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CIVIL DEFENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 1935-1945
(Part II)

by

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This second and concluding part of the author’s paper “Emergence of a Civil Defence Strategy in the U.K. from 1935-1945” (Emergency Planning Digest Vol. 3 No. 1 January-February 1976) reflects the rapid change of pace following the Munich Crisis and the valuable contributions the Ministry of Civil Defence made during the perilous years when Germany held the initiative.

Of particular interest to readers of Mr. Wallace’s study of United Kingdom civil defence planning leading into a world war situation, this edition of the Digest presents an appreciation of civil defence planning thirty years later in which Mr. Duncan Buttery, the Home Office’s chief civil emergency planner for the U.K. takes up where Mr. Wallace left off (United Kingdom Civil Emergency Planning — Page 11).

FROM MUNICH TO THE END OF THE WAR

Response to the Changing Nature of the Threat

Considering what was accomplished in the year following Munich, it is doubtful whether without that stimulus, the United Kingdom could have ever reached the level of preparedness which was in effect when ultimately war was declared. Attendance of officials to meetings associated with emergency preparations soared. But nowhere was the immensity of the problem of preparations more revealing than the quantities of supplies and provisions for which the ARP Department had to make arrangements during early 1939, e.g. 2.5 million Anderson Shelters; 50 million gas masks; 475 million sandbags; 1.5 million children’s gas masks; 1.7 million anti-gas suits; 22,000 tons of bleach; millions of gloves and untold quantities of whistles, rescue equipment.90

One consequence of the Munich postmortem was the creation of the Ministry of Food, in an area where effective planning had been virtually non-existent despite the creation in 1936 of a Food Supply Sub-Committee41, and Sir William Beveridge’s memorandum on the “Wide Aspects of Food Control”. By September 1939, the new Ministry had printed 45 million ration books even though the Government had not decided what should be rationed.42

Another consequence of Munich was that the confusion between the responsibilities of the ARP Department and the Ministry of Health were clarified by the simple expedient of making the latter fully responsible for all aspects of planning casualty care and hospital services. Relationships however with the War Office nearly collapsed when it balked at participating in the Ministry’s unified hospital scheme, and it was not until 1941 that the War Office came to see the Ministry’s point of view. With a target of finding over one million hospital beds for casualties, the Ministry was confronted with organizing not only 2300 hospitals of varying size and competence with 300,000 beds43, but providing for protective works, organization of transport for casualties, organizing doctors and nurses, staffing emergency hospitals, and ordering vast quantities of medical supplies. Additionally, and in cooperation with local health departments, it became responsible for the planning associated with, among other matters, maintenance of water supplies and burial of the dead.

43. R. M. Titmuss, op. cit., p. 73.
Munich also revealed a serious lack of ARP preparedness on the industrial front and the need for positive action on shelters. Both issues were to be largely resolved by the passage of the Civil Defence Act of 1939. Interestingly enough the title of the Act seemed to signify a new dimension of the civil preparedness program, as well as a gradual recognition that it was more broadly based than anyone had been able to foresee. In any case the term ARP continued to be used interchangeably with that of Civil Defence until the end of the war.

The forty weeks of grace which followed the declaration of war, instead of the predicted early knock-out blow, was a blessing. It was also a period when many of the public and the press, dismayed by the 'phoney war', worked off their frustration by heaping verbal and written abuse at members of ARP. But with the fall, in rapid succession, of Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries, and finally France, 300 airfields brought close to 1800 enemy long-range and dive-bombers nearer to Britain. But the respite was not wasted by those engaged in the ARP General Services. Over 1.5 million members occupied their time training and becoming more proficient in the use of the accumulating stocks of operational and other equipment. The sketchy hollowness of local authority and central departmental plans disappeared as realism and determination took over.

The scattered but light bombing which took place between May and August 1940 provided ARP with its baptism of fire. The Blitz which followed and lasted until May 1941 resulted in some major adjustments to the program. There was a shift in the Government's attitude toward shelter, and special measures had to be taken to create post-raid services for which no adequate provision had been made. Until the V-weapon attacks, and even during them, what changes occurred in Civil Defence were really adaptations to meet variations in the scale of attack. And when the threat from the air disappeared the Civil Defence General Services ceased to exist. However local authorities continued to be legally responsible for maintaining a watching brief over air raid precautions.

46. 2 May 1945.
The Control and Coordination Machinery of the Nation

Munich brought about the final stage in the evolution of the central civil organization for war. On 31 October 1938 the Prime Minister finally acted on the proposals put to him before Munich, and which now formed part of Scheme Y. Sir John Anderson was appointed Lord Privy Seal taking over from the Home Secretary the responsibility for the ARP Department, an organization which had "assumed such gigantic proportion and developed such Complexity". In effect he became, in the words of the Prime Minister, the 'Minister of Civilian Defence', and as such he would be Chairman of a Ministerial Committee of Civil Defence responsible for the coordination of all ARP activities. The sixteen Ministers on the Committee represented Departments concerned with Home Affairs. And because the CID was becoming more preoccupied with purely military matters, the Committee started to exercise a tighter rein over all non-military preparations. On the outbreak of war Anderson would become both Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, and from the Committee he would create small executive group to handle the day-to-day problems, leaving the full Committee to ponder on major items of policy.

By June 1940 the Civil Defence Committee was the largest of five major Ministerial bodies concerned with Economic and Home Affairs of the nation, and the Minister of Home Security in his capacity of being in charge of Civil Defence later became a member of the Economic and Home Affairs Coordinating Committee of the War Cabinet, which in the words of Winston Churchill became almost "a parallel cabinet concerned with home affairs...". What had started as a secret wartime function of government in 1924, had now become a major non-military ministry being represented by its Minister on a Committee "almost equal to the Defense Committee in authority and status".

