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February-March 1973

EMO

NATIONAL DIGEST



Municipal Emergency Measures
U.S. Civil Preparedness
Civil Disturbances and Industry
No First Use of Nuclear Weapons
Civil Emergency Planning — Netherlands
Index — 1972

CANADA EMERGENCY MEASURES ORGANIZATION

EMO

NATIONAL DIGEST

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In addition to publishing articles which reflect Canadian Government policy the Digest may also publish articles by private individuals on subjects of current interest to the emergency measures programme. The views of these contributors are not necessarily subscribed to by the Federal Government.

Editor: A. M. STIRTON

EMERGENCY MEASURES IN A MUNICIPALITY

by
Andrew Currie

Mr. Currie, Deputy Minister of Urban Affairs for the Province of Manitoba and senior official responsible for the Emergency Measures Branch, presented the following address to the Manitoba EMO Controllers Conference in November 1972. Participants at the one day meeting included mayors and reeves, municipal clerks, provincial administrators of local government districts and private citizens who formed the hard core of emergency area controllers during past years.

The title "Emergency Measures Organization" is now quite well known throughout Canada, although it is not one with which we in Manitoba are too happy, as the word "organization" implies a force in being. The term we prefer is Emergency Measures Branch, which is, in fact, a truth at both the Provincial and Municipal levels. The staff of Manitoba Emergency Measures comprise a branch of the Department of Urban Affairs, of which the Hon. Sidney Green is Minister and of which I am Deputy Minister. The Minister is charged with the responsibility of Emergency Measures in Manitoba. The detailed planning for Emergencies and the actual co-ordinating of Provincial participation in actual disasters is the responsibility of the Provincial Emergency Measures Co-ordinator and his staff.

To the group assembled here today "Emergency Measures" and local government should mean one and the same thing. "Emergency Measures operations" occur when a local government responds to any massive emergency — a snowstorm, flood or other natural disaster; a major fire, explosion or industrial accident; a civil disorder or disturbance; or a nuclear attack.

News stories about a disaster may report that the police force cordoned off the disaster area and helped remove the injured, the fire department fought the blaze, the public works department cleared away the debris, and doctors treated casualties. Some people ask, "Yes, but where was Emergency Measures?" The answer is that Emergency Measures was there. It was the police, fire, public works, and other forces of government dealing with the emergency, whether or not they regarded themselves as engaging in Emergency Measures operations, or even thought of the two words, "Emergency Measures". And it was the doctors and nurses and hospital staffs doing their jobs with the over-all co-ordination of the Emergency Measures Controller.

"Emergency Measures" are the concerted response to an unusual emergency condition — a response that calls for maximum use of community resources, and with a greater need for co-ordination between emergency forces than usually exists.

Emergency Measures are not a special unit or group of people, standing by to save the day in case of a major disaster. Local police, fire and other forces may sometimes need some trained auxiliaries to assist the regular

forces in disaster operations. Some additional trained people may be needed to monitor radioactive fallout with special instruments, or to serve as Rescue Teams. But the forces responsible for Emergency Measures operations are the normal forces of government — plus non-government personnel with needed skills, such as doctors.

The official in charge or in command during an Emergency Operation is the official who is always in charge — the mayor or other chief executive. He often has a key staff adviser or specialist called an Emergency Measures Controller, and there may be a municipal office of the Emergency Measures Branch. It should be clearly understood however, that the Emergency Measures Controller is not solely responsible for Emergency Measures preparations. Rather, he is a staff specialist for the chief executive. In many cases he is the individual who normally handles the administration of the Community, the Secretary Treasurer, or, in the case of local government districts, the local administrator. These individuals are ideally suited for the role of Emergency Measures Controller for many reasons, they know the community, its people and its resources and — not least — they are well known to the people who will respond to directions from established local authority.

This concept is a far cry from the old days of "Civil Defence" when controllers were not part of the Government and when reliance was placed almost entirely on volunteers, in fact another level of government was found.

One of the controller's major responsibilities is to take the load in assisting and guiding the operating departments of government — the police, fire, engineering, and other departments — to make plans and preparations for major emergencies of all types. But the Emergency Measures office, as such, does not normally have operational forces of its own to deploy. These forces belong to the operating departments of municipalities.

A related function, to allow local forces and resources to be used most effectively in a major emergency, is to provide the means and procedures for the chief executive and his department heads — the chief of police, fire chief, city engineer, and other key officials — to make

(Continued on page 19) **EMERGENCY**

THE NEW U.S. CIVIL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

by
The Honorable John E. Davis
Director, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency

A presentation to the
NATO Civil Defense Conference, Brussels, Belgium, September 1972

Last year the title of my briefing was "U.S. Civil Defense Takes a New Direction." You may recall the broader concept of U.S. civil defense envisioned at that time — the concept of protection from peacetime disasters, as well as from the effects of nuclear attack.

This year I can report the concept has become reality in the U.S. program.

Our people can now look to civil preparedness as being integral to their daily lives. Civil preparedness as we see it centers on self-preservation, regardless of the type of disaster which might confront us — enemy attack or natural disaster.

Many similarities exist in nuclear attack preparedness planning and natural disaster preparedness planning. We therefore have undertaken a dual-capability program, with a single objective in mind — self-preservation of the individual.

I can assure you this dual-capability program in no way degrades enemy attack preparedness. In fact, the opposite is true: Enemy attack preparedness for our people is enhanced, and the dollars we invest do double duty.

In view of the broadened concept, we often hear the question, "How important is the need for civil preparedness to meet nuclear attack?"

Our answer is that the full range of preparedness is important: that the nuclear consideration remains as fully important as the peacetime consideration.

Encouraging progress has been made in the past year toward reducing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, and between the United States and the People's Republic of China. To the extent this is true, there has been a lessening of the likelihood of nuclear war.

On the other side of the ledger are these factors:

- the Soviet strategic arms buildup of the past few years, to near parity with the United States.
- the continuing expansion of Soviet naval power and naval operations in more areas of the world.
- the continued development of the People's Republic of China nuclear capability.

What does this add up to? I think it still means — for the United States and its allies — the requirement for us to continue civil preparedness programs. The likelihood of nuclear war has decreased, but the possibility of nuclear war remains.

As long as this is so, we in the United States feel we must maintain our military strength, and our passive defenses — our civil preparedness system — as well.

*Since retired

To achieve the "Generation of Peace" sought by President Nixon, we must be able to negotiate with potential adversaries from a position of strength, not weakness. The President has said, "Strong defenses are not the enemy of peace. They are the guardian of peace."

The relationship between military strength and civil preparedness has been stated several times by Secretary Laird.* For example, he said to a Congressional subcommittee, "I'm convinced that the civil defense system is a vital part of our overall strategic posture, and essential to the protection of our people."

Accordingly, our agency — in collaboration with State and local governments — continues efforts to develop an effective, nationwide civil preparedness system which would save lives and protect property if a nuclear attack occurs, reduce suffering and hardship, and substantially increase our chances of national survival.

Secretary of Defense Laird has felt for some time that the Department of Defense could and should play a vital part in reducing suffering and loss of property in major natural disasters. In the pursuit of this belief, he established the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, the Director of which reports directly to him.

Here is how Secretary Laird expressed this thought when he supported our Fiscal 1973 appropriation request before a Congressional subcommittee: "DCPA will stress the dual capability and utility of civil defense preparedness and natural disaster preparedness at local government level . . .

"We will provide preparedness assistance across the entire disaster spectrum, tying in closely the many similarities of nuclear attack and natural disaster planning — a concept long recognized and accepted by State and local government authorities . . .

"Our assistance in total civil disaster preparedness will improve civil defense preparedness (that is, attack preparedness) by making the dollars we invest do double duty . . .

"I believe the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency can make a significant contribution to total civil disaster preparedness. Civil defense preparedness planning and natural disaster planning are often similar, if not identical."

In the first eight months of 1972, there were 25 major natural disasters in the United States. These were officially declared major by President Nixon, and the affected areas became eligible for Federal disaster assistance.

The one you have all heard about is Tropical Storm Agnes, which struck six of our eastern states in June. Other disasters in the United States have taken a higher toll of life than did Agnes. But in both human terms and property damaged or destroyed — amounting to more than 3 billion dollars — Agnes was the most destructive storm ever to strike our country. Incidentally, there have been seven more officially declared major disasters since Agnes struck in June — but most people outside the immediate areas have not heard of them.

An important point I want to make, however, is this: In virtually all of these 25 natural disasters, local and state civil preparedness played a significant role in the saving of lives and protection of property.

And my second major point is this: These disasters, unfortunate and regrettable as they were, still had a positive value. They enabled the civil preparedness organizations of the governments involved to test their civil preparedness systems, to find out the shortcomings of those systems, and to thereby improve those systems.

Local and state governments found out whether their CD officials and personnel were effective; whether their communications worked; whether their warning systems got the word to residents; whether their Emergency Operating Centers were set up properly; and in total, whether their entire emergency preparedness systems succeeded or failed, and why they succeeded or failed.

And finally, my third point: Being involved in natural disaster preparedness makes our organization — or any organization — more effective in nuclear attack preparedness, and vice versa. The two kinds of preparedness go hand-in-hand. And when funds are spent on one, the other also benefits.

Government, of course, does not bear all the responsibility for protecting people from the effects of disasters. Part of this obligation falls upon the citizens themselves. In the film I brought with me, titled "Our Active Earth," you will see how the people of California are encouraged to take self-protective actions before and during earthquakes.

Our agency devotes a great deal of effort to educating citizens on measures they can take to prepare for various types of disasters, and emergency actions they should take during disasters.

As an example, we have distributed over 20 million free copies of our handbook, "In Time of Emergency." As many of you know, this handbook spells out specific actions to be taken by individuals to protect themselves from both nuclear attack and natural disasters. This handbook is printed in both English and Spanish.

I am glad to report that after several years of being on what I call "minimum sustaining appropriations" — during which time our program began to erode — we are now receiving more financial support.

