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BANK ROBBERIES AND
STOLEN BIKES

Thoughts of a Street Cop

No. 1986-4

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**BANK ROBBERIES AND
STOLEN BIKES**

Thoughts of a Street Cop

No. 1986-4

Inspector Chris Braiden
Special Advisor, Policing
Programs Branch
Ministry of the Solicitor General
August 1985

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BANK ROBBERIES AND STOLEN BIKES: THOUGHTS OF A STREET COP

Inspector Chris Braiden*
Edmonton Police Department
Special Advisor, Policing
Ministry of the Solicitor General

FOREWORD

This paper is not about bank robberies or stolen bikes. It's about policing styles as seen through the eyes of a street cop who has read a bit and thought a lot about what we do and how we do it. Neither does it contain any revelations. All of the main points are borrowed from original thinkers such as O.W. Wilson, George Kelling, James Q. Wilson, Herman Goldstein, Robert Trojanowicz, John Eck, Samuel Walker, John Alderson, Egon Bittner and others. It will not be footnoted as a research paper should, because it is not intended as such although references will be included whenever essential. It has been written in the hopes of stimulating interest in - and discussion of - the concept of Community-Based Policing as "the" future for policing in Canada.

Much has been learned about crime and policing in the past fifteen years. Unfortunately most of this valuable evidence remains buried in obscure government reports or academic journals. Little of it has progressed past the academic exercise stage and the term "The paralysis of analysis" is most appropriate. Many of these works unfortunately end up with a phrase like

* The author gratefully acknowledges the encouragement and advice of Chief Robert Lunney, and the many useful comments on the paper provided by Gerry Woods, Director of the Research Division, Ministry of the Solicitor General, Canada, and of his colleagues Scott Burbidge and Chris Murphy, and those provided by M.A. (Mo) Martin and Graham Muir of the Canadian Police College. He particularly wishes to thank Mrs. Nancy Warner whose diligence in typing the several drafts was indispensable.

"However, more work needs to be done in this area". Researchers rarely find complete solutions; it's not their job. But often they provide the practitioner with pieces of solutions. The task I have set for myself is to dig out the more practical and useful of these scholars' work and forge it into a logical, reasonable argument to support my position. The audience I'm trying to reach are the people untouched by this scholarship so far, the street cops, the ones in the trenches, the ones who do the legwork and who have it in their power either to give life to this style of policing or condemn it forever to the dusty library shelves where it will continue to sit in great expectation with its brethren studies. If these people read and understand the paper, I will have succeeded. But I cannot take the argument farther than that. The logic and philosophy of the ideas must sell themselves, and this is a tough audience to convince. Fancy packaging won't fool them.

At times it may seem that the paper is wandering. This is intentional. I am trying to look beyond law and crime. For too long, policing has tried to exist as an island in a sea of social and behavioural problems. It has pursued crime as if that phenomenon has a definitive start and finish. We cannot be very effective at controlling crime until we understand the community around us. True policing cannot be divorced from poverty, bigotry, racism, unemployment, illiteracy, hate, anger and all of the other non-criminal illnesses that afflict Canadian society because the consequences of society's maladies translate into the realities of policing in the 1980's. The flight to the suburbs has left most cities with core slums. The gap# between the poor and middle-class has widened. One third of all Canadian children now live with one parent. Money still talks, the poor being the overwhelming favourite to become either a criminal or the victim of violent crime. All of this begs an examination of the past, present and likely future of policing and this is the passage the paper takes.

One further comment. Some might interpret this paper as a criticism of police leaders. It is not. Today's police chiefs took over organizations deeply

entrenched in the para-military, law enforcement way of doing things. Many are striving to find a way out of it. But police organizations are very difficult ships to turn around. The fact remains, however, that our current chiefs happen to be the steersmen at perhaps the most turbulent period in the history of modern policing.

INTRODUCTION

Fact: In Canada in 1984 there were exactly 1,069 bank robberies which netted \$2.8M. The reporting rate for bank robberies is 100%; all banks are insured.

Fact: In the same year there were about 182,000 reported stolen bicycles which netted \$45M. The reporting rate for stolen bicycles is only 30%. Most people either don't have insurance or the loss is less than the deductible clause.

An examination of the policy and procedures manual of a typical urban police department will reveal copious instructions on how to respond to bank robberies. Meticulous records will be kept on all statistics relating to such incidents. No amount of time and resources will be spared investigating each incident, in fact more money may be spent investigating one bank robbery than all of the stolen bicycles combined. Special squads of detectives will respond to bank robberies and money is no object in hunting down the comparatively small number of criminals involved.

The manual, however, will be silent on the issue of stolen bicycles except to state when found ones are to be auctioned off. The police probably will not even respond to investigate; they will just take a report over the telephone. When a bank robbery 'goes down', all hell breaks loose in a police department. When a kid's bike is stolen, not a twitch. Why?

Are police leaders aware of the disparity of resources applied to these problems, or the magnitude of the stolen bicycle problem? I don't think so. If they were I'm sure they would do something about it. But therein lies the root of the problem. Too often they have become so enmeshed in senseless bureaucracy that they are unaware of individual community problems. They have become 'fire-fighters' with the 'In/Out' baskets dictating their daily work only to face the same baskets the next day. Contemporary policing reacts to incidents, not problems. As an incident a bank robbery is big stuff, a stolen

bicycle is small stuff. As an overall community problem, however, bank robberies pale in comparison to stolen bicycles; just ask anyone who lives in Ottawa. It seems that current police vision does not have the capacity to look beyond an individual incident to identify a problem. We are preoccupied with the behaviour of the individual criminal rather than the debilitating effect of multiple small crimes on the community.

I submit that the most important challenge facing police leaders today is the need to drastically overhaul and re-tool their thinking on what their organizations do and how they do it. They may find that their most pressing problem is not the high profile crimes such as bank robberies, drug busts and computer crimes because experience and research show that even under optimum conditions, police, working alone, can have little impact on these crimes anyway. Instead, their immediate problem may be illustrated by the stolen bicycles scenario. This means the police chief might have to tell the Bankers' Association that bank robberies will have to come down a couple of notches on the priority scale so that kids' bikes can move up a couple. The challenge facing police leaders is how to truly motivate and mobilize and then lead the community in solving its own problems. More simply, we must learn to be catalysts and facilitators rather than doers. To do this, the leaders need to have their ear to the ground and be in 'synch' with what is bothering the community. The bank robberies and stolen bicycles example indicate they are not. They will have to scratch the public's back if they want their own scratched. Perhaps if we help the community with their stolen bicycles, they will help us with the bank robberies.

There is another, more immediate need for this mental overhaul. We know that fear of crime is a more debilitating problem than the actual incidence. For example, many people believe there is up to five times as much crime than there actually is. The debilitating effect of crimes such as stolen bicycles because so many homes have been victimised clearly contributes to this fear, a fear that is eating away at the confidence law-abiding people have for the health of our communities and the criminal justice system of which we are a part.

WHY THE IMPLEMENTATION BOTTLENECK?

The time has arrived when police leaders in Canada must do some serious soul-searching. They must take a hard look at their traditional priorities. Should the police service continue to consider itself a creature of statute, insular and inward-looking, answerable to no one except for budgetary reasons, or should we serve the social needs of the community that pays the bills? It seems that policing has drifted significantly from its original mandate, that traditionally we have decided unilaterally what our priorities will be; that we have become essentially one dimensional crime-fighters, and that we are not very successful at what we have chosen to do, anyway. This paper suggests that community policing is the policing model that best meets the overall needs of the community and the police agency serving it.

Many basic ideas of community-responsive policing have been discussed and written about for perhaps 20 years. Why has so little been implemented despite the apparent logic of the ideas? Those in the know may be surprised to hear that the great majority of front line police officers have never heard of community policing, much less understand it. For whatever reason, it has remained the private reserve of academics and a few police leaders on the conference circuit and it has gone nowhere. I believe the bottleneck between discussion and implementation is caused by a lack of understanding on the part of the people who have it within their power to unplug this bottleneck. What I'm saying is that until the people in the operations end of policing understand and accept the newly emerging ideas of community responsive policing, it will go nowhere.

Perhaps there is another reason why community policing has not progressed past the idea stage. Researchers and police administrators admit that while it is comparatively easy to write and talk about the philosophy, they also infer that they themselves are not quite sure how this style of policing should be implemented in a given community. Because of this they are reluctant to spread abroad the ideas for fear they will be pressured to explain how it should be done. My view is that it is not the responsibility of the academic to show the police community how to do it. Once the people who are closest to the delivery of police services understand the concept fully, they will come up with ways to implement it. No one in the system knows their community

better or who the 'movers' and 'shakers' are. I have great faith in the ingenuity of these people if given the necessary freedom, leadership and support.