Correcting the error it had committed earlier of divorcing responsibility from authority, the Government now requested Local Authorities to appoint Emergency Committees to whom the previously and secretly appointed Air Raid Precautions Controllers would in future report. Similarly the powers of the Regional Commissioners were more clearly defined. They were to have no special powers except under conditions of extreme emergency when communications with the central government were destroyed, at which time they would have special powers delegated to take full control of all situations in their regions. But through the medium of the Regional Commissioners' Conference which was assembled after an attack they did in fact exert considerable influence on the course of post-raid recovery activities. "The offices... provided a form of regional administration. And finally an earlier proposal to move 'the seat of government' out of London was abandoned.

Policy of Dispersal — Evacuation

The two Civil Defence measures which caused the most concern to the Government and the people were evacuation and shelter. In terms of social and economic dislocation they could be self-defeating strategies. Both did bring about a reduction of the vulnerability of the population through dispersal and both led the Government into uncharted courses of social action; and in the case of shelters led to the change of portfolio for the Minister of Home Security.

The implementation of the evacuation plan on 1 September 1939 was the last step in the plans to mobilize the nation. The country had been divided into three areas; evacuation areas being those likely to receive the brunt of air attacks, neutral areas were those in which the population stayed put and received no evacuees, and reception areas were designated to receive the millions of evacuees from the evacuation areas. The 1939 evacuation involved over four million people. But the government failed in its objective to keep them out of the threatened areas for the duration when millions returned home by Christmas. The Government failed also when it assumed that any problems of billeting had been solved by the summer of 1939, when one hundred thousand volunteers had uncovered over four million spaces in billets. The immediate aftermath of the first of

47. John Wheeler Bennett, op. cit., p. 214.
49. Home Policy; Production Council; Food Policy; Economic Policy; Civil Defence. See also W. K. Hancock & M. M. Gowing, British War Economy, H.M.S.O. London, 1949, p. 217.
50. The Times, June 5, 1940.
55. Ibid., p. 36-37.
what were to be three evacuations was the appearance of a myriad of problems which had been overlooked by the Ministry of Health Planners. These ranged from bed-wetting to problems of separated families, "Evacuation became a multitude of problems in human relationships," which were to bring about the birth of a host of social welfare activities in the reception areas.

The second movement took place under battle conditions in September 1940 and involved about 1.2 million and the third took place at the height of the V-weapon attacks in 1944. In addition to these, business and government evacuated staff, thousands were moved out of the invasion threatened areas, and thousands of refugees arriving from the Continent and the Channel Islands added to the reception problem. Although millions returned to their homes, the measure undoubtedly saved many thousands who otherwise might have become victims of the air attacks. From this point of view this aspect of dispersal was a success.

**Policy of Dispersal — Shelters**

Public demand following Munich forced the Government to produce a comprehensive shelter program which was not to everybody's liking. However the Hailey Conference findings on shelter confirmed the Government's principle of dispersal which found its way into the Civil Defence Act of 1939. The Act also gave Local Authorities wide powers regarding the use and modification of buildings as shelters, and made it mandatory for industry to provide shelters for employees. The principle features of the shelter policy as it evolved provided shelters at home in the form of steel domestic shelters (Anderson and Morrisons), strutted basements, and brick domestic shelters. Public shelters were provided through a combination of basements in large buildings, trenches and street surface shelters. For the workers and school children there were shelters at their places of work.

By June 1940 the Government could claim that over twenty million shelter spaces had been provided. Despite this the Government became involved in what became known as the deep shelter controversy. The Government continued to stick to its policy of providing large numbers of small shelters designed to provide protection against near misses and bomb splinters but with the heavy bombings of 1940 and still no deep shelters, beyond the use of the underground tubes (subway system) "public confidence in John Anderson... had been shaken." Churchill was forced to replace him with Herbert Morrison. Later in 1940 the Government reluctantly relented on the matter and authorized construction of twenty tunnels in London which would accommodate about two hundred thousand people. In the end eight were completed at double the estimated cost, and the first was not ready for use until March 1942. But the end of shelter construction had been forecast as early as April 1940 when because of a growing shortage of steel, the Ministerial Priority Committee had recommended that the production of home shelters should stop. But when the Blitz started the Government ordered more shelters, both steel and brick surface types to be built. This continued at a reduced rate of construction until the middle of 1942 when for all intents and purposes shelter construction came to an end. The determining factor was the easing up of bombing but the need to divert manpower and resources to war projects which had by then assumed a higher priority than the need for shelters.

The "prolonged and intensive night raiding had considerable repercussions on shelter policy." Early in the Blitz 40% of London's people spent the night in shelters, 27% in home shelters, 9% in public shelters, and 4% in tubes. Demands arose for the shelters to be provided with bunks, lighting, heating and sanitary conveniences, feeding facilities and medical posts. The Ministry of Health was ultimately charged with providing all these services within shelters. By December 1940 Shelter Wardens had been appointed to supervise the larger shelters.

**Some Unanticipated Problems:**

**New Approaches, New Services**

The conduct of life saving and other operations in damaged areas was governed by changing enemy
bombing tactics. The early attacks caused more property damage, less casualties, and more homeless than had been expected. As well the increasing use, by design or otherwise, of unexploded bombs — London Region reported 3,000 in November 1940 — prevented even undamaged homes from being reoccupied until the hazard had been removed. Such was the homeless problem that by the end of June 1941 roughly 2.2 million persons had been made homeless for periods of one day to one month.66

Apart from rescue, firefighting and casualty care, post-raid activities centred on three general areas: housing, feeding and caring for the general population; the restoration of utilities and services; and the restoration of industry. The main features of the hastily conceived scheme dealing with the homeless was the immediate provision of 'first air' welfare services at a Rest Centre, in many cases organized by a WVS team. The Ministry of Food was made responsible for all aspects of a program related to all aspects of emergency feeding, including the creation of what were known as Queen's Messenger Convoys comprising a number of mobile canteens and support vehicles, available for dispatch to cities or areas where food services were either destroyed or disorganized. These services were backed up by readily available financial and other assistance to get people back on their feet and back to work.

