2007-2008 Formative Evaluation of the Investments to Combat the Criminal Use of Firearms Initiative

Prepared for
Public Safety Canada
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Canada Border Services Agency

Prepared by
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# List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACIIS</td>
<td>Automated Criminal Intelligence Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSC</td>
<td>Balanced Scorecard</td>
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<tr>
<td>CACP</td>
<td>Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAFC</td>
<td>Canadian Firearms Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBCF</td>
<td>Cross-Border Crime Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBSA</td>
<td>Canada Border Services Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCGFT</td>
<td>Canadian Consultative Group on Firearms Trafficking</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCJS</td>
<td>Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFIS</td>
<td>Canadian Firearms Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFTC</td>
<td>Canadian Firearms Tracing Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIBIN</td>
<td>Canadian Integrated Ballistic Identification Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Criminal Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISC</td>
<td>Criminal Intelligence Service Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRU</td>
<td>Case Receipt Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>Departmental Performance Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Expenditure Review Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRT/CIBIN</td>
<td>Firearms Reference Table/ Canadian Integrated Ballistic Identification Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLS</td>
<td>Forensic Laboratory Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOES</td>
<td>Firearms Offences Enforcement Support System</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRT</td>
<td>Firearms Reference Table</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSSD</td>
<td>Firearms Support Services Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTE</td>
<td>Full-Time Equivalent</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBET</td>
<td>Integrated Border Enforcement Team</td>
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<td>IBIS</td>
<td>Integrated Ballistics Identification System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCUF</td>
<td>Investments to Combat the Criminal Use of Firearms</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICES</td>
<td>Integrated Customs Enforcement System</td>
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<td>IMS</td>
<td>Intelligence Management System</td>
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<td>JMT</td>
<td>Joint Management Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLAT</td>
<td>Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty</td>
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<td>NCDB</td>
<td>National Criminal Data Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Collection Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDCT</td>
<td>National Data Collection Template</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFCP</td>
<td>National Firearms Collection Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTA</td>
<td>National Threat Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWEST</td>
<td>National Weapons Enforcement Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIRS</td>
<td>Police Information Retrieval System</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROS</td>
<td>Police Reporting Operational System</td>
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<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Public Safety Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWEU</td>
<td>Provincial Weapons Enforcement Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIFLO</td>
<td>Regional Intelligence Firearms Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAU</td>
<td>Tactical Analysis Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBS</td>
<td>Treasury Board Secretariat</td>
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[*] - In accordance with the Privacy and Access to Information Acts, some information may have been severed from the original reports.
1. Executive Summary Report

1.1 Background and Objectives

In May 2004, the Government of Canada announced a comprehensive package of improvements aimed at, among other items, enhancing the capacity of law enforcement agencies to address gun crime and smuggling. These investments were intended to stabilize funding for existing efforts, increase funding to enhance intelligence collection activities related to firearms, and increase funding to build on efforts already identified through the Canada-U.S. Action Plan on Firearms Trafficking. The ICCUF Initiative was established as a response of the Government to enhance intelligence sharing capacity among federal organizations and agencies involved in firearms control related activities. The ICCUF operates as a horizontal initiative within the Public Safety (PS) Portfolio, and involves six distinct partners from three federal organizations:

- PS
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP):
  - National Weapons Enforcement Support Team (NWEST)
  - Firearms Reference Table and Canadian Integrated Ballistic Identification Network (FRT/CIBIN)\(^1\)
  - Criminal Intelligence (CI)
- Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC)
- Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)

The table below shows the allocation of Initiative funding to the six funded partners which was in place as of April 1, 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ICCUF Funding Organization</th>
<th>Five Year Funding Level</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NWEST</td>
<td>$25.08M *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRT/CIBIN</td>
<td>$8.965M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISC</td>
<td>$2.20M *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>$5.6M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSA</td>
<td>$6.65M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>$1.22M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$50M</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The funding distribution shown above reflects the following shift of resources from those shown in the original Initiative design. A total of 4 FTEs and $506,583 annually over five years (or $2.53M total) was transferred from CISC to NWEST as a result of responsibility for the National Firearms Tracing Centre being moved from CISC to NWEST, subsequent to the original request for funding.

\(^1\) Original ICCUF documents refer to the FRT/CIBIN partner as Forensic Laboratory Services (FLS). Due to reorganization within the RCMP, the former FLS partner is referred to as FRT/CIBIN throughout this report. The activities and responsibilities of this partner remain the same.
The overall aim of the ICCUF is to improve the national collection, analysis and sharing of firearms-related intelligence and information. Therefore, at the heart of this Initiative is the enhancement of the criminal intelligence capacity of the RCMP, CISC and the CBSA to gather, analyze and share intelligence in order to improve individual investigations and to increase knowledge of the extent and patterns of smuggling and trafficking of firearms used in crime so that an intelligence-led national enforcement strategy can be developed.

As part of ongoing efforts to ensure the continued integrity and efficiency of the ICCUF Initiative, in August 2005, an evaluation framework was prepared. The framework was developed through a consultative process involving the ICCUF Joint Management Team (JMT). The Evaluation Framework included an Initiative profile, a logic model, an evaluation strategy and an evaluation reporting strategy. As illustrated in the ICCUF logic model at Appendix A, the funded activities undertaken by each of the partners fall into three main components: Policy/Research; Intelligence; and Investigative Support.

As per the Evaluation Framework, the overall objective of the formative evaluation was to assess how the Initiative is being implemented, particularly with respect to the intelligence component, whether adjustments should be made, and whether progress toward the achievement of the immediate outcomes was occurring. Consequently, the formative evaluation questions and analysis focus on the design and delivery aspects of the Initiative as well as early success, and likelihood of achieving intermediate and ultimate outcomes. In addition, the formative evaluation examines the effectiveness of ICCUF in its current structure, roles, and functions; and identifies internal and external influences on performance of the ICCUF to date.

1.2 Evaluation Methodology

Research activities for the evaluation were conducted by Government Consulting Services (GSC) from October 2006 to January 2007. During the evaluation, GCS conducted the following activities:

**Preparation of Data Gathering Tools:** Based upon the methodology outlined in the methodology report, GCS developed templates and tools for data analysis.

**Document Review and Review of System Reports (Quantitative Data):** Over 56 pieces of documentation were received by GCS for review.

**Interviews with Managers and NWEST Team Leaders:** GCS conducted seven interviews with program managers and three NWEST Team Leaders.

**Focus Groups:** GCS conducted four regional intelligence focus groups with staff involved in implementing the intelligence function of the ICCUF Initiative at the regional level. The focus groups included members chosen from the ICCUF regional staff of CI, NWEST and CBSA. In addition, one focus group was held with members of the NWEST Advisory Board in order to discuss the needs of stakeholders.
Data Analysis and Report Production: Using information gathered during the document review, quantitative review, interviews, and focus groups, GCS analyzed the findings according to each evaluation issue area and question. GCS then prepared a draft and final report.

1.3 Summary of Achievements to Date

The following paragraphs provide a summary of achievements, of the ICCUF Initiative, to date.

In the area of design and delivery, progress has been made toward the establishment of an appropriate governance structure of the ICCUF. The structure includes a JMT with representation from all partners. Through the JMT, planning problems have been identified and solutions have been implemented. The JMT is functioning well in its response to issues (reactive planning) as a consensus-based forum for issues resolution. The JMT has produced positive results in terms of shared decision-making and problem solving. Regional subcommittees, with membership from the Intelligence Component (CBSA, CI, CISC and NWEST), are included in the governance structure. Several of these regional subcommittees have been established, and some planning is taking place at the operational level of the ICCUF. Implementation of resources has been slower than expected due to several challenges that now appear to have been overcome.

In terms of output production, the ICCUF Initiative is in the early stages of delivery; as such, all partners have demonstrated a great deal of output production and delivery, particularly given that the funding was not received until April 2005. It can be stated that the partners have sufficiently delivered outputs consistent with expectations of a formative evaluation.

Success in the area of strategic intelligence sharing has been demonstrated in several areas. There are indications that CISC intelligence products have been useful in identifying trends in support of re-prioritizing resources. In addition, the NWEST Monthly Report is providing useful information to ICCUF partners. Specifically, NWEST is providing high quality actionable and timely intelligence. Clearly progress has been made, and it is apparent that there are ongoing efforts being made towards developing intelligence analysis that meet the needs of the broader law enforcement community. There also exist several concrete examples of how the sharing of information and intelligence is leading to action within the policing community, and the level of success in this area is consistent with the current stage of the ICCUF.

In terms of the added value of tactical intelligence, ACIIS and informal day-to-day conversations among NWEST regional offices are the primary mechanisms for tactical intelligence sharing. The sharing of tactical intelligence among ICCUF partners in the regions has resulted in increased interdiction of firearms at the border; and a more unified approach to addressing the criminal use of firearms. NWEST regional staff have supported multiple individual investigations, and feedback from law enforcement regarding the collection of intelligence and information to produce search warrants indicates that the advice provided by NWEST is useful. Finally, implementation of CIBIN means that users can access tactical intelligence data in other jurisdictions, save time, and connect firearms intelligence to otherwise unconnected events and across precincts.
The ICCUF has also contributed to the increased knowledge of investigative procedures as evidenced by the significant number of training sessions delivered, advice provided, and perceptions of interviewees. Further information from training recipients on the value of training would support findings in this area.

Finally, as evidenced by the number of seizures, interviewee responses, and information provided by the NWEST Monthly Reports, significant progress has been made in investigation and enforcement of gun legislation. In addition, seizure data provided to date will provide a good baseline for future evaluation activities.

1.4 Recommendations for Improvement

In addition to the achievements noted in the preceding section, several recommendations are presented for improvement of the ICCUF. General recommendations related to the Initiative overall are presented along with recommendations organized by the three ICCUF components: Policy/Research, Intelligence, and Investigative Support. After each recommendation, a bracketed reference is included indicating to which partner(s) the recommendation is directed.

1.4.1 General Recommendations

PLANNING FRAMEWORK

1. Consideration should be given to the addition of strategic planning expertise to the JMT so that formalized horizontal planning documents can be prepared that complement/supplement the Evaluation Framework which is currently being used as a planning tool. (JMT)

2. Indicators associated with the Intelligence Component should be reviewed to ensure that performance information provides useful information regarding the quality and usefulness of intelligence produced and does not simply provide a quantification of outputs. To this end, a mechanism for soliciting stakeholder feedback should be implemented. (NWEST, FRT/CIBIN, CISC, CI, CBSA)

PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

3. The JMT should consider developing a Performance Management Framework to supplement the Evaluation Framework. Given the amount of information being produced by partners, it could be capitalized upon for management of the Initiative; particularly with respect to determining appropriate resource levels and the geographic location of resources in support of a national enforcement strategy. (JMT)

4. ICCUF partners should continue efforts to track output-based efficiency measures in order to assist in workload planning and provision of performance information. (All)

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2 Although no formal performance measurement is in place for the initiative, partners have agreed that, to the extent possible, internal performance measurement systems will be used to link to the indicators for the ICCUF evaluation.
5. CISC and CI have experienced challenges in achieving sound management of financial resources, due to lengthy staffing processes, which has caused expenditure variances to be outside generally acceptable limits. With staff in place, management of financial resources should likely improve. Going forward, CI and CISC should ensure that budgets are more closely monitored and managed, so that funds do not lapse in the future. (CISC, CI).

GOVERNANCE

6. Since the effectiveness of the regional subcommittees varies from region to region, the governance structure should be strengthened. The role of each partner should be clearly communicated and participation in the subcommittees should be encouraged. (NWEST, CISC, CI, CBSA)

7. Secretariat functions of the JMT should be strengthened. To this end, consideration should be given to: establishing a charter or terms of reference for the JMT; establishing frequency of meetings; and finding a mechanism that will even out the balance of power so that all partners are considered in decision-making. (JMT)

8. The role of PS should be discussed at the JMT in order to clarify their participation. (JMT)

1.4.2 Policy/ Research Component

OUTPUT DELIVERY

9. PS consultations with the JMT should be continued to ensure that research papers respond to the operational environment, in addition to the strategic agenda, and directly relate to ICCUF partner challenges operationally. For example, the research agenda might include legislative and policy research with respect to the challenges that operational partners are facing with respect to information sharing under the constraints of the Privacy Act and the Customs Act. (JMT/PS)

1.4.3 Intelligence Component Recommendations

PROCESSES FOR SHARING INTELLIGENCE

10. A process map should be prepared for the intelligence function at the regional level so that partners can clearly understand their roles, and potential duplication can be eliminated. This may also encourage common understanding and/or standardization of the process across regions. In conducting this exercise, consideration should be given to the existing regional networks of CBSA, NWEST and CISC. The need to provide tactical intelligence to support strategic intelligence activities must be considered in the process mapping of the regional intelligence function. (NWEST, CISC, CI, CBSA)

11. Although intelligence sharing through informal means is providing some desired results, the informal process limits investigations within a particular geographic area or within a personal network of contacts. Database issues should be resolved so that linkages among geographic
areas can be established and investigations can be expanded beyond their current limits. (NWEST, CISC, CI, CBSA)

12. Beyond the evaluation forms gathered by CISC on their intelligence products, there appears to be no formal mechanisms through which law enforcement can offer constructive feedback on intelligence products. Similarly, there is no formal mechanism through which ICCUF program managers can assess how intelligence provided to stakeholders is being utilized. Mechanisms to gather feedback on the usefulness of intelligence products should be expanded. Some interviewees suggested a feedback process that would determine whether actionable intelligence is being acted upon. (NWEST, CISC, CI, CBSA)

RESOURCES

13. The data entry and analysis portion of the Intelligence Component is not adequately supported. This is a serious issue that should be addressed immediately if the ICCUF is to attain its intelligence-based outcomes. (NWEST, CISC, CI, CBSA)

14. For the Intelligence and Investigative Support Components, consideration should be given to the development of a mapping of the geographic location of resources, against workload volumes. An illustration of the resource mapping may assist in understanding what synergies might be achieved through the available resources and how efficiencies may be realized. (NWEST, CISC, CI, CBSA)

IMPROVED SHARING OF ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE

15. Stakeholder needs for actionable intelligence should be further identified through stakeholder consultation in order to align the needs of stakeholders with the products produced. (NWEST, CISC, CI, CBSA)

1.4.4 Investigative Support Component

INFRASTRUCTURE FOR EDUCATIONAL MATERIAL AND ADVICE

16. A communications strategy should be developed in consultation with partners and targeted to law enforcement personnel so that the role of ICCUF partners and particularly that of NWEST can be clearly understood. The communication strategy should be inclusive of a component to educate front line officers on the role of NWEST staff to support and not to conduct investigations. (NWEST)

RESOURCES

17. The workload of NWEST members should be further monitored in order to determine if staff are becoming overloaded, as this may be an emerging issue. If no further resources are available, demands for the work of NWEST members (among training, providing advice, and intelligence activities) may require prioritization. (NWEST)
2. Introduction

This formative evaluation report of the Investments to Combat the Criminal Use of Firearms (ICCF) Initiative is organized into three sections:

- The first section provides background on the ICCUF Initiative; an overview of the evaluation framework and description of the objectives of the formative evaluation; an explanation of the methodology used to conduct the evaluation; and, finally, a listing of limitations related to the study.

- The second section provides findings and conclusions from all lines of inquiry of the evaluation, organized by the evaluation issue areas of Design and Delivery and Success, and broken down by individual evaluation question.

- The third section presents recommendations.

2.1 Background

In order to address the issue of crime and the use of guns to commit crime as an important component of public safety, the Government of Canada has committed to enhancing the coordination and analysis of information on crime guns and other issues associated with the criminal use of firearms.

In May 2004, the Government of Canada announced a comprehensive package of improvements aimed at, among other items, enhancing the capacity of law enforcement agencies to address gun crime and smuggling. These investments were intended to stabilize funding for existing efforts, increase funding to enhance intelligence collection activities related to firearms, and increase funding to build on efforts already identified through the Canada-U.S. Action Plan on Firearms Trafficking. The ICCUF Initiative was established as a response of the Government to enhance intelligence sharing capacity among federal organizations and agencies involved in firearms control related activities. The ICCUF operates as a horizontal initiative within the Public Safety (PS) Portfolio, and involves six distinct partners from three federal entities:

- PS

- Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP):
  - National Weapons Enforcement Support Team (NWEST)
  - Firearms Reference Table and Canadian Integrated Ballistic Identification Network (FRT/CIBIN)\(^3\)

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\(^3\) Original ICCUF documents refer to the FRT/CIBIN partner as Forensic Laboratory Services (FLS). Due to reorganization within the RCMP, the former FLS partner is referred to as FRT/CIBIN throughout this report. The activities and responsibilities of this partner remain the same.
The table below shows the allocation of Initiative funding to the six funded partners which was generally in place as of April 1, 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ICCUF Funding</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWEST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRT/CIBIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The funding distribution shown above reflects the following shift of resources from those shown in the original Initiative design. A total of 4 FTEs and $506,583 annually over five years (or $2.53M total) was transferred from CISC to NWEST as a result of responsibility for the National Firearms Tracing Centre being moved from CISC to NWEST, subsequent to the original request for funding.

The overall aim of the ICCUF is to improve the national collection, analysis and sharing of firearms-related intelligence and information. Therefore, at the heart of this Initiative is the enhancement of the criminal intelligence capacity of the RCMP, CISC and the CBSA to gather, analyze and share intelligence in order to improve individual investigations and to increase knowledge of the extent and patterns of smuggling and trafficking of firearms used in crime so that an intelligence-led national enforcement strategy can be developed.

### 2.2 Overview of the Evaluation Framework

As part of ongoing efforts to ensure the continued integrity and efficiency of the ICCUF Initiative, in August 2005, an evaluation framework was prepared. The framework was developed through a consultative process involving the ICCUF Joint Management Team (JMT). The *Evaluation Framework* included an Initiative profile, a logic model, an evaluation strategy and an evaluation reporting strategy. As illustrated in the ICCUF logic model at Appendix A, the funded activities undertaken by each of the partners fall into three main components described in detail as follows:

1) **Policy/Research (PS)**

The Policy/Research component of the Initiative addresses the need for effective and comprehensive crime guns policy development. The policy, planning, coordination and research activities of PS ensure that Ministers have the information needed regarding the criminal use of firearms. As such, activities and outputs associated with the Policy/Research component fall
under the sole responsibility of PS. In conducting its research and policy activities, PS will draw upon outputs from the intelligence component, particularly the use of strategic intelligence to inform production of its policy advice. These efforts will directly support increased knowledge and understanding of crime gun issues and trends, so that a fully informed enforcement strategy to address smuggling and trafficking of crime guns can be produced.

2) **Intelligence (FRT/CIBIN, CI, CBSA, NWEST, CISC)**

The intelligence component addresses the need for better information gathering; intelligence production, through the analysis of the information; and better sharing of information and intelligence related to the criminal use of firearms. Under the plan for ICCUF, five partners share responsibility for outputs associated with the intelligence component. These are FRT/CIBIN, CI, CBSA, NWEST, and CISC. Although separate funding has been provided to each partner for distinct activities associated with intelligence activities, the component has several shared outputs related to data and information, strategic, and tactical intelligence. The information and intelligence outputs will contribute to outcomes shared by the Policy/Research component, through increasing knowledge of gun crime issues, trends and threats, and by the Investigative Support component, through improving investigations and enforcement. In addition, the activities and outputs associated with the Intelligence Component will contribute to improved sharing of firearms information and intelligence, with the intent that the scope of sharing will be applied nationally.