After a low of \$60.5 million for Fiscal Year 1969, we received \$70.5 million for 1970, \$73.5 million for 1971, \$78.3 million for 1972, and \$83.5 million for 1973. This current budget is 38 percent more than that of 1969.

Also, we note substantial evidence that the Congress endorses our broadened concept of civil preparedness.

Incidentally, our \$83.5 million for this fiscal year still represents only one-tenth of 1 percent of the total requested Defense Department budget of \$81.5 billion. Thus, out of every thousand dollars the Defense Department receives, one dollar goes to civil preparedness.

Returning to the idea of a "full-coverage" program, I would like to emphasize that our basic objective is to increase the emergency operating capabilities of local governments.

We attempt to do this through technical, administrative, and financial assistance.

We concentrate our assistance on the local level, for it is in the communities of America — in our cities, counties, towns, and villages, where our people live and work and play — that they must be protected.

Here are some of the main facets of our new program:

- The effectiveness of the local program is largely dependent upon the professionalism of the local director.

Consequently, we embarked last winter on a major effort to increase the professionalism of local directors, by arranging for each state — with the aid of our regional people — to hold one or more "State Seminars for Local Directors."

To date, 56 seminars have been held — in 29 states and two territories. These have been attended by 1,260 local directors, plus state and federal personnel who conducted the meetings.

Another 79 seminars are planned between now and next July. Some of these will be "primary" seminars, for new directors and those with little experience, while others will be "advanced" sessions, for directors who already know the fundamentals.

Response to the seminars has been good, and we believe substantial progress is being made toward "professionalizing" local directors throughout the country.

- Another important activity is our "On-Site Assistance" program. Briefly, this calls for teams of state civil preparedness people and regional DCPA professionals to visit — at their request — certain communities in each state.

At each place, the team spends of few days or weeks conferring with the local government officials and community leaders, including the CD director. The community's protective resources are identified; its peacetime and wartime protective needs are defined; and a program of specific actions is laid out. Then the team helps the local government carry out some of the high-priority, agreed-upon actions.

This program got underway last January. As of this August, 249 communities in 43 states were participating. In 102 of these communities, Action Plans have been developed and are being followed.

We now have a backlog of requests to participate. We are training state civil preparedness people to make the initial contacts with communities; and our regional personnel participate as each program progresses.

- In another facet of our program, we emphasize Emergency Operations Simulations. We feel these exercises are essential to real preparedness. Many local CD organizations and programs may look good on paper, but still be ineffective in actual operation.

Paper plans must be put to the test — and they must involve local officials, from the mayor and department heads down through clerks who will be needed in emergency operations.

EOS's, as we call them, are not new in our program, but we are recognizing the need for increased emphasis on them. Some of these exercises follow a nuclear attack scenario, while others simulate peacetime disasters of the sort likely to occur in a particular community — for example, a hurricane situation in Florida, a tornado disaster in Missouri, or an earthquake in California.

In the 12 months ending April 30, 1972, about 305 simulations were carried out by local governments, with more than 11,000 people participating — an average of 36 participants per exercise. We hope the number of exercises will increase from year to year.

- Warning capabilities are vital to preparedness. In that regard, I can report that the first element of our new, automatic Decision Information Distribution System — which we call "DIDS" — is nearing completion. This is a 50,000-watt, low-frequency radio transmitter at the Army's Edgewood Arsenal, northeast of Baltimore, Maryland.

Within 30 seconds after being activated by one of the National Warning Centers, this station will automatically transmit warning of either nuclear attack or peacetime disaster to about 500 receivers in 10 eastern states, which have a total population of some 65 million.

The 500 receivers include a voice-only type, voice-plus-teletype, and siren activators. These 10 states will eventually get thousands of additional receivers, for complete local government coverage.

The prototype station and receivers are scheduled for completion this December, at a cost of more than 4 million dollars. If these prove satisfactory during the period of testing and evaluation that will start in January — and if funds are provided in our future budgets — we plan to go forward gradually with 11 more stations. These would cover all of the continental United States.

If you should want to know more about the DIDS system, a fact sheet is available.

- Another new DCPA program, begun this past spring, seeks to apply the invaluable resource of our 2½ million military Ready Reservists to civil preparedness work. Local and state CD agencies, and our own regional staffs, can use this volunteer support manpower to very good advantage.

Accordingly, we have instituted a Civil Preparedness Mobilization Designee, or MOBDES, Program. Briefly, this is a plan under which military reservists can volunteer to train and serve as auxiliary staff members of local, state, or regional agencies near their homes.

In time of attack, these reservists — men and women, officer and enlisted — would be called to active duty with the agencies to which they were originally assigned.

In peacetime disaster periods, they would have the opportunity of volunteering for active duty with those agencies.

For this fiscal year, the Army has allocated and funded 600 such MOBDES spaces, and the Air Force nearly 3,000 spaces. We are expecting the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard also to participate.

In the three months since announcement of the program, the response of both civil defense directors and military reservists has been encouraging. We hope to fill all the available billets by next spring. Even more important, the quality of the reservists volunteering is high. They are well qualified.

Full details of the program are given in Information Bulletin No. 265.

From the standpoint of management and administration, we are continuing the process of decentralizing — of delegating more program responsibility to our eight Regional Offices. There are several reasons for this:

1. Our Regional Directors and staffs are closer to state and local directors, and local situations, and therefore have a better feel for their needs.
2. Regional Directors and their staffs can better "tailor" DCPA technical, financial, and administrative assistance to the unique needs of each community.
3. An effective "span of control" over our various field programs can be maintained better by our regional staffs. For one thing, we simply do not have enough professionals in our Washington office to do this job.

In summary, the past year has been a period of growth and progress for our agency. We have put into effect some of the ideas and concepts I discussed with you last year. We have consolidated our gains in a number of program areas. And we have created and instituted several new programs.

Our national program is bearing fruit, insofar as civil preparedness at the all-important local level is concerned, and at the state level as well. Our efforts are reflected in tangible improvement in the capabilities of local governments to protect their citizens from the full spectrum of disasters and other hazards.

Perhaps most significant, in long-range perspective, is that in the past year we have become committed to — and have begun to carry out — a dual-capability program. We are now dedicated to the idea that wartime protection and peacetime protection for our citizens go hand-in-hand; that our national, state, and local civil preparedness systems must be developed with both types of protection in mind; and that the money spent on these systems must serve to advance both these objectives.

Protection from both types of disasters and hazards is what we're striving to accomplish. We still have a long way to go in safeguarding our citizens, but we're encouraged by the progress being made. ▲

IS YOUR COMPANY READY FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCES?

by

Virgil L. Couch*

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U.S. Office of Civil Defense, Washington, D.C.¹

So, the chairman of the board was hit with a rotten egg. The corporate president's face was splattered with an overripe tomato. The board of directors' meeting was closed by a sit-in of agitators. The stockholders' meeting was disrupted. Corporate records were destroyed. Crowds are milling around in front of the plant gates. Threats are being hurled at the security forces. Company trucks and other vehicles have been delayed or destroyed. Windows broken, fences smashed, power transformers damaged beyond repair. Telephone lines and power lines cut. Small fires have been started. Gasoline bombs have been tossed over the fence or through the windows, starting larger fires.

This is clearly a confrontation involving violence and civil disturbance. Hundreds of riots and major disturbances have occurred in the last five years. Thousands of people have been injured and hundreds have been killed. Property damage has been in the billions of dollars. Of special significance is the fact that the rule of law has been challenged, along with a challenge to our entire economic system.

The history of human relations within our society is largely a process of balancing and adjusting conflicting interests. This is usually achieved by voluntary agreement or through established legal proceedings. These proceedings may be accompanied by peaceful public demonstrations. At times, however, individuals and groups have abandoned these orderly procedures and have resorted to violent demonstrations, riots, and destruction of property — civil disturbances.

The Office of Civil Defense² has a keen interest in minimizing the effects of emergencies on the business structure which is the backbone of our free enterprise system, and vital to our survival as a free nation.

My intention here is not to rebut any individuals or organized groups engaging the world in peaceful debate. Instead, I would summarize basic procedures for protecting private property from *unwarranted violent assault*, and protecting the lives of employees of companies engaged in legitimate enterprise.

*ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Virgil L. Couch was the nation's top advisor on industrial civil defense and emergency preparedness. He has conducted civil disturbance workshops and panel discussions at international security conferences, national security seminars, the National Safety Congress and other meetings of business and industrial executives throughout the nation. Mr. Couch retired in 1972.

The suggestions included here should be part of a total emergency preparedness plan to manage all kinds of emergencies. It is impossible to establish procedures which can be rigidly applied in every company, in every industry, in every city. There are, however, definite measures which business, industry, and institutions can take to be as fully prepared as possible in the event a civil disturbance should occur.

To minimize effects of violence

No company can "play it by ear" insofar as civil disturbances are concerned. A realistic control of these situations involves a number of factors. But, just what can corporate management do to minimize the effects of this kind of violent confrontation — civil disturbances?

It may surprise you to learn that the home offices of many multiplant corporations, with facilities scattered throughout the nation, have given a simple answer to inquiries received from their plants at various locations. "What do you do to prepare for this type of emergency or disaster? Turn to pages so-and-so in your *Plant Civil Defense and Emergency Plan Manual*. Be sure you have done the things indicated there, and you will be well prepared for civil disturbances." In other words, "use your internal plant civil defense preparedness plan and emergency organization."

Unquestionably, plant preparedness for the ultimate disaster, a nuclear attack, will assure preparedness for any lesser disaster. Every company should have a *plan* to deal with emergency and disaster in peacetime. If such a plan is enlarged and extended to deal with wartime disaster — a nuclear attack — the company will be better prepared to manage disaster conditions arising from civil disturbances.

The "blueprint" is an *outline* of a comprehensive "total preparedness" plan to deal with all kinds of emergencies. Total preparedness is important; however, there are certain elements in emergency preparedness which require special emphasis in planning for each particular kind of emergency. Just as it is in planning for civil disturbances.

Information obtained from numerous sources and experiences makes it clear that one cannot assume that every procedure suggested herein will not justify or require additional procedures.