In the case of housing and repair to services, Emergency Repair Committees were established following raids comprised of representatives from the Ministries of Labour, Works and Health, who together with Local Authority representatives established priorities for general repairs in damaged areas.67 Industries especially those associated with the Ministry of Aircraft Production, created specially organized flying squads to hasten repairs and restore production. In 1944 V-weapons were causing such extensive damage to buildings that "the War Cabinet agreed to give the highest priority to repair... (and) ...a hundred and thirty thousand men were employed in repair work on London by January 1945"68. Through the course of the war some 4,698,000 homes sustained varying degrees of damage. The drain on manpower and materials, not to speak of enforced absenteeism of workers, represented a real strain on the war economy.

The increased use of fire raising weapons during the Blitz was directly responsible for the creation of the Fire Guard Organization. In 1941 service in it was made compulsory, and by May 1942 it had become so important that despite objections from the Trades Union Congress, fire watching became compulsory for women. According to Herbert Morrison, "Fire Watching became a sort of social organization"69. Its membership exceeded five million, and during the Little Blitz of January 1944 was credited with extinguishing 75% of the fires without assistance from the NFS.

As early as December 1940 air raids had been causing such severe damage to aircraft factories that it was feared the industry might be destroyed. Beaverbrook, as Minister of Aircraft Production, is credited with making the decision to disperse the factories so as to avoid that possibility. The short term effects of implementing the policy of dispersal were nearly as disruptive on production as were the raids. In the long run, despite its unsettling effects, "the industry was saved from complete dislocation during the later and heavier raids of 1941"70. In the course of implementing the policy Beaverbrook had issued orders to seize empty accommodation previously earmarked for other ministries, and this "piracy... secured him aircraft for the duration and enemies for life"71. Apart from some limited effort at directing defence contracts there is little evidence of any effort to exploit industrial dispersal to reduce damage to other key industries.

Other Challenges and Responses

Being largely a voluntary service, there were considerable fluctuations in the strength of the Civil Defence General Services. By early 1940 through a combination of boredom, more attractive pay in industry and military call-ups, the ranks of these services were being depleted. Yet "it was essential... (that) ...trained members of the Civil Defence Services should be immediately available"72 to meet future attacks. June and July 1940 saw the first violation of the volunteer principle when freezing orders were issued to maintain the strength of police, fire, rescue and first aid services. In September deferments were requested by many authorities for other services. Clearly

68. Angus Calder, op. cit., p. 563.
insufficient volunteers were left to fill the vacancies created by call-ups. By April 1941 the situation was so critical that the National Service Act had to make provision for call-ups to be able to opt for civil defence, as well as providing for the establishment of a Civil Defence Reserve.

The problem was that “economic mobilization for an all-out effort was well under way and manpower had become a key factor”73. So as to make up the manpower shortages the civil defence authorities resorted to four strategems which in the end maintained an adequate number of trained personnel to meet the future air attacks. These were: rescue, first aid and decontamination squads were made interchangeable thus reducing the total manpower required for these three services; the Civil Defence Reserves were created by withdrawing som full-time local personnel to form centrally located Mobile Columns under the direct control of the Regional Commissioners; the Minister of Labour cooperated by assigning larger numbers of people to become part-time civil defence workers; and finally in January 1942 all volunteer part-time workers were frozen. From April 1942 when the severity of the raids began to decline, Local Authorities were continually being asked to release their full-time Civil Defence workers. Gradually all that was left was a small cadre to stiffen the ranks of the part-timers, and these were to be backed up by the Mobile Columns should an authority require their assistance following an attack.

The changes in the nature of the threat, as well as changes in the methods of delivery also had their effects on other measures of protection. For example, in August 1942 the Government advised the public that it was no longer necessary to carry gas masks. But in 1944 when invasion preparations were being made, Regional Commissioners on the South Coast were advised to prepare and to hold in readiness, instructions relating to chemical warfare should the Germans decide to use gas against the troop concentrations.

Although the operational procedures for the warning system were in effect in 1939, considerable criticism arose in early 1940 when there were serious delays to production caused by the warnings, “with Lord Beaverbrook lamenting the drop in output, and with Bevin strongly defending all possible precautions for the work people”74. Gradually key industries organized ‘roof spotters’ who would take to their posts when the public alert sounded, and when an attack appeared imminent they would sound a special factory alarm, at which time all factory workers would scramble to shelters.

When in late 1942, the German Air Force adopted ‘hit and run’ raids on coastal towns, the Observer Corps, which were operationally under command of Fighter Command, initiated warnings. When the V-2 attacks started the warning system came to be more closely associated with key RADAR stations on the coast, and special arrangements were introduced to give factories more direct access to warning information. The importance of warning is pretty self-evident, but its true importance can be determined when no less an authority than the Prime Minister or the War Cabinet was involved in approving modifications to the system.

Blackout regulations were kept under constant review by the authorities. The only substantive changes were those permitted to shipyards, factories and other premises engaged in the production of aircraft or landing craft, but even here, when an alert sounded the blackout lighting standard was restored. There were some relaxations in the London area during the V-weapon attacks but it was not until 2 May 1945 that the restrictions were lifted for all but a few coastal areas.

If on the whole the general response to the challenge of air attacks was reasonably good, there were lapses on the part of some local authorities. Being in the front line they were to be the first in action and many unfortunately faltered. One writer has observed that many were downright futile and incompetent and that “nothing emerges more forcibly from the Blitz than a contrast between laggard councillors, obsessed with their own prestige, and the self-sacrifice of the volunteers...”. Another suggests too many “simply could not cope with the war emergency”, and whereas only one London authority had its civil defence powers taken away, “others were threatened with equally drastic treatment”. Yet despite the shortcomings of the few, the many had met the challenges set for them.

The war ended with a total of about 71,000 tons of high explosives, and untold numbers of incendiary bombs, being dropped on the United Kingdom by aircraft, flying bombs and rockets. On the basis of prewar calculations the United Kingdom should have suffered 3,550,000 casualties. The official

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casualty figures were 60,595 killed and 86,182 seriously injured. The number of whole-time and part-time workers in the Civil Defence Services exceeded 1.7 million from 1940 to 1944. There were 36 emergency functions associated with post-raid activities involving central, regional and local authorities. The cost of civil defence to the nation from 1939 to 1945 was estimated to be 1,026,561,000 pounds. But behind this visible side of civil defence were the many millions of J. B. Priestly's 'militant citizens', who together with the faceless side of the civil administration throughout the nation forged the formidable force which was able to respond to all that the enemy was permitted to deliver. Although the country which had brought on the war was to suffer more grievously than did the United Kingdom, there is nothing to show that if the attacks on it had been more severe that it could not have responded as effectively as it did to the lesser scale of attack.

