingrained, though antisocial value set, also engages in such acts.

THE SOCIOPATHIC PERSONALITY

The studies concerning the sociopath seem to indicate that the sociopathic personality is responsible for anordinate proportion of crimes. He also makes up a significant percentage of our prison population. If this be the case, it is logical to assume that he represents a significant number of those who engage in hostage taking, particularly the trapped armed robber and the prison rioter.

The primary personality trait of the sociopath is lack of conscience, in fact lack of all humanity. His only concern is “Can I get away with it?” Appeals to him must always be couched in terms of what is best for him. He will not hesitate to kill hostages, law enforcement officers, and, in some instances, even himself, if such act is sufficiently dramatic. He is extremely impulsive and unable to delay gratification, so those over whom he has control are in constant danger. Moreover, if the hostage is female, rape becomes a very real possibility.

Although the sociopath is not mentally ill in the traditional sense, he represents a potential bombshell in any hostage situation because of impulsive behavior and total lack of concern for others. It has been an axiom in hostage negotiations that the more time the hostage spends with his abductor, the better the chances of the hostage. This is because of a type of common bond which appears to grow between the two. If the felon is a sociopath, however, he is unlikely to develop such warm feelings for anyone, including the hostage. His only reaction will be based on opportunity and self-indulgence.

THE VICTIM

Because of the increasing trend of terrorist groups to use the kidnap tactic, some preliminary investigation has been conducted to determine the effect of captivity on the hostage. The tentative, and still largely incomplete, results of these inquiries have been somewhat startling, particularly with regard to the change in the value set of the hostage. This phenomenon has been popularly dubbed the “Stockholm-Syndrome” after an incident which occurred in Stockholm, Sweden, in which female hostages were held in a bank vault by trapped would-be bank robbers for several days and after their release expressed a strong attachment to their captors, to the point of refusing to testify against them.

The degree of identification which the hostage may feel toward his captor of course varies with the treatment he receives, but this does not appear to be the only factor. Almost all victims have admitted to this phenomenon to some degree. It may be that the stronger personality with a well-founded set of values is less swayed than the weaker personality who may actually feel guilt because he is made to believe that his previous lifestyle has been wrong and immoral. This may explain the seemingly total conversion of Patricia Hearst to the cause of the Symbionese Liberation Army.

The politically motivated hostage taker in particular may spend long hours in discussion and rationalization of his cause and his terrorist acts in furtherance of that cause with the victim. It has been found that this, plus the possibility of imminent death, is in effect, a crude, unintended, yet an effective type of brainwashing. It may cause the victim to reassess his values and lifestyle. Most persons who have been victims in a hostage situation find themselves cooperating with their captors to a degree they would not have thought possible prior to the incident.

The long-range psychic effect on the hostage is, as yet, not known. Whether the trauma of being a victim of a kidnap could lead to a permanent change in the personality is an area which will require further study.

This identity syndrome must be kept in mind by law enforcement personnel, especially when an attempt is made to predict the probable reaction of the victim or to count on his assistance and cooperation in his own release. Most persons who have been hostages found themselves to be extremely docile and cooperative with their captors, sometimes to the point of failing to take advantage of carelessness or mistakes on the part of their captors which may have easily led to escape.

A COORDINATED RESPONSE

The hallmark of any police reaction in a kidnap/ hostage situation must be the blending of tactical response and behavioral know-how. This requires the development of team tactics using blocking and containment forces. It requires expertise in weapons use, deployment, and instant communications; and it requires the use of behavioral experts coordinated by cool-headed and professional leadership. This is a challenge which is being met by many police departments.

The phenomenon of the hostage situation has had the positive effect of bringing together the professional expertise of law enforcement and the behavioral sciences. The mutual respect and understanding which is being engendered has led to sophisticated training programs for the police in this vital area.

Admittedly, much of that knowledge which would enable police or anyone to predict human motivation and response is not known. However, detailed analysis of each new hostage situation by professionals in law enforcement and the behavioral science increases the ability of the police to refine their response while adding to that body of knowledge which will save lives.
HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

Recent events in this city and elsewhere have brought to light the increasing police problems of handling barricaded perpetrators holding hostages.

When such an occurrence takes place and the perpetrator has seized hostages, whether as a result of being trapped by the police or the intentional seizure of hostages for political or other reason, the actions of the police at the scene should be clear, decisive, coordinated and fully understood by members of all units responding. The success of any hostage plan hinges on a team approach, good communications and coordination of tactical maneuvers under one commander.

A. Facts to Weigh Concerning Hostage Situations

1. Remember that Hostages are taken solely for the purpose of gain.

2. Personalities of criminals who take hostages vary and are important.

3. Points to remember concerning criminal holding the hostage.
   a. Know his personality.
   b. Know what prior crimes he has committed, if any, by obtaining his record.
   c. Know exactly what crime he has committed, which has led to the hostage situation.
   d. Know all available facts about the criminal, before weighing chance of negotiations.
e. Any and all facts concerning the criminal, could help determine the mental state of the individual.

4. Important to ascertain the feeling of the community and gathered crowd.
   a. An uncooperative community or hostile crowd would only double your problem.

B. Steps to Take in Hostage Situations

1. **DON'T RUSH - SLOW DOWN**

2. **Gather all facts available.**
   a. Get information on I.D. of suspects, so you know background of person with whom you are dealing. (plus physical description)
   b. Know exactly what crime or crimes have been committed.
   c. Obtain names and descriptions of all hostages.
   d. Know suspects needs, in order to make plans for negotiations.

3. Set up a perimeter and block all avenues of escape.

4. Obtain detailed layout of place in question.

5. Contain firepower.

6. Define the problem.

7. Take all necessary steps to obtain the non-lethal release of all hostages, and apprehension of the perpetrators.

8. Safety of hostages and their eventual release without injury represents the fundamental premise for the formulation of
these plans. In other words, the major premises "The Hostage(s) Must Live."

C. Psychological Types of People You May Encounter

1. Schizophrenic
   a. Has no thought train.
   b. Simple, out of touch with reality.
   c. Uninvolved and disinterested.
   d. Unable to concentrate on any objective over period of time.
   e. Can usually be handled easily.
   f. Usually dismembers body after death.
   g. Can be handled by listening to what he says, keeping him talking, and forcing him to make decisions.

2. Neurotic
   a. Knows what he is doing.
   b. Well aware of situation and possible consequences.
   c. In touch with reality, however, has an overbearing and unexplainable feeling about something which causes his irrational and neurotic behavior.

3. Psychotic
   a. Emotionally unable to understand or reason.
   b. Ability to reason is affected by his emotional state.
   c. Harbors great inner frustration and conflict.
   d. His actions, the words he uses, and the demands he makes often are clues to his mental condition.
4. Psychopath (Criminal and non-criminal)

a. Non-criminal psychopath
   (1) Appears normal and rational.
   (2) Usually an extrovert and well liked.
   (3) Undue dependence on others.
   (4) Excellent con-man.
   (5) Continued sexual experimentation.
   (6) Desires immediate satisfaction.

b. Criminal psychopath
   (1) Has no conscience.
   (2) Hates with a passion, loves no one.
   (3) Commits most violent acts - also capable of Bunco.
   (4) Most dangerous of all psychos.
   (5) Will do anything to inflate ego.
   (6) Thinks only of himself - has no regard for human life.
   (7) Abuses, tortures, and mutilates body before death.
   (8) Will execute a hostage without hesitation.
   (9) No feeling for persons, but sometimes gets attached to animals.
   (10) Commits violent crimes against persons (rapes most, robs most, beats most.)

5. Paranoiac
   a. Delusions of persecution.
   b. Knows his enemy.
   c. Delusions of Grandeur.
d. Many times small in stature.

e. Born loser - socially insignificant.

f. Absolutely dedicated to his cause (evaluate dedication to cause)

g. Can build a philosophy out of half truths.

6. Weak Personality

   a. Weak mind and is easily swayed.

   b. Will be a follower and dedicated to a cause until another strong minded person with a magnetic personality takes them over.

D. Psychological Guidelines to Negotiations

1. Measure emotional stability.

   a. Determine with whom you are dealing and their psychological make-up.

      (1) Common Criminal - who can be successfully reasoned with.

      (2) Psycho - who is unpredictable and has to be dealt with according to his mental state.

      (3) Fanatic - who has total dedication and is tough to deal with.

   b. Remember that the emotional stress affects the aggressor, the hostage, and the policemen on the scene.

   c. Never serve coffee to policemen at the scene, as it can be a noticeable stimulant under stress causing mistakes in judgement.
2. Evaluate Dedication to Cause.
   
a. Reason with aggressor according to his weaknesses
   
   (1) Common criminal - use good common sense and reason with him.
   
   (2) Schizophrenic - Keep him talking and making decisions.
   
   (3) Neurotic - knows what he's doing and can be reasoned with.
   
   (4) Psychotic - very unstable, must be carefully reasoned with, can be set off by anything.
   
   (5) Psychopath - His only downfall is his ego, must concern him with his own survival and constantly feed his ego. Always remember that once he uses a hostage to escape, the hostage has less than a 50-50 chance of survival.
   
   (6) Paranoiac - Appel to his ego, tell him he's the greatest, and if he were killed, who could fill his shoes and carry out his cause.

3. Never Negotiate to Supply Weapons
   
a. Do not consider a bluff and supply a dummy weapon.
   
   b. Weapons negotiations only worsen situation.

4. Stall for Time
   
a. Time saves lives - Time is money.
   
   b. Always say you have to go to higher authority to get ok's for bargaining.
   
   c. Stall in any way possible without spooking the aggressor.
5. Never offer Suggestions
   a. Offering suggestions speeds up the critical time factor.
   b. If suspect is forced to make decisions, he is not dwelling on killing the hostages.
6. Never Agree to a Demand Without Receiving Something in Return.
   a. Set up a psychological atmosphere of give and take.
7. Keep perpetrator in a decision-making status.
   a. Keep his mind busy and occupied.
   b. Gives you more time.
8. Nurture his escape potential
   a. If he feels all is lost, he may decide to kill the hostages.

E. Select Negotiator with Care
1. He should be non-authoritative in rank and stature.
2. Pick an average size man - low in rank.
3. Should be a good bargainer and know the psychological make-up of the people with whom he is dealing.
4. During the negotiations the negotiator should command the respect of everyone.

F. Important Points to Remember
1. Gather all available facts by going to all resources and weighing all information.
2. Do not act hastily.
3. Do not take the initial leap without making strategic plans.
be considered. To have hostage escape vehicle available if necessary. (Equipped with listening device, beepers, luminous marks, etc.) To follow escape vehicle with unmarked car if so directed by the Field Commander. To assume immediate perimeter containment at new location with additional units if perpetrators and hostages move.
HOSTAGES

Hostage taking by inmates has become a more frequently used method to air grievances and force acceptance of demands. Since YOU ARE EXPOSED TO THIS THREAT it is important that you understand the Service policy and the type of behaviour you should display so that unnecessary risks can be avoided and the crisis resolved without injury or harm to those involved. The two basic overriding considerations are THE PREVENTION OF INJURY AND THE PRESERVATION OF HUMAN LIFE and THE MAINTENANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY. With these goals as guidelines the prison administrators will endeavour to engage in negotiations with the inmates to resolve the crisis.

Preliminary Considerations

It is felt that the practices set forth in this paper can do much to help in resolving the situation and preventing harm to those who are held as hostages. They are intended to help prison personnel to deal with the responsibility, implicit in their duties, for taking measures that minimize situations where hostages are taken. These include:

(1) TO BE AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING TAKEN HOSTAGE.
(2) TO APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING GOOD INMATE-STAFF RELATIONSHIPS THAT CAN MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING TAKEN HOSTAGE AND MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES OF SUCCESSFUL RELEASE IF TAKEN.
(3) TO USE DYNAMIC SECURITY MEASURES BY:
   (a) MAKING DISCIPLINED OBSERVATIONS,
   (b) LEARNING TO PROPERLY EVALUATE INMATE ACTIONS AND RESPONSES,
   (c) IDENTIFYING POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS INMATES,
   (d) IDENTIFYING INMATE PROBLEMS EARLY,
   (e) REPORTING THE ABOVE TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTION.

Principles

The guidelines are based on three principles which should be fully understood so that one may improvise in any set of circumstances.

(1) REDUCE ANXIETY IN YOURSELF AND YOUR CAPTOR(S):
   THIS PRINCIPLE PROVIDES A BASIS FOR CLEAR AND CALM THINKING FOR BOTH PARTIES AND REDUCES THE CHANCE OF UNPREDICTABLE, RASH AND SOMETIMES VIOLENT ACTION ON THE PART OF THE CAPTORS.
(2) MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION WITH THE CAPTOR(S); THIS PROVIDES A BASIS FROM WHICH REASONABLE DECISIONS CAN BE MADE. THE HOSTAGE CAN KNOW AND UNDERSTAND THE CAPTOR(S)' INTENTIONS AND ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE CAPTOR(S)' BEHAVIOUR AS WELL AS REDUCE ANXIETY IN BOTH PARTIES.

(3) WATCH THE EFFECT OF YOUR ACTIONS (i.e. WORDS, ATTITUDES, AND ACTS) ON THE CAPTOR(S); THIS PRINCIPLE PROVIDES A BASIS FOR TESTING THE FIRST TWO PRINCIPLES. ANY OF YOUR ACTIONS THAT DO NOT REDUCE ANXIETY OR INTERFERE WITH EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION MUST BE ALTERED IMMEDIATELY. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, YOUR ACTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE, YOU KNOW YOU ARE DOING THE BEST THING.

Goals

The goal for effective behaviour in a hostage situation is:

(1) PASSIVE CONTROL ON THE PART OF THE HOSTAGE -- WHERE THE HOSTAGE, THROUGH CLEAR THINKING AND ANXIETY REDUCING ACTIONS, TAKES CONTROL OF THE SITUATION WITHOUT OUTWARDLY APPEARING TO DO SO. THIS SHOULD LEAD TO MINIMIZING THE SITUATION BOTH IN TERMS OF THE NUMBER OF HOSTAGES HELD AND IN TERMS OF THE LENGTH OF TIME THEY ARE HELD.

GUIDELINES FOR PERSONAL BEHAVIOUR AS A HOSTAGE OF INMATES

Reminders: (1) IT IS TO BE REMEMBERED THAT NO ONE RETAINS HIS AUTHORITY WHEN TAKEN HOSTAGE.

(2) INMATES GENERALLY VIEW A DISTURBANCE AND THE TAKING OF A HOSTAGE AS A FINAL ACT OF DESPAIR. THE INMATES ARE ANXIOUS AND AFRAID.

What to do as a Hostage:

1. KEYS: If capture is foreseeable and unavoidable hide your keys and personal property if practical. As long as inmates do not have keys, a disturbance may be localized. The institution is able to maintain control over inmate movement in all except general riot situations.
2. REMAIN OUTWARDLY CALM: Although physical harm is threatened, in order to control your behaviour and as a point in negotiation, your life is important to your captors. They are aware that the death of a hostage removes their bargaining power and invites the use of force to overpower them. It is in their interest to keep you safe. Panic and fear must be controlled. Sound judgement and moral courage are necessary.

3. LIMIT THE SITUATION: If the intention of taking two or more hostages is expressed, attempt to convince your captors that one hostage is as effective and easier to control. This may help to minimize the number of hostages and simplify the situation.

4. GIVE ALARM: If possible indicate to other staff that you have been taken hostage. This should be done as soon as possible so that others are made aware of the situation and can consider appropriate action.

5. MEDICAL PROBLEMS: Notify your captors immediately of any medical problems which you may have and your need for medication. Your physical health is important to all. Such information will be considered by the captor and may have an affect on how he deals with you.

6. INDICATE LOCATION: In many instances hostages have been dressed in prison garb and moved to various locations in the institution to make identification and recovery difficult. If possible, as a hostage, indicate your location so that plans for your recovery can be considered.

7. MOVEMENTS: Avoid movements which may be interpreted by the captors as threatening. Quick and unnecessary movements should be avoided for, though innocent in their intent, they may startle or threaten the captor(s) and result in physical harm to you. It is advisable to keep your hands in view of the captor(s).