It should be noted that three aspects of intelligence are discussed in this report. These aspects are explained in greater detail as follows:

**Strategic Intelligence** refers to intelligence that is usually required by senior officials and policy makers for long term planning and to make informed decisions on budgets, resources and policy. It provides a view of the abilities, strengths, weaknesses, and trends of criminal enterprises or activities. It also helps make informed judgments and forecasts on future criminal endeavours (CISC). As it pertains to the Initiative, Strategic Intelligence is considered an output of the ICCUF activities.

**Tactical Intelligence** is intelligence used to develop methods to counteract immediate criminal threats. It is directed at a specific crime or criminal entity; and is used to support ongoing investigations by developing new leads and identify specific targets. It can also provide pieces of information that are the subsequent building blocks of strategic intelligence (CISC). Tactical intelligence involves the analytical work of combining and recognizing trends and identifying patterns in crime guns information. Tactical intelligence is primarily used at the operational level to support ongoing investigations by developing new leads and identifying specific targets. As it pertains to the Initiative, Tactical Intelligence is considered an output of the ICCUF activities.

A third characterization of intelligence was identified as “actionable” intelligence. Actionable intelligence is characterized by intelligence, whether tactical or strategic, that meets the needs of law enforcement communities to prevent firearms tragedies and the criminal use of firearms in various jurisdictions. Actionable intelligence is related to the intermediate outcome of the
Initiative that pertains to how information and intelligence generated and shared enables law enforcement community to act in their capacity as front line personnel in the struggle for combating the criminal use of firearms. Therefore, by this definition, actionable intelligence is intelligence that fulfills the intermediate outcome of the Initiative to “meet the needs of the law enforcement community”.

3) Investigative Support (NWEST)

The investigative support component of the ICCUF Initiative is intended to address the need to provide better support for gun crime investigations. NWEST is the ICCUF partner with sole responsibility for the outputs associated with the Investigative Support component. Investigative support is provided directly to law enforcement agencies through the provision of advice and expertise, and through educational material and training. These outputs contribute to increased knowledge of investigative procedures which will, in turn, play a role in the shared outcome of improving investigations and enforcements activities.

2.3 Evaluation Objectives

The ICCUF Evaluation Framework proposed that a formative evaluation be conducted and completed by March 31, 2007. Government Consulting Services (GCS) was engaged by PS to conduct a formative evaluation of the ICCUF Initiative. The formative evaluation was comprised of a phased approach. Phase 1 activities involved the production of a methodology report to guide evaluation activities. Phase 2 entailed the preparation of the formative evaluation report.

The overall objective of GCS’s assignment was to conduct a formative evaluation of the ICCUF Initiative. The focus of the formative evaluation was to assess how the Initiative is being implemented, particularly with respect to the intelligence component, whether adjustments should be made, and whether progress toward the achievement of the immediate outcomes was occurring. Consequently, the formative evaluation questions and analysis focus on the Design and Delivery aspects of the Initiative as well as early success, and likelihood of achieving intermediate and ultimate outcomes. In addition, the formative evaluation examines the effectiveness of ICCUF in its current structure, roles, and functions; and identifies internal and external influences on performance of the ICCUF to date.

The following specific evaluation questions, contained in the Evaluation Framework, are answered in this formative evaluation report.

Design and Delivery Questions

DD1 Has the Initiative established a clear planning framework?

DD2 Have performance measurement and reporting led to informed decision-making and program adjustments?  

Although no formal performance measurement is in place for the Initiative, partners have agreed that, to the extent possible, internal performance measurement systems will be used to link to the indicators for the ICCUF evaluation.
DD3  Has the management of the Initiative contributed to the efficient use of financial and human resources? (ERC Affordability, Efficiency question)

DD4  Does the Initiative have an appropriate governance structure?

DD5  Are the processes for sharing intelligence clearly defined?

DD6  Is the infrastructure in place to deliver educational material and advice?

DD7  Are allocated resource levels sufficient based upon the scope of the Initiative, and the identified need?

Success Questions

S1  To what extent has the Initiative delivered its intended outputs? (Policy/Research)

S2  To what extent has the Initiative delivered its intended outputs? (Intelligence)

S3  To what extent has the Initiative delivered its intended outputs? (Investigative Support)

S4  To what extent has the Initiative improved sharing of firearms information and intelligence?

S5  To what extent has the Initiative increased knowledge of investigative procedures?

S6  To what extent has the Initiative improved investigations and enforcement of gun legislation?

2.4 Evaluation Methodology

Following ICCUF JMT approval of the Formative Evaluation - Methodology Report, GCS initiated the formative evaluation in conjunction with PS and the JMT. Research activities for the evaluation were conducted from October 2006 to January 2007. During the evaluation, GCS undertook the following activities:

**Preparation of Data Gathering Tools:** Based upon the methodology outlined in the methodology report, GCS developed templates and tools for data analysis.

**Document Review and Review of System Reports (Quantitative Data):** Over 56 pieces of documentation were received by GCS for review. These documents and system reports were reviewed and the information was input into the data gathering templates. The list of documents and system reports is contained in Appendix B.
Interviews with Managers and NWEST Team Leaders: Using the approved interview guide, GCS conducted seven interviews with program managers responsible for the ICCUF in PS, NWEST, FRT/CIBIN, CI, CISC and CBSA. GCS also conducted interviews with three NWEST Team Leaders by telephone in the Western Region, Quebec Region, and Atlantic Region. The interview guides are contained in Appendix C.

Focus Groups: GCS conducted four regional intelligence focus groups with staff involved in implementing the intelligence function of the ICCUF Initiative at the regional level. The focus groups were held by telephone conference call and included members chosen from the ICCUF regional staff of CI, NWEST and CBSA. Focus groups were held for Ontario, Western, Atlantic and Quebec Regions.

In addition, one focus group was held with members of the NWEST Advisory Board in order to discuss the needs of stakeholders and to gain feedback on the degree to which these needs are being met. Participants included a representative from Halifax Regional Police; RCMP ‘E’ Division; Director of the Firearms Support Services Directorate; Sûreté du Québec; Peel Regional Police; and the Victoria Police Department. The focus group guides are contained in Appendix D.

Data Analysis and Report Production: Using information gathered during the document review, quantitative review, interviews, and focus groups, GCS analyzed the findings according to each evaluation issue area and question. GCS then prepared a draft and final report.

2.5 Study Limitations

Several limitations are noteworthy with respect to this study and should be kept in mind when reading this report. They are as follows:

- The perceptions of CBSA field personnel and NWEST members in the field were limited to discussions in the regional intelligence focus groups. This approach was taken due to fact that it is still early in the implementation of the ICCUF and some resources were not yet in place.

- The NWEST Advisory Group was consulted in order to obtain feedback from the frontline officer perspective. The feedback provides useful information, but it does not represent broad-based research, or full stakeholder consultation, since a broad-based survey of a statistically valid sample of front line officers themselves was not conducted.

2.6 Context for the Evaluation Report

It is important that this evaluation report be read in light of several challenges that partners experienced during the start-up phase of the ICCUF. These challenges are outlined below:
Although funding for ICCUF was announced in May 2004, funding was generally not in place for partners until April 2005. This initial lag time presented several challenges for partners in their ability to attain implementation goals that would meet the timeframe for the formative evaluation, since research activities for the formative evaluation were conducted from October 2006 to January 2007.

Conflicting policies and ongoing legislative issues particularly related to Section 107 of the *Customs Act* has presented challenges in implementing the Intelligence Component of the ICCUF.

Issues and challenges related to the implementation of technology, such as difficulties in gaining access to the National Police Services Net, and the length of time required meet Government security requirements, were experienced. In addition, organizations having individual collection processes, databases, and computer systems presented coordination challenges.

Staffing issues such as staff turn-over in positions already staffed, and long staffing processes made resource implementation difficult; and

Finally, pressing external current and political events contributed to the challenges partners faced during the start-up phase.

Having stated this, despite these obstacles and challenges, many achievements are noted in the report that follows.

3 Findings

The findings in the sections that follow are presented by evaluation question. They include findings from all lines of inquiry: interviews, document review and systems reports. For each evaluation question, the set of findings is accompanied by conclusions which are based on the findings and are pertinent to the evaluation question.

3.1 Design and Delivery

**DD 1 HAS THE INITIATIVE ESTABLISHED A CLEAR PLANNING FRAMEWORK?**

In order to assess if the ICCUF Initiative has established a clear planning framework, several aspects were explored during the evaluation. These aspects included: whether or not operational and strategic plans were in existence (both at the horizontal level and within partner organizations); whether the plans were aligned with the intent of the original Initiative design; the extent to which comprehensive horizontal planning is actually occurring; and the extent to which resources (staff, systems and tools) have been implemented as per the original Initiative design. These aspects are explored below.
FINDINGS

Existence of Operational and Strategic Plans

Program managers indicated that a Joint Management Team (JMT) has been established which includes all partners, and that the Evaluation Framework has been used as a primary planning document. The logic model itself was cited as a reference point that helped in guiding decisions and discussions at the JMT. A Framework for Delivery for all partners was produced in draft format in February 2006 by NWEST. The Framework outlined expectations associated with the ICCUF, challenges being faced, recommendations for their resolution, timelines for meetings of the JMT, and the production of deliverables. It is unclear whether the draft framework was finalized or whether it has been accepted by partners. On September 12, 2006, a document entitled Investments to Combat the Criminal Use of Firearms was prepared. It contained the proposed structure on how partners should proceed and was submitted at the JMT for discussion. This document was adopted by the JMT as a planning guidance tool. Following this, the individual Regional subcommittees were established. In addition, the responsibility for gathering data from various information sources was also established for each ICCUF partner.

In terms of planning documents within partner organizations, NWEST prepared its Business Plan for 2006-2007 which outlines delivery approaches, key services, new initiatives, key risks and mitigation strategies. In addition, as an RCMP service line, CISC produces the following planning documents: strategy map, balanced scorecard (BSC) implementation spreadsheet, business plan, and 90-day monitoring reports for BSC initiatives, which include CISC’s ICCUF-related efforts. Internal planning documents from other ICCUF partners were not received by GCS.

Alignment with the Intent of Original Initiative Design

Progression of activities within partner organizations shows congruence of operational implementation with intent of original Initiative. The fact that program managers cited the use of the Evaluation Framework and logic model, as a basis to guide their activities, provides evidence that partners are attempting to remain aligned with the original intent. Indeed, the expected outcomes as shown on the logic model were confirmed with partners during Phase 1 of this evaluation. During this review, partners indicated that the original design lacks proper emphasis on the use of the ‘actionable intelligence’ provided for immediate investigation, and that this had not been adequately reflected in the original logic model or the performance indicators.

Program managers also offered comments on the design of the ICCUF Initiative itself. Several program managers raised issues regarding the adequacy of the original design when submitted to the test of operational realities. For example, most partners agree that, “without appropriate efforts on all three sides of: enforcement, data input and analysis, the quality of intelligence products suffers”. Both program managers and participants in the intelligence focus groups expressed a need for better coordination between ICCUF and enforcement. To this end, most program managers agree that the Initiative lacks an appropriate communication strategy with the whole law enforcement community, indicating that, at the field level, not all RCMP officers are aware of the ICCUF Initiative. In terms of communication activities, CI Regional Firearms
Intelligence Coordinators attend and present at various fora, including Divisional Recruit Field Training sessions, Divisional Monthly Officer meetings, and conferences. Presentations were made at the National Firearms Conference in November 2006.  

Most program managers also agreed that the resources outlined in the original Initiative design are insufficient to cover a territory of the size of Canada. In fact, since inception, ICCUF partners have prepared to seek additional funding three times to alleviate these concerns, and to further improve the capacity to counter the criminal use of firearms.

**Occurrence of Horizontal Planning**

At the horizontal level, the JMT has been created as the on-going planning forum to oversee the participation of all partner organizations, coordinate activities and ensure that the goals of the ICCUF are attained. The JMT was created on September 28th 2005 when the member agencies comprising the ICCUF Initiative met formally for the first time, 16 months after the announcement of the ICCUF Initiative in May 2004. This slow start-up is likely due to the fact that ICCUF funding was not received for some partners until April 2005. A budget freeze at the RCMP, and slower than anticipated staffing process have also provided some planning challenges to the JMT.

During their first meeting, the JMT planned for the creation of four regional subcommittees to, among other things, assist in planning by providing a feedback loop to better inform decision-making at the JMT. At the time of the interviews, several subcommittees had representation from partner organizations which were being coordinated through an NWEST Manager, and had been established to report monthly to the JMT. In several subcommittees, an information flow has been created to limit duplication of functions and ensure a smooth transfer of data.

Other evidence of the existence of horizontal planning and coordination is the fact that, [   *   ]

**Implementation of Resources (Staff, Systems, and Tools) as per Original Initiative Design**

For the most part, staff resources have been implemented according to the original Initiative design. As detailed in Appendix E, FRT/CIBIN, CISC, PS, NWEST and CBSA are deemed to be fully implemented, or nearing full implementation, and CI has been partially implemented. Some challenges were noted by interviewees, and included: staffing taking longer than originally planned due to slow staffing processes within the RCMP, departure of personnel from positions already staffed, and a temporary budget freeze between January and April 2006. This has created some setbacks particularly in CI. Some shifts from the original design are noteworthy, and are as follows:

- NWEST is now planning for 46 FTEs, whereas the original Initiative design called for 38. Two tactical analyst have been added to PWEU and the Gangs and Guns Task Force.

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5 It should be noted that, during the time period of this evaluation, CI created a dedicated bilingual web page on the ICCUF Initiative to inform the broader RCMP audience across Canada. It links to partner agencies, PowerPoint presentations, fact sheets, etc. In addition, presentations have been made at the annual National Divisional Intelligence Officer meeting in February 2007, and a Divisional Intelligence Officer meeting in February 2007.
(Toronto) which was not part of the original design. In addition, two administrative positions have been terminated and the funds redeployed to increase NWEST’s Tactical Analytical Program by three additional analysts. These shifts were implemented with the goals of ICCUF in mind, to improve the flow of tactical intelligence in the Greater Toronto Area.

- A total of four FTEs and $506,583 annually over five years was shifted from CISC to NWEST as a result of responsibility for the National Firearms Tracing Centre being moved from CISC to NWEST, subsequent to the original request for funding.

- FRT/CIBIN units were part of the former FLS, under the name Firearms Program Forensic Science Support Section (FPFSSS). Forensic Laboratory Services (FLS) was merged with Information and Identification Services (IIS) in April, 2006, and NWEST, FRT and CIBIN were combined to create the Firearms Support Services Directorate (FSSD). All three units, NWEST, FRT & CIBIN, continue to retain their individual identities; however, this action co-located these functions organizationally to create a “one-stop shop”.

In terms of systems and tools, NWEST, FRT/CIBIN and CISC have made some progress in implementing systems and tools, but have experienced challenges such as the requirement to adhere to RCMP security protocols and staffing procedures for the establishment of the CIBIN network and a web-enabled version of the FRT. Both these components “have to work within informatics policy of the RCMP which slows everything down”. FRT/CIBIN also had difficulties with IBIS running properly indicating that it took 18 months for the RCMP network staff to make it operational due to a combination of conflicting policies. It required 18 months for RCMP Network Services, RCMP Departmental Security, the IBIS vendor (Forensic Technology Inc.) and CIBIN to develop and agree on a security policy that was workable for all parties, and to implement that solution. CI, CBSA and PS did not have responsibility for developing tools.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Start-up of the ICCUF Initiative has been slow due to several challenges faced by partners including: delay in receipt of funding; slow staffing processes; required adherence to departmental security protocols and departures from positions already staffed.

2. The ICCUF Initiative has yet to establish an encompassing, clear planning and implementation framework at the horizontal level. At this level, planning documents appear to be in draft format, and beyond this, GCS has received little evidence to support the conclusion that there is comprehensive horizontal planning.

3. There is planning taking place at the operational level. Implementation of resources has been slower than expected due to several challenges that now appear to have been overcome.

4. The progression of the Initiative is aligned with the original intent; however, the original design lacks proper emphasis on the use of the ‘actionable intelligence’ provided for immediate investigation, and this was not been adequately reflected in the original logic model, or the performance indicators. In addition, connection and communication with
enforcement appears weak. That is, a communication strategy has not been considered as part of the original design.

5. Through the JMT, planning problems have been identified and solutions have been implemented. The JMT is functioning well in its response to issues (reactive planning) as a consensus-based forum for issues resolution. However, strategic planning is lacking.

DD2 HAVE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND REPORTING LED TO INFORMED DECISION-MAKING AND PROGRAM ADJUSTMENTS?  

In assessing whether performance measurement and reporting have led to informed decision-making, GCS examined the following: the extent to which performance monitoring systems are in place to manage and report; the extent to which performance information is adequate to meet accountability needs; and the extent to which performance information is adequate to monitor and managed activities. The findings are presented below.

FINDINGS

Performance Monitoring Systems

Systematic reporting of (performance) information for ICCUF involves several formalized reports. The RCMP partners are using the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) system, which is the departmental performance management system, for reporting. The BSC reports every quarter. The NWest Monthly Report has been formalized but the extent to which information is/can be used to reprioritize and manage is unclear. CBSA RIFLOs produce monthly reports, and CBSA National Headquarters produces a monthly Firearms Report which is issued nationally among CBSA personnel and its ICCUF partners. Also, CBSA is planning to forward quarterly reports to the Vice President of the Enforcement Branch beginning in the 2007-2008 fiscal year.

Each partner is also reporting through their respective Departmental Performance Reports (DPR).

Adequacy of Performance Information to Meet Accountability Needs

A separate performance management strategy was not implemented for the ICCUF beyond the requirements contained in the Evaluation Framework. During the evaluation, GCS was provided evidence that each partner department or agency is reporting on ICCUF in their individual DPRs.

Adequacy of Performance Information to Monitor and Manage

Some program managers appear to be confused by what is deemed to be “performance information” and what is “intelligence for the purposes of ICCUF activities”. Thus, is unclear to

6 Although no formal performance measurement is in place for the initiative, partners have agreed that, to the extent possible, internal performance measurement systems will be used to link to the indicators for the ICCUF evaluation.
what extent the reports produced are being used, or potentially can be used, for decision-making or program adjustment.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Performance information is being produced by the ICCUF that satisfies accountability requirements. However, it appears that performance information is not leading to informed decision-making or program adjustments. This is likely due to the early stage of the ICCUF Initiative.

DD3 HAS THE MANAGEMENT OF THE INITIATIVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE EFFICIENT USE OF FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES? (ERC AFFORDABILITY, EFFICIENCY QUESTION)

In exploring the question of efficient financial and human resource use, GCS examined three areas: efficiency measures and planned to actual resource use.

FINDINGS

Efficiency Measures

GCS was able to calculate several efficiency measures for the three components of ICCUF as follows:

Within the Policy/Research Component, according to information provided by PS, 121 pieces of policy advice were delivered between June 1, 2004 (since ICCUF inception) and December 31, 2006. This translates to an average of 3.9 pieces of policy advice per month.

For the Intelligence Component, FRT/CIBIN provided information regarding CIBIN, for the period January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006, as follows:

• an average of 517.75 pieces of data entered into CIBIN per month; and
• an average of 19 hits were obtained per month.

It should be noted, that several partners that participate in the Intelligence Component of ICCUF were uncomfortable with the use of output-based efficiency measures since they feel that they do not provide value-added. That is, it could take staff a long period of time to work on one piece of intelligence that could prove to be invaluable; thus, they believe that indicators which measure the value to recipients would be more appropriate to intelligence activities.