Conclusion

If one looks back and reviews all that took place in the field of civil defence, and analyzes the events which set the various aspects of the program in motion, one is led to the conclusion that the United Kingdom backed into its strategy of civil defence. The success which was achieved in organizing ARP, and then Civil Defence, can to a large extent be credited to two gross errors committed and persistently pursued by the Air Staff. The first of these was in making casualty estimates based on an improper analysis of the effects of attacks on England during the First World War. This led to an overestimation of casualties, and the requirement for a host of services which in the end proved more than adequate to meet the problems created. The second error was the complete misinterpretation of intelligence as to the real intentions of the German Air Force which in fact had been established, not as a strategic bombing force, but as a ground support arm. There were two fundamental errors led the Government to support the financial and other requirements of ARP, as well as providing the resources which were needed to re-equip the RAF with the weapons it needed to blunt the air attacks when they were made.

However, be that as it may, the threat as it was posed indicated that critical targets in the United Kingdom would be attacked with a combination of high explosive, incendiary and gas weapons. The destruction of these critical areas would impede the successful prosecution of the war. For almost eleven years central planners had been overwhelmed with the importance of establishing the central machinery of government to meet the air menace that they ignored many other equally important aspects of the problem. Then in 1935 as if to reverse the course, the emphasis was placed on the need for organization in the large urbanized centres.

It was recognized that it would be in those places that the previously mentioned weapons would be detonated, and it would be against the effects of their explosions that measures would have to be developed. But this time, driven by the fear that the events in Europe would overtake them, the planners, trying to make up for lost time, sought to establish services and measures at the local level to meet the direct effects of an attack. These would be fire-fighting rescue of persons trapped in collapsed buildings, anti-gas decontamination, care of casualties, and clearance of debris from the streets. In concentrating on these they overlooked the consequences of the indirect effects which would arise. These were the reception area problems of dealing with millions of 'displaced' persons, and the post-raid problems of the homeless and repair of damage to homes, services and industry. But at least the planners were now focussing their sights in the right direction.

Civil Defence to most people was the visible side of the war. This included the individual and collective measures of defence such as home and public shelters, fighting incendiary bombs, carrying respirators and carrying out other anti-gas protective measures, warning and blackouts. These applied to most people throughout the course of the war. It also included the uniformed ARP (later Civil Defence) General Services which was the 'volunteer army' on the ground equipped to carry out work in the damaged areas. There was also at the start the AFS, and later the NFS, as the force....
developed to counter the fire threat, and the Auxiliary Police and the Casualty Services. Later it included the post-raid services without which that elusive factor 'morale' might well have foundered. The ARP preparations made at the place of work for employees was another recognizable sign. But there was the invisible side and that was provided from the centre of government.

The Ministry of Home Security provided the direction to the visible side of Civil Defence. Its Regional Commissioners provided moral and other support to the local authorities. The Ministerial Civil Defence Committee, working through central government departments, provided the requisite support of all kinds to the visible side. Superimposed on top of this was the Lord Presidents Council,77 although not a part of Civil Defence, which acting as a sort of ringmaster in a circus was able to keep Civil Defence moving in a coordinated fashion with the other important elements of the civil machine for war. It was probably this aspect of the problem with which the early planners had tried to come to grips not realizing that ARP or Civil Defence was only a portion of the civil machinery required for war.

It was fortuitous that it had been recognized as early as 1935 that the only successful way to meet the threat would be to spread the responsibility not only to governments at the local level, but to industry, business, commerce but most important of all to the populace at large. Defining civil defence as a function rather than an organization may have contributed to some delays in getting things done, but in the long run, it made use of existing resources. The methods to be employed in fighting the 'civilian' battle were in many ways similar to those used by an army, but to have created a force which would be required exclusively to fight civilian battles would have been a gross mismanagement of manpower, a resource which turned out to be in short supply as early as 1941.

As the aims and objectives of the program became clearer it was easier to recognize that the overall purpose of civil defence preparations was the contribution it could make to the successful prosecution of the war. In this it was successful for by the measures that it created it was able to help in maintaining morale and keeping people at work. Its demands on the economy for manpower and other resources to achieve its objectives were always governed by the overriding purpose. And a factor not to be overlooked was the assurance it gave to those in the Forces that their families were being provided with reasonable measures of protection.

The single most important event in the creation of the strategy had been the passage of the ARP Act of 1937. Munich was a proving ground following which a great many deficiencies were made good. The forty weeks of grace following the declaration of war provided the time to amplify and bring the program to a high degree of readiness. The air attacks provided the ultimate testing ground during which new organizations and methods were adopted. In the end it could certainly be said that the aims suggested by the Warren Fisher Committee in 1937 had all been met.

Considering that most European countries had started to develop their programs in the early 1930's, it is remarkable that in the short space of four and a half years, two of which were based solely on voluntary effort, that the United Kingdom strategy had been developed to such an extent that in its main elements it remained in effect throughout the course of the war. On the other hand British Military strategy up to 1942 was in a shambles. Notwithstanding the deserved credit to the RAF, it is highly unlikely that if there had not have been a successful strategy of civil defence that the United Kingdom could have survived the attacks of 1940 and 1941. It is also interesting that the success of the strategy in large measure was based originally on faulty assumptions. Without those assumptions it is doubtful whether the United Kingdom planners would have been permitted to formulate the strategy they did.

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It is a great honour for me to be invited to your country and to talk to you about emergency planning problems as we see them in the United Kingdom. I have received several very kind and pressing invitations to come to Canada in recent years and it has always been difficult for me to accept for one reason or another. On this occasion your Director General of Emergency Planning set up a series of meetings this week which made it absolutely impossible for me to refuse on any pretext. I can only say how delighted I am that he has succeeded in the end.