8. BE A GOOD PRISONER: A hostage is a prisoner. Behave as you would have the inmate behave if you were a guard. Go along with them and do as they say. The one limit to this is that if you see a safe opportunity to escape, or to overpower your captor (in isolated incidents) do not hesitate.

9. TALK: The principle of maintaining effective communication is important. The captor(s) may be quite emotional and fearful, although it may not be apparent. By talking to the captor(s) in a calm and friendly manner you can do much to cool off the captor(s) and help them behave rationally. Be aware of the effect that certain lines of conversation have on the captor(s). If they visibly increase their anxiety, use another approach. Do not hesitate to suggest that they end the hostage situation. This may be done several ways depending on the nature and personality of the captor(s), but do not threaten the captors for threats may only increase their hostility and reinforce their fears.
The captors have hopes and dreams that they feel the situation will help fulfill. Do not knock these, for though possibly unrealistic, they are very real and important to the captors. If the purpose for the hostage taking is to bring about a change in procedure or meals one may agree with their hopes and dreams. This will reduce the hostility toward you. It will be repeated again later but, as a hostage, let the authorities do the bargaining with the captor(s).

10. RUMORS: As a hostage one hears rumors circulating among inmates. Do not believe rumors you hear. Many are false. On occasion you can assure the inmates that certain harmful rumors are not true if you know this to be a fact. Or you may correctly interpret what they have seen and reduce the danger level. Do not get caught up in the rumor grape-vine.

11. OBSERVE: Observe, if practical, the behaviour of inmates and make a mental note of the identity of inmates in possession of weapons.

12. EAT: Do not refuse food. To remain physically and mentally able you must eat. In a long waiting situation the medical authorities may feel it necessary to calm nerves.

13. REST: A hostage is under physical and nervous strain. Rest is important for your mental as well as physical functioning. Do not waste energy needlessly, you may need it at a later opportunity.

14. FALL DOWN: As soon as you are aware of an active attempt to overpower your captors, whether by firepower or manpower, it is suggested that you drop to the floor to avoid physical harm and increase the visibility of your captors.

THERE ARE SIX DO NOTS

1. DO NOT BARGAIN: Do not enter into any personal bargaining for your release.

2. DO NOT AGGRAVATE: Do not arouse the hostility of the captors. They are under stress and if stirred to anger may act irrationally. You are safe as long as you do not antagonize your captors.

3. USE OF FORCE: Do not use physical force when seized except to protect your life or to escape if success is certain.

4. INJURY: Do not indicate that you expect to be harmed. This expressed fear may actually contribute to your personal danger.
5. **LIE:** Do not lie or try to deceive your captors in an attempt to gain release. Do lie to protect vital information, your colleagues or yourself. Do not give inmates any information regarding security procedures.

6. **CARRYING PERSONAL PROPERTY:** Do not carry, while on duty, large sums of money, credit cards, licences or other articles such as pen knives, that can be used as a weapon, or any other personal item that can be taken by an inmate and used to his advantage.
POLICE - MEDIA RELATIONS:
THE ELEVEN COMMANDMENTS
OF SURVIVAL

Prepared by:

Irving Goldaber, Ph.D.
Associate Consultant
Professional Standards Division
International Association of Chiefs of Police
POLICE - MEDIA RELATIONS:
THE ELEVEN COMMANDMENTS
OF SURVIVAL

1. Don't ever avoid the media.
2. Don't discriminate against any member or members of the media.
3. Don't be uninformed.
4. Don't ever fabricate.
5. Don't exaggerate.
6. Don't say publicly anything you don't want on the record.
7. Don't "take on" the media.
8. Don't continually report on your plans only; talk about something concrete.
9. Don't use the media to engage in a public debate.
10. Don't be inconsiderate of the media's needs for access to those who have the facts; also consider their deadline problems.
11. Don't fail to set up weekly interview dates with the chief of police for beat reporters.
In accordance with the terms of reference prescribed by the faculty and pursuant to agreement with the Canadian Penitentiary Service (CPS), your first term (fall 1974) on field placement with the Preventive Security Division has called upon your background experience and on-going training in a practical research assignment. The first phase of the assignment has exposed you to the known antecedent research available and to the remarkable lack of data available in Canadian Penitentiary Service records, including the results of Administrative Inquiries which would permit the prior detection of incident indicators and thus the provision of a prevention capability. The student was assigned to research available literature, including academic studies, texts and CPS records and reports of incidents of riots and disorders to identify a program of research which would permit the prior detection of pre-incident indicators established as being a significant factor in prison disturbances. Office accommodation, central registry facilities, communications and limited clerical support was provided by CPS Preventive Security Division.

Two major term papers were requested: the first of which is attached hereto; the final paper required by the University will be completed by April 15th, 1975. This study will NOT, however, be completed by that date and some favourable preliminary discussion with the Deputy Commissioner Security has already taken place with a view to continuing the study project through the summer - as a summer employment program - and on through the 1975-76 academic year.

The purpose of this memorandum is to critique the work already performed and to provide preliminary direction for continuance.

Although my function is to provide general field placement project guidance I must comment upon all aspects of the student’s participation for him to obtain optimum benefit and for the Faculty to similarly benefit from this experience. Initially it is difficult without a copy of the criminology course outline to take advantage of theoretical training to couple with practical assignment for cost-effective resource utilization. Reading assignments may inadvertently be duplicated. Secondly, from a management view there may be some slight differences in report/paper requirements which, through increased communication between the Faculty and the field placement instructor, could be resolved to mutual advantage and ease
The preparation for the student. For example, Mr. McDonald's first paper was prepared using extensive quotations and footnote references. Not the footnotes are conspicuous by their absence: the purpose of his paper is buried in a short paragraph at the top of page three; an extensive table of contents is provided but one is at loss to determine where the purpose ends, where the discussion begins, the order or rationale of the conclusions: and, normally one would expect to find some recommendations following the conclusions rather than ignobly listed in an Appendix. These observation, however, should be accepted as constructive criticism based upon management's (or at least one manager's) wishes in respect of format.

As a general rule the use of an extensive quotation, without headings, preluding a paper can be effective unless the quotation is too long and too obtuse to be recognized as essential to the paper. I would suggest that you make a conscious effort to reduce the length of your quotation and introduction of aim, motivation, outline and link (AmID); to write your papers in sequence - Part One Introduction; Part Two Discussion; Part Three Conclusions; Part Four Recommendation, etc.

It is extremely interesting to note that a wide variety of previous academic studies relative to the causes of prison disturbances have been reviewed and reported. It would have been interesting to see a matrix of the cumulative findings rather than emphasis on the theories developed especially when one considers that this particular research is for the purposes of prevention and not overall management of the prison system. At times, as I read and spread the paper I wondered why, instead of repeating the obvious, the writer didn't narrow his perspective to the identification of significant factors in prison disturbances which are within the sphere of Preventive Security.

At page six, Mattick's theory (undated in the paper) refers to "increased politicization of prison populations" yet this theory has not apparently been related to the Kingston Riots of 1971, the Millhaven situation, the St. Vincent de Paul or B.C. Pen. disorders etc. Where does theory relate to Canadian experience? Do the administrative Inquiry reports support Mattick, Deutsche or Ciale etc., and what is the correlation of Cioeter's research on escapes?

At page eleven the Fox papers are referenced and the opening phrase "predisposing causes" prepared me for the main course - the causes - but I was again disappointed with the lack of definitive cause and trigger description. I found some of them at page twelve where Prof. Justin Ciale's "disturbances" and "reactions" are listed and begin to provide the first glimpse of indicators as used in an Intelligence sense. Then at page thirteen I am told that there are recurring patterns of behaviour that initiate a potential riot situation": this is what we want! Please describe them. When do
they occur? In what order? What is their frequency and pattern? I agree with Bens (p. 36-38) but I want to go one step further, especially about the identification of potential disturbances in the embryonic stages. I agree too with Fox, but the reports published here generalize and regrettably specific which can be translated into identifiable pre-incident indicators. I want to be able to tell management and staff what to watch for and what such pre-incident indicators mean.

9. Annex V - Potential institutional disorder indicators observed in the writings of theorists should now be related to those items within Preventive Security capability and sphere of influence and become as specific as possible. For example items two, four, fifteen, sixteen (which is duplication of four, five, twenty-five and thirty-one) seventeen, eighteen, twenty-eight, thirty-one, thirty-two, thirty-three, thirty-seven, and thirty-nine are of great interest and lead to approval of recommendations at Annex VI one, two, six and nine.

10. You are, accordingly requested to concentrate during this term on:

a. Re-creation of the Collective Violence Research Project Questionnaire;

b. Research to establish profiles of violent and dangerous inmates who participated in disorders and diagnosis of their behavioural patterns preceding such violence;

c. Analysis and cross-reference of disturbance reports covering the period 1 January 1964 to 1 January 1975;

d. Research, from existing records inmate sub-culture establishing inmate leadership profiles re the disturbances identified and analysed at c. above;

e. Correlate and analyse the occurrence of disorder indicators: two, four, 15, 16, 17, 18, 26, 31, 32, 33, 37 and 39 from Annex V with the result of c. above and the findings of S.A. Shuster in respect of escapes; and

f. Prepare a paper for presentation by April 15th, 1975 reporting the results of your research.

11. In respect of your activity for the first term, I am satisfied that you have achieved success and have met the requirements of both CPS and the faculty. I admit that you have been heavily taxed that management assistance and guidance has been curtailed because of pressures arising from incidents and that you were initially erroneously believed to be a second year student instead of a first year student. Thus, were I to be grading your efforts I would assign a B.

Dawc.
Director, Preventive Security.
Robert DiPaer - Deputy Commissioner Security.
Johanna Healey - Director, Community Relations and Special Programs.

ATTACHMENTS

I - Term Paper "Prison Riots" by A.L. MacDonald.
II- Study Report "Escapes from Penitentiaries" by S.A. Shuster.
Prison Riots

Mr. D. Dawe
Director, Preventive Security
Canadian Penitentiary Service

A. L. MacDonald
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"The strong are, as a matter of fact, never absolutely strong, nor are the weak absolutely weak, but neither is aware of this, they have in common a refusal to believe that they belong to the same species...Hence we see men in arms behaving madly. We see their sword bury itself in the breast of a disarmed enemy who is on the very act of pleading at their knees...We see Achilles cut the throats of twelve Trojan boys on the funeral pyre of Patroclus as naturally as we cut flowers for a grave. These men, wielding power, have no suspicion of the fact that the consequences of their deeds will at length come home to them— they too will bow the neck in their turn...Thus it happens that those who have force on loan from fate count on it too much and are destroyed.

But at the time their own destructions seems impossible to them. Since other people do not impose on their movement that halt, that interval of hesitation, wherein lies all our consideration for our brothers in humanity, they conclude that destiny has given complete license to them, and none at all to their inferiors. And at this point they exceed the measure of the force that is actually at their disposal. Inevitably they exceed it, since
they are not aware it is limited."

To the general public prison riots invoke an image of desperate criminals taking control of a situation of which they have no legitimized authority, wreaking havoc and destruction, sometimes endangering the lives of those assigned the task of providing order, control and ultimate sanction to the "riffraff" of society.

There has been, since the United States prison riots of the fifties and sixties, and similar occurrences in Canada, an influx of scholarly enterprise attempting to identify the causes of these disturbances usually resulting in a model or process of riot genesis.

Based on direct field observation, the analysis of the above mentioned research studies and administrative enquiries of prison disorders, it is my personal opinion that one of the significant features of these disturbances is the power and conflict relationships involved, including both inter and intra-group orientations.

The prison is a self-enclosed community where individuals are placed after they have been arrested, convicted and sentenced by the criminal justice system. They are deprived of their freedom for varied lengths of time and are forced against their will to remain within the confines of the prison. What evolves is a coercive prison control structure and an alleged unilateral employment of power directed from superordinate to subordinate to main-
tain this control.

The purpose of this paper will be to present an examination of the various theories on prison riots and related material keeping in mind the power and conflict relationships which, as the writer has stated, appear to be significant factor in prison disturbances.

As an overview to the use of power, force and the production of conflict Morton Deutsch offers an interesting perspective. He states that destructive conflict tends to escalate and becomes independent of its initiating causes. The dimensions along which the conflict escalates are influenced by:

1. the size and number of issues involved
2. the number of motives and participants on each side
3. the cost the participants are willing to bear in relation to the conflict
4. the size and number of principles and precedents perceived to be at stake.
5. the number of norms of moral conduct from which behaviour toward the other side is exempted.
6. the intensity of negative attitudes towards the other side.

Also, when conflict is intensified the harmful and dangerous elements drive out those keeping conflict within bound with a dependence upon power and tactics of threat, coercion, and deception. When these processes occur communication between various factions deteriorates creating misperception, misinformation and strengthened biases. Deutsch says that the objective is then
to resolve the existing situation with superior force for attaining use of behaviour directed at the other side that would not be acceptable when received by oneself. If conflict is further intensified the stress and tension involved reduces the intellectual ability to cope with a situation or to develop a suitable solution thus resulting in simplistic thinking and polarization of thought and thereby enabling both side to see only limited alternatives which are only resolved when the cost of continuing is outweighed by any other value.5

Although Deutsch's concepts were formulated to pertain mainly to labour relations, it is ideally suited to explain the negative escalating of unbalanced power relationships in a penal setting. What seems to be indicated is the need for expert management and ongoing bilateral communication to reduce the escalation of tensions and anxiety. This, however, is difficult to implement when each party refuses the authority of the other.

Another perspective is presented by Gresham Sykes when he suggests certain defects in the total power of prison officials. He states that although custodial forces are perceived as being in continuous struggle to maintain order this is not always the case. What he calls a "corruption of the rulers"6 occurs as a defect in the assumption prison inmates can be forced to assume behaviours alien to them. A more subtle type of coercion than direct force is used centering on increased friendship and reciprocity between staff and inmates. Certain inmate leaders are allowed to participate in the informal maintenance of the status quo and are rewarded by additional privileges and increased power.

...5/
When it is perceived that this process has moved too far and inmates have too much power an attempt is made to recapture the reins of authority. This attempt to regain control leads to tension, anxiety and frustration. Inmate leaders then have little vested interest remaining and do not control the population. This void in the inmate power base makes it possible for aggressive, violent and unstable inmates to emerge as leaders who influence and agitate until the general self-control of the group is weakened and an organized plan of insurrection arises.

Sykes believes that a riot is a denial of official authority and occurs because those in official power lack the ability for "self-regulation and self-correction," causing a basic instability in a confined social system.

Richard McLeerey presents a view that is consistent with Sykes. He states that the authoritarian power and indirectly to prison riots and disorders. Policies are changed and decisions made without communication or consideration of the benefactors of these changes. He states that the correctional community is a loosely integrated social structure and sudden poorly planned changes initiate feelings of tension and anxiety. Authorities overestimate what can be accomplished by direct order without consent. Disobeyed orders result in punishment increasing the disorder that effects the fabric of cohesive interpersonal dependencies of the prison community creating disorder and chaos, ultimately expressed by riot. McLeerey believes changes should not be abrupt or sudden but fails to
mention a suitable method for implementing change or what type of change is really required.

Writing approximately fifteen years later, Hans Mattick states a similar approach to that of Sykes and McLeer. He states that order in prison depends on "the passive acquiescence of the controlled" which is obtained by sharing power minimizing the negative effects of prisonization. This tolerance depends on the provision of satisfiable work programs, lack of guard harassment and brutality and is influenced by the political and social climate of society outside the prison. Again, once this partnership is in operation it is difficult to change because mutual expectations and obligations of staff and inmates have come to depend on it with any disruption in a routine, tolerable situation increasing the probability of violence.

Mattick's theory emphasizes the awareness that a prison is no longer isolated from society because increased politicization of prison populations results in the denial of legitimate official prison authority with refusal to bargain for shared power. Mattick's addition to riot theory is an awareness of the effect trends outside the prison have on life inside of it and that the prison cannot be judged as an isolated entity.