Community-based policing must become a mentality before it can become things. A strategic vision must precede strategic planning, otherwise planning is for planning's sake. Until the idea is universally understood, it will remain dormant. Having been understood, it must be accepted and it is there that the philosophy of community policing is on its own. It must sell itself. Its logic must be obvious to the rank and file. If it requires salesmanship and hype, it will go the route of team policing in the mid 1970's which never took off because the front end of the system never understood its philosophies or objectives. I know I never did.

THE PAST

Soren Kierkegaard once said:

"Life can only be understood backward but it must be lived forward".

I have no idea who Soren Kierkegaard was but he was being very astute when he said the foregoing. In my view any intelligent discussion of contemporary policing in Canada must include an understanding of its history. It is only then that we can have a clear picture of where we should be heading and how we should get there. We must understand the past of policing before we can plot the future. That means we must ask the five following questions:

What exactly were police intended to do?

What are police actually doing?

Should police be doing what they are doing?

What should police be doing?

How should police do what they should be doing?

These questions beg an examination of the history of policing. Policing as we know it today started in the metropolis of London, England, in 1829. Numerous

efforts had been made for the fifty years prior to that in England to form civil police forces but it all came to nought until Sir Robert Peel, as Home Secretary, saw his Police of the Metropolis Bill passed in Parliament in that year. It is significant that a main contributing factor to the genesis of civil policing was the need to put down incidents of disorder by using the army for that purpose. Sabres and carbines in the hands of people specifically trained to kill have a certain finality about them which was a bit too drastic for civil unrest even 150 years ago. A better way had to be found for handling these domestic problems. That better way was the formation of what has become known as the Metropolitan London Police. Of interest to the paper though is the Statement of Principles that accompanied the formation of the Force. That statement, or job description if you will, had never been intentionally altered or rewritten until this year when the Policing Principles of the Metropolitan Police manual was introduced. More about that later. Writers continually point out that Peel's nine principles are as much the "reason for being" of policing today as they were in 1829. I include them here for ease of reference.

1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and by severity of legal punishment.
2. To recognize always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour, and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.
3. To recognize always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing the observance of laws.
4. To recognize always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured diminishes, proportionately, the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.
5. To seek and to preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of police and without regard to the justice

or injustices of the substance of individual laws; by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing; by ready offering of sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.

6. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order; and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.
7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen, in the interests of community welfare and existence. Remember this one, it will come up again later on).
8. To recognize always the need for strict adherence to police executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary or avenging individuals or the state, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.
9. To recognize always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

Let us jump ahead in time 150 years and turn to section 57 of the Ontario Police Act which has an equivalent section in all of the other Police Acts across the country.

57. "The members of police forces appointed under Part II, except assistants and civilian employees, are charged with the duty of preserving the peace, preventing robberies and other crimes and offences, including offences against the by-laws of the municipality, and apprehending offenders, and commencing proceedings before the proper tribunal,

and prosecuting and aiding in the prosecuting of offenders, and have generally all the powers and privileges and are liable to all the duties and responsibilities that belong to constables".

(R.S.O. 1970, c.351, s.55)

The messages to be gleaned from the two are very different. It is this contradiction of purpose that forms the basis for the five questions posed above. To summarize the two, Peel seems to be asking for an order maintenance, prevention oriented model that performs its tasks with the blessings of the public and determines its tasks from the needs of the public. He speaks of "public approval", "public respect", "co-operation of the public", "public favour", "individual service and friendship to all members of the public", "community welfare and existence". Fully six of the nine principles address specifically public needs and co-operation. The word "crime" is mentioned only twice and in both cases in connection with prevention. Nowhere is there even an allusion to criminal investigation or crime-fighting. And, of course there is that famous passage, "the police are the public and the public are the police".

In general, Peel seemed to have in mind a broad social-needs mandate for the police. When we examine a provincial police act, the message is different. The words "public" or "community" are not mentioned once. There is not even a hint that the police should concern themselves with the needs, wishes, or blessings of the people they serve. The entire, sole thrust is preventing, catching and prosecuting crime and criminals. It is isolationist and one-dimensional in nature and lends itself to "being available for the big catch" mentality.

I recognize that Peel's Principles are not legislation and that the police acts do not prevent community responsive policing, but neither do they introduce, stimulate or promote it. And there are some among us who will point to the legislation as a cop-out and say "This is my job description; the law doesn't say I have to get out of my car and mix with people." Legislation is the medium by which elected officials should lead their constituents. Police acts should reflect what it is people expect of their police.

The question that remains to be answered is whether our legislators intended such a deviance from the original starting point. I doubt it very much. I do not think that their thoughts went that deep and the content of current police acts support that view. It was probably a development of time just as police administrators wandered in the objectives they set over the years in their organizations. Nevertheless, it is one of the reasons that practically all police acts are in need of overhauling to bring them into step with today's policing needs which is arguably at its most thought-provoking period in its short history. An example of the laziness of the legislation is to be found in the last phrase of section 57; "and have generally all the powers and privileges and are liable to all the duties and responsibilities that belong to Constables". I have yet to find a person or a document that can either explain or direct me to a source that sets out the powers, privileges, duties or responsibilities of constables. I always come back to Peel, or the police acts or some ambiguous case law, all of which leave me no wiser. Indeed, the study paper "Legal Status of the Police"¹ for the Law Reform Commission doesn't even attempt a clarification. Perhaps this side-stepping was intentional.

It is not clear whether police administrators followed the lead of the legislators or vice versa but suffice to say both have refined the objectives of Peel, intentionally or otherwise, into a crime-fighting package. The bottom line is that the typical urban police agency of today devotes 80-90% of its time and resources to patrol operations and follow-up criminal investigations. This is very much in keeping with the apparent direction of the police acts. Neither source seems to have contemplated community needs or input in plotting the police mandate.

Perhaps another contributing factor to the narrowing of the police function is the absence of academic interest in determining exactly what police did. It was an interest that was practically non-existent until about 25 years ago. Prior to that time, police managers did not seem to realize how their product was being affected by technology. If they did, they must have been happy with the drift towards a crime-fighting model because very little adjustment was made. The things we know today were not known to planners and administrators of earlier times. But we do know them today and have known many of them for some considerable time. Since the 1960's,

policing in all its manifestations has come under increasing scrutiny by academe. This research originated almost entirely in the United States where one researcher suggested recently that today, next to politicians, policing may well be the most studied occupation. In that country there are research institutions such as the Police Foundation, Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and the National Institute of Justice; there are private funding foundations such as Vera, Charles Stewart Mott, Guggenheim, Eisenhower; there are schools of criminal justice at many of the most prestigious universities headed up by world renowned scholars. In our country, with the exception of the infrequent researcher working alone there is nothing to compare. This is unfortunate because there is a definite reluctance on the part of many people in and around policing in this country to accept research that originated south of the border. Nevertheless, it is my belief that much of the research carried out in U.S. urban centres is applicable to the Canadian setting. It is nothing but foolishness and jealousy for us not to learn from it.

To understand where we are at now in policing strategies, we need to look back several decades and examine how we arrived there. Some scholars argue that policing was becoming essentially crime-fighting by the end of the nineteenth century. Regardless, for sure it was heading in that direction by the 1920's, the days when "public enemies" became publicized. Things that are accepted today as absolute necessities to the masses were considered the luxuries of the few at the time, including the automobile, telephone and two-way radio, all of which were to have dramatic effects on policing practices, each in its own way. Coupled with emerging demographic and social changes, the effects on policing were profound.

In terms of the technological, the telephone was the first to influence policing. To understand its effect, one needs to remember what things were like before its introduction. Before the telephone, when citizens needed a police officer they had to go find one either in the street or at the police station. In other words, a person with a problem had to take themselves and their problem to the police who were only to be found in public places. Today the vast majority of calls for police originate via the telephone, an extremely easy act. The police will then respond to the scene, usually the home or business place. Secondly, police began to encourage people to use their police services more and more because they were now only a telephone

call away. The more calls they received, the better they could substantiate their need for improved communications systems. Statistics and reports are created by dispatched calls. Encounters between people and police that occur in public are often handled informally and are not reflected in 'stats'. Legitimizing the 'system' was already replacing genuine service to the public as the primary objective. Police priorities and public priorities were beginning to part company.

Over time, the phenomenon that began to emerge was that whereas prior to the introduction of the telephone, police were rarely invited into people's homes or became embroiled in their personal lives, they would now become intimately involved in people's private affairs more and more so that today 85% of all calls for service originate from, and occur within, privately owned premises, a complete reversal of the pre-telephone era. Today, 60% of all serious crime occurs in private places. Not only did the location of police - citizen contact change but the reasons for that contact began to take on an entirely different character. Police began to spend less time on the order maintenance in public places that Sir Robert Peel had in mind and began to devote more time and resources to personal problems that exist in private places. They began to encounter 'ordinary' people less and 'problem' people more. More significantly though was that more often than not, the problems were social rather than criminal in nature. Already the message was emerging that people saw the police as helpers rather than crime fighters.