There is one important caveat which I should enter now, and that is, nothing I say should be taken to imply that, because something seems to work satisfactorily in my country, it necessarily has any application whatsoever to your country or to anybody else's country. I can tell you how we do things in the United Kingdom and I am always interested to know how you do things in Canada. My meetings over the years with your Director General and his staff, with your High Commission in London and with the members of your delegations to NATO, these have all given me some insight into the similarities and differences in how we do business in our two countries.

Perhaps I could start by saying what in my view makes a good Emergency Planning Co-ordinator.

• He is knowledgeable about everybody else's organization, its powers, its resources and above all its limitations. Yet he always acknowledges openly the greater experience of others.
• He provides himself with clear and attainable aims and objectives, both in his mind and recorded on paper. His feet are always on the ground, even when he is seated.
• He makes his offer of help in terms acceptable to the recipient's pride, particularly when the recipient does not even recognize that he needs help.
• He suppresses the tendency to tell a person to get a move on, while at the time he is quietly and relentlessly working towards his defined goals.
• He allows others to claim the credit for any progress.
• He takes the blame when the plans do not prove as effective in the event as he had hoped.

No doubt most of you recognized this modest catalogue as an accurate portrait of yourselves.

For the avoidance of doubt, as the lawyers say when they want to confuse you, I am not going to talk about military planning, not specifically about civil NATO planning, but about national emergency planning within the United Kingdom. And first of all I propose to concentrate on war planning, on what we call home defence planning and then later I shall say something about the contingency planning to cope with major man-made accidents and natural disasters.

Some of you may have read a very excellent appreciation of the historical background to civil defence in the United Kingdom which was prepared by Jack Wallace during his recent stay at Kings College, London.* My brief remarks on the general background take up, more or less, where Jack left off.

Looking back over the 50’s and the 60’s, one is left with a picture of great upheavals, great enthusiasm for building up organizations which in the end were demolished. In these two decades civil defence was greatly influenced by the events of World War II. It was very much a political pawn but by the end of the 60’s the morale of all those connected with civil defence organizations and with home defence planning in the U.K. could not have been at a lower level. It was absolutely rock-bottom.

Even more disturbing to me was the public attitude by 1970. They believed, and many still do, that, with no visible sign of life in civil defence organizations on the ground, all preparations for

*See page 2.
the possibility of war must have ceased. Nothing one said about contingency planning had any impact. Nothing politicians said was credible in the minds of the public. They had heard too often Ministers call for maximum effort in civil defence only to be faced a few years later by trenchant and ever more severe cuts. Promises were not honoured. However it is said that the imminence of his death can concentrate a man's mind wonderfully, and I think this is particularly true of home defence in the United Kingdom.

The Government in 1970 required its officials in the various departments concerned with home defence to prepare a comprehensive review not only of the existing arrangements but also of the various options which were then open. And these options included reducing expenditure, keeping it at its same level and even increasing it, albeit modestly. Particular emphasis was for the first time put on the need for a coherent package of home defence activity at whatever level of expenditure Ministers decided. In the past we had created an imbalance, because financial cuts had fallen particularly harshly on some important activities, while some lesser activities had been insulated for one reason or another from those economies. In the end, Ministers chose the package of not increasing the amount of expenditure but of reallocating it so that the country got better value and balance for the investment. Strange to say, the decisions of 1971 have stood the test of time. Our small budget has remained steady in real money terms for over six years. That, I submit, is no mean record in these inflationary days.

Home defence planning in the United Kingdom is still based on the Civil Defence Act of 1948 which did two things. It placed initial responsibility on Ministers to take steps to ensure that the country could be put in a position whereby the effects of war could, to some extent, be mitigated. Secondly the Act enabled the Ministers to make regulations which imposed functions for civil defence purposes on local government and on a number of other public authorities, particularly those concerned with the provision of essential services. These regulations are subject to approval by both Houses of Parliament. Thus it can be seen that the central government clearly has the responsibility of making the policy. And the role of the Home Office, in addition to its special responsibility for national training, police and fire services, is to make sure that the policies of the individual departments, and the activities which they pursue, are in general line with the overall policy. In other words, a large part of my task is to ensure coordination between the various Ministries and Departments, many of whom have substantial home defence interests.

Looking at the constitutional arrangements at the top we have the Cabinet. Very rarely do home defence matters, in this day and age, get to the Cabinet. Under the Cabinet, there are a variety of other committees, sub-committees, working parties etc. concerned with particular aspects of the home defence arrangements. If we have some new problem which perhaps doesn't seem to be covered by any of the established committees or working groups, then the Cabinet Office is always prepared to set up an ad hoc working party and to arrange for the working party's report and recommendations to be processed.

For crisis management in a deteriorating international situation there is a committee of officials which is specifically concerned with advising the Cabinet on the measures necessary and the rate at which those measures should be introduced, in order and in accordance with the general defence posture, to put the country onto a war footing. All these various committees and bodies are normally serviced by the Cabinet Office Secretariat. The principal departments involved, in addition to the Home Office, are the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence. At the functional level, the principal departments involved are the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; the Department of the Environment which has two major interests, one surface transport, including ports, and the other, its public works organization; the Department of Health and Social Security which again has two major divisions, one dealing with the provision of personal social services and the other one dealing with the National Health Service; the Department of Energy which has four major divisions concerned with war planning; coal, gas, oil and electricity; the Department of Employment which is concerned mainly with manpower; the Department of Trade which is also concerned with civil aviation and shipping; and the Department of Industry which is concerned with ports and telecommunications. These are the major departments. Other departments such as Education and Science, the Treasury, Civil Service Department, may be involved but to a lesser extent. Then there are what you might call territorial offices of state, the Scottish Office, the Welsh Office and the Northern Ireland Office. From this list you can see that the coordination problem of keeping all the departments,
both functional and territorial, in step is not an easy one.

It may be of interest if I describe some of the basic assumptions which govern our national war planning.