The best defense

The best defense against civil disturbances is knowing the objectives and methods of attack during disorders and having a plan for limiting damage from such disorders.

¹ New Defense Civil Preparedness Agency

² Italics by Author

Beginning with the Watts disorder in 1965, research indicates that the major objectives or targets for most riots have been: (1) credit records, accounts receivable, (2) liquor stores, (3) home appliance stores — radios, TV's, ranges, washing machines, (4) clothing stores.

It is important, therefore, in civil disturbance planning, to keep in mind *the type of property* to be protected in terms of the desirability of the contents to looters and the location of such property. A large warehouse with an adequate security force is less likely to be attacked than a liquor store in a slum area, and an appliance store in a middle-class district is less likely to be affected than one in a slum area. In the large warehouse, the contents are protected, may be difficult for looters to utilize, and are not easily accessible. In the middle-class area, the rioters and looters are more easily identifiable than in the slum area, even though businesses in all three areas have been subject to attack.

A civil disturbance has much the same disruptive effect on public protective services as does a major natural disaster or industrial accident. Police departments become severely overtaxed and are often unable to do more than acknowledge reports of vandalism and looting. Fire departments often are faced with such enormous requirements they sometimes cannot respond to alarms due to shortage of equipment or blocked streets. It is unquestionably clear that *business and industry must be prepared for self-help*.

Self-help in practice

Self-help means organizing and training employees to manage day-to-day emergencies which occur at the workplace — inside the facility or plant. This means being prepared to help yourself without help from elsewhere. A sound plan for managing civil disorder emergencies should provide for maximum utilization of the existing emergency leadership protective teams and the equipment on hand. The organization which has proved successful in handling emergencies should be enlarged and extended by recruiting and training additional employees for each element of self-help, to effectively manage conditions created by civil disturbances or nuclear attack.

The self-help principle can be extended by participation in an industrial mutual aid association — by joining with other plants and with the community protective forces to exchange help in any kind of emergency.

This breakdown of normal community services for protecting property during civil disturbances does not mean that a company *can go it entirely alone in its planning*. Instead, all plans for minimizing the effects of civil disturbances should strictly follow local, state, and Federal laws and regulations. All company planning pertaining to civil disturbances should be conducted at all times with the knowledge, cooperation, and assistance of local law-enforcement authorities. Important first steps, therefore, include establishing liaison with local law and Civil Defense officials. These officials should be provided with the names and phone numbers of key

company personnel. It is important that appropriate company executives know and keep in close touch with local police and fire departments and disaster coordinators year-round, rather than waiting until emergency occurs.

But coordination and liaison with local government is not enough. Similar relationships should be maintained also with nearby plants and business firms, employee union officials, local utilities, and the local news media. This is important to assure fully effective mutual planning approaches and objectives, and for keeping informed of the social climate and receiving advance information of the imminence and possible magnitude of a disturbance.

Emergency operating centers

In time of civil disturbance, the *control centers* in both industry and government are of major importance. They quickly become the focal points — the plant command posts — for directing all emergency actions. The local government Emergency Operating Centers, or EOC's, constitute essential elements of successful control of civil disturbances. They provide for the physical assembly of those key individuals who must make important decisions at a place where a good central communications capability exists.

There are almost 3,700 local government EOC's located or being located in protected areas (areas protected from radioactive fallout and from civil disturbances).

In time of civil disturbance, these local government control centers are occupied by the mayor, city manager, police chief, fire chief, civil defense and disaster coordinator, and others who are directing activities for saving life and protecting property during the emergency. Likewise, *the control center in a plant* becomes the channel through which emergency actions are directed throughout the plant area, and for maintaining contact with local government. To augment the plant control center, it is often necessary to designate an alternate protected area for use in event of major damage to the primary center.

Equipment for the control center should include communications, public address system, emergency power, maps, plant layout, and other supplies which, after testing the operation of the control center, are deemed necessary.

Training for civil disturbances can be increased by business and industrial firms by holding training exercises with local government decision-making officials participating, just as they have in the past.

Communications are critical

Communications are critical to the continuity of emergency operations. They must be properly protected. Appropriate emergency backups must be provided. All communications planning should be coordinated with local telephone companies and should be adequate to cover the entire plant area. Usually the primary com-

munications are by telephone. The primary system should be backed up with two-way radios, walkie-talkies and field telephones. Megaphones or electric bull horns are often necessary.

In order to know what is taking place, arrangements should be made to listen in on local and state police radios, local fire department radios, hospital and ambulance radios, and other sources of information.

Remember that regular communication channels often become severely overloaded under civil disturbance conditions. In numerous instances, Citizen's Band transceivers have proved extremely useful in maintaining communications within and around the plant. Officials at the plant control center can be advised quickly of developments throughout the premises, and can direct security and firefighting activities. *Citizen's Band transceivers have proved especially useful for listening in on directions and instructions being given to rioters by their leaders.*

In some cities, regularly broadcast information by riot leaders has included location of fires, police personnel, firefighting equipment, military forces, stores and plants scheduled for attack, trucks which should be hijacked, transportation equipment to be blocked, and progress being made by the various rioting groups. This kind of information is useful to company management in deciding on preventive measures.

Communications should also be established between management and key employees, and with adjacent plants and businesses. Switchboard operators should be trained in emergency procedures; if necessary, designate men operators as alternates for women who may not be available for duty. Be sure unlisted telephone numbers are available at the control center for use by management and key executives.

Most local civil defense systems are tied into a nationwide warning and communications network. In time of civil disturbance, if the civil defense facilities are fully and properly used by local authorities, the community is in close contact with the state civil defense headquarters — and through that headquarters, with the governor and with Federal agencies.

Security protection

Some have referred to a civil disturbance or riot as a "crime against property." Both *people and property* must be protected.

The normal plant security organization and responsibilities should be reviewed, with the objective of adapting to meet requirements which may be imposed by a civil disturbance. The nature and size of the security organization of a plant, retail store, commercial firm, or other facility will depend almost entirely on its size, location, and the desirability of contents to potential rioters.

The company legal counsel should maintain close working relationships with the city attorney, district attorney, or other legal offices to make sure of the authority of company officials and employees in protecting property and saving life.

Major legal factors to be considered include: geographic limits within the authority of management; local laws and statutes concerning arming the security force, and their use of weapons; type of weapons with which members of the security force may be armed; actions they can take during a civil disturbance; when and how they may exercise "citizen's arrests"; when and how much force can be used; the advisability of deputizing the security force; the differences, if any, between legal limits of authority for normal conditions and emergency conditions.

For protection of property, consideration should be given to the types of protection most effective for the particular facility. The type of construction of the building, chain-link fences, barbed wire, protective grill work, laminated shatterproof glass, shutters for windows, bars for doors and other openings — all these should be considered in planning for property protection.

Protective lighting is perhaps the best security bargain available. Most rioting and fire-bomb damage occurs after dark. Nothing discourages hit-and-run type attacks and looting so effectively as full-coverage bright lighting. Rioters facing "glare" lights don't know whether an armed guard or a camera is waiting beyond the lights. Reports of civil disturbance experience make it clear that a building which is obviously occupied and is well-lighted inside and outside is less likely to be attacked than one which is obviously unoccupied or poorly illuminated.

Orderly and speedy shutdown of industrial plants in time of emergency is sometimes necessary — whether it involves pulling a switch, closing a valve, or cooling a large furnace. Improperly executed shutdown can cause a plant to "self-destruct."

Other important procedures in protection of plant property: inspect security fences regularly for proper maintenance; post trespass warnings on all barriers in accordance with local laws; park vehicles *outside* security fence or wall (to reduce fire potential and minimize hazard of concealed explosives or incendiary devices); light outside walls and fences and critical internal areas; use screening to protect lighting fixtures against rocks and other objects; insure continuous lighting in parking lots and on ground floors; install intrusion detection devices; install protection for glassed areas exposed to streets (i.e., windows, doors, and roof light windows); develop procedures for positive identification and control of employees for entrance to the plant and critical areas within the plant; give samples of photographic identification cards or badges to local police for crossing police lines or during curfew; control movement and parking of vehicles; control admittance of visitors; identify critical areas within the plant; enclose critical areas with walls or fences; designate and control specific personnel who may have access to critical areas; equip critical areas with high security locks or intrusion devices; develop package and material control procedures; protect gasoline pumps and other dispensers of flammables.

In some instances, employees have had to be locked into their offices and plants due to the hazards on the

outside. Supplies of food and medicine stockpiled in fallout shelter areas were used to feed and treat such employees. (This is an example of how *industrial CD preparedness pays off in peacetime emergencies*, and a reminder that provision should be made for feeding and housing stranded personnel.)

Several industrial security and emergency planning officials have placed heavy emphasis on the importance of suitable photographic arrangements to gather evidence of illegal activity.

In a civil defense emergency, police requirements may substantially exceed regular police manpower. This situation would require that auxiliary police be trained to augment regular police forces. In support of this requirement, OCD has developed a course, "Law and Order Training for Civil Defense Emergency." Among the subjects included are the police role in civil defense emergencies, role of the auxiliary policeman, techniques of crowd control, protection of property, prevention of looting, shelter duties, and police public relations. This training is available to business and industry through the local police chief or sheriff, who are police professionals. Two student manuals and two instructors' guides — SM-10.1A and B and IG-10.1A and B — published by the Office of Civil Defense are available for training security forces.

Many local police chiefs and sheriffs who have been trained at the Army Military Police School, Fort Gordon, Georgia, in modern methods of managing civil disturbance conditions, can help train industrial security forces.

Fire protection

Because the services of the local fire department may not be available during civil disturbances, certain measures by owners and managers are of the utmost importance in preventing or minimizing fire damage. If your plant or building is already well protected, it may be necessary only to adjust your plan of action to use your equipment and personnel most effectively in case of civil disturbance.

It's a good idea to check your insurance policies to be sure you are covered for this kind of disaster, in sufficient amount, and that premiums are paid up. Because of the complexities involved, discuss this with your insurance counsellor.