The telephone was very closely followed by the automobile in terms of technology influence on policing. The two-way radio completed the tripartite of things that was to have such a huge effect on the direction of policing practices, not all of them healthy, or even intended, as we shall see. In the times when police walked, they were in constant contact with ordinary people during their daily wanderings and all of the social benefits of such normal, non-crisis interaction were in evidence. People knew their local cop and he knew something about many of the people in his area. He was like the mailman or milkman of today. Having to walk amongst people for eight hours each day, it was almost impossible for a police officer not to become friendly with at least some of them, known to most and familiar with their problems. The automobile was to have a dramatic impact on this friendly, personal contact as we shall see.

Direct police contact with people diminished to the point where police were only having personal contact with "problem" people which included not just law-breakers, but people with multiple social problems or who, for whatever reason, couldn't care for themselves, drunks, drug addicts or the physically or mentally disabled. One recent study in the United States, for example, revealed that the police were instrumental in 25% of all psychiatric hospital admissions in one state.

POLICE MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY

In the economic prosperity after the Second World War, we saw the beginning of major changes in Canada's population, who we were and where we lived, along with changes in values and habits, what we believed in and how we behaved. At the heart of this was the rapid expansion of Canadian cities as centres of industry and commerce, and thus people. The population of urban centres grew from two major sources; rural Canadians and immigrants, mainly from Europe. In a few short years, Canadian cities grew by millions.

Because these changes took place so rapidly and were so massive, there was little chance for planning. The result was the familiar urban sprawl and everything that went with it: demands for more schools, paved streets, public transportation, hospitals, police services, and sewers, etc. Although there was the need to manage these escalating demands, this was not seen as a major problem in the context of easy money from an expanding tax base, borrowing and inflation. For the police, the availability of telephones, of cars, and the use of two-way radios were of considerable importance. The new suburbanites placed new and increasing demands on the police who responded by using a "rapid response - car - telephone - radio mobilization" model as the basis to manage their quickly growing resources.

This model, while useful in its day, is in many respects no longer appropriate. But urban growth is almost stopped; financial restraints are a fact of life; and immigration is greatly reduced. Now, at the end of the era of urban growth, there is a much greater concern with the quality of urban life. Along with this change in focus, we find a marked growth in citizen organizations and outspokenness. In this context, it is clear that CAD and 911 systems, for example, serve an outdated idea of the relationship between a city and its police force. The few police voices, such as John Alderson², who in the seventies were calling for greater emphasis on community responsive policing, were obviously ahead of their time. However, they did open the debate on the subject and contributed to the development of models of policing more useful in contemporary society.

Perhaps the most influential agent on policing practices to appear on the scene around this period was in the person of the late O.W. Wilson who was to become the guru to two generations of police administrators. Wilson was initially a police administrator, then an academic for many years before he returned to policing to take over the Chicago Police Department in the 1960's. By the 1930's, policing was experiencing widespread corruption. Wilson believed the way to combat this corruption and to bring professionalism to policing was to remove police officers from all unnecessary personal contact with people; in short, put them all in cars and have them mix with people only when they had to. This would prevent, it was thought, the coziness that leads to graft and corruption. In fact, the police agencies that were considered most professional in those days stressed this aloofness and took extra measures such as frequent change of beat assignments, to keep personal contact to a minimum.

Wilson's theory of police management also emphasized tight central control, little delegation of power and the suppression of crime as the primary mission of policing. He contended that the best way to bring professionalism to policing was to use the automobile and two-way radio to provide rapid response to crime calls. This rapid response was presumed to achieve two things:

1. Increase the arrest rate of criminals caught in the act; and
2. Create an aura of police omnipresence.

This theory of omnipresence, it was presumed, would in turn accomplish two things:

1. Criminals would be deterred from committing crimes because the chances of being caught were too great; and
2. Honest citizens would feel secure and safe in their homes and in public because the police had the capacity to be "everywhere".

The final ingredient that completed the recipe for the Wilsonian theory of police management was the introduction of Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Prior to the UCR there was no accurate way to measure the product of a police agency. Very quickly, the UCR became the measure of success, the report card

if you will, of a police agency. However, because these reports gathered only crime statistics, every other function the police had performed now became secondary because they were thought not to influence the report card one way or the other. The emphasis towards capturing stats and data rather than handling complaints informally gathered momentum. Gradually, the police lost interest in many of the social service activities they routinely performed prior to the introduction of the telephone, the car, two-way radio, and UCR. They were fast becoming one-dimensional crime-fighters. Capturing stats began to predominate conflict resolution.

The Wilsonian theory of police management which stressed centralized control, professionalism and optimum use of technology continued as the model to be emulated for forty years. Even today, most, if not all, police departments measure their efficiency by UCR's, Clearance Rates and Response Times. Today statistics, data and computer print-outs have become the dominant bywords of police jargon with the personal, informal resolution of human conflict relegated to a form of idiosyncrasy to be tolerated in a few eccentric officers. It is neither encouraged nor rewarded and it cannot be recorded as a separate activity on the Daily Activity Report. It is thrown in under the catch-all heading "General Patrol". A constable with too much general patrol will soon find himself in trouble with the sergeant.

Indeed, the lion's share of work done in research and development, planning, and training within the police community in the last 20 years was to get better at what we had chosen to do - crime fighting. Multi-million dollar communication systems have been installed to improve response times by mere minutes, sometimes even seconds. In many jurisdictions, constables have been reduced to responders and report-takers who are urged to get back to their car and radio as soon as possible.

Computers and terminals are now the 'in' thing with everyone insisting they must have one to function efficiently. For example, an official with the Federal Department of Supply and Services was reported recently by the Globe & Mail as saying that expenditures by that department for this type of equipment skyrocketed from \$2M in 1981 to \$33.5M in 1984. (Does this mean the Federal public service efficiency has improved equivalently?) The cry has been "if we only had better technology, we could control crime better". Some police cars

are now equipped with computer terminals. But computers are irritable animals; they must be kept cool so the cars must have air-conditioning. For the air-conditioning to work properly, the windows must be rolled up. Now in police jargon, "in service" means to be in the car, close to the radio and computer. It is considered good to be "in service". "Out of service" means one is away from the car, radio and computer perhaps casually chatting with a bunch of snotty-nosed kids bent on mischief. "Out of service" is bad. So we have now come full circle; technology contact has become primary and people contact has become secondary. "Load-shedding" of "service" calls are current buzz words. Service calls where people might just need a bit of help or advice are lowest on the totem pole. These calls are being shed so that officers are free for the 'big catch'. The end result is that we spend 40-60% (one study had it at 78%) of our patrol time doing nothing because the big catches do not come that often. So we have arrived at the puzzling position of load-shedding genuine opportunities to involve and befriend kids by not responding to their stolen bike complaints but then we provide constables with hockey and football cards to hand out as a means of stimulating artificial contact between the two.

THE PRESENT

It is often said that hindsight is always 20/20 vision. The world is full of past-event experts. We know all of the foregoing because we now have the benefit of hindsight and subsequent research. We know infinitely more about the police function today than ever before. Our predecessors were not as informed. Much excellent research has been done over the past twenty years which allows us to intelligently examine the police function and everything about it. Armed with this research, we can now analyze Wilson's theory and the subsequent police management styles that flowed from it. Remember, it was only presumed that Rapid Response and Preventive Control would produce certain results. These theories were left untested for 40 years!

Perhaps it was Wilson himself who first realized the consequences of his theory because as far back as 1953 he was advocating getting police out of the

cars and back on the beat. What remains now is for us to take down from the library shelves some of the available research, dust it off, and put it to use. What does it tell us? Much.

1. Traditional tactics of more police and better technology to fight crime have failed. Between 1962-1981, the ratio of police to population increased from 1.6 per 1,000 to 2.3 per 1,000. During that period, the crime rate rose from 4,300 per 100,000 to 11,400 per 100,000. All of this happened notwithstanding 80-90% of police budgets were being devoted to patrol operations and follow-up criminal investigations over that same period.
2. How much crime is there, anyway? We will probably never know. The Canadian Urban Victimization Survey (1984) indicates that nearly 62% of all crime is not reported to police when it happens. We have always known that such crimes as wife and child assaults are hugely unreported, but what about personal theft (71%), burglaries (36%), robberies (55%), assaults (66%)? These findings are corroborated by the national crime survey conducted every six months in the United States by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Consistently they find that for every "index" crime reported (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and auto theft), two remain unreported. For example, in 1979 there were four times as many personal and household thefts as the number reported. Victim research in Britain by Sparks, Gunn and Dodd in 1976 suggest only 10% of crime is reported.
3. The U.C.R. are supposed to give an accurate picture of reported crime. They do not. When a criminal incident involves numerous crimes, only the main crime is captured; the rest do not show up. So if a bank was robbed by someone riding a stolen bike, the latter wouldn't count!
4. Rapid Response, which was supposed to help police catch many criminals in the act, does not. Rapid response is a factor in solving only 3% of all serious crime! (the seven "Index" crimes). What is more important is how quickly the crime is reported to the police. Research shows that most victims will call a relative or friend before calling the police. The average elapsed time is six minutes, a lifetime when trying to catch

someone in the act. One study had it at 50 minutes. Eighty six percent of all dispatched calls do not require a rapid response.