We start from a very basic assumption that, in a small densely populated country like the United Kingdom, in the face of nuclear attack we cannot guarantee the continuation of central government in its existing massive bureaucratic form, from either its present location or from any alternative location anywhere in the United Kingdom. I refer here particularly to the very complex nature of central government as part of the totality of domestic internal government. I am not talking about the continuation of a defence command, nor am I talking about the formulation of foreign policy or relations with foreign powers, whether friendly or hostile. So our home defence planning is based on the assumption that we have to devolve responsibility from this enormous complex central bureaucracy down to, in England and Wales, ten home defence regions. In Scotland there is a similar devolution from a Scottish Commissioner to three Zone Commissioners. In each of those regions or zones we plan for a skeletal system of government which would have all the power that one associates with both central and local government but would only wield them should the central capability, as it exists now, cease to function for whatever reason. This decentralization of authority from the centre has as yet no comparable organisation in England in normal peacetime government. As I said, this regional concept is essentially one of a skeletal organization for the direction of policy; the staff are housed in special facilities and provided with special wartime communications. Much of the regional staffing and their accommodation, over and above the skeletal organization, would be identified after an attack, depending upon what, in terms of buildings and population, has survived. If you create massive government complexes for wartime administration, surely they then become vital targets and worth a bomb. To destroy a location is relatively easy, to destroy a whole region is virtually impossible and pointless. The bulk of the executive action would not lie with that skeletal organization or with the reinforced regional administration but with the county and district councils outside Greater London. In order that country and district war plans can be prepared, the central government grant-aids the Emergency Planning Officers employed by county councils to the extent of 75% of their salaries and associated expenses. Similar arrangements apply, in Greater London, to the Greater London Council. The Home Secretary has made regulations defining the statutory planning functions of local authorities in England and Wales.

These regulations place the initiative for home defence planning to maintain essential local services primarily on the county council but aided and supported by the district councils in that county. However, we have been at pains to stress that emergency planning is not just the job of the Emergency Planning Officer. He is there as a catalyst, as an aide, as a staff officer. The detailed work of emergency planning is everybody's job. The continuation of essential services in a war setting can only be planned on a credible basis by those who are responsible for the equivalent or comparable service in normal peacetime. I cannot stress too strongly that we view the Emergency Planning Officer at the county level essentially as an aide to his Chief Executive who is the wartime controller in that area. He himself is not an operational commander. The command of the essential services rests with the chief officers, with the Chief Fire Officer, with the Director of Social Service with the Director of Works, the Director of Housing or the wartime equivalents. The task of the Emergency Planning Officer is to help those chief officers, who are exceedingly busy people in normal peacetime, to prepare their wartime plans. In passing, perhaps I should mention that there is a particular problem as a result of local government reorganization in the United Kingdom in 1974, whereby six areas, called metropolitan areas, were set up in the areas around Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham and in South and West Yorkshire and up on Tyneside. The metropolitan county is basically a planning level of local government. The bulk of the local resources, to provide essential services, are controlled by the metropolitan district councils, and, in London by the London borough councils. Outside these major conurbations the reverse is the case, in that the bulk of the resources are at the county level. The non-metropolitan district council is a relatively small employer of staff connected with essential services. Nevertheless in the U.K. we have placed responsibility for initiating local home defence planning at the county level, both in the metropolitan conurbations and in the non-metropolitan shire counties. Other home defence planning, for example police war planning, is dealt with in
different ways. For the police the regional police commander, who is a Chief Constable specially appointed in each home defence region, co-ordinates police war planning and training by the forces in his region. Every policeman receives war duties training. In a similar way the Regional Fire Adviser co-ordinates war planning for the county fire brigades in his region. The planning for the National Health Service in war is to be arranged by the Department of Health and Social Security through regional and area health authority co-ordinators. Other departments arrange through nationalized industries for particular functional war planning to continue in different ways appropriate to those organizations.

Let us leave the organizations for the moment and look at some of the problems. The political problem is very simple. On the left the argument is that all that we do in the field of home defence planning is fascist and all futile. On the right wing one hears the argument that, whatever one does, it is never enough. In the centre lies the so-called silent majority who don't want to know. In the U.K. we attempt to counter allegations of fascism by pointing out that Communist countries spend more than Western democracies, that non-aligned countries such as Sweden and Switzerland spend as much, if not more than most. And we try to take politics out of home defence and emergency planning. The futile argument is answered by pointing out that inevitably there will be some survivors and emergency planning is all about the care of survivors. The left should shed tears of shame for its apparent callousness in opposing emergency planning and the aims of caring for people. The arguments of the militant right are harder to counter, since every emergency planning officer worth his salt, would like to see more done and have it done faster and with better facilities. But we come inevitably back to the problem of where is the money to come from? In the United Kingdom the right may be as reluctant to put its hand deeper into the taxpayer's pocket as the left appears ever to take it out. The only difference between the right and the left in this field is the priorities which they have for spending the taxpayer's money. Neither the right nor the left want to spend more on home defence. As to the centre we believe that it will make itself heard only when it feels the real threat of war. Of course by then it may be too late, but home defence planning in the United Kingdom is geared to a low level of peacetime activities, coupled with rapid intensive transition-to-war measures, the plans for which are kept ready to implement in a crisis. Whether the government of the day will ever press the button to enable those plans to be implemented in time is the fear which haunts all emergency planners. However, there is no practical alternative in our view. One cannot keep the country in a perpetual state of readiness for war. If a major European or world war were to break out at breakfast time tomorrow, or sometime this week, there is no way of ensuring that we would be ready. Fortunately even our potential enemies would not be ready in that time scale and one can only hope that the various measures, by which international tension is monitored, would give us sufficient warning and even more importantly that the warning would be heeded.

There is one area where the U.K. pursues a rather different line to what I understand is the tendency in Canada and this is in the area of public information in peacetime. I have long admired the quality of much of the material, which the old Emergency Measures Organization had prepared, to inform the general public as to what was expected of it both in a variety of peacetime emergencies and also in war. In the U.K. we start from the basic assumption that there will be no attempt in normal peacetime to acquaint the general public as to what is expected of them in war. We reserve the timing of this campaign for a deteriorating international situation. Otherwise the material which we are now up-dating, using all the modern techniques of mass information and based on television, is very similar to that which has been developed in Canada. Indeed you might almost say that we have copied your excellent methods.

