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Canada

Executive Summary:

EVALUATION ASSESSMENT REPORT

SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

W.A.J. Atack
Evaluation and Special Projects
November 1982

HV
9506
A8
1982
Summ.
c.2

Correctional Service Canada
Service correctionnel Canada

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One purpose of conducting an Evaluation Assessment of a program is to identify evaluation issues about that program which it would be practical and useful to investigate. The Office of the Comptroller General of Canada identifies the general types of evaluation issues as:* Program Rationale (Does the program make sense? Is it reasonable to expect that program activities will achieve the intended results and are these intended results still relevant?); Impacts and Effects (What has happened as a result of the program, including both intended and unintended effects?); Objectives Achievement (Has the program achieved what was expected? In what manner and to what extent?); Alternatives (Are there better ways of achieving the results? Are there more cost effective alternative programs, or more cost effective ways of delivering the existing program?).

Actual issues, while falling within these general categories, are much more program specific. Further, in order to determine if it is practical to address such issues (i.e. to determine how it can be done at what cost), they must be formalized as even more precise evaluation questions. While the issues identified in this report have been transformed into evaluation questions, in this summary we will deal only with the more general issues rather than the more specific questions.

A number of steps were taken to identify issues and determine their practicality and utility.

The first step was to set up an Advisory Committee for the project which consisted of:

J.U.M. Sauvé, Deputy Commissioner Security
H. Neufeld, Director Operational Security
T. B. Kelly, Director Preventive Security
H. Mansfield, Director Inmate Population Management
E. Baylis, Chief Living Units
G. R. Hooper, Director Evaluation and Special Projects.

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* Office of the Comptroller General of Canada, Guide on the Program Evaluation Function, May, 1981 (MSSC Cat BT 32-16/1981) p. 7

L. Morgan, of Evaluation and Special Projects and F. Purvis, as A/DOS, also participated in many of the sessions of the Committee. Throughout the project this committee acted as a discussion forum and advisory group for the materials and reports produced.

The next step was the preparation of a structured description of the program, called a Component Profile. In the process of Program Evaluation such Component Profiles are prepared not only to have a clear, concise description of the program to be evaluated, but also to document the full range of expected results that can be tested in an evaluation and to provide an overview of the rationale for the existence and design of the program. The Component Profile for the Security and Intelligence Program was discussed and revised several times throughout the course of the project. The final agreed upon Component Profile follows immediately after the Introduction to this final report and forms Chapter II of the report.

The next step was a long iterative process of identifying relevant issues that could be examined in an evaluation of the program. In the final report this begins in Chapter III with a delineation of assumptions* underlying general practices of correctional security.

This chapter begins with a discussion of what is commonly called "static security" - a term which is, unfortunately, very misleading because while this mode of security does involve the use of stationary barriers and observation posts, the major elements are the actions which staff could or do take with respect to inappropriate inmate behaviour. The general assumptions behind this mode of security, as delineated in the report, are:

1: No one sentenced by the courts to a prison will remain there without some externally imposed restrictions and motivations.

* It should be noted that while technically some of these assumptions might be more appropriately labelled as corollaries, deductions, propositions, hypotheses, conclusions, or observations. However, given that the important point is that they are assumed to be true, it was deemed that it would be less confusing if they were all labelled, in the report and here, with the one simple term, "assumption".

2: All prisons require an externally imposed system of security and control of prisoners.

3: Physical barriers (locks, walls, bars, etc.) and restraining devices are essential elements of correctional security systems.

4: A relatively impenetrable perimeter with well controlled exit and entry points is an essential element of correctional security for most prisons.

5: In order to provide secure custody and control in correctional institutions it is essential to have staff deployed within institutions with the means and ability to monitor inmate behaviour and to physically restrain inmates in order to prevent unacceptable behaviour and impose acceptable behaviour.

6: In order to provide secure custody and control in correctional institutions it is essential to have staff control and limit inmate movement in order to keep inmates away from sensitive areas (e.g. armouries, administrative files), prevent undesirable congregations of inmates and ensure that there is always sufficient staff to control the number of inmates in an area.