F. E. Hartung and M. Flock advocate two types of prison disturbance. The first type is called Brutal and is centered around poor, insufficient food, inadequate, unsanitary housing and brutality by prison officials. Inmate unrest is shown by grumbling and discontent, violation of prison rules, self-
mutilation, assaults on guard and escape attempts with the end result being riot.

The second type is referred to as Collective and is a result of a combination of social and psychological circumstances and forces from within the prison community. The collective social forces of the prison center upon the unnatural nature of a prison, the aggression of different inmates within one prison and the destruction of semi-official, informal inmate government by new administrative systems.

The authors state that a prison is primarily made up of two types of inmates; overt aggressive individuals and covert passives. Leadership of the prison population comes from the aggressive group and this provides them with the greatest amount of self-expression and status. If changes in the social structure occur the leaders lose status and no incentives are provided for leaders to keep control. It is noted by the authors that the most stable and prison-wise leaders rarely appear in open leadership of prison riots. Lesser, more aggressive men are used to lead overt hostilities. The real leaders fan the flames from underneath and are never spotted and usually claim a reward for attempting to quell an institutional disturbance.

This model, although very status quo in casting light on concrete causes and solutions, does have value in that it exposes some inmate power interactions.
Edith Flynn, in a recent article, presents a position consistent with the above mentioned theorists. She believes that a prison is run with the consent and cooperation of the inmate population. Also mentioned is the prison staff in constant conflict for advocacy of either treatment or custodial goals. Conflict is also visible within custody and treatment segments. Control over the inmates is effected by "an intricate web of informal and symbiotic social relationships between staff and inmates." Any change in the equilibrium makes living in that total environment intolerable. She presents an explanation for the modern prison disturbance when she postulates that inmates' expectations have been raised on the rhetoric of promised reform but when these promises do not materialize extreme disappointment and frustrations occur. The prison also reflects the social patterns of society at large and because of the enclosed space magnified. The above conditions produce an atmosphere that on occasion is predisposed for violence and definitely cannot function as a place of resocialization.

Robert Martinson, using a historical perspective, has identified three types of prison disturbances. The first is panopticon type endeavour occurring in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and centering on escape from an oppressive penal regime. The prison riots of the twentieth century were an attempt to improve institutional conditions. The third and most recent type of disturbance is categorized as an expressive mutiny whereby inmates try to communicate society's inhumanity, both
inside and outside prison. The prison becomes a political institution taking on the vestiges of the new left, black and red power, the student movement and revolutionary sects. The central feature of Martinson's analysis is that prison are a part of the larger society and reflect both societal conditions and values. The myth of the treatment institution could no longer provide control as the sick have denied their illness.

Martinson identifies four main characteristics of the collective behaviour at Attica. They are:

1. a militant inmate leadership sharing a political idea of societal revolution to be sparked by riot conditions similar to previous black race riots.
2. an ecstatic solidarity and negative bondage of the riot participants reinforced by their central bargaining position and the attention directed towards them by the media and the rest of society.
3. magical thinking - the collective enthusiasm reinforced by outside militants so that the inmates ceased to be themselves and forgot the reality of their situation and the impending threat of death.
4. social bluff - the uncompromising rhetoric of political ideology of the inmates prepared those in official positions to believe that the inmates meant to kill the hostages. The outside negotiators did not know the role of bluff in the prison setting and so advised that the hostages were in extreme fear for their lives.
This theory is the most comprehensive in explaining the dynamics of the modern prison riot but has no suggestion for either long term or short term solutions.

Marvin Wolfgang and Enrico Fenacuti state that the use of force or violence is a reflection of the basic values of a subculture (prison) but that no subculture can be totally different or in conflict with society of which it is a part. Violence and force by the dominant culture is legitimized while use of force by a subculture is censured. The use of violence in a subculture is not illegal and users do not feel guilt about their aggression. A most significant point concerning violent retaliation being legitimized by a situationally specific rationale adds insight into the brutal treatment of inmates by staff during the aftermath of a riot and vice versa.

This point is similar to that made by Deutsch as it centers on depersonalization and dehumanization. Also violence that is the norm and value of the general society is reflected in the prison. Perhaps an extension of this is that a majority of those imprisoned are little different from the rest of society which, if a true statement, could be a great blow to the treatment model.

Richard Korn, advocating a radical criminologist approach, states that "a prison riot is merely the most extreme manifestation of the continual warfare between inmates and staff, a war conducted on all levels, on both sides and with every psychological weapon - from deception to pretended compliance"
to outright defiance with participants on both side being brutalized by each other and by their own excesses.15

In this analysis the legitimized power of the prison officials has been warped and has become an instrument of oppression far from the expressed goals of rehabilitation. The dynamics of this power are that when an offender commits a crime he is all powerful, the victim is powerless but this continuum reverses itself when the victim, represented by the criminal justice system, apprehends the offender and becomes all powerful. The offender is sent to prison where he is powerless, being controlled by the all powerful representatives of society, and strives for a restoration of power to himself either physically or psychologically.

The next group of theorists to be discussed have based their models on constants and variables and predisposing and precipitating causes. Predisposing causes, according to Vernon Fox, are the underlying cumulative factors while precipitating causes are the triggers which set off the spark igniting the first signs of violence.16

The only Canadian author to be represented in this paper is Justin Ciale. He believes that when an administration has control over inmates, minor crises can be easily assimilated or adapted. Leadership is centralized and is aware of currents and forces in the prison. The frustration level of the majority of inmates is low as they are obtaining enough gratification that they have a vested interest in the status quo. If however,
a majority of the inmates feel victimized their frustration levels rise and counter retaliatory measures are initiated. This results in a fluid and unstable power structure and communications are reduced leading to a higher frustration level establishing a pattern of violence allowing the inmate power structure to upset the unstable equilibrium and take over for a short period of time.

Ciale's contributing factors are: 1) excessive size, 2) overcrowding, 3) a loosely organized professional program under maximum security conditions, 4) a shifting professional leadership creating power vacuums.

He matches the above with variables such as individual inmate disturbances that represent a changing equilibrium and spiralling upward in tension levels. Some of these disturbances are stabbings and assaults between inmates and assaults on guards, and increased use of intoxicants and drugs. These create rigid in-group and out-group solidarity that surfaces in reciprocal hate. Also certain unseen reactions such as hunger strikes, refusal to work, sabotage and smuggling of narcotics represent continuous clashes between staff importance in this dynamic situation. The cumulative effect creates a latent riot situation.

The American Correctional Association in its publication Riots and Disturbances in Correctional Institutions states that riots are too varied and complex to be attributed to any single cause or group of causes. This is true but...
there does appear to be recurring patterns of behaviour that initiate a potential riot situation. This publication distinguishes between causes generated from inside the institution and non-institution related causes. The constants in this report are the unnatural institutional environment and anti-social characteristics of inmates which makes living inside a prison intolerable, and difficult to manage.

Institutional related causes are listed as inept management, inadequate personnel practices, inadequate facilities, insufficient meaningful activity and insufficient rewards. The legitimized power structure has failed in providing basic administration services to both staff and inmates. What is suggested to correct this situation are a series of liberal reform solutions, most of which fall short of any long term and long range reform which results in further maintenance of the correctional administrative hierarchy.

Non-institution related causes are an acceptance by the correctional hierarchy that correctional institutions are no longer an isolated entity. They realize that basic social attitudes, unrest in the community outside and inequities and complexities in the criminal justice system all have an impact on the correctional institution. Having recognized this fact, as it was suggested above, there are no long range programs suggested for the overall social system.20

Riot processes are usually explained with stages similar to the development of a drama with interlocking phases.
According to Vernon Fox, riots occur in prisons where oppressive pressures are generated in the presence of a strong custodial atmosphere. The first stage, according to Fox, is a spontaneous event triggering violent destruction. There is much disorganization among both prisoners and staff. Custodial officials are usually surprised and unprepared. Quick reaction could usually contain such a situation from spreading. The second stage emerges as leaders present themselves out of the chaos. These leaders remain detached from the violence and attract other individuals who work for them and perform a policing role. The leaders take a moderate position between the two inmate extremes. Some want to go on a killing rampage. If the inmates have managed to obtain restoration of legitimate authority occurs. The fourth stage is the surrender of the authority back to the legitimate owners. This can either be done by force or by orderly restraint. Fox maintains that there is a fifth stage consisting of an administrative or political enquiry that is a consolidation of the remaining power structure showing that those who have rightful access to power are back in control.

Clarence Schrag offers another indepth analysis of riot process. He states that causes that create a potential disturbance situation can be generalized as poor administration. These are identified as insufficient budgets from legislative bodies, untrained employees at all levels, enforced inmateanness, over-crowding and excessive architectural size, lack of professional leadership, ineffective or nonexistent treatment...
programs and political interference in prison management.
Inmates again have identified events that make their situations intolerable such as bad food, oppressive and inconsistent discipline, staff vengeance on inmates, inadequate medical care, racial antagonism and lack of treatment opportunities.23

Riots were perceived to have occurred when the prison administration was implementing programs and tightening controls. Treatment goals were developed and advocated but institutions were equipped to facilitate a custodial role. Certain inmates exploited existing disorganizations. The administration recognized the presence of heightened tension and anxiety and official reaction to the flare-up of violence was slow and indecisive.

Schrag advocates a process similar to the already included positions. The first step being violence in seizing power and destruction of property, followed by the rise of small bands of leaders that slowly gain control over parts of the institutions. They exert power and control staff that have been taken hostage and dictate conditions to the rest of the inmate population. The riot leaders have been identified as being aggressive and unstable and they monopolize and censor communication between officials and the inmate body. Fatigue, jealousies and petty disagreements occur and the leaders are faced with the threat of losing control of the population. They then are forced to negotiate as Schrag states control and authority are not ends in themselves and unless power is used to gain other objectives rather than used to maintain power it is the inmate leadership
occur. Individuals with cooler dispositions come forth and discuss conditions and means for the restoration of authority to officials. As an exchange they insist on publicity over their plight and appeal for public sympathy through the media. Institutional officials are removed from the negotiations by medial and political interference. Concessions are made followed by return of control and public sympathy for a period of time. However, returned inmate violence shifts public opinion into demanding tighter custodial measures against inmates and a cyclical repetition is initiated.24

In an article that suggest a preventive aspect to prison riots Jack Brent assumes that prison violence and its prevention is a management process. Prison inmates and staff, according to Brent, have a negative image of each other. Their behaviour is initiated to reinforce their own beliefs and norms developing a "consciousness of kine"25 in that each group has its own goals, interests, channels of interaction and communication and any attempt to interfere from either side solidifies each group even more. The inmate narrowly perceives his environment as being frustrating and boring and ferments discontent. He states that if this discontent reaches a high peak: small incidents become most important and are used as a focal point. This atmosphere of heightened discord enacts a conditions of awareness that clearly identifies each group and increases their distance from each other and spirals into violence.

...17/
Brent advocates that managers need to be flexible in order to be adaptable to keep abreast of the rapid social change in society reflected in the prison. Managers must identify potential disturbance situation in their embryonic stage and initiate corrective action.

J. M. Firestone has a more complex understanding of the riot process phenomenon. He, like Fox, considers the precipitating incident to occur previous to the organization of inmate grievances. Therefore we assume a cumulative effect of other related incidents. A qualitative aspect is added as he states early negotiation tends to dampen the inmate motivation towards violence but once the aggression is fully engaged offers a release of frustration. Whether negotiation will be effective depends on the costs to the riot participants. Perhaps, as a short term measure, it would be important to decide whether the start of the disorder was spontaneous or planned. If there is early official intervention this checks a planned escalation of violence but increases resentment and arouses inmates' aggressive motivation which may lead to more spontaneous violence. If the point of frustration then direct communication becomes impossible until the effects of exhaustion necessitate negotiation for the return of legitimate authority. The degree of force or restraint used by the administration in this situation depends on the long range planning and leadership of that body.

Before concluding this paper two related articles will be discussed. The first article deals with whether force is a better
policy than restraint in prison riots. David Carson, writing in 1972 after the Attica riots, states that contrary to the official position prison riots have been one of the main vehicles for prison reform. Each series of riots has reawakened and promoted further reform advances.28 In regard to hostages Carson states that there has been no killing of hostages by inmates, in spite of threats to do so, regardless of the policy of force or restraint. He does not comment if staff or inmates are murdered outside of his specific topic.

His analysis of major riots shows that they attract attention and inspire other revolts but this is not related to their duration. There has been an unnecessary resort to force and this reflects cultural sets, inadequate training of prison officials and the enormous pressures for quick, simple decisive restoration of order and submissiveness. Restraint has been categorically more successful than force in preserving human life.29

The last article to be discussed is "The Politics of Riot Commissions" by Anthony Platt.30 He is writing in this article about U.S. race riots but perhaps his statements could be used to analyse investigations of prison riots. According to Platt, Riot Commissions are composed of elite representatives of established interest groups. They are protective of existing institutions and are not disposed to propose radical changes which would diminish the power of established groups and are not critical of society's poverty of the existing deprivation of opportunities.
He further states that the official position of the Riot Commissions is that riots are irrational and self-defeating. They depend on social scientific explanations of collective behaviour that view disturbances as inappropriate behaviour and as actions of the impatient. Instigators are labelled as frustrated, irrational agitators who are not responsible for their actions. This, he states fails to account for the intrinsically political and rational aspect of collective protest and fails to take seriously the grievances or societal conditions which motivate riots.

In summary, this paper has focused on the power relationship in the prison environment and its intergral effect on riots and disturbances. This relationship is multifaceted in that it effects prison staff and inmates' inter and intra group relations. The perception of power in society is also reflected in the microcosmic prison community.

It can be observed that the theorists analysed in this paper fall within the three main spectrums of political orientation: 1) the conservative internal inadequacy advocates, 2) the liberal reformist, 3) the radical criminologists. All perspectives have interesting contributions to the understanding of riot phenomena and this writer has found it impossible to integrate the above material as each perspective has its partial validity. Not to acknowledge each position would be restrict one's understanding of the entire phenomenon.

As prison become more and more a focal point of social...
awareness the refusal to acknowledge or understand the total perspective of power sharing is to exemplify the opening quotation.

In conclusion, correctional managers will ill-equipped to meet the demands of their ever changing society if they maintain a limited understanding of the dynamics central to their administration.
Appendix I - Indicators of Potential Disorders

The first project by the South Carolina Correction Department in the article "Riots Behind Bars: A Search for Cause" involved 73 correctional systems, 360 wardens, 54 deputy wardens, 2,000 correctional officers and 2,000 inmates. In this article a riot is defined as an incident involving fifteen or more inmates and resulting in damage to property or physical injury.

This article states that there was a positive association between the security classification of a prison and riot occurrences in that:

1) 56% of riots occurred in a maximum security institution
2) one-half of all reported riot prison had staff over 151
3) a higher incidence of riots in larger prisons
4) the larger planned capacity of a prison the greater the probability of riot.
5) 82% of riot prisons had populations over 3,000 inmates
6) the older the prison the higher the incidence of riots
7) wardens in riot prisons spend less time with inmates than non-riot prisons
8) 15% more wardens in non-riot prisons than in riot prisons spent 26 hours or more per month in direct contact with inmates
9) education of correctional officer and inmates higher in prisons reporting riots
10) little difference in riot and non-riot maximum security prisons in regard to meaningful and productive work assignments for inmates
11) in minimum and medium security prisons 79% of non-riot wardens report meaningful and productive work
12) inmates in riot prisons report more dissatisfaction with opportunity to participate in active recreational programs
13) riot prisons had administrative and punitive segregation facilities more often than non-riot prisons
14) segregation and punishment used more frequently in riot prisons
15) prison staffs that emphasized rewards over punishments had greater control over their inmate population and lower incidence of riots.
Appendix II

The second article "Prison Riot" by Donald Shelton, attempted to identify riot participants. Those that were assailants in prison disturbances were younger than those that did not participate. Violent behaviour and emotional disturbance were part of their past, accompanied by paranoid trends and sexual psychopathology. Their parents were either separated or divorced. Whatever were the grievances of rioters many of the assailants exhibited previous behaviour patterns.
Appendix III

Neil Smelser, in his theory of Collective Behavior, discusses multi-stage value-added theory and identifies causal processes in social conflict. Several conditions must be present for collective action to occur. If they occur in sequence this increases the possibility of riot. They are identified as:

1) Structural Conduciveness
2) Strain or Tension
3) Growth and spread of a generalized belief
4) Precipitating factors
5) Mobilization and organization for action
6) Operation of mechanisms of social control.