For the Investigative Support Component, quantitative data was provided by NWEST. The data covers the period from January 1 to September 30, 2006. The following efficiency measures were noted:

• an average of 9.4 reports for assistance per month per NWEST member.

7 These figures were calculated based on 41 FTEs for NWEST, nationally.
- 0.3 search warrants per month per NWEST member
- 140.7 traces per month by NWEST tracing unit
- 561 firearms recovered per month by NWEST

Planned to Actual Resource Use

The table below provides a snapshot of ICCUF planned to actual expenditures for FY 2005-06. Included in the table is the variance between actual and budgeted amounts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 2005-2006</th>
<th>ICCUF Funding 2005-06</th>
<th>Budget Received</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
<th>Variance (actual/budget)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>O+M</td>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWEST</td>
<td>$5,250,233</td>
<td>$5,175,424</td>
<td>$1,690,607</td>
<td>$2,758,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRT/CIBIN</td>
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<td>$343,028</td>
<td>$661,540</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISC</td>
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<td>$430,616</td>
<td>$166,982</td>
<td>$2,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>$847,170</td>
<td>$735,349</td>
<td>$482,131</td>
<td>$173,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSA</td>
<td>$985,000</td>
<td>$985,000</td>
<td>$673,149</td>
<td>$177,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>$215,000</td>
<td>$215,000</td>
<td>$105,911</td>
<td>$110,020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The information in the table illustrates that NWEST, FRT/CIBIN, CBSA and PS have expended within an acceptable range of 5% of their budgets. Since supplementary funding was frozen in 2005-2006, PS had to seek monies from other sources in order to fulfill the research requirement for that year. The large budget variance shown by CISC is due to several factors. First, the salary expenses are less than anticipated because CISC hired two strategic analysts who arrived in their positions at different times. The first analyst arrived in June 2005; the second, in February 2006. Secondly, CISC did not incur expenses for the production of some firearms-related intelligence reports under ICCUF. The reports produced and shared with the community were funded from sources other than ICCUF. The budget variance shown for CI is due to staffing challenges. It is noted that, on average, it takes 9 to 12 months to hire someone through the RCMP staffing process, the length of which is outside the control of ICCUF partners.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Although the efficiency measures illustrated provide good data, in the absence of a reference point, such as a benchmark or baseline, it cannot be conclusively stated that resources are being used efficiently at this juncture of the ICCUF. However, these measures could provide
valuable baseline information for future performance management activities, both in terms of tracking and managing workload, and providing information to the summative evaluation.

2. NWEST, FRT/CIBIN, CBSA and PS have expended within an acceptable range of 5% of their budgets. CISC and CI have experienced challenges in achieving sound management of financial resources, due to lengthy staffing processes, which has caused expenditure variances to be outside generally acceptable limits.

**DD4 DOES THE INITIATIVE HAVE AN APPROPRIATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE?**

Several aspects of governance were explored during the evaluation in order to answer the evaluation question. These included: whether the governance structure has been articulated; what contribution the articulated governance mechanism makes to the efficient operation of the ICCUF; and whether the roles of ICCUF partners in governance of the Initiative are clear. The findings are presented below.

**FINDINGS**

**Articulation of the Governance Structure at the Horizontal Level**

The present governance structure for common objectives at the horizontal level is comprised of the JMT and four regional subcommittees which report back through the JMT. The JMT is responsible for coordinating ICCUF efforts. As was set out in the Evaluation Framework, the JMT is composed of senior managers from each participating agency, with NWEST as the chair. With the exception of PS, it was anticipated that partners would be heavily involved in the meetings of the JMT. PS would attend, at invitation, and participate in national data gathering to the extent possible by its research role. The JMT was to meet on an “as-needed basis, depending on areas of shared responsibility or issue”.

Regional subcommittees were created during the summer of 2006. The role of the subcommittees is to:
- coordinate regional gathering of data to better inform decision making at the JMT;
- share data and work together in a coordinated manner to prosecute individuals involved in the illegal movements of firearms;
- interact on a regular basis to ensure that relevant information is exchanged within partner organisations of the ICCUF and where appropriate with the external law enforcement agencies.

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8 It should be noted that the role of the Ontario sub-committee is somewhat different because Ontario is the only province that has a major provincial unit, namely PWEU, which for all intents and purposes meets the mandate given to the Ontario sub-committee. Therefore the role of the sub-committee in Ontario is somewhat diminished. However the information is coming to CISC through means other than the Ontario sub-committee.
The subcommittees were established during the summer of 2006, which is 10 months after the decision to do so. In September 2006, the JMT discussed measures to improve the subcommittees operations, including the creation of an organizational chart for the governance of the subcommittees. At the time of the interviews, several subcommittees having representation from partner organizations, were being coordinated through an NWEST Manager and had been set up to report monthly to the JMT. Some subcommittees lacked membership from CI due to staffing issues.

**Contribution of Governance Structure to Efficient Operation of the Initiative**

Most program managers agreed that “JMT meetings serve to retain focus on the overarching objective of the ICCUF, keep the Initiative on track, and discuss and resolve horizontal issues.” They believe that the JMT has been useful to identify issues, information gaps and needs of individual partners, and that this governance structure helps to facilitate collaborative arrangements to develop and implement solutions. Additionally, “JMT allows for a single point of contact for contentious issues” which is important when a partner makes internal changes that have an impact on its partners. Despite this, at the regional level, there is a perception that the content of the discussions and the level of decision making happening at the JMT do not alleviate coordination issues in the regions.

JMT meeting minutes show that through the JMT discussions, common or key problems have been identified and consensus has been reached regarding the development of solutions or, at least, the development of mechanisms to reach durable solutions. Most program managers indicated that decision making has used a consensus-based approach which they found to be satisfactory. CBSA was the exception to this, commenting that, likely because of the uneven balance of representation among the partner organizations, sometimes decisions are made without due consideration of the impact of the decision on their organization.

Although program managers agree that the JMT is a good mechanism for horizontal governance of the ICCUF, they also believe that the current governance structure needs to be improved to ensure the efficient operation of the Initiative. The following challenges were noted:

- Strategic linkages are somewhat weak; objectives are not necessarily clearly articulated; roles and responsibilities are sometimes unclear, and expectations are not clearly outlined;
- There is an insufficient level of knowledge of financial guidelines to provide effective decision making at the JMT;
- Lack of financial controls and reporting does not provide adequate transparency among the partners. This would make it clear where money has been allocated, particularly in the regions e.g. if positions have not been staffed, and for what purpose was the funding used;
- Since not all subcommittees are functioning, there is a lack of leadership in some regions in order to mobilize the resources around firearms issues.
• Although NWEST has taken a strong stance, with both the Department of Public Safety
and the Canada Firearms Centre, that the Provisions of the Public Agents Firearms
Regulations, requiring the reporting of all seized guns, should be implemented as soon as
possible; and CBSA has initiated discussions regarding legislative issues with Section
107 of the Customs Act, there are issues that cannot be resolved at the JMT level. These
issues are larger than ICCUF, and this is a source of frustration among partners.

• Program managers are looking for solutions to improve the governance structure. Some
changes have already been made to the governance structure to improve the level of
consultation. For example, new partners, such as RCMP Custom and Excise, have been
invited to the JMT table as required. The JMT is presently looking at including other
major organizations involved in firearms, such as the Export and Control Division of
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and local and provincial police
agencies, as appropriate. At the regional level, in September 2006, the JMT discussed
measures to improve the subcommittees’ operations, including the creation of an
organizational chart for the governance of the subcommittees.

Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities

All program managers indicated that they have a clear perception of their roles and
responsibilities. However, their understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the other
ICCUF partners requires clarification and discussion, in order to better realize potential linkages
and synergies. This is true particularly for partners involved in the Intelligence Component at the
regional level. For example, NWEST, CI, CISC, and CBSA have experienced issues due to the
duplication of requests for information from/to police services. There is also a lack of clarity
with regard to their sharing of responsibilities and resources in certain regions. Participants in the
regional intelligence focus groups indicated that there is confusion regarding the interplay among
the ICCUF partners. Some believed that a process map would alleviate some confusion.

The final area where some confusion was evident is with regard to the role of PS on the JMT. All
partners, except PS, have been participating in the JMT meetings. There are tensions among
some partners with regard to their understanding and, thereby, fulfillment of the role of PS on the
JMT. Some program managers indicated that PS should have a stronger role and attend the JMT
on a regular basis, and perhaps assume the role of chair, or co-chair of the JMT. PS has
understood that its participation at the JMT is by invitation when required, and that the JMT is
operationally focussed. Thus the appropriate participation for PS is unclear.

Outside of the issues noted above, all interviewees agreed that roles and responsibilities are clear.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Progress has been made toward the establishment of an appropriate governance structure of
the ICCUF. The structure includes a JMT with representation from all partners and regional
subcommittees with membership from the Intelligence Component (CBSA, CISC and
NWEST). The JMT has produced positive results in terms of shared decision-making and problem solving. Several of the regional subcommittees have been established, but the effectiveness of these committees varies from region to region.

2. In terms of efficient operation of the governance mechanism, the JMT is using a consensus-based approach to decision making and all partners see the benefits of the JMT. However, the balance of power sits with RCMP simply due to the fact that there are four funded partners within the RCMP. This is reinforced by the fact that NWEST is the chair of the JMT. Other issues regarding the efficient operation of the JMT include the belief that secretariat functions of JMT are not optimal. For example, although the Chair has consistently canvassed all member agencies for their input in developing each agenda, some partners perceive that their issues are not being addressed. Also, in some cases the agendas are lengthy due to the input received from partners, making the length of some meetings unwieldy.

3. Membership on the JMT is generally appropriate including all ICCUF partners; however, the JMT could benefit from having additional representation such as: financial expertise; strategic planning expertise and possibly other partners that could contribute different perspectives on the firearms issue. In terms of roles and responsibilities on the JMT, there is confusion among partners regarding the role of PS. Questions remain as to the extent of PS’s role in policy/legislative review and on the JMT.

4. There has been some confusion regarding the roles and responsibilities of partners within the Intelligence Component. To some extent these issues have been resolved. At the time of the interviews, discussions had been initiated, at the subcommittee level, to better identify where the boundaries are, and partners were beginning to resolve overlapping issues. However, further work is required to define the limits of each partner’s responsibilities with regard to information gathering and intelligence production.

**DD5 ARE THE PROCESSES FOR SHARING INTELLIGENCE CLEARLY DEFINED?**

In answering this evaluation question, GCS looked for evidence of the existence of defined intelligence processes, standards and tools for data collection; whether the processes were being followed; and what value-added these processes bring to the attainment of desired outcomes of the ICCUF. The findings are presented as follows.

**FINDINGS**

Existence of Defined Intelligence Processes and Standards
RCMP program managers indicated that the processes for sharing intelligence have been clearly defined and communicated among ICCUF partners at the headquarters level and that there is some formal or systematic sharing of information. For example, monthly reports providing actionable intelligence are disseminated to all partners and operational units. These include CBSA Regional Intelligence Firearms Liaison Officers (RIFLO) reports and NWEST Monthly Reports. Currently, these reports are disseminated to 19 agencies across Canada, all ICCUF Initiative partners and provincial Chief Firearms Officers. Some interviewees suggested that a parallel feedback process should be established to ensure that actionable intelligence contained in these reports is being followed up at the appropriate agency once it is made available to enforcement agencies.

CBSA program managers defined three distinct processes and associated protocols for sharing intelligence in accordance with geographic jurisdictional requirements. Firstly, internal intelligence sharing processes between the national CBSA office and regional RIFLOs were defined as being in accordance with Section 107 and local policy requirements. Secondly, international sharing occurs through the Borders Intelligence Directorate and HQ and in compliance with applicable Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements (CMAA), Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs), etc. If evidentiary intelligence is required internationally, information is exchanged through the (MLAT) process, although program managers indicated that this process is time consuming. If there is a CMAA or MOU in existence with the foreign agency providing for the exchange of this information, an MLAT may not be required. The MLAT process is required, however, in cases where no CMAA or MOU exists to exchange information particularly if evidence is needed for court purposes. Finally, CBSA program managers indicated that they regularly receive the NWEST Monthly Report and NWEST Guns in the News analysis reports. Intelligence is shared between the national and regional CBSA ICCUF personnel through formal meetings, conferences, workshops, informal exchanges (i.e. phone calls/e-mails), and through the CBSA RIFLO Monthly Report.

Documents provide supporting evidence that processes exist for sharing intelligence between the RCMP and external partners, including two MOUs between the RCMP and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) of the United States of America. One agreement sets out the provisions for the ATF and the RCMP to maintain an interface between their respective IBIS networks, and contains further provisions governing access to and use of IBIS information. The other MOU stipulates that the RCMP will have access to the ATF “E-Trace” application for firearms tracing. This will allow for the RCMP to expedite firearms tracing requests to the ATF. Semi-annual meetings between ATF and RCMP officials form part of the MOU as a condition to ensure operational effectiveness.

### Tools for Data Collection
In terms of the provision of tools for data collection, CISC has developed three distinct information collection tools, some of which are directly as a result of ICCUF. These are as follows:

1. The National Collection Plan (NCP) – This information collection tool is in its third year. The NCP is used to collect information on organized and serious crime affecting Canada. It was not designed for collecting information specifically on firearms, nor was it developed under the ICCUF Initiative. Completion of the National Collection Plan by CISC’s 380 plus member agencies results in the production of 10 integrated Provincial Threat Assessments produced by CISC’s Provincial Bureaus and in the production of the National Threat Assessment, the National Criminal Intelligence Estimate and, to some extent, the Annual Report on Organized Crime produced by CISC’s Central Bureau.

2. The National Firearms Collection Plan (NFCP) – This tool was developed in 2006/07 exclusively for the collection of information on firearms to produce a strategic intelligence assessment. The first time the NFCP was used, 50 completed forms were returned to CISC Central Bureau. This information forms the base for the National Strategic Firearms Threat Assessment, which is currently being produced within the ICCUF mandate for distribution to the partners. Interviewees stated that, in order for the NFCP to be effective, RCMP needs to ensure buy-in from all law enforcement agencies across Canada. To this end, CISC has conducted national working groups to consolidate and improve the efficiency of intelligence and information exchange. This group includes CISC member agencies, NWEST, and the Ontario Provincial Weapons Enforcement Unit (PWEU). It was noted by RCMP program managers that, in future, there would be a need to extend membership of this working group.

   The National Firearms Collection Plan Framework (2006) states that the purpose of the National Firearms Collection Plan is to collect information and intelligence thereby establishing a baseline with regards to the illegal firearms situation in Canada. This document provides evidence that prior to the ICCUF, information and intelligence had been collected by various agencies but not in a coordinated effort.

3. The National Data Collection Template (NDCT) on Firearms – This template was exclusively designed to collect statistical and tactical data. It was developed by CISC Central Bureau under the ICCUF initiative. Shortly before distribution to the CISC community, it came to CISC’s attention that NWEST was developing a tool for this purpose as well. At a subsequent JMT meeting, it was decided that NWEST would disseminate the NDCT and collect the tactical data for tactical intelligence purposes. There was consensus among interviewees that the NDCT requires expansion to meet the needs of the law enforcement community, and that integration with the CISC National Collection Plan would be beneficial. Synergies could be realized here since CISC already uses information from the National Collection Plan to prepare various intelligence products such as the CISC Annual Report.

There is documented evidence that the Canadian Firearms Tracing Centre (CFTC) is currently developing an information collection template that is designed to facilitate the daily data input
and collation of firearms information. This data will use universally standardized and recognized
data fields such as FRT data to ensure consistency in reporting.

Documents attested to the effort to improve intelligence sharing protocol through increased
involvement with the NWEST Tactical Analysis Unit (TAU). The TAU is currently involved
with several working groups to enhance the collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of
firearms-related tactical intelligence. The objective of this activity is to develop an information
collection template that will allow partner agencies to collect “core” information (i.e. make,
model, caliber etc.) for input into a standardized format. This effort is designed to reduce the
potential for data corruption and will enhance the validity of the analytical and statistical
products produced by partner ICCUF agencies. The core of the working group includes CISC, CI
and CBSA.

RCMP intelligence data collecting systems/ tools available for gathering and disseminating
information and strategic and tactical intelligence include ACIIS, the Firearms Reference Table
(FRT) and the Canadian Integrated Ballistics Identification Network (CIBIN).

ACIIS: RCMP interviewees indicated that all CISC member agencies cooperate with each other
in the collection, collation, evaluation, analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence by
contributing to the Automated Criminal Intelligence Information System (ACIIS). As such,
ACIIS is recognized within the law enforcement community, including the RCMP, as being a
common tool necessary to organize and disseminate intelligence. Information and intelligence
captured in ACIIS is available to all CISC member agencies; however, ACIIS is not readily
accessible to all ICCUF partners. Interviewees also noted that the RCMP utilizes PROS
and NCDB; however, documents obtained form the RCMP cited that the NCDB system is being
phased out while the RCMP is moving its intelligence to ACIIS.

In July 2006, the JMT created an informal sub-committee to provide an overview on the state of
firearms information on ACIIS. The sub-committee is led by CISC with participation from
NWEST, CI and CBSA. The research was recommended to determine what is presently
available on the ACIIS pertaining to firearms, to select a best course of action to enter
information on ACIIS, to decide what type of information will be entered, to evaluate the
resources necessary to do the job, and to identify issues that hinder obtaining the best use of
ACIIS and therefore the best sharing of information among ICCUF partners.

FRT: The Firearms Reference Table is disseminated nationally to the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), CBSA and all forensic laboratories and police

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9 ACIIS is recognized by all Category 1, 2 and 3 CISC member agencies (including CBSA and the RCMP) as the
common intelligence database necessary to store, organize and disseminate criminal intelligence and information
with the CISC community. Information on ACIIS is directly accessible by Category 1 members (police agencies)
and indirectly by Category 2 members (including CBSA) via their respective Provincial Bureau. Information
contained in ACIIS that is shared with Category 2 member agencies have to meet the ‘consistent use’ test as per
Canada’s Federal Privacy Act. As well, the ‘third party rule’ applies, which means the owner of the criminal
intelligence or information stored on ACIIS decides whether or not the information will be released to a Category 2
member agency. With the exception of PS, all ICCUF partners have either direct or indirect access to ACIIS.

10 An electronic system for reporting police occurrences and for records management.

11 An online repository of tactical, operational and strategic intelligence reporting across RCMP jurisdictions.
agency across the country. FRT is an effective standardization tool providing a means through which the law enforcement community and Initiative partners use a common language of reference for firearms information thereby increasing the probability that the same firearm will be recognizable in different jurisdiction. In addition, the FRT also contributes to the standardization of data entry information and increases the accuracy of Firearms description and classification. This is useful for INTERPOL as well. The FRT provides for accurate classification of firearms (simplifies Part III of the *Criminal Code*). The benefit of the FRT for the ICCUF is that users are able to identify firearms not already known by FRT/CIBIN and CIBIN, therefore FRT contributes to expanding the database.