An adequate and properly maintained sprinkler system will pay handsome dividends in fire prevention. Remember that key personnel should know the location of the shut-off valve for the system. Outside sprinkler control valves may be closed by rioters; therefore, where not in violation of fire department regulations, *sprinkler control valves should be locked open*, or the hand wheel removed when the sprinkler control valve is in the "open" position.

Numerous instances of attacks with "Molotov" cocktails directed at roofs makes it imperative that means of quick access to roofs and alternate escape routes from roofs be provided. In addition, fire extinguishers suitable for extinguishing flammable liquids fires should be placed on roof areas for quick access.

Discussions with law enforcement officials indicate generally that during civil disturbances it is not safe for personnel to be on the roof. Fire-watch personnel have sometimes been mistaken for snipers. Therefore, before establishing a fire-watch, check with local government officials.

Several companies have indicated that their best solution to combatting potential "Molotov" cocktail roof fires is to *waterproof and reconstruct the roof* so it can be flooded with several inches of water. Some have jokingly referred to these as their "rooftop wading pools." Often it only requires minor construction to insure that the roof will support the water-load without leaking or collapsing.

Determine with the help of your local fire department the feasibility of using mesh wire or other screening materials to protect roofs from fire bombs, Molotov cocktails, and other incendiary devices.

Built-in protection

In planning for new buildings and remodeling existing buildings, consider including Molotov cocktail protection in the initial design. Numerous companies have included fallout protection in the initial design of new construction at little or no additional cost. As part of their civil defense plans, many existing buildings have been remodeled to provide fallout protection by making walls a bit thicker and by filling windows and other openings with brick or concrete. In addition, numerous windowless buildings have been constructed. Here again, *civil defense planning has paid off in peacetime emergencies*. It is not easy to throw a Molotov cocktail through a solid masonry wall which has been constructed for civil defense purposes!

Other important fire-control measures: post and enforce fire prevention regulations; place buckets of sand throughout the plant; extend fire alarm systems to all areas of the facility; provide a secondary fire water supply system; have facility fire protection equipment on-site, and insure that it is properly maintained and inspected regularly.

Also coordinate with the local fire department fire hose connections and other firefighting equipment, to assure compatibility; organize employees into firefighting brigades and rescue squads for each building; store combustible materials in a well protected area; instruct employees in the use of fire extinguishers; conduct fire drills regularly; place fire extinguishers near exposed windows, and be sure they are capable of extinguishing gasoline fires.

Other fire-protective measures: maintain good house-keeping standards; assure that package and trash chutes, skylights, roof hatches, ventilator shafts, windows and other glass areas, entrances to sewers, service tunnels, and computer rooms, are adequately protected against fire bombs and other incendiaries. Such protective measures might include use of wood or metal shutters, shatterproof glass, wired glass, protective screening or mesh.

The number one weapon of rioters is arson. Although evident arson resulting from riots may be of major con-

cern, don't overlook investigation of small fires of unknown origin. If you eliminate all possible "accidental" causes, start looking for an arsonist. You may have an employee who is a first-class arsonist; he may even be a member of the fire brigade! Your local fire department can give you excellent guidance and can provide a trained investigator and assistance in conducting investigations, as can your insurance company.

You suspect arson? Look for these clues: piles of wood shavings, debris, paint, or turpentine, strands of gasoline-soaked cotton leading to flammables; a heating system which has been tampered with; doors or windows forced open to provide a draft.

An excellent publication, *Industrial Defense Against Civil Disturbances, Bombings, Sabotage*, prepared by Major General Lloyd B. Ramsey, Provost Marshal General, and Jervie P. Fox, Jr., Chief, Industrial Defense Branch, is available.

Records protection

Since the number one target of most rioters is records — including credit records, accounts receivable, inventory, stockholders, and similar records and files — it is vital that these be secured at a suitable distance from the place of business. Duplicate records are vital in establishing true losses, business interruption claims, and to identify stolen goods by means of serial numbers.

Identification of stolen property is especially important. Law-enforcement officials in major riot areas have been forced to auction unidentified property, often worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, which they have recovered, only because the owners did not maintain inventory records and could not identify their property! Records of serial numbers are an important aid to recovery. Also, the use of secret markings such as those made with ultraviolet sensitive ink and coded price markings are valuable aids in identification of property.

Thousands of companies have protected their vital records and documents at remote locations and often in deep underground storage facilities constructed especially for this purpose, as part of their company civil defense plans. This is another example of the *peacetime payoff of plant preparedness for nuclear attack*.

In this country, *civil* authorities are responsible for enforcing and maintaining domestic law and order. Americans recognize, however, the possibility that during times of crisis, it is sometimes necessary to use *military* forces to preserve the *civil* authority.

Generally, the several states — not Federal authorities — are responsible for enforcing laws and maintaining order within their respective boundaries. Most acts of violence are punishable by state rather than by Federal law. Thus, when ever the military is required in order to cope with a civil disturbance, state-controlled forces normally are employed prior to use of Federal troops. The use of Federal troops is a drastic last resort.

State forces normally include the National Guard, which is part of the organized militia of the several states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. When not in

the service of the United States, the National Guard of a state is commanded by the governor. He has the authority to employ the Guard to suppress civil disturbances within his state. When he does so, members of the Guard called to duty operate in accordance with state laws or under emergency authority proclaimed by the governor.

Generally, when we speak of military assistance to civil authority we think of humanitarian assistance in situations resulting from disasters such as floods, storms, earthquakes, and serious fires. However, when civil authorities are unable to cope with civil disturbances, soldiers may assist in this area also, provided the legal requirements are met. In such situations, military personnel assist civil authorities by creating an environment in which civilians are able to control.

The mission of a soldier assigned to quell a civil disturbance is to help civilian authorities to restore domestic tranquility under a rule of law.

The enforcement of law and the preservation of order is traditionally a local responsibility — first of the city or town, then of the state. Only in emergencies are Federal forces used. (Before the Detroit riots of 1967, it had been 24 years since a governor requested the aid of Federal troops.)

To assure that prompt and effective supplementary law-enforcement assistance by Federal forces will be available when necessary, the Department of Defense established a new "Directorate of Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations." This consolidates into a single office the total responsibility for directing, coordinating, and supervising all Federal military activities related to civil disturbances. The directorate's command center is in the Pentagon.

The Office of Civil Defense, as a Federal government agency, has no explicit authority or responsibility to deal with peacetime disasters. OCD's basic job is to organize, lead, coordinate, and help finance a national program to minimize the effects of nuclear attack. The OCD does, however, approve and encourage the dual-purpose role of peacetime and wartime activities for state and local civil defense, including control of civil disturbances and alleviation of suffering which follows in their wake. In many cities where trouble has occurred or threatened, the local civil defense director serves as "Chief of Staff" or key advisor and coordinator for the senior political official. The local civil defense office can help business, industry, and institutions develop plans for emergencies.

Knowledge of your company's plan for civil disturbance emergencies should be restricted to executives responsible for developing policy and implementing such plans. Each holder of the company or plant *Civil Disturbance Plan* manual should be held strictly accountable for its control. Knowledge of the contents of the plan by unauthorized personnel might defeat its effectiveness.

Keep in mind that *total emergency preparedness* includes preparedness for *all types of emergencies*, whether they be major industrial accidents such as fires and explosions, natural disasters such as tornadoes, hurricane, floods, and earthquakes, bomb threats, civil disturbances, or nuclear attack. ▲

NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

by
Richard H. Ullman*

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In his first speech to the General Assembly, the leader of Peking's delegation to the United Nations, Chiao Kuan-hua, stated on behalf of his government: "I once again solemnly declare that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons." And he continued: "If the United States and the Soviet Union really and truly want disarmament, they should commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This is not something difficult to do."

Chiao's remarks, and their prominence in the first official statement by a representative of the People's Republic of China before the United Nations, came as no surprise: the declaration that China would not be the first to use nuclear weapons has been a staple of Peking's foreign policy, constantly reiterated, ever since the first Chinese nuclear explosion in October 1964. From a Chinese point of view, such assurances made eminent good sense. In their first years, the few Chinese nuclear weapons and their manufacturing facilities offered a tempting target for a preëmptive enemy. Indeed, it was more than once rumored first that the United States and then that the Soviet Union was planning such an attack. Even today a first strike could very largely eliminate China's nuclear capabilities. In so far as a solemn declaration foreswearing first use tends to make it morally more difficult for others to use nuclear weapons against China, the P.R.C. continues to be well served by it. Moreover, it is also self-evident that, given the marked disparities between the Chinese nuclear force as it will be for the rest of the 1970's and the forces possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union, first use by China against either "nuclear superpower" (a term the Chinese use only derogatorily) would be suicidal.

Now that Peking is at last represented at the United Nations, it is likely that the theme of no first use of nuclear weapons will be heard with increased frequency and from increasing numbers of voices among the non-nuclear powers, fearful as they are that some day, in some perhaps unforeseeable circumstance, nuclear weapons might be used against them. The United States and the Soviet Union will undoubtedly be under more pres-

sure to declare that they, also, will not use nuclear weapons first. The fact that such a declaratory position is so self-evidently in the interest of China, with a large ground army and vulnerable nuclear force, does not necessarily mean that it would not also be in the interest of the United States.

The U.S. position on first use of nuclear weapons has been virtually the mirror image of the Chinese. Ever since 1945 American leaders have tended to look upon nuclear weapons as a vital counterbalance to superior Soviet and (after 1949) Chinese ground forces. It became accepted wisdom that "free world" countries could not — or should not — regiment themselves to the same degree as their communist adversaries and place an equal number of their citizens under arms, but would rely on superior American technology to provide a nuclear deterrent to large-scale conventional aggression. This dogma was basic to the Dulles notion of "massive retaliation." Ever since the early 1960's, however, when the Soviet Union achieved strategic nuclear forces in sufficient numbers to rule out an American first strike, the planning and accompanying declaratory policy of the United States have emphasized a second-strike retaliatory role for its strategic forces, at least so far as the Soviet Union is concerned.