A research project using Smelser's theory and the eight main variables of the Collective Violence Research Project has been suggested.
Appendix IV

Emerson Smith states that riots are the result of unresolved conflicts. One person wants another to exercise power in a specified manner but the other person does not want to exercise power in the specified manner resulting in four reactions:

1) Participants may bargain
2) One participant may withdraw
3) Participants may engage in physical combat
4) Third party mediator

Questions posed are: Do Maximum Security prisons produce unresolved conflicts? What aspects of Maximum Security produce conflicts? What are ways conflict is generated and handled in prison?
Appendix V

The writer of this paper submits a list of potential institutional disorder indicators that have been observed in the writings of the above theorists. They are:

1) A lack of formal and informal communication between
   a) staff and inmates
   b) director and staff
   c) staff inter-departmental
   d) director and inmates

2) Accumulated unresolved minor grievances such as poor food, slow mail, inadequate medical care, etc.

3) Inapt administration

4) Unnecessary brutality or agitation of inmates

5) More punishment than positive rewards

6) Where inmates have medium to high morale and where conflict is present in staff or where staff have low morale

7) Where prisons are in a state of transition from one correctional philosophy to another

8) Enforced idleness of inmates

9) Unrest in general society reflected in prison's failure to be flexible or to compensate

10) Accumulation of young violence prone inmates accompanied by older hardened criminals

11) Excessive size of prisons

12) Overcrowding in prisons

13) Loosely organized treatment program

14) Goals of central administration are unrealistic

15) Increase of knifings, self-mutilations and suicide attempts

16) Increase of assaultive behaviour between inmates and staff and inmates

17) Hunger strikes, refusals to work, sabotage indicate discontent
18) Increased use of narcotics and intoxicants

19) Unstable leadership and lack of direction - what are realistic goals and how can they be best accomplished?

20) A tradition of violence between staff and inmates established over a period of time as a means of restoring order by staff and as a means of retaliation by inmates

21) Inmates nor receiving immediate gratification and feel victimized

22) Overreaction by administration or staff to minor incidences increases tension levels.

23) Inability of treatment personnel to set realistic goals and admit limitations in relation to heightened expectations of inmates and general public

24) Inadequate recreational programs

25) Inconsistent discipline

26) A loosening of custodial control then attempts to tighten up

27) Failure to understand bilateral powersharing relationship between staff and inmates

28) Inability of prison officials to know who the real leaders of the prison population are (Swackhamer Report)

29) Lack of knowledge of riot and contingency plans by all staff members and inability to activate promptly

30) Lack of knowledge by staff of basic prison and inmate dynamics

31) Concentration of violent assaultive and dangerous inmates in an institution

32) Failure to realize some grievances are only initiated by agitators and inability to neutralize agitators

33) Leaders of community unrest, serving time and politicizing prisons making institutions focal points of social awareness

34) Hand to mouth budget practices and deficit financing
35) Inadequate personnel training indicates that we have correct knowledge on how to "treat" the inmates - which is questionable.

36) Failure to have open communication with news media indicating realities of prison experience.

37) Inability of correctional staff to observe and report change of institutional mood and if reported inability of administration to react to it.

38) Failure of inmates to be informed of matters affecting their welfare.

39) Escape attempts, requests for protection and petitions from inmates.

This list is only an indication of behaviour patterns that can be observed, reported and corrected that have a direct relationship to institutional disorders.

Much more direct field observation is required to verify the above list and to investigate and analyse institutional dynamics and to research further indicators.
Appendix VI - Suggestions for Further Study

1) Research into inmate subculture establishing, inmate leadership profiles.

2) Research to establish profiles of violent and dangerous inmates who will participate in disorders.

3) Research into realistic goals and related programs for maximum security institutions.

4) Re-evaluation of the treatment model.

5) Evaluation of proper institutional management technique.

6) Evaluation of institutional riot and contingency planning.


8) Evaluation of management review audits and cross-reference to institutional disturbance reports.

9) Recreate Collective Violence Research Project Questionnaire.

10) Application of theoretical perspectives of 1-9 above to CFS raw data.
CRISIS INTERVENTION
HOSTAGE SITUATIONS
A REPORT AND PROPOSAL TO THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY NETWORK
September 26, 1975
HALIFAX, N.S.

D. Dawe,
Director, Preventive Security,
Canadian Penitentiary Service.

September 20, 1975.
PART ONE - INTRODUCTION

SITUATION

Prior to 1975, the incidence of hostage taking was rare. However, two incidents are recorded where staff died during the final moments of the occurrences and in both cases the actual causes of death were gunshot wounds inflicted by responding rescue forces. The Discussion Paper on the Role of the Federal Corrections Agency (October 1974) at pages five and twelve predicts, and current trends confirm, that "the proportion of dangerous offenders in the federal system will grow". Efforts are in progress to identify dangerous offenders. As of 16 June 1975, there are at least 737 inmates in the Canadian Penitentiary System who must be considered dangerous but to date it has not been possible to devise an acceptable dangerosity prediction model not to predict the precise nature, location or timing of such violence. Action is in progress, on a priority basis to develop such a capability.
Eight serious hostage taking incidents have occurred in Canadian Penitentiary Service Institutions in the past seven months. A number of additional potentially grave situations of similar nature - including one on August 28, 1975 at the Saskatchewan Penitentiary - have been averted.

We are aware of the concerns of other jurisdictions and agencies in the spectrum of crisis intervention both nationally and internationally.

Everyone is fully cognizant of the fact that there is a lack of understanding of the nature and causes of hostage-taking incidents, and recognize that the sharing of information on effective training programs and research among law enforcement agencies and institutions and the available training materials are inadequate.

Police forces and other enforcement and correctional agencies in every country are concerned with this problem, and the following organizations have held symposiums, and developed courses as well as training material for police on the subject - namely,

INTERPOL
UNIVERSAL STATES FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
NEW YORK CITY POLICE.
The federal government, provincial governments, police and correctional associations and agencies and even the public at large are concerned with the increasing incidents of hostage seizures.

This involves the whole range of hostages seizures which occur in prison take-overs, escape attempts, and aircraft hi-jacking; seizure of business executives, diplomats, and cultural personalities and armed robberies, in which by-standers are seized to aid in escapes, or incidents involving mentally unbalanced citizens who seize hostages in an attempt to gain recognition.

We, in the Canadian Penitentiary Service have faced the pressures demanding immediate positive action. We have compared our responses, studies, findings, procedures and proposed future courses of action with other Canadian law enforcement agencies, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the New York City Police, the Washington District of Columbia Police, the Munich, Germany, Police, The International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Calgary City Police, the Metropolitan Toronto City Police and the Preventive Security Institute in Louisville, Kentucky, U.S.A. We find no conflict. As members of the National Advisory Network, but even more importantly, as a co-operating and contributing component of the Canadian Criminal Justice System, we wish to share with you the result of our efforts in support of not only cost-effective and adequate response to crisis situations, particularly hostage incidents but, as supported by your sub-committee in
Ottawa (John WILSON of Alberta, Dick TILL of Saskatchewan, Merv BOUMAN, Bob DUNPHY of the Ministry of the Solicitor General and John BRAITHWAITE of the Canadian Penitentiary Service) we would like to see that:

1. A national repository of information concerning crisis situations - particularly those involving criminal and terroristic violence be maintained and up-to-date materiels be made available to all components of the Criminal Justice System;

2. That suitable training courses be made available to all components of the Canadian Criminal Justice System in respect of common philosophy, practice and procedures in respect of crisis intervention; and

3. That current on-going Canadian Research and Development in this area be drawn together in a co-ordinated effort to reduce duplicity to effect efficient speed of implementation.

Accordingly, the purpose of this report and proposal, is to initiate co-operative response to an increasing threat by sharing our research and experience with you, soliciting your counsel and constructive criticisms and your support of our recommendations previously outlined.
To achieve these objectives action has been taken to:

(a) identify, study and understand the nature and causes of hostage-taking incidents;

(b) identify the roles and tasks of personnel who provide crisis intervention response;

(c) identify, evaluate and improve the objectives for these personnel;

(d) relate existing training programs to the knowledge and skills required for crisis intervention;

(e) incorporate contemporary learning techniques in crisis intervention training;

(f) share crisis-intervention information; and

(g) prepare training materials.
Phase Two:

A review of available literature and study of some 400 hostage taking incidents in Canada, the U.S.A. and Europe reveals that the successfully hostage reaction plan generally involves three distinct phases:

Phase One: The Containment Phase which occurs at the initial location and time when the hostages are first taken and confrontation occurs;

Phase Two: The Mobile Negotiation Phase, which is that period during which containment continues, negotiations are initiated and demands are presented, usually for transportation or other means of escape, and it is generally this phase which is of the longest duration.

Phase Three: The Relocation or Change of Venue Phase, which is principally a duplication of Phase One but which involves exposure of those holding the hostages, the possibility of protracting Phase Two, the possibility of arranging to reduce the number of hostages held, the possibility of creating improved observation and containment conditions and thus enhancing opportunities to effect the safe release of hostages.
Techniques have been developed, tested and applied with considerable success in hostage taking situations. These techniques demand a co-ordinated team response by highly trained personnel. No two incidents will be identical, yet similarities in conditions may prevail. The over-riding consideration of authorities and response elements must be the preservation of life-hostages, the public, and the hostage-takers-in a situation of extreme stress which thrusts the mantle of arbitrator, psychologist, administrator, and law enforcement officer automatically upon the initial responder. He, or they, must react non-emotionally, rationally in the face of extremes of potential violence, abuse, profanity and criticism dealing with mind barriers to determine the intentions, objectives and capabilities of the hostage-takers and hostages. His first objective, if he cannot immediately and safely resolve the situation is to negotiate - to talk - to gain time.

In all instances, there are but three acceptable possible conclusions:

a. the hostage takers may recognize the futility of their actions and surrender;

b. the hostages may effect their own release; or

c. the hostages are rescued and the hostage-takers apprehended.
The first possibility is, of course, the preferred one. The second and third are fraught with danger. The former most difficult to predict and generally uncontrollable. The latter requiring planning, and precise response by well trained and equipped specialists.

A methodology of crisis intervention through negotiations was developed for such situations in order to ease anxieties and tensions and, if possible, to allow the captor to assess the situation rationally. This methodology is based on an understanding of the psychological forces which are present during hostage confrontations.

Since no two hostage confrontations are alike, there can be no standardized format for negotiations. Each situation is treated individually. However, the following techniques have been developed as a result of experiences:

- Members of the Hostage Negotiating Team should have a mature appearance so that they will be perceived by the captor as a person of authority.

- The negotiator should not portray himself as the ultimate decision maker. This will permit the negotiator to defer decisions, buy time and maintain rapport with the captor when demands are delayed or refused because he, the negotiator, is not the person denying the captor's request.
The negotiator should be aware of the following psychological differences among captor types:

- Usually the easiest type of captor to deal with is the professional criminal. He is considered a relatively rational thinker who after assessing the situation and weighing the odds, in most cases, comes to terms with the police and refrains from unnecessary violence or useless killing;

- The psychotic individual, on the other hand, presents different and more complex problems. He tends to be irrational and therefore less predictable. His actions, the words he uses and the demands he makes, are often valuable clues to his mental condition. The psychotic harbors great inner frustration and conflict. He may even feel a degree of pleasure from his precarious predicament as he now finds himself important and the center of attention, a position which may be unique in his life. Time works for us in this instance because the psychotic is emotionally tense and expends a great deal of physical and psychic energy, which eventually wears him down.
The terrorist creates an even more difficult hostage situation. Many rationalize their behavior by claiming to be revolutionaries seeking social justice. In these situations, the resolve to die for their cause may deteriorate with the passage of time, thus allowing mistakes to be made.

In any case, if the captor kills one of the hostages during negotiations, action should be taken to save the lives of the remaining hostages because once he kills one he is likely to kill more.

Practically all demands are negotiable but two:

1. Supplying weapons. If the felon is bluffing with an unloaded or bogus weapon, giving him a gun would truly create a real danger.

2. No additional hostages are to be given or exchanged. However, this does not preclude a situation where police provide an unarmed trained police drive for the escape car who, in effect, would be another hostage.
With due acknowledgement to our colleagues in other jurisdictions we therefore suggest that there be a phased development for reaction to Crisis Intervention.

1. Preplanning Phase

2. Immediate Action Phase

3. Tactical Planning Phase

4. Response Phase

5. Critique Phase.

And, I should, for a few moments like to address myself to each of these.

**PREPLANNING PHASE**

The preplanning phase is involved with those preparations completed BEFORE a crisis develops and includes consideration of at least the following subjects:

a. Identification, analysis and assessment of the potential crisis problem;

b. Development of jurisdictional policy in respect of crisis reaction;
c. Command and control considerations;

d. Response Resource Requirements;

e. Liaison and Co-ordination;

f. Development of Contingency Plans;

g. Development of Standard Operating Procedures;

h. Identification of Potential Problem Areas

i. Basic crisis prevention program development and training;

j. Development of Tactical Response Teams;

k. Development of Tactical Response Resources;

l. Development and Implementation of Tactical Response Resource Training;

m. Training.

This phase must be on going.
The Canadian Penitentiary Service is organized on a de-centralized five region basis. Except in the Prairie Region, all major institutions within each region are accessible from the Regional Headquarters and each other within three hours travel time. Experience, particularly within the Canadian Penitentiary Service, has established that the effective objectivity of the response element is increased if the respondent team members are from other than the institution actually involved in the incident. To meet prolonged activity requirements, more than one team is required but cost-effectiveness dictates a requirement for graduated response from which could be met by the initial response from within the effected region - within three hours; and two additional teams, from other regions were able to respond the first within eight hours and the second within twelve hours thus providing three teams for 24 hour coverage. Two other teams, would be brought to increased readiness.

Teams when deployed would provide adviser and response capability to the Director of the Institution at which the occurrence was taking place.

Teams would in all cases consist of at least five specially trained and equipped personnel.
SELECTION OF TEAM MEMBERS

The participation in a Tactical Emergency Response Security Team activity would provide increased penological hazard risk potential. Participants must be in above-average physical and mental health condition. Rigid pre-selection medical criteria - possibly to high performance jet aircrew standards - must be developed and applied. Psychological testing and full application to nuclear security standards of the Human Reliability clearance must be applied and all selectees must be volunteers. It is suggested that the following minimum selection criteria be established:

a. Volunteers only;

b. Age 28 to 50 years;

c. At least ten years CPS, law enforcement military security, professional experience (NOTE: professionals in human sciences are essential);

d. Medically fit to standards determined by DGMS. Heart problems, high blood pressure, defective colour vision, defective perceptive vision, or any physical disability automatic cause for rejection;
e. Psychologically fit to standards determined by DGMS and;
f. Established marksmanship ability.

Not more than one team member to be selected from any one institution nor more than five team members from any region.

All Regional Preventive Security Investigators will be trained as team members.

All potential volunteer selectees will be interviewed by a selection board.

TRAINING

The Ontario Provincial Police have very recently completed a full review of training requirements for police emergency response teams, however, during the special course attended June 9 - 13, 1975, in Toronto, by CPS personnel, it was determined that the training provided by police agencies is not adequate to meet the special requirements of the Penitentiary environment and a specially designed course is necessary. Accordingly, although some expertise in the various disciplines involved is available from within existing resources and utilizing the experience of all agencies already having organized, trained and successfully employed personnel in the crisis intervention role, we are in the process, in conjunction with training specialists developing for presentation to selected CPS volunteer personnel, a course covering
the following crisis intervention related topics:

a. Pre-incident indicators;

b. Dangerosity indicators;

c. Initial response to crisis situations;

d. Hostage taking;

e. Crisis Intervention;

f. Crisis Reporting;

g. Crisis Negotiation;

h. 'Alert Recall;

i. Crisis Situation Assessment;

j. Reconnaissance;

k. Crisis Response Deployment;

l. Crisis Information Collection;

m. Crisis Information Analysis;
n. Crisis Decision Making;

q. Organization of Crisis Response;

p. Situation Appreciations;

q. Canadian Law on the Use of Force;

r. Electronic Surveillance;

s. Response Force Deployment;

t. Armed Response Tactics;

u. Narcotics;

v. Weapons Training;

w. Gas Training;

x. Exercises;

y. Report Writing;

z. Crisis Response Research;

AA. Crisis Response Critiques;
It is estimated that a three week course - 120 hours - of training would be required and preliminary syllabus preparation has commenced.