CIBIN: The Canadian Integrated Ballistics Identification Network is a national network that collects firearm information derived from Integrated Ballistics identification systems (IBIS) across the country. CIBIN allows for computer-assisted analysis of evidence that compares bullets and cartridge cases to the weapon. IBIS collects images of bullets and cartridge cases recovered from crime scenes and from test fires of firearms. IBIS detects minute details on both spent bullets and used cartridge cases, which are then compared against an inventory of similar images. Recently, the processes for making requests changed due to internal program changes at the RCMP. All requests for CIBIN are now filtered through a Case Receipt Unit (CRU) that handles forensic requests.

**Adherence to Defined Intelligence Processes**

There were mixed perceptions from various perspectives as to how the processes for sharing intelligence were being adhered to within and between partner organizations. These are highlighted below.

In terms of the use of intelligence system databases, individual partner organization staff were aware of how their respective data capturing process and systems (e.g. ICES and IMS for CBSA) feed into the national criminal intelligence database (ACIIS). However, regional intelligence focus group participants indicated that they were not clear as to what happened with the data thereafter and how it was utilized to assist field operations. Regional office staff were aware of CISC’s National Firearms Collection Plan; however, they noted that it is too soon to tell whether this will prove to be a useful information collection tool in the field and whether it will be taken up by enforcement agencies. An indication of the level of participation in the information collection is illustrated by the fact that 50 completed National Firearms Collection Plans were returned to CISC.

At the regional level, JMT meeting minutes identified the need to create regional and provincial sub-committees to improve intelligence gathering and analysis. This documentation supported the evidence of the interview process that sub-committees have been created to drive intelligence sharing and dissemination process effectiveness under the ICCUF Initiative. The sub-committees were meant to include members from NWEST, CBSA, CI and CISC. At the time of the evaluation, sub-committees had been established in three regions: Western (Manitoba to Pacific);

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12 An encyclopaedic research tool developed by the RCMP that provides narrative and graphic information relating to the description, technical identification and legal classification of firearms. The FRT is used to accurately identify and classify firearms.
Central (Ontario + Quebec) and Atlantic. The participation level of partners varied from region to region, with notable absences of CI members due to staffing issues.

Participants in regional intelligence focus groups highlighted the fact that processes for intelligence sharing were not formalized and, in practice, much of this activity occurred informally and through individual contacts. CI enlisted the participation of CISC in order to create Provincial Firearms Projects in which all firearms related intelligence would be stored and linked to a national Firearms Intelligence Project. All CI – RFIC members have been made aware of this new “policy”. Further to this, it was noted that the ICCUF was instrumental in facilitating face-to-face introductions between regional staff at annual conferences and workshops and that these opportunities laid the foundation of the intelligence exchange between the regions. In addition, personal interrelationships were noted to be a key factor in developing an awareness and a common understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each ICCUF partner and thus contributed to limiting the duplication of efforts in the field. Participants also note intelligence sharing process issues, and made the comparison to the PWEU model which they believed to be more efficient, because the tactical operation can go directly to PWEU (provincial service) and does not have to go through NWEST (national service).

Participants also indicated that as a result of the sharing of intelligence, knowledge of firearms related activity by police agencies is on the rise and, as a result, front line officers have begun to identify trends and patterns in illicit gun use. However, participants pointed to the fact that although efforts are made to adhere to defined processes, for a variety of reasons it doesn't happen as it should. Participants clarified this statement acknowledging that this was not due to lack of willingness, but was a policy awareness issue concerning what partners can and cannot share both at the horizontal level and within partner organizations. For example, restrictive stipulations outlined in the *Customs Act* result in a number of policy issues regarding what can be shared between CBSA and the RCMP. A proposal was made and agreed upon that a MOU be developed between CBSA and RCMP to provide a workable and efficient mechanism to exchange information and intelligence that is both in compliance with the *Privacy Act* and Section 107 of the *Customs Act* and allows access to critical tactical intelligence. It was noted that this had been done previously by both departments for other joint force initiatives. JMT meeting minutes provide evidence that the issue of intelligence sharing between CBSA and the RCMP was being reviewed by legal advisors. [   *   ].

One final concern noted during the focus groups was that police agencies do not necessarily understand the role of NWEST in terms of tactical intelligence support for law enforcement. Interviewees indicated that law enforcement expectations were that, given the nature and amount of access to tactical firearms intelligence within NWEST regional offices, NWEST should be operational and participating to a greater extent in actual investigations on the front lines with police officers.

**Added Value of Intelligence Processes**

RCMP program managers within ICCUF stated that it is too early to tell whether the National Firearms Collection Plan will add value to the law enforcement community to contribute to the
outcomes of the Initiative; however, they agreed that all ICCUF partners must continue to build momentum to ensure buy-in from the law enforcement community. Interviewees noted that efforts must be made to integrate the CISC National Firearms Collection Plan with the National Collection Plan, to improve efficiency of firearms intelligence gathering and collation.

Respondents indicated that work is ongoing to finalize and disseminate the *National Firearms Threat Assessment*. The assessment is not yet available to the law enforcement community.

Tactical intelligence sharing processes were expressed as adding value by being timely and accurate; providing increased tactical intelligence and information related to firearms incidents; and providing much needed investigative support to front line officers. However, it was noted that if all partners situated in the regions were co-located, it would improve effective communication and information and tactical intelligence sharing. Furthermore, participants indicated that more value would be added to this process if all tactical intelligence were collected in a central accessible database that was equally accessible to all partners and disseminated on an ongoing basis. From the perspective of NWEST regional officers, there is a need to increase personnel in the field, outside of the ICCUF partners, to carry out the investigations that are being triggered by the increased inflow of tactical intelligence.

The NWEST Advisory Group identified the NWEST monthly report, ACIIS and informal day-to-day conversations among NWEST regional offices as the primary mechanisms for tactical intelligence sharing. Advisory committee members indicated that NWEST has received constructive and positive feedback from police agencies with regard to the NWEST monthly reports, specifically, that they were providing “top notch” and timely tactical intelligence. Participants cited many instances where tactical intelligence outputs had led to firearms seizures, directly attributable to NWEST reports. For example, in Victoria, 1,000 guns, linked to US and international trafficking were seized as a result of intelligence from NWEST. The Advisory committee acknowledged that CISC’s intelligence products allows for timely strategic intelligence sharing, and further, that it is useful in identifying trends in support of re-prioritizing resources and in advocating for legislative changes.

Advisory committee members were aware that CBSA Monthly RIFLO reports were not being received by NWEST regions. In addition, committee members pointed to the fact that geographic proximity, in relation to geographic distance to the National Headquarters offices was an indicator of how much or how little intelligence and information was received by NWEST regional offices. There were variations reported across the regions in terms of the use and applicability of the NWEST monthly reports. In addition, committee members referred to the circumstance that there are different visions of and approaches to what constitutes an effective process for intelligence sharing and what type of intelligence is shared in that process. However, there was consensus across regions that NWEST be the “one-stop-shop” to gather, analyze and diffuse tactical intelligence relating to firearms.

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13 Information obtained subsequent to the focus group indicates that there are ongoing efforts to ensure that all NWEST regions will soon receive a newly developed CBSA strategic product, the *Firearms Monthly Report*, which is based primarily on the monthly RIFLO G11 reports.
Common among interviewees was that a communication strategy was required to ensure that all NWEST regional staff and local law enforcement communities are aware of the role of NWEST in collecting firearms intelligence and disseminating tactical intelligence products.

Generally, NWEST Team Leaders emphasized that as a result of existing processes for sharing intelligence at the ICCUF horizontal level, they are receiving more accurate, efficient and effective strategic intelligence in a timely manner. In addition, it was emphasized that the sharing of intelligence among ICCUF partners has resulted in increased interdiction of firearms at the border (i.e. as opposed to inland), better integration and a more unified approach to addressing the criminal use of firearms. A common desire among NWEST Team Leaders was to develop the basis for more tactical intelligence sharing among regions.

As a final note, interviewees stated that CIBIN provides a means through which investigators can access tactical intelligence data in other jurisdictions, save time, and connect firearms intelligence to otherwise unconnected events and across precincts. RCMP program managers cited that they routinely share firearms information residing on CIBIN with the Canadian Firearms Tracing Centre (CFTC), although CFTC is not a formal partner in the Initiative.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In general, processes for sharing intelligence exist, are understood, and are clear to ICCUF partners at the headquarters level. Some formal processes for collecting information and producing strategic intelligence, such as the National Firearms Collection Plan are in existence. However, with few exceptions, partners appear to be sharing tactical intelligence on an informal basis, especially in the regions, where there seems to be some confusion regarding each partner’s role in the intelligence process. This may be due to the fact that participation varies in regional sub-committees which have not yet been fully implemented. One example of the level of coordination in tactical intelligence sharing is that the Monthly Reports of CBSA and NWEST in the regions are not well integrated. It is clear from the NWEST focus group discussions that CBSA, NWEST and other RCMP representatives in the regions require more collaboration and integration to improve intelligence sharing.

2. In terms of intelligence tools, information required to populate tactical and strategic intelligence products is continuously being fed into national systems, and the National Firearms Collection Plan is being used to collect information for the production of strategic intelligence. While RCMP program managers indicated a clear understanding as to how the intelligence sharing tools, such as ACIIS, would be used to collect and disseminate intelligence, [ * ]. In addition, the extent to which the information collected by these tools is returning intelligence in a useful or actionable form to the field is not well understood.

3. Adherence to intelligence processes is being hampered by several factors that include: a lack of communication; absence of a common database among all partners; lack of resources for data entry; information sharing issues between RCMP and CBSA due to restrictions of Section 107 of the Customs Act; lack common understanding of what partners can and cannot share; and confusion regarding NWEST’s role in the regions among law enforcement officers who sometimes expect that NWEST can provide services beyond their mandate.
4. Interviewees indicated that determining the usefulness and value of the strategic intelligence sharing processes and products is somewhat premature. However, there are early indications that the CISC National Threat Assessment, even with its limited distribution, has been useful in identifying trends in support of re-prioritizing resources. In addition, the NWEST Monthly Report was cited by the Advisory Group as useful in providing useful information. Advisory committee members indicated that NWEST has received constructive and positive feedback from police agencies with regard to the NWEST Monthly Reports, specifically stating that NWEST is providing high quality actionable and timely intelligence. Clearly progress has been made, and it is apparent that there are ongoing efforts being made towards developing intelligence analysis that meet the needs of the broader law enforcement community. Having stated this, there appears to be no formal mechanism through which law enforcement can offer constructive feedback. Similarly, there is no formal mechanism through which ICCUF program managers can assess how intelligence provided to stakeholders is being utilized.

5. In terms of the added value of tactical intelligence, ACIIS and informal day-to-day conversations among NWEST regional offices are the primary mechanisms for tactical intelligence sharing. The sharing of tactical intelligence among ICCUF partners in the regions has resulted in increased interdiction of firearms at the border (i.e. as opposed to inland); and a more unified approach to addressing the criminal use of firearms. NWEST regional staff have supported multiple individual investigations, and feedback from law enforcement regarding the collection of intelligence and information to produce search warrants indicates that the advice provided by NWEST was useful. Finally, implementation of CIBIN means that users can access tactical intelligence data in other jurisdictions, save time, and connect firearms intelligence to otherwise unconnected events and across precincts.

**DD6 IS THE INFRASTRUCTURE IN PLACE TO DELIVER EDUCATIONAL MATERIAL AND ADVICE?**

The provision of direct investigative support to law enforcement is identified under the Investigative Support Component in the ICCUF logic model and it is a key responsibility of NWEST. Investigative support is delivered through advice and expertise and educational material and training. This evaluation explored the question of whether the infrastructure is in place to deliver educational material and advice. The findings are presented below.

**FINDINGS**

Program managers indicated that most of the infrastructure is in place as per the logic model and the Evaluation Framework. NWEST positions are very close to being completely staffed, with 41 of 46 positions in place. Regional subcommittees are part of the organizational infrastructure and are partially operational. Some training has been conducted for NWEST Team leaders. Despite these advances, program managers cited some issues affecting infrastructure implementation. These were that the processes for intelligence gathering and analysis that meets the needs of stakeholders need to be better defined, and that database issues have not been resolved. Although these issues are more applicable to the Intelligence Component, they have impacts on the ability
of NWEST members to deliver educational material and advice because competing priorities must be managed.

Program managers also indicated that there may be emerging issues with the capability of the existing infrastructure to handle future work. There are several detractors that may affect their ability to continually deliver on outputs and activities. The first of these detractors is workload increase cited by interviewees who indicated that calls for service increased by 25% last year alone. Second, the retention of knowledgeable personnel is a continual challenge. This is an issue that is indicative of organizational trends in staff turnover; however, the effect on the ICCUF is that it will affect the number of adequately trained officers available and it will require more time to train new officers as approximately two to three years training is required for new officers. Third, interviewees cited that they were ‘victims of their own success’. In other words, their mandate has increased through natural progression as a result of more law enforcement agencies becoming aware of their services.

NWEST Team Leaders stated that activities are being implemented as planned, and they are able to deliver the educational material and advice to law enforcement personnel. However, they cited some issues pertaining to infrastructure. The first is that they are losing officers; NWEST Leaders believe that this is because officers are losing interest due to lack of training on how to do their work properly. They indicated that further training is required for all NWEST members.

A few participants in the regional intelligence focus groups expressed some frustration with the transition of the management of NWEST to the RCMP. They believe that there are too many forms to be filled out and approved, and this added layer of bureaucracy slows down the work of investigators.

CONCLUSIONS

1. NWEST has successfully implemented the infrastructure to deliver educational material and advice. However, there are emerging issues with respect to the continued ability to deliver these services due to potentially increasing requests for service; recruitment and retention issues; lack of training; and competing demands on NWEST members among required activities (that is, provision of education and advice; providing training and resolving intelligence process issues).

2. As a result of their success, NWEST may be experiencing a contradiction between the need to increase the education of law enforcement to understand and effectively use the services of NWEST (education and marketing) and the lack of human resources in the regions to deal with the increasing workload resulting from the increased awareness among law enforcement personnel (service delivery).

DD7 ARE ALLOCATED RESOURCE LEVELS SUFFICIENT BASED UPON THE SCOPE OF THE INITIATIVE, AND THE IDENTIFIED NEED?
Interviewees were asked if they had sufficient resources to undertake the activities identified in the component of the ICCUF for which they were responsible. Findings are summarized below according to the ICCUF Components: Policy/ Research; Intelligence and Investigative Support.

**FINDINGS**

**Policy/Research Component**

PS program managers indicated that there is insufficient funding to undertake both evaluation and research activities in a single fiscal year.

**Intelligence Component**

RCMP program managers generally indicated that it is too soon to tell whether the resources are sufficient to adequately serve the Intelligence Component, since several RCMP partners are still in the process of putting staff in place; however, they noted several staffing issues. They have had significant challenges staffing positions due to internal staffing processes. Regional staff echoed sentiments of program managers with regard to staffing, stating that it is slow, and that staff turnover affects relationship development. Staff replacements have also been an issue with CI, in particular, who noted that they are in the process of restaffing three out of seven positions. These resource gaps are reducing the ability to provide service.

Interviewees also cited workload issues. RCMP program managers also indicated that the resources that have been put in place are becoming strained because of increased volumes of work and increased demands for firearms-related intelligence products. Particularly, FRT/CIBIN think that the growth of FRT is further limited by the limitations on travel money to send firearms people to trade shows where they can obtain new information; that three or more IBIS are necessary to address volume; and that current legislation needs to be addressed in order to create a national collection point of information on seizure. They are limited by the current legislation to determine how many FA have been seized. Regional staff also indicated that they are “victims of their own success” because workload has increased due to marketing campaigns that were undertaken in several regions. They believe that they are being utilized to capacity and there are not enough resources on the ground to handle the new requests being generated by the campaigns. CBSA program managers stated that proper delivery of the Intelligence Component of the Initiative using the allocated resources is constrained because of the size of the coverage area, the volume of data and the number of referrals.

Lack of resources in the data entry and analysis level was expressed on several fronts. FRT/CIBIN indicated there are not enough dedicated resources to data entry which limits the growth of FRT. Participants in the regional intelligence focus groups indicated that there is a lack of resources for data entry, and that the analysts cannot meet the requirements to process and share information and intelligence. This was metaphorically expressed as “the boat floats but it does not advance”.

As a final note, several locational issues were cited by interviewees. The perception of lack of resources in the regions is exacerbated by the fact that the strategic distribution of available
positions officers is perceived as not being optimal. CI questioned the pertinence of having one agent in Iqaluit where there is little firearms intelligence to gather. However, there are no resources in Winnipeg where there are important criminal firearms-related activities. Regional staff also pointed to locational issues stating the CI position in Iqaluit is not well used. Interviewees at CI, CISC, NWEST and CBSA expressed an interest in having field personnel co-located with their regional partners, possibly with CISC provincial bureaus or in the NWEST offices. One possible advantage to this arrangement would be that CI Intelligence Officer could gather information so that NWEST tactical analysts could produce tactical intelligence reports and CISC strategic analysts could produce strategic intelligence assessments and reports.

The table below summarizes human resource needs by region, as identified by interviewees.

### Regional Resource Requirements Identified by Interviewees

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>NWEST</th>
<th>CI</th>
<th>CBSA</th>
<th>CISC</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>General Requirements</strong>&lt;br&gt; (cited by Program Managers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWEST</td>
<td>• data entry personnel and tactical analysts (one per province) located with CISC provincial bureaus</td>
<td>• one person per region is insufficient - need one Intelligence Officer per province (5 additional FTEs)</td>
<td>• personnel for data input and analysis in the regions</td>
<td>• one strategic intelligence analyst in CISC Central Bureau is insufficient; a second analyst was hired (but left and this position needs to be restaffed)</td>
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<td>CI</td>
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<td>CBSA</td>
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<td>CISC</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Requirements by Region</strong>&lt;br&gt; (cited by Participants in Regional Intelligence Focus Groups)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>• 2 FTEs (Cape Breton and St. John’s (NFLD or Saint John, NB?); also data entry personnel</td>
<td>• 1 FTE for NB and PEI</td>
<td>• 1 FTE</td>
<td>• vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>• more NWEST officers to fill demand; tactical analysts</td>
<td>• CI position filled and co-located with NWEST</td>
<td>• lacking analytical assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>• 3 enforcement officers</td>
<td>• 1 FTE per region is not enough</td>
<td>• 4-5 additional FTEs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>• 2 enforcement officers</td>
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</table>

### Investigative Support Component

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14 During the evaluation process, CI indicated that steps have been taken to relocate the position located in Iqaluit, Nunavut to Winnipeg. This is expected to be complete in June/July 2007.
In terms of the Investigative Support Component, RCMP program managers indicated that data entry clerks are needed to save money and streamline processes for providing frontline support, to accommodate increased demand for services. NWEST Team Leaders each cited differing requirements. In the Western Region, there are currently 15 NWEST members. This number was stated as insufficient, particularly to provide coverage in the metropolitan areas. The NWEST Leader indicated that the number of firearms seizures has risen dramatically and there are insufficient resources to dedicate to each of the files. In the Atlantic region, resources were deemed to be sufficient with the exception of the need for another member in St. John and Cape Breton where there is a high volume of activity. In the Quebec Region, the NWEST Leader stated that officers working on the ground are not allocated 100% to firearms issues, and the number of positions of officers working on the ground is limited.

The NWEST Advisory Group indicated that there is a lack of human resources. This was particularly true in Quebec, because the faster NWEST is known, the faster the requests are submitted. Participants also indicated that, in Vancouver, the caseload has gone up 25%.

In terms of quantitative information to supplement interview findings, data on the number of reports for assistance received by NWEST is contained in the NWEST Monthly Report. A summary of this information is provided in the graph below.