5. Preventive Patrol does not create an aura of police omnipresence. It does not achieve the two objectives Wilson thought it would. It neither prevents crime nor creates a feeling of safety among citizens. On the contrary, fear of being victimized is a more serious social problem today than the actual incidence of crime. People think there is more crime than there actually is. One survey indicated the public believes 54% of crime is violent. The actual figure is 6%. Considering also that in a city of 500,000 population, there may be as few as 20 police officers on patrol between 0400 - 0700 hours on any given day, it is simply impossible to try and cover everything. In many organizations, constables may account for only half the total complement so that ratio figures are misleading. As much as 25% of sworn personnel may be assigned to administration. All of this renders police/citizen ratios meaningless.
6. Sixty-eight percent of all serious crime is committed by 7.5% of the criminal population. Much excellent research has been done by both John Eck and the Rand Corporation on such topics as managing criminal investigations, targetting career criminals and selective incapacitation. Some of this research has been available since 1974 and it recognizes the fact that when certain people are not in jail, they are either committing, planning or enjoying the fruits of crime. It suggests that we fish where we are most likely to catch something.
7. 50% of all calls for service come from sources that have called the police at least 10 times in the preceding year. These in fact are recurring problems being treated as individual incidents.
8. The best single source of information to solve crime comes from crime victims yet we spend as little time as possible with these people. Constables, because there are more of them and they are usually first on the scene, solve much more crime than detectives because of the information supplies by victims and witnesses. Success in solving crime diminishes rapidly with the passage of time.

9. Contrary to what television would have us believe, most of a detective's workday has nothing to do with catching criminals. Only one third is spent investigating crime, the rest is eaten up with paper work, disposing of seized property and 'servicing' dead-end cases not to mention the countless hours spent in courthouse hallways.

The real irony of this shifting of emphasis to that of crime fighting in the police function is that it was self inflicted. Over time, the police seem to have taken on the mantle of professional crime-fighters a myth soon coupled with another, that the police alone could control crime if just given the people and technology. The fact remains that the police were never expected to do it alone as is evident from Peel's Principle which state in part:

"The police are the public and the public are the police. The police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence".

One of the tragic consequences of this narrowing of vision that developed over the years was the inaction by police, throughout the western world, in cases of family violence. The prevailing attitude was that a husband beating a wife was not a crime in the pure sense. If it was not a real crime then it was not a police problem but rather a family problem. Because of this attitude, these crimes were never captured by UCR. Therefore, family problems were of little importance to police. For years, countless thousands of these victims were denied this most fundamental right of police protection because their assailant was a member of the family. Incredibly, a mentality was allowed to form and grow that said a husband punching his wife is not the same as that husband punching a police officer, for most assuredly there would be no question as to the outcome of the latter scenario.

It is not intended to treat family violence in depth in this paper although it is arguably one of the most prevalently debilitating and least reported crimes. The point to be made is that one of the reasons it was treated differently is that it was not considered a real crime and so of little importance to the police. Perhaps if police had fundamentally viewed

themselves as helpers and protectors of the weak and vulnerable as well as crime fighters, this unfortunate practice of denying protection to spouses would never have developed. It is only in the 1980's that police are beginning to change their attitude towards these assaults, but few provided the needed leadership.

HOW THE PEOPLE SEE 'THEIR' POLICE

How about the public? Where do they see the police fitting into the scheme of things? Are they happy with the way policing has developed? Are they enamored with the technology and hardware and the pre-occupation with crime-fighting? What is more important to them, bank robberies and drug busts or stolen bicycles and battered wives? Research indicates they do see things differently.

People in Western democracies have traditionally had a high regard for their police so it should be no surprise when a recent study in the United Kingdom corroborated that view. The study involved the police and the public and it measured the following:

1. The public's perception of the police;
2. The reasons for that perception;
3. How the police think they are perceived by the public; and
4. The reasons for that belief.

The study determined that the public has a high regard for the police (this will be treated in more depth further on) and the police believed they were well liked. The revelation of the study however was in the reasons for both groups' opinions.

The police believed people liked them because of their rapid response, improved clearance rates, state-of-the-art technology, their professionalism, and, above all, the ability of the police to control crime. Not so. These things meant little to the public. When the people were asked why they liked the police, they said it was for such things as the human element of the encounter; they liked police who stopped and talked to them, who took the time

to listen to their problems, who went out of their way to help those who could not care for themselves. People were obviously looking beyond the uniform and technology and were looking for the human being within.

In short the people liked the police, not for their crime-fighting abilities, or their technology, but for their human, personal qualities. As a matter of fact, the people seemed to understand that the police could not control crime alone and did not expect them to. They wanted the police to be a part of their community, not apart from it. They thought of the police as "theirs".

There is further proof of what people want of their police. Research conducted in the U.S. between 1970-1978 to determine why people called the police indicated that crime calls were outnumbered four to one by non-crime calls and the latter category was growing all the time. Constantly, the message is the same; people want to be able to turn to the police with their social and personal problems, not necessarily for a solution, but sometimes simply for a shoulder to cry on. A very important fact in our favour is that we are the only 24 hour social service available and there are no user fees! A question that begs asking is why we are the only 24-hour agency.

Sometimes there can be tragic consequences to this unilateral, insensitive policing style as was evidenced by some of the urban riots that occurred in the United States and the United Kingdom in 1980 and 1981. In Liberty City, which is part of Dade County in Florida, the flashpoint that was needed to ignite an already volatile situation was the acquittal of five police officers who had been charged with murder in the death of a motorcyclist. They had chased the motorcyclist at high speeds and eventually apprehended him, beating him to death in the process in front of numerous witnesses. On the day the acquittal was handed down, people took to the streets on a rampage and police headquarters was literally under siege. The final tally was 17 dead, \$200,000,000 in property damage and approximately 900 arrests.

Perhaps the most revealing statistic was that 68% of those arrested had no previous criminal record. The subsequent inquiry into the riot revealed numerous causes which included racism, poverty, unemployment, hooliganism and downright criminal behaviour on the part of some, but the most common complaint heard from the many groups and individuals called to give testimony was

the years of oppressive, impersonal policing that preceeded the riot. People viewed the police as intruders in their neighbourhood.

Prior to the riot, police patrolled that area of metro-Dade County three to a car. That fact alone should have told somebody something. It certainly told them something after the riot. Today, that same area is patrolled by police officers, alone, on foot. The authorities have realized that the entire community, no matter how poor or humble, must have a say and an input into how they are policed, that the police and the community must work shoulder-to-shoulder on identifying the problems, setting the objectives and providing solutions. Drastic changes have taken place in the metro-Dade County Sheriff's Department to bring these things about, but it was a very expensive lesson.

On April 10, 1981, Brixton, a residential area in central London, exploded in much the same way as Liberty City. The incident that provided the spark in this case was quite innocuous by itself. A couple of uniformed 'Bobbies' found a black youth who had apparently been stabbed. He was very agitated and it was necessary for them to manhandle him in order to apply first aid. While they were doing so, a crowd of about 30-40 people mis-perceiving that aid, gathered and began to jostle and harass the police. There was a build-up after this incident that culminated in a full-scale riot which lasted for three days. When order was restored to Brixton, 279 police officers had been injured and 82 people arrested although the figure could have been in the hundreds had the police been able to arrest all of those who qualified. Sixty-one private and 45 police vehicles and 145 premises were destroyed or damaged. In the words of Lord Scarman, who conducted the subsequent inquiry, **"the police had undergone an experience until then unparalleled on the mainland of the United Kingdom."** I lived in that part of London in 1959. What happened during the Brixton riots was unthinkable then. How times change.

Once again it was determined there were numerous contributing factors, but one seemed to predominate. To quote Lord Scarman again:

"The disorders were communal disturbances arising from a complex political, social and economic situation, which is

not special to Brixton. There was a strong racial element in the disorders; but they were not a race riot. The riots were essentially an outburst of anger and resentment by young black people against the police."³

At first sight it might appear that Lord Scarman was being very critical of the police. He was not. Indeed, his report has been praised by police leaders, politicians and public alike as being insightful, direct and accurate. Lord Scarman, a Law Lord, has for long been held in high esteem by the British police and has conducted similar inquiries in the past. If anything he would be considered pro-police in his opinions. The general consensus was that he simply said what had needed saying for some time.