7: In order to provide secure custody and control in correctional institutions it is necessary to have specialized staff well trained in the use of weapons and other methods of physical restraint, in observing inmate behaviour to watch for indicators of trouble, and in the procedures and common actions required to control inmates.

8: In order to provide secure custody and control in correctional institutions it is essential to have staff report observations as intelligence information to supervisors, intelligence officers and managers so that information from various sources can be collected and analyzed, problems can be anticipated and managers can direct preventive actions.

The next set of assumptions are assumptions underlying another mode of security, commonly called "dynamic" security. Again the term is misleading - and perhaps ought to be replaced (and for this reason is used in quotations throughout the report). The term is also all too often grossly misused to differentiate between security provided by non-uniformed staff and security provided by uniformed staff.

The difference between "static" security and "dynamic" security are not who does it, nor even necessarily what is done, but how it is done. While "static" security is based upon controlled physical environments and actions by staff towards inmates, "dynamic" security is based upon controlled social environments and interactions between staff and inmates, plus the knowledge and understanding of individual inmates gained by staff in this process. While "static" and "dynamic" security are under many conditions complementary and reinforcing, there are pre-conditions for effective "dynamic" security which at times conflict with the pre-conditions and actions of "static" security - and vice-versa. The pre-conditions for effective "dynamic" security can be stated as a set of assumptions:

9: In order to provide "dynamic" security in correctional institutions it is necessary to have staff who are assigned to be responsible for, and are in regular contact with, one group of inmates.

#10: In order to provide"dynamic" security in correctional institutions, the front line security staff must be the focal points for all types of information on the offenders they are responsible for.

#11: In order to provide "dynamic" security in correctional institutions, authority and responsibility for inmate control must be delegated to front line staff who have been trained in human dynamics and who demonstrate initiative.

#12: While "dynamic" security cannot be based upon rigid adherence to detailed procedures for dealing with individual cases, some basic procedures, plus extensive guidelines drawn from experience of many situations, are required.

#13: Front line workers for "dynamic" security should work under the supervision of persons who are able and available to act as consultants for difficult problems and cases, who are kept generally informed about cases and about all major decisions on cases, and who periodically review each case with the front line workers.

#14: In order to provide "dynamic" security in correctional institutions it is necessary to have staff teams collectively responsible for a specific group of inmates and in order for these teams to be effective provision has to be made both to ensure that information and observations about inmates is shared and to allow whole teams to meet on a periodic basis.

#15: Operating a diversity of planned and controlled programs in an institution contributes to the security of an institution if those programs are ones that inmates want to participate in and if they are accessible to those inmates who do want to participate in them.

#16: For "dynamic" security to be fully effective, front line security staff must make as much or more use of rewards to encourage acceptable behaviour as they do of punishments to discourage unacceptable behaviour.

#17: For "dynamic" security to be effective, front line staff must have at their disposal a range of rewards that can be given to inmates to encourage acceptable behaviour.

#18: For "dynamic" security to be effective, inmates must be treated as persons and responsibilities must be carried out with courtesy, tact and sensitivity.

#19: Inmates will respond positively and responsibility to be treated as persons and with courtesy, tact and sensitivity.

#20: The ultimate goal of "dynamic" security is to create a milieu based upon co-operation of staff and inmates to achieve positive social goals.

The next set of assumptions deals with the common correctional practice of security classification of inmates and institutions. Underlying this practice is an assumption that:

#21: There is a wide range of differences amongst inmates in the likelihood of their causing incidents or attempting to escape and in the likelihood that if they did they would endanger or damage members of the public, staff, other inmates or government property; therefore there is a wide range of difference in the degree of security required to keep inmates in custody and under control.

Further, there are a number of common assumptions about what makes for different degrees of security and about the effects of these practices:

#22: The greater the number of strength of physical barriers, the greater the control and restriction of inmate movement and the greater the degree of surveillance of inmates and internal and perimeter areas, the greater the security of an institution.

#23: The greater the number and strength of physical barriers at an institution, the greater the control and restriction of inmate movement and the greater the degree of surveillance of inmates, the higher the cost per inmate of providing security at that institution.