EQUIPMENT

Standard Canadian Penitentiary Service equipment has been used on an ad hoc basis to react to crisis situations. To meet the full requirements for effective Tactical Emergency Response Security Team reaction, professionalism and safety consideration is being given to the following equipment suggestions:

a. Clothing: Response teams should be uniformed. Currently studies are in progress to modify and re-issue CPS uniforms. Recent technological developments have made it possible, under extremely tightly controlled circumstances to obtain, in any materiel, design or cut, protective clothing which will protect the wearer from small arms fire or knife slashes.
Such clothing should be provided to TERST personnel. The cost is approximately 50% higher than the normally provided clothing and such clothing is tailor made.

b. **Communications:** Individual portable radio transmitters having a capability to provide institutional frequency plus an exclusive TERST frequency is available off the shelf. Delivery time is 30 days maximum providing six channel capability.

c. **Electronic Surveillance:** Equipment is already held by CPS major institutions plus one set at National H.Q. and each Regional H.Q.

d. **Weapons:** While current CPS weapons holdings might appear adequate it is considered essential that telescopic night viewing sights be provided and that weapons destined for use by TERST should be an individual personal issue to ensure the user's total familiarity and expertise with the weapon. It is suggested that under the circumstances envisaged for TERST intervention .222 cal. rifles on a .303 sidearms if necessary should be of the longest possible barrel type to promote optimum accuracy.
e. Ammunition: To ensure optimum capability and proficiency military experience has established that each man should fire a minimum of fifty practice rounds per month with each weapon he is required to use. Therefore, authorization will be required for the training expenditure of at least 1600 rounds per month for weapon type.

ESTABLISHMENT

Budgetary resources will not permit nor would potential utilization justify the allocation of specific man-years solely to TERST. It is, therefore, suggested that personnel identified and selected for TERST be annotated as Institutional Preventive Security Officers employed normally within their parent institutions. Personnel would thus be drawn from and enhance the career progression where necessary by not more than five additional previously experienced personnel possessing the requisite qualifications.

INCREASED KNOWLEDGE

The U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in April of 1975 formed "Standards and Goals II" with Task Forces for Criminal Justice Research and Development, Juvenile Justice and Delinquence Prevention, Disorders and Terrorism, Organized Crime, and Private Security. The Preventive Security Institute, on the campus of Louisville Kentucky University provides a wealth of information as a clearing house and co-ordination centre for research
in all of these areas and for the provision of university level training courses which, in the main are similar to those previously outlined. The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police meeting in Toronto, in a closed session, recommend that a "suitable course for Canadian police forces be researched and developed by either the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or Provincial Police Commissions who provide training facilities, and that it be made available to all police forces. Further, that a national repository on information concerning extortion and hostage incidents be maintained in order that up-to-date materiel will be available on the various modus operandi employed by persons or organizations perpetrating this type of crime".

While I am a member and strong supporter of CACP, I feel that Canada is experiencing, like Europe and the United States previously, realization that such incidents as:

a. Prison takeovers and escape attempts in which hostages are seized;

b. Aircraft hijackings;

c. Seizures of business executives, diplomats, athletes, and cultural personalities;

d. Armed robberies in which by-standers are seized to aid in escapes;

e. Incidents involving mentally unbalanced citizens who seize hostages in an attempt to gain recognition;

are an increasing danger with which the community at large is, at present, not totally prepared to effectively deal in a co-ordinated, common, or adequate defence.
Studies have been, and continue to be undertaken by local, provincial, national and international bodies. Forty nations met in Saint-Cloud France, bringing together police administrators to recount experience and exchange ideas. The result of the symposium mirrored the findings of other research and the mandate of this sub-committee:

"to develop tactical plans and training programs in order to respond professionally to hostage-taking incidents".

All are agreed that while tactical response plans must ultimately be designed by individual departments or jurisdictions to meet specific needs, there are existing commonalities which relate overall to effective crisis intervention and further there is an urgent requirement for commonality of national crisis response and crisis intervention training.

IMMEDIATE ACTION PHASE

The immediate action phase, which occurs simultaneously with the crisis demands implementation of the efforts of the pre-planning phase and;

a. Personnel Response
   (i) Self-protection;
   (ii) Warning and reporting;
   (iii) Help
b. CONTAINMENT of the incident to protect the public by:
   (i) Establishment of a perimeter;
   (ii) Evacuation of non-essential personnel;
   (iii) Isolation of those immediately involved.

c. Establishment of Control

d. If immediate resolution is practicable - resolution; or

TACTICAL PLANNING PHASE

In a military or police situation the action planning phase would then be smoothly and quickly entered. The phase consists of:

a. Situation Analysis;

b. Strategy Determination;

c. Tactical approach development;

d. Resource deployment;

e. Warnings and COMMUNICATION;

f. INTELLIGENCE - Research, Reconnaissance, collection, collation, analysis and dissemination;

g. Detailed planning;
RESPONSE PHASE

The actual crisis response phase consists of:

a. Controlling the environment;
b. Negotiation, discussion, etc.;
c. Intervention, if necessary; and
d. Debriefing.

It is this phase which is most crucial. I am indebted to my American and German colleagues for the following guidelines for the response phase:

A. Facts to Weigh Concerning Hostage Situations
   1. Remember that Hostages are taken solely for the purpose of gain.
   2. Personalities of criminals who take hostages vary and are important.
   3. Points to remember concerning criminal holding the hostage.
      a. Know his personality.
      b. Know what prior crimes he has committed, if any, by obtaining his record.
      c. Know exactly what crime he has committed, which has led to the hostage situation.
d. Know all available facts about the criminal, before weighing chance of negotiations.

e. Any and all facts concerning the criminal, could help determine the mental state of the individual.

4. Important to ascertain the feeling of the community and gathered crowd.

   a. An uncooperative community or hostile crowd would only double your problem.

B. Steps to Take in Hostage Situations

1. **DON'T RUSH - SLOW DOWN**

2. Gather all facts available:
   a. Get information on I.D. of suspects, so you know background of person with whom you are dealing. (plus physical description).
   b. Know exactly what crime or crimes have been committed.
   c. Obtain names and descriptions of all hostages.
   d. Know suspects needs, in order to make plans for negotiations.

3. Set up a perimeter and block all avenues of escape.

4. Obtain detailed layout of place in question.

5. Contain firepower.

6. Define the problem.
7. Take all necessary steps to obtain the non-lethal release of all hostages, and apprehension of the perpetrators.

8. Safety of hostages and their eventual release without injury represents the fundamental premise for the formulation of these plans. In other words, the major premise is "The Hostage(s) Must Live".

C. Psychological Types of People You May Encounter

1. Schizophrenic
   a. Has no thought train.
   b. Simple, out of touch with reality.
   c. Uninvolved and disinterested.
   d. Unable to concentrate on any objective over period of time.
   e. Can usually be handled easily.
   f. Can be handled by listening to what he says, keeping him talking, and forcing him to make decisions.

2. Neurotic
   a. Knows what he is doing.
   b. Well aware of situation and possible consequences.
   c. In touch with reality, however, has an overbearing and unexplainable feeling about something which causes his irrational and neurotic behavior.

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3. **Psychotic**
   a. Emotionally unable to understand or reason.
   b. Ability to reason is affected by his emotional state.
   c. Harbors great inner frustration and conflict.
   d. His actions, the words he uses, and the demands he makes often are clues to his mental condition.

4. **Psychopath** (Criminal and non-criminal)
   a. **Non-criminal psychopath**
      (1) Appears normal and rational.
      (2) Usually an extrovert and well liked.
      (3) Undue dependence on others.
      (4) Excellent con-man.
      (5) Continued sexual experimentation.
      (6) Desires immediate satisfaction.
   
   b. **Criminal psychopath**
      (1) Has no conscience.
      (2) Hates with a passion, loves no one.
      (3) Commits most violent acts - also capable of Bunco.
      (4) Most dangerous of all psychos.
      (5) Will do anything to inflate ego.
      (6) Thinks only of himself - has no regard for human life.
      (7) Abuses, tortures, and mutilates body before death.
      (8) Will execute a hostage without hesitation.
      (9) No feeling for persons, but sometimes gets attached to animals.

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(10) Commits violent crimes against persons (rapes most, robs most, beats most).

5. **Paranoiac**
   a. Delusions of persecution.
   b. Knows his enemy.
   c. Delusions of Grandeur.
   d. Many times small in stature.
   e. Born loser - socially insignificant.
   f. Absolutely dedicated to his cause (evaluate dedication to cause).
   g. Can build a philosophy out of half truths.

6. **Weak Personality**
   a. Weak mind and is easily swayed.
   b. Will be a follower and dedicated to a cause until another strong minded person with a magnetic personality takes them over.

D. **Psychological Guidelines to Negotiations**

1. Measure emotional stability.
   a. Determine with whom you are dealing and their psychological make-up.

   (1) Common Criminal - who can be successfully reasoned with.

   (2) Psycho - who is unpredictable and has to be dealt with according to his mental state.
(3) Fanatic - who has total dedication and is tough to deal with.

b. Remember that the emotional stress affects the aggressor, the hostage, and the policemen on the scene.

c. Coffee can be a noticeable stimulant under stress causing mistakes in judgement.

2. Evaluate Dedication to Purpose.

a. Reason with aggressor according to his weaknesses

   (1) Common criminal - use good common sense and reason with him.

   (2) Schizophrenic - Keep him talking and making decisions.

   (3) Neurotic - knows what he's doing and can be reasoned with.

   (4) Psychotic - very unstable, must be carefully reasoned with, can be set off by anything.

   (5) Psychopath - His only downfall is his ego, must concern him with his own survival and constantly feed his ego. Always remember that once he uses a hostage to escape, the hostage has less than a 50-50 chance of survival.
(6) Paranoiac - Appel to his ego, tell him he's the greatest, and if he were killed, who could fill his shoes and carry out his cause.

3. Never Negotiate to Supply Weapons
   a. Do not consider a bluff and supply a dummy weapon.
   b. Weapons negotiations only worsen situation.

4. Stall for Time
   a. Time saves lives - Time is money.
   b. Always say you have to go to higher authority to get ok's for bargaining.
   c. Stall in any way possible without spooking the aggressor.

5. Never offer Suggestions
   a. Offering suggestions speeds up the critical time factor.
   b. If suspect is forced to make decisions, he is not dwelling on killing the hostages.

6. Never Agree to a Demand Without Receiving Something in Return
   a. Set up a psychological atmosphere of give and take.

7. Keep perpetrator in a hopeful decision-making status.
   a. Keep his mind busy and occupied.
   b. Gives you more time.
8. **Nurture his escape potential**
   a. If he feels all is lost, he may decide to kill the hostages.

E. **Select Negotiator with Care**
   1. He should be non-authoritative in rank and stature.
   2. Pick an average size man - low in rank.
   3. Should be a good bargainer and know the psychological make-up of the people with whom he is dealing.
   4. During the negotiations the negotiator should command the respect of everyone.

F. **Important Points to Remember**
   1. Gather all available facts by going to all resources and weighing all information.
   2. Do not act hastily.
   3. Do not take the initial leap without making strategic plans.

**CRITIQUE PHASE**

We learn by experience. Every hostage crisis is slightly different. Each must be studied. The recording of every event, and the debriefing of all concerned is essential.

**PART THREE -- CONCLUSION**

Hostage taking is a relatively new, but growing criminal and terroristic phenomena. It is intensifying in both frequency and ferocity. Richard W. Kobitz claims two reasons for the growing
*popularity of hostage taking can be isolated:

1. The "contagion factor" which spurs imaginative well-publicized acts; and

2. Society itself is becoming more violent, more readily accepting violence and the threat of violence.

Accordingly the incidence of hostage taking may be expected to increase in all jurisdictions. The sharing of information on effective training programs and research, on a need-to-know basis is essential.

A national repository on information relative to these situations providing modus operandi of both offender and respondent is essential.

Commonality of training and research demands increased co-operation and communication.

We all face the potential of crisis at any time. We all face constraints. Only by increased communication, co-operation, liaison, dedication to common purpose can we provide effective response. A copy of our (CPS) preliminary draft syllabus of two phased training is attached for your consideration and comment.

D. Dawe,
Director,
Preventive Security.
An Overview of Hostage Taking Events in the C.P.S. - 1970 - 75

with

Proposed Guidelines for the Control & Management of these Events

By H. E. Popp - Director of Operational Security - C.P.S.

Reference Material

- Statistical data and information gathered in a follow-up study of the J.D. Wharry report of March, 1973 - "Guidelines for the Behaviour of Prison Personnel Held as Hostages"

- Reports of Administrative Inquiries of Hostage Taking Events

- C.D. 120 - Emergency Situations

- D.I. 713 - Institutional Riots, Disturbances & Taking of Hostages

- D.I. 714 - Use of Force
An Overview of Hostage Taking Events: In the C.P.S. 1970-75

Proposed Guidelines for the Control & Management of these Events

Introduction

The period under review extends from July 1970 to July 1975, during which a total of 27 hostage taking incidents occurred in maximum, medium, and minimum security institutions of the Canadian Penitentiary Service. Prior to 1970 reports on incidents of this kind were not available or lacking in the detail required. The review has a number of purposes, namely:

a) to determine the nature and extent of the problem;
b) to determine causes and major contributing factors;
c) to evaluate the adequacy of National policies;
d) to evaluate operational performance; and

e) in consideration of the foregoing determine the precise requirements for more effective countermeasures.

Definition

Hostage taking for the purpose of this report is viewed in the context of Kidnapping and Abduction as defined in Section 247 of the Criminal Code of Canada, reading as follows:

Kidnapping and Abduction

Kidnapping - Forcible Confinement - Non-resistance - 247 -

(1) Everyone who kidnaps a person with intent

a) to cause him to be confined or imprisoned against his will;
b) to cause him to be unlawfully sent or transported out of Canada against his will; or

 c) to hold him for ransom or to service against his will, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for life.

(2) Everyone who, without lawful authority, confines, imprisons, or forcibly seizes another person, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for five years.
Vital Statistics

a) Total number of events - 27 - This includes 4 events that occurred outside of the responsible institutions, namely:

Dorchester - escape of an inmate, with outside assistance, and taking a nurse hostage from Sackville Memorial Hospital, November 24, 1970. It should be noted the victim was held for only 5 minutes.

Kingston - an inmate under escort enroute from Kingston to Winnipeg, via C.P. Air, seized stewardess and held her for 10 minutes - November 18, 1971.

Archambault - inmate patients at Pinel Institute Provincial Psychiatric Hospital seized an orderly, a female employee and a nurse, and held them for 6½ hours, June 11, 1973.