The concept of official dispersal of the public is another area in which there is some difference in the policies of my government and the policies of your government. But the difference, I believe, stems from the very different nature of the geographical and topographical conditions in the two countries. For a number of years planning in the U.K. was coloured unduly by the experiences of World War II when, of course, large numbers of children were evacuated from the towns, particularly London, to the rural areas. Similar plans existed throughout the 50's and the 60's for moving, what were called the priority classes. These were the old people, and all women and children. We have now scrapped all those arrangements insofar as official dispersal or evacuation is concerned. We recognize that, when the threat of war is felt, then a number of families may wish
to make their own private arrangements to move from one area to another. Provided they can make adequate arrangements to move from one area to another. Provided they can make adequate arrangements for their accommodation and support in the area to which they are going, then we see no objection whatsoever to this movement. If a family moves without making adequate private arrangements at the other end, then we believe that they are not acting in the best interests of that family. Consequently the whole of the mass information campaign would be directed in crisis to persuading people that they should make arrangements for their protection and survival in their own homes. We have advised local authorities that they should not prepare plans to deal with an influx of persons from the conurbations in a pre-attack situation in excess of the normal fluctuations, for example, in holiday areas. Of course there can be no question of compulsion. If people move and they have not made adequate arrangements, then we shall continue through all the means open to us to try to persuade them to return to their own home areas. The reason for the policy is quite simple. In the conditions of the United Kingdom we cannot say that any one area is less likely to suffer from the effects of a nuclear attack than any other area. Our climate and our winds are such that fall-out patterns cannot be predicted in advance. The military targets are dispersed throughout the length and breadth of the land and many of them are in rural areas. If, of course there is an inter-city war and our major cities are subject to heavy attack, then there would be very heavy casualties. On the other hand, even if people were dispersed from those towns to the peripheral rural areas, they would be unlikely to survive the subsidiary effects of those inter-city attack in the overcrowded conditions in areas where there was no proper accommodation for them.

Food control is another area where I think planning in the U.K. has to proceed on rather different lines from that in Canada. As you may know the United Kingdom imports about half its foodstuffs in normal peacetime. The various attack scenarios which we postulate for the United Kingdom make it impossible to impose any central control of food or to arrange for its equitable distribution by means of rationing. In World War II the rationing system controlled the supply of food from both imports and domestic production right down to the lowest retail outlet. Everybody got his basic rations even though the amount of that ration might have to be varied from time to time. In a post-nuclear situation such a system could not work. Consequently our food policy is one of endeavouring to get a subsistence economy going as quickly as possible with the surviving agricultural resources and secondly, to get a system whereby at least one meal a day can be given to survivors either by way of an allocation of food which they cook themselves or through the use of emergency feeding centres. No attempt is being made to pre-plan a balanced diet, merely sufficient food to prevent further deaths from starvation. In this situation food may well take the place of money. In other words, unless people work there will be no food for the family.

I think this is a good point to stop talking about war planning and crisis management for the moment and say something about peacetime emergencies. Part of my job is to read the reports of the many disasters that occur all over the world in order to see what lessons, if any, can be drawn from them for emergency planning in the United Kingdom. Your Canadian reports make my task much easier. This work makes me appreciate the geographical and meteorological conditions which we have in the U.K., because these make it unlikely that we would suffer a disaster of the same sort of magnitude as those about which I am continually reading.

We have one major threat which is of immense proportions. We, at worst, could have 250,000 people homeless for a time. And this is the risk of sea-surge flooding on the east coast and in the Thames estuary of the kind that we experienced in 1953 and similar to the Hamburg disaster. With that exception most of our peacetime emergency threats are of relatively minor magnitude. However we still have something in common with the rest of the world and that is those disasters caused my man's error. For example the faulty design or operation of a petro-chemical plant, such as led to the explosion at Flixborough. The major fire perhaps exacerbated by bad design or the use of suspect materials such as the Summerlands fire in the Isle of Man. We also have our fair ration of collisions at sea, air crashes or accidents to train or on the roads. However, compared with the prospect of even a conventional war, all these emergencies are relatively minor and many of them create no planning or co-ordination problem whatsoever. Normally the majority of them can be dealt with by what I call the first response emergency services, the police, the fire service and the ambulance service, without any outside aid.
And these services have a long and successful relationship of working together. As a basic assumption of U.K. emergency planning, we stress that, whereas there may be some common ground between the peacetime emergencies and war itself, the enormous scale of the latter and the relative insignificance in the U.K. of the former make it necessary to regard any increased local preparedness, which may be achieved in the peacetime situations, as an unexpected bonus in war and not as a substitute for detailed war planning. The great value of peacetime emergency planning, vis-a-vis war, lies in its greater political acceptability on the left, and so it can provide a basis for, or a key to, initiating emergency planning for both situations.

The legal basis of providing additional emergency powers of a somewhat draconian nature is the Emergency Powers Act 1920. This enables a state of emergency to be proclaimed in situations where the essentials of life of the community are threatened. While a state of emergency exists, and the proclamation has to be made again at the end of every month, emergency regulations may be made imposing any necessary powers and duties on Ministers or other persons acting on behalf of the Crown. In practice these rarely used powers, which were originally conceived to deal with a threat of civil war, have been granted and states of emergency have been proclaimed fairly frequently as a result of industrial disputes rather than in disasters and major accidents. In addition to these powers of the Crown, local authorities also have legal powers to incur expenditure in anticipation of, or as a result of, an emergency or disaster. As with war, the central government role is mainly that of policy maker, leaving the executive action to the local authority. Even the local authority role is largely one of local co-ordination. The police, the fire service and the ambulance service — connecting to the acute hospitals of the National Health Service — are the principal executive arms, particularly in the early stages of any emergency. It is only when the emergency is of much greater magnitude or special nature that other services may be needed to deal with its aftermath. These are mainly the services which are concerned with mitigating human suffering or loss, and with the repair and restoration of essential services. It is in this situation, particularly where voluntary effort is being used as well, that the co-ordination problem for local authorities really starts.

