6. Aviation Safety

Since the mid-1960s, when targeting aviation interests came into vogue, the means of attack and choice of targets have not changed that much, although there have been fluctuations in the frequency of attacks. As shown in the chart below, airports, aircraft and off-airport facilities, such as airline offices, have remained the principal targets of interest. In addition, bombings, hijackings and armed assaults remain the main modes of attack.

For purposes of information, I am attaching as Appendix 3, a list compiled by Transport Canada of terrorist incidents involving aircraft over the last 50 years.

The Air India Flight 182 incident was not the first time explosive devices were placed in checked baggage, nor would it be the last. On September 7, 1974, a Trans-World Airlines jet with 88 people aboard crashed off the coast of Greece following an explosion in the baggage compartment. Similarly, on December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 people on board as well as 11 on the ground. An explosive device had been hidden in a Toshiba radio cassette player in a suitcase. Examples can also be found of improvised explosive devices being assembled on board aircraft.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 represented a shift in paradigm in that the aircraft themselves were used as weapons; although suicide attacks using transportation assets is not a new phenomenon. There have been at least 20 suicide attacks since 1996, and, according to statistics, three quarters of all suicide bombings have taken place since September 11, 2001.

In terms of suicide terrorism and aviation security since September 11, had Richard Reid been successful in detonating his shoe bomb aboard American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami in December 2001, the incident would have qualified as a suicide mission. The near-simultaneous explosion of two Russian passenger aircraft on August 24, 2004, is generally believed to have been the work of two suicide bombers.

Focussing on the Air India tragedy, Indian targets around the world had been the subjects of internal and external security threats for decades. The risks associated with Air India flights to and from Canada were taken seriously. Yet disaster still struck.

Because of the ambient threat in 1985, Air India had more extensive security measures than almost any other Canadian or international carrier. Air India had, in accordance with the Foreign Aircraft Security Measures Regulations, submitted a copy of its security program to the Minister of Transport. The Air India program included:

• Established sterile areas.
• The physical inspection of all carry-on baggage by means of hand-held devices or x-ray equipment.
• Control of boarding passes.
• Aircraft security.
• The off-loading of baggage of passengers who failed to board flights.
• The full screening of all passengers and carry-on baggage.
• The physical inspection or x-ray inspection of all checked baggage.
• A 24-hour hold on cargo except perishables received from a "known shipper" unless a physical search or x-ray inspection was completed.
• Security screening of all flight deck and cabin crew.
• No screening exemptions for Indian VIPs or embassy staff, including ambassadors.
• Aircraft inspections for the presence of weapons at the originating station.
• Cargo hold checks prior to loading.
• Constant surveillance of baggage on the ramp and in transit carts.
• Preparation of catering supplies and food in a secure area and measures to ensure they were not unattended while in transport.
• Inspection of catering supplies and food upon delivery to the aircraft.

As we have seen, all these additional measures were not enough to stop the conspirators from getting the bomb on the plane. Transport Canada enacted additional security measures for all Canadian and foreign carriers for all international flights from Canada on June 23, 1985, as an immediate response to the Air India Flight 182 tragedy and the baggage cart explosions at Narita Airport. These measures included:

• More rigorous screening of all passengers and carry-on baggage.
• The physical inspection or x-ray inspection of all checked baggage (international destinations).
• 24-hour hold on cargo except perishables received from a known shipper unless a physical search or x-ray inspection was completed.
• The acquisition and deployment of 26 explosive detector units, which were in the final stages of testing and development at the time of the Air India tragedy.
• The acquisition and deployment of additional carry-on luggage x-ray units, hand-held metal detectors and walk-through metal detectors.

The Air India and Narita disasters transformed Canada's civil aviation program. These two events also changed the international environment and generated new approaches to protecting passengers, airports and aircraft around the world.

In the aftermath of the Air India tragedy, the Indian Government's Kirpal Commission of Inquiry and the Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB) began separate investigations. Numerous recommendations stemming from the Kirpal Commission's report to improve aviation security and prevent the placement of explosive substances on board commercial aircraft were implemented by Canada.