As shown in the graph, the reports for assistance reached a high in February of 2006, after which they trended downward and generally leveled off through June to September 2006. The graph does not indicate that reports for service have consistently trended upward. It is noteworthy, that one possible explanation for the difference between the perception of interviewees and the data in the graph is that the graph does not make allowance for vacant positions that result in fewer officers to respond to requests for investigative support. Thus, quantitative data does not necessarily support or refute the perception of interviewees. Although quantitative data does not show an increase in requests for service, without available information on the number staff in
place during the time period studied, an accurate conclusion cannot be drawn. Thus, although the requests may not be increasing, with variances in the number staff in place during the time periods shown, the caseload/officer will vary. Thus, further data on caseload/officer may provide clarification as to whether workload is increasing.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Policy/Research Component of the ICCUF has sufficient resources for the current scope of the ICCUF. However, there is insufficient funding to undertake both evaluation and research activities in a single fiscal year.

2. The Intelligence Component appears not to be sufficiently supported by ICCUF funding in terms of data entry and analytical positions. Most of the resource requirements are at the regional level; however, at the headquarters level, FRT/CIBIN requires more resources for data entry; as does CISC. For CI, in addition to analytical and data entry positions, intelligence officer positions are perceived to be inadequate in number, based solely on the number of criminal intelligence positions and geographical representation. The extent to which this can be quantified may be clearer once staff have been placed all positions for a longer period of time.

3. ICCUF regional personnel are not necessarily placed in the appropriate geographic locations, and some cases, coverage is insufficient. Co-location is desired. Additional resources are required in some locations.

4. It is unclear if the Investigative Support Component has sufficient resources. Resource requirements appear to vary among the regions, again possibly indicating that resources are not necessarily placed in the appropriate geographic region. Interviewees indicate growing pressure on NWEST to provide services. Quantitative data does not necessarily support or refute this finding. That is, although quantitative data does not show an increase in requests for service, without available information on the number staff in place during the time period studied, an accurate conclusion cannot be drawn. Thus, further data on caseload/officer may provide clarification as to whether workload is increasing.

3.2 Success

S1 TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE INITIATIVE DELIVERED ITS INTENDED OUTPUTS? (POLICY/RESEARCH)

FINDINGS

PS program managers indicated that one research paper entitled *Youth, Weapons and Violence in Toronto and Montreal* was commissioned by PS and circulated to Initiative partners. A copy of the paper was also provided to GCS. As with the previous research paper, PS consulted with partners to develop a list of potential research projects in order to begin to identify priorities.
However, no research is currently being undertaken, since available resources are only adequate to fund the formative evaluation.

The table below provides a summary of the outputs planned to be delivered under the ICCUF and outputs actually delivered.

**Policy/ Research: Outputs Planned and Delivered**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Planned Outputs</th>
<th>Outputs Delivered</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>• Policy papers and advice</td>
<td>• 121 pieces of policy advice since ICCUF inception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>• Targeted research on the criminal use of firearms</td>
<td>• 1 research paper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Policy advice noted in the table includes briefing notes, Memoranda to Cabinet, question period backgrounders, ministerial correspondence, transition and strategic direction papers. RCMP documents also provide evidence that five pieces of policy advice were submitted in 2006. Two of these were entered into Mercury system. [*].

Several challenges hampering the production of outputs were noted by interviewees. [*].

**CONCLUSIONS**

1. PS has made progress in the production of research outputs, with the development of a prioritized list of research, in consultation with partners, and one research paper.

**S2 TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE INITIATIVE DELIVERED ITS INTENDED OUTPUTS? (INTELLIGENCE)**

Outputs identified in the logic model pertaining to the Intelligence Component include data and information, tactical and strategic intelligence.

**FINDINGS**

Five ICCUF partners are responsible for the Intelligence Component. These are: NWEST, FRT/CIBIN, CISC, CI and CBSA. The table on the following page provides a summary of the outputs planned to be delivered under the ICCUF and outputs actually delivered for each partner involved in the Intelligence Component. The information is separated by Data/ Information outputs; Tactical Intelligence outputs; and Strategic Intelligence outputs.

**Data/ Information: Outputs Planned and Delivered**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Planned Outputs</th>
<th>Outputs Delivered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NWEST</td>
<td>• PROS database elements</td>
<td>• Not tracked. Interviewees indicated some data is being entered, but there are issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>Planned Outputs</td>
<td>Outputs Delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRT/CIBIN</td>
<td>• FRT</td>
<td>• FRT production:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• CD-ROM individual use version 2075 delivered (updated once per year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• CD-ROM Corporate version: 28 delivered, total number of users unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Network version: 24 users (always up to date)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Canadian Firearms Registry version: approximately 300 users (updated six days per week, Web Business version exact number to be established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Number of records added in 2006:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• For Canadian version:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Parent records: 1230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Child records: 5730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Image sets: 570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Glossary records: 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• For International version:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Parent records: 1230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Child records: 3160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Image sets: 570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Glossary records: 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• CIBIN database elements</td>
<td>For 2006(^{13}):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 5,986 pieces of data entered into CIBIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• number of hits total 236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISC</td>
<td>• National Firearms Collection Plan</td>
<td>• National Firearms Collection Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• National Firearms Data Collection Template</td>
<td>• National Firearms Data Collection Template (while CISC has developed the template, the coordination of the collection was entrusted to NWEST by JMT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Introduction of a ‘firearms’ screen in ACIIS, developed to facilitate the storage and retrieval of firearms-related specifics using ACIIS. Over 600 entries were added to ACIIS using the firearms screen, since it was introduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Research into the present state of firearms information on ACIIS. The ACIIS Evaluation Report will be presented to the next JMT meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>• Undeveloped intelligence (prior)</td>
<td>• Examples include:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{15}\) FRT database updates and additions is an indicator of delivery of data and information outputs. Documents received stated that here are two versions of content for the FRT (Canadian and International) which differ in that certain types of firearms (converted automatic firearms for example) are tracked in the Canadian version but which are not applicable to international use. The parent records represent families of firearms (example AK47 family); the child records reflect all variations ever produced (example: the AK47 family includes the child records for AKM, AKMS, AK74 etc, all distinct firearms within the AK family). The image sets typically contain four to six images depending on the type of firearm and how it is marked.

\(^{16}\) Documents from the RCMP state that information from the CAFC on the number of web hits on the Web Business version and the number of Canadian Firearms Information System (CFIS) network hits on the FRT by the CFIS software used by the CFR is currently being collected. There were 520,995 inquiries made to the FRT by the CFIS system for calendar year 2006.

\(^{17}\) The CIBIN planning figure for the productivity of an IBIS instrument is 2,000 items per year, a figure which is based on an average mix of bullets and cartridge cases, noting that bullets take twice as much time as cartridge cases to enter. Thus the planned output of the three operational instruments in 2006 was 6,000 items. With 5,986 actual, FLS is meeting targets. In addition, with 236 hits, FLS has averaged a 4% hit rate (as compared to the typical worldwide IBIS rate of 1%).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Planned Outputs</th>
<th>Outputs Delivered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|         | to being analyzed) | • E Division – participated in a seizure (PROS file 20066509); assisted in a probe (20064667)  
|         | • PROS database elements | • V Division - assistance in a triple homicide file and 1 ACISS entry  
|         | | • Other Divisions (combined) - 4 ACISS entries and PROS file 200643821 |
| CBSA    | • IMS/ ICES database elements | • 210 files opened on IMS related to firearms smuggling  
|         | | • RIFLO Workshop March 2006  
|         | | • Regional RIFLO/PWEU meetings  
|         | | • Regional RIFLO/NWEST meetings  
|         | | • NHQ coordinator meetings |

**Tactical Intelligence: Outputs Planned and Delivered**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Planned Outputs</th>
<th>Outputs Delivered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| NWEST   | • Operational & records traces  
|         | • Customized reports that respond to issue or location | • 1266 traces conducted in 2006.  
|         | | • Interviewees indicated that information is shared via PROS and ACISS |
| NWEST   | • Investigational leads | Information not provided. |
| FRT/CIBIN | • Correlations (CIBIN traces) and negatives | From ICCUF inception to Oct 31, 2006  
|         | | • 16,173 samples total; 524 hits; 15,649  
|         | | From Jan 1, 2006 to Oct 31, 2006  
|         | | • 5,166 samples total; 197 hits; 4,969 negatives. |
| CBSA    | • Lookouts  
|         | • Investigative referrals  
|         | • Intelligence reports and bulletins | Since Jan 2006:  
|         | | • [ * ]  
|         | | • 248 internal and 128 external investigative referrals |

**Strategic Intelligence: Outputs Planned and Delivered**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Planned Outputs</th>
<th>Outputs Delivered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| NWEST   | • Regional trends analysis  
|         | • National issues identification | Some issues identified in the NWEST Monthly Report which has been produced 9 times since ICCUF inception. |
| CISC    | **ICCUF-Funded**  
|         | • National Strategic Firearms Threat Assessment  
|         | • Combating Illicit Firearms | Produced – in distribution stage – to be disseminated to the community March 2007. A second Assessment will be produced and delivered by June 2007.  
|         | | Completed – distributed in December 2006. The Canada-U.S. Overview was co-produced with the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the U.S. Customs & Border Protection, the U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement on behalf of the Cross-border Crime Forum. The Canadian component was written by CISC in collaboration with the Canadian Firearms Centre, NWEST, CBSA and PWEU. The report was produced under the |

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18 CI appreciates the need to monitor outputs, but places greater value on quality versus quantity. It should also be noted that PROS does not allow the capture and tracking of information in a statistical fashion, which is a current gap the RCMP must contend with until system patches/upgrades are made.

19 [ * ]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Planned Outputs</th>
<th>Outputs Delivered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Firearms-related assessments and reports, as needed and on request from the law enforcement community</td>
<td>• None have been requested, so far.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Progress Summary on the CISC Map of Canada</td>
<td>• Under development – target date for distribution June 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not ICCUF-Funded</td>
<td>Other publications containing a firearms component written by CISC’s ICCUF-funded strategic analyst:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Integrated National Treat Assessment</td>
<td>• Completed – released in August 2005 and in August 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Integrated Provincial Threat Assessments</td>
<td>• Completed – 10 distributed in 2005 and in 2006 (one in each Province) for a total of 20 assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• National Criminal Intelligence Estimate</td>
<td>• Completed – released in March 2006 and in February 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Annual Report on Organized Crime</td>
<td>• Completed – released in August 2005 and in August 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSA</td>
<td>• Intelligence reports and bulletins</td>
<td>• RIFLO monthly reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Monthly Firearms Report – NHQ Strategic Intelligence Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 14 reports analyzed from IMS data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of challenges to producing outputs, program managers indicated that they have begun to identify gaps in intelligence in the regions and are working towards continuous improvement in this regard. Another key challenge to delivering intelligence products to ICCUF partners was identified as pertaining to Section 107 of Customs Act and database issues regarding interoperability and partner accessibility.

**Feedback on Outputs from the Field Level**

From the field perspective, NWEST Team Leaders indicated that there had been numerous outputs related to information that responded to field requests and that information from the field was being analyzed by all partners. Regional intelligence focus groups participants identified that one of the challenges to delivering on tactical outputs was municipal and provincial agency buy-in and cooperation and attraction of staff for key positions. In addition, it was noted that key positions have only recently been staffed and the majority of their efforts has been devoted to training. In regions where staffing has been in place for some time, there is an ongoing struggle to retain staff. In the northern region, participants indicated that there has not been a requirement for tactical intelligence to date.

Another common issue identified through the regional intelligence focus groups was that there is a lack of resources and time available for data entry, thus compromising the effectiveness of
tactical intelligence tools. In addition, participants cited that there needs to be a common, widely-utilized and accessible database for firearms intelligence because ACIIS is not readily accessible to all partners and PROS is not used by external law enforcement community. Participants also indicated that they are not able to access data in a structure or form that is useful because there is a lack of flexibility resulting from pre-determined data fields.

Members of the NWEST Advisory Group cited that while they were familiar with NWEST tactical intelligence outputs, they were less aware of other RCMP agency and CBSA intelligence products. The focus group participants also stated that NWEST tactical intelligence products were the most reliable source of tactical intelligence. In addition, participants noted that more effective decision-making regarding the types of tactical intelligence outputs that should be produced should be done in consultation with provincial and local policing services. One concern regarding the number of tactical intelligence outputs was that, as intelligence outputs increased, caseload intensified and there was a lack of human resources in the field to effectively keep up with investigations triggered by tactical intelligence.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The ICCUF Initiative is in the early stages of delivery; as such, all partners have demonstrated a great deal of output production and delivery, particularly given that the funding was not received until April 2005. CISC’s National Strategic Firearms Threat Assessment has not yet been finalized, but in April 2007 it was in its completion stage. Interviewees noted that despite staffing challenges, CI contributed to the National Firearms Collection plan. It can be stated that the partners have sufficiently delivered outputs consistent with expectations of a formative evaluation.

S3 TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE INITIATIVE DELIVERED ITS INTENDED OUTPUTS? (INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT)

NWEST is the ICCUF partner responsible for outputs under the Investigative Support Component of the ICCUF. Its mandate, as stated in the Evaluation Framework, is not to lead or direct an investigation, but to provide investigative support and training. Members of NWEST work with the law enforcement community to enhance best practices. In addition to its support role, NWEST is to provide education and training. The recipients of this training include front line officers, NWEST members themselves, CBSA and other government departments as well as Crown Attorneys and lawyers.

FINDINGS

RCMP program managers indicated that NWEST has successfully delivered on its mandate to establish educational material and advice and has implemented all of their obligations as intended. NWEST Team Leaders were in agreement stating that they have implemented all activities as planned and extensive marketing of NWEST to law enforcement, from front line officers to senior management about what services NWEST is capable of offering in accordance with its mandate. The table below provides a summary of the outputs planned to be delivered
under the ICCUF and outputs actually delivered for each partner involved in the Investigative Support Component.

### Investigative Support: Outputs Planned and Delivered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Planned Outputs</th>
<th>Outputs Delivered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| NWEST   | Advice and expertise:  
- Search warrant preparation advice  
- Locating expert witness services  
- Analytical assistance for weapons-related investigations  
- Advice on the use of the *Firearms Act*  
- On-site crime scene advice  
- Serial Number Recovery  
- Expert Witness for Court Prosecutions  

For January 1, 2006 to September 30, 2006:  
- 3,453 reports for assistance processed  
- 110 search warrants prepared  
- numerous Cases of Interest cited in NWEST Monthly Reports containing various types of advice and assistance provided |
| NWEST   | Educational material and training:  
- Search Warrant Preparation and Processes (for firearms issues)  
- Characteristics of an Armed Criminal  
- Firearms Offences Enforcement Support System (FOES) and FRT  
- Customs Processes  
- International Trafficking School  
- Investigators Toolkit Module (online)  
- Techniques on Restoring Serial Numbers  

- western region: 73 information and 53 officer safety bulletins in 2006  
- For January – September 2006, 1,456 persons have received training  
- 87 training sessions delivered  
- NWEST team leaders stated that they had offered the following training to police agencies: Public Safety Warrants, Firearms Prohibitions, Prohibitive Weapons Devices, Characteristics of an Armed Person. In addition, NWEST has provided training and legal advice to the Crown on Part 3 of the Criminal Code.  
- Annual national and international firearms trafficking conferences (Nov 2006) provide a forum for NWEST regional intelligence officers to share best practices and applied knowledge.  
- Information sessions held at the National Firearms Tracking conference provide supplementary education to NWEST staff in the regions and law enforcement. |

In terms of challenges and opportunities related to Investigative Support, it was noted that the RCMP/NWEST needs to create opportunities for investigators to meet and discuss the work and activities of NWEST to create greater awareness of how they may benefit stakeholders. RCMP program managers stated that NWEST has been engaged in a process of establishing an improved knowledge of the information gaps existing between partners and law enforcement communities so that efforts to improve investigative support are targeted and appropriate to the needs of stakeholders.

Other issues affecting NWEST capacity to fulfill their mandate involve access to and entry of data. There are also issues across regions that data entry by police officers into PROS is taking too much time. In addition, as indicated in the discussion of intelligence outputs, many NWEST regional staff are not receiving intelligence outputs. In general, NWEST Advisory committee members pointed to two key needs to improve investigational support in the field. These are: the need to organize human resources to support frontline officers, and to consider options to
improve upon data entry.\textsuperscript{20} When discussing PROS and intelligence data, regional intelligence focus group participants concurred that not only does data entry consume too much time this software does not compile the data (i.e. PROS does not allow for the number of seized guns/revolvers to be extracted).

Another issue that arose during the focus group discussions was that PROS does not allow for a knowledge of possession/registry that was available previously by the registry. Thus, participants indicated that it is critical that this information is accessible through another mechanism if the Firearms Registry were no longer in place. Meetings are being held with the CAFC to resolve this issue.

**CONCLUSIONS**

1. Outputs under the Investigative Support Component of the ICCUF have been delivered as planned.

2. NWEST is under increasing pressure to deliver investigative support. NWEST regional teams are uneven in terms of their ability to offer support in the field.

\textbf{S4 TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE INITIATIVE IMPROVED SHARING OF ACTIONABLE FIREARMS INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE THAT MEETS THE NEEDS OF STAKEHOLDERS?}

The finding presented below focus on the success of the Intelligence Component related to sharing of actionable firearms information and intelligence. As previously stated, the five ICCUF partners are responsible for the Intelligence Component are: NWEST, FRT/CIBIN, CISC, CI and CBSA.

**FINDINGS**

Most program managers interviewed believed that there has been improved sharing of actionable firearms information and intelligence that meets the needs of stakeholders. Several examples are provided below under the separate headings of Data/Information, Tactical Intelligence and Strategic Intelligence.

**Data/Information Sharing**

The following statistics provided by FRT/CIBIN illustrate the extent to which FRT has been distributed through its five different versions:

- The CD-ROM individual use version was delivered to 2,075 recipients.
- The CD-ROM Corporate version is a network capable version with multiple users. It is typically for large municipal police departments, RCMP detachments with hundreds of users, and CBSA nationally. 28 copied were delivered, but the total number of users is unknown.

\textsuperscript{20} It should be noted that NWEST has recently reinvested administrative resources to operational support to address the issue of front line human resource needs. While current budget restraints do not allow for the option of staffing data entry FTEs, there is ongoing effort to streamline the data entry process.
The network version is used by FRT staff to maintain the database and by the RCMP Canadian National Firearms Tracing Unit. There are 24 users of this version.

- The Canadian Firearms Registry (CFR) version is used by the CFR, the Canada Firearms Centre, and provincial Chief Firearms Officers. There are approximately 300 users.
- Web Business version 21 is a subset of the CFR version supplied to firearms business verifiers. There are several hundred users (exact number to be established).

As the statistics above indicate, there are several thousand users of this information.

**Tactical Intelligence**

The NWEST Monthly Report has been produced nine times since the inception of ICCUF. The report illustrates trends and patterns, statistics and tactical analysis. In terms of how broadly information is shared, the monthly report goes out to all ICCUF partners, the four NWEST Team Leaders and many police agencies, units and other law enforcement agencies.

Interviewees indicated that there have been a number of cases where NWEST has provided information that has led to investigations, seizures and arrests. Several interviewees noted that the sharing of intelligence and information among partners in the newly established regional subcommittees has led to investigations and seizures. For example, the sharing of information among NWEST, CI and CISC in Victoria and in Atlantic Region contributed to investigations and seizures.