#24: The greater the security of an institution the higher the cost per inmate of providing security at that institution.

#25: It is cost efficient to keep inmates at the lowest level of security appropriate to their circumstances.

#26: The greater the number of security staff at an institution, the greater the degree of surveillance of inmates and the greater the degree of security of that institution.

#27: The greater the security of an institution the greater the difficulty and cost per inmate of operating programs.

#28: It is program efficient and effective to keep inmates at the lowest level of security appropriate to their circumstances.

#29: Humane treatment requires that an inmate be incarcerated at the lowest level of security appropriate to his or her circumstances.

#30: The lower the level of security of an institution the lower the probability of antagonism of inmates towards the Service and its staff and the more normal the social climate, and therefore the higher the probability that programs operated in that environment will achieve intended effects of preparing offenders for their return as useful citizens to the community.

#31: In order to maximize the probability that inmates will be prepared to return to society as useful citizens, inmates should be incarcerated to the lowest level of security appropriate to individual circumstances.

The final two assumptions delineated in this chapter are assumptions made in the Service in operating within a security classification system:

#32: It is possible to classify and allocate offenders to different levels of security within acceptable risks of over and under classification.

#33: It is more effective and/or efficient to operate institutions with different levels of security each housing an inmate population which is relatively homogeneous as to adjudged security requirements, than to operate multi-level institutions housing inmate populations with a wide range of adjudged requirements for security.

Having delineated these underlying assumptions (corollaries, observations, etc.), the report turns to Chapter IV to delineating evaluation issues and questions that arise from them.

The first issue raised challenges the second and third assumptions about the necessity of externally imposed systems of security and control and of walls, locks, bars, etc. for all prisons. It asks whether the Service has gone as far as it could and should in the use of "open" prisons. Addressing this issue would involve comparative analysis with countries that make more extensive use of open prisons and a review of the cultural, legal and practical constraints of making more use of such "open" prisons in the federal correctional system in Canada.

The second issue is derived from the fourth assumption about the need for relatively impenetrable perimeters. It thus goes to the other extreme in examining the desirable and possible degree of "closedness" of "closed" institutions. Addressing this issue is a matter of identifying alternative ways in which institutions could be made more "closed" and considering the moral, legal, political and cost limitations of using such alternatives.

The next issue is the idea of "dynamic" security as delineated in assumptions nine to nineteen. The questions are how do you know when "dynamic" security is being effective or being (or becoming) ineffective and what types of conditions and actions are really necessary for it to be effective.

The next issue challenges the way in which we normally define the level of security of an institution, as set out in assumption #22, and looks at the

question of the degree of reinforcement and conflict between the practices of "static" and "dynamic" security. It further raises questions about the appropriateness and the consequences of the use of these labels and about the appropriateness of current organizational structures. Addressing such questions is a matter of comparative analysis between alternative styles of operation, on the one hand, and, on the other, of drawing on the experience and observations of field practitioners and managers.

The fifth issue is derived from assumption #30 about the correlations between antagonism, social climate, program effectiveness and level of security. It asks, in effect, whether maximum security inmates are appropriately classified as such because of continuing patterns of behaviour or whether maximum security inmates behave as they do because they have been classified and kept under conditions of maximum security. To address this issue it would be necessary to conduct longitudinal studies of inmates and institutional climate.

The sixth issue is the question of whether it really is possible to classify offenders by required security level within acceptable risks of over and under classification (assumption #32). To address this issue it would be necessary, on the one hand, to evaluate the impacts of the new inmate classification and re-classification systems and, on the other, to look at problems that have arisen because of inappropriate classifications.

The next issue is a challenge of assumptions underlying the "cascading" of individual inmates to institutions of lower and lower degree of security (assumptions #25, 28, 29 and 31). To address this issue it is necessary to conduct some cost analyses and to look more closely at the meaning, implications and feasibility of humane treatment of inmates.

The final issue raised in this chapter is the issue of single level security institutions versus multi-level security institutions. The trend away from multi-level institutions began many years ago and has continued to the present with some reversals but only for protective custody inmates and as a result of lack of cell space. The change appears to have been based on an untested assumption (#33) rather than careful evidence, and to have been done without

subsequent evaluation of results and impacts. It is therefore suggested that it would be appropriate to examine relative advantages, disadvantages and costs.