Very different, however, has been the declared purpose of American tactical, or "theater nuclear" weapons. Here the implied trade-off between communist "hordes" and American technology still applies, despite the fact that our potential enemies also possess tactical nuclear weapons. As Secretary of Defense Laird put it in his statement on the 1973 Defense budget: "our theater nuclear forces add to the deterrence of theater conventional wars in Europe and Asia; potential opponents cannot be sure that major conventional aggression would not be met with the use of nuclear weapons." Thus, we have been deliberately ambiguous about the circumstances in which we might initiate the use of nuclear weapons. The Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations have all insisted upon maintaining sufficiently strong conventional forces so as not to be forced into early escalation to nuclear weapons, but they have also asserted that they would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons in the face of a major conventional attack if it seemed that it could not otherwise be stopped. In the context of NATO this posture has been characterized as "flexible response."

The Soviet government has also been vague — no doubt also deliberately — about defining the circumstances in which it might initiate the use of nuclear

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weapons. Military writings and Warsaw Pact exercises indicate that the Red Army leadership generally assumes that a NATO attack would employ tactical nuclear weapons, and that such weapons would similarly be used by the defenders. This assumption is so strong that the question of whether or not to meet a conventional attack with tactical nuclear weapons seems scarcely to have been addressed. Another assumption is that once an exchange has taken place it would be almost impossible to limit the employment of nuclear weapons to "tactical" targets: general nuclear war would almost surely follow. Yet despite the pervasiveness of these assumptions in Soviet military writing, the Soviet Union's declaratory policy has been strongly hostile to nuclear weapons from the outset of the nuclear era, a logical concomitant of its position of nuclear inferiority for so many years. The Soviet position throughout has been that the use (and not merely the first use) of nuclear weapons should be banned and existing stockpiles destroyed as the first step toward general and complete disarmament. The American position, by contrast, has been that nuclear weapons and their delivery systems should be eliminated from national inventories only as part of a general process of disarmament, and only in proportion to reductions in conventional arms levels. Thus while the destinations of Soviet and American declaratory policies are the same, the routes to be taken are very different.

The Soviet government was a moving force behind the 1961 U.N. General Assembly resolution, sponsored by Ethiopia and seven other African and Asian states, declaring the use of nuclear weapons to be a violation of the Charter, an action "conary to the laws of humanity," and "a crime against mankind and civilization." Taking shelter, perhaps, behind this absolutist stand, Moscow — in contrast to Peking — has not formally foresworn the first use of nuclear weapons, nor have Soviet spokesmen drawn a distinction between "use" and "first use." Only the Chinese government has explicitly and consistently emphasized "no first use," although its declarations have also called for the "complete prohibition and thorough destruction" of nuclear weapons. British and French policy has closely paralleled that of the United States. Both London and Paris seem to regard the possible use of nuclear weapons as a powerful deterrent against conventional attacks. The 1964-70 British Labour government placed special emphasis on the development within NATO of more precise and comprehensive guidelines regarding the use of tactical nuclear weapons. In doing so it was motivated at least in part by its own unwillingness to maintain significant levels of conventional forces on the Continent. Perhaps because French military policy has developed formally, at least, outside the context of NATO, French rhetoric has

emphasized to a degree much greater than either American or British statements the desirability of banning nuclear weapons and destroying stockpiles, but French statements have almost always included the qualification that nuclear disarmament must be accompanied by conventional disarmament and that all disarmament measures must be guaranteed through rigorous inspection and international supervision.

"No use" carries with it the implication that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is wrong, and that existing stockpiles should be destroyed. "No first use," however, has very different practical implications and probable psychological consequences. It contains no built-in presumption toward the phasing out of nuclear stockpiles. In the absence of dependable international guarantees, a nuclear power undertaking not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons would retain its ability to retaliate fully in response to the use of nuclear weapons by others. It would, in short, give up nothing of its ability to deter nuclear attacks. Many factors have contributed to the nuclear truce which the world has observed since the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki in August 1945, but not least — and perhaps most — among them has been the knowledge that the United States and the Soviet Union (and lately, perhaps, other nuclear powers as well) are able to absorb a devastating nuclear attack and yet respond in a manner that will devastate the attacker. Under a "no-first-use" obligation, no matter what form it might take, this ability, and therefore the efficacy of a deterrent, would be undiminished.²

On the other hand, to the extent that a "no-first-use" undertaking appeared credible — and that extent undoubtedly would vary — a nuclear power's ability to deter conventional attacks by the threat of a nuclear response would be reduced. This is the contingency referred to by Secretary Laird in the statement quoted, and it has long been an important part of American (and NATO) military doctrine. Yet it is also true that no area of military doctrine is more vague than guidelines for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Most writers on the subject take it for granted that in Europe, at least, the use of tactical nuclear weapons by one of the opposing alliance systems would lead to a nuclear response by the other. Where analysts disagree is on the probability that the conflict would remain limited. The preponderance of informed opinion, however, is that it would not, and that once a belligerent takes the momentous step of using tactical nuclear weapons, it would be more likely to escalate than to accept an unfavorable battlefield outcome, particularly under the conditions of stress that would invariably accompany the outbreak of nuclear

¹ Note the comment by Premier N. S. Khrushchev to C. L. Sulzberger of *The New York Times* on September 5, 1961: "Let us assume both sides were to promise not to employ nuclear weapons, but retained their stockpiles. What would happen if the imperialists unleashed war? In such a war if any side should feel it was losing, would it not use nuclear weapons to avoid defeat? It would undoubtedly use its nuclear bombs."

² "No first use" would not — strictly speaking — apply to strategic defensive systems such as ABMs. For practical purposes the irrevocable launch by an opponent of a missile suspected of containing a nuclear warhead would constitute "first use," thus justifying interception by a nuclear-armed ABM before the actual detonation of the incoming warhead.

hostilities. Thus there would be no certain advantage for NATO in meeting a conventional attack with a nuclear response, and the risks of mass destruction would be enormous. The notion of "no first use" aims at making absolute the boundary between conventional and nuclear weapons, even at some cost.

The cost, of course, is recognition that a party declaring that it will not initiate the use of nuclear weapons renders itself at least marginally more open to conventional attack. It therefore must tend to its non-nuclear defenses. In some circumstances this cost may seem overwhelmingly high: where there exist major tensions that might lead to conflict, and where there are significant disparities in non-nuclear military capabilities, the threat of a nuclear response by the weaker side may, indeed, be its sole assurance against coercive pressure from the stronger. In such a case, the potential costs of nuclear escalation, once war had started, would seem far less worrisome than the costs involved either in sustaining a conventional invasion or in creating conventional forces sufficiently powerful to deter one. Indeed, in some situations, the creation (or the perpetuation) of conventional parity may be simply impossible. If the Arab-Israeli confrontation were to continue indefinitely, and if the Arab nations were eventually to achieve the ability to field formidable military forces, the Israelis might well conclude that only nuclear weapons — with all the risks entailed — would give them the ability to deter a potentially overwhelming attack.

The case of the United States, however, is very different. In no cases where it has commitments which might ultimately lead it to engage its military forces does there presently exist this hypothetical combination of severe political tension and a pronounced disparity in non-nuclear capability. The area which has traditionally been the source of greatest concern, Europe, is now the scene of considerably lessened East-West tensions. Despite the traditional worst-case predictions which accompany requests from the NATO bureaucracy at Brussels for more military resources, Western non-nuclear forces are capable of offering formidable resistance to their Warsaw Pact opponents; even if they are in some respects inferior, their inferiority is not now such as to invite an attack.

The trade-off, of course, for raising the nuclear threshold is the maintaining of non-nuclear capability adequate to deter a non-nuclear attack. Any enunciation of a "no-first-use" policy by the United States would necessarily have to come as an integral part of our military policy relating to Europe. Here some obvious questions immediately arise: Why do it? Tensions are low. War in Europe is not likely. Why change arrangements that seem to have worked so well? The questions are good ones. Yet if anything is certain about American conventional force levels in Europe over the next decade it is that they will drop; what is uncertain is by how much. And any significant drop will itself change the arrangements which have seemed to work so well. Such a change need not be for the worse. Provided the process by which American troop levels are reduced is gradual, provided

the cuts themselves are not drastic (down, say, to no less than 100,000 men), and provided they are signaled to our European allies well in advance, they could serve as the spur to a healthy process whereby the West Europeans assume more responsibility for their own defense.

Paradoxically, a U.S. "no-first-use" policy would be likely to assist rather than hinder that process. Raising and maintaining armies has never been popular with the European members of NATO. They are subject to the same sorts of domestic pressures for the reallocation of scarce resources away from military and toward internal purposes as we are. Like us, they have made piecemeal reductions in the size of their forces. In the absence of a U.S. "no-first-use" policy they would be likely to reduce further their own force levels as we reduced ours, and not take over the military leadership of the Alliance. They would choose instead to rely on the deterrent power of the thousands of American tactical nuclear weapons (with their implicit escalatory link to U.S. strategic weapons) which would surely still remain in Europe even if our manpower level fell sharply. Thus the nuclear threshold would be lowered and the risks of potential nuclear war — although still remote — would be correspondingly increased.

Yet while the Europeans have at least in some measure justified their less than enthusiastic response to past American calls for larger forces and increased readiness on their part by pointing to U.S. nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent against a Warsaw Pact attack, many of them have been unable to suppress their doubts as to whether, in fact, any administration in Washington would be willing to trade American for European cities. And just as they have questioned the credibility of the U.S. strategic deterrent, so they have also expressed considerable uneasiness about the probable consequence of the use of tactical nuclear weapons to stop an advance by Warsaw Pact forces. The West Germans in particular have shown a not surprising skepticism toward claims, from their own military establishments and ours, that tactical nuclear weapons might be employed on European territory without themselves causing widespread and horrifying devastation and triggering even more destructive escalation.

A U.S. "no-first-use" policy in conjunction with a gradual and deliberate drawing down of U.S. force levels in Europe would necessarily break the linkage between lowering U.S. force levels and a lowering nuclear threshold. It would also be the clearest way of telling the West Europeans that a set of states which have come to comprise the largest economic entity in the world must henceforth take primary responsibility for its own defense — for assessing the threats that it faces and for allocating appropriate resources for defense.