Many of his observations were echoed by police and community leaders alike. The observations he made were many and direct and it is useful to quote a few:

"The police were unimaginative and inflexible in their relationship with the community as a whole and with community leaders in particular, and in the methods of policing they adopted. The criticism was directed at all ranks of the force. It was said that they are insensitive to local opinion, unimaginative and uncomprehending in their dealings with the ethnic minorities, and have their priorities wrong. The critics suggest that a more responsive, and responsible, attitude might develop if the Metropolitan Police were made locally accountable. Lip service is paid, they say, by senior officers to the need for consultation and good relations with the community."

"I do, however, recommend that a statutory framework be developed to require local consultation between the Metropolitan Police and the community at Borough or Police District level."

"Community involvement in the policy and operations of policing is perfectly feasible without undermining the independence of the police or destroying the secrecy of those operations against crime which have to be kept secret. There is a need to devise means of enabling such involvement. Police authorities can use their existing powers to set up local consultative or liaison committees. Chief Officers of Police should take Authorities fully into their confidence, and should co-operate with Police Authorities in establishing consultative arrangements in their police areas. I recommend that a statutory duty should be imposed on Police Authorities and on Chief Officers of Police to co-operate in the establishment of such consultative arrangements. I also recommend that meanwhile Police Authorities and Chief Officers of Police should act at once under their existing powers to set up such arrangements."

"I conclude by recommending that, in consultation with their Police Authorities and with local community leaders, Chief Officers of Police should re-examine the methods of policing used, especially in inner city areas."

Many of the recommendations of the Scarman Report³ have since been adopted and implemented by the Metropolitan London Police Force. Sir Kenneth Newman, the Commissioner, in his annual report for 1985 to the Home Secretary and in a new handbook entitled "The Policing Principles of the Metropolitan Police" published in 1985, embraces completely the community-based policing style recommended by Lord Scarman as the way of the future for his Force. The handbook I refer to, which has been distributed to every member of the Force, sets out the job description to be adhered to. To my knowledge, it is the first restatement of those principles since Peel's time and re-endorses what Peel said so long ago. The principles reflect the changes that have occurred in society, and to the Commissioner's credit, recognize that policing in the metropolis had become isolated from the community when he says in the foreword to the handbook:

It develops those principles into a discussion of some of the practical - and often perplexing - consequences of moving from a profession which had been comparatively inward-looking to one which is more attuned to other people's needs."

The truths we now know about current police practices and the social explosions described in the preceding pages are not the only reasons why police managers must stand back and take a global look at the way we do things. There are others. The money is no longer available for more police and more sophisticated technology. But even if it was, the cat is out of the bag. Enough decision-makers now know that this approach never did work. John Sewell's recent book "Urban Policing in Canada" makes this known to the masses.⁴ Most police agencies are looking at static or decreased budgets. Ordinary people know more about policing today than ever before and many of them are resentful; the police officer sitting in a comfortable, expensive

patrol car (which to the observer translates into "doing nothing") represents wasted tax revenue to the business person and a cushy, well-paid job to the unemployed. People resent paying for something they have no say in or control over.

Neither should we take comfort from the many trendy, superficial programs implemented in recent years. Claims that these programs are reducing crime may be wishful thinking.

The danger in many of these cosmetic programs that have been implemented under such rubrics as Crime Prevention and Community Relations is that they allow some police and government administrators to claim that they are doing something about the problem. They believe their own figures when they suggest that crime is decreasing because of these programs. It is probably more a matter of demographics such as a shift in population age. The best cure for crime, is time. Most people grow out of it. What is more likely is that people are reporting crime less because they are progressively losing faith in the justice system, a fact indicated in resent research.

The point to be made is that many of the programs initiated in recent years to bring the police and public together were for the sole purpose of police popularity; to sell ourselves and our self-ordained product; to improve the image; without changing the product. These programs are condescending, shallow and demeaning to the true dignity of the police calling, for that is what it is if it is done right, a calling. And they are harmful for another reason, they are an impediment to real change and innovation. Lord Scarman in his report put it this way:

"the need for this approach to policing is necessary in all aspects of police work. It is not something which can be put into a separate box labelled "community relations".

But let us not blame the constables and detectives for this. If they are galloping in the wrong direction, we must check who is at the reins. Our leaders are paid higher salaries to lead.

What is needed now is a stepping back from traditional policing and a thorough examination of it in light of the many things we now know. No more bandaids! We are at a crucial period in the development of policing, perhaps the most significant in its comparatively short history.

THE FUTURE

Oscar Wilde once said, "The only thing we have learned from history is that we have learned nothing from history". It would be trite to say he was right but the fact is that we have learned much from the past of policing; it remains only to put that knowledge into practice. Policing is as at a crossroads. In my view, this crossroads has three arteries:

1. Stay with the law enforcement model which requires about 30% of resources and pay lip service to the service calls. If the inefficiency of this model ever becomes general public knowledge, which is likely, the public may say "Fine, we only need 30% of the police we have, let's get rid of the rest!" Private security entrepreneurs are delighted with this mentality and have been gnawing away at the periphery of traditional policing for years. We might just be load-shedding many of us out of work. The National Institute of Justice estimates that \$22 billion was spent on private security and only \$14 billion on public police in 1980 in the U.S. In Canada as far back as 1978, there were 115,000 private security compared to 52,000 police personnel and the gap is widening all the time.
2. We can continue to promote the shallow "P.R." approach with its gimmicks and gadgetry, stickers, buttons and "Officer Friendly" and hope that we can continue to fool the public into believing they are getting the best bang for their buck. At best these programs are creating a siege mentality with people locking themselves away and giving up the streets to criminals. Ironically, the people most influenced by these programs are elderly females who are least likely to be victims of violent crime. The least influenced, males between 20-25 years, are the most likeliest victims.

We can level with ourselves, admit we cannot do it alone, accept the fact that true policing is much more than law enforcement and make the public a genuine partner with us in policing our communities.

In my view, the only logical choice is the last one. The way to achieve it is through community-responsive policing.

WHAT IS COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING?

Kenneth Oxford, Chief Constable of Merseyside in Liverpool, in commenting on the Scarman Report said "I have yet to find out the definition of Community Policing. It seems to be all things to all people." Perhaps the Chief Constable has answered his own question. Anyone (and there are many) who cannot get beyond demanding a pat, verbal definition of the philosophy and ideas has missed the point. But in traditional policing, we have always tried to keep things nicely packaged and pigeon-holed. You cannot do that with community-based policing. Depending upon the problem faced, it might just be all things to all people. However, in my view, community policing does have a solitary definition, a single philosophy, but once again we must look to the past to enlighten our present.

It is to be found in item seven of Peel's Principles, and I quote:

To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police. The police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.

I believe that when this passage is analyzed for its total message, it is the most accurate, concise, definitive statement of community policing. Let me explain further. Most people are familiar with the trite statement "The

police are the public and the public are the police". That is incomplete by itself. It is also misunderstood, I think. For most it seems to mean that cops are just ordinary people like everyone else. It is presumed to be talking about the status of the people involved rather than the work they do. It is the second part of the principle that gives full meaning to the statement and qualifies what Peel had in mind for his day. I would submit that while the community he speaks of changes and reshapes itself from time to time, and the strategies police employ do likewise, the fundamental rationale and philosophy of the message remain constant. I believe that what Peel intended was to position the "new" police as social catalytic agents, not the law enforcement trade-craft journeymen we have fashioned ourselves into.

George Kelling et. al. echo Peel in modern terms:

Assigning the police full responsibility for the maintenance of order, the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals constitutes far too great a burden on far too few. Primary responsibility rests with families, the community and its individual members. The police can only facilitate and assist members of the community in the maintenance of order and no more. (1974:535).

It is also critically important to a complete appreciate of which Peel speaks that he didn't use words such as 'tasks' or 'responsibilities'. He used the very clear word 'duties' which has been defined numerous times in case law (Stenning (1970) S.C.C., Eccles v. Bourque, (1974) S.C.C.) as being a mandatory requirement.

Central to my proposition that this principle is an accurate description of community policing is the last phrase of the passage "**in the interests of community welfare and existence**". It is clearly not limited to crime, criminals, criminal investigation or law enforcement. It embraces the myriad of social issues that surround and are inextricably linked with policing.