British Columbia Penitentiary - an inmate on transfer from Millhaven seized escort and vehicle at Vancouver Airport, February 9, 1975.

b) Number of events by Security Classification of Institution:

Maximum security - 15 events,
Medium security - 10 events,
Minimum security - 2 events.

c) Number of Institutions involved:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6 Maximum Security Institutions</th>
<th>7 Medium Security Institutions</th>
<th>2 Minimum Sec. Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B.C. Penitentiary - 7 incidents</td>
<td>Drumheller - 1 incident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan - 1 incident</td>
<td>Stony Mountain - 1 incident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingston - 2 incidents</td>
<td>Warkworth - 2 incidents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reg. Medical Ctre(Q) - 1 incident</td>
<td>Collins Bay - 1 incident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archambault - 1 incident</td>
<td>Cowansville - 1 incident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorchester - 3 incidents</td>
<td>Leclerc - 3 incidents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fed.Trg.Ctre. - 1 incident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 15
TOTAL 10
TOTAL 2
d) Number of inmates involved - 68, exclusive of the Kingston Riot in 1971 when the entire inmate population was involved to some extent.

e) Average number of inmates per event exclusive of Kingston Riot - 2.5.

f) Number of hostages taken - 58.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By Sex:</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>11</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>By Occupation:</th>
<th>CX</th>
<th>Docto</th>
<th>Nurse</th>
<th>Orderly</th>
<th>Shop Instructor</th>
<th>Gang Supervisor</th>
<th>Classification Officer</th>
<th>Program Staff</th>
<th>Recreation Officer</th>
<th>Storeman</th>
<th>Receptionist</th>
<th>Stewardess</th>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</table>

TOTAL 58

Length of time hostages held captive:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Hours - Minutes</th>
<th>Number of Hostages</th>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3 hostages in 3 incidents</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>3 &quot; &quot; 3 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1 &quot; &quot; 1 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1 &quot; &quot; 1 &quot;</td>
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... /4
Length of time hostages held captive: (cont'd)

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<th>Days</th>
<th>Hours - Minutes</th>
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<td>&quot; 1 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>&quot; 1 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 15 -
Background Information

The inmate population figures in 1970-75 ranged between 7500 and 9000. The staff strength ranged between 4700 and 6200 in the same period.
There are currently 24 major institutions in the C.P.S. All but two were in operation in 1970.
There are 9 maximum security institutions, plus Regional Psychiatric Centres in Matsqui, Laval and Kingston, plus the Prison for Women, for a total of 13. There are also 13 institutions classified as medium security.
Approximately 35% of the inmate population is housed in maximum security.

50% " " " medium security.
15% " " " minimum security.

National Policies

Hostage taking is covered in the following Commissioner's Directives and Divisional Instructions:

C.D. - 120 entitled - Emergency Situations.


D.I. - 714 entitled - Use of Force.

Type of Weapons Used by Hostage Takers

Knife - in 18 incidents
Razor - " 1 "
Scissor - " 1 "
Pistol - " 2 "
Dummy Pistol - " 1 "
Dummy Rifle - " 1 "
Physical Force - no weapons - " 3 "
Inmate Objectives - Reasons for Hostage Taking

- Escape - 18 incidents
- Transfer to another institution - 3
- Request for pardon - 1
- Publicity - attention seeking - 5

Injuries and Hostage Fatalities

There is only one recorded fatality - Mary Steinhauser, a female classification officer, who was accidentally shot and killed in the rescue operation of 15 hostages at British Columbia Penitentiary, June 11, 1975. There are no other cases of permanent physical injury.

Number of Negotiated Hostage Taking Incidents

In 14 events there was no need or opportunity to negotiate as the hostages were used only as a temporary expedient to facilitate escape.

In 5 events there was communication and dialogue between the inmates and members of C.P.S. administration that resulted in the safe release of hostages.

In 8 events negotiators from outside and C.P.S. personnel were involved in effecting the safe release of hostages.

Number of Successful Rescue Attempts by Emergency Response Teams
Major Contributing Factors to the Occurrence of Hostage Taking

In 50% of the cases the major cause has been staff failure. These failures include deficient performance in the following areas:
- control of inmate movement;
- general supervision;
- searching, locking and counting procedures;
- control of tools and equipment;
- control of contraband.

In 40% of the cases the major cause has been administrative failure, typified by errors in judgement, inadequate supervision, and in general the inability or failure to ensure staff adherence to security related procedures as normally set out in Institutional Standing Orders.

In the remaining 10% of the cases major responsibility can be imputed to inmate action, where in effect the inmate, through no direct fault of either staff or administration, has managed to overcome or circumvent established procedures for control.

New Treatment Concepts as Contributing Factors

There can be no doubt that new treatment concepts have resulted in some relaxation of traditional controls, introducing a greater element of risk. It then becomes a question of whether this risk is justified and whether it can or will be offset by the program benefits that will accrue.
Guidelines for the Control & Management of Hostage TAKING EVENTS

The primary objective in dealing with a hostage taking incident in the C.P.S. is to ensure the well being of hostages during the time they are held captive and to effect their safe release as quickly as possible, without acceding to unreasonable demands, or resorting to measures that will:

a) endanger lives, or cause serious injury to innocent persons;
b) compromise the safety of the public or the security of the institution;
c) establish dangerous precedents that could be used to advantage by inmates in future events;
d) precipitate the escalation of a disturbance, of which the hostage taking may be a part;
e) cause unnecessary embarrassment to the Service or the Government.

It is most important that agreement be reached as to the seriousness of the hostage taking problem in the C.P.S. today, to ensure that the response that is developed is in keeping with actual needs and not based on misleading emotional viewpoints and reactions.

Certain critical disclosures were made in the course of this review requiring further close examination. They include:

- a rate of occurrence approximating only one event per major institution every five years;
- some institutions have never experienced a single event;
- no hostage has ever come to serious harm or injury as a result of inmate action, while held captive;
- many of the hostage events were the result of inattention and carelessness of staff, errors in judgement and inadequate supervision and poor management practice.
Nature and Extent of the Problem

Frequency of occurrence has to be one of the more critical factors in evaluating the seriousness of the problem. The current rate approximates one hostage taking event per major institution every 5 years.

Chance of survival and the type of injury hostages are likely to incur at the hands of the inmates are also important factors. The record would indicate that most hostages are treated reasonably well and are safely released without any serious physical injury.
Conclusions - re

Causes & Major Contributing Factors

Hostage taking, like escapes, riots and disturbances, is a problem of supervision and control. There is a preponderance of evidence to support the conclusion that "failure to control" is the key critical factor in most hostage taking incidents in the C.P.S.
Conclusions - re

Operational Performance

The record of safe releases of hostages would indicate that performance of management and staff during the event cannot be seriously faulted. There is however room for a great deal of improvement in the planning and development of preventive measures before the event, and also in the follow up action required after the event.
Perpetrator Profiles

Case studies would indicate that:
- in most instances he will be under 30 years of age;
- he will probably use a knife to enforce his demands;
- he has a record of violence;
- it was his first attempt at hostage taking.
Conclusions - re Adequacy of National Policies

C.D.120 - Emergency Situations - This directive as a vehicle for setting out policy governing the management and control of riots, disturbances and hostage taking events, is inadequate. It leaves too many important areas of concern uncovered, saying little more than that the director will exercise complete authority, consult with the Regional Director, and develop emergency plans.

D.I.713 - Institutional Riots, Disturbances & Taking of Hostages - This document, promulgated in 1973, is the first formal instruction of its kind issued from National Headquarters on the subject material. As a result it is a conglomerate of philosophy, policy guidelines, procedures, background information and interesting views and observations. What it should be is an instruction setting out procedures to give effect to the policy that properly belongs in C.D.120. Notwithstanding, it does in one manner or another cover most of the important points of concern, namely:

- the detailed development of Contingency Plans for institutions,
  including guidelines for the management of hostage taking events;
- the use of force in rescuing hostages;
- negotiations with inmates.

While there has been little direct criticism of this Divisional Instruction the Security Branch at National Headquarters is aware of its major shortcomings and recognizes the need for extensive revision, in order to keep abreast of changes and developing trends. Certainly the instruction that there will be no negotiations with inmates at any time should be deleted. The selection and training of negotiators is one of the key issues.

Should we continue to yield to the demands of inmates for negotiators from the outside or should we attempt to gain acceptance of a policy to select and train negotiators from within our Service?
Conclusions - re

Adequacy of National Policies (cont'd)

The formation and training of emergency response teams (better known in
the past as riot squads) is another matter requiring a policy decision.
As the record shows, most of our hostage situations were escape oriented
with little or no opportunity or need for armed intervention. It should,
also be noted that the only lives of hostages that have been lost to date
were lost as a result of armed assaults by staff.

Extension of the Team Concept - permitting the organization of all
security staff into permanent teams under permanently assigned supervisors
seems a more logical approach than the establishment of more specialist
groups. With staff properly organized and trained within the team concept,
the ability to respond quickly, not only to a hostage taking situation,
but to any type of emergency, would be greatly enhanced. The transition
from a normal routine in a graduated response to a position of standby,
to a final full alert, can be easily effected in this system of staff
organization and deployment.

Check lists of essential items should also be included in emergency plans,
prepared in advance for the benefit of the officer in charge.
Conclusions - re

Determination of the Precise Requirements for more Effective Countermeasures

To be effective countermeasures must be developed with an eye to the factors that contributed most to the occurrence of these events. As indicated earlier in this review the main causes can be attributed to deficiencies in operational performance - not during the event - but before the event - in the day to day operation of the institution. Corrective measures must therefore be directly related to the improvement of staff performance not by engaging in any dramatic or spectacular training programs or the development of highly specialized skills, but highlighting the importance of learning to observe in a disciplined way and insisting on a high standard of performance, with emphasis on adherence to basic security principles and practice.

In addition to the foregoing specific countermeasures can be effected by:

a) developing procedures and routines that will, during the reception and diagnostic process, permit the early identification of the violence prone inmate with a hostage taking history;

b) developing a system whereby this information can be quickly and routinely communicated to staff without creating unnecessary fear or apprehension or interfering unduly with the rehabilitative process;

c) utilizing communications equipment designed for the protection of staff, with the capability for causing an instant alarm where a hostage taking appears imminent or has occurred;

d) developing standards of physical fitness and training in self defence consistent with the requirements of the job.

See also - paper on Behaviour of Personnel Held as Hostages;

- paper on Proposed Guidelines for Staff to Prevent or Reduce Adverse Effects of Hostage Taking Incidents - by D. Dawe, Director, Preventive Security.
POLICY DECISIONS - GENERAL

1. **Selection and Training of Negotiators** - selection from inside or outside - or a combination of both? What type of training?

Currently no formal training program. Reliance on institutional experience of people inside. Reliance on ?? of people used from outside. The practicality of maintaining lists of people from the outside as suggested in D.I.713. Should we continue to yield to the pressures and demands of inmates in crisis situations to bring in well known newscasters as Negotiators? Or should we attempt to gain acceptance of a policy to use our own people as Negotiators?

2. **Formation & Training of Emergency Response Teams** - referred to in D.I.713? In the past referred to as "Riot Squads" - now sometimes referred to as "Tactical Squads" - "Tactical Emergency Response Security Teams".

Assuming and accepting that we need "Emergency Response Teams" for a variety of functions in a variety of emergencies, of which hostage taking is only one, can we with existing resources meet the requirements outside of a full scale riot, when the R.C.M.P. or D.N.D. are called upon for assistance?

Is the problem today a lack of bodies and equipment to respond to these situations, or is it a matter of failing to properly organize and to take the time to conduct the training that is necessary?

The Team Concept - Experience has shown that in most emergencies (except for the initial stages) that there are so many people they are getting in each others way - and so many with no assigned role or duties.

3. Should we prepare separate CD's and DI's on Hostage Taking?
Incident Typologies

are being developed by Preventive Security in conjunction with International Law Enforcement Agencies.
Victim Profiles

are being developed by Preventive Security in conjunction with International Law Enforcement Agencies.
Future Considerations

- The impact of pending legislation that would result in longer sentences and a higher percentage of dangerous inmates.
- Special institutions and more rigid controls - the more you take away the less the inmate has to lose.
- The impact of T.A's - and paroles of all types.
- The impact of strengthened perimeter security.
- The effect of smaller institutions.
- Living Unit Concept - Team Concept.
- The impact of changing the rules of the game - the increased use of assault teams and lethal fire power.
WHY PRISONERS RIOT

by H. W. HOLLISTER

MaTe it is time, now that everyone else has had his say on the continuing problem of prison riots, that a former convict should make some observations on the subject. A lot of analyses of the problem have been made during the past couple of years, and a lot of solutions proposed; but most of them have managed to sound more like the product of laboratory experiments than the result of a good close look into prison itself. And nowhere does this show up more plainly than in the unanimity with which the analysts have placed the blame primarily on external “trigger” factors — overcrowding, poor food, parole policies, psychological pressures generally — while almost completely disregarding the large and obvious part played, first, by what can loosely be called convict nature and, second, by deep-rooted convict tradition.

It seems to be a general assumption that a prison riot springs into existence either directly, from just grievances, or indirectly, from the tensions peculiar to prison life which make trifling grievances seem large and insupportable. Normally, since rational people risk disaster in search of a better future only when they feel that the present has become intolerable, this would be a reasonable assumption. But who said convicts were rational people?

There is plenty of evidence to show that they aren’t — a determining percentage of them, anyway — and no plan to tackle the problem of prison disorders is likely to be of much practical value unless it takes this fact into account. The first and most obvious evidence is simply one of definition. A person of sound common sense, even if his moral standards should permit such carryings-on, doesn’t clean out the office safe — the combination of which is known only to his employer and himself — and still report to work the next morning. He doesn’t boast of his thefts to pickup girls or other such doubtful confidantes, or flash his stolen roll in public, or do any of the braggart, exhibitionist, nonsensical things that are reported in the crime news of every daily newspaper. This common inability of smalltime lawbreakers to conduct their affairs in a manner consistent with their own best interests seems to ensure that prisons will always be a collecting ground for men of erratic nature, with yawning gaps in their thinking machinery.

This is not to quarrel with statistics which place the convict’s intelligence quotient nearly as high as that of his counterpart in free society; it is merely to say that he lacks the particular quality of mind — call it clearheadedness and plain common sense — which would let him think in an orderly manner and arrive at sensible conclusions. Nor is it to say that all convicts, or even most of them, are positively aberrant. It is only to say that the same “determining percentage” of them are — and in prison this percentage need not be large, although in a general, unclassified prison it is likely to be.

For eight years I did time in just such a penitentiary, under administrations representing opposite extremes of penological thought. This period produced a 400 per cent turnover in prison population; half a dozen work stoppages — one of them an institution-wide six-day hunger strike; numerous sporadic disturbances of shorter duration; at least two fires of incendiary origin; and one full-blown riot, with all the attendant violence and destruction.

For both of those years prison discipline was almost nonexistent. Never, probably, were inmates of a general penitentiary granted a standing of greater dignity and freedom as a matter of policy. Never did they have less cause for bitterness and resentment. Never did they have more to gain by cooperating with a truly bold and forward-looking prison program. And never was reason so lightly overthrown and privileges so joyously abused.

The details make pretty strident reading. In a single cell block, more than a hundred window frames were glassless at one time — the puns
having been kicked out in protest against poor reception on the institution radio hookup or to express some other passing dissatisfaction. Guards, especially "good" guards with records of mildness and fair dealing, were given a miserably hard time; and several guards, good and bad, were engaged in bare-knuckle combat by convicts made brave by home-brewed pruno. Inmate goon-squads, self-appointed and armed with heavy bunt chains, seized the opportunity to roam the tiers, squaring accounts with individual inmate enemies.

These conditions of limited chaos were the handiwork of a relatively small, energetic band — perhaps no more than $10$ per cent of the inmate body — encouraged by the approval of the rest of the lunatic fringe and the neutrality of practically everyone else. Disorder was clearly a minority action — or, more exactly, a collection of individual actions that only superficially resembled organized rebellion. Yet the most obvious characteristics here — total irresponsibility, indifference to consequences, wanton destructiveness — are a primary ingredient in most collective inmate actions, and they spring from fundamental aspects of mass convict nature.

2

If your first experience with prison revolt is of the slow-building, inevitable sort growing out of general resentment and just indignation, it is easy to assume that disorder can come no other way; that an uprising cannot mature without whole-hearted main-line support. But many times a full-scale riot has taken place when hardly a man participating is genuinely convinced that violence or rebellion of any sort — is either right or necessary.

Except under truly intolerable prison conditions, sensible prisoners oppose a strike, and still more a riot, for they know that sooner or later rebellion is almost sure to leave them worse off than before. Violence inevitably brings restricted privileges, tightened discipline, an uprooting of the routines that make for doing easy time. As indicative of anything of the "differentness" of convicts as a social group, therefore, is the nature of the causes for which they will unite in extreme action. I have known demands to be made, under threat of strike (and strikes can easily explode into riots), that pepper be provided for the main-line dining tables; that clean socks be delivered to the cells daily; that unemployed prisoners be permitted to swim in the stream used for generating the prison's power. A leader of one action vigorously insisted that the terms of peace include that "they turn my brother out of the hole," where he was doing time for breaking prison rules and getting caught.