The issues raised in Chapter IV can thus be summarized as:

(a) Can more use be made of "open" prisons?
(b) Are there acceptable ways (normally, legally, financially) of decreasing escapes and contraband movement through the perimeter barriers of institutions?
(c) What are the essential elements of "dynamic" security and how do you know how well "dynamic" security is working?
(d) How do "dynamic" and "static" security actions interact and what is the optimum balance under what conditions?
(e) What are the impacts of intensive "static" security measures and to what extent do these conditions produce "maximum security" inmates?
(f) What are the benefits to C.S.C. and inmates of reduced security?
(g) What are the advantages/disadvantages of security-homogeneous institutions v.s. multi-level security institutions?

The next chapter, Chapter V, looks at issues about the results of the Security and Intelligence Program. By results is meant not only the achievement of objectives but also the production of those direct and immediate outputs and those indirect and/or longer-term impacts and effects which are believed to lead to the achievement of objectives (see Security and Intelligence: Program Model, next page).

The first issues raised in the chapter are issues about whether the four basic elements of the program objectives are being achieved and the extent to which they are being achieved. These four elements are:

1. to keep inmates imprisoned under the terms of the sentence until release according to the provisions of the law;
2. to minimize the risk of harm being inflicted by inmates on the public, the staff, other inmates and themselves and the risk of damage to government property;

SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE: PROGRAM MODEL

December , 1982



3. to accomplish these in accordance with recognized international standards of humane treatment of inmates;
4. and to provide an effective environment for program operations.

While measurement of the achievement of the first two elements is very difficult because the actions are intended to prevent rather than cause particular results, several indicators of attainment are suggested. The achievement of the third element, humane treatment within recognized standards, is not as difficult to measure but is already dealt with in the accreditation exercises and the audits and reports of the Inspector General. The achievement of the fourth element, like the first two, is very difficult to measure, but the issues at this time appear to be more a matter of interrelated impacts with other institutional programs than direct measurement of operational environments.

Next the report moves back from objectives in the program logic model to look at issues about the identified impacts and effects.

The first of these is the "Development and Maintenance of Standards of Security". The first issue here is how adequate and appropriate are C.S.C.'s security regulations and standards in the opinion of security experts and in comparison with regulations and standards in other jurisdictions. A secondary issue is how successful the Service is in ensuring that staff know and understand these regulations.

The second impact and effect is the "Prevention of Escapes and Incidents". Since the question of prevention of escapes had already been dealt with in reviewing achievement of objectives, the primary issue dealt with in this section is indicators of prevention of other types of incidents.

The next section of the chapter considers two closely related impacts and effects, "Improved Inmate Behaviour" and "Reduced Violence and Disruption in Institutions". These are intended impacts and effects of the Disciplinary System and Special Management Inmate Procedures and Operations. Thus this examination leads to proposed ways to measure the effectiveness of the Disciplinary System and to measure the impacts of actions taken in dealing with Special Management Inmates on institutions and the inmates themselves.

Next the report turns to examining issues about the production of direct outputs by sets of program activities. This review leads to proposed measures of effectiveness of three sub-programs (Intelligence Operations, Perimeter Operations, and Contraband Control), to some further questions and measures of effects of the Disciplinary System and actions within the Special Management Inmates procedures, and to some special questions and measures of impacts of Involuntary Transfers and Escorted Temporary Absences - including a review of the impacts on E.T.A.'s of the change in jurisdiction for Unescorted Temporary Absences.

Chapter V concludes with a brief review of three special responsibilities within the Security and Intelligence Program: Inmate Population Management, Security Clearance and Security of Information and Premises. Some measures of effectiveness are proposed.

The issues raised in Chapter V are thus primarily questions about whether or not the intended results (outputs, inputs and effects, objectives) documented in the Program Logic Model (p.11) are adequately achieved with some attention paid to documenting differential effects on identifying different types of inmates.