My contention is that what Peel was describing in 1829 has come to be known in 1985 by the expression "community policing". In his day, the only descriptive used was "policing". In our time, we have gone through a decade of adjective policing; we've had team policing, zone policing, preventive policing, proactive policing, reactive policing, hard policing, soft policing. I think all of these terms have served to confuse most of us (certainly me). If it weren't for these previous adjectives, we wouldn't have to use the word 'community' to isolate what we're talking about. Today, there is only policing as it was intended to be and as it has developed to be. The real question facing police leaders and police governing bodies is whether they want to stay with policing as it has developed to be or return to the original starting point while embracing all of the changes that have taken place in society in the interim. If the decision is to return to Peel's philosophy, then that happens to be called community policing today. I would argue that Peel's principles and community policing mean exactly the same thing. They are interchangeable.

For example, the decisions facing police leaders and governing bodies are not unlike those being grappled with by religious leaders, especially in poor countries. The dilemma they face is whether the clergy should stick to the business of saving souls (the equivalent of our law enforcement and criminal investigation) or whether they should become socially and politically active to take care of people's temporal needs first and thus create a more conducive environment to save souls. For us, that equates with Peel's "Community Welfare and Existence". Maslow's hierarchy of needs helps to explain the same rationale.

How community policing is achieved, however, may vary from community to community, even within the neighbourhoods that make up communities. And that is how it should be, for that is the essence of it. For example, the problems experienced by business people with drunks, addicts and hookers in a city core setting are very different from a suburban neighbourhood where the biggest problem might be stolen bicycles, speeding vehicles or noisy parties. The solution to one problem might be foot patrol which might be totally inappropriate to another; one scenario might call for strict, heavy law enforcement while another for personal persuasion, arbitration and informal

resolution of the conflict. Fear and physical force can stand side by side with gentleness and kindness as legitimate tools of true policing. The good cops can do both.

A problem that seems to be encountered by some people grappling with the idea of Community-Based Policing is that they see it as a complete departure from the crime-fighting model. They polarize the two. Nothing could be further from the truth. Law enforcement and crime-fighting will always be central to modern policing. In fact, strict application of the law may be the only solution to many problems, i.e, drunk driving, wife battering, motorcycle gangs, organized crime. Law enforcement and crime fighting are also central to Community-Based Policing.

It has never been possible to quantify actual policing in exact terms and we shouldn't waste our time trying. The complexity of the interaction between the police and the public as we have seen, has grown considerably even since the 1930's. Today's society defies comparison with the 1930's. It now crosses many social boundaries so that the police today are dealing with problems never dreamed of 50 years ago. Contemplate for a moment the impact of the automobile, television, drugs.

Community-oriented policing reflects those changes in the following ways:

1. It recognizes the realities of contemporary policing, embraces all we have learned from past research and mobilizes the community to help itself solve its own, unique social problems.
2. It positions the police as essential community leaders and catalysts. It becomes a stimulator in fighting crime and other social problems rather than fighting crime alone. It leads the community in this endeavour and acts as the catalyst to mobilize others.
3. It recognizes that a police agency provides a service to its constituents; it works closely with the community to identify community problems and determine solutions to those problems, if possible.

4. Crime and disorder are not police problems alone, they are community problems with the police being the stimulator and facilitator towards the solution. Just as dentists cannot bring about dental health alone but must lead the community to create its own dental health by employing good habits and frequent checks for problems.
5. Community policing realises that large urban communities cannot be policed in a blanket fashion; that neighbourhoods have unique problems and resources. Some will need a great deal of help to mobilize while others will require little. Likewise the solutions will have to vary.
6. Community policing recognizes that de facto police work involves much more than law enforcement and catching criminals. Police are the delivery service for social 'first-aid' to the community. They are the agency of first call. They are the first to become involved in most social problems but are not expected to solve those problems or see them through to the end. They are often the link between problem and solution. This is so even in their law enforcement role; they start the process and then pass it on to the rest of the justice system. They are the gatekeepers to the criminal justice system.
7. Community policing prioritizes crime by its effect on the community rather than the actions of the criminal.
8. Community policing is pro-active when possible and reactive when necessary.

Finally, community policing gives substance to the national crime prevention motto "Working Together to Prevent Crime".

THE POLICE LEADERS ROLE

Police leaders are paid to lead. With some notable exceptions, few have done so. Instead, most have chosen to bury themselves in bureaucratic memo writing and paperwork. Paperwork can be delegated; leadership cannot. Senseless, needless paperwork in policing has proliferated in the twenty years I have been involved. The solution to everyone's problem throughout the criminal justice system translates into more work for the constable because that is where the buck stops. When some bureaucrat wants more statistics, it's the constable who collects them, all the time adding to his paperwork. Most leaders have clung to the status quo of policing, neither learning from the past nor trying to prepare for the future. To quote Chief of Police Anthony Bouza of Minneapolis, Minnesota; **"Our profession withers for a lack of an informed and vigorous discussion on a number of key issues. The police profession is slipping into an ice age. Survival and comfort are the unspoken bywords of our calling. I do not see the responses to challenges that stimulate other professions to progress."** Bouza made that statement in 1984. The inefficient tactics that characterize current policing practices are the creation of police leaders, past and present. But so too can police leaders change these tactics. The system in Canada, unlike Japan for instance, where policing is national, lends itself to local ingenuity. Police leaders are not bound by the dictates of their brethren, each one is free to change their own organization, independently. The words of Thoreau might stimulate us here: **"If a man does not keep pace with his companions perhaps it is because he hears a different drummer. Let him step to the music he hears, however measured or far away."**

Police leaders must also learn to share not only the work but the decision-making process. The objectives and priorities of their organizations are the legitimate forum of community representation. Such bodies as police boards and municipal councils should be more active at the community level. Unfortunately in the past, few members of police commissions and boards have fulfilled their mandate; indeed some do not seem to know what it is they are supposed to be doing. Sadly, many have been appointed for the wrong reasons. If policing is significantly off course, they must share the blame.

Incidentally, a very informative study of police governance has been completed and should be read.⁵ Police chiefs are getting little assistance from this direction. Citizens' groups should have an input at the neighbourhood level so that the organization is congruent with the needs of its constituents. This does not mean the chief of police will lose control of the organization. Operational decision-making must always remain with the experts. The real test of police leadership in the future will be the ability to arbitrate, mediate, persuade and to generally pull together the disparate priorities of the various interest groups so as to fashion a product that most closely addresses the needs of the entire community.

The police leader must also genuinely promote delegation, not only of work but of autonomy and authority. There is tremendous latent ingenuity throughout the ranks of the police service just waiting for a chance to surface. Regardless of rank, more people must be given a chance to run with the ball. Research in New York (1978) indicates that when this happens, job satisfaction increases. If neighbourhoods are to be policed for their unique needs, "head office" must give sufficient autonomy to unit commanders to make some decisions independently. In this regard, Canadian police leaders would be well advised to examine the changes being made in the Metropolitan London Police, a monolithic organization of some 40,000 employees. Following the release of the Scarman Report on the Brixton riots, Sir Kenneth Newman, who had commanded the Royal Ulster Constabulary prior to becoming Commissioner of the 'Met', to his credit, immediately began to implement many of the recommendations of the report. Sir Kenneth has publicly committed himself to implementing community policing throughout his organization. Part of his plan is to give considerable autonomy to the chief superintendents who command individual police districts. An entire process has been developed which ensures that the priorities of these districts are dictated by the unique needs of the neighbourhoods they serve. He has told his chief superintendents, in essence, "Serve your neighbourhoods, not me", the exact opposite of the O.W. Wilson theory of centralized control of management. Once again, we have come full circle in time.

The autonomy given to unit commanders must, in turn, be passed on to the people at the front end, the sergeants and constables, so that they are not perpetually looking over their shoulder or fearful of being second-guessed. When this happens, ingenuity is stifled and people become drones. Although this delegation of authority has been preached for years in police management courses, the fact remains it is not practiced. Police leaders continue to receive echoes of their own opinions from sycophantic understudies afraid to disagree. All of the recent research into job satisfaction in the workplace indicates that most people want to have some power to influence what is to be a final product. Japanese industry capitalizes on this fact. It's time to put to rest O.W. Wilson's organizational theory of tight central control, impersonalized policing, heavy emphasis on crime statistics and a blind faith in technology. It doesn't fit the bill in the 1980s.

Even in these times of mind-boggling technological advances, the guts of police work is still human-being reacting to human-being and this is not likely to change. Robots may be able to make cars but they cannot bring peace to a family in turmoil nor can they provide a shoulder to cry on for an old 'wino' intent on suicide. Computers may have great memories, but they cannot create. We will get the best mileage out of technology by realizing its limitations and not by being overawed by it. A tremendous example of how to harness technology was demonstrated recently when the 'Live Aid' rock concert was shown simultaneously around the world and raised \$100M in a matter of hours for famine relief in Africa. The advances in fingerprint technology in the past ten years is a classic illustration of the right way to harness this science.