It would not be surprising if the resulting assessment did not result in increased European conventional forces; indeed, the Europeans might even further reduce their active forces. But in so doing they would make explicit the assumption which underlies this whole argument: that it is not the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons but the absence of overriding political tensions which is

responsible for the very low likelihood of war in Europe. In such circumstances, it should be added, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons would not be removed, although undoubtedly their number should in any case be reduced from their reported present swollen 7,000. Rather, they would remain as a deterrent against nuclear first use by the Warsaw Pact. Whether they remained wholly under U.S. control, or whether some or all were placed under multilateral arrangements,³ the U.S. nuclear umbrella — in so far as it shields our allies from nuclear attack — would be unimpaired.⁴

At present, NATO policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons is ambiguous. It seems clear in retrospect (as, indeed, it did to many observers at the time) that Secretary of Defense McNamara was determined to raise the nuclear threshold so high as to amount virtually to a "no-first-use" position; this was a principal implication of the "flexible response" strategy which the United States imposed on NATO in the early 1960s. Yet because "no first use" has never been adopted as U.S. policy, both U.S. and NATO military planning has always proceeded in a climate of uncertainty regarding the critical issues of whether, and how, nuclear weapons might in fact be used, and how further escalation might be prevented. There is no question but that formal adoption of "no first use" would make possible a more realistic process of military planning. Under present conditions planners and field commanders must fear that the option of initiating the use of nuclear weapons would be denied NATO forces in a crisis, yet they cannot fully plan for that contingency. By limiting options in advance, "no first use" might well enable commanders to respond more decisively, and thus, paradoxically, increase the effectiveness of NATO forces.

As regards Asia, even more than Europe, U.S. military doctrine has been to regard nuclear weapons as a cheap and effective barricade against communist "hordes." Asia, and not Europe, has been the scene of the only U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons — to induce the Chinese Communists to accept a ceasefire in Korea in 1953 and to forestall their invasion of the Nationalist-held offshore islands in 1958. Yet while the doctrine remains the same, reality is changing. The domestic outcry which greeted rumors — almost certainly unfounded — that the Johnson administration was planning to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, to lift the siege of Khe Sanh in 1968, led to official statements that the use of such weapons in the Southeast Asian war was out of the

question. At the same time, there is a heightened general awareness of the racist undertones of a military doctrine which had implied a greater readiness to use nuclear weapons against Asians than against Europeans. These sensitivities, combined with our new relationship with China and a widespread realization that we had wildly overestimated the likelihood of Chinese military expansionism, make it increasingly improbable that we would ever initiate the use of nuclear weapons in any foreseeable Asian contingency.

The United States would not need to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in order to meet its commitments to Japan, Taiwan or the Philippines. If these island territories were ever subject to non-nuclear attack, a non-nuclear response would be sufficient to prevent an invasion or to lift a blockade. Nuclear attack, of course, would be deterred by the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation, just as it would anywhere else where we have commitments (and, more than likely, even where we do not). Only in the case of Korea is there any real likelihood of the kind of "classic" border-crossing attack with main-force units which might be deterred by the threat of a tactical-nuclear response. Here the situation resembles that in Europe: we maintain U.S. forces in Korea for the express purpose of helping an ally deter an invasion. As in Europe, the administration is under considerable budgetary pressure to draw down force levels. Yet the large and well-trained Korean army is a formidable force in its own right, undoubtedly capable of acquitting itself well in the event of a North Korean invasion.

Indeed, U.S. forces have often appeared to be needed less to deter a North Korean attack than to cool hotter heads in the South who want to turn their own soldiers northward. As in the case of Europe, the price of a U.S. "no-first-use" policy might need to be a decision to keep U.S. forces — particularly air forces — in South Korea at greater than token (although lower than present) levels for the foreseeable future.

Alone of Asian governments, that of the Republic of Korea would be likely to lodge strenuous objections to a U.S. "no-first-use" position. In part, however, its objections would be for bargaining purposes, in order to assure the continued presence of U.S. non-nuclear forces, and in part they would also be for domestic political reasons — the Park régime in Seoul has long found it useful to magnify the threat from the North as a rationale for the suppression of opposition at home. Less heated objections, as much for the record and from simple opposition to any change, would be likely to come from Taipei and Bangkok, while the Japanese and perhaps also the Filipinos would be at least as likely to welcome any such move, so long as it was apparent that the U.S. deterrent against nuclear attack remained as effective as before. Provided the Japanese had concrete reassurance on this point, a U.S. "no-first-use" policy would not give them any additional reason to develop nuclear weapons of their own. Indeed, in so far as such a position was made to appear as part of a move to deemphasize nuclear weapons, pressures to "go nuclear" in nations like Japan,

³ As proposed by Walter F. Hahn in his article, "Nuclear Balance in Europe," in the April 1972 issue of *Foreign Affairs*.

⁴ If the United States were to adopt "no first use" and if the British and French did not, it would be at least theoretically possible for either or both of the two smaller nuclear forces to initiate a chain of events which would involve our own. At least for the rest of this decade, however, when both London and Paris will be devoting such resources as they allocate to nuclear weapons predominantly to strategic forces, their tactical capabilities will remain sufficiently modest so that preemptive use would be most unlikely.

which face no insuperable non-nuclear threats, might decrease.

Perhaps the most far-reaching political effects of a U.S. "no-first-use" position would be on our relationship with Peking. Virtually ever since it came to power on the mainland, the communist régime has viewed American (and, later, Soviet) nuclear weapons as a threat aimed particularly at themselves. It is not surprising, therefore, that they have insisted that a prerequisite for China's participation in any measures of arms control relating to nuclear weapons would be prior U.S. and Soviet adoption of the "no-first-use" position to which China has adhered since even before its first nuclear test. This is not to imply that once the United States (and the Soviet Union) had adopted "no first use" the Chinese might be willing to accept restrictions on their own nuclear force which would not also apply to other nuclear powers. Even if China does not plan to deploy nuclear weapons in nearly the quantities fielded by the two superpowers, simple reasons of "face" would prevent Peking's acceptance of lesser quotas. But once the other two had pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons — and therefore, once they had removed from the conduct of their diplomacy nuclear threats, to which the Chinese have been particularly sensitive — Peking might well agree to join the various forums, bilateral and multilateral, in which arms control is discussed. This would be a symbolic step of no small importance, psychologically emphasizing the role of China as a state in the world of states. It also might well have beneficial consequences, as part of the process of wiping the slate clean, for future U.S.-Chinese relations.

A U.S. commitment to "no first use" might come through agreement with one or more other governments, or it might be unilateral. In addition, it might be general or specific (*i.e.* confined to a specified geographic region) in its application. A logical first such bilateral agreement would be between the United States and China. Each would pledge not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against the territory or the armed forces of the other. Such a bilateral agreement would perhaps be easier to negotiate than one that is multilateral. In addition, it might be easier to get agreement to it within the U.S. government than a consensus on a wider commitment. An agreement including the Soviet Union might be postponed until agreement had been reached on other matters affecting European security, such as mutual and balanced force reductions. On the other hand, a bilateral U.S.-China agreement would necessarily leave the parties free to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against third countries, which would clearly be undesirable. (It can be argued, however, that China has already assumed unilaterally a general "no-first-use" commitment which would not be reduced except by explicit reservations.)

If the United States were to adopt a "no-first-use" policy, there are undeniable advantages in doing so within the context of an international — preferably multilateral, rather than bilateral — agreement. An

international agreement would be seen both in the United States and abroad as another measure of arms control, a follow-on to the test-ban, the nonproliferation treaty, SALT and the treaties banning nuclear weapons from Latin America, Antarctica, the seabeds and outer space. It would be useful as a means of preserving the momentum that is an important psychological concomitant of arms control, and therefore as a stepping-stone to eventual arms reductions.

Yet, desirable though "no first use" by international agreement might seem, there are also strong arguments for adopting such a policy by means of a unilateral declaration, as the Chinese have done. Within the United States, a unilateral declaration would meet less resistance from the foreign affairs and military bureaucracies and the Congress, because its wording would not need to be negotiated with other governments and therefore could incorporate any shadings or reservations — such as a statement of conditions which would make the declaration void — which might be regarded as necessary on political grounds.

Moreover, of all the various measures for arms control already in effect or foreseeable, "no first use" is the least dependent for its efficacy on international agreement. The purpose of a "no-first-use" commitment is to decrease the likelihood that parties to a conflict will resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Even if only one party (call it nation A) has made such a commitment, the behavior of its opponent (nation B) will also be affected. A's "no-first-use" declaration will give B at least some assurance that A will not strike with nuclear weapons. B will therefore have less of an incentive to use nuclear weapons to strike preemptively at A's nuclear forces in order to minimize the damage that they might inflict. Indeed, B will have a positive incentive not to use nuclear weapons, for their use would free A from its "no-first-use" commitment, and invite nuclear retaliation. Thus a "no-first-use" commitment undertaken unilaterally by only one party to a conflict will still serve to widen the fire-break between conventional and nuclear weapons for the conflict as a whole. And unilateral "no-first-use" declarations will encourage other governments to do the same: the more that do so, the wider the fire-break becomes.

Whether "no first use" is undertaken unilaterally or by international agreement, the consequences for individual nations are exactly the same, for "no first use" does not depend for enforcement upon international mechanisms. Instead, it is self-enforcing: once a nation violates its pledge of "no first use," others are thereby released from their pledges, subjecting the violator to the prospect of nuclear retaliation — a prospect which would be a powerful deterrent against violation. This simplicity is one of the attractive aspects of "no first use" as an arms-control measure. It is also one of its weaknesses. A nation may go back on its declared word. A government — indeed, a single national leader — may decide that a nation stands to gain more from escalating to nuclear weapons, despite the retaliation that would then be invoked, than it does from allowing a conflict to

proceed using only conventional weapons. Moreover, an abrogation would not need to be formally a violation; before actually escalating, a government could solemnly announce that its previous declaration of "no first use" is rescinded. Indeed, the prospect of abrogation — which would never be entirely absent so long as states retained nuclear stockpiles — would in itself serve as a form of deterrent against conventional attacks. Who can say what a government might do under crisis conditions should it feel that its existence, or vital national interests, were threatened?