In order that the emergency arrangements for dealing with man-made accidents and natural disasters are brought up to date, this year I have issued consolidated advice to local and other public authorities in the United Kingdom, describing the more likely situations and drawing their attention to the need to have adequate arrangements which come into play the moment it seems likely that the emergency is of such a nature as to be beyond the resources of the three initial response services.

There is one aspect of peacetime emergency situations which is very difficult to handle. This is the terrible need, at the political level, for the government and individual Ministers of the lead department to be seen to be doing something. Dynes and Quarantelli at Ohio State have reported on the dangerous effect of outsiders on a stricken community and on the "strong leadership" syndrome. From the point of view of emergency administrators, it is important to make sure that visiting tycoons do not interfere with the executive responsibility of the people on the ground. Since we have no specific disaster funds, Ministers may wish to say that more money will be made available, or that they will arrange for additional resources to be poured in, if needed. But it is equally important that they should not, in any way, interfere, with the operational control on the ground.

I think that brings me to the end of what I have to say about the way in which we handle peacetime emergencies in the United Kingdom. I hope that this talk has given you an insight into some of our own thinking, our own organizations and the way in which we process various aspects of emergency planning. As in all good vital relationships, we in the Home Office like to feel that there is a mixture of love and hate, overlying the fundamental respect which we have for one another, in our dealings with other departments. Again as in all satisfactory one-to-one human relationships in or outside marriage, you both have to work hard at them. My staff would certainly assure you that they have to do their bit. Before the last war, there was a broadcaster of children's programmes who ended up each programme by saying "Goodnight children! Be good but not so good that someone comes up to you and says 'Huh! and now what mischief have you been up to?'" To my staff I say 'If necessary be devious with other departments but not so devious that they come back to you and say 'Huh! and what crooked deal are you now cooking up?"
One of the happy things about emergency planning is the thought that everybody will be pleased, if your policies and plans are never put to the ultimate test. On the other hand it is harder to measure progress and one has perhaps less immediate job satisfaction than in many other fields of work. And in that situation, one can get terribly stale. I regard the injection of new blood and there vigorous of existing planners by transfer to other work as being necessary about every five years. You will appreciate the truth of this when I confess that I have now been 5½ years in my present job.
CANADA AND CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING IN NATO

By involvement in civil emergency planning activities in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Canada, along with member nations, recognizes that today defence is not just a matter involving solely military forces. Civil preparedness in its broadest form is not only complementary to military preparedness but generally is a prerequisite to that of military preparedness. Thus the Alliance and Canada as a member nation looks upon civil emergency planning as essential nationally and collectively.

The peacetime development and coordination of NATO civil emergency planning is aimed at arrangements which in a period of international tension will contribute to crisis management within the Alliance and at the same time meet civil and military requirements in that phase. Civil emergency planning at NATO is also aimed at measures which in the event of attack will ensure to the greatest possible extent:

- the protection and survival of populations;
- support of defence efforts in both civil and military fields by the planned mobilization and utilization of resources;
- the recovery and rehabilitation of nations including social and economic systems.

The objectives of civil emergency planning are the preparation of plans and implementation of such measures as are necessary to achieve the above aims. These objectives are on the other hand, to carry out such planning as cannot adequately be undertaken by the individual nations without coordination, cooperation or common action within the Alliance; and on the other hand, to keep NATO informed of the progress of national plans and so enable NATO, if appropriate, to give guidance and make recommendations to member nations.

Civil emergency planning includes a wide range of governmental interests, expanded as these would be in crisis or war, including such diverse subjects as the preservation of the machinery of government, the exercise of emergency powers, the mobilization and utilization of resources (food, agriculture, industry, energy, manpower, transport, etc.), communications, law and order, civil defence and so on. These are clearly matters of major importance which are fundamental to and, as the NATO Council has already recognized, an integral part of the deterrent and defence posture of the Alliance.

The Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee is the NATO body responsible for civil emergency planning matters. It is supported in this work by eight planning Boards and Committees with national representation dealing with emergency planning in such fields as shipping, inland European transport, civil aviation, food, industry, energy, communications and civil defence. The Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee reinforced by senior officers from capitals supports the Council/Defence Planning Committee in time of crisis or war along with the Political and Military Committees.

The NATO civil emergency wartime organization that is being developed is simple and flexible to cater to any type of emergency situation. At NATO Headquarters the organization will consist basically of the Council, supported by a reinforced Senior Civil Emergency Committee, consultants of international standing in various specialized fields, and an increased International Staff. A number of NATO Civil Wartime Agencies (NCWA's) will operate in the various transport and resource fields. The Council will decide when these agencies should be brought into operation.

Each agency will consist of a directing body of national representatives from each participating country and an international staff of experts. The functions to be performed by these agencies would of course, be limited to matters which had international implications or which required a degree of consultation and or coordination at the NATO level from the overall defence point of view. The organization as planned provides a means for members to work towards a common goal rather than to operate in isolation, or even in competition, when transportation and other resources would be in short supply.

Canada participates actively in almost all NATO emergency planning activities and has an Emergency Measures Attaché on the Canadian Delegation staff. Canadian civil emergency planning officers attend NATO seminars and special study groups to discuss crisis management matters of common concern. Canada is represented for peacetime planning purposes on the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee and on seven of the light boards and committees subordinate to the Se-
nior Committee in the fields of communications, ocean shipping, civil aviation, petroleum, industry, food and agriculture and civil defence. In addition, Canada has nominated some fifteen officials to serve on five of the eight NATO Civil Wartime Agencies which are planned to be set up in the event of war for coordination of defence shipping, civil aviation, oil and supplies.

Having a relatively advanced civil emergency planning organization, Canada has been able to contribute its knowledge in civil emergency areas such as civil emergency organization at three levels of government in a federal state, a coordinated approach to the use of resources in an emergency, and a closer relationship between the civil and military for achievement of a total defence posture. ▲