THE CONSTABLE'S ROLE

It is the police leaders task to create an environment wherein community policing will grow, but in the final analysis it is the constables who must make it happen; they must give it life and vitality. More than anything else, constables must be familiar with the people in their neighbourhood and vice versa. But this need for police/citizen familiarity shouldn't surprise us.

After all, in our personal lives don't we seek it out all the time in the doctors we go to, the service stations we take our cars to and the butcher, hairdresser and bartender we choose to give our custom to? In every case, we are looking for one, predominant quality, trustworthiness. We want to be sure the doctor is familiar with our body, the service station operator with our car, the butcher with our choice of meat, the hairdresser with the way we like our hair and most important of all, that the bartender will give us full measure in our drinks. Why should we think it would be different when it comes to people and their police. Isn't it reasonable for them to want to have a cop they know and trust?

We are told it is unreasonable to expect this friendliness to happen in the hustle and bustle of big cities. This is a cop-out (no pun intended). Just because most policing occurs in big cities is no excuse for police officers being nameless and alien. Most doctors, service stations and bars are in big cities too! The main difference is that the latter serve specific neighbourhoods, see the residents of these neighbourhoods as their customers and cater to their individual needs. Policing need not be any different; it too has clients with needs that must be met but it must get its service down to the neighbourhood level. So long as cities are policed in blanket department store fashion, we are missing the point. We need to bring the speciality shop atmosphere to our policing product.

This familiarity cannot happen until police get out of their cars and meet ordinary people under normal circumstances on a regular basis and get to know each other as individuals. That cannot happen when the police are shut in behind closed car windows. This leads us to the subject of foot patrol. For the purpose of this paper, foot patrol and neighbourhood patrol are synonymous but I will most often use the latter term because full-time foot patrol is not realistic in all cases, e.g., the regional police forces in central Canada that embrace large rural land areas. However, whether it be full time or part-time, front line uniform police officers must start walking again. They must spend time with ordinary people on a regular basis away from technology, under normal circumstances.

It will be said by some that many police agencies across Canada already have foot patrols. That is true, but often they are there for the wrong reasons, to placate special-interest groups, and for public relations. Usually foot patrols are assigned to the business sections of large cities and only because of lobbying by the Chamber of Commerce or some similar group. This is dangerous because when the entire tax-paying population does not have a say in the role definition of their police, special-interest groups are often allowed to monopolize police time and resources for selfish reasons. In many cases the people who need us the most get the least of our times because they have no political clout. Wealth has no place in determining police service.

This style of foot patrol is harmful for another reason. It alienates foot patrol personnel from their motorized partners. Most often, current foot patrol officers are not assigned calls for service, do little substantive 'real' police work and there is no compulsion on them to really get involved in their beat or its problems. Their main task is to be visible and 'Fly the Flag'. Often, they will call in mobile patrol units to investigate incidents they are quite capable of handling themselves.

Central to genuine neighbourhood patrol however is ordinary police work; answering calls for service, including crimes in progress, whenever possible. And doing the paperwork, too! The objective of neighbourhood patrol is not to be different from mobile patrol but rather to do more with the uncommitted time experienced by both. Neighbourhood patrol must not and will not mean more work for mobile personnel. If it does, there will be friction between the two. The only limitation on neighbourhood patrol is lack of mobility. To counteract that limitation, it can perform all of the interpersonal social tasks that cannot be performed by an officer driving by in a patrol car.

THE FLINT MICHIGAN NEIGHBOURHOOD PATROL PROGRAM

The best example of neighbourhood patrol I am aware of is the Flint Michigan, Neighbourhood Patrol Program. I spent three days observing it. It is worthwhile to pause here and consider some of the experiences of this program that is now six years old and flourishing.

The program was started in 1979 with a private grant from the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation. Prior to that, Flint, a city of 155,000 souls and a police department of 310 had no foot patrol at all. The program was experimental in nature and its sole purpose was to implement community-based policing by using foot patrol.

At the beginning, the program comprised 22 foot patrol officers working 14 beats, 15 hours each day (one hour overlap between shifts) and included about 20% of the city's population. Each beat covered a neighbourhood. The type of neighbourhood policing exemplified by the Flint program has the individual officer assigned to a specific neighbourhood. The geographic boundaries and populations will vary, depending upon it being business or residential, highrise or single family dwellings. The residents are involved in deciding boundaries because the police realized that natural geographic boundaries often cut through defacto neighbourhoods.

The 'action' might occur during the day, evening or night. Problems and solutions will differ. It is up to the officer to determine its unique problems, to organize its residents, to be the catalyst to finding solutions, and to link people with problems to the social and government agencies that can help them. The neighbourhood officer becomes a dispute mediator who is encouraged and authorized to find mutual solutions to people's problems, realising the law is but one tool at their disposal and that law enforcement is but one of a variety of tasks to be performed.

The Flint Police Department no longer has Crime Prevention or Community Relations units. It has no "Officer Friendly" or teddy bears with police hats. It had these units prior to 1979 but now the neighbourhood officer provides all police services in their neighbourhood.

Each neighbourhood must provide its officer with an office, telephone and recorder and whatever furniture is necessary. Residents are encouraged to use their neighbourhood office or telephone number for non-emergency calls. Messages can be left on the recorder and the officer's first chore each shift is to answer these messages. Emergency situations are handled in the normal way.

The private funding ran out in 1982 but by then the program had become so successful that the citizens, by plebiscite, passed a tax millage increase not only to continue it but to extend it to cover the entire city. Today, there are 64 beats blanketing the city from boundary to boundary. The cost of this translated into \$60 per family at a time when unemployment in Flint was the highest in the U.S.A. at 25%. Flint is almost totally dependent on the auto industry and things were not good in the auto industry in 1982.

The progress of the program has been monitored and measured closely by Dr. Bob Trojanowicz and his staff at nearby Michigan State University School of Criminal Justice.⁶ A very detailed evaluation of the program has been published. Here are some of the findings:

Between 1979-1982, total dispatched calls for service decreased by a staggering 43%. The researchers found that people often preferred to wait until "their" police officer could respond to their needs, even if it meant waiting a few days. In many cases, they were telephoning the neighbourhood office of their foot patrol officer and leaving a message on the recorder. When the officer did respond the matter was often then settled informally to the satisfaction of all concerned. Officers are encouraged to do this whenever possible.

Crime rates in the 14 beat areas between 1979-1982 decreased 9% while crime in the rest of Flint increased.

Residents in the foot patrol areas felt much safer in their homes and in public than their fellow citizens in the rest of Flint.

Between 1980-1984, foot and mobile officers were asked about how safe they felt while going about their respective tasks. Remember almost all

foot patrol personnel were experienced mobile officers first. 87% of foot officers and only 41% of mobile officers felt very safe. Foot officers felt secure in the belief that most people in their areas would come to their assistance in an emergency while mobile officers believed few would. It seems that there is security in being familiar with one's surroundings.

The quantity and quality of the information flow between foot patrol officers and citizens was much superior than between mobile officers and citizens. In fact, detectives were very quick to realize this fact even before research confirmed it and began pumping foot patrol officers for leads to cases they were working on.

People began to take a much greater interest in their neighbourhood and in crime prevention activities. They reported things to their neighbourhood officers they would never think of 'phoning in to headquarters.

Many of these beats were in the poor areas of Flint, the areas that represent the 'hard' policing. Three-quarters of most cities need little policing, the other quarter a lot. The big task ahead of us in policing is to determine where, when, how and for what purposes we apply our resources instead of just dishing it out geographically.

It has consistently been shown that the only tactic that reduces crime over the long haul is an organized, active and concerned community which acts as the eyes and ears of their police. Citizen involvement in Japan is the best example of this fact where there are an astonishing 660,000 Crime Prevention Liaison Posts, one for every 54 households, all staffed by a rotation of civilians on a full-time basis. An apathetic community and an aloof police department are not effective crime-fighters. They are like two strangers sitting in a bar, they don't know each other, talk to each other and are entirely wrapped up in their individual problems, oblivious to the other's. Perhaps if they introduced themselves and shared their thoughts, they might find they have a common problem and each one has part of the solution. But even if they cannot find the solution between them, at least they have become

friends. It is not healthy to drink in isolation and it is not healthy to police in isolation.

At the moment, the situation that prevails in many communities, especially large cities, is similar to a sporting event. The police are on one side and the criminal on the other. The rest of the people are for the most part disinterested onlookers because the contest is on neutral ground. They do not care who wins. But playing before an enthusiastic partisan home crowd is a terrific advantage in sport. That is what the police must make out of these disinterested onlookers; a partisan home crowd. There are far more crimes and criminals than there are cops. The hired help cannot do it alone; the record shows that the vast majority of the people who are uninvolved at the moment must be animated to become involved in their own community welfare. The Kitty Genovese tragedy was a grim reminder of that fact. This is the primary challenge that faces the police service of this country in the coming years. Getting work done through the energies of others. There is tremendous ingenuity in every neighbourhood but often it has to be dusted off, fired up and guided.