...The closer you look into the matter of prison insurrections, the more of this demented sort of thing you find. One of the few really justified strikes to happen during my time in prison was engineered to obtain the release of inmate committee members who had wound up in the hole after pushing through a good many reasonable and badly needed reforms. The strike lasted two days and was successful. Besides granting the main point, the prison administration agreed to the election of a permanent inmate council. As a member of a pro tem committee, it fell to me to take the word to the regular committee men and to see them released. Four of them accepted the news enthusiastically. The other two — the committee chairman one of them — refused to quit lockup because, they complained, it had been their show and we, the main line, had "sold them out." The proportion here — two to four — seems like a fair one to keep in mind.

Later, near the end of a six-day hunger strike, I was named to establish some sort of liaison among the council members scattered among the three cell blocks. All of the demands that mattered had by that time been met by the prison administration and state officials — including the one calling for the hiring of a new warden. It was a clear-cut victory for the main line, and it was only too apparent that nothing but disaster would come of crowding our luck. Yet in spite of all this, at least three of the eight-man council, backed by a whopping percentage of the main line, were for holding out longer — either in the hope of gaining further concessions or just for the joy of holding out.

With all this advance warning, the spectacle, two years later, of a "causeless" riot shouldn't have been surprising. The strike began with a demand for better food, which the administration granted almost at once. It has been conclusively demonstrated, however, that nothing can so quickly arouse leaders of wildcat uprisings to full belligerency as the simple granting of demands: the return of peace always brings to an end their moment in the sun. It worked that way this time. Nobody was able to advance any plausible grievances, although a score of not very convincing pretexts were tossed about, to an accompaniment of soapbox exhortations and flailing arms, during the hours that the project was gaining momentum. There simply weren't any plausible grievances to be had. In spite of this, when the administration made a show of force, something like twenty-four hours after the affair began, the strike turned almost immediately into a riot. The first building put to the torch was the laundry, containing a fair share of the main-line wash. Then the canteen was broken into and plundered. Then the storehouse for inmate recreation and athletic supplies went up in flames. Some of the rioters attempted to fire the dining room, one floor beneath the prison hospital, but were dissuaded by cooler heads.

It is easy to say that such irrational behavior is an expression of accumulated, perfectly normal resentment of captivity. But sensible people don't lodge a protest by pulling their homes down about
their ears. Yet upward of a half-dozen times a year, this phenomenon of self-flagellation is repeated in the nation's prisons.

Why is it that no dissenting voices are raised before the pot boils over? Why is it that the great majority of prison uprisings appear, from beginning to end, to be an expression of the popular will? It is here that convict tradition comes into the picture.

The troubles lie almost entirely in the fact that there is no loyal opposition in prison; that opposition, especially to any form of rebellion against authority, is usually taken as prima-facie evidence of disloyalty. And among prisoners, nothing is quite so assiduously to be avoided as the suspicion of selling out to the enemy. Convicts, contrary to the notion popular with Hollywood producers and novelists, are not quite the hard-riding individualists that their excursions into outlawry might indicate. Their outcast state has made them all the hungrier for social approval, even if it must be the approval of fellow outcasts. The rarest thing in prison is the convict who chooses to stand against group opinion. Even nonparticipants and nonbelievers decline to rise up and protest the din that disturbs their peace, or the disorders that threaten their well-being or even their lives. They prefer to obey the prison world's First Commandment and "do their own time." In this light it isn't at all surprising that an entire inmate body should give at least passive support to a strike leader who demands that pepper be placed on the dining-room tables or that his brother be released from legitimate punishment in the hole. There is really nothing else for them to do.

All this leads to some general conclusions that seem to have escaped most of the people who are trying to find out how to cure the epidemic of prison riots.

1. Convicts, however many exceptions there may be, are generally not mature, fully developed people; and it is about time for high-minded idealists to stop assuming that they will respond to corrective techniques in the same way that normal adults would. Nothing could be further from the truth than the notion that prisoners are a representative cross-section of the human population, who, through mischance or uncharacteristic impulse, happen to land in jail. For the most part, notwithstanding any number of incidental virtues that may be found among them, they are truncated personalities—a separate breed whose natural habitat is prison and who find an outlet for all of their limited facilities in prison surroundings. From a therapeutic view, the important thing is to find and to concentrate all corrective efforts on the relatively small percentage who are complete human beings capable of assuming the responsibilities of free citizens.

2. By all the tests that can be applied, it is perfectly clear that the greatest threat to prison order always lies in the small group of violently unstable men, usually at least mildly paranoid, which every prison holds. It is equally clear that convicts of this sort respond to specific kinds of treatment in a quite predictable way. They will respect strict discipline and not much else. And with absolute dependability they will interpret kindness or a softening of discipline as a sign of weakness to be exploited. Obviously, then, the first requirement of prison management is to curb this element—vigorously, using whatever means are necessary.

3. But in a general, all-purpose prison, this isn't as easy as it sounds. The disciplinary standard of any prison has to be geared to the requirements imposed by the most troublesome element in the total group—and one man's discipline, after all, is another man's repression. It is obviously neither just nor wise, from a morale or security view, to impose on tractable prisoners the relatively severe disciplinary measures necessary to whittle the paranoids down to size. It doesn't seem enough, then, merely to suppress the style-setters of anarchy. As soon as they are identified they should be shipped off, bag and baggage, delusions and pretensions, to a separate, maximum-discipline institution. And if no such institution exists—as in the case of all one-prison states—it should be provided.

4. This would mean that the old technique of inmate classification would have to be relied on—but with a difference. Maximum-discipline prisons have always existed, but they are regarded as a special preserve for escape risks and "bad men" who for security reasons need closer watching. It is a perfectly safe bet that there are several prison wardens in the nation today who recognize (perhaps belatedly) that it is less disastrous that an occasional convict should escape, if it comes to that, than that his prison should go up in flames at the hands of a flock of baby-soxers. And the danger signs are easy to spot. It is the convict who swaggers in his walk, who shoulders a guard out of his path, who makes a theatrical production of his contempt for authority, and not the convict who gets caught with a pair of bar-spreaders in his mattress, who is the real threat to prison security.

If the experience of recent years means anything at all, it means that these are at least some of the principles on which the answer to wildcat riots must be based. Demonstrations can still be expected to occur, of course, as a last-resort means of calling a really hopeless state of affairs to attention.

Meanwhile it might as well be recognized that the simple fact of revolt doesn't by a long shot indicate the presence of real grievances, and that an uprising needn't have any element of good faith or good sense about it. Too often it hasn't had. The goal of sensible convicts, after all, is to get out of prison, not to run one.
APPENDIX I

A Review of the Literature on
Riots and Disturbances in Correctional Institutions: 1952 - 1969

[Handwritten note]

Riots & Disturbances
American Conv. Assoc.
Washington D.C.
Oct 1970
Nineteen hundred fifty-two is a particularly apt starting point for a review of riot-related literature because the worst wave of riots in history occurred in 1952 and 1953. The epidemic began at Jackson Prison, Michigan. Within the next four months, 12 correctional institutions in 8 states and Canada had serious riots. In all, 15 serious riots occurred in 1952, while riots were narrowly prevented in Oregon, California, and two federal institutions. By the end of 1953, more than 25 incidents had occurred, including riots in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio which resulted in about $2,000,000 damage each. Riots also occurred in Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Utah. Lloyd E. Ohlin attributes the whole distribution of riots to the fact that inmates throughout the United States feel that they form one community. The riots lasted from 2 hours to 5 days, but half were quelled in less than 24 hours.

In 1955, the United States was again hit by a wave of riots, which began in Walla Walla, Washington. Ruth Cavan points out that riots, when they occur, are likely to come in series. Frank Flynn hypothesizes that rumors of "substantial concessions" gained by riots spread from institution to institution.

Although incidents, which were considered serious because of the number of hostages involved, occurred in Utah in 1957 and Montana in 1958, the worst waves of riots were over. In 1968 a riot costing 2.5 million dollars occurred in Oregon penitentiary, Salem, Oregon. Two more disturbances, which could not properly be called riots, occurred at San Quentin in 1959. These disturbances were unique in the history of institutional riots in that they were coordinated with efforts of members of the community outside the correctional institution. The disturbances consisted of striking and refusing to participate in weekend recreational activities. The inmate leaders urged non-violence (although they, themselves, used death threats to insure widespread participation in the demonstrations). One can only guess at the implications the San Quentin disturbances will have on future riots.

Causes

Correctional institution riots are too complex and varied to be attributed to any one cause, but must riots seem to be caused by one or more of the following reasons: public attitude toward correctional institutions; lack of proper personnel; inadequate physical facilities; idleness; problems related to offender personalities; poor communications; and inequalities in the judicial system.

These causes were cited by students of institution riots, not by the rioters themselves. Typical demands by inmates, mentioned by both Flynn and Cavan, include better food, removal of unpopular personnel, cessation of harsh disciplinary practices, and better parole systems. Flynn also mentions among typical demands, more adequate medical facilities; segregation of sex offenders, and more recreation.

Public indifference has a direct and drastic effect on correctional institutions because they depend on publicly elected legislatures for their money. Correctional institutions at the present time simply do not have enough money to fulfill their needs. In 1945 the State of Pennsylvania set aside $8 million dollars for correctional institution
reform. Most of the money was eventually spent by the correctional institutions rather than by the state mental institutions. Two Pennsylvania correctional institutions were hit by riots in 1953.

Lack of money affects almost every other cause of riots. Personnel problems are the most important, although not entirely, by lack of money. James Bennett noted that in 1955 and 1956, the personnel turnover was 200 to 300 per cent per year, and there were cases of petty graft among personnel, which he attributes to low pay. At the time of the Jackson Prison, Michigan, riot, half of the correctional officers were outside jobs. The correctional institution had split beyond that in nearby towns. Warden Julian N. Fisher describes his desperation-based hiring criterion, "We would hire them if they were warm and alive."

At Jackson Prison there were rarely as many as 100 correctional officers on duty at a time in an institution housing 6,500 men (including those in farms and honor camps outside the walls). Vernon Fox states that when the average of staff to inmates is less than 1 to 12, officers must overlook rule infractions and inmate control of other inmates. The serious consequences of such laxity will be dealt with in greater detail later.

Correctional officers are not the only staff members in short supply. It is also very hard to attract rehabilitative personnel, such as psychiatrists, social workers, and teachers. The report of the National Task Force on Corrections states the problem involved:

"There are people who deal directly with offenders face extraordinary challenges in corrections and must have qualifications in addition to those regularly required by their occupations. To obtain competent people with the required aptitudes from these occupational groups requires financial inducement beyond the prevailing salary rate. Such an amount might, for example be fixed at 20% above the prevailing regional rate for an occupation."" Actually, the Task Force found that the average starting salary for both counselors (in 40 states) and teachers (in 23 states) averaged $458 a month. In addition to attracting and retaining personnel, Cavan and Bennett (among others) indicate the need for inservice training of personnel. The lack of trained correctional officers was directly responsible for the start of the Jackson Prison riot. Thomas Elliot, who had worked at the institution for one month and had no training, was unaware of the institution rule against opening cell doors after the evening backup. When one of the prisoners asked that his cell be opened so that he could pass an article to another prisoner, Elliot complied. Unfortunately, the man behind the door was holding a knife.

There are two major correctional institution personnel problems which cannot be blamed on lack of money. One is the political appointment of wardens. One example is George W. Page, who was the warden of Trenton Prison, New Jersey, until shortly before it had a riot. According to Sanford Bates, Page was a liquor dealer whom contributions to psychology were a good deal less substantial than his contributions to the local Republican party. Under Page's administration, discipline was lax so that a group of inmates ran a jewelry business within the prison walls. When a new administration attempted to restore order, the inmates rioted.

The other problem with personnel which cannot be attributed to lack of money is the conflict between staff members over the goals of psychology. Ohlin observes that there is frequently lack of communication and coordination between various units of the staff. Cavan notes that the original staff were the social scientists. An unusually blatant example of staff disagreement occurred at Jackson Prison at the time of the riot. A feud between the custody department and the individual treatment department had, to quote John Martin, "split the prison wide open."

Inadequate physical facilities, like personnel problems, are often the result of lack of funds and public demands for punitive prisons. It has already been pointed out that in some states 80 to 90 per cent of the offenders are kept in maximum security institutions, while in actuality not more than one third of the inmates need such close confinement.

Ruth Cavan cites four chief causes of correctional institution riots which are directly related to institution design. First, many correctional institutions are too large to enable individual treatment of inmates. She considers 1,200 the maximum number which can be housed effectively in one institution. Second, the institutions are frequently overcrowded. James Bennett notes that two or three inmates are often housed in cells built for one. Third, correctional institutions are outmoded. Not only are they forbidding, but they do not allow for the separation of different types of offenders. Fourth, inmates lack work. Obviously, they cannot work if shops and schools are not provided for them.

Some of the correctional institutions which were hit by riots include the Charlestown, Massachusetts institution, built in 1805, and the Trenton, New Jersey institution, built in 1836. Oregon's penitentiary was 102 years old in 1968 when it was hit by a riot. According to Clarence Lotis, only about 11 per cent of the state correctional institutions were built between 1905 and 1935. A number of the newer penitentiaries were based on outmoded design concepts.

Although most data support the fact that old, outmoded institutions contribute to riots, the inmates of Utah State
Another cause of inmate ill-discipline is the lack of teachers and other professionals. According to an unpublished paper, Causes of Riots and Disturbances, the lack of such personnel inevitably leads to inmate ill-discipline. Not all causes of correctional institution ill-discipline can be attributed to lack of funds. One cause, noted by both Calvin Tomkins and Sanford Bates, is that members of the middle community may fail to communicate with inmates. Tomkins attributes the pressure against correctional institution work to industry while Bates attributes it to labor unions.

Ill-discipline cannot be alleviated simply by creating non-constructive work activities. Flynn notes that inmates in the South and Southwest are sometimes overworked to the point that they mutiny themselves. The destruction of San Quentin brought to light the issue that many inmates consider correctional industries to be an exploitation of "slave labor."

Increased funds can do much to hire personnel and building problems and to provide constructive inmate activities. But no amount of money will enable administrators to eliminate problem inmates.

Three of the most permament causes of riots can be attributed directly to the inmates themselves.

First, there are inmates who are staged in order to create enough confusion to permit escape. Not even the most enlightened penal philosophy can completely eliminate the desire to escape. These are, however, some measures which can be taken to keep escapes to a minimum. Reed Cox found that he had only about four escapes per year at Seagoville, Texas, a low security institution housing 435 men. He was able to provide plenty of activities. Cox also asked inmates when they entered the institution whether they thought they would try to escape; those who admitted the intention were sent elsewhere.

Elmer Johnson listed eleven characteristics of an average escape-prone inmate which Nelson M. Cochrane had compiled. The inmate had:

1. weak or nonexistent home ties
2. served less than forty percent of his term
3. more than eighteen months remaining before eligibility for parole
4. more than four years remaining before attainment of maximum sentence
5. had a history of habitual offenses
6. not reached age thirty
7. de memorized on life
8. poor employment record
9. uncooperative attitude
10. sharing and aggressive personality
11. mental instability and inferior intelligence

Another cause of riots in the emotional instability of the disturbed men who make up a large proportion of the rioters are frequently referred to as psychopaths. Some psychiatrists, however, now say that such men suffer from "character disorders." Neither term is sufficient to describe the full variety of violent men found in correctional institutions. Vernon Fox describes a six-fold process which leads to destructive behavior:

1. The inmate is faced with a threatening situation.
2. He fails to find a way to cope with it.
3. He resorts to regressive behavior.
4. When regressive behavior fails to solve the problem he intensifies it.
5. He grasps for any solution.
6. Finally, he compulsively repeats any mode of dealing with the situation, whether it works or not.