Such fragility is undoubtedly a drawback, but "no first use" is in fact no more fragile than any other arms-control régime. Indeed, because it is so directly self-enforcing, with such potentially dire consequences from abrogation, it is as relatively durable as any arms-control régime can be in a world of sovereign states lacking any overarching mechanism of enforcement. In order to prevent violation, states which subscribe to the principle of "no first use" will nevertheless keep their own nuclear forces at whatever levels they calculate are necessary to deter nuclear attacks upon them by others. They might, however, find it possible to phase out some of their tactical nuclear weapons more suited to initial than to retaliatory use, and to withdraw others from forward positions to the greater custodial security of rear depots. And if the principle ever seemed to be well accepted by all of the main nuclear powers, national-security bureaucracies might be moved to make more far-reaching reductions in their nuclear forces, based upon more realistic notions of types and levels of weapons genuinely necessary for deterring nuclear attacks.

An alternative to a flat "no-first-use" declaration, at least for the United States, might come through congressional legislation stipulating that the President, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, may not initiate the use of nuclear weapons without receiving prior congressional authorization. Congress now has before it so-called War Powers legislation stipulating that in the absence of a formal declaration of war the President may not engage the armed forces in military operations for more than 30 days without specific congressional authorization. This draft legislation is premised upon the assumption that the "collective judgment" of Congress and the President should apply to the "initiation" and the "continuation" of hostilities. Senator Fulbright, Congressman Dellums, and others (including the Federation of American Scientists, one of the most active lobbying groups in the arms-control area) have pointed out that just as Congress should be concerned to limit the power of the President to *sustain* hostilities without its approval, so it should also limit his power to *escalate* them across the threshold from conventional to nuclear weapons. They are seeking to amend the War Powers legislation to that effect.⁵

In many respects the effects of this proposed legislation would be similar to those of an orthodox commitment to "no first use". Nuclear threats would be inappropriate.

Force deployments might reflect the assumption that the United States would not initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Just as in the case of a "no-first-use" commitment, U.S. ability to respond to a nuclear attack, and therefore the efficacy of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, would be undiminished. The granting of congressional authorization, should it take place, would be equivalent to a formal announcement rescinding a prior "no-first-use" commitment, unilateral or multilateral. Such authorization (or the rescinding of a prior "no-first-use" commitment) would, in fact, constitute in itself an important diplomatic instrument. It would convey to an adversary the seriousness with which Washington viewed a threat, and its willingness to risk nuclear war in response. In this respect congressional authorization (or the public rescinding of "no first use") would be akin to the "demonstration use" which figures in some war-fighting scenarios, when one party to a conflict explodes a nuclear weapon in a manner which inflicts no damage but nevertheless conveys resolve.

Depending upon the form it took, the requirement of congressional authorization might also differ in important respects from a "no-first-use" commitment. For example, the President might announce in advance, and the Congress informally indicate its agreement, that in certain contingencies — a build-up, for example, of Warsaw Pact forces near a Western frontier — he would seek advance authorization. Such an announcement might serve to reassure allies, such as the West Germans or the South Koreans, who otherwise might feel that their positions were excessively vulnerable.⁶ In such a form the basic principle of "no first use" — although substantially diluted — might also be more readily accepted by the American foreign affairs bureaucracy, by the military services and by the Congress itself. Yet, by the same token, it would be regarded as insufficient by others; the Chinese, for example, would be unlikely to regard it as sufficiently forthcoming to serve as an opening for their participation in arms-control discussions.

Regardless of whether Congress passes War Powers legislation which includes a prohibition on the first use of nuclear weapons without its authorization, and regardless of whether the present or a future administration should decide to commit itself to "no first use", the issue of when the United States might be prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons deserves more serious public discussion than it has thus far had. Present U.S. military

(Continued on page 19) **NO FIRST USE**

⁵ It has also been suggested that any such amendment should stipulate that when the President comes before Congress with a request for authority to use nuclear weapons, Congress must act on his request, positively or negatively, within a specified short period of time, say two or three days.

⁶ It might be argued that such an announcement might lead an opponent to respond with a preemptive nuclear strike on U.S. tactical or strategic nuclear forces. Yet such a risk would not be significantly greater than it would have been had "no first use" never been adopted in the first place, which merely points up the fact that the principal reason for adopting "no first use" is to reduce incentives toward nuclear preemption.

CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING AND CIVIL DEFENCE NETHERLANDS

Civil emergency planning covers all measures designed to maintain social and economic life in time of war.

The planning of these measures and their implementation in time of war are the responsibility of a number of ministers, each of whom undertakes the duties which, in wartime, would represent a national extension of his peace-time functions. All activities are co-ordinated by the Civil Emergency Planning Staff, acting for the Minister for Home Affairs. The Queen's Commissioner (Provincial Governor) is responsible for co-ordination at provincial level and burgomasters ensure co-ordination at municipal level.

Peace-time civil emergency planning covers both organizational preparations and the stock-piling of vital commodities and materials (emergency food supplies, medicines, hospital beds for war victims, fuel, spare parts for repairs, etc).

Civil Defence forms part of civil emergency planning and, as defined in Article 1 of the Civil Defence Act, comprises the totality of non-military measures for the protection of the population and its possessions and of the possessions of public bodies against the immediate effects of acts of war.

Organization of Civil Defence

Under the Civil Defence Act each burgomaster has command over and is responsible for the organization of civil defence in his community. From the point of view of efficiency, however, it would not have been justifiable to set up a separate CD organization in each community. The Civil Defence Act therefore provides for the Crown to group communities together when necessary into larger districts. There are now 44 Civil Defence districts covering the whole of the Netherlands, with the exception of 3 municipalities (Amsterdam, Dordrecht and Texel). The burgomasters of the communities within a Civil Defence district form the Civil Defence District Council, which is the joint administrative body for Civil Defence in each district. Each district is administered in accordance with a "common arrangement". Within his own community, however, each burgomaster is entitled to amplify the decisions of the District Council and in so doing must consult the municipal authorities and to report on the result of the consultations to the municipal council.

The National Plan

A National Plan drawn up by the Minister for Home Affairs provides guidelines for the organization of Civil Defence. It constitutes the basis of the municipal and district organization plans, in which arrangements concerning strength, composition, equipment and so on are set out in greater detail. These plans have to be submitted

for approval to the Minister for Home Affairs, thus enabling the national structure to be adapted to local conditions.

Districts Civil Defence, Community Civil Defence Civil Defence Command (Control)

The District Council (or, in the case of Amsterdam, Dordrecht and Texel, the burgomaster) is assisted in its task by a CD Command, which acts as its operational executive, headed by a Civil Defence Controller who is charged with Civil Defence activities.

The CD Controller is charged with organizing Civil Defence in his district and with the training of Civil Defence workers. The CD Controller has an office and a full-time staff whose number depends on the strength of the CD-organization in the district.

On mobilization of the Civil Defence forces, members of the Command man control centres offering reasonable protection against the effects of modern weapons and equipped with adequate means of communication, including radio transmitting and receiving apparatus.

Self-help Groups

Civil Defence, is based on the principle of individual self-help. Under the self-help scheme citizens co-operate at neighbourhood level. The self-help groups should be seen as a system providing a link between Civil Defence and the public in general. Self-help groups exist to inform and to advise the public on how they can protect themselves, to reconnoitre and report on the situation in their area and to give all possible help in an emergency, such as in the event of radio-active fallout. In urban areas these activities are the responsibility of a District Warden (1 per 15,000 inhabitants) assisted by a small staff and of Block Wardens (1 per 200 inhabitants).

In rural areas the self-help groups also comprise self-help units which have additional fire-fighting, rescue, and first aid duties.

In most rural communities the burgomaster is assisted by a Head of the Self-Help groups. The self-help groups are exclusively manned by volunteers.

Industrial Protection

The industrial protection aims firstly at the protection of everybody (both staff and visitors) in factories, workshops, offices and so on and secondly at the protection of these establishments themselves. To this end "Industrial protection groups" specialized in fire-fighting, rescue work and first aid are formed in every factory, workshop or office where there are normally over 30 people present. The present number of trained members of these groups is over 100,000.

District CD Service

The main force of each district CD command provides the following services a warning service, advanced assistance units, a fire service, a rescue service, a medical service, and ABC service, a signal service and a supply service. These services act as a complement to the existing municipal peace-time emergency services and supplement these in time of war in order to cope with the effects of disasters of a magnitude to be expected in such conditions.

- *The warning service* has to warn the public in time of the threat of an air attack or of fallout. Personnel from this service are stationed in the various control centres and they possess their own means of communication. Warning would be given by siren from 3,000 points throughout the Netherlands and by radio broadcasts.
- *The advanced assistance units.* These are only to be found in urban areas. Their duties are to penetrate quickly into the disaster areas before the arrival of the specialized services and to rescue as many people as possible before the area becomes inaccessible as a result of fire. Their training concentrates on the rapid rescue of trapped persons, giving first aid, and simple fire-fighting. The service was set up in 1966.

If the Civil Defence forces were mobilized in an emergency the fire fighting material of the municipal fire brigades would be incorporated into the CD fire service. The same would apply to the regular members of the fire brigades (volunteer members of the fire services would only come under CD command if they agreed to do so). The municipal fire brigades possess over 1,800 fire engines, the joint capacity of which is about 2.6 million litres per minute, and possess a total hose-length of about 900 kilometres. The Government has provided an additional 450 fire engines with a capacity of about 1.1 million litres per minute and a total length of 660 kilometres of hose. 36 of these 450 fire engines have been designated for mounting on 18 fire-fighting vessels which, together with 15 Command vessels constitute the CD fire-fighting squadron in the Rotterdam port area. The Government has provided 420 mobile water tanks with a capacity of 100 cub.m. each, for regions lacking water.