An earlier version of these first five chapters of the report was distributed for review and comment to the regions and amongst managers and staff at National Headquarters. In addition, the Commissioner, the Senior Deputy Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner Security, the Deputy Commissioner Offender Programs and the Inspector General were consulted directly about their views on evaluation issues for the Security and Intelligence Program. The primary purposes of these consultations, in addition to receiving suggestions for improvement of the material prepared to date for the project, were to ensure that no evaluation issues of concern to managers had been overlooked and to get some indication of priority of the various issues that had been raised.

From these consultations some changes and editorial improvements were made in the first five chapters of the report. In addition a number of significant issues were raised which had not been dealt with. These are set out and examined in Chapter VI.

The first of these issues concerns two concepts which are fundamental to the practice of correctional security: the concepts of "control" and "calculated risk". The practice of security in correctional institutions can be thought of as the means of exercising a necessary degree of control over the actions of inmates (and others, such as visitors). This leads to the question of determining what is the necessary degree of control for particular inmates and groups of inmates in particular circumstances. Given that such a decision always involves judgement it also always involves risks. Further, control involves both imposed control and self control by inmates. From such considerations it is proposed that it would be useful to document and examine methods which are or might be used to control inmates and motivate self-control, to identify the related types of risk decision and the types of information that is or might be used in making these types of decisions, to examine ways of assisting staff in improving these decisions, and to analyse appropriate balances between imposed and internally motivated control according to circumstances.

The next set of issues are issues concerning relatively recent program and system changes. These include the use of female CX's in male prisons, the introduction of the formal Code of Conduct, changes in inmate transfer procedures and responsibilities, and the over-population of C.S.C. institutions. Proposals are made to look at the impacts of these changes.

The final issue introduced from consultations is what may be called a "front-end" issue - the issue of program staffing. Having appropriately selected, trained and motivated staff to carry out a program is key to the success of any program. Therefore it was felt that it was important to look at the recruitment, replacement, selection, training and motivation of security staff. Chapter VI therefore concludes with proposals for an extensive review of these processes in relation to security staff and the Security and Intelligence Program.

Having thus raised a large number of relevant evaluation issues, and an even larger number of specific evaluation questions, the next problem is to group these into practical evaluation studies and to establish tentative priorities for these studies. This is done in the final and concluding chapter of the

report, Chapter VII. The grouping of questions into one study is based primarily upon identifying those questions that can, or logically should, be answered at the same time to economize resource use and minimize time demands on operational staff. Priorities are based largely upon the recognition that senior management is the primary client for program evaluation but also take into consideration the number of different managers who said that an issue is important and that the information gathered in addressing it would be useful and would be used.

The resulting suggested evaluation studies are summarized in the tables which follow. These tables show the fifteen possible studies in recommended order of priority and set out the general subject area (Title), the expected products, the anticipated elapsed time from start to finish on the project, and the expected resource requirements including the expected demands on field staff. Detailed terms of reference for each of these studies are given in the Appendix to the Evaluation Assessment Report on the Security and Intelligence Program of The Correctional Service of Canada.

SUMMARY OF EVALUATION STUDY OPTIONS, SECURITY & INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - HIGHEST PRIORITY OPTIONS

NO.	TITLE	EXPECTED PRODUCTS	TIME	RESOURCES		
				INST.	N.H.Q.	
			MOS.	P. MOS.	P.MOS.	$K*
1.	Analysis & Review of Intelligence Processes & Results	- Description & analysis of flow & use of Intelligence infor. - Analysis of reports on incidents & clarification of management needs for info. from Intelligence reports - Recommendations for improvements of operations & reports	16	6	12	32
2.	Collection and Analysis of Data on Contraband Seized & Tool Losses & Recovery	- Measures of rates of loss & reclaim of tools by type - Measures of volumes & ratios of contraband seized by type & source - Indicators of weak points in tool & contraband control operations	24	30	11	5
3.	Study of Security Staff Motivation & Morale	- Literature review on motivating correctional staff - Analysis of highly motivated CSC security staff - Assessment of current CSC actions that can or do affect staff motivation - Recommendations for improvements	15	4	8	32
4.	Study of Recruitment, Selection & Training of Security Staff	- Detailed step by step review of effectiveness of current recruitment, selection and training of security staff together with comparisons with processes & results of other jurisdictions - Identification and analysis of alternatives	19	6	26	11
5.	Collection & Analysis of Data on the Inmate Disciplinary System & Results	- Description & measure of disciplinary processes & results - Comparisons of different processes & deterrents - Recommendations for improvements of operations	30	50	21	54
6.	Conceptual Review & Comparative Analysis of Dynamic, Static, Control, Calculated Risk & Humane Treatment Security	- Literature review of basic concepts - Delineation of control tasks, risk-taking decision points & factors affecting risks - Analysis of practical aspects of dynamic sec., basis of measuring degree of security provided, comparison of effects of different modes of security operations - Analysis of implications of organization of security - Review of elements & feasibility of humane treatment - Recommendations for the development of risk-measuring instruments & for other improvements	20	6	12	31