Franz Ferramonti and Marvin Wolfgang use a sociological approach to the problem of violent behavior. They postulate a subculture of violence in American society. The one of peace may, in some cases, be viewed as counter to the norms of the society. Participants in such a society do not necessarily view violent behavior as illicit and, therefore, may have no feelings of guilt about their aggression.

T. L. Chanm takes a different approach and arrives at a different explanation of antisocial inmate behavior. He finds that a large percentage of the inmates who see a psychiatrist are classified as paranoid, but finds that the behavior of "paranoids" in correctional institutions is somewhat different from the behavior of those so classified in mental hospitals. A large proportion of the paranoid inmates have an "oral-regurgitative" type of "identification." [In other words, their project values and sanctions originally gained from others rather than being based on inmate drives.] They also tend to "externalize" their problems.

Elmer Johnson stresses the fact that "in many prisons incarceration is an unfamiliar experience." The usual norms which had guided their behavior no longer apply. Inmates internalizing the norms of the "inmate social system" tend to be hostile toward the staff.

Hans Tuch, in his book Violence Among Violent Men, took many views of violent behavior into account and arrived at ten classifications for violent men.
The first group of classifications includes men who are essentially interested in self-preservation. "With violence used to bolster and enhance the person's ego in the eyes of himself and of others."

The ten types are:

1. Reputation defenders.
2. Norm enforcers.
4. Self-image promoters.
5. Self defenders.
6. Pressure removers.
7. Bullies.
8. Explorers.
10. People who use violence as a catharsis.*

However one classifies violent men, everyone agrees that they abound in correctional institutions. David P. Philips, a psychiatrist, found that 128 of the 185 men in the 15-block of Jackson Prison (the incorrigible section and the scene of the beginning of the riot) showed evidence of psychopathy.*

Many authors agree that psychopathic inmates play a large part in prison riots. This is supported by the fact that many of the riots in correctional institutions start in incorrigible sections.* Lloyd Ohlin, however, brings up an interesting point. Psychopaths are always present in correctional institutions. Therefore, while they may contribute to riots, their presence is insufficient to explain them.*

A more complex, but also more useful, explanation of riots is based on the relationships of inmates to each other and to the staff. The process, basically, is this: Corrections officials, short on staff and legitimate rewards to offer prisoners for good behavior, let certain inmates have sub rosa privileges. These inmate leaders cooperate with the officials to ensure order. When a new administration tries to eliminate infractions and put discipline on a sounder basis, the deposed inmates either actively encourage insurrection or find that their power has gone into the hands of less stable inmate leaders.

In the words of Gresham Sykes, "I think the most important sort of riot is the recurrent (and more or less predictable) disturbance which grows out of an attempt by the prison officials to regain power which has slipped over into the hands of their prisoners."

There are basically two kinds of inmate leaders who profit from lax administrations. Hartung and Flock concentrate on the type of leaders who work with the administration in a semi-official capacity. They are given the power to assign cells and jobs and perform other tasks which seem routine to corrections officials but are immensely important in the drab world of the correctional institution. They may even dispense discipline. This type of leader usually gets his followers to break the rules for him when he wants something extra-legal. His own motto is, "Watch that good time and get out early."

Gresham Sykes has studied another kind of inmate leader, who is looked down upon by the staff but allowed some leeway in his behavior. These are the inmates who prey on other inmates for personal gain, sexual favors, and whatever else will make institutional life a little easier. This group can be divided into two categories. The first is composed of "gorillas" or "toughs" who are distinguished by arrogant behavior, the show of physical toughness, the use of force, and the propensity for starting fights. The second is composed of "merchants" or "peddlers" who are noted for skill in "figuring angles," "stinginess," "gypping" other inmates, and fawning behavior toward other inmates for personal gain. Many inmates (35 per cent of those studied) combined characteristics of both groups.* When correctional officers were questioned about the men most likely to lead riots, they most often named men who exhibited the characteristics of "toughs" but exhibited few of the characteristics of "merchants." The men who had many of the characteristics of both groups were next most likely to take part in riots, in the opinion of the officers.* Interestingly, the officers felt that the inmates who were most likely to be respected by their fellow inmates were those who had low scores in both categories. These were also the men the officers considered most likely to "go straight."

Clarence Schrag's study of inmates comes to a different conclusion. According to Schrag, the inmates who are considered leaders are those he terms "antisocial." They are recidivists with contacts with organized crime. He makes a distinction between inmates who are "antisocial" but do not have apparent difficulty in their relationships with other criminals and those who are "asocial." The "antisocial" inmates are also frequently recidivists but they have few personal ties with other inmates. Although they are the men most likely to be involved in riots and escapes, their inability to cooperate with each other dooms most of these efforts to failure.*

Gresham Sykes and Richard Cloward concur on the process by which inmates who do not cooperate with the administration manage to get officially condoned power within the institution. According to both authors, the administrators cannot offer sufficient rewards and punishments within the confines of institutional regulations to keep the inmates voluntarily cooperative. (Cloward specifically notes the failure to interest inmates in rehabilitation programs, which they view as unrealistic.) Lacking legitimate rewards, officials often resort to unofficial rewards such as overlooking minor infractions of the rules. Sykes indicates that this type of laxity tends to "snowball."
Chowdary notes that when an "immate elite" has been created, it may not be eradicated without any official action. Another inmate, by assuming the role and finding them well liked, they become a covee and rebellious. Eventually they may be able to start a disturbance.

Control of an institution may be lost if established regulations are not enforced and the administration's efforts to regain control may result in a rebellion. Rather than deposing the inmate leaders, staff trouble is to retain their position. Chowdary claims that the inmate leaders' stripped of power are replaced by "wilder, disgruntled inmates" (Stokes position). Harmin and flock take the intermediate position that when inmate leaders are stripped of their power, in the eyes of other inmates they no longer have any reason to "commemorate and direct the growing unrest."

Richard H. McLaughlin studied the phenomenon and found that prison officials actively contributed to the riots. Often riots, when trying to change institutional policies, totally disregarded the inmate social system. According to McLaughlin, "the myth of authority, itself, which dominates any mutinous incipient... generates misfortunes about what can be accomplished by order." The same myth makes officials prone to view "disorder as a source of dissatisfaction and to generate a 'conspiracy theory of failure': punishment of inmates is retaliated, but it merely increases disorder. When change has gone as far as to fragment the conventional social relationships, power becomes an instrument of anarchy." 4

An example of a riot staged after the fall of an inmate leader occurred in Deer Lodge, Montana. Jerry Myles, the "old leader" had been a "counselor" and supervisor of an inmate shop. "The new deputy warden, Theodore Rothe, fired Myles from his job. Myles blamed the staff supervisor, Walter Jones, for his dismissal and threatened his life. When Rothe heard of the threat, he put Myles in isolation. Eventually Myles, in the cell of isolation, started the riot. In its first moments, Rothe was shot to death by Lee Smart, who was described by TIME magazine as Myles' "closest friend." The article strongly implied that the two men were engaged in a homosexual relationship."

The Trenton, New Jersey riot also occurred after an attempted reform. The new warden, Franklin Carty, was attacked by an inmate a few months before the riot. Fortunately, he survived.

It might conceivably be possible to prevent riots caused by a change in institutional policy if there were better communications between patients and officials. Several writers point out the fact that communications between staff and inmates are likely to be poor. Edward Goldman, discussing total institutions in general, says: "In total institutions there is a clear split between the large managed group and the small supervisory staff. Each group tends to view one of the other in terms of narrow, hostile stereotypes: 'dull, dirty, minutes with either sensitive and understanding while inmates often see staff as coarse, distrustful, backbiters, and more'."

Flynn points out that most correctional institutions have no formal channels of communication between inmates and staff. Inmates have a difficult time bringing their complaints known. Administrators use informal channels to communicate.

There is another cause of inmate discontent which can be only partially cured by reform at the correctional institutions themselves. Inmates are usually aware of any unfair treatment and, naturally, resent it. According to Sanford Bates, "A ward in which the rules are harsh, lenient, injustice, and impartiality are usually, maintain discipline even among the most unmanageable men. But the inmate begins to show partiality for our inmate over another a vital element control comes from his hands."

This paper has already discussed the disastrous consequences of allowing certain inmates extra privileges in order to keep them quiet (a system which Austin McCor- mich calls "parapublic penology")

Not all pressures for favoritism, however, came directly from the inmates. Bates states that politicians have pardoned inmates who were willing to pay for the privilege, thus creating discontent among their poorer fellow inmates. He also alleges that he was once approached by a congressman who wanted one of his constituents released from Alaska and sent to a less horrifying institution. The reason Bates mentions this particular request (which was not granted) is that the inmate in question was Al Capone.

Administrators may be able to resist political pressure from politicians concerning inmates already in their custody. They do not, however, have any way of influencing those sent to them in the first place. Yet, inmates who are fed up with injustices in the court system will rail in the institution, not in the courthouse. Frank Flynn states that variations in the length of sentences for various crimes creates discontent. He gives this example of how great the discrepancies are. In some prisons, two thirds of those convicted are placed on probation. In other jurisdictions, less than one third are placed on probation. Flynn estimates that 20 to 30 per cent of the inmates of United States prisons should never have been sent there.

Congressman James Garman cites an example of arbitrary sentencing which he found in the writings of James Bennett. Two men were convicted of lashing worthless hicks. The first man, who had slashed a check for $50.40 and had no prior arrests, was sentenced to fifteen years. The second man, who had slashed a check...
PRESERVATION OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

Introduction

1. The success or failure of the investigation of an incident will depend to a large degree on the capabilities and efficiency of the staff member who is first at the scene.

2. It is the duty of the officer manning a post at the scene of an incident to ensure to the best of his ability that any physical evidence is not lost or destroyed through negligence, thoughtlessness or sheer stupidity. If evidence or clues are damaged or destroyed they are lost forever. The task of reconstruction becomes almost impossible. It is, therefore, imperative that every staff member become familiar with the responsibilities that rest upon him should he be the first officer at the scene. The officer's actions at this time will determine whether any clues will be discovered, and followed up. It has a bearing on all investigation that will follow.

3. The type of incident that would warrant particular caution on the part of a staff member would be murder, wounding, serious assault, suicide, arson or serious accident.

What Should an Officer do to Preserve Evidence at the Scene?

4. Whether he happens to be at the scene or if detailed to go to the area, or unexpectedly comes upon such an occurrence, he is the most important man at that time, also, he is the man who will be required to give evidence in Court. He will be one of the first in the witness box and will be asked to explain the situation as he first saw it.

5. The first action that he should take is to isolate the immediate area as best he can and in such a way that no valuable clue is lost. He must use intelligence and initiative. Because of the difference in each circumstance it is impossible to lay down any hard fast rules, however, the officer who comes upon the scene fully informed will find the task easier to carry out.
6. He must act quickly, and possibly, against odds which could limit him; e.g. other inmates attempts to cover up or destroy evidence. Staff or inmates swarming like bees on vital spots can trample and destroy clues. The handling, moving, or altering in some way of the details of the incident can make the area unrecognizable to what it was at the time of the occurrence.

7. After ensuring that the area is properly protected, the next responsibility of the first officer on the scene is to notify his superiors regarding the nature of the incident, along with any particulars that are available. It is important that the area of the incident is not left unprotected.

8. It is imperative when the officer arrives at the scene that he makes a quick and logical assessment of the situation. If there is doubt that the situation is not accidental he is advised to suspect the worst and take the fullest possible precautions.

Examples of What to Note:

9. a. **Enter in a notebook the time** on your watch or the time on any clock at the scene whether it is stopped or not. The day, week, month and year.

b. **Doors**: Whether they are open or shut, how many, their location, locked or unlocked and if damaged in any way.

c. **Windows**: Open or closed, locked or unlocked. Have they been tampered with? How many are there and their location, are they damaged or broken in any way?

d. **Lights**: How many and where are they? What type - direct, indirect, artificial, etc.?

e. **Blinds, Drapes, etc.**: What type, kind, were they up, down, drawn, open and were they damaged in any way.

f. **Odour**: Is there any smell - gas, perfume, acid smoke, etc.

g. **Weather**: Was it raining, clear, frost, snow, ice, fog, mist, sunny, cloudy, etc.

h. **Exact Location**: Where did it occur? Be as descriptive as necessary to fix location.
i. **Diagram:** Sketch a complete diagram of the scene and surrounding locality - noting all pertinent facts, such as location of doors, windows, tables, chairs, where articles, exhibits or bodies were located. It is imperative that the sketch be double checked to ensure no important item has been overlooked.

j. **Persons or Bodies Present:** If it is known who committed the offence or there is a strong suspect; keep that person away from others. Don't talk to him or allow him to talk with others. Note any spontaneous utterances he may make.

k. **Injured Persons:** Render attention at once remembering if possible even in the stress of the moment to make a mental note of the position and condition of his body and limbs. After removal of the person mark the position, if possible immediately. Endeavour to have the injured person accompanied by another officer if possible. The Officer on duty at the scene should remain there to protect it until advised otherwise.

l. **Mental Condition:** The suspect, victim or a witness should be assessed as to his mental condition, was he nervous, calm, inebriated, etc.

m. **Corpse:** If a person is dead, the body should not be moved or touched in any way, until officially notified to the contrary. However, it must be remembered a person must never be presumed dead. This must be verified by a qualified person. The livid stains caused by death are most important clues to the doctor who is to conduct the post-mortem. Movement causes the blood to flow, sometimes it flows after death and in trying to reconstruct the cause of death any flow of blood which cannot be accounted for is in the end attributed to careless and unauthorized movement after, not before death.

n. **Hanging:** Special precautions must be taken with bodies found hanging. Hanging can take place with persons sitting down or even lying. The instinct is to cut the person down at once and this must be resisted. If there is any possibility of life still being extant then the officer will act quickly and humanely by grasping the lower limbs and raising them to take the weight off the rope or skin and then ease if possible the rope off the neck. Careful observation should be made of the position of the rope round the neck. If the rope cannot be slipped, then the rope should be cut and the knot preserved as it is a most valuable clue.
Hangings may be suicide or they may be murder. It is not for the first officer at the scene to theorize. His immediate duty is to save the victim if possible by taking him down and applying artificial respiration and secondly, to search for clues. Note what the fixed end of the rope is attached to.

Handling and Packaging of Evidence:

10. No object should be touched or altered in its position and nothing added until it has been minutely described, noted and photographed. The first question a person should ask himself should be: Is this something that I am qualified to handle?

11. When the collection of evidence begins the officer must be ever mindful of and fully realize that the search for and of evidence — including the handling and packaging is most important. Evidence can be destroyed or rendered useless if care is not taken.

Materials Needed for Collecting Exhibits:

12. Apart from unusual cases the number of materials needed is relatively small, these would include simple tools such as, files, metal marking or "Diamond Pencil", nail polish, crayons, ordinary pencils, pen and ink. Numbered seals, stickers, tags, sealing wax, surgical tape, scotch tape and paper tape. Glass jars, plastic boxes, plastic bags, envelopes and pill boxes. Wrapping paper, cardboard cartons, string, twine and wire.

Marking Exhibits:

13. The basic rules is that each exhibit must be marked in a manner that will identify it. For all except small objects the identifying markings can be placed on the object itself. All exhibits must be distinctly marked (initials and date) and a label attached bearing completed information about its source. Small objects should be placed in containers at the scene, sealed, marked and labeled immediately. The label should have sufficient information on it so that the exhibit can be identified years later without referring to a note book. However, whatever information is placed on an exhibit must also be entered in a notebook with a further notation of the location of the markings on the exhibit and other pertinent information about the condition of these articles when received and to whom it was turned over.
Rules to Remember for the Preservation of Evidence:

14.  
   a. Collect it carefully  
   b. Identify it clearly  
   c. Seal it securely  
   d. Store it safely (in locked cupboard) until needed  
   e. Attach memorandum  

15.  The utmost caution must be exerted so that fingerprints etc., are not defaced either in handling or packaging.

Summary:

16.  Anything that comes into the possession of an officer whether picked up at the scene or turned in by some other person, should always be handled as evidence or exhibits until properly disposed of. The correctional officer must know and continually keep up on the subject of the correct handling and packaging of evidence - and the reasons why.