- *The rescue service* has to rescue trapped people and make the stricken area accessible to assisting units. There are 752 rescue units and 186 pioneer units in the local CD groups which, combined, could rescue about 13,000 persons per hour. Their equipment has been provided by the Government and includes 20 overheadloaders (in the larger towns).
- *The medical service* has been formed to transport as many injured as possible to hospital in the best conditions and in the quickest manner. The CD is not responsible for medical attention in the hospitals, this being done by the wartime hospital

service under the responsibility of the Minister of Health and the Environment with whom close co-operation is maintained. District and Municipal CD medical services possess a total of about 200 mobile medical units with a joint capacity of about 18,600 injured per hour for this special task. The Government has provided the necessary medical equipment and material for primary medical treatment to be given to 190,000 persons, plus a war-time reserve of 50% for infusion material and 75% for other material.

- *The ABC-service* is concerned with the nuclear, biological and chemical aspects of warfare. In case of nuclear war, the ABC-service has to locate nuclear bursts and to indicate the size of the bomb used by the enemy (using the 300 fixed monitoring posts provided for this purpose). Further, it has to reconnoitre the contaminated areas and measures and report the extent of radioactivity. The service makes use of 900 mobile monitoring posts in addition to the 300 fixed posts for this purpose. The ABC-service is also responsible for decontamination (of people, animals and goods) using existing public bathing facilities. Its equipment has been provided by the Government.

Other Civil Defence services are:

- *the signals service*, which is equipped with 1,100 radio telephones and 1,700 walkie-talkies and can make use of 300 fixed telephones.
- *the supply service*, responsible for supplies to mobilized CD forces in operational posts. This service was set up in 1967.

The principle of "assistance"

If all the local CD forces available were to join up they would constitute quite a considerable force. However, they are dispersed over several districts and the force in any one district would not be large enough to cope suitably with the effects of a major war-time disaster.

The Organization of Civil Defence is therefore based on the principle of "assistance" which means that the CD force from an unaffected CD district will come to the aid of a CD force in an affected district.

The Queen's Commissioner (the Provincial Governor) is responsible for arranging this assistance within each province. Just as at local level there is an executive command headed by the District Civil Defence Controller, so at provincial level the Queen's Commissioner is assisted by a Provincial Command, headed by a Provincial CD Controller, operating from the Provincial Control Centre.

Provincial CD Commands can make use of the following provincial units:

- mobile units for transporting the injured (in 9 of the 11 provinces);

- mobile monitoring and decontamination companies of the ABC-service, equipped with mobile shower facilities (24 showers; 1 company in each province).

The organization of assistance at national level is undertaken by the National CD Commander and his staff acting for the Minister for Home Affairs.

The National Commander is authorized to order district CD forces to render assistance in another province and he is further able to make use of a considerable national disaster relief organization, which possesses 3 ABC mobile monitoring and decontamination companies and well-equipped mobile columns.

The Mobile Columns

The Mobile Columns form part of the Royal Netherlands Army and are entirely manned by military staff. On mobilization of the Civil Defence forces, the Mobile Columns are made available to the Minister for Home Affairs.

There are: 12 Fire Service Mobile Columns, 6 Rescue Service Mobile Columns and 5 Medical Service Mobile Columns with a total strength amounting to 21,600 men.

Each *Fire Service* Mobile Column of about 790 men possesses 48 fire engines and 153 motor vehicles (including 11 motor cycles). The Fire Service MC's together possess 576 fire engines and a total hose-length of 736 km. The 3,456 hose nozzles can deliver 144,000 litres of water per minute.

The *Rescue Service* Mobile Columns are each composed of 48 rescue groups and 12 pioneer groups and one platoon responsible for mechanical equipment and one platoon responsible for three water purification installations. The total strength of one Rescue Service MC is about 1,060 men, with 186 motor vehicles (including 12 motor cycles). Together the 6 columns possess 24 overheadloaders and can rescue 5,000 persons per hour.

The 18 water purifying installations together can produce 1,500 to 2,400 cub.m. of drinking water per 24 hours, which should be enough to supply between 500,000 and 800,000 people.

Each *Medical Service* Mobile Column is composed of 10 platoons. The 5 Medical Service MC's together can make 5,000 injured per hour ready for transport to hospital. Each Medical Service MC has about 890 men, and 193 motor vehicles (including 19 motor cycles). The Government provided material for primary medical treatment to be given 50,000 persons, plus a wartime reserve for a further 25,000 persons (additional to District CD-medical service material).

The Mobile Columns will primarily be used to assist the district CD forces. The general principle of assistance, whereby a CD unit from an unaffected district goes to the assistance of a CD unit in an affected area, applies similarly to the Mobile Columns (operated by military personnel), who also place themselves under the command of the CD District Civil Defence Controller (who is a civilian) in the affected area.

Personnel

There are four categories of Civil Defence personnel:

1. full-time Civil Defence Staff officers
2. officials of the municipal, provincial and national authorities
3. volunteers
4. conscripted civilian members (active people not having military service obligations).

Permanent peace-time CD staff is limited to a nucleus, i.e. to the minimum number of people required to be prepared for actual war-time duties.

Officials of the municipal, provincial or national authorities can be assigned specific functions related to their normal peace-time duties (e.g. in the case of the municipal fire services or regular medical personnel).

Self-help groups are organized on an entirely voluntary basis. Volunteers may also join other services, such as the fire service. However, most C.D. personnel belong to the fourth category of conscripted civilian members.

Training

The principle behind Civil Defence training is that it should be given locally, that is to say within each CD district. The district Civil Defence Controller, therefore, has to organize training and exercises within his district for CD personnel, which he does in accordance with national guidelines.

The people responsible for Civil Defence training have to undertake a course at the Civil Defence Staff School. There are three training camps in three different parts of the country used for training and for exercises of the district Civil Defence Rescue Services.

Finances

The local CD groups are largely financed by the National Government (at a cost of about f. 4. — per head annually). The municipalities contribute a sum which varies according to local circumstances and which on average comes to f.0.50 per head of the population. The provincial organizations are entirely financed by the National Government.

Hospital services

The Minister of Health and the Environment is responsible for the "Wartime Hospital Organization". Co-ordination between this organization and the Civil Defence Medical Service is ensured in two ways. Firstly, by the congruence of the areas into which the country has been divided for the purpose of the one organization and the other so that, with a few exceptions of minor importance, the areas of the hospital districts — comprising all the existing hospitals — are geographically the same as the Civil Defence districts and the Provinces, respectively.

Secondly, by combining on the hospital group CD district level in one person the function of hospital group physician who will distribute the casualties to the avail-

able hospitals — and the function of Commander of the Civil Defence Medical Service in the CD district and moreover by equally combining on the hospital district-Provincial level the functions of leader of the hospital district and of Provincial Civil Defence Controller.

Evacuation

Evacuation policy is based on the stay-put policy. Before the outbreak of war, there will be no preventive

evacuations. After the outbreak of war evacuation will be ordered only if circumstances so require.

The ordering of an evacuation is the joint responsibility of the Minister of Defence and the Minister for Home Affairs. The Queen's Commissioners and the burgomasters can be authorized to take such a measure.

The burgomaster is responsible for the requisitioning of accommodation for evacuees and for those who would become otherwise homeless. ▲

EMERGENCY (Continued from page 1)

rapid and co-ordinated decisions. The Emergency Measures Controller should lead in this government wide effort to provide for "direction and control" in emergencies.

This usually involves plans for operations at a control centre, at which the key officials of government will get information on the emergency situation, and can make decisions rapidly, but after co-ordinating with each other as conditions may require. This control centre is the "Emergency Government Headquarters" of a municipality or Emergency Measures unit. Those of you who have been involved in our major floods will have seen such a headquarters in being in the Legislative Buildings on several occasions.

In an actual emergency, the chief executive is in over-all command and is responsible for policy-level decisions. The chief of police or fire chief, and other heads of operating departments are in command of their forces. The Emergency Measures Controller's function is to serve as senior staff officer for the mayor or other chief executive.

Emergency measures planning, before an emergency, is a form of insurance that will enable regular departments of government to swing into their emergency activities with a minimum of delay and confusion.

Wartime planning is still a responsibility of Emergency Measures but more and more our own energy and resources are being expended on planning and preparations for civil disasters such as major air crashes, chemical and oil spills, assistance to the RCMP in major searches for lost people, assistance in the evacuation of individuals and their property in the face of oncoming forest fires, etc.

A Manitoba Civil Disaster Plan has been prepared by the Provincial Emergency Measures Branch and this plan, copies of which have been forwarded to all municipalities, details the procedures to be followed in the event of civil disasters and in the paragraph headed "Responsibilities" it states "Immediate assistance to the victim of a civil disaster is the responsibility of the municipal government concerned." The plan then goes on to explain how assistance can be obtained through the Provincial Emergency Measures Branch should the disaster be beyond the ability of the municipality to handle.

Some 38 municipal emergency areas have disaster plans in being and these are checked regularly by our zone officers.

Some of you may be newly appointed to your present positions and may not yet have had an opportunity to study the Manitoba Civil Disaster Plan and I would suggest that you study the plan, in conjunction with your local emergency plan at the first opportunity.

Emergency measures preparation can be likened to buying fire or accident insurance, you have all accepted the essential need for such insurance but we all hope that we will never have to take advantage of the protection it provides.

It has been a very great pleasure for me to be with you this morning and I want to thank you for taking the time from your busy schedules to attend this conference. I am sure that you will return home with some new knowledge of the service our Emergency Measures Branch is endeavouring to provide, within the limits of the funds allocated to it. ▲

NO FIRST USE (Continued from page 15)

doctrine (if not practice) continues to regard nuclear weapons as trade-offs for adequate conventional forces — indeed, as simply higher levels on a continuum of violence. The public should have more information concerning the circumstances in which those trade-offs might be made, what might be achieved by escalating to nuclear weapons, and what risks of still greater nuclear

escalation would thereby be engendered. An unequivocal "no-first-use" position undoubtedly also entails certain risks. But careful and thoughtful examination might judge them lesser risks, and risks more easily hedged against, than those inherent in blurring the line between conventional and nuclear weapons, and thus jeopardizing the long-lasting nuclear truce. ▲

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