From ICCUF inception to Oct 31, 2006, 524 CIBIN correlations and 15,649 negatives have been produced. The confirmed correlations or "hits" connect two police files by agency number, sometimes within a particular police department, and sometimes between two or more police departments. Negatives are also of benefit but solely to the submitting departments, since it permits them to streamline the investigative process by disposal of firearms exhibits with a significantly lessened risk of overlooking the probative value of the evidence.

**Strategic Intelligence**

As previously noted, CISC has produced numerous analytical products with a firearms component. While most of these products were ongoing and funded from sources other than ICCUF, they were distributed to ICCUF partners where possible, as well as to the police and law enforcement community in general. These include *Combating Illicit Firearms* (Cross-border Crime Forum), Integrated Provincial Threat Assessment (10 reports in total; one per province), the *National Threat Assessment*, the *National Criminal Intelligence Estimate*, the *Annual Report on Organized Crime* and others. CISC has gathered the following client satisfaction statistics, based on tear-out evaluation forms received. They are average figures for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006, that were scored based on a rating of 1 to 5 where 1 is “of no use” and 5 is “most useful”. For the National Threat Assessment, 82% of respondents cited a 4 or 5; for the Criminal

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21 Documents from the RCMP state that information from the CAFC on the number of web hits on the Web Business version and the number of Canadian Firearms Information System (CFIS) network hits on the FRT by the CFIS software used by the CFR is currently being collected.
Intelligence Estimate, 80% of respondents cited a 4 or 5; and for the Annual Report, 76% of respondents cited a 4 or 5. Usefulness was measured along the following dimensions: strategic intelligence, national perspective, scope of criminal activities, emerging trends, and forecasting.

The distribution of the CBSA RIFLO Monthly reports does not go beyond internal distribution within CBSA. However, they form a good part of the new CBSA NHQ Analysis Strategic product – Firearms Monthly Report – which is beginning to be shared among ICCUF partners by the RIFLO’s.

Interview Feedback on Intelligence Products

NWEST Team Leaders

All three NWEST Leaders interviewed believed that there has been improved sharing of actionable firearms information. They were able to provide examples such as the fact that two suspects were apprehended at the border and a gun shop shut down, based on the free sharing of information among the ICCUF partner agencies. They also believe that, in some areas, there is better information being exchanged including more detailed information such as documentation, names, addresses and photographs of persons, weapons, and vehicles.

NWEST Advisory Group

The NWEST Advisory Group generally believed that there has been success in this area as far as NWEST is concerned, but felt it was more difficult to talk about ICCUF in broader terms because it is still in implementation mode. They cited several examples such as the closure of three gun stores in Vancouver bringing weapons from China. Through this investigation, of the 1,200 handguns that were identified to be in the area, police have recovered approximately 100 through intelligence received from NWEST. In Victoria, NWEST contributed to the largest seizure of firearms in Canada. In this case, 1,000 guns from a single individual were identified and linked to the U.S. and through international channels.

CONCLUSIONS

1. There exist several concrete examples of how the sharing of information and intelligence is leading to action within the policing community. However, beyond the perceptions of the limited number of field level personnel (NWEST Team Leaders and regional intelligence focus groups) and the NWEST Advisory Group, the impact of intelligence sharing cannot be properly assessed. Having stated this, the level of success in this area is consistent with the current stage of the ICCUF Initiative.

S5 TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE INITIATIVE INCREASED KNOWLEDGE OF INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES?
RCMP program managers unanimously indicated that ICCUF has resulted in an increased knowledge of investigational procedures. This is evidenced by quantitative information provided for January to September 2006, wherein 1,456 persons have received training and 87 training sessions were delivered. Although no recipient feedback forms were received by GCS as evidence of increased knowledge, program managers indicated a positive feedback from participants at the firearms trafficking school and conferences and in training courses. Examples of investigational support cited by program managers included providing the “ABCs” of how to conduct a solid firearms investigation; what database enquiries can provide; and how to query databases; and how to trace a firearm and how to properly employ Part 3 of the Criminal Code. Additionally, knowledge of investigative procedures was provided through the day-to-day advice and support of NWEST members as quantified in the NWEST Monthly Reports that indicated 3,453 reports for assistance were processed and 110 search warrants were prepared from January to September 2006.

Participants in the regional intelligence focus groups indicated that the extent to which they can improve knowledge of investigative procedures is being hampered by balancing between conducting training and providing active support. Investigational support is increasingly in demand as indicated by increased calls for service across the regions. However, participants were in agreement that they seem to be in ‘training mode’ all the time. They also indicated that further training is required for frontline officers and more support is required by Crown attorneys. To this end, NWEST is currently involved in having a Crown Attorney assigned to their unit on a permanent basis. Furthermore, NWEST Advisory Committee focus group participants indicated that they need more time to train agencies about new firearms legislation.

Other barriers noted that affect NWEST ability to improve investigational support, and thereby increase knowledge in the police community, is a common sentiment that the processes required of them to support the ICCUF (i.e. data entry, completing trace charts, completing forms, etc.) are overloading them beyond already stressed daily activities and demands. Participants stated that not all police agencies are using NWEST services; however, at the same time, NWEST is stressed as a result of limited resources and increased need for support among agencies that do use their services.

CONCLUSIONS

1. As evidenced by the significant number of training sessions delivered, advice provided, and perceptions of interviewees, the ICCUF has contributed to the increased knowledge of investigative procedures. Feedback from recipients on the usefulness of this training and advice in increasing their knowledge would assist in ascertaining the degree of success in this area.

2. NWEST staff is experiencing challenges in advancing knowledge of the police community due to competing priorities: delivering training, provision of advice and data entry requirements of the ICCUF. This is further exacerbated by the fact that service demands on NWEST may be trending upward.
S6 TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE INITIATIVE IMPROVED INVESTIGATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT OF GUN LEGISLATION?

FINDINGS
Several examples of early success in this area are evident. At the regional level, better coordination and sharing of information have led to cases being solved and charges laid. As an example, when guns started appearing across Western Canada, ICCUF regional partners were able to identify that all of the guns were coming from the same location. Therefore, they were able to provide information to local investigators to address the problem. The NWEST Advisory Committee cited that ICCUF has improved investigations and enforcement of gun legislation because NWEST has, through their rigour of developing solid court cases on other offences, included a weapon or firearm possession charge, thus enabling more convictions. Quantitative data provided by CBSA indicates that, since January 2006, there were 125 weapons seizures. In addition, data compiled from the NWEST Monthly Reports shows that over 5,000 firearms were recovered from January to September 2006.

NWEST Monthly Reports also reported 10-20 Cases of Interest each month from January to September 2006. The Cases of Interest provide evidence of the effectiveness of NWEST activities is assisting in investigation and enforcement. Numerous cases are illustrated from across Canada that resulted in preventing violent incidents; recovery of unregistered firearms; charges being laid; and traces being initiated and conducted resulting in firearms being identified and tracked.

CONCLUSIONS
1. As evidenced by the number of seizures, interviewee responses, and evidence provided by the NWEST Monthly Reports, significant progress has been made in investigation and enforcement of gun legislation. In addition, seizure data noted above will provide a good baseline for future evaluation activities.

ARE THERE ANY UNINTENDED POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE IMPACTS AS A RESULT OF THE ICCUF INITIATIVE?

During the research for the evaluation, interviewees were asked if there were any unintended positive or negative impacts as a result of the ICCUF Initiative. The responses are summarized below.

Interviewees indicated that some positive unintended impacts were that there are now stronger relationships with partners outside ICCUF, such as PWEU and the Guns and Gangs Task Force in Toronto. They also believe that support from ICCUF has helped provinces illustrate the firearms problem so that a better case can be made to their respective provincial governments. Also unforeseen was the fact that ICCUF has become a focal point for creating a National Firearms program, and it has created momentum. To this end, interviewees believe that ICCUF has become the “voice of Firearms in Canada”. Finally, interviewees feel that ICCUF has assisted with investigative support for other portfolios such as drug trafficking and organized crime.
Interviewees also cited some negative unintended impacts. The indicated that the legislative issues of information sharing between RCMP and CBSA were not anticipated. The also felt that there has been duplication of roles in the first few months of ICCUF, and that there is an overloading of resources due to demand for service. Finally, with respect to intelligence activities, they have uncovered potential investigations but, in many cases, the investigative resources are not available to conduct the investigations.

4 Recommendations

The conclusions drawn in this report are based on the evidence gathered during the study from all lines of inquiry (document review, interviews, focus groups and review of quantitative information). Recommendations provided herein are related to the conclusions presented throughout the report. After each recommendation, a bracketed reference is included indicating to which evaluation question the recommendation pertains and to which partner(s) the recommendation is directed.

4.1 Design and Delivery

PLANNING FRAMEWORK

1. Consideration should be given to the addition of strategic planning expertise to the JMT so that formalized horizontal planning documents can be prepared that complement/supplement the Evaluation Framework which is currently being used as a planning tool. (DD1) (JMT)

2. Indicators associated with the Intelligence Component should be reviewed to ensure that performance information provides useful information regarding the quality and usefulness of intelligence produced and does not simply provide a quantification of outputs. To this end, a mechanism for soliciting stakeholder feedback should be implemented. (DD1) (NWEST, FRT/CIBIN, CISC, CI, CBSA)

PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 22

3. The JMT should consider developing a Performance Management Framework to supplement the Evaluation Framework. Given the amount of information being produced by partners, it could be capitalized upon for management of the Initiative; particularly with respect to determining appropriate resource levels and the geographic location of resources in support of a national enforcement strategy. (DD2) (JMT)

4. ICCUF partners should continue efforts to track output-based efficiency measures in order to assist in workload planning and provision of performance information. (DD3) (All)

22 Although no formal performance measurement is in place for the initiative, partners have agreed that, to the extent possible, internal performance measurement systems will be used to link to the indicators for the ICCUF evaluation.
5. CISC and CI have experienced challenges in achieving sound management of financial resources, due to lengthy staffing processes, which has caused expenditure variances to be outside generally acceptable limits. With staff in place, management of financial resources should likely improve. Going forward, CI and CISC should ensure that budgets are more closely monitored and managed, so that funds do not lapse in the future. (DD3) (CISC, CI).

GOVERNANCE

6. Since the effectiveness of the regional subcommittees varies from region to region, the governance structure should be strengthened. The role of each partner should be clearly communicated and participation in the subcommittees should be encouraged. (DD4) (NWEST, CISC, CI, CBSA)

7. Secretariat functions of the JMT should be strengthened. To this end, consideration should be given to: establishing a charter or terms of reference for the JMT; establishing frequency of meetings; and finding a mechanism that will even out the balance of power so that all partners are considered in decision-making. (DD4) (JMT)

8. The role of PS should be discussed at the JMT in order to clarify their participation. (DD4) (JMT)

PROCESSES FOR SHARING INTELLIGENCE

9. A process map should be prepared for the intelligence function at the regional level so that partners can clearly understand their roles, and potential duplication can be eliminated. This may also encourage common understanding and/or standardization of the process across regions. In conducting this exercise, consideration should be given to the existing regional networks of CBSA, NWEST and CISC. The need to provide tactical intelligence to support strategic intelligence activities must be considered in the process mapping of the regional intelligence function (DD5) (NWEST, CISC, CI, CBSA)

10. Although intelligence sharing through informal means is providing some desired results, the informal process limits investigations within a particular geographic area or within a personal network of contacts. Database issues should be resolved so that linkages among geographic areas can be established and investigations can be expanded beyond their current limits. (DD5) (NWEST, CISC, CI, CBSA)

11. Beyond the evaluation forms gathered by CISC on their intelligence products, there appears to be no formal mechanisms through which law enforcement can offer constructive feedback on intelligence products. Similarly, there is no formal mechanism through which ICCUF program managers can assess how intelligence provided to stakeholders is being utilized. Mechanisms to gather feedback on the usefulness of intelligence products should be expanded. Some interviewees suggested a feedback process that would determine whether actionable intelligence is being acted upon. (NWEST, CISC, CI, CBSA)

INFRASTRUCTURE FOR EDUCATIONAL MATERIAL AND ADVICE
12. A communications strategy should be further developed in consultation with partners and targeted to law enforcement personnel so that the role of ICCUF partners and particularly that of NWEST can be clearly understood. The communication strategy should be inclusive of a component to educate front line officers on the role of NWEST staff to support and not to conduct investigations. (DD6) (NWEST).

RESOURCE LEVELS

13. The data entry and analysis portion of the Intelligence Component is not adequately supported. This is a serious issue that should be addressed immediately if the ICCUF is to attain its intelligence-based outcomes. (DD7) (NWEST, CISC, CI, CBSA)

14. For the Intelligence and Investigative Support Components, consideration should be given to the development of a mapping of the geographic location of resources, against workload volumes. An illustration of the resource mapping may assist in understanding what synergies might be achieved through the available resources and how efficiencies may be realized. (DD7) (NWEST, CISC, CI, CBSA)

15. The workload of NWEST members should be further monitored and studied in order to determine if staff are becoming overloaded as this may be an emerging issue. If no further resources are available, demands for the work of NWEST members (among training, providing advice and intelligence activities) may require prioritization. (DD7) (NWEST)

4.2 Success

OUTPUT DELIVERY

16. PS consultations with the JMT should be continued to ensure that research papers respond to the operational environment, in addition to the strategic agenda, and directly relate to ICCUF partner challenges operationally. For example, the research agenda might include legislative and policy research with respect to the challenges that operational partners are facing with respect to information sharing under the constraints of the Privacy Act and the Customs Act. (S1) (JMT/PS)

IMPROVED SHARING OF ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE

17. Stakeholder needs for actionable intelligence should be further identified through stakeholder consultation in order to align the needs of stakeholders with the products produced. (S4) (NWEST, CISC, CI, CBSA)
Appendix A – Logic Model

Logic Model - Investments to Combat the Criminal Use of Firearms Initiative

Components

Policy/ Research
- Provide policy advice to Ministers regarding the criminal use of firearms
  PSEPC
- Conduct targeted research on the criminal use of firearms
  PSEPC

Intelligence
- Collect and/or input firearms-related information
  FLS, CI, CBSA, NWEST, CISC
- Analyze firearms-related information
  CISC, CBSA, NWEST, FLS
- Disseminate information and intelligence
  FLS, CI, CBSA, NWEST, CISC

Investigative Support
- Provide direct investigative support to law enforcement agencies.
  NWEST

Activities

Policy papers and advice
Research papers
Data/information
Strategic intelligence
Tactical intelligence
Actionable intelligence is shared and meets the needs of the law enforcement community
Increased knowledge of investigative procedures

Outputs

Policy papers and advice
Research papers
Data/information
Strategic intelligence
Tactical intelligence

Immediate Outcomes

Increased knowledge of gun crime issues, trends and threats
(e.g. Strategic Threat Assessment)
Enhanced (national) coordination of investigations and enforcement
Improved investigations and enforcement of gun legislation

Intermediate Outcomes

Prevention of firearms tragedies
Prevention of the criminal use of firearms

Ultimate Outcomes

Safer homes and streets in Canada

Strategic Outcome
## Appendix B – List of Documents Reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NWEST</td>
<td>ICCUF System Report Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWEST-01-01 Jan</td>
<td>NWEST Monthly Activity Summary – Jan 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWEST-01-02 Feb</td>
<td>NWEST Monthly Activity Summary – Feb 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWEST-01-03 Mar</td>
<td>NWEST Monthly Activity Summary – Mar 06</td>
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<td>NWEST Monthly Activity Summary – Apr 06</td>
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<td>NWEST-02</td>
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<td>NWEST-03</td>
<td>National Firearms Tracking Conference Agenda</td>
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<td>NWEST-04</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWEST-05</td>
<td>MOU b/w RCMP and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives of the United States of America (‘ATF’),</td>
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<td>NWEST-06</td>
<td>Mandate of Tactical Analysis Unit</td>
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<td>NWEST-07</td>
<td>List of participants for Joint Training</td>
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<td>NWEST-08</td>
<td>Report for JMT dated Sept 12, 2006</td>
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<td>ICCUF Framework for Delivery (February 6, 2006) - with CISC feedback</td>
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<td>NWEST Org. Chart</td>
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<td>MOU b/w RCMP and Toronto Police Services</td>
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<td>MOU b/w RCMP and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (AFT)</td>
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<td>Conference Delegates</td>
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<td>Annual Estimates Documents: Departmental Performance Reports and Report on Plans and Priorities</td>
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<td>FLS</td>
<td>Monthly Performance/ Status Reports</td>
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<td>CIBIN-NIBIN Action Item List</td>
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<td>CISC 2006 Annual Report of Organized Crime in Canada</td>
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<td>Balanced Scorecard Report for Reporting Period September 30, 2006</td>
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<td>CISC National Firearms (data Collection) Template</td>
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<td>CISC-03</td>
<td>Letter of Introduction re: national Firearms Collection Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISC-04</td>
<td>Letter from [*] re: development of national firearms template</td>
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<tr>
<td>CI-01</td>
<td>Job Descriptions</td>
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<tr>
<td>CI-02</td>
<td>Tracing Ledger Matrix</td>
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<td>CI-03</td>
<td>Report for ICCUF Mid-term Evaluation RCMP-CI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSA</td>
<td>Annual Estimates Documents: Departmental Performance Reports and Report on Plans and Priorities</td>
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<td>CBSA</td>
<td>Job Descriptions</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSEPC</td>
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<td>Job Descriptions</td>
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<td>Hard copy - investments to Combat the Criminal Use of Firearms / Proposed Research Topics, 2006</td>
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<td>PSEPC</td>
<td>PSEPC Job description - Senior Policy Advisor Dated Jan. 10, 2006</td>
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<td>PSEPC-01</td>
<td>Research report on Youth, Weapons and Violence in Toronto and Montreal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSEPC-02</td>
<td>Synopsis of Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMT-01</td>
<td>Minutes from JMT Meetings/ Internal electronic mail</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMT-02</td>
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Appendix C - Interview Guides

Investments to Combat the Criminal Use of Firearms
NWEST Team Leaders Interview Guide

Introduction

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), in conjunction with the Joint Management Team (JMT) of the Investments to Combat the Criminal Use of Firearms Initiative (ICCUF), has asked Government Consulting Services (GSC) to conduct a formative evaluation for the ICCUF initiative. The ICCUF initiative includes six partners as follows:

- Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC)
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police:
  - National Weapons Enforcement Support Team (NWEST)
  - Forensic Laboratory Services (FLS)
  - Criminal Intelligence (CI)
  - Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC)
- Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)

The focus of the formative evaluation is to assess how the initiative is being implemented, particularly with respect to the intelligence component, whether adjustments should be made, and whether progress toward the achievement of the immediate outcomes is occurring. As such the formative evaluation questions will focus on the design and delivery aspects of the initiative as well as early success, and likelihood of achieving intermediate and ultimate outcomes.

As part of the formative evaluation, GCS is conducting interviews with NWEST Team Leaders. The questions that follow will help structure our conversation with you and we hope that you will find it useful in preparing for the interview. We anticipate that interviews will take about an hour and a half.

Interview Questions

Governance

1. a) Have the roles and responsibilities of the partners in the horizontal initiative been clearly identified and communicated?

   b) What do you see as the roles and responsibilities of your organization?

2. a) How have these processes contributed to the efficient operation of the initiative?

   b) What needs to be improved?
3. a) What are the challenges of working in partnership on this Initiative?
   
   b) What are the benefits?