As the Canadian Aviation Safety Board's mandate limited its investigation to the disaster itself, the Government of Canada felt a more holistic review of aviation security was required. It asked the Interdepartmental Committee on Security Intelligence to do a thorough review of airline and airport security. Those findings became known as the Seaborn Report, in recognition of its author, Blair Seaborn, at that time a senior official at the Privy Council Office and the Chair of Interdepartmental Committee on Security Intelligence.

Foremost amongst the changes recommended by Mr. Seaborn was the introduction of stringent requirements that forbade the carrying of checked baggage on international flights unless the passenger was also on board.

Canada was the first ICAO member country to require:

• Passenger/baggage reconciliation on international flights, a measure later extended to include domestic flights. (ICAO, in recognition of Canada's initiative as a best practice, mandated passenger-baggage match as the international standard in December 1987);
• Comprehensive background checks for airport workers;
• Removal of baggage coin lockers from major airports; and
• The banning of the use of cameras in and around security checkpoints.

Other significant improvements to Canada's aviation security regime included the following enhancements:

• The consolidation of the security functions in Transport Canada by the creation of a dedicated group, now known as the Security and Emergency Preparedness Directorate;
• Increase in the number of security inspectors and other personnel assigned to the Security and Emergency Preparedness Directorate;
• Funding of five million dollars for the development of new and innovative technologies through the Research and Development Program;
• General overhaul of the regulatory framework by creating new regulations and a graduated system in response to increased threat levels; and
• More efficient sharing of security intelligence information with domestic and international partners.

After the events of September 11, 2001 further regulatory and technical changes occurred. In the December 2001 budget, the Government of Canada allocated $2.2 billion over 5 years for:

• Creation of a new organization called CATSA to take over responsibility of pre-board screening passengers and carry-on baggage from air carriers.
• The hiring of 59 additional Transport Canada Security Inspectors across the five regions in the National Capital Region.
• Funding for aircraft security modifications (up to $30 million).
• One-time payment for increased police presence and security at airports (up to $20 million).

Other enhancements to aviation security include requiring all passengers in Canada to be subject to new limits on carry-on luggage and all passengers traveling on flights bound for the U.S. to be subject to random secondary searches prior to boarding their aircraft.

The current measures for checked baggage security are generally the same as existed immediately prior to September 11, 2001. One major enhancement however, is that checked baggage on flights to the U.S. must now be screened, using one of a number of approved configurations of conventional x-ray equipment, explosives detection equipment and physical means. By January 1, 2006, all checked baggage from Canadian airports for any destination will be subject to screening.

Given the foregoing, it would be fair to say that the regulatory environment today is improved over that of 1985.

It must also be said, however, that in a shrinking world, air transportation security and safety are only as safe as the weakest link in the chain. Canada's membership in the ICAO is one forum that should lead to more aggressive steps worldwide. While all passenger luggage will be screened in Canada by January 1, 2006, the same is not true of cargo. This is a serious gap in Canada and around the world. An ICAO security audit of member countries is not public, nor is the security plan of action a permanent part of ICAO's budget. These are major issues because they mean that whatever domestic issues are addressed, they can be undermined by weaknesses in other parts of the world.

I have toured both the Toronto and Vancouver airports in the company of officials from the airport authorities, CATSA, Transport Canada, Air Canada and Air India, and have also met with officials at the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal. But, as evidenced by the recent CBC investigation on "The Fifth Estate" regarding Canada's aviation security, there remain significant issues to be addressed in this area.

The Air India bombing is proof of the importance of the human factor. Better regulations and more efficient technology matter, but they are only as good as the people enforcing them. Tens of millions of people fly around the world every year, passengers in a hurry to get to their destination as quickly as they can. Security checks take time, the pressure is always there to do things quickly. Security work can be repetitive, increasing the risk of human error.

The Minister of Transportation has indicated recently that the statutory review of the legislation creating CATSA will include an analysis of security more generally. I see no point in duplicating that review, provided it is independent of government and is open to a discussion with the victims of terrorism about lapses in aviation security. In the alternative, issues of aviation security could be one of the subjects of the inquiry that I am proposing in this report.

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