The changes that need to occur at all levels of policing are essentially mental. As factories re-tool to produce new products, police leaders need to re-tool their thinking on what their organizations do and what they ought to be doing. But they do not have to do this thinking in a vacuum. There now is a good body of useful, practical research available to help them. Indeed, this very issue was central to the 'President's Message' in the June, 1985 issue of the Canadian Police Chief when Chief Bob Lunney of the Edmonton Police Department wrote:

"More achievable for most of us is the process of imitation - adopting or applying directly a new way of doing things from someone who has perfected it for their own use. The judicious entrepreneur concentrates on execution rather than on invention."

On occasion we are all guilty of claiming we are too busy to stop what we are doing. It seems to me that machines, hardware and 'things' are busy but our native intelligence and ingenuity lies dormant most of the time. Our modern,

frazzled way of life gets in the way of exploring ourselves for solutions. We look outside ourselves too much and not inside enough. The solutions we need in policing are not to be found in cars and computers but rather in the intelligence of the people who control those things. For too long, our remedy to problems in policing was to add another box to the organisation chart, stick a few people in it and consider the issue solved. Consider our approach to Crime Prevention. Even the most innovative organisations devote no more than 2-3% of their personnel to it while the rest of the department remains unchanged. My hat would come off to the Chiefs who would put a moratorium on technology and concentrate on developing their human resources.

SOCIAL LEADERSHIP

"I refuse to determine what is right by taking a Gallup poll of trends of the time". A true leader "is not a searcher for consensus but a molder of consensus." (Dr. Martin Luther King)

There is a leadership void in much of society today. There are distinct rumblings that our society longs for stability after a generation, perhaps two, of experimenting with freedoms. Radical individual rights with little thought for the overall cost to society are the order of the day. Consider the revelations of the 'Charter' and Young Offenders Act of recent times. People are fast losing faith in a criminal justice system that is shamelessly expensive and inefficient. We still build palatial courthouses even though most cases are dealt away in hallways and offices. The Bar and the Bench would benefit greatly from the same academic scrutiny that has told us so much about policing.

Fact is we have become a society of litigators rather than doers. The Supreme Court of Ontario sits to ponder the length of a person's mustache. The number of lawyers in Alberta doubled between 1975-1983 despite a severe economic regression. There are more lawyers in Washington, D.C. than the entire country of Japan with its 115 million people. If they have a problem in that country, they'll hire a few engineers and fix it. We'll retain a

dozen lawyers to argue its constitutionality. The astronomical increase in insurance rates is directly attributable to this abundance of lawyers and cavalier litigation with 'Joe Public' footing the bill for both the cause and effect of everything.

Institutions that should be providing social leadership are not and are losing the confidence of the people which was indicated in recent research:⁷

People having a great deal of confidence in:

Police	71
Medicine	67
The Military	60
Law Courts	42
Education	39
Civil Service	26
The Press	24
Parliament	19
Trade Unions	18

Sad to say, the media with all of its aberrations is the most influential factor in our society today but it has neither the mandate nor the confidence of people to lead. The police do have the public confidence as expressed above and community-based policing places us in a position to assume that social leadership role. In doing so we must legitimize the community and its problems in our objectives, priorities and solutions.

Consider: never in its history was Canada more prosperous than during the period 1961-1981; never was more money committed to policing; never did we have a higher ratio of police to public or better mobility and technology, and never was the reported crime rate higher.

Consider: even under optimum conditions the impact that the entire criminal justice system can have on crime is infinitesimal. Research referred to above suggests perhaps 25% of all crime is reported. Of that amount, someone is charged in about 20% of the cases. This indicates that only 5% of all crime

comes to any kind of official disposal. After all the wheeling and dealing, only 50% of those charged are convicted of something. It defies logic and common sense (those elusive qualities again) to claim that by actually punishing 2.5% of all criminals we are effectively dealing with the problem. The need for a new way of dealing with crime cries out. Governments have no solutions, otherwise they would have been introduced long ago. If there is a new way of dealing with crime out there somewhere, surely it must include expanding our mental vision in policing beyond trying to control the bad to motivating the good to help us control the bad.

Surely our crime clearance and apprehension rates would not be any worse if we diverted some of our resources from crime-fighting to stimulating a much more genuine involvement by the public. The most effective crime-fighting resource we have are the people we serve. And we do serve! We must learn to harness and direct the public's collective energies. We also know that people want us to do much more than just fight crime. They want to turn to us for leadership and friendship in a society that has become impersonal. They do not want us to 'load-shed' the things that eat away at the social fabric of their neighbourhoods. There still is that magic in a police uniform that makes people want to touch us, to befriend us. We should mobilize this for altruistic reasons.

THE "WHY NOT" MENTALITY

Some things in life cannot be changed, but many can. Sometimes it seems we are captives of our own thoughts; often, we are victims of those thoughts. Many of the limitations we experience in life are illusory, self-inflicted by a lack of faith in ourselves. Because we think we cannot do something, often we don't try. This can impose artificial boundaries on our achievements. Ted Kennedy, when he eulogised his slain brother Robert, described him this way:

"Some people see things only as they are and say, why? Others look ahead and see things as they might be and say, why not?."

In our own country, we have the poignant memories of watching the late Terry Fox and Steve Fonyo hobble across this vast country to help others. Scaled down, we can all apply this "go for it" attitude in our own particular sphere of influence, for we all have control over someone or something, even if it is only ourselves. In so many of the things we do in life, our range of mental vision is our greatest impediment. I keep thinking of the old Royer Miller song: "You can't roller-skate in a buffalo herd but you can be happy if you've a mind to". Community policing requires that we make this mental adjustment from the "Why" mentality to the "Why Not".

CONCLUSION

And so it goes. Policing, like the rest of society, has never stopped changing, reshaping. It's just that for many years we who are in the middle did not notice the subtle shifts that were happening around us and no one else paid much attention to what we were doing either. But all of that has changed now. For whatever reason, the gradual adjustments that should have been taking place did not and the result is we have a lot of catching up to do. From a very practical point of view, the growth of the private security industry should scare the hell out of the police service yet we continue to fuel that growth with our load-shedding. We are simply not as busy all of the time as we claim. There are countless little things we could be doing during that down time which need not detract from the big stuff. It is not a time for finger-pointing. Rather, what is needed is a huddle. The chiefs must share the decision-making and bring to the surface the human talent that exists in all of their organizations and give it the opportunity to flower. But then the rest of us must accept responsibility for part of the solution. It will take the combined efforts of all to turn that ship around. Only then will community-responsive policing move from the pages to the street. Only then will the valuable information that now sits in obscure government reports and academic journals be exposed to the test of reality.

"We are made wise not by the recollections of our past,
but by the responsibility for our future".

(George Bernard Shaw)

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AFTERWORD


Talk is cheap and this paper does a lot of it but I did caution that it would wander. But it's now time to "walk the talk". Here at the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada, my current employer, several projects are completed or are under way to contribute our bit toward the implementation of Community-Based Policing.

In 1983, a User Report was published by the Ministry entitled "**Community-Based Policing: A Review of the Critical Issues**". It was a joint effort between the Ministry and the R.C.M.P. and was authored by Chris Murphy, Senior Research Officer at the Ministry and Cpl. Graham Muir, Research Associate, R.C.M.P. This paper brings together the ideas and philosophy of Community-Based Policing under one cover and is intended as a discussion stimulator on the issues. It is one of the reports that should be dusted off and used. In my opinion, it is an excellent readable document and provides a broad range of research not to be found in this paper. Hopefully, the two will complement each other.

A conference on "**Community Policing in the 1980's**" is being organized which will bring together top international experts as presenters on sub-topics of the issue. The proceeding will be video-taped and the discussions published. We are also planning regional workshops to follow the national conference. By then we will have the video-tape of the national conference to use at these workshops. In this way, we should be able to reach a much larger audience and get closer to the front end of the system so that the ideas are reaching the people who, I am confident, will figure out ways to put them to practice. The ultimate objective is to expose all levels of the police, community, municipal government and police commissions to the information so that there will generate a common pressure to do something about implementing Community-Based Policing in their communities.

It would provide tremendous impetus for the implementation of Community-Based Policing to have a management course at the Canadian Police College devoted solely to the subject of Community-Based Policing. The College has commenced

preliminary work in this direction also. Work has been started on developing a recruit training curriculum built around Community-Based Policing. Ideally, the Police Research Section of the Ministry of the Solicitor General and the police community would work closely on this project. I suggest the best approach would be a team effort of people from research, police and education, who between them, should be able to put together a high quality product for universal use.



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