*for contract Fees, Computer Costs, Travel, etc.

SUMMARY OF EVALUATION STUDY OPTIONS, SECURITY & INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - MODERATE PRIORITY OPTIONS

NO.	TITLE	EXPECTED PRODUCTS	TIME	RESOURCES		
				INST.	N.H.Q.	
			MOS.	P. MOS.	P.MOS.	$K*
7.	Cost, Impact & Comparative Analysis of Security	- Appraisal of procedures & practices & comparisons with other jurisdictions, including Crisis Management plans - Identification & analysis of cost structure of C.S.C. security - Analysis of interrelations - security & other programs - Appraisal of measures for protection of staff - Appraisal of single v.s. multi security level institutions, use of female CX's, & effects of Code of Conduct - Recommendations to improve economy, effectiveness and/or efficiency of the program	20	20	25	85
8.	Review of Impacts of Special Management Inmates Procedures & Practices	- Aggregate data on types of inmates, reasons for placement and length of stay - Identification of impacts of Segregation & S.H.U. placements on inmates and institutions	25	16	10	56
9.	Review of Organization, Impacts & Alternatives for Transfer Processes	- Aggregate statistical review of population flow by types of moves and length of stay - Impacts of transfers on inmates & institutions - Documentation of modes of organization of transfer processes - Outline of alternatives & advantages & disadvantages	21	6	8	23
10.	Measurement of Selected Areas of Objectives Achievement of the Security & Intelligence Program	- Comparative data on escapes & incidents, C.S.C. & others - Follow up data on crimes of escapees - Data on tampering with security components of facilities - Data on damages by inmates to government property - Statistical indicators of accomplishment of basic objectives of program	20	11	27	3

*for contract Fees, Computer Costs, Travel, etc.

SUMMARY OF EVALUATION STUDY OPTIONS, SECURITY & INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - LOWEST PRIORITY OPTIONS

NO.	TITLE	EXPECTED PRODUCTS	TIME	RESOURCES		
				INST.	N.H.Q.	
			MOS.	P. MOS.	P.MOS.	$K*
11.	Review of Results of Classification Processes & Impacts of Over-population	- Assessment of revised basis of classification of inmates - Delineation of impacts of over-population - Explicit statement of acceptable levels of risks and objectives	18	4	11	4
12.	Review of Impacts of Intensive Security Measures on Inmates & Institutions	- Test of effects of intensive static security measures on institutions and inmates and hypothesis that maximum security institutions make minimum security inmates	32	46	11	12
13	Study of Alternative Use of Open Prisons	- Statement of conditions under which direct placement to open prisons would be feasible in Canada - Analysis of costs & benefits of such direct placements - Criteria for direct placement	15	1	4	81
14	Review of Perimeter Control Operations & Alternatives	- Measures of effectiveness of perimeter control operations - Review of current methods v.s. alternatives	15	4	21	2
15	Analysis of Escorted Temporary Absences	- Basis for assessing degree of dangerous & risk of escape for escorted TA's - Review & analysis of rates of escapes & incidents for ETA's - Annualized total costs of escorts for all ETA's & for those cases judged not to be dangerous to the public and/or serious escape risks.	28	6	12	33

*for contract Fees, Computer Costs, Travel, etc.