4. In your opinion, is there any evidence of duplication of roles, responsibilities or activities?

**ICCUF Resource Allocation and Efficiency**

5. Do you believe you have sufficient resources to undertake the activities identified in your component of the ICCUF? (Consider: financial, human, training, information resources) If not, what is the greatest area of need?

6. Has working in a partnership allowed you to leverage any additional resources or to undertake additional activities?

7. a) Can you briefly outline the process or protocols for sharing information and intelligence among ICCUF partners.

   b) In your opinion do these processes contribute to timely and useful knowledge sharing and dissemination? If not, why?

**Intelligence Sharing**

8. a) Can you briefly outline the process or protocols for sharing information and intelligence with stakeholders outside of the ICCUF initiative.

   b) In your opinion do these processes contribute to timely and useful knowledge sharing and dissemination? If not, why?

9. Do you feel these processes for sharing intelligence are adhered to by ICCUF partners? If not, why do you think this is so?

10. a) How efficient are these processes?

    b) What could be improved?

    c) What benefit do you feel is derived from following these processes?
Implementation

11. a) Have NWEST activities been implemented as per the implementation plan?

   b) What are the contributors/ detractors from achievement of the plan?

12. To what extent has your organization has been able to produce or deliver intended outputs of the ICCUF initiative, in the areas of:
   a) intelligence; and,
   b) investigative support?

   c) Can you provide some examples.

   d) Have there been any challenges or barriers to delivering these outputs?

13. In your opinion, has the ICCUF contributed to the following desired outcomes?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired Outcomes</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>too soon to tell</th>
<th>Please explain and/or provide examples</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved sharing of actionable firearms information and intelligence that meets the needs of stakeholders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased knowledge of investigative procedures</td>
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<td>Increased knowledge of gun crime issues, trends and threats</td>
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<td>Prevention of firearms tragedies</td>
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<td>Prevention of criminal use of firearms</td>
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14. Are there any unintended positive or negative impacts that have occurred as a result of the ICCUF initiative?
Guide d’entretien à l’intention des responsables des ENSALA sur l’initiative sur les Investissements dans lutte contre l'utilisation d'armes à feu à des fins criminelles

Introduction

Le ministère de la Sécurité publique et de la Protection civile (SPPCC), en collaboration avec le Comité de gestion mixte (CGM) de l’initiative sur les Investissements dans la lutte contre l'utilisation d'armes à feu à des fins criminelles (ILUAFC), a demandé aux Services conseils du gouvernement (SCG) d’effectuer une évaluation formative de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC, qui est composée de six partenaires :

- Sécurité publique et Protection civile Canada (SPPCC)
- Gendarmerie royale du Canada :
  - Équipe nationale de soutien à l'application de la Loi sur les armes à feu (ENSALA)
  - Laboratoire judiciaire central (LJC)
  - Direction des renseignements criminels (DRC)
  - Service canadien de renseignements criminels (SCRC)
- Agence des services frontaliers du Canada (ASFC)

L'évaluation formative sera axée sur l'évaluation de la façon dont l'initiative est mise en oeuvre, notamment en ce qui a trait à la composante Renseignement, sur le fait de savoir si des modifications sont nécessaires et si la situation permet de croire que l'on est en voie d'obtenir les résultats immédiats. À ces fins, les questions pour l'évaluation formative se concentreront sur les aspects de l'initiative concernant la conception et la prestation, de même sur les premières réussites et sur le fait de savoir s'il est permis de croire que l'on obtiendra des résultats intermédiaires et des résultats définitifs.

Dans le cadre de l’évaluation formative, le SCG organise des entretiens avec les responsables de l’ENSALA. Les questions qui suivent aideront à structurer la conversation; nous espérons qu’elles vous seront utiles pour vous préparer à l’entretien. Nous prévoyons que les entretiens dureront environ une heure et demie.

Questions de l’entretien

Gouvernance

1. a) Est-ce que les rôles et responsabilités des partenaires de l’initiative horizontale ont été clairement établis et communiqués?

   b) Quels sont, d’après vous, les rôles et responsabilités de votre organisation?

2. a) Dans quelle mesure ces processus ont favorisé le fonctionnement efficace de l’initiative?
b) Quelles améliorations pourraient être apportées?

3. a) Quels sont les défis que constitue le travail en partenariat dans le cadre de cette initiative?

   b) Quels en sont les avantages?

4. À votre avis, est-ce qu’il y a un dédoublement des rôles, des responsabilités ou des activités?

Affectation des ressources et rendement - initiative sur ILUAFC

5. Croyez-vous avoir suffisamment de ressources pour mener les activités ciblées pour votre composante de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC? (ressources financières et humaines, formation, ressources en matière d’information). Si non, quel secteur a le plus grand besoin de ressources?

6. Est-ce que le travail en partenariat vous a permis de mobiliser des ressources supplémentaires ou de mener d’autres activités?

7. a) Veuillez donner les grandes lignes de la procédure ou des protocoles d’échange de renseignements entre les partenaires de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC?

   b) À votre avis, est-ce que cette procédure favorise l’échange et la diffusion en temps opportun de connaissances utiles? Si non, pourquoi?

Échange de renseignements

8. a) Veuillez donner les grandes lignes de la procédure ou des protocoles d’échange de renseignements avec les intervenants à l’extérieur du réseau de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC.

   b) À votre avis, est-ce que cette procédure favorise l’échange et la diffusion en temps opportun de connaissances utiles? Si non, pourquoi?

9. Estimez-vous que les partenaires de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC respectent la procédure d’échange de renseignements? Si non, pourquoi selon vous?

10. a) Dans quelle mesure cette procédure est-elle efficace?

    b) Quelles améliorations pourraient être apportées?

    c) Quels sont les avantages liés au respect de cette procédure?
Mise en oeuvre

11. a) Est-ce que les activités des ENSALA ont été mises en oeuvre conformément au plan de mise en oeuvre établi?

b) Quels sont les facteurs qui favorisaient la réalisation du plan ou lui nuisaient?

12. Dans quelle mesure votre organisation a-t-elle été capable de produire ou de livrer les extrants attendus dans le cadre de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC relativement aux secteurs suivants :
   a) renseignements;
   b) appui aux enquêtes?

c) Fournissez des exemples.

d) Est-ce que vous avez eu à faire face à des problèmes ou à des obstacles dans le cadre de la prestation de ces extrants?

13. À votre avis, l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC a-t-elle favorisé les résultats attendus suivants?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Résultats attendus</th>
<th>oui</th>
<th>non</th>
<th>trop tôt pour le savoir</th>
<th>Expliquez et/ou fournissez des exemples</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>b) Connaissance accrue de la procédure d’enquêtes</td>
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<td>c) Connaissance accrue des questions, des tendances et des menaces relatives aux crimes commis au moyen d’armes à feu</td>
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<td>d) Meilleure coordination à l’échelle nationale des enquêtes sur les crimes commis au moyen d’armes à feu et de l’application des mesures législatives sur le contrôle des armes à feu</td>
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<td>e) Amélioration des techniques d’enquête et de l’application des mesures législatives sur le contrôle des armes à feu</td>
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<td>f) Prévention de tragédies commises au moyen d’armes à feu</td>
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<tr>
<td>g) Prévention de l’utilisation d’armes à feu à des fins criminelles</td>
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</table>

14. Est-ce que des répercussions positives ou négatives inattendues se sont produites par suite de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC?
Investments to Combat the Criminal Use of Firearms
Program Managers Interview Guide

Introduction

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), in conjunction with the Joint Management Team (JMT) of the Investments to Combat the Criminal Use of Firearms Initiative (ICCUF), has asked Government Consulting Services (GCS) to conduct a formative evaluation for the ICCUF initiative. The ICCUF initiative includes six partners as follows:

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  - Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC)
- Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)

The focus of the formative evaluation is to assess how the initiative is being implemented, particularly with respect to the intelligence component, whether adjustments should be made, and whether progress toward the achievement of the immediate outcomes is occurring. As such the formative evaluation questions will focus on the design and delivery aspects of the initiative as well as early success, and likelihood of achieving intermediate and ultimate outcomes.

As part of the formative evaluation, GCS is conducting interviews with program managers responsible for the ICCUF in PSEPC, RCMP (NWEST, FLS, CI, CISC) and CBSA. The questions that follow will help structure our conversation with you and we hope that you will find it useful in preparing for the interview. We anticipate that interviews will take about an hour and a half.

Interview Questions

Governance

1. a) Have the roles and responsibilities of the partners in the horizontal initiative been clearly identified and communicated?
   
   b) What do you see as the roles and responsibilities of your organization?

2. a) How have the processes and expectations for decision-making for each partner, and among partners, been defined?

   b) In your own words, what are the expectations associated with your organization/ agency?
3. a) How have the decision-making processes contributed to the efficient operation of the initiative?

b) What needs to be improved?

4. a) What are the challenges of working in partnership on this Initiative?

b) What are the benefits?

5. In your opinion, is there any evidence of duplication of roles, responsibilities or activities?

Planning

6. Please describe the planning process at the portfolio level.

7. a) Have you identified any planning deficiencies?

b) Have the ICCUF initiative partners taken steps to address its strategic planning deficiencies?

8. Are there ways in which the management of the Initiative could be improved?

9. Please refer to the attached Table 1. To what extent has your organization implemented it’s activities as per the table.

10. What challenges or barriers have you experienced in implementing these activities?

Performance Management

11. a) Have performance measurement systems or processes been put in place to monitor the performance of your component of the ICCUF Initiative?

b) If yes, please describe. If no, what are the barriers to developing them?

12. Do you have information on any of the following indicators? This information could help establish a baseline now so that changes can be assessed during the summative evaluation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) # and % of research papers disseminated</td>
<td>PSEPC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) # CIBIN correlations and negatives sent to police services</td>
<td>FLS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Extent to which FRT is disseminated</td>
<td>FLS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) # and % of strategic intelligence products shared Extent of dissemination of strategic intelligence products (coverage)</td>
<td>CISC, CI, CBSA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) # and % of tactical intelligence products shared</td>
<td>CBSA, NWEST, CI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Extent of dissemination of tactical intelligence products (coverage)</td>
<td>CBSA, NWEST, CI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) # and type of training sessions delivered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) % of attendees indicating increased knowledge</td>
<td>NWEST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Extent to which information and intelligence was deemed to increase knowledge of recipient (through client feedback forms)</td>
<td>CBSA, CISC, CI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j) Trend in # of interventions where weapons registration was revoked and/or firearms seized</td>
<td>NWEST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k) Trend in # of weapons seized vs. trend in criminal use of firearms</td>
<td>NWEST/ CCJS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Do you currently have sufficient capacity to meet the accountability and performance reporting requirements for your organization? Please explain.

14. a) How is performance information being used?

   b) Do you feel the information is/ will be adequate to meet reporting requirements and manage activities related to the ICCUF and meet other reporting requirements of your organization?

15. Is there a mechanism in place to ensure that ICCUF partners are held accountable for financial and performance results?

**ICCUF Resource Allocation and Efficiency**

16. a) Do you believe you have sufficient resources to undertake the activities identified in your component of the ICCUF? (Consider: financial, human, training, information resources)

   b) If not, what is the greatest area of need?

17. Has working in a partnership allowed you to leverage any additional resources or to undertake additional activities?
**Intelligence Sharing**

18. a) Can you briefly outline the process or protocols for sharing information and intelligence among *ICCUF partners*.

   b) In your opinion do these processes contribute to timely and useful knowledge sharing and dissemination? If not, why?

19. a) Can you briefly outline the process or protocols for sharing information and intelligence *with stakeholders* outside of the ICCUF initiative.

   b) In your opinion do these processes contribute to timely and useful knowledge sharing and dissemination? If not, why?

20. Do you feel these processes for sharing intelligence are adhered to by ICCUF partners? If not, why do you think this is so?

21. a) How efficient are these processes?

   b) What could be improved?

   c) What benefit do you feel is derived from following these processes?

**Implementation**

22. a) Have NWEST activities been implemented as per the implementation plan? (NWEST only)

   b) What are the contributors/ detractors from achievement of the plan? (NWEST only)

23. As applicable, to what extent has your organization has been able to produce or deliver intended outputs of the ICCUF initiative, in the areas of:
   a) policy research;
   b) intelligence; and,
   c) investigative support?

   d) Can you provide some examples.

   e) Have there been any challenges or barriers to delivering these outputs?

24. In your opinion, has the ICCUF contributed to the following desired outcomes?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired Outcomes</th>
<th>yes</th>
<th>no</th>
<th>too soon to tell</th>
<th>Please explain and/or provide examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Improved sharing of actionable firearms information and intelligence that meets the needs of stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Increased knowledge of investigative procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Increased knowledge of gun crime issues, trends and threats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Enhanced national coordination of crime gun investigations and enforcements of gun legislation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Improved investigations and enforcement of gun legislation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Prevention of firearms tragedies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Prevention of criminal use of firearms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. Are there any unintended positive or negative impacts that have occurred as a result of the ICCUF initiative?
Guide d’entretien à l’intention des gestionnaires de programmes sur l’initiative sur les Investissements dans lutte contre l'utilisation d'armes à feu à des fins criminelles

Introduction

Le ministère de la Sécurité publique et de la Protection civile (SPPCC), en collaboration avec le Comité de gestion mixte (CGM) de l’initiative sur les Investissements dans la lutte contre l'utilisation d'armes à feu à des fins criminelles (ILUAFC), a demandé aux Services conseils du gouvernement (SCG) d’effectuer une évaluation formative de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC, qui est composée de six partenaires :

- Sécurité publique et Protection civile Canada (SPPCC)
- Gendarmerie royale du Canada :
  - Équipe nationale de soutien à l'application de la Loi sur les armes à feu (ENSALA)
  - Laboratoire judiciaire central (LJC)
  - Direction des renseignements criminels (DRC)
  - Service canadien de renseignements criminels (SCRC)
- Agence des services frontaliers du Canada (ASFC)

L'évaluation formative sera axée sur l'évaluation de la façon dont l'initiative est mise en œuvre, notamment en ce qui a trait à la composante Renseignement, sur le fait de savoir si des modifications sont nécessaires et si la situation permet de croire que l'on est en voie d'obtenir les résultats immédiats. À ces fins, les questions pour l'évaluation formative se concentreront sur les aspects de l'initiative concernant la conception et la prestation, de même sur les premières réussites et sur le fait de savoir s'il est permis de croire que l'on obtiendra des résultats intermédiaires et des résultats définitifs.

Dans le cadre de l’évaluation formative, le SCG organise des entretiens avec les responsables de programmes chargés de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC à SPPCC, à la GRC (ENSALA, LJC, DRC, SCRC) et à l’ASFC. Les questions qui suivent aideront à structurer la conversation; nous espérons qu’elles vous seront utiles pour vous préparer à l’entretien. Nous prévoyons que les entretiens dureront environ une heure et demie.

Questions de l’entretien

Gouvernance

1. a) Est-ce que les rôles et responsabilités des partenaires de l’initiative horizontale ont été clairement établis et communiqués?

   b) Quels sont, d’après vous, les rôles et responsabilités de votre organisation?
2. a) Comment a-t-on défini les processus et les attentes relativement à la prise de décisions de chaque partenaire, et entre les partenaires?
   
b) Expliquez dans vos propres mots quelles sont les attentes à l’égard de votre organisation?

3. a) Dans quelle mesure ces processus ont favorisé le fonctionnement efficace de l’initiative?
   
b) Quelles améliorations sont nécessaires?

4. a) Quels sont les défis que constitue le travail en partenariat dans le cadre de cette initiative?
   
b) Quels en sont les avantages?

5. À votre avis, est-ce qu’il y a un dédoublement des rôles, des responsabilités ou des activités?

**Planification**

6. Veuillez décrire le processus de planification au niveau du Portefeuille.

7. a) Avez-vous cerné des lacunes au niveau de la planification?
   
b) Est-ce que les partenaires de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC ont pris des mesures pour combler ces lacunes?

8. D’après vous, existe-t-il des moyens d’améliorer la gestion de cette initiative?

9. Veuillez consulter le Tableau 1 ci-joint. Dans quelle mesure votre organisation a-t-elle mise en oeuvre les activités indiquées dans ce tableau?

10. Avez-vous fait face à des problèmes ou à des obstacles dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de ces activités?

**Gestion du rendement**

11. a) Est-ce que des systèmes ou processus de mesure du rendement ont été mis en place pour surveiller le rendement de votre composante de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC?
   
b) Si oui, veuillez les décrire. Si non, qu’est-ce qui empêche la mise en place de tels mécanismes?

### Indicateur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicateur</th>
<th>Responsabilité</th>
<th>Oui</th>
<th>Non</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Nombre et pourcentage de documents de recherche diffusés</td>
<td>SPPCC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Nombre de corrélations avec le RCIIB et de négatifs transmis aux services de police</td>
<td>LJC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Mesure selon laquelle le TRAF est diffusé</td>
<td>LJC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Nombre et pourcentage de produits de renseignements stratégiques échangés Mesure selon laquelle les produits de renseignements stratégiques sont diffusés (couverture)</td>
<td>SCRC, DRC, CBSA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Nombre et pourcentage de produits de renseignements tactiques échangés</td>
<td>CBSA, ENSALA, DRC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Mesure selon laquelle les produits de renseignements tactiques sont diffusés (couverture)</td>
<td>CBSA, ENSALA, DRC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Nombre et types de séances de formation données</td>
<td>ENSALA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) Pourcentage de participation donnant lieu à un niveau de connaissances accrue</td>
<td>ENSALA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Mesure selon laquelle on juge que les renseignements augmentent les connaissances du participant (établie en fonction des formulaires de commentaires des clients)</td>
<td>CBSA, SCRC, DRC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j) Tendance relativement au nombre d'interventions où le certificat d'enregistrement des armes à feu a été révoqué et/ou que l'arme à feu a été saisie</td>
<td>ENSALA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k) Tendance relativement au nombre d'armes à feu saisies par rapport à la tendance relative à l'utilisation d'une arme à feu à des fins criminelles</td>
<td>ENSALA / CCSJ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Affectation des ressources et rendement - initiative sur ILUAFC

13. Avez-vous actuellement la capacité suffisante pour respecter les exigences de reddition de comptes et de présentation de rapports sur le rendement de votre organisation? Veuillez expliquer.

14. a) À quelles fins les renseignements sur le rendement sont-ils utilisés?

   b) Croyez-vous que les renseignements sont/seront adéquats pour respecter les exigences en matière de rapports et pour gérer les activités relatives à l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC, ainsi que pour répondre aux autres exigences de présentation de rapports de votre organisation?

15. Est-ce qu’un mécanisme est en place pour veiller à ce que les partenaires de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC soient tenus comptables des résultats financiers et des indicateurs de rendement?
Affectation des ressources et rendement - initiative sur ILUAFC


b) Si non, quel secteur a le plus grand besoin de ressources?

17. Est-ce que le travail en partenariat vous a permis de mobiliser des ressources supplémentaires ou de mener d’autres activités?

Échange de renseignements

18. a) Veuillez donner les grandes lignes de la procédure ou des protocoles d’échange de renseignements entre les partenaires de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC?

b) À votre avis, est-ce que cette procédure favorise l’échange et la diffusion en temps opportun de connaissances utiles? Si non, pourquoi?

19. a) Veuillez donner les grandes lignes de la procédure ou des protocoles d’échange de renseignements avec les intervenants à l’extérieur du réseau de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC?

b) À votre avis, est-ce que cette procédure favorise l’échange et la diffusion en temps opportun de connaissances utiles? Si non, pourquoi?

20. Estimez-vous que les partenaires de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC respectent la procédure d’échange de renseignements? Si non, pourquoi selon vous?

21. a) Dans quelle mesure cette procédure est-elle efficace?

b) Quelles améliorations pourraient être apportées?

c) Quels sont les avantages liés au respect de cette procédure?

Mise en oeuvre

22. a) Est-ce que les activités des ENSALA ont été mises en oeuvre conformément au plan de mise en œuvre établi? (ENSALA seulement)

b) Quels sont les facteurs qui favorisaient la réalisation du plan ou lui nuisaient? (ENSALA seulement)
23. Dans quelle mesure votre organisation a-t-elle été capable de produire ou de livrer les extrants attendus dans le cadre de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC relativement aux secteurs suivants :
   a) recherche stratégique;
   b) renseignements;
   c) appui aux enquêtes?
   d) Fournissez des exemples.
   e) Est-ce que vous avez eu à faire face à des problèmes ou à des obstacles dans le cadre de la prestation de ces extrants?

24. À votre avis, l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC a-t-elle favorisé les résultats attendus suivants?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Résultats attendus</th>
<th>oui</th>
<th>non</th>
<th>trop tôt pour le savoir</th>
<th>Expliquez et/ou fournissez des exemples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Amélioration de l’échange de renseignements sur les armes à feu qui pourraient permettre d’intenter des poursuites et qui répondent aux besoins des intervenants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Connaissance accrue de la procédure d’enquêtes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Connaissance accrue des questions, des tendances et des menaces relatives aux crimes commis au moyen d’armes à feu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Meilleure coordination à l’échelle nationale des enquêtes sur les crimes commis au moyen d’armes à feu et de l’application des mesures législatives sur le contrôle des armes à feu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Amélioration des techniques d’enquête et de l’application des mesures législatives sur le contrôle des armes à feu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Prévention de tragédies commises au moyen d’armes à feu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Prévention de l’utilisation d’armes à feu à des fins criminelles</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. Est-ce que des répercussions positives ou négatives inattendues se sont produites par suite de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC?
Appendix D - Focus Group Guides

Investments to Combat the Criminal Use of Firearms
NWEST Advisory Group

Introduction

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), in conjunction with the Joint Management Team (JMT) of the Investments to Combat the Criminal Use of Firearms Initiative (ICCUF), has asked Government Consulting Services (GSC) to conduct a formative evaluation for the ICCUF initiative. The ICCUF initiative includes six partners as follows:

- Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC)
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police:
  - National Weapons Enforcement Support Team (NWEST)
  - Forensic Laboratory Services (FLS)
  - Criminal Intelligence (CI)
  - Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC)
- Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)

The focus of the formative evaluation is to assess how the initiative is being implemented, particularly with respect to the intelligence component, whether adjustments should be made, and whether progress toward the achievement of the immediate outcomes is occurring. As such the formative evaluation questions will focus on the design and delivery aspects of the initiative as well as early success, and likelihood of achieving intermediate and ultimate outcomes.

As part of the formative evaluation, GCS is conducting a focus groups with the NWEST Advisory Board in order to obtain stakeholder feedback regarding intelligence production and sharing. The questions that follow will help structure our conversation and we hope that you will find it useful in preparing for the focus group. We anticipate that the focus groups will take about one hour.

Interview Questions

Intelligence Sharing

1. a) Can you briefly outline the process for sharing information and intelligence with stakeholders outside of the ICCUF initiative.

   b) In your opinion do these processes contribute to timely and useful knowledge sharing and dissemination? If not, why?
2. Do you feel the processes for sharing intelligence are adhered to by ICCUF partners? If not, why do you think this is so?

3. a) How efficient are these processes?

   b) What could be improved?

   c) What benefit do you feel is derived from following these processes?

4. To what extent do you feel ICCUF partners have been able to produce or deliver intended outputs of the ICCUF initiative, in the areas of:
   a) investigative support; and,
   b) enforcement of gun legislation?

   c) Can you provide some examples. Are there any challenges or barriers that you know of that impeded delivery of these outputs?

5. a) One of the desired goals of the ICCUF is “improved sharing of actionable firearms information and intelligence that meets the needs of stakeholders”. To what extent has the ICCUF contributed to this goal in terms of:
   • sharing of intelligence,
   • providing actionable intelligence; and
   • meeting the needs of stakeholders?

   b) Why do you think this is so? Can you provide some examples.

6. a) Do you believe that the ICCUF has contributed to improved investigations and enforcement of gun legislation? Why do you think this is so?

   b) Can you provide some examples.

7. Are there any unintended positive or negative impacts that have occurred as a result of the ICCUF initiative?
Guide d’entretien à l’intention du Groupe de discussion des intervenants sur l’initiative sur les Investissements dans lutte contre l’utilisation d'armes à feu à des fins criminelles

Introduction

Le ministère de la Sécurité publique et de la Protection civile (SPPCC), en collaboration avec le Comité de gestion mixte (CGM) de l’initiative sur les Investissements dans la lutte contre l'utilisation d'armes à feu à des fins criminelles (ILUAFC), a demandé aux Services conseils du gouvernement (SCG) d’effectuer une évaluation formative de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC, qui est composée de six partenaires :

- Sécurité publique et Protection civile Canada (SPPCC)
- Gendarmerie royale du Canada :
  - Équipe nationale de soutien à l'application de la Loi sur les armes à feu (ENSALA)
  - Laboratoire judiciaire central (LJC)
  - Direction des renseignements criminels (DRC)
  - Service canadien de renseignements criminels (SCRC)
- Agence des services frontaliers du Canada (ASFC)

L'évaluation formative sera axée sur l'évaluation de la façon dont l'initiative est mise en œuvre, notamment en ce qui a trait à la composante Renseignement, sur le fait de savoir si des modifications sont nécessaires et si la situation permet de croire que l'on est en voie d'obtenir les résultats immédiats. À ces fins, les questions pour l'évaluation formative se concentreront sur les aspects de l'initiative concernant la conception et la prestation, de même sur les premières réussites et sur le fait de savoir s'il est permis de croire que l'on obtiendra des résultats intermédiaires et des résultats définitifs.

Dans le cadre de l’évaluation formative, le SCG organise un groupe de discussion avec le Comité consultatif de l’ENSALA afin d’obtenir la rétroaction des intervenants à propos de la production et de l’échange de renseignements. Les questions qui suivent aideront à structurer la conversation ; nous espérons qu’elles vous seront utiles pour vous préparer au groupe de discussion. Nous prévoyons que la rencontre durera environ une heure.

Questions de l’entretien

Échange de renseignements

1. a) Veuillez présenter les grandes lignes de la procédure d’échange de renseignements avec les intervenants à l’extérieur du réseau de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC.

   b) À votre avis, est-ce que cette procédure favorise l’échange et la diffusion en temps opportun de connaissances utiles? Si non, pourquoi?
2. Estimez-vous que les partenaires de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC respectent la procédure d’échange de renseignements? Si non, pourquoi selon vous?

3. a) Dans quelle mesure cette procédure est-elle efficace?
   
b) Quelles améliorations pourraient être apportées?
   
c) Quels sont les avantages liés au respect de cette procédure?

4. Dans quelle mesure croyez-vous que les partenaires de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC ont été capables de produire ou de livrer les extrants attendus dans le cadre de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC relativement aux secteurs suivants :
   a) appui dans le cadre d’enquêtes;
   b) application des mesures législatives sur le contrôle des armes à feu?
   
c) Fournissez des exemples.
   
d) Est-ce qu’il existe, à votre connaissance, des problèmes ou des obstacles qui nuisent à la prestation de ces extrants?

5. a) L’un des objectifs de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC est d’améliorer l’échange des renseignements sur les armes à feu qui pourraient permettre d’intenter des poursuites et qui répondent aux besoins des intervenants. Dans quelle mesure l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC a-t-elle favorisé cet objectif en ce qui a trait :
   • à l’échange de renseignements;
   • à la prestation de renseignements sur les armes à feu qui pourraient permettre d’intenter des poursuites;
   • au respect des besoins des intervenants?
   
b) Pourquoi, selon vous? Fournissez des exemples.

6. a) Croyez-vous que l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC a favorisé l’amélioration des enquêtes et l’application des mesures législatives sur le contrôle des armes à feu? Pourquoi, selon vous?
   
b) Fournissez des exemples.

7. Est-ce que des répercussions positives ou négatives inattendues se sont produites par suite de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC?
Investments to Combat the Criminal Use of Firearms
Intelligence Focus Group Interview Guide

Introduction

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), in conjunction with the Joint Management Team (JMT) of the Investments to Combat the Criminal Use of Firearms Initiative (ICCUF), has asked Government Consulting Services (GSC) to conduct a formative evaluation for the ICCUF initiative. The ICCUF initiative includes six partners as follows:

- Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC)
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police:
  - National Weapons Enforcement Support Team (NWEST)
  - Forensic Laboratory Services (FLS)
  - Criminal Intelligence (CI)
  - Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC)
- Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)

The focus of the formative evaluation is to assess how the initiative is being implemented, particularly with respect to the intelligence component, whether adjustments should be made, and whether progress toward the achievement of the immediate outcomes is occurring. As such the formative evaluation questions will focus on the design and delivery aspects of the initiative as well as early success, and likelihood of achieving intermediate and ultimate outcomes.

As part of the formative evaluation, GCS is conducting focus groups with the five ICCUF partners responsible for intelligence production and sharing. The questions that follow will help structure our conversation and we hope that you will find it useful in preparing for the focus group. We anticipate that the focus groups will take about an hour and a half.

Interview Questions

Governance of the ICCUF

1. a) Have the roles and responsibilities of the partners in the horizontal initiative been clearly identified and communicated?

   b) What do you see as the role and responsibilities of your organization?

2. a) How have these processes contributed to the efficient operation of the initiative?

   b) What needs to be improved?
3. a) What are the challenges of working in partnership on this Initiative?

   b) What are the benefits?

4. In your opinion, is there any evidence of duplication of roles, responsibilities or activities?

**ICCUF Resource Allocation and Efficiency**

5. a) Do you believe you have sufficient resources to undertake the activities identified in your component of the ICCUF? (Consider: financial, human, training, information resources) If not, what is the greatest area of need?

**Intelligence Sharing**

6. Do you feel the processes for sharing intelligence are adhered to by ICCUF partners? If not, why do you think this is so?

7. a) How efficient are these processes?

   b) What could be improved?

   c) What benefit do you feel is derived from following these processes?

8. To what extent has your organization been able to produce or deliver intended outputs of the ICCUF initiative, in the areas of:
   a) investigative support; and,
   b) enforcement of gun legislation?

   c) Can you provide some examples.

   d) Have there been any challenges or barriers to delivering these outputs?

9. a) One of the desired goals of the ICCUF is “improved sharing of actionable firearms information and intelligence that meets the needs of stakeholders”. To what extent has the ICCUF contributed to this goal in terms of:
   • sharing of intelligence,
   • providing actionable intelligence; and
   • meeting the needs of stakeholders?

   b) Why do you think this is so?

   c) Can you provide some examples.
10. a) Do you believe that the ICCUF has contributed to improved investigations and enforcement of gun legislation?

   b) Why do you think this is so?

   c) Can you provide some examples.

11. Are there any unintended positive or negative impacts that have occurred as a result of the ICCUF initiative?
Introduction

Le ministère de la Sécurité publique et de la Protection civile (SPPCC), en collaboration avec le Comité de gestion mixte (CGM) de l’initiative sur les Investissements dans la lutte contre l’utilisation d’armes à feu à des fins criminelles (ILUAFC), a demandé aux Services conseils du gouvernement (SCG) d’effectuer une évaluation formative de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC, qui est composée de six partenaires :

- Sécurité publique et Protection civile Canada (SPPCC)
- Gendarmerie royale du Canada :
  o Équipe nationale de soutien à l’application de la Loi sur les armes à feu (ENSALA)
  o Laboratoire judiciaire central (LJC)
  o Direction des renseignements criminels (DRC)
  o Service canadien de renseignements criminels (SCRC)
- Agence des services frontaliers du Canada (ASFC)

L’évaluation formative sera axée sur l’évaluation de la façon dont l’initiative est mise en œuvre, notamment en ce qui a trait à la composante Renseignement, sur le fait de savoir si des modifications sont nécessaires et si la situation permet de croire que l’on est en voie d’obtenir les résultats immédiats. À ces fins, les questions pour l’évaluation formative se concentreront sur les aspects de l’initiative concernant la conception et la prestation, de même sur les premières réussites et sur le fait de savoir s’il est permis de croire que l’on obtiendra des résultats intermédiaires et des résultats définitifs.

Dans le cadre de l’évaluation formative, le SCG organise des groupes de discussion avec les cinq partenaires de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC responsables de la production et de l’échange de renseignements. Les questions qui suivent aideront à structurer la conversation; nous espérons qu’elles vous seront utiles pour vous préparer au groupe de discussion. Nous prévoyons que rencontres dureront environ une heure et demie.

Questions de l’entretien

Gouvernance de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC

1. a) Est-ce que les rôles et responsabilités des partenaires de l’initiative horizontale ont été clairement établis et communiqués?

   b) Quels sont, d’après vous, les rôles et responsabilités de votre organisation?
2. a) Dans quelle mesure ces processus ont-ils favorisé le fonctionnement efficace de l’initiative?
   
   b) Quelles améliorations pourraient être apportées?

3. a) Quels sont les défis que constitue le travail en partenariat dans le cadre de cette initiative?
   
   b) Quels en sont les avantages?

4. À votre avis, est-ce qu’il y a un dédoublement des rôles, des responsabilités ou des activités?

Affectation des ressources et rendement - initiative sur ILUAFC

5. a) Croyez-vous avoir suffisamment de ressources pour mener les activités ciblées pour votre composante de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC? (ressources financières et humaines, formation, ressources en matière d’information). Si non, quel secteur a le plus grand besoin de ressources?

Échange de renseignements

6. Estimez-vous que les partenaires de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC respectent la procédure d’échange de renseignements? Si non, pourquoi selon vous?

7. a) Dans quelle mesure cette procédure est-elle efficace?
   
   b) Quelles améliorations pourraient être apportées?
   
   c) Quels sont les avantages liés au respect de cette procédure?

8. Dans quelle mesure votre organisation a-t-elle été capable de produire ou de livrer les extrants attendus dans le cadre de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC relativement aux secteurs suivants :
   a) appui dans le cadre d’enquêtes;
   b) application des mesures législatives sur le contrôle des armes à feu?
   
   c) Fournissez des exemples.
   
   d) Est-ce que vous avez eu à faire face à des problèmes ou à des obstacles dans le cadre de la prestation de ces extrants?
9. a) L’un des objectifs de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC est d’améliorer l’échange des renseignements sur les armes à feu qui pourraient permettre d’intenter des poursuites et qui répondent aux besoins des intervenants. Dans quelle mesure l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC a-t-elle favorisé cet objectif en ce qui a trait:
   • à l’échange de renseignements;
   • à la prestation de renseignements sur les armes à feu qui pourraient permettre d’intenter des poursuites;
   • au respect des besoins des intervenants?

b) Pourquoi, selon vous?

c) Fournissez des exemples.

10. a) Croyez-vous que l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC a favorisé l’amélioration des enquêtes et l’application des mesures législatives sur le contrôle des armes à feu?

b) Pourquoi, selon vous?

c) Fournissez des exemples.

11. Est-ce que des répercussions positives ou négatives inattendues se sont produites par suite de l’initiative sur l’ILUAFC?
### Appendix E - Resource Implementation Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/ Agency</th>
<th>FTEs</th>
<th>Systems &amp; Equipment</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Implementation Status</th>
<th>Shifts/ Challenges Barriers to Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| PS                    | 1    | Not applicable      | • Provide policy advice to Ministers on firearms and gun crime  
                    |      |                     | • Support targeted research activities  
                    |      |                     | • Evaluate ICCUF initiative  
                    |      | • 1 FTE in place  
                    |      | • Policy advice being provided  
                    |      | • Limited research being conducted  
                    |      | • Evaluation underway  
| NWEST                 | 34 (Seconded members from other police services)  
                    |      | PROS and FOES       | • Intelligence: firearms identification/ trace  
                    |      |                     | • Training – International Trafficking Schools, investigators toolkit, training of Crown attorneys  
                    |      |                     | • Investigative support  
                    |      | • Fully Implemented:  
                    |      | • 46 FTEs in place  
                    |      | • Updated the FOES program to enhance RCMP toolkit  
                    |      | • Implemented a new RMS (PROS/PRIMS)  
                    |      | • Built a Crown Attorney Network / Case Law Database signed E-Trace Agreement which will allow electronic trace as per ATF in the US  
| FLS                   | 6 (3 existing and 3 new IBIS operators)  
                    |      | 3 additional IBIS workstations plus server upgrade and creation of CIBIN network  
                    |      | • Maintain firearms reference table (FRT)  
                    |      | • Create Canadian Integrated Ballistic Identification Network (CIBIN)  
                    |      | • Intelligence: firearms data entry  
                    |      | • Fully Implemented:  
                    |      | • 5 FTEs in place  
                    |      | • 1 position being restaffed  
                    |      | • IBIS machines implemented and server upgraded  
                    |      | • CIBIN partially implemented (Advanced Threat and Risks assessment signed off in November 2006)  
                    |      | • MOU signed between CIBIN and NIBIN November 16, 2006 to allow sharing of ballistic information between Canada and US.  
|                       |      |                     | • Competing demands for funding evaluation and research  
|                       |      |                     | • Slow staffing process  
|                       |      |                     | • Budget freeze January to April 2006  
|                       |      |                     | • Database and data entry issues  
|                       |      |                     | • Slow staffing  
|                       |      |                     | • Restaffing due to departures  
|                       |      |                     | • Budget freeze January to April 2006  
|                       |      |                     | • Delay due to security protocols  
|                       |      |                     | • Technical delays getting IBIS up and running  
|                       |      |                     | • CIBIN: required threat assessment in order to migrate to the new system  

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<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>7 (2 in Pacific; 2 in Northwest; 1 Central; 1 Atlantic; 1 at Headquarters)</td>
<td>• Not applicable.</td>
<td>• Intelligence – collection of firearms specific intelligence</td>
<td>Partially Implemented: • 4 FTEs in place (Iqaluit, HQ, positions being restaffed, input data into CISCs National Firearms Collection Plan</td>
<td>• Slow staffing process • Restaffing due to departures • Budget freeze January to April 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>• Not applicable</td>
<td>• National intelligence coordination from Canada’s law enforcement community (CISC National Firearms Collection Plan framework, CISC National Collection Template) • National strategic analysis</td>
<td>Fully Implemented: • FTEs in place (currently restaffing 1 position) • conducted National Firearms Collection Plan exercise; analyzed information</td>
<td>• Slow staffing process • Restaffing due to departures • Budget freeze January to April 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSA</td>
<td>12 Regional and NHQ Intelligence Officers/Analysts</td>
<td>• Equipment for intelligence officers.</td>
<td>• Intelligence: collect, develop, analyze, coordinate and disseminate tactical, operational and strategic intelligence • Identify firearms smuggling trends</td>
<td>Fully Implemented: • [ * ] 23</td>
<td>• Lack of analytical resources at field level</td>
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